

Attachment 1

to Operations Group Factual Report

DCA12FA024

**INTERVIEW SUMMARIES and WRITTEN
STATEMENTS**

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A. INTERVIEW SUMMARIES

1.0 Interview: Michael Vaclavik Pilot-in Command (PIC) Slingshot 71

Date: January 25, 2012

Location: Phone interview

Time: 1000 EST

Present were: David Tew, Dan Bower, Mike Hauf - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Mark Whitson - AAR counsel; Thomas Howell – AAR VP of Quality, Safety, and Security; David Prewitt – AAR VP Operations; Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

During the interview, PIC Vaclavik stated the following information:

- He had been with AAR for about one year.
- Prior to AAR, for about 8 years he worked for Air Methods located in Colorado flying the BK-17 doing emergency medical services (EMS) work in the Northeast.
- Prior to Air Methods, he had worked about 3 years for Air Logistics flying the Bell 206 offshore.
- Prior to Air Methods, he was in the United States Army for about 17 years where he worked as a maintenance test pilot and instructor pilot in the Apache helicopter. He attended a school to become a maintenance test pilot. His first 3 years in the Army, he worked as mechanic on helicopters.
- His total flight time was about 6,700 flight hours.
- He had about 500 flight hours in the Bell 214 helicopter.
- He had no previous accidents, incidents, or violations.
- He had failed a check ride while working for the US Army.
- On the day of the accident, he started his duty at about 0200 Zulu time.
- He had been on duty for about 4 hours when the accident occurred.
- He felt rested on the day of the accident.
- His helicopter was a part of a flight of two helicopters for most of the day.
- He said they did a walk-around of their aircraft before and after every flight. They perform a preflight of the aircraft before the first flight. He said the crew chief checks the aircraft. When asked if he observed the crew chief of slingshot 72 perform a preflight inspection at Bastion, he said he saw Scott (crew chief of slingshot 72) check his aircraft at Bastion FOB¹.

¹ FOB – forward operating base

- Their aircraft was using the call sign Slingshot 71 and they departed Shindan FOB at about 0731 local time for a flight to Herat (OHR) FOB. They flew nonstop to Herat. They arrived at Herat about 0759.
- The other helicopter, accident aircraft 5948M, call sign Slingshot 72, flew from Shindan to another FOB about 7 miles away and then flew to Stone FOB.
- Slingshot 71 aircraft departed Herat and flew to Stone where they joined up with Slingshot 72.
- During the flight to Herat and then to Stone, Slingshot 71 was separated from and did not see Slingshot 72. They were both heading North but were separated by about 7 miles.
- Slingshot 71 joined up with Slingshot 72 at Stone and they then flew to Farah FOB and arrived about 0901. They flew as a flight of two to Farah but were separated by a “couple of miles”. They were behind Slingshot 72, but could visually see them.
- Both aircraft landed at Farah and shut the aircraft down
- Both aircraft were refueled and each picked up 2 passengers.
- Both aircraft departed Farah at about 0934 and flew to Bastion (OAZI) FOB arriving at about 1031.
- At Bastion, the pilots went into ADAC [arrival departure airfield control] and left both aircraft with their engines running. Both aircraft offloaded their passengers, and we [slingshot 71] took on 4 new passengers. Slingshot 72 did not take on any passengers
- Slingshot 72 called for taxi clearance for the flight of two
- We were then transferred to tower control and tower told us to line up and wait on the runway. We were in a hover for about 2 minutes while we waited for traffic. Slingshot 72 (accident a/c) looked “normal” while we were in hover.
- We were then cleared to depart on a 190 degree heading for Bawire (OADY) FOB.
- As both aircraft departed Bastion, we were trailing Slingshot 72. PIC Vaclavik said he was monitoring the radios during the flight.
- It was a normal climbout. PIC Vaclavik said he was looking outside his aircraft as they departed.
- He heard Slingshot 72 pilot Mike Clawson call the tower and ask for a frequency change. The frequency had some “jamming” on it but he could understand what was being said on the frequency and said “nothing seemed wrong at that time”.
- Slingshot 72 was above them and to their right front during the departure and climb. He estimated that they were about ¼ to ½ mile behind Slingshot 72 at that time.
- He did not hear any radio transmission from slingshot 72 indicating a problem.
- He looked inside his aircraft and switched to an approach frequency, and then looked up and saw Slingshot 72 in a nose low attitude and was in a “steep” pitchdown. The aircraft seemed to “go straight down”. He did not recall if Slingshot 72 was in a bank. He said he was having a hard time comprehending what he was seeing. He said he did not notice anything wrong with Slingshot 72 prior to seeing it pitch down. The flight path of the accident aircraft was “straight down’ after he saw it in the nose low position.
- He was asked what the position of the accident aircraft was when he looked up and saw it in a nose down position and he replied slingshot 72 was at about his one o’clock position and was about 50-100 feet above them.
- He said prior to the pitchdown, the aircraft had been climbing after takeoff at about a 300 fpm rate and had an airspeed of about 120 knots.

- He continued to watch Slingshot 72 and saw “things” start “blowing off” the aircraft. He said the debris looked “like confetti”. He could not tell what the debris blowing off was.
- He saw that the tail boom was “folded under” Slingshot 72. He was asked about the aircraft boom as it was folded under the aircraft and he replied he could see a “difference in color” and said he saw a “lighter shade” since the inside of the boom was a zinc color. He said “part of the tail seemed folded”.
- He was asked if the tail folding affected the heading of the accident aircraft and he replied it “looked like it went straight” He said it was still going in the same direction we were.
- He watched Slingshot 72 impact the ground and saw it burst into flames.
- He told the second-in-command (SIC), who was flying Slingshot 71 not to fly into the debris and flames. He said they turned to avoid the debris coming off the accident aircraft.
- They circled the accident aircraft looking for survivors, but did not see any.
- They circled until U.S. forces arrived and secured the area.
- While they circled, they flew as low as about 15 feet. He recalled dust blowing. They circled a “number” of times.
- They activated “Blue Sky” flight following and told approach control there had been an accident. The approach controller advised us to change to tower frequency and we complied. We told the tower controller that there had been an aircraft accident and the controller asked if it had occurred at the location where we were circling. We replied yes.
- We then departed the accident area for Bastion FOB. We landed, shut down our engines, and deplaned the passengers. I then started making phone calls.
- He had flown the accident aircraft for about 15 minutes on the day before the accident. The aircraft “flew fine” and was “good flying”. There were no maintenance write-ups on the aircraft.
- He did not recall hearing any negative comments about the accident aircraft. He said he had regularly flown the accident aircraft.
- He said that AAR had 4 crews flying three aircraft. There had been no problems with any of the aircraft.
- He was the last person to fly the accident aircraft prior to the accident crew flying it. Todd (accident pilot) flew the accident aircraft with him prior to the accident flight.
- He did not see any sign of hostile actions however he was “looking around” to be safe. He said he saw 7 or 8 people near some mud huts a distance away and they seemed to be moving away from us but they were not running. He said he had been through the area many times with no signs of hostile actions.

2.0 Interview: James Benson Second-in Command (SIC) Slingshot 71

Date: January 25, 2012

Location: Phone interview

Time: 1000 EST

Present were: David Tew, Dan Bower, Ron Price, Mike Hauf - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Mark Whitson - AAR counsel; Thomas Howell – AAR VP of Quality, Safety,

and Security; David Prewitt – AAR VP Operations; Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

During the interview, SIC Benson stated the following information:

- He had worked for AAR since July 2011.
- He was the SIC on Slingshot 71.
- He was the Site Manager and was responsible for the overall operations in Afghanistan.
- Prior to AAR, he worked as an aviation officer in the U.S. Army for about 22 years.
- His total flight time was about 2,400 flight hours and he had no fixed wing flight time. He had flown about 15-20 hours in the Bell 214 aircraft. It was a great aircraft and he said he “loved it”.
- He had not had any accidents, incidents, or violations.
- He had never failed a check ride.
- They reported for duty at 0545 local time and did a crew briefing.
- He felt rested during the day of the accident and did not fly on the day before the accident.
- He flew 3-4 hours on January 14, 2012 on the accident aircraft. He said there were “no issues” with 48 Mike [accident aircraft], but some work had been done on the door handle on the pilot’s side. He said that was the reason for the 15 minute flight on the accident aircraft on the day before the accident. He had also flown the aircraft the day before the 15 minute flight.
- Not all the pilots were qualified as PICs – two were type rated in the aircraft and the rest were working toward becoming PIC.
- He said they “linked up” with the accident aircraft at Stone FOB and there was also an additional aircraft with them. They flew to Shindan and landed. They offloaded their 2 passengers and got 2 new passengers.
- They departed for Farah FOB and arrived about 0902. At Farah, they shutdown the aircraft and requested a “cold refueling”.
- They departed Farah at about 0934 for Bastion FOB and arrived at Bastion at about 1031. They landed at the airfield departure arrival and control group (ADACG) location.
- The crew chiefs escorted the passengers to the terminal. They brought out 4 passengers for us but none for Slingshot 72.
- Joe [crew chief] did a walk-around inspection and gave us a “thumb-up”.
- He said he did not observe Scott [crew chief on Slingshot 72] do a walk-around of his aircraft but did see him confirm the doors were closed. He did see Scott check the left side of his aircraft.
- He was flying the helicopter.
- They called for taxi clearance and did a hover taxi to hold short of runway 19.
- They called the tower and were told to line up and hold for traffic. They hovered for about 2 minutes. On the runway, he was “three rotor discs behind Slingshot 72.
- They were cleared to depart to the south.
- They departed as a flight of two.
- They accelerated and climbed on departure. They accelerated to 120 knots. They climbed to 800-1,000 feet altitude. They climbed at a rate of about 300 feet per minute

(FPM). They were using about 70-75% power. He said he was flying about 100 feet below Slingshot 72 and was located in about his 6:30 to 7:00 o'clock position

- About 5 minutes into the flight and about 6-7 miles after departure, Mike [SIC] from Slingshot 72 called for a frequency change.
- SIC Benson said he was watching Slingshot 72 and saw the aircraft go into a "sharp" bank to the right – maybe a bank of 70 to 80 degrees. He said the rate of bank was "exceptionally fast". He estimated it took about ½ a second to a second to reach a 90 degree bank. He said it was "not a normal turn".
- He was asked if the heading of slingshot changed as the aircraft rolled and the tail folded and he replied that was "beyond my comprehension".
- He did not see any yaw or spinning by the accident aircraft before it began to roll to the right. He then saw the aircraft begin to "come apart". He saw a large debris field come from the aircraft which included blue pieces coming off the aircraft. He thought he might have seen an engine cover come off but said he was not positive of that.
- He flew to the left to avoid the debris field.
- He saw the tail boom of Slingshot 72 begin to "separate and fold". He said it was "no more than 3 seconds" before the tail boom started to fail near the transition section near the exhaust. He was asked about how much of the tail boom came off after it failed and he responded about 2/3rds of the boom.
- He said the right bank and tail boom starting to fail occurred "simultaneously" at the same time the debris field started. He said it all happened "very quickly".
- The accident aircraft pitched to about 75-80 degrees nose down.
- SIC Benson said he radioed that Chalk 1 [Slingshot 72] was going down.
- He said when the accident aircraft started its nose down pitch, it went "straight into the ground". He estimated it was about 2 seconds from the time the aircraft seemed to go out of control until it impacted.
- He saw the accident aircraft burst into flames after it impacted the ground.
- He did not see any tracers or anything impact the accident aircraft. He said it did not look like any enemy action.
- The only time he saw the top of Slingshot 72's blades was when the aircraft was in the bank. He said his focus was to "not damage my aircraft".
- He did not hear any Mayday call from Slingshot 72.
- He was asked if the debris field included plexiglass or glass and he responded that he did not recall seeing any.

3.0 Interview: Joseph Jeziorski, Crew Chief of Slingshot 71

Date: January 25, 2012

Location: Phone interview

Time: 1000 EST

Present were: David Tew, Dan Bower, Mike Hauf, Ron Price - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Mark Whitson - AAR counsel; Thomas Howell – AAR VP of Quality, Safety, and Security; David Prewitt – AAR VP Operations; Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA);

During the interview, Crew Chief Jeziorski stated the following information:

- He had worked for AAR since October of 2010.
- He was a crew chief and performed maintenance.
- Prior to AAR, he worked for one year at Dyne Corporation for the Department of State on the C-17 at Robbins Air Force base.
- Prior to Dyne Corporation, he worked for Atlantic Southeast Airlines as a lead mechanic, doing heavy maintenance.
- Before Atlantic Southeast, he was in school getting his airframe and powerplant certificate.
- Prior to school, he was in the U.S. Marine Corp where he worked as a mechanic.
- Bell 214 service started at AAR in December 2010.
- The accident aircraft was at AAR when he came to work there.
- He flew on the accident aircraft a few days prior to the accident. There were no maintenance items on the aircraft, except for a door latch issue. He did not know anything about what maintenance had been performed on the door latch of the accident aircraft.
- The SIC and he performed the preflight - a visual inspection of their aircraft. There was no paperwork on the preflight.
- He did not observe the crew chief of Slingshot 72 doing his walk-around. He said the other crew chief was already inside his aircraft when they performed their walk-around.
- He sat on the right side of the helicopter behind the SIC and faced toward the rear of the aircraft. He mainly looked for other aircraft traffic and managed the passengers in the back. They load passengers on the left side of the aircraft. They had 4 passengers sitting in the back rows and they were facing forward. He said they may have had a view of Slingshot 72.
- He entered the aircraft through a crew door on the right side. He was the last person to board. They flew with the doors closed. The crew chief checked all the doors.
- He heard radio jamming and heard James [SIC] say something and turned around in his seat to look forward. As he turned he saw the tail boom of Slingshot 72 folding. He said it looked like a "large section" folded but he did not know how much had folded. He did not know where the tailed boom folded. He said it folded directly under the aircraft. He said it "happened so fast".
- When he turned to look, the accident aircraft was already in a bank to the right and was "nose down". The tail boom was already folding and they [Slingshot 71] were flying through debris. James moved their aircraft to the left so the accident aircraft went out of his view. While looking out of his window, he saw the accident aircraft hit the ground and burst into flames.
- He did not see any enemy fire or action.
- He was asked what the balance between being crew chief and performing maintenance and he responded it was about equal. He said they were low on crew chiefs so he was flying more.
- He could do engine changes.
- There was an inspection program for the tail boom.

- There is a limited visual view inside the boom. He usually opened the door on the boom and looked in the compartment. He thought all the crew chiefs did this. He thought he looked inside the tail boom the last time he flew the accident aircraft.
- He said he saw paperwork in the debris field from the accident aircraft and said it might have been manuals.

4.0 Interview: Jayson Scott Wilson, Director of Operations AAR Airlift

Date: March 5, 2012

Location: Phone interview

Time: 1315 EST

Present were: David Tew - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

During the interview, Mr. Wilson stated the following information:

- He was the Director of Operations (DO) for AAR Airlift and had held that position since December 9, 2011. He was also the Deputy Vice President of Operations.
- His was hired by AAR on July 11, 2011. Served as the Deputy Vice President of Operations prior to becoming the Director of Operations (DO) and Vice President of Operations.
- Previously he was the DO for Rampart Aviation which was based in Franklinton, NC. Rampart Aviation was a provider for the Department of Defense (DOD) and was a Part 135 operator. Rampart Aviation was a “heavy” [numerous] Casa 212 aircraft operator. When he left Rampart Aviation to work for AAR, it was still in the process of changing the certificate name from Presidential to AAR Airlift.
- From July 2009 to December 2010, he was Director of Operations (DO), Vice President (VP) of Operations, and Executive VP at Evergreen Helicopters, Inc. Evergreen had operations in Alaska, Hawaii, Afghanistan and other places. This was his second time working for Evergreen.
- From July 2008 to August 2009, he flew for Presidential Airlines in Baghdad, Afghanistan. He flew the Bell 214 helicopter and was type rated in the Bell 214. Presidential Airlines was based in Moyock, NC but he was flying in Afghanistan.
- Previous to Presidential Airlines, he worked on a project for Evergreen Helicopters and was the deputy DO and a program manager. He liked working for Evergreen. His areas of duty included safety and maintaining operational control. He tried to look at quality of life. He was responsible for the oversight of all training and pilot operations.
- He knew the accident copilot [SIC] at Evergreen Helicopters and had hired him at AAR. The copilot was a “good guy” who was the father of 5 children. He had previously been a police officer and an Army officer. He was a leader.
- Prior to Evergreen Helicopters, he was the DO and Chief Pilot for the U.S. Red Baron Pizza Squadron which was the longest running civilian formation aerobatic team in the world. The squadron was based in Marshall, NC.
- Prior to the Red Barons, he was in the U.S. Army and served as an aviator for 23+ years. In the Army, he did 2 tours in Afghanistan, and tours in Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia, and flew the Apache Helicopter.

- He came back to work at Presidential Airlines because of the company president Jeffrey Schloesser. He felt Mr. Schloesser had a lot of integrity. Mr. Schloesser was currently president of AAR.
- When he returned to Presidential, he saw changes were being done at the company. The differences at the company from when he previously worked there were “glaring” and he felt that the changes were “enhancements”. He said he came from “safety is paramount” atmosphere in the Airshow industry. He liked the company infrastructure.
- The AAR Part 135 certificate began in Melbourne, FL. It was purchased and moved to Moyock, NC. When he started working for the company, its name was Presidential and was based in Moyock, NC and was owned by Blackwater.
- When he came to work for Presidential Airlines the second time, the President, VP of Operations, and VP of Maintenance had all been replaced. The Senior VP had stayed in position.
- Mr. Wilson was asked if there were any problems at Presidential when he arrived in July 2011 and he responded “yes”. He said there was an abnormal amount of issues every other day because of growth and management changes. There were Letters of Investigation against the company. Things had changed since they changed FSDO²s.
- He said he had always had a good rapport with FAA FSDOs.
- When he arrived, he said “it seemed to me that the company had an adversarial relationship with the previous POI from the GSO FSDO”. He said he was not involved in that relationship.
- He said they had senior pilots conducting rotary wing training. Dick Anarude was the assistant site manager in Afghanistan as well as a check airman. Ray Poss was the FAA Designated Pilot Examiner for the Bell 214 with a lot of flight time in the aircraft and was a senior training captain. Most of the Bell 214 training was conducted in Melbourne, FL. Two 299 checkrides in the Bell 214 were conducted in Afghanistan.
- Two check airmen had been removed as check airmen by the previous POI. Mr. Wilson thought the interpretation of the rules that was used to remove the check airmen was incorrect. He was not involved with that because it occurred before he came back to the company.
- One problem he inherited had to do with the use of TS1 fuel [Russian]. He said it was a big issue to the company because of its availability. One issue is TS1 fuel is available in Afghanistan but we cannot utilize it in all our fleet types yet. The other issue was DOD accountability of misused TS1 fuel in our fleet types with mismarked JP8 fuel. I just thought the POI would look at the TS1 issue as an issue that was not malicious on AAR’s part. The company self disclosed using TS1 fuel. The company had done “due diligence” on the TS1 fuel using their own aircraft. The CASA airplanes were going to be able to use TS1 fuel soon according to the engine manufacturers. He said the use of the TS1 fuel was not approved in their operating rules and some manuals. He said that prior to December 2011 both additized TS1 and JP8 fuel were in Afghanistan. Currently all additized TS1 in Afghanistan is said / projected by Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Energy Support Center to be the equivalent of JP8.

² FSDO – Flight Service District Office.

- Another problem he inherited had to do with aircraft which had a low cost low altitude (LCLA) drop system. It was mainly an equipment issue. The company used to do LCLA training at Moyock, NC. He said he did not know how the previous POI had said he did not know the company was doing LCLA drops.
- He was concerned with single ship operations instead of two aircraft operations. Some areas we should not do single ship operations.
- Class II navigation – working with the FAA on this. The contract called for IFR capable aircraft. Fixed wing aircraft were okay for Part 135 IFR operations. Because of the lack of infrastructure and the lack on navigation aids, we could only fly IFR to certain places. There were limits to where aircraft could go. We were mapping this out. In certain areas Class II navigation was needed because of mountains or lack of VORs³.
- The company was required to abide by Part 135 rules and regulations. I was required to assure our pilots are adequately trained.
- Mr. Wilson said “from my perch” the fixed wing and rotary aircraft were operating in compliance with Part 135 rules and regulations.
- Post-accident, the site managers reported directly to Mr. Wilson. This development enhanced Operations and communications throughout.
- He had some pilots who were having problems were brought back from deployment. It was mostly due to personality issues. One pilot was brought back due to a safety issue and was counseled. The company changed bases for that pilot and he seemed to be doing okay. The safety issue was more of a “he said-she said” type of issue that could not be substantiated.
- AAR’s operation was considered a Part 135 operation and was treated as such. They were not a public aircraft type of operation. Mr. Wilson said he thought the LCLA operation would be a good operation to be done under public use aircraft rules and regulations. He said that since AAR took over the certificate there had been a constant improvement and the company followed the Part 135 rules.
- Mr. Wilson said he hopes to be the DO at AAR for a while.
- He said he goes to see the POI every month.
- He said he had a very competent fixed wing chief pilot with good regulatory experience that was going to be assigned to the FAA liaison / assistant DO position.
- Mr. Wilson said the Chief Pilot talked to the POI almost daily. He said the POI had visited him 2 or 3 times since he had been the DO. He said the rotary wing qualified assistant POI had visited more frequently. The assistant POI performed type rating rides on the Puma helicopter and had monitored their training. The assistant POI had said he was pleased with the level of training on the PUMA.
- The accident PIC was a very experienced pilot.
- AAR was impressed with the accident SIC Clausen
- Neither accident pilot had any problems during training.
- He was going to be leaving for a month in Afghanistan.

**5.0 Interview: Frank E. Trinkle – AAR Chief Pilot – Rotary Wing
Date: March 5, 2012**

³ VOR – very high frequency omnidirectional range

Location: Phone interview

Time: 1500 EST

Present were: David Tew - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

During the interview, Mr. Trinkle stated the following information:

- He had worked for AAR since June 2007. The name on the certificate was Presidential Airways when he was hired. He spent 4 years working from U.S. Navy ships flying supplies. He was the site manager on the ships.
- He previously had worked for the U.S. Army flying Cobra helicopters.
- From 1987 to 1990, he worked for oil companies flying helicopters in the Gulf of Mexico.
- From 1990 to 1992, he worked for ERA Helicopters flying in the Gulf of Mexico.
- He worked for 3 years at Keystone Helicopters in Pennsylvania where he flew single pilot emergency medical services (EMS) in a Bell 412 helicopter.
- From 2003 to 2004, he again worked for ERA Helicopters flying heavy lift helicopters offshore.
- He had about 10,000 flight hours on rotary wing aircraft and about 1,000 flight hours on his personal Grumman Tiger airplane.
- He was the chief pilot in charge of rotary aircraft. Mr. Trinkle became the rotary wing chief pilot after the certificate was transferred to Orlando, FL.
- He was responsible for ensuring AAR's training and recurrent was compliant with Part 135 rules and regulations and with Navy regulations. We monitored flight and duty records daily.
- AAR had about 110 rotary wing pilots and there were 9 in training. There had been some turnover in the pilots. There are pilots who come onboard for the money and work for a short time. Others get tired of the austere conditions overseas.
- The normal rotation for rotary wing pilots was 60 days on duty and then 30 days off. Some pilots worked 60 days on and then 60 days off. Other pilots worked 45 days on and 45 days off.
- When flying in Afghanistan, pilots usually flew about 100 flight hours per 60 days. The company was strict about compliance with Part 135 on-duty times. Mr. Trinkle said he was responsible for Part 135 compliance and said company check airmen monitored the on-duty times of the pilots and the flying abilities of the pilots. He said that often when a pilot came back from flying mostly VFR for a year, the company would give them some instrument training as a matter of policy.
- AAR had done rare training on helicopters in Afghanistan since there was rarely any place to go to do the appropriate training and there was rarely an aircraft available for training.
- They did some training in Melbourne, FL on the Puma and the Bell 214 including a robust recurrent training.
- He had interacted with the current POI Billy Meadows but said he had more interaction with the assistant POI. The assistant POI was at the company quite frequently. He performed all the type rating rides on the Puma helicopter. The assistant POI had plans

to observe some of our future ground school and flight training. The assistant POI had already monitored the company's Puma ground training and indicated he "was pleased" with that training.

- PIC Todd Walker was an excellent pilot for us and a very experienced PIC. He had no problems during training.
- SIC Michael Clausen was on his first contract with us. We were very impressed with him during his initial training. He had not had any problems during training. He actually helped the instructor and the other students because of his experience on the airplane. We were really excited to have him. He was a great loss to us.
- There were some problems with operational control back in 2007, but since AAR has purchased the certificate, there has been a constant improvement in the operations.
- During new hire training, he met with the pilots and told them we were a Part 135 operation and we were not looking for "cowboys". We followed the rules and regulations to the letter.

6.0 Interview: Billy Meadows, current Principal Operations Inspector (POI) for AAR Airlift

Date: February 29, 2012

Location: Telephone interview

Time: 1000

Present were: David Tew - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Dave Prewitt – AAR Airlift; Gary Vosburgh – Department of Defense (DOD).

Mr. Meadows was represented by Brook Lewis - FAA

During the interview, Mr. Meadows stated the following information:

- Date of hire with the FAA was 1997. Hired as Aviation Safety Inspector (ASI)
- Previously worked in general aviation doing charter and corporate flying.
- Worked as a pilot for the city of Jacksonville, FL doing mosquito control.
- His total flying time was about 7,500 flight hours which included 7,000 flight hours of fixed wing flying and about 500 flight hours of rotary wing flying.
- He was the current POI of AAR Airlift and had worked on the AAR certificate for about 9 months. He had been continuously assigned as POI to about 9 certificates since he had been with the FAA.
- He was the POI for about 9 other Part 135 operations all of which were smaller in size than the AAR operation.
- His current work program for AAR was issued for the previous AAR certificate number and was transferred to him from the Greensboro, NC FSDO.
- The AAR certificate was transferred from the Greensboro FSDO to the Orlando, FL FSDO. He had "knowledge" of the entire transfer process of moving the certificate from the Greensboro FSDO. He said the certificate was transferred because the company changed their main base of operations. He was briefed by the Greensboro POI during the

transfer – he said it was a “normal” handoff. The briefing concerned the status of the training program, the status of the manuals, what types of aircraft were being operated and where. There were no problems with training or the manuals.

- He was aware of the certificate name change to AAR Airlift. The only certificate name change that he was aware of and participated in was from Presidential Airlines to AAR.
- He had gone to AAR about 5 or 6 times since he had been on the certificate. He said that AAR personnel had visited him about the same number of times. The personnel who visited included the Director of Operations, the Chief Pilot, and others.
- He had an assistant POI Rick Sheppard on the certificate who had visited AAR 6 or more times.
- Mr. Meadows said he had observed AAR training and checking and had reviewed records as part of his oversight. He estimated that he had observed training or checking about 3 times. He did not observe any problems.
- He had not observed any operations or done any oversight in Afghanistan as he was not authorized to travel there. He said he was required to observe the airline but not in Afghanistan.
- He thought AAR was performing some checks in Afghanistan. He said AAR now had some training facilities in Afghanistan and thought they were doing some training there. FAA did not have anyone doing observations in Afghanistan. AAR did a significant amount of training in the US.
- He had a limited observation of AAR training records and thought some checking was done in the United States and some checking was done in Afghanistan. He said he was pleased with the training and checking he had observed.
- The approval to low-level drop cargo was still in process. The military wanted AAR to low-level drop cargo and the company was in the process of configuring their aircraft for the drops and getting a drop training program approved.
- Before the certificate transfer, the previous POI was in the process of withdrawing the authority of 2 check airmen to perform checks. This was due to checking that had been done inappropriately. AAR had since retrained the check airmen and the Orlando FSDO had accepted the retraining and had reissued their check airmen letters.
- There were no other operational concerns that he was aware of except for the drop approvals.
- He said when the certificate was transferred; there were some outstanding violations against AAR. One violation was due to the operation of a Dehaviland aircraft that had a limitation on runway width and it was operated on inappropriate runways. He thought there were 3 other violations but did not recall details.
- Enforcement actions [violations] that had been filed by the Greensboro FSDO against AAR were currently in the hands of FAA legal people. He said he was not personally concerned about the violations.
- He thought the AAR certificate had been transferred to the Orlando FSDO in July, 2011. He also thought there had been a name change on the certificate on December 15, 2011. Mr. Meadows said he had been directed to advise the company that a name change did not change the violations that were pending against the company. He said he did inform the company. He said the violations were still open as far as he was concerned.

- Mr. Meadows advised he would provide the current status of any enforcement actions against AAR. He did not know how they would be handled since they occurred in another region.
- He said that during the certificate transfer process, the Director of Operations (DO) position changed hands 3 times and AAR was currently on the fourth DO. He said the company was changing all the time in size and equipment.
- After a question, he recalled there was an enforcement action against AAR that involved the use of Russian fuel. They had used the fuel in an unauthorized aircraft. He said the FAA was still working on that enforcement. AAR was trying to get approval to use the Russian fuel. Mr. Meadows said the AAR Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) had looked into the issue and Mr. Meadows thought any maintenance requirements had been done or the affected aircraft would not be on the company's Ops Specs.
- Mr. Meadows said he was not aware of any oral or written agreement in place between the Greensboro FSDO and the Orlando FSDO for items to be accomplished during the transfer of the certificate.
- He could not say much about the AAR day to day operation since he had not seen much of it. He said the AAR personnel were knowledgeable and compliant.
- He said the previous POI was more "disappointed" than myself that he could not see the Afghanistan operations.
- Mr. Meadows said he was aware that the certificate transfer process did not go smoothly. He was not a part of that and said he thought the Orlando FSDO would not take the certificate until any concerns were addressed.

7.0 Interview: Oscar Bocanegra, previous Principal Operations Inspector (POI) for AAR Airlift

Date: February 29, 2012

Location: Telephone interview

Time: 1700

Present were: David Tew - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Dave Prewitt – AAR Airlift; Gary Vosburgh – Department of Defense (DOD).

Mr. Bocanegra was represented by Brook Lewis - FAA

During the interview, Mr. Bocanegra stated the following information:

- His date of hire with the FAA was August 4, 2004.
- Previous to the FAA, he worked for Caribbean Sun which was a regional airline based in the Caribbean. He flew the Dash 8 airplane at Caribbean Sun.
- Prior to Caribbean Sun, he worked for Potomac Airlines which was a regional airline owned by U.S. Airways based at Washington Airport, Washington, D.C. It went out of business after 9/11 occurred.
- Prior to Potomac Airlines, he worked for Shuttle America Airline and Chautauqua Airlines.

- His total flight time was about 6,000 flight hours of which about 4,400 flight hours were as pilot-in-command (PIC).
- He was the POI for Presidential Airways, which was the previous name for AAR Airlift, from the fall of 2008 until September 1, 2011 when the Part 135 certificate was transferred to the Orlando FSDO. In 2007, he was the assistant POI on the certificate.
- He was the POI for 15 different certificates. He was also the POI on 7 or 8 Part 135 certificates along with the Presidential certificate. The other certificates included Part 141 operations and Part 137 certificates.
- When the Presidential certificate was in the Greensboro, NC FSDO, its operations were located in Moyock, NC. They conducted some ground training in Moyock, but no flight training except for some Casa 212 training. Most of their flight training was conducted in Montana, CO or overseas.
- Until 2010, the company mainly flew the CASA 212 airplane and had very little helicopter operations.
- Oversight was done mostly by reviewing records for training and for dispatch records. He performed all the required surveillance items[R items]. He did go to Atlanta to observe Dash 8 flight training. He went to Guam to conduct a base inspection. He also went to Turkey to observe some CASA 212 checkrides which did not get completed. Some training was performed in Afghanistan and he was not allowed to go there. The S330J Puma training was about 95% done in Afghanistan. He said a lot of type rating checkrides were observed by inspectors out of the, Montana, CO and Seattle, WA FSDOs. Majority of flight training was in Montana.
- The company check airmen performed the checkrides in Afghanistan. The company did not have any designees.
- He said all of the company check airmen were of “high caliber” except for 1 or 2 who were removed from being check airmen.
- Under Part 135, he was required to observe the check airmen. He did perform observation of the check airmen.
- The company check airmen performed line checks.
- He said Part 135 oversight was a “big” issue because you had to take everything on paper for what it was since we had no way of checking the operation in Afghanistan. What looked “great” on paper might not be representative of what was actually going on in the field. The FAA had no way of determining what was actually occurring in the field.
- The FAA Part 135 rules were not designed for the type of operations that were being conducted in Afghanistan. The company’s operations, such as troop hauling, was more the type of operation that would be done under Part 125 rules since it was a single contract for hire. The company had a Part 135 certificate because the military required it. If you look at Part 125, it was designed for large aircraft and Part 135 was not. The FAA had to issue exemptions and deviations for the type of operation.
- An example of a deviation was one that was issued for the Dash 8 airplane. Part 135 aircraft were not supposed to operate above 7,500 lbs. which the Dash 8 was capable of, so the FAA issued a deviation where the company agreed not to operate the Dash 8 at a weight above 7,500 lbs. Mr. Bocanegra said he did not issue the deviation and said it was issued above his “pay grade”.
- He had some concern about training that was being done in Afghanistan. Required approaches for training were not available at times as they were shut down by the

Department of Defense (DOD). As a result, Part 135 required approaches for checkrides were not being performed. Mr. Bocanegra asked the company why they were conducting training in Afghanistan when they could not perform some required approaches and the company responded that was where their aircraft were and they did not have the aircraft to perform required checkrides anywhere else. A violation was filed against the company because required approaches were not being performed. The company had to redo some training and checkrides in Afghanistan when required approaches were available. There were “quite a few” checkrides that had to be redone.

- From what he could determine from the paperwork, the Afghanistan operations were “okay”. He said minor issues that he found were corrected. He said, other than paperwork review, he did not have oversight of the Afghanistan operation.
- Last year there was a violation filed against the company because they were performing operations that they did not have approval for. These operations were the low cost low altitude (LCLA) extractions and also the company did not have the proper low cost low level altitude drop roller system installed in the airplane. The Greensboro FSDO operations supervisor asked the company if they were performing LCLA drops and he was told “absolutely not”. Mr. Bocanegra said he received a call from someone [he said he did not recall who it was] in Washington who advised him to look at Youtube and when he did, he saw the company performing LCLA drops. He then started an investigation and the company cooperated from that point and said they had been performing the LCLA drops for about 4 years and estimated about 3,400 low extractions had been performed. He filed a violation against the company for performing low level extractions. He said he did not know what the outcome of the violation was. He said this was an example of “what looks good on paper may not be happening over there”. He said without the ability to perform direct oversight, you don’t know.
- He said his FSDO had filed 9 violations against the company but they were mostly for maintenance items. There was 1 operational violation filed because the company used TS1 [Russian] fuel. That violation was “kicked back” because they did not provide a fuel sample. He said he did not know how he was to provide a fuel sample from Afghanistan since he could go there. There were several problems that turned into warning letters to the company on check rides.
- The certificate was previously owned by Blackwater which changed it’s name to the Xe Corporation. In March, 2010, when AAR bought the Part 135 certificate, the Xe Corporation wanted the aviation operation moved off their property in Moyock, NC. He said the certificate was transferred to Orlando because the Xe Corporation wanted the operation off their property.
- During the transfer process, he briefed the new POI.
- When the transfer was final, he drove the company manuals to the Orlando FSDO and also did a standard briefing.
- The Orlando FSDO was “in shock” over the size of the company operation. When the Part 135 operation had started it was in the Orlando FSDO and consisted of 2 airplanes. When the certificate was transferred back to the Orlando FSDO, the company was operating about 30 aircraft on the certificate.
- When the Part 135 certificate was transferred to Orlando FSDO, there were 9 outstanding violations and a number of hot line complaints. The FAA Southern Region said all hot line complaints had to be answered and violations forwarded to the legal department

before they would accept the transfer of the certificate into the Orlando FSDO. The Greensboro FSDO answered all the hot line complaints and forwarded all violations to the FAA Eastern Region legal department.

- There were about 214 anonymous hot line complaints and these complaints concerned personnel being forced to take flights into dangerous areas, complaints about Bell 214 parts, complaints about fuel and other complaints.
- The Part 135 certificate was sold to AAR while it was still being held in the Greensboro FSDO. The certificate number was also changed.
- Mr. Bocanegra said it was his understanding the name change to AAR and the number change on the certificate were not supposed to occur until all violations had been closed out. He said it was “his understanding” that was the normal procedure. He said he did not know if that was done.
- He was under the impression that the previous company [Blackwater/Xe] were not associated with AAR. When the certificate was sold, AAR replaced the president, chief operating officer, director of maintenance, and the director of operations. He said it was a new company and new management.
- He said his operations supervisor and FSDO manager had expressed concerns with all the hot line complaints that occurred over a 2-3 month span. The hot line complaints started shortly after the certificate was sold to AAR and key personnel were being replaced. He also said the hot line complaints received initially concerned Russian fuel usage and he thought they were from pilots because some referenced the engines not making enough power with the fuel.
- He was asked if the Orlando FSDO had asked for his assistance since the certificate transfer occurred and he replied “not that I can remember”.

8.0 Interview: Gary Vosburgh – Department of Defense

Date: June 28, 2012

Location: NTSB Training Center

Time: 1000

Present were: David Tew - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Tony James, FAA

During the interview, Mr. Vosburgh stated the following information:

- The Department of Defense (DOD) strived to place an evaluator in Afghanistan approximately twice a year to observe AAR Airlift operations, procedures, aircraft, and facilities. This in-theater evaluator “for the most part” had been an Operations specialist but had occasionally been a Maintenance specialist. The operations evaluators had access to the cockpits and used this access to evaluate in-flight operations in the aircraft.
- The evaluator used a cockpit evaluation form which was similar to a checklist to evaluate flight operations. The completed cockpit evaluation forms were shared with the FAA.
- The maintenance evaluator looked at aircraft, stations, and any maintenance records that are in Afghanistan.
- The evaluator had a different evaluation form to use in inspecting line stations.

- The evaluator could also write a “Memo for Record” (MFR) to capture any additional information he deemed necessary.
- All inspection discrepancies and records were tracked in the Air Carrier Analysis System (ACAS) and follow-ups were performed on any discrepancies.
- Every two years a biennial on-site survey was performed on the carrier. A team was sent in to do an evaluation. This was a totally separate event and one that was driven by Congressional mandate. The in-theatre visits were not part of the biennial. The biennial team looks at all maintenance areas and operations areas. After the biennial survey, the DOD performs a “desktop” performance evaluation (PE) approximately every six months. There are usually 3 desktop PEs performed between biennial surveys.
- The desktop PE looks at areas such as operations, maintenance, accident and incident reports, financial data, and service quality. The DOD communicates with FAA certificate personnel and key management personnel such as the Director of Operations (DO), the Director of Safety, the Director of Maintenance, and the Director of Quality control. They attempted to validate the currency of the operations, document any changes such as personnel, fleet changes, mission changes, etc. The company was required to document Quality Assurance and Safety programs were active and up to date. The DOD attempted to determine “how good is the product” they were receiving from the contractor. If there were any concerns on the part of DOD during the desktop PE or any other oversight process, they could perform a short notice special survey or call in the company to discuss any concerns with DOD leadership. All records were shared with the FAA.
- The last biennial on site survey of AAR was moved up to an earlier time due to “risk factors” that appeared. These risk factors included the company moving its headquarters after being sold to AAR Airlift, a “huge” management change including several positions that were changed several times, the aircraft fleet increasing in number, and a shared concern with the FAA that the Quality Assurance program was not meeting standards. The company had been under increased surveillance due to these risk factors. The company was subsequently put back under “normal surveillance”.
- The biennial on site survey covered all DOD transportation operations which were performed by the company which included “vertical replenishments” on U.S. Navy ships and some operations in Africa.
- The DOD could cancel a contract if there was concern that the company did not meet DOD Quality and Safety standards. The DOD had canceled contracts in the past but not with AAR Airlift. Prior to the sale to AAR Airlift, the company name was Presidential Airways and Presidential was issued a “temporary non use” directive after an accident with one of its CASA 212 airplanes in 2004.
- The DOD maintained a liaison representative with the FAA. This liaison officer was often one of the evaluators who performed in-country evaluations.
- The DOD had access to and used all FAA oversight information and also maintained continuous communications with the FAA. The FAA and DOD shared all information on the company.

9.0 Interview: Assistant POI Richard Keith Sheppard

Date: July 11, 2012

Location: Phone interview

Time: 0900 EDT

Present were: David Tew - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Tony James – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Gary Vosburgh – Department of Defense (DOD).

Mr. Sheppard was represented by Steve Dunn – Federal Aviation Administration.

During the interview, Mr. Sheppard stated the following information:

- He was the Assistant Principal Operations Inspector for AAR Airlift.
- He had worked for the FAA for about 22 years and started in 1990.
- He had always worked in the Orlando, FL Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). It was a General Aviation FSDO.
- He worked with the POI on seven different operators. A mix of Part 135 operators and Part 91 companies. He had about 90% Part 135 operators and the rest were Part 91.
- He was assigned to the AAR Airlift certificate because of his experience on the Puma helicopter. He had been on the certificate since September of 2011.
- The movement of the certificate from the Greensboro, NC (GSO) FSDO was a “long drawn out process”. There were issues with the name change from Presidential Airways to AAR Airlift. There had been some enforcement proceedings in place which needed to be taken care of first. The enforcement proceedings were “taken care of” before the name change and movement of the certificate. The certificate was officially moved in August, 2011.
- He was the National Resource Specialist (NRS) for the Puma helicopter. He was also the NRS for Air Ships [blimps] and had about 300-400 flight hours on Air Ships.
- His total flight time was more than 10,000 flight hours. He said he stopped counting flight time when he reached 10,000 flight hours. He had no flight time on a Bell 214 helicopter. He had about 150 flight hours in the S-332 Super Puma helicopter. He got his type rating on the Super Puma helicopter in 2007. He had about 1,400 flight hours in fixed wing aircraft. He had about 8,500 + flight hours in helicopters.
- He said “in general”, he was at AAR Airlift headquarters at least once every other week. It was about an hour drive to AAR Airlift.
- He did not have a work plan for AAR. The POI had a work plan which he worked off. The POI received specific items to perform and Mr. Sheppard said he took care of helicopter items.
- “For a time” he performed checkrides on the Puma helicopter at AAR about 2 or 3 times a week. He said AAR had two check airmen for the PUMA helicopter, but the checkairmen could only perform Part 135 checkrides and not certification checkrides. Mr. Sheppard performed the certification checkrides.
- He did not perform enroute checks on the Puma. He had observed AAR training on the Puma.
- He observed one Bell 214 oral examination for a Part 135 checkride and it went fine.

- He had mainly been focusing on the Puma helicopter at AAR. He had gone through AAR training records and said there was “nothing that jumps out” about the records.
- When the company operated under the Presidential name, he went to Fort Collins, CL, Middleton, DL, and Rhode Island to observe training or perform checkrides.
- He said all Puma training was now being performed in Melbourne, FL.
- SK61 training will be done in Oregon and said he would be going to do oversight.
- He said the POI was traveling to perform oversight on the CASA 212 airplane.
- He had not written any Enforcement Investigation Reports (EIRs) on Presidential or AAR. He had written EIRs in the past.
- He did not know the accident pilots. He was not aware of the accident pilots having any problems during training.
- He was asked what did he think of AAR Airlift as a company and their compliance with Part 135 regulations and replied that the people he had worked with did their best to conform to Part 135 regulations. He said he was “satisfied with what I have seen”. He was asked if he had any concerns with the company and replied he had been concerned with one pilot’s attitude but he was no longer with the company.
- He said supposedly there was a plan for him to go to Afghanistan for oversight on AAR as soon as the “paperwork was place” He was in the process of getting a U.S. Government passport to “possibly” travel to Afghanistan to perform oversight. He said the idea to go to Afghanistan had been “bounced around” in the FAA for a couple of months
- He could not speak to what the DOD did in Afghanistan.
- He said the POI had not expressed any concern with DOD oversight.
- Before the certificate was transferred to the ORL FSDO, the GSO FSDO POI and Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) came to visit us and briefed my supervisor, Billy [POI], me and any inspectors that worked on the certificate. He said it was a “pretty thorough” briefing.
- He had not received any complaints about AAR from pilots or others.
- He was not involved with the hot line complaints that came in on AAR.
- There was only one Designated Pilot Examiner on the Super Puma and he worked for Evergreen Airlines and had not done any work on the AAR certificate.

B. WRITTEN STATEMENTS

10.0 TEXT OF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF MICHAEL E. VACLAVIK – CAPTAIN SLINGSHOT 71

1/16/2012 Michael E Vaclavik, Captain, 391AL

- 391AL (SS71) Departed Shindand 0731 to Herrat (OHR) arrived 0759, 5748M(SS72) departed Shindand (OASD) aprox. 10 min prior for pax drop off at FOB Spartan.
- Both acft met at FOB Stone and departed to OASD at aprox 0810 and arrived OASD at 0829.

- Both acft loaded pax destined to Farrah (OAFR) departed at 0833 and arrived with no intermediate stops at OAFR at 0901.
- Both acft refueled at OAFR and then departed to Bastion at 0934 and arrived at 1031 and landed at the ADAC.
- SS71 loaded four pax and SS72 did not load any.
- The flt departed the ADAC at 1039 with SS72 leading, we were cleared to line up and wait on runway 19, we hovered on the runway waiting for traffic to clear for about one or two minutes.

My SIC was on the controls so I was watching the clearing traffic which was beyond SS72, I did not notice anything out of the ordinary with the way SS72 was hovering.

- Once we were cleared for takeoff we departed to the south heading for Dawyer (OADY) at aprox 5 miles from the airfield (OAZI) I heard SS72 frequency change with Bastion TWR (OAZI), I then looked inside our cockpit to change our radio to Bastion APP frequency. There was a substantial amount of jamming on the various frequencies we were monitoring but communications were understandable. When I looked up I saw SS72 and was surprised to see it pitch nose low and impact the ground seconds later, I believe SS72 was about a half mile in front of us at the time.

It appeared to me that as the acft pitched down it was shedding parts though I couldn't identify anything. I watched the acft impact the ground and burst into flames, it appeared to me that the acft impacted at a high angle. As we turned left initially to avoid the immediate area there was a large cloud of papers I noted to James Benson and that he should avoid them. We then turned back towards the crash and began circling. I activated the Blue Sky at this time and called Bastion approach to report the crash, they frequency changed me back to Bastion tower and I reported it to them. The crash happened at aprox 1045hrs. We continued to circle until ground units arrived at which time we returned to OAZI.

[Signature of Michael E. Vaclavik on original]

11.0 TEXT OF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF JAMES T. BENSON – SIC/SITE MANAGER

Statement of James T. Benson 16 January 2012.

Crew day started at 0545 with a mission brief conducted by flight lead Todd Walker with all crew members present in aircraft N5748M Bell 214ST Slingshot 72 were Todd Walker (PIC), Mike Clawson (SIC) and James "Scott" Ozier (Crew Chief) and aircraft N391AL Bell 214ST Slingshot 71 Mike Vaclavik (PIC), James Benson (SIC/Site Manager) and Joe Jeziorski (Crew Chief). Upon completion of the crew brief the PICs went to the threat and weather brief and I went to preflight aircraft N931AL. As briefed we started, conducted runups and commo checks loaded passengers and departed Shindand Airfield at 0731 for Spartan, Herat and Stone. After passenger dropoff at 0759 in Herat we departed south and linked up with our wingman and Xenon 44 SK-61 departing from Camp Stone for the flight back to Shindand. We arrived at

Shindand at 0829 along with Slingshot 72. Slingshot 73 already departed and linked up with Xenon 44 going to Farah. Slingshot 71/72 departed Shindand at 0832 en route to Farah. The flight landed at Farah at 0902 and conducted cold refuel. The flight departed Farah at 0934 enroute to Bastion. Arrival at Bastion at 1031 at the Arrival Departure Aircraft Control Group Ramp. At 1040 Slingshot 72 aircraft N5748M and Slingshot 71 N391AL departed runway 19 for FOB Dwyer. Approximately 7 miles to the south and 5 minutes into the flight at 1045 just after Slingshot 72 frequency changed from Bastion Tower to Bastion Approach I witnessed Slingshot 72 make hard roll to the right and as it did so the tail rotor and boom began to disintegrate in flight and the aircraft pitched almost straight down and impacted the ground and burst into flame. There was no distress or Mayday calls made. I announced to the crew that lead was going down and immediately began a descent and low orbit to look for any survivors and prepare to render assistance as necessary. We contacted approach and informed them of what happened and we were told to go up tower for coordination of QRF and site security. Another rotary wing aircraft came overhead and assisted in relaying calls to Bastion Tower. I noticed parts of the main rotor and other debris approximately 200 yards east of the impact site while I was scanning for threat and watching a group of local nationals. After 10 at 1055 minutes of circling the crash site with no sign of survivors we observed the QRF in MATVs approaching to secure the site and we departed to the North and recovered to Bastion Airfield at 1059 shut down and made notifications to company operations and transported Slingshot 71's 4 passengers back to the ADACG.

End of Statement.

[Signature of James Benson on original]

12.0 TEXT OF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF JOSEPH P. JEZIORSKI – CREW CHIEF SLINGSHOT 71

Joseph P. Jeziorski 1/16/2012

- CH1 and CH2 both landed at the ADAC in Bastion.
- CH2 (AL my aircraft) picked up 4 pax (4 total passengers onboard)
- CHi (48M) picked up zero pax
- About 1045 we were leaving Bastion
- About 5-7 miles off the South end of the runway I heard one of the pilots in my aircraft say something over the radio traffic I could not make it out I turned around to see what was going on and saw 48M ahead of us and what looked like the tailboom folding under it, roll to the right and fall to the ground.
- We circled the sight to look for survivors, but saw none in the wreckage and fire.
- We circled until there was military on the ground and then returned to Bastion

[Signature of Michael E. Vaclavik manager on original]