Attachment 1

to Operations Group Factual Report

DCA12FA062

INTERVIEW SUMMARIES and WRITTEN STATEMENTS

1.0 INTERVIEW SUMMARIES

1.1 Interview: U S Airways Accident Captain Rory Dale Higman,

Date: May 7, 2012
Location: Phone interview
Time: 1500 eastern daylight time (EDT)[1]

Present: David Tew – NTSB; Brent Holman – U S Airways; Larry Rooney – USAPA; Bob Kanive – FAA

Captain Higman did not have a representative.

During the interview, Captain Higman stated the following information:

- He was 46 years old
- He hired on as a pilot instructor with America West Airlines in January 1995. His U S Airways pilot seniority date was April, 1997.
- He had about 9,300 total flying hours which included about 8,500 flight hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) and about 5,300 flight hours on the Airbus A-320 airplane. He said he flew the A-320 as a first officer (F/O) for a "couple years" and his F/O time on the A-320 was about 700 flight hours.
- He was not currently an instructor with the airline as U S Airways did not allow captains to be instructors.
- He was not a check airman.
- While flying with U S Airways, he also worked as a chief pilot for Southwest Jet Aviation, a Part 135 operation based in Scottsdale, AZ. He had received approval from U S Airways to work at Southwest Jet Aviation.
- Prior to America West/U S Airways, he worked for Arizona Airways which was based in Tucson, AZ. He flew as a captain on the BE-1900 and the Dash 8 airplanes.
- Prior to America West/U S Airways, he worked for Native Air Ambulance in Phoenix, AZ and flew the Citation 560XL.
- When he was an instructor at America West, he worked 15 duty periods a month.
- On the day of the turbulence event, he awoke about 0730 Mountain Standard Time (MST). He said he had slept "great". He was at his commuter pad in Phoenix because he was on a "reserve day"[2]. He lived in Colorado. He spent the day at a friend's house working on a project to fix an old radio. He requested the accident trip since it was in open flying[3]. He took a nap in the afternoon. He departed for the airport at about 1930 MST. He had a scheduled departure time of 2045 MST. The accident flight was the first flight on the first day of a scheduled 4 day trip.

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[1] All times are EDT unless otherwise stated.
[2] Reserve day - when a crewmember is considered on duty but does not have any assigned flying but has to be prepared to fly when needed.
[3] Open flying - U S Airways listed flight sequences / trips as open flying when they had not been assigned a complete crew. Crewmembers could select a trip from open flying if desired.

- The day before the accident, he was in Phoenix and awoke about 0730 MST after sleeping "well". He was on reserve from 1300 MST to 2300 MST. During the day, he relaxed and did "normal" activities. He went to bed at about 2200 to 2230 MST.
- Two days prior to the accident day, he was at his home in Colorado. He said he awoke about 0530 Mountain Daylight Time (MDT). He did not recall what he did but thought he did some lawn chores. He took his kids to school in the morning. He said he departed Grand Junction, CO about 1825 MDT on a flight to Phoenix, AZ. He arrived in Phoenix at 1825 MST.
- He had an incident in February 1987 when he was being trained in instrument flying. He was flying a Cessna 182RJ and was unable to get the nose gear to extend.
- He had no previous accidents or violations.
- He failed a flight test for a commercial multi-engine rating when his airspeed slowed below "the blue line" on the airspeed indicator.
- The accident airplane did not have any maintenance items except for a lavatory that was inoperative.
- There was nothing unusual about the weather information in his departure paperwork. It contained a "straight forward" weather package. He said he usually looked to see if there were any fuel additions in the paperwork as that was often any indicator of weather or delays. He reviewed the turbulence plot in the paperwork and it had "zeros" so no turbulence was indicated. He said a zero on the turbulence plot indicated no turbulence and a 4 would indicate moderate turbulence. He reviewed the turbulence plot with the flight attendants (F/As) during his briefing to them. He briefed the F/As that should be no problem getting into Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado.
- There were no pilot reports (PIREPs) or air traffic control (ATC) reports of weather prior to the event.
- The seat belt sign was on at the time the event occurred. He had left the seat belt sign on during the entire flight to allow the F/As could do their service.
- During cruise flight, he made a passenger address (PA) to the passengers describing the DEN weather.
- During cruise flight at 39,000 feet altitude, they had a smooth ride and clear visibility. He was the pilot monitoring (PM).
- During their descent, as they were approaching 32,000 feet, he noticed the airspeed increasing and "knew" the airspeed was going to go into the overspeed region. He said he disconnected the autopilot and said "overspeed". Captain Higman said he was pitching the airplane nose up to control the airspeed. The F/O, who was the flying pilot (FP), also got on the flight control and we were both pulling the controls aft. The aircraft made an aural announcement of "dual input" so I released the control. Captain Higman said the when they hit the turbulence, he was not on the flight control and that the F/O was flying the airplane.
- There was no warning before they were "jolted" by the turbulence.
- He said that when both pilots pull on the flight controls, the airplane will not exceed the maximum pitch that the pilots are inputting.
- When he saw the airspeed increasing, his first thought was that they were experiencing a mountain wave activity. He said the A-320 autopilot will normally handle mountain wave activity.

- He was "surprised" how smooth the ride was when the airspeed increased.
- They received a "jolt" that was "not like any turbulence I had felt before".
- During the turbulence encounter, the F/O held about a 7 to 10 degree pitchup. Captain Higman said the pitchup was not excessive. The F/O kept the wings level.
- The airspeed stabilized.
- After the encounter, he noticed that the ELAC[4] 1 and 2 had faulted due to the "out of normal" G [gravity] loads they had experienced. He said he fixed the ELACs using the ECAM[5] procedure.
- He reported to ATC that they had encountered a severe mountain wave and could not control their airspeed.
- They decided to keep the airspeed at 260 knots because they did not know if they had any damage to the airplane.
- He called the A F/A to assess the damage. He felt some passengers might have gotten hurt. The F/A said there were four passengers, who had not been wearing their seatbelts, who had been hurt. The A F/A said she was in her seat when they hit the turbulence. The F/A said she could see "bodies" on the floor of the aft galley.
- Captain Higman said that after the ride was smooth again, he asked the A F/A to assess the situation and get back to me. A few minutes later the A F/A reported that there were two F/As hurt. She said the hurt F/As had been on their jumpseat but did not have their seatbelts on when they encountered turbulence. She said she thought one F/A had possibly broken an arm. She also said a doctor and nurse were attending to the injured F/As. She said two passengers had hit the ceiling.
- We were near OJAY intersection at that time
- I informed dispatch that we had encountered severe turbulence and would need paramedics. Dispatch said they had no reports of turbulence.
- He had wanted to give the F/A plenty of time to prepare the cabin for landing. He asked if she was ready for an approach. She said she was ready and the cabin was secure. Captain Higman said he felt like the F/A did a really good job.
- He informed ATC of the turbulence and the controller replied that was the first report they had of turbulence.
- One passenger refused medical attention and one passenger wanted to be "checked out".
- He declared a medical emergency and requested paramedics.
- He said they were the number one airplane for the approach but still declared a medical emergency.
- He did not know if the airplane had any damage, but it seemed to fly okay.
- There was no problem with ATC getting us on the ground.
- The F/O was calm and collected.
- After we got on the ground, it was a normal operation except we had to wait maybe 60-90 seconds for ground personnel to come park us.
- The paramedics came through the gate area to board the airplane.
- He said he had a lot going on in the cockpit so he did not walk around the airplane.

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[4] ELAC – elevator aileron control computer
[5] ECAM – electronic centralized aircraft monitor

1.2 Interview: US Airways accident First Officer (F/O) Steven John Stackelhouse

Date: May 7, 2012
Location: Phone interview
Time: 1300 EDT

F/O Stackelhouse was represented by John Sabel, USAPA

Present were: David Tew – NTSB; Brent Holman – U S Airways; Larry Rooney – USAPA; Bob Kanive – FAA

During the interview, F/O Stackelhouse stated the following information:

- He was 43 years old.
- His date of hire at U S Airways was October 23, 2000.
- His total flying time was about 13,000 flight hours which included about 1,300 flight hours as pilot-in-command and about 8,000 flight hours on the A-320.
- He had not flown as captain at U S Airways.
- He had been a check airman at a Part 142 operator, but never at a Part 121 operator
- From 1993 to 1995, he flew a Beech 1900 for G P Express. The company went out of business
- From 1996 to 1998, he worked for a Part 142 operator as Director of Training. They operated the Beech 1900.
- On the day of the accident, he awoke about 0630 MDT. He had slept "good". He went to his boys' baseball tournament and was there till about 1500 when he went home. He lived in Denver, CO and was based in Phoenix, AZ. He departed his home at 1630 MDT and caught an 1820 MDT flight to Phoenix which arrived about 2000 MST. His check-in for duty was at 2045 MST.
- He had four days off prior to the accident day.
- On the day before the accident, he awoke about 0700 and said he had slept "good". He took his kids to school in the morning. He then had various appointments till noon. In the afternoon, he worked around his house then picked up his kids from school. He took his kids to baseball practice. He went to bed about 2300.
- Two days before the accident, he awoke about 0700 and said he had slept "good". He took his kids to school and then worked on his house.
- He had no medical problems and said he felt good. He said he took the medication allopurinol for gout and the medication exforgen for high blood pressure
- He had no previous accidents, incidents, or violations.
- He had never had a turbulence event with injuries.
- He had failed a checkride for his certified flight instructor rating in 1989 and also failed a checkride for an airline transport pilot rating in 1994 on the Beech 1900. He had never had a failure during training at U S Airways.
- He had weather training during ground school and during line flying.

- During simulator training, the instructor turned the turbulence on to moderate to simulate what you would feel in the airplane.
- The captain got their flight departure paperwork. F/O Stackelhouse said he checked the flight plan and time and also looked at the turbulence plot. The turbulence plot was on the dispatch release paperwork and was a number system that gave an overview of turbulence enroute. He said the captains use the turbulence plot during the F/A briefings. The numbers in the plot ranged from 0 to 7. A 0 would indicate nil [no] turbulence, a 3 would indicate light to occasionally moderate turbulence, and a 4 or 5 would indicate moderate turbulence. The plot was broken down by the areas where they went. Dispatch would make a remark if necessary. There was nothing unusual about their plot for the accident flight. The plot had all 0s. This agreed with what he knew since he had just flown from Denver and the flight was smooth. He had never seen higher than a 3 on the plot because dispatch would have already re-routed the flight if turbulence was present. He thought the information for the turbulence plot came from Northwest Airlines.
- When they flew into Denver there was occasionally some mountain wave activity but usually that occurred further out from Denver and more to the east than where they encountered turbulence. He had encountered some light to moderate turbulence before when flying into Denver but never had he seen turbulence like they encountered.
- He was on the first leg on the first day of a scheduled four day trip.
- There were no warnings of turbulence from either dispatch or ATC. There had been no radio communications about any turbulence.
- He thought the captain had done a preflight briefing to the F/As but he did not hear it.
- When he arrived at the airplane, the captain had already performed the pre-flight inspection.
- There were no maintenance write-ups on the airplane that he recalled
- F/O Stackelhouse was the pilot flying (PF) for the accident flight.
- He had flown with the accident captain previously about one year before.
- The captain had been his simulator instructor during his initial training on the airplane in 2002. He had about 5 or 6 simulator training sessions with him. The captain had also been the chief pilot of G P Express in 1993 when the F/O had worked there. He did not really know him at G P Express which was not unusual since they had about 200 pilots.
- The flight operated normally prior to the turbulence encounter.
- He said the seat belt sign was on when then encountered turbulence and he did not know if it had been turned off previously
- The autopilot was on but he was commanding the descent manually in open descent mode. He was descending to cross LARKS intersection at 17,000 feet.
- The captain noticed the airspeed was increasing as we descended through 32,000 feet. The F/O said, at the time, he was "heads down" writing down his Denver phone number to give to the captain. He heard the captain say "overspeed" and he looked and saw the airspeed was going toward redline. The autothrust function should have handled the speed. He thought the speed increased because they entered a mountain wave.
- The captain turned the autopilot off and we both pitched the airplane nose up, but we still got an overspeed warning
- When asked who was controlling the airplane, the F/O said the captain's actions were instinctive. The captain pitched the airplane nose up and the F/O said he was pitching the

nose up. The F/O said he was the FP so he "acted". The F/O said he was not initially aware the captain was on the controls. He said the airplane did not pitch up too much as it doesn't normally allow extreme movements. He said it would be difficult to make an extreme movement with the airplane.

- F/O Stackelhouse said that he had the airplane and tried to keep the wings level and have a slightly nose-up attitude. The captain told him to talk to ATC. The captain talked to the F/A.
- The captain then contacted dispatch via ACARS.
- There was no visible weather and we were in VMC conditions. We could see a cloud layer lower down. We had the radar on and were getting no significant returns and what returns we saw on the radar were to the east and north of Denver. The returns were green which meant they were not significant and they were at lower levels.
- After the turbulence, we had ELAC[6] 1 and 2 failure indications and the captain reset the faults. The F/O said he did not notice any problem flying the airplane with the faults.
- The captain talked to the F/A to find out if there were any injuries in the back.
- I contacted Denver ATC and gave a pilot report of severe turbulence.
- The captain told me that there were F/As injured and possible some passengers.
- We were very busy with the airplane, but the captain later declared a medical emergency. The captain notified ATC of the injuries. We were headed straight toward the airport so did not ask for priority handling.
- After we got the airplane under control we started doing checklists. Everything operated normal after the event.
- We asked for paramedics to meet the airplane.
- When we were on the ground near our gate, we had to wait about two minutes for ground personnel to come and help us park. It was busy at that time and the personnel came running over. He did not know if the ground personnel knew there was a medical emergency onboard.
- The paramedics came on the airplane from the gate area via the jetway.
- He did not see the paramedics when they treated the injured people.
- He had told the passengers to remain seated so the paramedics could board and treat the injured people.
- F/O Stackelhouse went to the back of the airplane to disarm the doors since the F/As were hurt and on the floor.
- He did a post-flight walk around of the airplane but did not see any external damage. There was damage inside the airplane
- The captain talked to dispatch on the ground.
- The F/O said he had never experienced anything like that before and never wanted to experience something like that again. He said everything seemed to slow down during the event. He said he was just trying to maintain control of the airplane during the event. He said he went into an "all business mode" which was "intense" and did as he was trained.
- When both pilots pull on the flight control at the same time, when the airplane reaches a limit it does not go any further.

[6] ELAC – elevator aileron control computer

- The captain was using the ECAM procedure to reset the ELACs. He got the airplane back to normal "pretty quick".
- The captain did not ask the F/As to be seated prior to the event because we had no fore warning
- Asked to describe the sequence of events, he replied the captain disconnected the autopilot and pitched the airplane nose up, we got an overspeed warning and then encountered turbulence.
- He was aware of the degraded mode due to the ELAC disconnects.

2.0 WRITTEN STATEMENTS

2.1 US Airways Captain Rory Higman

04/18/2012
Mr. Alberto,
Here is my description of event which took place in regards to Flight 496 from Phoenix to Denver, April 14, 2012.

Upon arriving at the aircraft 808 I reviewed the logbook and release. As the First Officer had not arrived yet I performed the walk around liking to get things looked over as soon as possible. Noting the fuel requirements included an alternate and some hold fuel I reviewed the destination and alternate current and forecast weather. There were no fuel additions for possible turbulence or mountain wave avoidance. Nor were there any dispatcher remarks regarding mountain wave activity on our planned route or altitude avoidance. I also reviewed the turbulence plot on the release in case the flight attendants needed to be made aware of a time when caution should be taken. There were only zero's. Additionally there were no pilot reports of mountain wave. Finishing the walk around I talked with the flight attendants informing them of the alternate on the release and that the weather in Denver would not warrant a diversion. Possible mountain wave was not discussed. Ironically, the last words in the interest of safety I used when talking to the flight attendants were, "Don't get hurt."
The flight proceeded normally until after the descent was initiated into Denver from FL390. The weather was VMC at altitude. We had been cleared direct to the Larks intersection on the arrival and to descend to 17,000 feet. The seat belt sign was on. I had briefed the passengers of the Denver weather and told them we were beginning the descent. First Officer Stackelhouse was the flying pilot. The flight had been smooth the entire time at altitude and was smooth in the descent. Noting some convective activity well to the east I turned on the radar and confirmed there was no radar activity between us and Denver. Approaching FL320 I observed the airspeed increasing rapidly. There was no change in flight path associated with the increase in airspeed. It was clear to me the speed would exceed limits immediately so I called out "overspeed" and disconnected the autopilot and began pitching the nose up. Mr. Stackelhouse followed my actions and knowing he was flying the plane I released the sidestick. We received the overspeed warning and encountered severe turbulence. The jolt to the aircraft was significant. ELAC's 1 and 2 faulted as Mr. Stackelhouse held the wings level and maintained a constant pitch through the jolt. The turbulence ended as quickly as it appeared out of nowhere. The event seemed to take place in a period of ten to fifteen seconds. We were stabilized again at approximately FL300. I told Mr. Stackelhouse to continue to fly the aircraft

and I would accomplish ECAM actions which included a successful reset or the ELAC's. Alarmed at the severity and surprise of the event I notified ATC. His response gave the impression that it was the first report he had had. He may have used those words. I then called back to the A flight attendant to access the cabin situation. She said that she was on her jumpseat and was okay but that there were bodies lying in the back galley. The plan was for her to further assess and report back. We continued the descent to Denver and I used ACARS to inform dispatch of the severe wave activity. Several minutes later the A flight attendant reported the B and C attendants were injured with possible broken bones and were being cared for by a Doctor and Nurse. She said they were sitting on their jumpseats when the turbulence hit and had impacted the ceiling. I told her to secure the cabin for landing and to report back when the cabin was ready. By this time we were working with approach control. The flight remained smooth while in clear air and we only experienced light chop in the clouds on the approach. There was also some light icing which was later reported. Not hearing from the A attendant I called back to verify that she was ready to land and was told that there were additional injuries of two passengers and the severity of the flight attendants was worse than we discussed earlier. We had told the controllers that we needed paramedics at the gate and I also declared a medical emergency with the approach controller. While knowing we were number one for the runway it may not have made much difference to the controller however I wanted to be able to exercise emergency authority if needed. Arriving at the gate we were met by paramedics. The passengers were briefed to remain in their seats until they had a chance to make their way to the aft galley. There were several announcements being made by the Denver agents. The dispatcher requested I call him so I did. He mentioned that there was no warning of the mountain wave activity that he could have passed along. A mechanic was also at close hand and we worked with him to be as informative as possible. When finished with these tasks I made my way past the few remaining passengers to the aft galley. I spoke with both passengers who hit the ceiling. One gentleman (row 10) was returning from the lav and had not yet fastened his seatbelt when the jolt hit, the other (row 19) stated that he just didn't have his on. He had a slight smell of alcohol and I was told that he was going to refuse care initially. I greeted the B and C flight attendants briefly as the paramedics were ready to transport them.
These are the events as I can best remember.

Rory Higman

2.2 US Airways F/O Steven Stackelhouse

April 23, 2012

Conrad Alberto, Jr.
Flight Safety Investigator
US Airways
480-693-4941

Steven Stackelhouse
22301 Quail Run Way
Parker, CO 80138
303-681-7075

Dear Mr. Alberto,

Here is my description of the incident that occurred on flight 496 on April 14, 2012.

I arrived at the airplane and greeted Captain Higman. He mentioned that he had completed the preflight walk-around already, so I introduced myself to the 2 flight attendants in the forward galley at the time and began my preflight preparations. I had just commuted to Phoenix from Denver on flight 491. Although, there was light rain in Denver when I left, the flight was smooth except for some light chop on the descent into PHX. My expectations for the return flight to Denver were for mostly smooth air.

We had been cleared direct to LARKS intersection and began our descent to 17000 feet. There were no reports from pilots or ATC of turbulence. We were in VMC conditions and had had a smooth flight up to now. Captain Higman had turned the radar on earlier, but I did not see any radar returns between Denver and us. The seatbelt sign was on. As we descended through about 32000 feet Captain Higman noticed increasing airspeed. He called out "increasing airspeed." He turned the autopilot off and began pitching the airplane up. I immediately joined him on the controls and began pitching the airplane up. Captain Higman then relinquished control to me. It was all I could do to maintain a wings level, nose-up attitude. We were really getting tossed about. The episode seemed to last about 10 to 15 seconds. The overspeed warning sounded and ELAC 1 and 2 ECAM messages appeared. We hit severe turbulence due to mountain wave. As we came out the back-side of the turbulence our speed had slowed to around 260 knots with the nose pitched up, yet we were at about 30000 feet; as I recall.

Captain Higman then reaffirmed my duties as flying pilot and asked me to monitor the ATC frequency, while he issued a PIREP, performed ECAM actions and contacted the Flight Attendants and Dispatch. The Captain then declared a medical emergency with ATC as he was made aware of injuries to the Flight Attendants and possibly passengers. We were not in a position, time-wise, to contact med-link. I focused on flying the airplane, getting the descent back on profile and preparing for landing. I do recall that we were not able to accomplish the descent/approach checklist until about 12000 feet, as Captain Higman was extremely busy talking to the A flight attendant, sending ACARS

messages to dispatch, etc. A normal descent and landing occurred and we taxied to the gate where Paramedics were standing by. I briefed the passengers to remain seated until the Paramedics could attend to the injured. Captain Higman also asked me to immediately go to the aft galley and unarm both cabin doors and check on the status of the passengers and flight attendants. I unarmed the two aft doors after climbing over the flight attendants that were laying on the galley floor. The Paramedics quickly arrived and I returned to the cockpit to brief Captain Higman. I then proceeded outside to do my post-flight walkaround, at which point I ran into the mechanic. The mechanic had already been walking around the aircraft. I completed my walkaround and noted that there were no exterior signs of damage. The mechanic and I then proceeded up the jetway to the cockpit. Captain Higman was on the phone with the dispatcher when we arrived. The mechanic and the Captain discussed how and what had occurred and decided on the best course of action. I left the cockpit and began greeting the passengers as they deplaned and tried to make myself as useful as possible to the gate agents and passengers.

These are the events as best I can recall.

Steven Stackelhouse

2.3 - "A" FLIGHT ATTENDANT DIANE USTRUD

NTSB
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594

To whom it may concern,

Here is my account of the incident of Flight 496 on April 14th. PHX-DEN flight was uneventful with little to no turbulence. About 25 minutes before scheduled landing, I was sitting on my jumpseat in the forward galley. I thought the seat belt sign was off, since it was smooth air and we had not yet started our initial descent, but I have been told that the pilots said it was on. All of a sudden without any warning whatsoever, this came out of NO WHERE - - - BAM ! ! SEVERE TURBULENCE. The aircraft dipped side to side violently for about 10 seconds. I was not strapped in. I did not fall off my jumpseat - I grabbed the handle by the door to hold on. After the shaking stopped I sat in my jumpseat for about 20 - 30 more seconds - not knowing if I should get up or not at this point in case there were to be more turbulence. I quickly checked on my First Class passengers, and they were alright. I noticed a woman running back to the aft galley and knew something was wrong. When I arrived at the back of the aircraft - the woman, a doctor, was already attending to the 2 Flight Attendants who were laying side by side on the galley floor, and also there was a nurse attending to them also. The Flight Attendants were conscious but obviously in a lot of pain. They had been seated on the jumpseat, hit both their heads on the ceiling which made a huge crack/hole in the ceiling. Then they came crashing down on the floor, and I think he must have landed on her. The doctor and nurse did a phenomenal job in attending to these people. They assured me that they had the situation under control, and I should do what I needed to do at this point in order to prepare for our landing. I then went forward to call the Captain from my front phone because I wanted to quickly assess the cabin and passengers in order to tell the Captain. I called him and reported everything to him. He told me to secure the cabin for landing and he would call me back to verify that we were indeed ready for landing. At this point I walked through the cabin stopping at each row to make sure the passengers were safe. There were 2 passengers who hit their heads: one man on the ceiling and the other young man on the side wall making a big dent in the wall. I got a bag of ice for the one man, and the other younger gentleman said he did not need any ice or anything. I once again confirmed with the doctor and nurse that everything was stable for landing. They stayed seated on the floor next to the Flight Attendants for landing. The Captain called me and asked if the cabin was secure for landing and I assured him it was. I sat in my jumpseat , we landed. At the gate, the paramedics came on board immediately to assess the condition of the Flight Attendants. They determined that we could deplane the passengers, which we did, and then they carried both Flight Attendants on stretchers with neck braces on, off the aircraft. Paramedics attended to the man with the neck injury and he also went to the hospital. The younger man refused medical treatment.

Diane Ustrud

Diane Ustrud C 6351/ 258025 'A' position Written on April 18, 2012

2.4. "B" FLIGHT ATTENDANT STEPHANIE FREEMAN

Wednesday 4/18/12 10:13a.m.

Stephanie Freeman statement regarding F496 14APR 2012 PHX/DEN Tail# 808 Equip. A319

Statement dictated by Stephanie Freeman, recorded by PHX Inflight Supervisor Mary Fosberg. In attendance were Stephanie, AFA EAP Representative Benjamin Gonzalez, and myself. On the phone via conference call was AFA Safety Chair Dauna Slater.

I, Stephanie Freeman am providing my statement below:

I was working the B FA position in the aft galley. There were turbulence communications coming out of PHX to stay seated. We were seated for a little bit, and that was all the turbulence prior to the event that I can remember. I just did the regular level off announcement, fasten seat belt sign. I made another fasten seat belt announcement at the top of descent to remain seated for the duration of the flight. Compliance checks were made after the "remain seated" announcement at the top of descent. The air was smooth while sitting in the jumpseat- it just came out of nowhere, there was no time to react. The Fasten Seat Belt sign was on.

Stephanie Freeman
4/18/12

2.5 "C" FLIGHT ATTENDANT TOM GAUTHREAUX

April 19, 2012

NTSB
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594

To whom it may concern,

Flt. 496 PHX- DEN
April 14, 2012
Cabin Crew: (A) Diane Ustrud, (B) Stephanie Freeman, (C) Thomas Gauthreaux

At the top of decent, just before final, I had completed a walk through trash service/compliance check. The seatbelt sign was on. There had been no concerns about the flight during the standard briefing. I sat next to Stephanie in the double rear facing jumpseat. The cabin was prepared. The passengers were in compliance and the seatbelt sign was on. We were waiting for the double ding indicating our final decent into Denver. Shortly after sitting down, I felt a rapid change in the pitch of the plane. The aircraft pointed down and there was an intense vibration and loud rumbling noise. It also felt like we were picking up speed. As the speed increased, it felt like the weight of my own body increased also. This sensation seemed to have lasted about five seconds. We then were catapulted up to the ceiling as if it were the floor. Our heads made a hole in the ceiling. Then within that same second, we smacked down on the floor. Having the wind knocked out of us, we could not move or communicate. There were medical professionals on board who assisted us until the paramedics arrived after landing in Denver. We were then rushed to the Denver hospital with multiple injuries.

Tom Gauthreaux

T. Gauthreaux

US Airways Flight Attendant