

Operations Group Chairman Factual Report

Attachment 2 - Record of Statements

ANC10MA068



RECORD OF STATEMENT

Thomas M. Little
Air Safety Investigator
Western Pacific Region

Date:	March 10, 2011
Person Contacted:	Bill Behnke, GCI Sr. Vice President
Subject:	Windshield cleaner and airplane headsets
NTSB Accident Number:	ANC10MA068

On March 10, 2011, Mr. Behnke, GCI Sr. Vice President who oversees GCI flight operations, responded to a request from the Operations Group Chairman concerning whether or not the pilot, Terry Smith, had ordered any type of a rain repellent product, such as Rain-X, etc. Mr. Behnke was also asked to provide information relative to the type of headsets the airplane was equipped with and whether they had volume controls. Mr. Behnke's response to my requests was as follows:

I did some additional follow-up regarding window cleaning products -

1. THREE products were available in the fuel shack – Plexus Plastic Cleaner, RainX and Prist Acrylic, Plastic and Glass Cleaner for Aircraft.
2. Of the three, we had more Prist on hand (half case). The fuel shack supported both aircraft and boats.
3. According to Aircraft Spruce's website, RainX is NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PLEXIGLASS OR ACRYLIC PRODUCTS SUCH AS WINDSHIELDS OR WINDOWS ON SMALL GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT.
4. Neither Hon, Priscilla nor Dave Roseman remembers Terry mentioning the need for any window cleaner.
5. Hon didn't instruct pilots on how to clean the windshield. From his experience, most pilots at the lodge used soap and water to clean the windscreen.
6. We don't know what Terry used to clean the Otter windshield.....I am relatively certain that Terry would have told Hon if he wanted to order something special to clean the Otter windshield.

As for headsets, we replaced all the headsets in the Otter in 2010 with Bose aviation headsets.....yes, the Bose headsets do have a volume control.

STATEMENT

I am a technician employed by GCI and am stationed in Dillingham. I was at home when I received word that the GCI's Otter was overdue and potentially missing. I heard about this from another GCI technician, Rod Williams.

In response, I called Tom Tucker, a local helicopter pilot. I do not recall the time of this call. Mr. Tucker is the owner of an R-44. Mr. Tucker said let's go and take a look. I went to the location of Mr. Tucker's helicopter, and we took off to assist in the search for the aircraft. We were about 5-8 miles from the accident site when we received notification that the aircraft had been found. We heard there was at least one survivor, and received a request for a helicopter to assist with responding to the accident. Mr. Tucker found a place to land above the accident site and dropped me off, and then went to pick up Dr. Bowman at Aleknagik.

After I was dropped off, I started down the mountain toward the aircraft. I estimate it took 20-30 minutes to reach the aircraft. When I arrived at the accident site, I found that access to the aircraft was difficult and talked to the survivors from outside the aircraft. I estimate I was at the accident site for about five minutes. At that time, Mr. Tucker's helicopter came back, and I went back up to the helicopter to assist Dr. Bowman. We unloaded Dr. Bowman and her gear from the helicopter and started back down the mountain.

Tom Tucker started down the mountain with Dr. Bowman and me, but after a short time, it was decided that Mr. Tucker should go back and get more help. I had arrived back at the aircraft with Dr. Bowman when Mr. Tucker came back with two EMTs, John and Susan Dunson. Also around the time Dr. Bowman asked me to contact Norman Hayano to see if help was coming, and I may already have been going back up the hill to get cell reception when Mr. Tucker arrived. Mr. Tucker was required to land at a different location, due to visibility going up and down the mountain, and I assisted guiding the two EMTs through a large patch of alders or willows, to the accident site. When they arrived at the accident site, I assisted Mr. Tucker in building a shelter for the passenger who was sitting in the front passenger seat, who was exposed to the weather.

At some later time, I received a call from Norman Hayano, the airport manager, who said that he had two EMT's on the mountain. I had previously seen Sam Egli's Ranger helicopter land further up the mountain, but the EMTs went in the wrong direction, up the hill. I went back up the mountain with Mr. Tucker to look for the two EMTs. We found them back on the ridgeline, near Mr. Tucker's helicopter, around 11:30 p.m. We considered it unsafe to try to find their way to the site due to darkness. Tom, the EMTs, and I flew back to Dillingham and arrived at around midnight.

10/20/10

Date



Robert Himschoot

NTSB STATEMENT

I have been employed by GCI at the Agulowak Retreat since 1996 in various capacities including Chef, Roustabout, Guide, and Manager. I have held the position of manager since 2005. Since GCI's purchase of Wood River Lodge and its airplanes, the Retreat has been assigned the DeHavilland Otter N455A by GCI's Aviation Department. The Otter pilot is under the direct supervision of GCI's Chief Pilot Hon Kinzie. The pilot normally resides at the Retreat and generally has no other duties other than flying and loading the airplane. In addition to the pilot and myself, the Retreat normally carries a staff of 10. At the time of the accident, in addition to the pilot and myself we had 12 staff present in anticipation of a large group scheduled to arrive the following week.

Part of my responsibility as manager is to coordinate transportation for our guests and supplies between the Retreat and Dillingham with GCI's Otter pilot. Guests arrive into Dillingham either on a commercial carrier, a chartered aircraft, or on GCI's own corporate jet. Arrangements for guest transportation between Anchorage and Dillingham are made by the Agulowak Retreat Scheduler, who is based in Anchorage. If the Otter is not available to transport guests and supplies, I will arrange for a chartered flight normally using Freshwater Adventures. If the weather does not allow for flying, we have the option to travel by boat from the Retreat to Aleknagik then by van to Dillingham.

Normally, I will write out an itinerary of the day's flights to include times, destinations, passenger names, or a list of cargo that needs to be hauled. Each morning, the pilot and I will review the itinerary and discuss its feasibility given the day's weather conditions, time available, weight restrictions, and fuel needs. It is entirely the pilot's decision whether or not to fly given the different variables. It is sometimes the case that certain GCI senior executives will also coordinate directly with the pilot regarding transportation.

The Retreat began the season with a pilot named Jim Miller who left on July 5th for personal reasons. Between July 5th and July 23rd, the Retreat chartered flights using Freshwater Adventures. On July 23rd Charlie Pike, who flies Freshwater Adventures' Otter, arrived and flew GCI's Otter until July 26th.

On July 26th Virgil Peachey and Terry Smith arrived. Virgil has previously been employed as GCI's Otter pilot and accompanied Terry Smith to help familiarize Terry with the airplane and the Retreat's aviation operations. On July 29th Terry departed due to a family emergency. Virgil stayed and flew the Otter until July 31st when Charlie Pike returned.

Charlie flew the GCI's Otter until August 2nd when he departed to begin a previously scheduled vacation. On August 3rd Hon Kinzie, GCI's chief Pilot arrived. On August 4th Terry Smith returned and Hon Kinzie departed. From that date until the date of the accident, Terry Smith piloted the Otter.

On the morning of the accident, Terry flew Virgil Peachey, who was there as a

guest along with his wife Dana Tindall, into Dillingham to catch a commercial flight back to Anchorage. At that point, no plans had been made for a fishing trip. On prior days, members of this group had fished at HRM Sports Camp on the Nushagak River. On the morning of the accident, I assumed that the group would go back to HRM for further fishing, weather permitting. At lunch, Terry along with a number of guests decided the weather was good enough to make the trip to HRM. I had already left the dining facility and was not present when the decision was made. When I was told that the decision to go had been made, I sent an email to Cindy at HRM saying that we had a group hoping to go fishing with them that would arrive between 2:30 and 3:00pm. I received a reply from Cindy saying they were on the phone with Terry Smith as she wrote and that they would be ready for our guests. A review of the emails shows I emailed Cindy at HRM at 1:51pm, and she responded at 2:09pm acknowledging the trip. I estimate that around 2:30pm, I was walking near the dock between other tasks and noticed Taylor Vance on the dock preparing to assist the Otter's departure. All of the guests had already loaded the airplane and as I approached, Terry was starting the airplane's engine. I helped Taylor untie and push the airplane off the dock.

While I did not observe Terry check the weather on the day of the accident, Terry regularly checked the weather via computer. I do not know what Web sites he consulted, and do not have a specific recollection of what Terry did on that day.

At the time the Otter took off, I could see all of Jackknife Mountain across the lake, which is about 2,100 feet high. It was mostly cloudy, but there were some blue patches in the sky. I could also see all the way to the end of the lake, so at least three miles. It was somewhat windy.

It was not a regular practice for HRM to call when the aircraft arrived, or for HRM to call when the aircraft had departed to return to the Retreat. HRM's phone had worked only sporadically all season and in my mind, there was nothing unusual that afternoon that caused me any concern.

At around 6:00pm I received a call from Chaz Baki, the Retreat's Chef, asking if I knew if the guests would be on time for dinner (dinner is normally served at 7:00pm but often a group hosted by senior executives would adjust meal times). Greg Chapados, a GCI executive who had not accompanied the group on the fishing trip that day, also asked if I had heard from the group. I told Greg that I had not, and gave HRM a call at about 6:11pm. I believe I talked to John at HRM who told me that the plane had never arrived. I informed Greg Chapados and Ron Duncan that the flight had not arrived. I then called Flight Service in Dillingham to ask if they had seen the Otter. This call was at 6:22pm, according to phone records. They said no, and indicated that they had last seen it that morning, which was consistent with the morning trip Terry had taken. While I was on the phone with Flight Service, the controller radioed other aircraft in the area to see if they had seen the Otter, and at least one pilot responded that he had not. I told the Flight Service controller that I was concerned, but wanted to make one more phone

call before starting search and rescue. I then called HRM a second time to confirm not only that the passengers had not arrived to fish, but they had not even seen the Otter. I thought that they might have decided to go flight-seeing, perhaps to Katmai or elsewhere, but a change of plans like that without notifying someone would have been unusual. In any case, HRM confirmed that they had not seen the plane at all. I then called Dillingham Flight Service back at 6:38pm and asked them to commence a search and rescue operation.

After initiating a search and rescue with Flight Service, I called Johnny Evans, a State Park Ranger, and asked him if he could join the search in his airplane. I also heard from Bob Himschoot, a GCI employee in Dillingham, who was at Tucker Aviation. Bob let me know that he and Tom Tucker were ready to join the search in Tom's helicopter. I told Bob that I would call Hon Kinsey and have him get ahold of Tom Tucker if he thought the helicopter was needed. I also received a call from Rod Williams (another GCI employee based in Dillingham) who was at Egli Air in King Salmon. Rod said the ceiling was dropping in King Salmon and said if we needed Egli's helicopter to join the search, it would need to leave soon. I likewise told Rod that I would call Hon and ask if he wanted them to join the search. In the meantime, Ron Duncan along with his wife Dani Bowman departed from the Retreat in Ron's own airplane to join the search.

Other than some mechanical work performed in late June, I am not aware of any prior problems with the Otter, or any complaints about the Otter expressed by Terry or any of the other pilots. I understand that Terry Smith had a lot of prior experience in the Dillingham area. He had flown his own Albatross around Wood Tikchik State Park for GCI a number of times during my tenure at the Retreat and he related to me that he had flown for Tikchik Narrows Lodge in the past. I believe he would have been familiar with the routes to the fish camp. Terry seemed to be in very good spirits on that day, telling a lot of stories at lunch. I noticed nothing unusual about Terry that day.



David Roseman

10/18/2010

Date

Statement of Dr. Dani Bowman for NTSB

On the day of the accident, I was at the Agulowak lodge. I recall having lunch with Bill and Willy Phillips, Senator Stevens, Jim Morhard, Dana and Cory Tindall, and Terry Smith. The group decided to go salmon fishing for the afternoon during lunch. I do recall a discussion about the weather at the next table, where Sean, Kevin, Sen. Stevens, and Terry Smith were sitting, prior to the Otter leaving. I recall that the weather was checked, including looking at the radar on the internet. The weather looked improved from the morning. I recall the ceilings were not excessively low, but there was intermittent rain. I do not recall the exact time the Otter departed for fishing. I estimated at my interview that the Otter departed around 3:00 pm and that my husband, Ron Duncan, and I took off in his aircraft on a "look for sunshine" flight after the Otter departed.

The flight that Ron and I took in Ron's aircraft lasted about an hour. I recall there being plenty of visibility for the flight. We in fact flew in the general area of the crash site, without knowing it, and there was good visibility in the area. We did encounter some low clouds when we flew north of the lodge, and decided to return to the lodge. After returning to the lodge we re-packed gear on the aircraft and worked on other tasks.

Later that afternoon, I recall Greg Chapados stating that "I think we have a problem" as the Otter had never arrived at the HRM camp on the Nushagak River. I am not sure who would have called the camp, but the call was likely made to determine when the group would be returning for dinner. I went to get my medical kit and grabbed fleece and sleeping bags for a search flight. We also had blankets, a satellite phone and a hand-held radio. Ron checked the weather, and then Ron and I left in his Lake Renegade to search for the Otter. I do not recall how long we had been back at the lodge, or when this flight took off.

The route to the fish camp was in the GPS in the Renegade, and we followed that route. The flight would have initially taken us north and east, and then to the south. We talked to another pilot who had said he had flown much of the route, and he suggested we fly to the south of the route. Less than ten minutes later, the other pilot said "I got him," meaning he had located the Otter. He gave us the coordinates and we put them into the GPS, and flew to that area, where we circled around the area and spotted the aircraft. The aircraft was pointed up the hill, and Willy Phillips was outside waving his arms. Ron and I agreed that because there were survivors, I needed to get to the crash site.


Ron found Tom Tucker by radio, and we made arrangements for Tom to pick me up at Lake Aleknagik in his helicopter. Tom then flew me to the site and we landed on the mountain above the site, about 1000 feet above the crash site.

There was a GCI employee, Bob Himschoot, already at the landing site, and he helped carry equipment down the hill. We found it quite a difficult climb down to the Otter because of the steep slope. The 8-10 foot high canopy of Alder made it impossible to see anything other than the Alder brush, the mud and the rock scattered on the slope. We did lose our way once, taking a wrong turn across a rockslide; I think it took us about 30-40 minutes to reach the crash site. Soon thereafter, the fog began descending from the top of the mountain and within a few hours completely obscured the site both on the ground and from the air.

When I arrived at the wreckage, it could only be approached from the left side. The plane was oriented almost perpendicularly to the slope of the hill. Willy was back inside the plane. I entered the plane via what remained of the back right double door and assessed the passengers. I determined that there were four survivors. I assessed Jim as the most seriously injured of the survivors; Sean O'Keefe had significant left lower extremity fractures; Kevin was not very verbal, but was hemodynamically stable with several fractures. Willy had a broken ankle and a facial fracture. All were conscious. I talked to Willy about the accident some time during the night. He said he was asleep on impact and did not recall the accident. I did not ask the others how the accident occurred or what they remembered.

I was later joined by volunteer first responders, an RN and an EMT from Dillingham. Another EMT, Josh Flint, also arrived at the site. I do not believe that Bob Himschoot stayed the night at the site. I do not recall seeing Tom Tucker at the Otter. I recall hearing of a couple of other EMTs trying to locate the site but subsequently getting lost, and later I heard a helicopter leaving the top of the hill. The EMTs who came to the site had blankets, bandages, some trauma supplies, but no medications. I had some pain medication in my medical bag, which I dispensed to several of the survivors. I did have a satellite phone and did talk to Dave Roseman at the lodge. I also called the Dillingham police and hospital to let them know that supplies and medications were needed at the site. However, a decision was made in Dillingham by the search and rescue team there that the weather at the crash site prevented any attempt at rescue or delivery of supplies during the night.

Two pararescuemen, who I believe were from the Air National Guard, arrived around seven in the morning, and were able to help us extract the survivors and evacuate them to Dillingham. EMT Josh Flint and I were the last to leave the site along with some Guard personnel; we were flown to Dillingham via their Jay Hawk helicopter.

A handwritten signature in black ink is written above a solid black rectangular redaction bar. The signature appears to be 'J. Flint'.

Statement of Dr. Dani Bowman for NTSB

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August 14, 2010

Michael Richards
NTSB

I am based at Tikchik Narrows Lodge and I am the Owner and Chief Pilot for Tikchik Narrows Lodge. I have been flying in this area every summer for the past 33 years.

On Monday August 9, 2010, I departed on a VFR flight from Tikchik Narrows Lodge (AK56) with 2 passengers in N35851, a Cessna 206 on floats, at 12.45 PM to Shannon's Pond in Dillingham Alaska. I arrive at 1:30 PM. My route of flight was the East side of Agenuk Mountain, direct to Aleknagik then on to Shannon's pond. I went over the East end of Lake Nerka and over the ridge between Marsh Mountain and Table Mountain just North of Aleknagik. Pilots refer to this as the Aleknagik hump. You need a 500' MSL ceiling to get over the hump comfortable. I remember the ceiling was a non issue for going over the hump.

The weather at East Lower Nerka Lake and the hump was 600 ceiling and visibility greater than 5 miles, 10 to 15 mile an hour wind out of the Southwest. The Dillingham ATIS was reporting 600' Scattered to Broken and 3 miles visibility and winds out of the South Southwest.

About 2:15 I departed Shannon's pond VFR and flew back to Tikchik Narrows Lodge. The weather was the same or even a bit better on my return trip. I arrived at Tikchik about 2:50 PM. I had a head wind going down to Shannon's and a tail wind returning so my flight time was less on the return trip.

Please let me know if you any further questions.

Regards


Frederick (Bud) Hodson

Summer (June/September)
P.O. Box 690, Dillingham AK 99576

Winter (October/May)
P.O. Box 807, Port Townsend, WA 98368

Gregory F. Chapados
Senior Vice President (hired June 2006)
General Communication, Inc.

As requested by Thomas Little of the National Transportation Safety Board (the "NTSB"), I am providing the following written statement. In response to a series of questions relating to Senator Stevens' trip to the Agulowak retreat (the "Wak") and the Otter accident, I provided the following information to the NTSB interviewers on August 14, 2010:

SENATOR STEVENS' VISIT TO THE WAK

Ron Duncan, Dana Tindall, and I were scheduled to host the Senator and his party from August 7th through August 11th of 2010. The thirteen trip members included:

Ron Duncan (GCI President and Chief Executive Officer)	Senator Ted Stevens
Dr. Dani Bowman (Ron's wife)	Bill Phillips (Partner, Utrecht & Phillips)
Dana Tindall (GCI Senior Vice President)	Willy Phillips (Bill's son)
Virgil Peachey (Dana's husband)	Sean O'Keefe (Chief Executive Officer of EADS North America)
Corey Tindall (Dana's daughter)	Kevin O'Keefe (Sean's son)
Greg Chapados (GCI Senior Vice President and former Chief of Staff to Senator Stevens)	Jim May (President of the Air Transport Association)
	Jim Morhard (President of Morhard & Associates)

PRE-ACCIDENT EVENTS

Saturday, August 7, 2010. That morning, seven individuals – Bill Phillips, Willy Phillips, Sean O'Keefe, Kevin O'Keefe, Jim Morhard, Jim May, and I (collectively "Group One") – flew from Anchorage to Dillingham on a chartered Cessna Conquest.

After landing at approximately 11:00 a.m., Group One was met by Terry Smith, who flew Group One from Dillingham to the Wak in the Otter. Group One had lunch at the Wak, secured fishing gear and licenses, and then was flown by Terry on the Otter to the HRM Sports fishing camp on the Nushagak River. After fishing for several hours, Group One was flown back by Terry on the Otter to the Wak, arriving after 5:00 p.m.

I had flown in the Otter many times and typically would try to sit in one of the back two seats in the cabin, which I did again on these three flights. I visit the Wak two to three times each summer and usually fly to the Nushagak on the Otter several times to fish for king or silver salmon. Generally, I don't pay much attention to the route of the flight from the Wak to the Nushagak, and I often nap during the flight.

That afternoon, while Group One was fishing, Dana Tindall, Virgil Peachey, and Corey Tindall (together with Senator Stevens, "Group Two") departed Anchorage on the same chartered Cessna Conquest. The Conquest made a stop in Kenai to pick up Senator Stevens and then flew on to Dillingham. Group Two was met by Terry, who flew Group Two from Dillingham to the Wak in the Otter before picking up Group One at the Nushagak.

Ron Duncan and Dr. Bowman flew to the Wak separately in their Lake Renegade airplane arriving after Group One had returned to the Wak from the Nushagak. Everyone gathered for dinner at the Wak dining hall and spent the remainder of the evening visiting.

Sunday, August 8, 2010. The next day, Dana and I organized a fishing trip to the Nushagak. The fishing group included nine individuals: Senator Stevens, Dana, Virgil, Corey, Bill, Willy, Sean, Kevin, and Jim Morhard. Ron, Dani, Jim May (who was content to fly fish on the Agulowak River), and I stayed back at the Wak.

Terry piloted the Otter throughout the day. The Otter left mid-morning to take the fishing group to the Nushagak. In the afternoon, the Otter picked up the group. The Otter then went to Dillingham to drop off Virgil who was scheduled to travel back to Anchorage on a commercial flight. The commercial flight was delayed, and Virgil elected to fly back with the group to the Wak.

Again, everyone gathered for dinner at the Wak dining hall and spent the remainder of the evening visiting.

Monday, August 9, 2010 – Morning to Mid-Afternoon. That morning, Terry flew Virgil from the Wak to Dillingham. I missed breakfast, which started at 8:00 a.m. After breakfast, I spoke with Dana (Dana, Corey, and I were staying in the same cabin), who had spoken with Terry about the flying conditions. Terry had advised Dana that the ceilings were low and the flight back from Dillingham was turbulent. Terry and Dana therefore had decided not to pursue a trip to the Nushagak that morning. I did not speak to Terry that morning.

That afternoon, at the tail end of a leisurely lunch, which started at 1:00 p.m., I spoke to Terry about the flying conditions since the weather at the Wak had improved since the morning. Terry stated that the weather had lifted and that he was comfortable with flying since he would not need to fly low and possibly expose the passengers to a turbulent flight. The plan was for Terry to wait at HRM until the fishing was over and fly the fishing group back to the Wak.

GCI's standard practice is of course to defer to the pilot in command on flying conditions and all other safety matters. As a non-pilot, I am particularly deferential to the pilot's judgment. Because everyone on the trip who had wanted to catch silver salmon on the Nushagak had already done so, there was no concern that a guest was "missing out" on fishing.

To my knowledge, I was the only person at the Wak who discussed a trip to the Nushagak with Terry that afternoon. Terry was calm, soft-spoken, and chose his words carefully. Although I did not know Terry well, I had previously flown with him and his wife in their Albatross at the Wak. He appeared entirely normal and at ease.

After talking to Terry, I got up from his table and canvassed the folks at the other tables to determine who wanted to fly to the Nushagak. Senator Stevens, Bill and Willy, Sean and Kevin, Dana and Corey, and Jim Morhard said they wanted to go. I had originally planned to go to the Nushagak as well, but my personal preference as a host is not to have more than four guests in a single riverboat. Since only two boats were available at HRM and eight guests wanted to go, I decided to get caught up on some email prior to dinner rather than join the fishing group. Again, Ron, Dani, Jim May, and I stayed back at the Wak.

The fishing group left the dining hall to get ready for the flight. I helped them get organized and accompanied them to the dock, where I helped distribute the life preservers that all passengers were required to wear when flying on the Otter. I noted that Kevin was sitting in the co-pilot's seat but otherwise did not note which passengers were sitting where. As far as the weather was concerned, I could see down the Agulowak River to the bend, and in the other direction, I could see across River Bay. The cloud layer was clipping approximately the top 25% of the mountain peaks across River Bay from the Wak.

I stayed on the dock until the Otter was buttoned up. I was walking back to my cabin when the Otter took off. I don't know the exact time of departure except that it was after 2:00 p.m.

POST-ACCIDENT EVENTS

Monday, August 9, 2010 – Late Afternoon/Evening Onward. At the cabin, I read email, napped, and worked on a large email that I wound up not completing. Later in the afternoon, I walked over to the Bergt Cabin (the cabin where Wak guests typically congregate in the evening before and after dinner) to make sure that it was ready for the return of the fishing group. I then walked to the other end of the Wak to the dining hall.

At the dining hall, I spoke with Chaz Baki, the Wak's chef, who asked me when the Nushagak group was expected back since he had dinner scheduled for 7:00 p.m. While he was asking the question, I noted that the time on the dining hall clock was approximately 6:13 p.m. I suggested to Chaz that he ask Dave Roseman, the manager of the Wak, to call HRM to find out the status of the group. I then returned to the Bergt Cabin.

At the Bergt Cabin, I called Bill Behnke, another GCI senior vice president, on an unrelated matter. A few minutes into my call at approximately 6:20 p.m., I noticed through a window Dave Roseman and Mary Nicholas (another Wak staff member) hurrying to the Bergt Cabin. As they entered, I excused myself from the call with Bill. At that point, Dave said: "Greg, we may have a problem." He then went on to explain that he had just spoken with an HRM employee, who said that the Otter had not arrived at HRM's location on the Nushagak.

At that point, Dave began calling other places, including Dillingham Flight Operations, to determine whether the Otter had diverted to another location. I went outside to alert Ron, who was working on his Lake Renegade airplane, to the situation. I went back inside the Bergt Cabin, where Dave was finishing his calls to no avail. After Dave made one more call to HRM to confirm the initial report, he and I went outside to consult Ron. We decided to request Dillingham Flight Operations to initiate a search, and Ron and Dani decided to take the Lake out to retrace the probable route of the Otter.

While Dave, Mary, and the Wak staff helped Ron and Dani prepare to launch by gathering up blankets and other supplies and turning the Lake around, I discussed the situation with Bill Behnke by telephone. My recollection is that the Lake launched at or before 7:00 p.m.

After the departure of the Lake – I don't recall exactly when – Dave Roseman received word that the Otter had been spotted on the side of a mountain and that there appeared to be at least one survivor. At that point, we accelerated the mobilization of GCI company resources, setting up a company-wide teleconference bridge for communications and coordination. Jim May and I took on the task of reaching out to several of the affected families. I was the primary contact for the Stevens, Phillips, and O'Keefe families. Jim May was the primary contact for Jim Morhard's family. We communicated throughout the night with the families and their friends.

This is the end of my statement.



Gregory F. Chapados
10/19/10

HON KINZIE STATEMENT FOR NTSB

I have worked at GCI, a Part 91 Operation, since February 2002. I was hired as a line pilot, and became GCI's Astra SPX Program Manager around 2005. After the summer of 2006, as GCI's Senior Corporate Pilot, I became primarily responsible for hiring and supervising the Otter pilots. The pilots who flew the Otter reported to me. The Otter flies from about June 1 to October 15 each year. The Otter is not flown in the winter, but is usually kept in Anchorage. Generally, necessary maintenance, such as an annual inspection, would take place in Anchorage during the off season, and 100 hour or other maintenance would take place there too.

The Otter would normally be stationed at the Agulawak Lodge during the summer, but it would come into Anchorage if maintenance was needed. The primary Otter pilot would start in May to assure that the aircraft was properly outfitted. There was fuel for the Otter at the lodge, i.e., a 2000 gallon above ground tank, but the Otter was fueled in Dillingham when possible due to the difficulty in bringing fuel out to the lodge.

Part of my job was to support the operation of the Otter. During the summer, I would talk to the Otter pilot every day or two. I would also travel out to the lodge frequently, 15-20 times a summer. GCI would hire one main pilot for the Otter, and would have 2-3 relief pilots to use as needed to assure that the primary pilot had adequate rest or to otherwise fill in. The main Otter pilot for 2009 and 2010 was Jim Miller. He left in early July for personal reasons, and I arranged to have coverage for the remainder of the season by Charlie Pike, Virgil Peachey, Terry Smith and myself. If we did not have a pilot available for the Otter, we would hire Fresh Water Adventures to provide service for the lodge.

Pilots at the lodge would generally fly a zero to three hour/day depending on the presence of guests and weather. The Otter was used to fly in guests and staff from the Dillingham airport, to fly in supplies for the lodge, and to fly guests out from the lodge for fishing trips. The HRM fish camp was a frequent destination. When weather is poor, the lodge has a boat that can bring in people and supplies, and there is therefore no need to fly in marginal weather.


I have known Terry Smith, the pilot on the accident flight, since the 1990s. Terry frequently gave seminars on seaplane operations and safety. Terry had excellent flying skills and knowledge of aviation subjects. I understood he had substantial experience flying in the Dillingham area, and that he had previously worked for the Tikchik Narrow Lodge, among others in the area. When I flew with him, he demonstrated a very good familiarity with the area and was very familiar with landmarks. Although Terry did not have extensive hours in the

Otter, he had very substantial previous experience flying Garrett Turbine Engines and the DeHavilland Beaver, an aircraft similar to the Otter. He also owned and flew a Grumman Albatross, another amphibious aircraft, as well as a Cessna 185 equipped with floats. I believe he did have previous Otter time flying a Garrett powered Otter for Paul Claus of the Ultima Thule Lodge.

GCI had been discussing with Mr. Smith regarding flying as a relief pilot for them for several years, and Terry had set aside time in early August to fly for the lodge, maybe to fly the Albatross, early in July. Thus, he was available when GCI needed a relief pilot. While Mr. Smith had previously flown for GCI in his Albatross, this was the first time that he flew the Otter for GCI. Mr. Smith requested an opportunity to see the operations once again (he had seen it as a guest) prior to working as a relief pilot. Accordingly, in order to provide Mr. Smith familiarity with the lodge and the Otter, arrangements were made for him to fly with Virgil Peachey. He flew with Mr. Peachey on July 26 and 28. There was no flight on the 27th due to weather. Mr. Peachey had been the Otter pilot for GCI, prior to taking a job with Rust's flying service. In addition, I met and flew with Mr. Smith on August 4 to review his flying skills in the Otter and to discuss GCI's safety philosophy with him. The flight included landings and steep turns, and I was impressed by Mr. Smith's ability to handle the Otter, and his sharp skills operating on water and on land. I also made sure that he met the FAA staff at the Dillingham airport and obtained an airport badge.

Charlie Pike flew the Otter July 23 through August 2, except for the days that Mr. Peachey and Mr. Smith flew together. I flew the Otter on August 3, and flew with Mr. Smith on August 4. Mr. Smith began working as a relief pilot on August 5. Mr. Smith was scheduled to fly until August 11. I talked to Mr. Smith at least twice after leaving the lodge, and he said that everything was going excellent and he was doing fine. Mr. Smith would have been familiar with the route from the lodge to the HRM fish camp, having flown it with Mr. Peachey, and having flown it several times the days before the accident.

GCI pays its pilots the same regardless of whether they fly. There is no incentive to fly regardless of conditions. I tell all the pilots that they do not need to fly if they feel uncomfortable flying on any given day. They do not need to give a reason for not flying. GCI did not second guess its pilots' decisions not to fly, but would support them. In addition, I let all the pilots know they can call me any time for support. I discussed the policy that no pilot is required to fly any flight if they do not want to fly, for weather or other reasons, with Mr. Smith, and he was in agreement with that philosophy.

 10-20-2010

GCI OTTER CRASH RESCUE STATEMENT

By Joshua Flint

11 August 2010

Close to initial drop

N59° 19' 57.0"

W158° 22' 33.9"

9 Aug 10 21:57 hrs

(Josh departing N13AT on initial hike out)

N59° 19' 53"

W158° 22' 24.2"

9 Aug 22:14.46 hrs

Dropped gear location while looking for aircraft above R44

N59° 19' 46.6"

W158° 22' 43.6"

9 Aug 23:09.10 hrs

Location of reposition with helo. (LZ 100 yards above crash site.)

Actual location of wreck

N59° 19' 45.4"

W158° 22' 48.6"

10 Aug 0140 hrs

About 2030 local time Sam called said there was a plane crash, needed help pushing helo out. Rode up to hangar, just after arriving Sam called again said that I could be useful and did I want to go. We took off at 2041 landed at PADL at 2118. Picked up 2 EMT's, some blankets and other gear at PADL. Took off at 2129 found R44 sitting on hill side. Landed near it, (R44) at 2140 and began hiking up the mountain. At this time all I knew was that an Otter had crashed, and there were some survivors. Dillingham EMT's told me that they knew a nurse and an EMT-3 was already there. After looking around above the R44 for almost an hour doing occasional check-ins with Sam, EMT's told me that the radio they had would allow direct communication with the EMT at crash site. Sam had taken off at this point to look for crash site as myself and 2 Dillingham EMT's came down the mountain. I took the radio from Dillingham EMT, and talked Sam into location to find the crash site. Sam upon finding crash site returned to R44 location and picked me up with gear (mostly blankets). 2 EMT's didn't want to go at this point in our helo. Sam flew me over the wreck to get a good location then back to LZ (3rd GPS coordinates.) I walked 100 yards down mountain to crash site, arriving at about 2315 hrs. After a brief discussion, I realized that due to darkness, fog and injuries of PT's, removal was impossible at that time and radioed Sam to return to PADL for the night. I had left some stuff at the LZ with a pile of other gear that was already there and had only brought

with me 2 trash bags of blankets (much appreciated throughout the night). Upon arrival at the aircraft, one PT was moved outside underneath the LH wing where he spent the night with Doc. Climbed inside, second PT was sitting on head on aft bulkhead with several significant injuries. Myself and John began to rotate PT around so that his head was uphill. Between all movement and medical procedures attempted and/or accomplished it was 0130 before we finished. PT was kept from sliding down to bulkhead by using a ratchet strap underneath his buttocks and secured to aircraft. PT needed to be repositioned approx every ½ hour throughout the night. Susan was providing emergency care to injured pax towards the front of the aircraft. John was moving back and forth as needed between front and back of aircraft. About 6 AM Doc got too cold, asked to switch with some one in aircraft. John moved outside, Doc came in. There was not enough room in aircraft for all PT's and EMS personnel. Cell signal was weak. Some calls were made throughout the night. One was to confirm that the other 2 Dillingham EMT's returned to PADL with the R44. Throughout the night C-130 was heard occasionally flying overhead. Attempts to reach them on CH16 were unsuccessful. Just after 7 AM John who was outside of aircraft at this time heard a helo in the distance. Called on CH16, said they were Air Force and about 3.8 mi out. Gave a general status update, helped talk them into location. (still foggy) 2 guys were dropped in. One came to aircraft other began clearing brush to make a place for hoisting. PT in aft of aircraft was priority. We began to package him. We started to move him, realized that due to angle of aircraft, PT on backboard etc. we needed to make a bigger hole. Second PJ had finished clearing brush began to create a hole in aircraft. First PJ began to treat and package other 2 PT's still in aircraft. One was in copilot seat. Another was in first or second row behind pilot. Between the PJ and myself we created a hole in side of aircraft to slide PT's out. When CG rescue swimmer arrived first PT was moved out placed in Stokes basket, hoisted out. Second PT was removed from aircraft as well, hoisted. The other PT in copilot seat and PT that spent the night outside were prepped hoisted into CG helo (CG I think) as well as Susan. We gathered gear up. Air Force helo returned to pick up John, Doc, myself, rescue swimmer, 2 PJ's and our gear. Time was about 1030-1100. All returned to PADL.

(Signed, Joshua Flint 11 Aug 2010)

Chris and John were Air Force PJ's who responded and helped pull PT's from wreckage. Rescue swimmer's unknown name. While sitting in Pavehawk, I watched rescue swimmer and 1 PJ return to aircraft and remove the ELT. I was later told that the ELT was dangling from the antenna cable and was not in the bracket.

close to initial drop

N 59 19 57.0
W 158 22 33.9
9 Aug 10 21:57 hrs

N 59 19 53
W 158 22 24.2
9 Aug 22:14.7 hrs
Dropped gear location
while looking for BC
Above R44.

N 59 19 46.4
W 158 22 43.6
9 Aug 23:09 10 hrs
Location of Reposition
w/ Helo. (2 100 yds
above crash site).

Actual location of wreck
N 59 19 45.4
W 158 22 48.6
10 Aug. 0140 hrs

About 2030 local time Sam called said there was a plane crash, needed help pushing
helo out. Ate up to Auger, just after arriving Sam called again said that I could be useful
and did I want to go. so took off @ ~~2030~~ landed @ ~~PAUL~~ @ 2118. Picked
up 2 EMTs, some blankets and other gear PAUL. Took off @ 2127 found R44 sitting
on hill side. Landed near it (R44) and began hiking up the mtn. At this time all I knew
was that another had crashed, and there were some survivors. Dillingham EMTs told me
that they knew a nurse and an EMT 3 was already there. After looking around above the
R44 for almost an hr doing occasional checks w/ Sam. EMTs told me that the radio they
had could also direct com. w/ the EMT @ crash site. Sam had taken off at this point
to look for crash site as myself and 2 Dillingham EMTs came down the mtn. I met
the Radio from DL EMT, and talked Sam into location to find the crash site. Sam upon
finding crash site returned to R44 location and picked me up w/ gear (mostly blankets).
2 EMTs didn't want to go at this point in our mtn. Sam flew me over the wreck to get a good location
then back to LZ (old GPS coord) I walked 100 yds down mtn to crash site, arriving at about
2315 hrs. After a brief discussion, I realized that due to darkness, fog and injuries of PTs,
Removal was impossible at that time and radioed Sam to return to PAUL for the night.
I had left some stuff at the LZ w/ a pile of other gear that was ~~not~~ already there, and had
only brought w/ me 2 trash bags of blankets (Paul approached throughout the flight). Upon arrival
at the aircraft, one PT was named outside underneath the LZ wing where he spent the night w/ Don.
Clouded inside, second PT was sitting on head on aft bulkhead with several significant injuries. Myself and
John began to rotate PT around so that his head was up. Between all movement and medical
procedures attempted ~~for~~ accomplished it was ~~2330~~ before we finished. PT was kept from sliding
head to bulkhead by using a racket strap underneath his buttocks and secured to aircraft.

(over)

PT needed to be repositioned ~~and~~ appear every 15 min throughout the night. Susan was providing canopy care.
to covered one towards the front of the aircraft. John was moving backward further as needed between front
and back of aircraft. About 6 AM we got to coast, asked to switch w/ some one in A/C. John moved
outside, one came in. There was not enough room in A/C for all PT's and EMS personnel. Cell signal
was ~~was~~ weak. Some calls were made through out the night. One was to confirm that the other 2 with the
SMT's returned to PADL w/ the R44. Through out the night C-130 was heard occasionally flying
overhead. Attempts to reach them on CHX were unsuccessful. Just after TAMs John who was outside
of A/C at this time heard a helo in the distance. Called on CH 16, said they were Air Force
out about 3.5 mi out. Gave a general status update, helped talk them into location. (Still foggy)
2 guys ~~equipment~~ were dropped in, one came to A/C other began clearing brush to make a place for hoisting
PT in A/C of A/C was priority, we began to prep gear. We started to move him, realized that due to
hole of A/C, PT on back board etc. We needed to make a bigger hole. Second PJ had finished
clearing brush began to create a hole in A/C. 1st PJ began to treat and prep gear other 2 PT's still
in A/C. One was in Copilot seat. Another was in 1st or second row behind pilot. Between the
PJ and myself we created a hole in side of A/C to slide PT's out. When CG rescue swimmer arrived
1st PT was moved out placed in Stoker basket, hoisted out. Second PT was removed from A/C
as well, hoisted. The other PT in Copilot seat and PT that spent the night outside were prepped
hoisted into CG helo (~~CG~~ ^{CG}) as well as Susan. We get back gear up. A/C helo returned
to pickup John, Dec, myself, rescue swimmer, 2 PJs and our gear. Time was about 1030 - 1100.
All returned to PADL. ~~John~~ 11 Aug 2010.

Hi Robin,

It wasn't very nice wx as you prob know.. and it would change so fast it was hard to even give an accurate piprep. I was up that direction probably around noon and couldn't go thru the Muklung pass (near where he ran into the MT.) and went thru the hump at Aleknagik. We call that area thru the Muklung valley on up towards the NW the "twilight zone" especially with an easterly or south easterly flow, it really seems to get packed in there and often it seems the wind comes around the Muklung hills from both ways...

I left a couple trips to Ongivinuk lake on the table (which would of been right up thru Aleknagik lake) because it was very low conditions up that way all day. I did get out west later that afternoon and picked up some very soggy folks off the bottom of the Arolik river. I would say however, if he hit the MT. at or about the 1000' level I doubt if he was VFR. Good ole FSS was doing the "few at 300 and then several layers and I think our vis was reported about 2 to 3 miles all day. Until later that evening it got down pretty good.

I don't understand why they weren't on some sort of flt. plan with all those folks onboard ?? it shouldn't have taken 4 hrs. before somebody decided they were missing. and what was NTSB going on about a possible faulty gps? I thought we were meant to use them as a nav aid only ?? It really is a shame and should of been avoided.. I question if he didnt think he was clearing the SE side of the hills at Aleknagik and then grabbed the 070 ish heading they were on (which would of been pretty much a direct bearing to the camp he was headed for from Aleknagik not the Muklung gap).. because that heading from where he crashed doesn't make any sense unless I suppose he could of turning around.?? It wasn't like he impacted the ground crawling around low level in the crap.. It's right smack in the biggest portion on the Muklung hills. This sort of accident shouldn't happen.. it was the only Mt. between them and the river camp. Sorry if I sound bitter.. We did know Terry and he and his wife spent some time with us in New Zealand.

I'm not sure why GCI thought they had to replace Charlie Pike for the week.

anyway, that's about all I know I guess. It has been a very long stretch of awful weather.. with tons of that heavy misted crap moving all the time.. you'd go thru a pass going someplace with plus 5 miles or better and come back an hour later and it would be crap and you go to the next pass.

Hope all's well & keep in touch
Cheers,
Rick

Tikchik Airventures
Rick and Denise Grant

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- - - Alaska 99576
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Ron Duncan Statement

I recall that the pilot, Terry Smith, flew Virgil Peachey into Dillingham the morning of the accident. When he returned, Terry said that while the weather was otherwise ok, he did not want to fly to the fish camp that morning due to the turbulence.

The turbulence had lessened by lunch time, and Terry Smith determined that the conditions would allow for a flight to the fish camp on the Nushagak. At the time, the ceiling at the lodge had lifted to above 2000 feet.

After the Otter departed, my wife, Dani, and I decided to take a pleasure flight in my Renegade. We departed about 15 minutes after the Otter. From checking the flight track data on my GPS data, I have confirmed that power to the instruments was turned on at 2:46:24 p.m., and we departed the lodge at 3:02:52. We first flew northeast over Nerka Lake, before turning north north east to Grant Lake. We passed within 14 nm of the crash site at 3:07 pm and while there were rain squalls in the area, the weather in that direction appeared very flyable. We continued on to Grant Lake, reversed course and came back along a route more generally to the west of the out bound course although we did take tour around the far east end of lakes Beverly and Nerka and were once again within 14 nm of the crash site at 3:30 pm. We landed back at the lodge at 3:49:20 p.m. We flew a total of 92 miles in one hour and 13 minutes on that flight. We reached a point 30 miles northeast of the lodge at the apogee of the flight. (All time and distance detail are taken from the flight tracks on my Garmin 396 GPS which have been provided to the NTSB.) The weather during our fight was turbulent with occasional areas of significant wind shear but it was all good VFR. Visibility ranged from 5 to 30 miles and the ceilings that we observed ranged from 600 feet to high scattered along the upper range of the flight. We did observe isolated rain squalls in the distance – particularly in the Togiak Mountains to the west where it appeared that visibility was severely reduced in rain and visibility and ceilings were lower in the vicinity of rising terrain. There were no places in which the lowered ceilings or reduced visibility could not have been easily circumnavigated. Other than the turbulence it was what I considered to be a good flying day. As mentioned above we flew within 14 miles of the accident site on this flight, and I observed the ceilings to be good in that area, although there were isolated squalls in that direction.


When I returned, I worked on the Renegade's heater control knob, which was sticking. I was finishing work on the heater control when Greg Chapados came to inform me that the Otter had not arrived at the

fish camp. Dave Roseman, the camp manager, called FAA flight service around 6:30 pm, and also Bristol Bay Air and several other air services, to see if they knew the whereabouts of the Otter and to ask them to start looking for it. HRM had been called prior to the plane leaving the lodge that the party was coming, but they did not call when the plane did not arrive.

We quickly realized something was very wrong and called the Rescue Coordination Center to activate search and rescue. Then Dani and I departed in the Renegade to search for the missing aircraft. We started the engine at 7:10:48 and took off at 7:15:25. I had my radios tuned to 122.9 and 121.5. I flew along the route I expected that the Otter took to the fish camp. The normal route is to the south of the Muklung Hills. Although I had my second radio on 121.5, and flew about three miles from the accident site, I did not get any hit from the ELT aboard the aircraft.

I believe that John Bouker had two aircraft searching for the Otter. I talked to Mr. Bouker on the radio, and he said he had flown the primary path that the Otter would have flown, and he indicated he would step to the north, and suggested I step to the south. About ten minutes later (at 7:31 pm), I recall John stating that "I got it." I received GPS coordinates from John and flew to the accident site, where we were able to spot the Otter (at 7:43 pm), and we saw Willy Phillips outside the Otter. The aircraft was on a heading that was about 75 degrees to the left of the expected heading to the HMS fish camp and pointed up the hill. At that time the ceiling was well above the aircraft.

Because there were survivors at the accident site, Dani and I agreed that she should go to the accident site to render medical aid. I was able to talk to Tom Tucker, who was flying in the area in his helicopter. We arranged to meet at the Aleknagik air strip, and Dani transferred to Tom's helicopter at around 8:00 p.m. I then returned to the accident site in the Renegade (8:23pm) to assist with coordinating communications. In doing this I coordinated with Park Ranger Johnny Evans, who is based in Aleknagik. We arranged for Mr. Evans to depart Aleknagik to arrive at the accident site about 45 minutes after my arrival. As I was circling in the area of the accident site, the weather began to deteriorate, and I returned to Dillingham landing at 9 pm.

A handwritten signature in black ink is written over a solid black rectangular redaction bar. The signature appears to be "J. Roseman".

GCI OTTER CRASH RESCUE STATEMENT

By Sam Egli
19 August 2010

On 9 Aug 10 at approx 1945 I received a phone call from our company pilot Heather Mase advising me she had just heard about the Otter plane crash near Dillingham, and that someone was looking for a helicopter right away. I was not at Egli Air Haul, but in Naknek at the time.

At approx 1957 I received a phone call from our company pilot Bob Egli who was on a flying contract in Dillingham at the time. He told me he had just gotten a call from Norman Heyano needing a rescue helicopter right away. Bob was unable to respond and was handing it off to our King Salmon base. He gave me Norman's phone number with the message to call him.

At approx 2000 I called Norman Heyano.

At approx 2003 Norman Heyano gave me the order to launch.

At approx 2005 I departed Naknek for EAH.

At 2007 I called our helicopter mechanic Josh Flint for assistance with the scramble-launch.

At approx 2009 I called Norman Heyano to reassure him I was on the way to King Salmon. I told him our mechanic Josh Flint is an EMT and would be assisting me with the launch. I asked Norman if he would like Josh to come along as an EMT.

Norman told me if Josh wanted to come along, that would be great. That would mean 1 less guy he would have to send from Dillingham. He told me Josh would not need to bring any medic stuff with him, as they had everything already in Dillingham.

At 2017 I called Josh Flint back to invite him to fly with me as EMT if he wanted to. Josh accepted.

At approx 2019 I called Norman Heyano back to tell him Josh Flint would be coming along as EMT.

At approx 2022 I arrived at EAH. Josh and I completed the necessary preparations, pushed out the helicopter, and fueled it up.

Josh and I launched N13AT at 2041 from PAKN.

I air-filed a VFR flight plan with Kenai FSS on 122.2 through King Salmon Radio, destination PADL.

Approaching PADL airspace, I made my initial radio call to Dillingham FSS. At this time, the FSS controller gave me coordinates which he had for the crash site, which were N59 19.971' W158 22.696'.

Josh and I landed at **2118** at PADL on the Alaska Cargo Service ramp. Norman Heyano and 2 Dillingham EMT's were there to meet us.

At approx 2119 Josh began loading the 2 Dillingham EMT's and medic equipment into N13AT.

At approx **2122**, while Josh was loading the EMT's and medic equipment, Norman Heyano gave me coordinates N59 19.971' W158 22.696'. He told me this location was a few hundred feet below the crash site. He said Tom Tucker was out there with his helicopter (an R-44). After my conversation with Norman Heyano, I compared his coordinates with those I received from Flight Service. I noticed that they were the same coordinates I had received from the FSS controller.

At **2129** Josh and I, plus the 2 Dillingham EMT's took off from PADL.

I closed my VFR flight plan from PAKN to PADL and air-filed a new one from PADL out to the crash site area, with an ETA back at PADL of "midnight".

The FSS controller advised me that there was another helicopter and possibly other aircraft at or over the scene or in the area. He also advised me that a C-130 and a Blackhawk helicopter were also enroute to the area.

I asked the controller if he knew of a rescue coordination radio frequency being used by those already involved. He told me that 123.6 and 122.3 were being used for rescue communications and coordination. I set both my com radios up to monitor these two frequencies simultaneously.

We arrived at Muklung Hills area at approx. **2135**.

Weather was 600 overcast with 3 miles visibility.

I hovered upslope through fog in failing twilight, beginning at the base of the cloud ceiling, maintaining visual contact with the ground until I reached the Norman Heyano coordinates. On arrival at this location, I saw a black R-44 helicopter parked there with nobody around.

At **2140** I landed at N59 19.988' W158 22.620' with my altimeter reading 1160 feet elevation. I completed aircraft shut-down and everybody unloaded from the helicopter.

Josh Flint had his Bristol Bay Borough EMT-issued handheld radio with him. He had a channel in it for the Alaska State Troopers frequency 155.250 MHz. I tuned my aircraft's Tactical FM radio to this frequency. The Dillingham EMT's had their own radio, and did

not know its frequencies, so I could not program my radio to theirs. Thus, I had radio contact with Josh Flint only, and not the 2 Dillingham EMT's.

Josh and I agreed that we would maintain a 15-min interval for radio check-in with each other.

At approx 2150 Josh Flint and 2 Dillingham EMT's departed N13AT's location with the medic equipment and hiked away uphill into the fog searching for the crash site.

At 2200 I powered up the aircraft radio on schedule and talked with Josh Flint.

Josh and the 2 Dillingham EMT's were about 400 feet further up the mountain from me at N13AT's location at that time.

At approx 2201 I powered down to wait for the next scheduled radio interval.

At 2215 I powered up the aircraft radio on schedule and talked with Josh Flint.

Josh and the 2 Dillingham EMT's were further up the mountain from my location than before. They had not found any sign of, and no voice contact with the crash site.

Josh told me the 2 Dillingham EMT's had gotten word over their radio that the crash site was below where we had landed, not above. At word of this, the 2 Dillingham EMT's had turned back downhill. Josh, not sure what was fact, decided to continue to search further uphill.

At approx 2216 I powered down to wait for the next scheduled radio interval for the 2 Dillingham EMT's to show up back at my location.

At approx 2217 I called Norman Heyano on my cell phone and confirmed that we were thought to be actually above the crash site.

At approx 2230 the 2 Dillingham EMT's showed back up near my location. I met the 2 Dillingham EMT's and told them I had talked with Norman.

I told them to remain at the R-44 while I flew solo, performing hover-search for the crash site. I would give them "body language" with my helicopter, flashing lights, etc. if and when I found the crash site, so they could begin their hike on foot down the mountain to the crash site. I also advised them that I would call Josh on the radio to have him return back downhill to rejoin them.

I started N13AT and took off at 2236 by myself on hover-search. I worked my way downhill until I was out of the fog below the cloud deck without finding the crash site. I broke out below the ceiling at about 400 feet AGL with 1 mile visibility. It was noticeably darker at this time, too.

At 2236 I talked with Josh Flint on the radio. I advised him that Norman had confirmed they should move downhill in the search. Josh told me he had already turned around and was almost back to my location. I told Josh that I would be flying hover-search to assist the 2 Dillingham EMT's in the ground search effort while he descended back to their location. I told Josh the EMT's would be waiting at the R-44 for my return, and he should join back up with them there until I got back.

I hovered back up the mountain slope in the fog on another trajectory until I reached the 1200-foot level MSL without finding the crash site.

At approx 2240 Josh Flint called me on the radio to advise me that he had arrived at the R-44 and had rejoined the 2 Dillingham EMT's. I told Josh I was not finding the crash site. I would continue to hover-search, and call him on the radio when I located it.

Josh called me at approx 2245 telling me that he was in radio contact with the crash site, and I was close to them. They gave Josh a direction for me to fly to find them, which Josh relayed to me. I flew the direction I understood them to mean and found nothing.

I continued downhill in my search. At approx 2248 Josh called me that they said I had just gone over them. I told Josh I had seen nothing. I turned back uphill.

At approx 2251 Josh told me he had just told them at the crash site to "make themselves more visible", and just then I saw a flashlight waving at me from up-slope.

I hovered to the light, saw the wreckage, and saw a person standing outside the left rear cabin door between the fuselage and the broken-off-and-backward-swept left wing. As I hovered overhead, the person was waving both hands at me.

I marked the location in my GPS, and then navigated my way back to the R-44 for Josh and the 2 Dillingham EMT's.

On my way back to the R-44, I passed over a terrace which looked good enough to land on, so I marked that location in my GPS. I also noticed a backpack or something was laying there.

At 2257 I landed back near the R-44 at coordinates N59 19.988' W158 22.620'.

Josh Flint loaded medic equipment in my helicopter and climbed aboard. He told me the 2 Dillingham EMT's did not want to fly in the foggy mountainous darkness (I don't blame them!) Their intention was to hike in the direction I hovered with Josh and get to the site on foot.

At 2300 I took off with only Josh Flint aboard. I navigated at a hover back to the terrace I had marked for landing near the crash site and showed him the backpack which was there. Then I hovered from there to the crash site to show Josh that location and let him see the route he would have to hike to get there.

Passing over the crash site, I saw a couple of people at the left rear cabin door of the Otter.

I hovered back up the mountain slope to the terrace with the backpack, landing at **2305** at coordinates N59 19.80' W158 22.71', at an altimeter reading of 1120 feet elevation. (I did not get the altimeter reading at this location until 2 days later during the crash investigation.) Josh exited N13AT taking the medic equipment with him.

I took off solo at **2307** and picked my way at a hover back down the mountain, passing again over the crash site. I again saw a couple of people standing near the left rear cabin door of the downed plane. I had great difficulty maintaining visual reference with the ground as I continued my hover down-slope. I broke out below the overcast at 300 feet AGL, finding a scant ½ to ¾ mile visibility beneath. The twilight was spent, and it was completely dark at this point.

Trying to take up a position where I could help further, I picked my way using my search light, looking for someplace I could land near the crash site, at the base of the mountain below the site. I told Josh I was looking for someplace near the site at the base of the mountain to land. I asked him if he knew anything about the situation of the crash victims. He told me there were "4 survivors". I asked him if any of them could walk. He responded that none of them were able.

During this phase of flight, I contacted Dillingham FSS to advise that I was off the mountain, and that my EMT's were stuck on the mountain for the night. Following my radio conversation with FSS, a rescue C-130 aircraft struck up a radio conversation with me on 122.3 or 123.6 MHz (I don't remember which; I was monitoring both freqs as I flew.) His call sign was "Air Force Rescue 2104". He explained to me that they were enroute at 10,000 feet, and planned to remain overhead at high altitude during the rescue operation. He asked me if I would be returning to the crash site.

I gave Rescue 2104 my pilot report on the weather at the surface and stated that I would be unable to return to the site until morning. I told him I was underneath the bad weather, picking my way to Dillingham for the night.

I told Rescue 2104 there were responders at the scene, and 2 more EMT's who I had left on the mountain to make their way downhill to the site. Rescue 2104 wanted to know the disposition of the crash victims. I passed on to him the info I had received from Josh Flint who was at the scene that there were "4 survivors". I offered Rescue 2104 the GPS coordinate info I had marked for the crash site. He wanted it.

In order to facilitate my looking up the coordinate information while flying single-pilot nap-of-the-earth in low IFR conditions in the dark by search light, I landed at **2313** at coordinates N59 18.989' W158 24.193' with my altimeter reading 160 feet elevation.

At 2315 I called Josh on the radio to tell him I was below the cloud deck and on the ground. I told him I had lost all visual reference twice as I had picked my way down through the fog and darkness, and unless the weather cleared, I would be unable to return before daylight. Josh responded that he had arrived at the crash site and would be good for the night.

I had at this point forgotten that I had actually captured a plot of the crash site. I did not have it written down on my flight log card. I did have the coordinates of the terrace where I had dropped Josh Flint, so I passed that info on to Rescue 2104. I explained that coordinates N59 19.80' W158 22.71' (altimeter reading of 1120 feet elevation) was the LZ which I had used to drop 1 EMT off. I told him the crash site was located southwest of the LZ about 400 yards on a steep slope, and I estimated the crash site to be 100 to 200 feet lower than these LZ coordinates.

Rescue 2104 relayed this coordinate info to the Blackhawk helicopter. Then Rescue 2104 relayed back to me that the Blackhawk was proceeding enroute to the site at that time. The rescue helicopter would be making his way through the mountains from the east to the coordinates I gave him.

I knew the only realistic way to approach the site in the low weather conditions would be to approach Muklung Hills from the southwest side of the mountain. Not knowing whether the rescue helicopter was scud-running under bad weather as was I, or would be making an NVG instrument approach or whatever to get underneath the weather, I offered to remain landed on the tundra where I was, well clear of the terrain. I would keep my strobe lights running, to give the approaching rescue helicopter a "beacon light" to visually home in on, thus placing him in the corridor he should approach the crash site from. Rescue 2104 liked that idea, so I remained on the ground, engine running strobe and navigation lights ON, awaiting the Blackhawk's arrival overhead.

At approx 2340 while I waited on the ground, I saw aircraft strobe lights to my northwest, flying at low level in a south-southeasterly direction (probably following the Wood River downstream). Although this was from the opposite direction I expected, I thought it might be the rescue Blackhawk so I turned on my search light and pulse landing lights to enhance my conspicuity for that aircraft. I don't know if that aircraft saw me or not. They did not deviate from their flight path toward me at all.

The weather got lower and lower, until finally it was all the way to the ground. At that point I decided to pull out and return to PADL. I took off at 2352, notified Rescue 2104 my plan, and resumed picking my way back to Dillingham.

At approx 2400, I notified Dillingham Flight Service that I was north of the airport inbound. I extended my flight plan with them, received a Special VFR clearance, and continued to pick my way to the airport. I landed at the Alaska Cargo Service ramp at PADL at 2412.

After completing my aircraft shutdown, I secured the helicopter for the night. Norman Heyano offered me a ride into town to find a bunk. He had to wait for the Blackhawk rescue helicopter which was at this point planning an IFR approach to PADL for fuel prior to proceeding on to the Muklung Hills area. I remained with Norman and waited for the Blackhawk.

When the Blackhawk arrived, I acted as a fueler for Alaska Cargo Service by pumping approx 320 gallons of Jet-A fuel into the rescue helicopter's fuel tank. During the course of this fuel delivery, I heard the rescue crew mention that the weather was too low for them to continue with rescue efforts at that dark hour. They would wait to continue until first light.

I put the Alaska Cargo Service truck away, and rode with Norman to the Alaska DOT shop at PADL airport. Walking inside the shop, I saw the 2 Dillingham EMT's which I had left on the mountain. One of them told me that Tom Tucker had hiked from the crash site back to his R-44. She told me that the weather had briefly cleared enough for the R-44 to fly, and they had ridden back from the mountain with Tom in the R-44.

I suspect that the low-flying aircraft I saw flying by me in the vicinity of the Wood River while I was waiting on the ground for the Blackhawk was actually the R-44 returning to PADL.

A woman at the state shop (Norman Heyano's wife, I think) drove me to the USFW bunkhouse and dropped me off, where I spent the remainder of the night.

Hi Tom,

Norman Heyano is the Dillingham Airport Manager. Norm also did seem to me to be in charge of the Dillingham EMT activities surrounding the rescue. I don't know if that is because he is also himself on the EMT Squad, or if his position as Airport Manager automatically puts him directing EMT activities, or what.

On 9 Aug 10 one of our pilots, Bob Egli, was in Dillingham on another flying job with our helicopter N83193, at the time of the accident. He had landed at Dillingham at the end of his flying day, put his helicopter away for the night, and had gone off duty. Following his duty day, he said he had consumed a beer, and was therefore ineligible to fly. In this off-duty status, Norm Heyano contacted him about assisting on the rescue. Bob explained to Norm that he was unable to respond due to his having consumed alcohol. Bob suggested that Norm call me in King Salmon.

Apparently, Norm contacted me right after that. I proceeded to launch from King Salmon with our other helicopter N13AT. My subsequent actions are in the statement I already sent to you.

After Bob handed Norm off to me, the State Troopers contacted Bob in Dillingham to begin coordinating for my arrival in Dillingham.

The next day on 10 Aug 10, during the course of the military rescue operation in progress, Larry Lewis of NTSB picked up our helicopter for his post-accident investigation. We were unable to fly to the scene until the afternoon of 11 Aug 10 due to bad weather conditions. The holding for weather improvement, the flying out to the scene, the helicopter standing by during the initial investigation, and the flying back to Dillingham following this initial visit, was a joint effort between NTSB and FAA, but from my viewpoint as Pilot In Command, was directed by NTSB.

The evening of 11 Aug 10, following this NTSB on-scene investigation, the wreckage was released to insurance adjuster Kevin Wyckoff of Alaska Claims Services, for recovery to Dillingham. Kevin immediately picked up our helicopter to facilitate his recovery operation. I flew Kevin the evening of 11 Aug 10 to initiate his recovery of the aircraft wreckage. Dan Boyette, a GCI representative, rode along with Kevin on this initial flight out to the scene. As far as I was concerned as the Pilot In Command, Dan was along for the ride, and to assist Kevin in his recovery of the wreckage. We worked at the scene until nearly dark, whereupon another helicopter, a Huey, completed a couple of lifts from the scene back to Dillingham. With darkness approaching, Dan rode back to Dillingham aboard the Huey, while Kevin rode with me. Dan did not direct anything concerning the flight of our helicopter.

On 12 Aug 10 I had another flying commitment which I had to fly out of Dillingham. Kevin still had recovery to complete. Bob, still on his flying job with N83193 in Dillingham, was released that morning. Therefore, Bob flew Kevin the next two days, 12 and 13 Aug 10, to wrap up the wreckage recovery operations. Again, Kevin was the customer in charge of these two days' flying.

After everything was over with, and because Norm Heyano was who actually ordered our launch of N13AT, I asked him who I was supposed to give the bill to. He said he didn't know if GCI would be picking up the tab, or the State Troopers, but that his office would definitely not be paying for it. He and I then talked together over the phone with the Dillingham Post of the State Troopers, and they agreed to accept the bill for our initial rescue flight of 9 Aug 10.

I billed the NTSB and FAA each half of the investigation flights of 11 Aug 10.

I billed Alaska Claims for the recovery flights of 11, 12, and 13 Aug 10.

No one identifying themselves as "GCI" spoke with our company requesting any rescue assistance. Our initial rescue assistance launch order came from Norm Heyano to me via telephone. Although we did interact with a number of GCI people during the course of the rescue, investigation, and recovery, we did not receive from GCI any launch orders or directives concerning our helicopter support to the any of the entire series of flights initially surrounding the accident. GCI was also not billed by us for any of this work effort.

Sincerely,
Sam Egli
Egli Air Haul

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