

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

Attachment 3 – Dubai One Captain Interview

**OPERATIONS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE SUPPORT TO
THE U.S. ACCREDITED REPRESENTATIVE**

DCA10RA092

Interview: Paddy Hirst, Dubai One Captain

Date: September 8, 2010

Location: Telephone call

Time: 1415 GST

Present in Abu Dhabi were: David Lawrence, Katherine Wilson - NTSB

Represented by: NA

Capt. Hirst was flying to Dubai. The flight was level at FL390 and they switched to the Bahrain frequency. Commotion was heard on the radio. They were issued a descent clearance and Bahrain control asked the crew to relay information to UPS 6. It happened suddenly and there was no time to ask about the nature of the event. It sounded urgent.

The Dubai One crew made 2-way contact with UPS 6. UPS 6 needed position reports; they were flying blind. It was a futile effort because UPS 6 was in a desperate situation. UPS 6 asked them to tell them their position, to turn left or right and how many degrees. Capt. Hirst told Bahrain this.

Bahrain said UPS 6 was at 7000', to descend, that they were 10 miles from Dubai, and they were cleared to land on runway 12L. Capt. Hirst relayed this to UPS 6. Capt. Hirst realized that UPS 6 was too high and too fast.

After overflying the airfield, Bahrain suggested UPS 6 land at Sarjah, but UPS 6 was so close; he was too fast, too high, too close.

Bahrain gave Capt. Hirst a readout – UPS 6 was at 1500', 1000', and climb immediately. There was no response from UPS 6.

When communicating with UPS 6, Capt. Hirst said it sounded like the pilot had his oxygen mask on. He only spoke to one of the UPS 6 pilots and thought it was probably the first officer.

Capt. Hirst did not recall Bahrain relaying a suggested altitude to UPS 6, but rather headings and the ILS frequency. He said it sounded desperate. It was no good giving UPS 6 that information. UPS 6 wanted to know to turn left or right and how many degrees, and their position related to Dubai.

Pilots were stepping on each other on the frequency. There was a 3rd person on the frequency. 4-5 times a transmission was blocked because they were 'standing on each other'. It made it difficult.

The last clearance given to UPS was an altimeter readout and that they were getting too low.

Dubai One was monitoring 121.5, however, before their descent, Capt. Hirst went to the washroom and called his company requiring him to turn from 121.5, but then he went back. It was about that time that Bahrain gave them their descent clearance. Capt. Hirst did not hear anything on 121.5. He said the captain of Dubai One started the communications with UPS 6 but

then gave it to me. The captain said he had 'box 1' and was flying the airplane, and Capt. Hirst had 'box2'. Capt. Hirst talked with UPS 6 for about 6 minutes and then radar contact was lost. He did not hear an ELT on 121.5 after radar contact was lost.

The last transmission from UPS 6 was asking "what should I do?" The pilot of UPS 6 was very distressed. Capt. Hirst did not get a response from UPS 6 about landing at Sarjah. UPS 6 only asked for position, speed, and how many degrees to turn, and never read back any information that was relayed to them.