

ADDENDA and ERRATA 1

to OPS Group Chairman's Factual Report -

DCA06MA009

submitted
October 30, 2006

The Technical Review for accident DCA06MA009 was conducted on October 17, 2006 in the 5th floor Technical Room at NTSB Headquarters in Washington DC. At that meeting it was determined that the following Addenda and Errata be attached to the Operational Factors Group Chairman's factual report.

ADDENDA:

Page 4: Regarding the simulator approach touchdown locations. The touchdown distances described in each of the four approaches are referenced from the displaced threshold of the runway.

Page 6: In fourth paragraph, clarify that statement is attributed to the first officer; ***However, the first officer stated that if the RVR decreased to 4,000 feet or if the runway braking action report was POOR, the maximum tailwind component would be reduced to 5 knots.***

Page 29: Clarify that use of past tense indicates company information at the time of the accident. Insert phrase, ***"At the time of the accident"*** at the beginning of the second sentence.

ERRATA:

Page 4: The sentence mentions two checkairmen. One was a checkairman and the other was a simulator instructor: Change: *During the simulator period, the following observation and comments by company checkairmen were made.* Change to read: ***During the simulator period, the company checkairman and company simulator instructor made the following observations and comments:***

Page 5: History of Flight Paragraph erroneously designated paragraph D. Change this paragraph to paragraph **E** and re-designate all following paragraphs in order.

Page 5 –6: First paragraph in History of Flight erroneously indicates that the captain received his flight paperwork in the operations office. Change first paragraph in History of Flight to read: ***When the captain arrived at BWI, he and the first officer went to the departure gate and arrived there about 20-30 minutes prior to the arrival of the airplane. At the gate they were given the flight paperwork revision #1. The captain said he wasn't sure what changes had been made to revision #1, because he had not seen the original paperwork. Both pilots reviewed the weather package and associated flight paperwork prior to departure from BWI. The captain recalled that the weather conditions at MDW prior to their departure were light snow and low visibility.***

Page 10: Change Total duty time (day of accident): to **6:35**
Delete footnote #18. The captain and first officer both had the same report for duty time.

Page 12: Last paragraph identifies simulator instructor as a checkairman. Change sentence to read: ***A Southwest Airlines simulator instructor said he believed that new-hires had a good understanding of the OPC, and received "just about the right amount of training time.***

Page 13: Second paragraph, change sentence to read: ***He said they decided that a landing would not be attempted if the runway conditions were WET-POOR or if the tailwinds reported were at 10 knots or more.***

Page 17: Paragraphs 5 and 7 attributed to two different checkairmen. The same person made the statements. Move paragraph 7 up and blend with paragraph 5 to read: ***Another SWA checkairman stated that he had not seen any thrust reverser deployment problems on the line. However, he stated that he had seen problems in the simulator during engine failures when the failed engine was on the standby hydraulic system. In his experience, pilots generally did not have a problem with initiating reverse thrust.***

Page 19: Paragraphs one and two attributed to two different checkairmen. The same person made the statements. Blend two paragraphs together to read: ***A SWA checkairman stated that both pilots monitored the “amount” of reverse thrust on landing. However there was no callout. He also stated that he did not instruct the PNF to monitor reverse thrust on landing, because it was not a SWA procedure and it might not be in the Boeing manual. SWA tried to “stay in line” with the manual.***

Page 21: Paragraphs one and two attributed to two different checkairmen. The same person made the statements. Change second paragraph to read: ***He also stated that pilots should use the “worst case” when issued a mixed braking action report. He did not specifically know if it was in the manual, but it was talked about and taught in new-hire ground school. He did not know what specific scenarios were used to teach the application of braking action reports during new-hire training.***

Paragraphs five and six are attributed to two different checkairmen. The same person made the statements. Change sixth paragraph to read: ***He also stated that he did not recall any training regarding a mixed braking report and had never heard a mixed braking report while at SWA. However, he was flying the night of the accident and both he and the captain mutually agreed that the worst braking report received should be entered in the OPC.***