

Attachment 12

**Operations Group Chairman's
Factual Report**

DCA06MA009

Captain's Irregularity Report

Kirchgessner David

From: David Grant McCracken [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, December 16, 2005 1:17 PM
To: Kirchgessner David
Subject: SWA 1248: Captain Sutherland's Additions/Corrections to statements made in his NTSB interview on 12/10/05



Captain
herland's NTSB Sup Dave,

Attached as a Word.doc is the text of an Irregularity Report that Captain Sutherland was asked to submit to his domicile Chief Pilot after his NTSB interview. I was advised that you preferred this vehicle for him to advise you of the additions and corrections he wished to make to his interview statements rather than reopening his interview next Monday. I have put the additions/corrections in red font for your convenience in reviewing the IR. If you have any questions of me, please do not hesitate to call or email me.

I was flying flight 1248 on December 8th, 2005 with F/O Steve Oliver. We were scheduled to depart BWI at 1455 and arrive MDW at 1700. The actual flying time was 1+40. We were given a gate hold at BWI for weather in MDW. We were later given a release and we pushed at 1650, nearly 2 hours late. Flight enroute was normal. We checked ATIS continually enroute and copied 4 or 5 different ones and each time ran the OPC to determine our parameters. We inputted other possibilities such as various winds, braking conditions and visibilities so as to formulate a plan for going or not. We tried to input every variable we could think of, if we had known that thrust reversers were already figured in our landing data we would have done a what if one or both did not operate. This could have very likely changed our go no go plan.

We experienced some enroute icing and had the engine anti-ice on and had to put the wing on as well. We continually checked the wing enroute but did not have to put it back on once we left the altitude and temp level that had caused it to form.

Prior to descent I briefed the ILS Z to RWY 31C, which was the only one we could use, and that I would transition to the HUD on final for the landing. We reviewed and discussed the use of max auto-brakes and elected to use them.

Shortly after we entered the MDW area on the goshen 3 arrival we were given holding instructions to proceed to the lucit intersection and hold as published. We set up the box and commenced holding. We were given an expected approach clearance time and they said we would be holding while we waited for them to plow the runway. We looked at our diversion cities of MCI/STL and their weather as well as looking at IND and I think CMH. We came up with our fuel plan for possible diversion and shortly there after dispatch coordinated with us and we accepted their plan.

We exited the holding pattern for the ILS Z approach to rwy 31C. We were vectored through final and given a heading back to intercept., we were over 20 miles away and this did not cause a problem or concern. We configured to flaps forty and started down final. Landing checklist was run and FAF call made and the 1000' call all made. I noted about 12 knots right quartering tail wind inside 1000'. Around 700-800' I called I could see the approach lights. I clicked off the auto pilot some time after that, I think

between 300 to 500' and went to the HGS to get a feel for the flying conditions. Around approaching minimums I called landing and transitioned outside with reference to HGS. F/O called a little high and I made an adjustment and then he called a dot high and I was about 70' and at about 50 to 60' I pulled the throttles to idle and landed. I did not fly the HGS AIII flare command because I knew it would land me further down the rwy than I wanted to land.

Touchdown was good and I put the nose wheel down immediately.

Braking started immediately and went right into antiskid cycling. Speedbrake deployed and I tried to raise the thrust reversers and they resisted and would not come out of the detent. Then the antiskid stopped working and I felt the aircraft seemed to accelerate like it does if you come out of thrust reversers too soon. This diverted my attention to the braking and at some point the F/O moved my hand and attempted to deploy the thrust reversers and he had difficulty getting them to deploy as well. They came out but to late. We both made the comment we aren't going to stop even though we were both on the brakes applying as much brake pressure as we could.

We exited the runway overrun and hit the blast shield and slid onto the road. As we went through the blast shield I said "oh no a car".

We came to rest on the road and I immediately shut the engines down as I was concerned about a fire. I opened up my side window to survey the area and a policeman was already standing there and another man bleeding from the bridge of his nose holding a child came walking around from the front of the aircraft yelling at me. I told the F/O I have to talk to the passengers, you get the checklist and I got up went back and told the passengers to keep their seats, we are ok, we hit some ice and ran off the runway, I will find the best way out and we will leave shortly. I went back in the cockpit and opened the window and told the policeman we are bringing them out the front left and will take them to the front left of the aircraft near the traffic shelter. I went back immediately and told the folks to grab their coats, leave their bags and exit the front left. I asked Steve to go outside and help them exit and he was already on his way. I stood at the front and assisted passengers to the door to the F/A's and then started taking bags from the ones further back that had a chance to get their bags. I stacked them in the front isles and no one complained. Our deadheader Tim Bidlack was the last out and he said everyone was out. I went back

into the cockpit to check that everything was done on the checklist, but a fireman was trying to pull me out to exit the aircraft, I did check that the aircraft battery was off and I am 90-95% sure I turned off the anti-ice as well. I walked out the back of the aircraft to check that everyone was out of the aircraft.

Steve Oliver is an outstanding first officer and great pilot, he did everything he could and was there for me and the passengers at every turn. He will continue to be an even better pilot in the years to come. Our flight attendant crew of Charlene Yao, Rhonda M, and Holly Carr were just awesome, they responded as the professionals they are. I couldn't ask for a better crew.

Myself, I deeply regret the loss of life of that young boy and like any grandfather I would replace my life for his if I could. I am ashamed that this happened and regret the loss of our aircraft and the position this has put our company. We are so blessed to be working for Southwest airlines and these last few days have only strengthened that belief. I am sorry I have let so many people down.

Note: During the NTSB questioning I had indicated that I thought I had done some practice auto brake landings at MDW. After the questioning I realized that in fact those had been rejected takeoffs that we had practiced at MDW. I was also asked for detail about the deployment of the thrust reversers. I know how they function but I did not explain it very well. I think I may have left the impression that the reversers deploy automatically. What I meant was that we pilots deploy them automatically when the parameters are met, such as aircraft on the ground sensed by the radio altimeter and wheel rotation reaching its parameters. Then the reverse thrust unlocks automatically to be deployed.

DK

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