Attachment 5

to Operations Group Factual Report

DCA08MA098

Bombardier Learjet 60/60X Temporary Flight Manual Change

BOMBARDIER
LEARJET

Subject: Learjet 60/60XR Temporary Flight Manual Change

The following summary describes the changes that are incorporated with this temporary flight manual change.

LIMITATIONS

SYSTEM LIMITS

Nose and main tire pressures must be checked within 96 hours (not flight hours) prior to takeoff using the procedures listed in Chapter 12 of the Learjet 60 Maintenance Manual.

Add Note to check tire pressures for aircraft parked more than 10 consecutive days.

Added table with allowable tire pressure range based on maximum certified takeoff weight.

NORMAL PROCEDURES

EXTERIOR PREFLIGHT Added three additional steps to check nosewheel and main tire pressures.

ABNORMAL PROCEDURES

ABORTED TAKEOFF Provides additional information to help crew recognize that FORWARD thrust (not reverse thrust) is being applied because of a malfunction of the thrust reverser system.

INADVERTENT STOW OF THRUST REVERSER AFTER A CREW-COMMANDED DEPLOYMENT Provides additional information to help crew recognize that FORWARD thrust (not reverse thrust) is being applied because of a malfunction of the thrust reverser system.

NOTICE

This Temporary Change is **NOT** approved for the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) at this time (9 March 2009).

TEMPORARY FLIGHT MANUAL CHANGE

Publication Affected: Learjet 60 AFM (FM-123)
Learjet 60XR AFM (FM-133)

Description of Change: Added table to Tires Limitation Section with allowable tire pressure range based on maximum certified takeoff weight. Revises Exterior Preflight procedure by adding an additional check for proper tire pressure inflation.

Revised step 4, added new step, added NOTE and WARNING to ABORTED TAKEOFF procedure.

Revised NOTE to a WARNING to INADVERTENT STOW OF THRUST REVERSER AFTER A CREW-COMMANDED DEPLOYEMENT procedure.

Filing Instructions: This document consists of 9 pages. Insert the individual pages in accordance with the following filing instructions and retain until further notice. Record this temporary change in the "Log of Temporary Flight Manual Changes" at the front of the AFM.

TFM 2009-03 page number	Insert adjacent to FM-123 page number	Insert adjacent to FM-133 page number
page 2 of 9	1-25	1-33
page 3 of 9	2-3	2-3
page 4 of 9	2-4	2-4
page 5 of 9	2-7	2-7
page 6 of 9	3-32	—
page 7 of 9	3-32	—
page 8 of 9	—	3-33
page 9 of 9	—	3-37

FAA APPROVED _____ **DATE** 3/9/09

for MARGARET KLINE, MANAGER
AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION OFFICE
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
WICHITA, KANSAS

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to the TIRES Limitation under SYSTEM LIMITS in the affected manual.

Add the following to the TIRES limitation under SYSTEM LIMITS:

The nose and main tire pressures must be checked within 96 hours (not flight hours) prior to takeoff using the procedures listed in Chapter 12 of the Learjet 60 Maintenance Manual.

NOTE

- Aircraft parked for extended periods (10 or more consecutive days) will have tire pressure checked periodically in accordance with Chapter 12 of the Learjet 60 Maintenance Manual.
- The following table is provided for reference only.

AIRCRAFT WITH THE FOLLOWING MAXIMUM CERTIFIED TAKEOFF WEIGHT	ALLOWABLE TIRE PRESSURE RANGE	
All	Nose Gear	104 - 114 psig (718 - 785 kPa)
22,750 Pounds (10,319 kg) — 23,100 Pounds (10,478 kg)	Main Gear	205 - 215 psig (1413 - 1481 kPa)
23,500 Pounds (10,660 kg)	Main Gear	209 - 219 psig (1441 - 1508 kPa)

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page containing Exterior Preflight, area 2 in the affected manual.

Added additional step within the Exterior Preflight procedure:

2 Nosewheel Tire Pressure — Check (refer to Limitations Section).

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page containing Exterior Preflight, area 5 in the affected manual.

Added additional step within the Exterior Preflight procedure:

5 Right Main Tire Pressure — Check (refer to Limitations Section).

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page containing Exterior Preflight, area 23 in the affected manual.

Added additional step within the Exterior Preflight procedure:

23 Left Main Tire Pressure ---- Check (refer to Limitations Section).

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page containing ABORTED TAKEOFF in the affected manual.

Added NOTE and WARNING , revised step 4 and added new step to Aborted Takeoff procedure:

Thrust Reversers — Deploy, if necessary. Check for TR DEPLOY lights illuminated.

If none of the TR lights are illuminated, both Thrust Reverser Levers — Stow.

NOTE

The normal sequence of each engine's annunciators are as follows:

- Green TR ARM — Thrust Reverser ready to deploy.
- Green TR ARM and Amber TR UNLOCK — Thrust Reverser in transit.
- Green TR ARM and White TR DEPLOY — Thrust Reverser fully deployed (reverse thrust greater than idle is possible when both engine's thrust reversers have been fully deployed).

WARNING

- A damaged squat switch (or other failures) may cause the thrust reverser auto stow system to activate (both engine's clamshell doors will stow), resulting in **FORWARD** thrust, ranging from idle to near takeoff power, depending on thrust reverser **LEVER** position. If this occurs, thrust reversers **LEVERS** must be stowed immediately.
- Squat switch failure with the thrust reversers deployed will be indicated by the white TR DEPLOY lights extinguishing and the amber TR UNLOCK lights illuminating for several seconds, then extinguishing. The green TR ARM lights will flash during the transition, then extinguish. **In summary, the absence of any TR lights indicates forward thrust**. There may also be a change in acceleration as the engines transition from reverse thrust to forward thrust.

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page containing INADVERTENT STOW OF THRUST REVERSER AFTER A CREW-COMMANDED DEPLOYMENT in the affected manual.

Changed the NOTE to a WARNING in INADVERTENT STOW OF THRUST REVERSER AFTER A CREW-COMMANDED DEPLOYMENT procedure:

WARNING

- A damaged squat switch (or other failures) may cause the thrust reverser auto stow system to activate (both engine's clamshell doors will stow), resulting in **FORWARD** thrust, ranging from idle to near takeoff power, depending on thrust reverser **LEVER** position. If this occurs, thrust reversers **LEVERS** must be stowed immediately.
- Squat switch failure with the thrust reversers deployed will be indicated by the white TR DEPLOY lights extinguishing and the amber TR UNLOCK lights illuminating for several seconds, then extinguishing. The green TR ARM lights will flash during the transition, then extinguish. **In summary, the absence of any TR lights indicates forward thrust**. There may also be a change in acceleration as the engines transition from reverse thrust to forward thrust.

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page containing ABORTED TAKEOFF in the affected manual.

Added NOTE and WARNING , revised step 4 and added new step to Aborted Takeoff procedure:

Thrust Reversers — Deploy if necessary. Check for DEP indications on the EIS page.

If none of the TR lights are illuminated, both Thrust Reverser Levers — Stow.

The normal sequence of each engine's annunciators are as follows:

- Green REV — Thrust Reverser ready to deploy.
- Amber UNL — Thrust Reverser in transit.
- White DEP — Thrust Reverser fully deployed (reverse thrust greater than idle is possible when both engine's thrust reversers have been fully deployed).

- A damaged squat switch (or other failures) may cause the thrust reverser auto stow system to activate (both engine's clamshell doors will stow), resulting in **FORWARD** thrust, ranging from idle to near takeoff power, depending on thrust reverser **LEVER** position. If this occurs, thrust reversers **LEVERS** must be stowed immediately.
- Squat switch failure with the thrust reversers deployed will be indicated by the white DEP extinguishing and the red UNL annunciation illuminating on the EIS for several seconds, then extinguishing. An amber REV annunciation may flash momentarily. **In summary, the absence of any thrust reverser annunciations indicates forward thrust**. There may also be a change in acceleration as the engines transition from reverse thrust to forward thrust.

Filing Instructions: Insert this page adjacent to page containing INADVERTENT STOW OF THRUST REVERSER AFTER A CREW-COMMANDED DEPLOYMENT in the affected manual.

Changed the NOTE to a WARNING to Inadvertent Stow of Thrust Reverser After a Crew-Commanded Deployment procedure:

- A damaged squat switch (or other failures) may cause the thrust reverser auto stow system to activate (both engine's clamshell doors will stow), resulting in **FORWARD** thrust, ranging from idle to near takeoff power, depending on thrust reverser **LEVER** position. If this occurs, thrust reversers **LEVERS** must be stowed immediately.
- Squat switch failure with the thrust reversers deployed will be indicated by the white DEP extinguishing and the red UNL annunciation illuminating on the EIS for several seconds, then extinguishing. An amber REV annunciation may flash momentarily. **In summary, the absence of any thrust reverser annunciations indicates forward thrust**. There may also be a change in acceleration as the engines transition from reverse thrust to forward thrust.