NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

Attachment 1 - Interview Summaries

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

DCA11MA075

Contents

A. ACCIDENT

Operator:	Omega Air Refueling
Location:	Point Mugu NAS, California
Date:	May 18, 2011
Airplane:	Boeing 707

B. SUMMARY

On May 18, 2011, at about 1727 pm local time (0027 UTC), Omega Air flight 70, a Boeing 707 (N707AR), crashed on takeoff at the Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California The airplane impacted beyond the departure end of runway 21 and was destroyed by post-impact fire. All three flight crewmembers aboard escaped with minor injuries.

C. OPERATIONS GROUP

Captain David Lawrence - Chairman
Senior Air Safety Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
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Washington, DC 20594

Captain John Banitt
B707 Flight Standardization Officer
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Mr. Tony James
Air Safety Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
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D. POINT MUGU INTERVIEWS

1.0 Interview: John Banitt, B707 Captain, Flight Standards Officer, Omega Air Refueling

Date: January 20, 2010
Location: Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California
Time: 1425 PDT
Present were: David Lawrence - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Robert Drake - FAA; Michael Coker – Boeing.

During the interview Captain Banitt stated the following:

His name was John Elliot Banitt, and he was the Flight Standardization Officer and B707 Captain for Omega Air Refueling. He was hired by Omega Air in 2008 a contractor, and said all employees were contracted at that time. On April 1, 2010, all Omega flight crew employees

became part time. His schedule was usually 2 weeks on, and 3 weeks off. He was in the Navy starting in 1998, and completed flight school in 1992. He flew at Tinker Air Force Base on the B707's with the Navy, and also was an instructor on E6's. He left the Navy in November of 1999 and was hired by United Airlines on March 13, 2000, and was subsequently furloughed. He flew GS work and also flew for John Travolta before returning to United in June of 2007 until October 2008.

His total time was about 6500 hours, with 4400 of that in the B707. He had 3200 hours of PIC on the B707, and also held type ratings on the G-II, B737, and B707/720.

On the day of the accident, he said he went to preflight his B707, waiting for their operations to determine if his flight would substitute for a military tanker with a maintenance issue. He said he got a call from Omega ops that the military aircraft was fixed and they would not be departing, and started shutting down their aircraft. He said he hung around to watch the other aircraft depart. He sat in the captain's seat on his aircraft and watched the aircraft taxi out. He then got up to stand in the opening of the main cabin door.

He said he saw the aircraft taxi straight out, with no line up and wait. He heard the engines spool up and begin its takeoff roll. He said everything looked "great" and the sounds were normal. He saw the aircraft rotate with a normal pitch attitude, and saw it leave the ground. He said he was about to go inside when he saw a large flash and a "separation" from the #2 engine area. He then saw debris and fire. Shortly after, he saw the plane level off, then go behind a tower obstructing his view. He said he grabbed his phone and car keys, and he and the FE drove to the site. He said he called their operations folks, and then he called his wife. He drove to where the smoke was, and saw fire on the airplane. He said he tried to find the crew.

He said the weather was sunny and windy, and was gusty earlier. He said the limits for the B707 was about 31 knots, based upon the charts. The forecast was for the winds to "die off". Their scheduled takeoff was 1830, and when he called the tower, the winds were going down. He recalled the winds as 280 degrees at 22-23 knots. He did not see any problems with the initial takeoff. He did not see any roll inputs from the airplane. He did not see any spoilers deploy on the aircraft. He said the flash was on the front of the wing at the #2 position. It looked like the motor had separated. He said he saw parts come over the wing simultaneous with the flash. He did not hear any "bang" prior to the flash.

He said he had flown with all of the accident flight crewmembers. He said that the Captain, Chris Thurman, was an excellent pilot, and that if he had to pick someone to fly with, it would be him. He knew him from the Navy, and that he flew the Airbus at United.

He said that the F/O, Joe Becker, was dual qualified on the DC10 and was Captain qualified on the B707 but flew as F/O. He had no issues with the F/O.

He said he had never had an emergency with any of the accident crewmembers. He did not know of any alcohol or drug problems with any of the crewmembers.

He said he went to the Ventura County hospital to meet the crew after first being told they were at St. John's. Their ops told them they were at Ventura. When he arrived, the doctors were still assessing the crew. He said all of them walked in under their own power. After the doctor told him he could go back, he saw Chris first, and noticed no visible signs of impairment. He was kept for x-rays, but there appear to be nothing broken. He said he then called the company and advised them of the crew's location.

He said he made a request to the doctor for the crew to receive drug and alcohol testing, as per their emergency checklist. The doctor advised him of a chain of custody concern, and didn't see a need to perform the testing. He said he personally would have wanted to be tested.

One pilot then appeared, and was visibly shaken, upset, and had an elevated blood pressure. He said the crew began talking normally, and there was no sign of impairment, slurred speech, and the only complaints were a sore knee and sore neck.

He said his impression of the FE was that he was an Air Force guy whom he flew with years ago. He had been with the company for a long time, was very professional, knowledgeable, a he was like the "lead FE".

He said the Captain lived in Kansas City, the F/O lived in Mustang, Oklahoma, and the FO lived somewhere in Arkansas.

Interview concluded at 1455 PDT.

2.0 Interview: Craig Perry, Omega Air Mechanic

Date: January 20, 2010
Location: Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California
Time: 1515 PDT
Present were: David Lawrence - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Robert Drake - FAA; Michael Coker – Boeing; John Banitt – Omega Air Refueling.

Craig Kendall Petty

His name was Craig Kendall Perry. Mr. Petty was a 21 year old flight mechanic with Omega Aerial Refueling Services and received his Airframes and Powerplant certificate in March 2010. He has been with Omega for one year and two months working on 707's the entire time.

Mr. Petty was on the North ramp at the edge of the parking lot by the hangar and observed the aircraft during the take off roll. He observed the aircraft rotate, lift off, climb 10-20 feet and crab into the wind. Shortly after liftoff he saw an orange flash and debris departing the left wing. He did not recall if the debris went over or under the wing. He then lost sight of the aircraft from his vantage point. When asked if the aircraft banked Mr. Petty stated that the aircraft did not bank but crabbed into the wind. He did not hear the aircraft impact the ground.

Mr. Petty was asked about the start and taxi evolution. He was present for engine start and noted no issues during the start sequence. The aircraft pulled from the chocks checked brakes and stopped after moving 10-20 feet. The aircraft was stopped for a period of time and he observed the pilots talking to each other and then resumed taxi.

Additionally Mr. Petty noted there were no noted brake issues with the aircraft or maintenance discrepancies.

Interview concluded at 1540 PDT.

3.0 Interviewee: Andrew Michael Jeppson, Undesignated Airman, Maintenance Department

Date: January 20, 2010
Location: Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California
Time: 1545 PDT
Present were: David Lawrence - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Robert Drake - FAA; Michael Coker – Boeing.

He stated he was standing between the Hawkeye hanger and LOX building facing the runway talking to three of his shipmates whose backs were to the runway. He said that he saw the aircraft for about 2 seconds from the time it came into his field of view until the time it left his field of view.

He told the people he was talking to "yeah look that plane is on fire". He said that the aircraft was on the ground the entire time and that something on the port side of the aircraft was on fire which he believed to be one of the engines. He also stated that all the landing gear were on the ground and rolling and that after the aircraft left his field of view and all he could see was the tail, it appeared to drop, followed shortly by a lot of smoke. He said that during this time he did not hear anything.

Interview concluded at 1555 PDT.

4.0 Interviewee: Michael James Grainger, Omega Air Refueling Mechanic

Date: January 20, 2010
Location: Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California
Time: 1600 PDT
Present were: David Lawrence - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Robert Drake - FAA; Michael Coker – Boeing.

During the interview, Mr. Grainger stated the following:

Michael James Grainger is an Airframe and Power plant Mechanic with Omega Air Refueling. He has been a licensed mechanic for 32 years with approximately 25 years experience on the B-707 and has been with Omega Air Refueling for six years.

He said he was one of the launch mechanics on the subject airplane the day of the accident and there were no mechanical or maintenance write-ups on the airplane nor had there been any since he arrived for his work shift at Pt Mugu on Monday, May 16th.

He said he talked to the crew prior to the event for the normal maintenance briefing and they expressed no concern over the condition of the airplane. He stated he saw no indications of impairment displayed by any of the crewmembers.

He said the engine start was carried out normally utilizing hand signals. The normal start sequence was carried out with engines #3 and #4 started followed by #2 and #1. He said the aircraft came to a complete stop after 10-20 feet of initial taxi roll. He visually inquired about a maintenance issue, observed the crew apparently talking to air traffic control and received no indications that there was an issue that needed his attention. When asked how he would communicate with the crew if a maintenance issue arose he said that he would enter the airplane through the aft pit access and enter the cockpit. He said there was an interphone capability on the aircraft with a headset stored in the E and E compartment but there was no headset on this airplane. He also stated there was no known history of recent brake condition issues on the airplane.

Mr. Grainger stated that the airplane had recently undergone a B check at the contracted maintenance facility within the prior 3 to 4 weeks. He said he had been present during the B check as the Omega representative although he did not personally perform any of the checks. He further stated that during the B check some additional visual inspections and performance of some Airworthiness Directives had been conducted in anticipation of an upcoming C check that was due in August 2011. He believed these additional visual inspections included looks at the cowling and pylon areas of the engines and may have included X-ray inspection of the pylon attachment fittings although he could not be sure. He also believed, but was not certain, that the anti-rotation pin on the diagonal braces were visually inspected. He said there was no log-book entry for removal and re-installation of the engine cowlings as this work was accomplished in accordance with and documented via the approved maintenance work cards. He said the B check was performed at Stanbaugh Aviation.

Mr. Grainger relayed that on the day of the event, following a normal engine start and taxi out of the subject airplane he moved from his ground launch position on the north ramp of Pt Mugu to the area where the crew's cars were parked and proceeded to observe the takeoff as he normally did for every flight. He commented that the takeoff roll was completely normal in his opinion and immediately after a normal rotation, the airplane crabbed into the wind with the tail moving to the left of the airplane's direction of travel. He stated that the wings were level and he believed the airplane attained an altitude of approximately 50 feet. He then saw an immediate explosion and could not determine whether it was the number one or number two engine but that it was definitely on the left wing. He said he initially believed the left wing had come off as he saw debris concurrent with the bright flash of the explosion and saw a large piece or pieces of the aircraft travelling in an upward direction. He mentioned that at the instant he observed the debris departing the airplane the rest of the aircraft was obscured by the fireball and smoke. He stated there was no roll motion observed nor was there any unusual sound.

Mr. Grainger responded to questions regarding the Safety Culture at Omega and stated that in his opinion it was good. He said that since all of their work was performed on the road that there was little opportunity for oversight from company personnel and the individual mechanics took it upon themselves to monitor each other and promote a safe operation. He said he had encountered no pressure from company management to meet schedules or perform less than safe operation.

Interview concluded at 1640 PDT.

5.0 Interviewee: Ronald Hugo Kanoff, Omega Air Refueling B707 Flight Engineer

Date: January 21, 2010
Location: Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California
Time: 1215 PDT
Present were: David Lawrence - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Robert Drake - FAA; Michael Coker – Boeing

During the interview, Mr. Kanoff stated the following:

Ronald Hugo Kanoff is a 45 year old contract flight engineer for Omega Air Refueling. He is a turbojet rated flight engineer and holds a license as an airframe and power plant mechanic. He obtained his flight engineer certificate in 1999 and has 7400 hours as flight engineer in the B-707. Additionally, Mr. Kanoff is a licensed pilot with 528 hours total time and 145 hours in the B-707 as second in command. He retired from the US Navy in 2005 and holds a BS in Aeronautics, some work towards a MS degree and is pursuing a rating as certified flight instructor. Mr. Kanoff has worked as a contract flight engineer with Principle Air, Constellation Productions and Omega Air Refueling.

On May 18th, 2011 Mr. Kanoff had completed his duties preflighting Omega's MQ aircraft in anticipation of a possible sortie. He chose to remain on the flightline and watch the departure of 707 AR aircraft. He was located in the left seat of MQ which was parked next to AR on the north ramp. He chose to sit in the left seat of MQ to get out of the wind. He stated that start and taxi of AR were normal with the minor exception that AR taxied 5-10 feet then stopped for approximately 30 seconds prior to resuming taxi for takeoff.

He said that the initial takeoff roll and rotation of AR were normal and he observed the aircraft become airborne approximately 15 to 20 feet. At that time he observed a bright flash of flame from the left wing and bits of debris departing the airplane. He then lost sight of the aircraft behind some buildings. Mr. Kanoff left the pilot's seat and moved to the entry door of MQ, an interval that he said took 2-3 seconds. He had no further sighting of the event airplane but observed a plume of smoke and fire and verbalized "They're down". Mr. Kanoff and the two other crew members of MQ then attempted to drive to the crash site.

Mr. Kanoff did not encounter the incident aircrew until approximately 1 hour after the event when they found them at the Ventura County Hospital. He said Ken McNamara, the flight

engineer on AR was in a hospital room in bed and was visibly shaken and on the verge of tears. He observed no evidence of impairment. He met with the two pilots who were mobile and uninjured and stated they were calm but shaken up. He observed no indications of impairment in either of the pilots.

He briefly discussed the accident with Chris Thurman, the PIC of AR and stated that Capt Thurman talked about the #2 throttle retarding and Ken, the FE, pushing the throttle back up. He said Capt Thurman further said he realized they were drifting left and attempted to keep the wings level but realized they were along for the ride at that point. Mr. Kanoff said Capt Thurman indicated there was an initial bounce followed by a violent stop in the bog. He then said the crew told him they immediately attempted to depart the airplane and found the cockpit door somewhat jammed but they were able to negotiate the cockpit door, and the main entry door and egressed the airplane and met in front of the airplane.

When questioned about existing weather, Mr. Kanoff said the skies were clear but it was very windy. When he did his pre-flight for MQ approximately 2.5 hours before the accident, the wind was reported as 270 degrees at 12 knots with gusts to 28.

Interview concluded at 1245 PDT.

6.0 Interviewee: John Kearns, Omega Air Refueling B707 pilot

Date: January 21, 2010
Location: Point Mugu Naval Air Station, California
Time: 1250 PDT
Present were: David Lawrence - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Robert Drake - FAA; Michael Coker – Boeing

During the interview, Mr. Kearns stated the following:

John Douglas Kearns is a 37 year old employed as a First Officer on the B-707 with Omega Air Refueling. He was hired by Omega at the end of April 2011. He has approximately 3100 hours total time with approximately 2500 hours in the B-707 with 1500 hours as PIC on the B-707. He is also rated in the Beech 400. He served as a flight mechanic with the US Coast Guard on the HH-65. Following his Coast Guard duty he attended civilian flight school and logged approximately 150 hours. He entered the US Air Force Reserve flying the KC-135 at Tinker AFB after 1 year of USAF flight training. He was copilot for 18 months followed by upgrade to aircraft commander. He was employed by Atlantic SE Airlines flying the CRJ 200 in the fall of 2005 and moved to Principle Air Services in April of 2007 flying the B-707. He left Principle Air Services in January 2011 after logging approximately 600 hours in the B-707 evenly split between PIC and SIC.

On May 18, 2011, Mr. Kearns had completed a pre flight on Omega's B-707 MQ and was standing on the airstair outside the airplane and watching the departure of Omega B-707 AR. He stated that he observed a normal taxi and takeoff of AR. He said after a normal rotation, he saw an orange ball of fire over the mid to inboard section of the left wing and something "big" came

up and over the left wing. He stated the airplane was fully airborne. He said the airplane then disappeared behind some buildings and 5 to 6 seconds later he observed a smoke and fire plume. He said his initial impression was that the aircraft had ended up at the end of the runway or between the runway and the ocean.

He said he later observed the crew at the hospital and everyone was mobile except for the Flight Engineer and all appeared shaken. He noticed no indications of alcohol or drug impairment in any of the crew and said they were "amazingly well together". He also noticed no slurred speech.

When questioned about the initial taxi out of AR, Mr. Kearns said the airplane taxied 10-20 feet then stopped briefly before resuming taxi. He indicated that he waved at the Captain of AR who smiled and waved back.

He stated there were no unusual sounds on start. He observed no evidence of compressor stall and the start was normal. When asked about the winds, he said it was very windy with what he thought to be a direct cross wind across the airplane for the start sequence and that aircraft MQ may have shielded AR from the wind somewhat.

When asked about walk around inspections, he stated that Flight Engineers and Mechanics normally did the walk around but he had done them as a pilot in other jobs.

When asked about the "big" piece of debris he observed depart the airplane he stated his initial thought was that the wing had folded.

Interview concluded at 1320 PDT.

E. OMEGA AERIAL REFUELING MANAGEMENT INTERVIEWS

7.0 Witness: "Bud" Orr, President – Omega Aerial Refueling Services (OARS)

Date/Time: 14 June, 2011 1330 EDT
Location: OARS Conference Room, Alexandria, Virginia
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Mike Coker, Boeing; Ed Boullianne, Omega Chief Operating Officer (representative).

During the interview, Mr. Orr stated the following:

His name was William "Bud" Stewart Orr, Jr. and he was 68 years old. His title was President, Omega Aerial Refueling Services, Inc. He had been with Omega three years this coming January. His previous job was running the Washington office of Cobham, a "multi-billion dollar" aerospace company. He helped start that company. He was a former navy carrier pilot where he became a wing commander. He then became a senate liaison to the navy where he got a "sub-culture degree in lobbying and politics" where he traveled around the world with members of the senate. He worked and traveled with senator McCain, who was a former flight instructor of his. He then went to work for the secretary of navy, who had left to work for Rolls

Royce. He had worked in various other offices prior to working for Cobham. The owners of omega then asked him to run their Washington office for them. He said he had known the McEvaddy's for over 20 years and had previously helped buy several B707's from them for the navy for Tacamo.

He said he then hired Ed Boullianne to help run the office. He said he was not an accountant nor a mechanic, but a fighter pilot, and relied on Ed for running the details of the company. He said he did the "forward thinking" for the company and Ed handled the details.

He said omega aerial refueling services had a small office, 3 people and an accountant, and as a cost cutting maneuver by their Irish owners made her a temporary. They had two operations vice presidents, one on the east coast and one on the west coast, who handled scheduling of the aircraft and crews. They worked with an OFSO (OARS Flight Standardization Officer). He said they used to have a chief pilot, but the Irish owners were not happy with the "authority that was intimated" by the position, and since the chief pilot commanded a high salary and wasn't required, they eliminated the chief pilots position for cost savings. The OFSO also assists in the scheduling of the air crews. He said they had several "consultants", the chief of which was the wife of the accident FE, who took the billing from the government and provided to the accountant for the "$8,136 per hour they get" for operation of the aircraft. He said it comes to about "$1 million per year to run this office" and help pay the full and part time employees.

He said the most critical positions were his two ops guys. They take the missions from the Navy and arrange for the tankering support for US Navy training missions on both the east and west coasts, Indian ocean, and all over the world. He said the Air Force is suppose to provide tanker support to the Navy, "but they don't" due to over-tasking, and that's where they come in to provide tanking when the Navy air wing "needs to be exercised" and is conducting training prior to combat. They also help extend the range of the air wing.

He said his ops guys are Bob Perrano in San Diego and Ryan Murphy in Norfolk, Virginia. He said Brian has been with the company since it began almost 10 years ago. He said Ryan is the "brain-trust", and keeps all the computer records and spreadsheets regarding the plans for what the Navy needs.

He said in addition to support of the Navy, they also fly in support of the RAAF, tanking to deliver their new super Hornets from the manufacturer in St. Louis and at Boeing. They fly support with them all the way to Australia "circuitously via islands" on the Navy contract to also help support the Navy during training operations off Australia. He said the Australians had purchased the EADS tanker, which had malfunctioned in the boom. He said $9.8 million went from EADS to the RAAF to Navco Syscom to be used to pay Omega for tankering support. He said they had done some work with the RAF, but that was outside of OARS. The aircraft were registered in the US, but the owners were in Dublin. The export license restricted their use in many parts of the world, but they could gain an export license in Ireland.

He said Ken McNamara ensured all the proper training for the flight engineers. The OFSO ensured the proper training and licensing for the pilots. He said almost all of their pilots were former military, and most were retired, which is how they saved money since they were all part

time employees and did not pay benefits to the pilots since they had their military retirement and medical insurance. He said "we really get off well, there". Most of his pilots formerly flew for Tacamo (Take Charge and Move Out), which flew nuclear support missions in B707s with CFM engines. He said that was the source of their "labor pool for pilots, those who could not get on with Fedex or one of the major airlines, for whatever reason." The other source for pilots were former KC135 pilots in the military. This provided them with a "money savings return on investment" by providing a lower cost using full-fledged, qualified pilots as part time employees.

He said when they used to fly secret missions, they were under close supervision from the DSS. They were precluded as OARS from talking to their shareholders, who were foreign owners. They now have a proxy board that allowed them to communicate directly with the board members. Omega Air Inc. is the American branch of Omega Inc. 7Q7 is the maintenance side and OARS is the operations side. He said OARS "has nothing to do with the maintenance of the aircraft". He said their maintenance provider is Stambaugh Aviation.

When asked about the FAA letter of authorization being with Omega Air Inc., but the Navy contract naming Omega Aerial Refueling Services, he said "that probably is an error".

When asked who their FAA representative was with oversight of their LOA, they did not know his name. He said OARS was directed not to speak directly to the FAA on maintenance issues, and only Kevin O'Neil, Director of Quality Assurance with Omega Inc., was allowed to speak with FAA in that regards. He said OARS leases the aircraft AMI (aircraft, maintenance, insurance). He said his OFSO coordinated with the FAA regarding crew training and certification issues and worked with Pan Am.

He said they are coming up to a new 5 year contract with the Navy in March.

He said he had never been approached by the FAA with any concerns about their public aircraft status.

He said the aircraft OARS operations are "100%" public aircraft operations. Flights operated to maintenance facilities are paid for by the Navy, and are also considered public use.

Ed Boullianne, representative, said that the experimental market survey certificate that they had is just for the modification and STC for the carriage of the refueling equipment installed in the aircraft. He said "the minute you energize it and stream it, you are no longer under Part 91." There is no FAA category for commercial services inflight refueling, so it must operate as a public aircraft. He said they could take off and fly as Part 91 "so long as the switches are cold. The minute you energize those switches, the aircraft has to be in the public use. There's no other way to operate." He said that when companies like Boeing want to use their aircraft, the only way to do it was for Boeing to take a check down to NavAir to hire OARS to fly them somewhere.

Mr. Boullianne also said there is no fuel element in any of their contracts. It doesn't matter what the price of fuel is, they don't have to pay for it.

Mr. Orr said the 7Q7 was the maintenance portion of OAR inc., and each element of Omega are not individual dba's. They now have a limited FCL that allows them free communication between the various companies.

He said the two remaining aircraft were still flying, the return to flying for the remaining 707 was predicated on ensuring the pylon AD had been complied with.

He said they had bought three additional 707s from the RAAF and were in the process of bringing them over. The first one should be in service October of this year.

Interview concluded at 1415 EDT.

8.0 Witness: Ed Boullianne, Omega Chief Operating Officer

Date/Time: 14 June, 2011 1415 EDT
Location: OARS Conference Room, Alexandria, Virginia
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Mike Coker, Boeing.

During the interview, Mr. Boullianne stated the following:

His name was Edmond Lawrence Boullianne, and he was 53 years old. His current title was Chief operating officer, and his roles and responsibilities were "everything". He was retired Navy, having started as an A&P at a vocational high school. He transferred to college and got his private, commercial, instrument CFI and MEI and 727 FE ratings. He was a NFO in the Navy and did some recruiting work.

He started work with Omega in 2009, and was not current in any aircraft. Operationally, he said "this is not a hard business to run". Last year, they did $24 million in business. He said they had two vice presidents, one on the east coast and one on the west coast, and they basically run the operations of the company. He said they make good decisions and don't question them. He said the government pays them for all the costs of the crews except for the salaries. The Navy buys 1500 hours per year based on their contract, and considers this a vital service. He said that most of their operations are on the west coast, while the air force concentrates on the east coast.

He said they were getting ready to negotiate another contract. He said the air force has responsibility for aerial refueling, but the Navy doesn't' have the lift to support their operations, so Omega provides a vital service. There was no bidding process for the contract they are currently under because they had the only Navair certified tanker available.

They do not have ops specs other than operating under Part 91 standards, but they still are always in the public use "from the minute they start the engines." He said the Navy" absolutely" has operational control of their operations. Their pilots would only fly when told to by Commander Mark Carlton "Fisk:" who worked for Connie Brown at FACFACS FACVACAPS, and they authorized each flight based upon the Navy needs. He said then their two vice presidents would

schedule the aircraft by making them available to the Navy. He said the Navy had the power to cancel a flight.

He said the MOAs that they typically would fly out to were "absolutely" outside the 12 mile CONUS limits. When asked what authority they had to fly beyond the 12 mile limit as a public aircraft, he said "that's the age-old question". The Navy doesn't look at the 12 mile limit, and since they are in the public use they tell them to fly based upon the PWS (performance work statement). He said they had been doing this for 10 years, and since they got to Omega. The flight crews have also asked about the legality of public use beyond the 12 mile limit.

He said they receive compensation from the Navy, and all their flying was in the public use, which is why they don't have to fall under Part 125, 135, or 121. He said private operators like Boeing who would want to lease their services would have to go through the Navy to keep the flight under public use. He said the accident aircraft went into public use back in 2008 and had not been signed back to civilian since.

He believed that John Allen at the FAA "doesn't want us to be in business". The FAA had been asking questions like "how can these guys be in business", but they'd been doing this, flying international, for over 10 years and for 15,000 hours of flying. He said if it took a mishap for people to ask how they were able to operate in public use, then "wow, that train has already left the station" since they had been doing it for 10 years. He said he had never met John Allen. He was aware of the FAA policy to transfer an aircraft in and out of public use for each flight, and that would be very difficult for Navair.

He said the Navy had no audit program for contract operators, but were in the process of designing a program. He said Omega was going to price future audits into the new contract.

He said that DAR in Orlando was Sammy Hansen, and helped educate him about the paperwork for public aircraft. He had not spoken with him since the accident. Regarding the renewal of the experimental certificate every 90 days, he believed that was a requirement.

There was no formation training or refueling training done at Omega. All their pilots were military pilots, and most come with refueling experience. He had never been to the simulator in Miami, but was not aware of any specific training for refueling.

He said the vice presidents work for him, and they communicate regularly. The Navy was their biggest customer, followed by the RAAF, and then Boeing.

He said the Navy considered their operation public use from takeoff to the 12 mile limit, and from that point on "you belong to the US Navy, you are a Navy airplane." He said the Navy had told them "you belong to the US Navy". He said the Navy's Commercial Services division is a "relatively new" entity, and perhaps the FAA should come up with a classification for refueling aircraft. He said they are treated as a military airplane when they land at various airports because their aircraft "look like a military airplane and smells like a military airplane", and it operates like a military airplane, and the US Navy is in charge of this.

He said he was notified about the accident from the "Bud", and he knew all the crewmembers. All the crew were very professional, and they have more pilots that want to work for them than positions they have available. They only take pilots with "sterling reputations" from the military.

He said he had looked through the accident crew records prior to delivering them to the NTSB.

He said they own the RAAF simulator, and were planning on bringing it to the US, but the parent company was buying it and they were not involved in that process, and he did not know what they planned to do with the simulator.

Interview concluded at 1535 EDT.

F. FAA INTERVIEWS

9.0 Witness: Todd Ritchey (Former Omega Aerial Refueling Services POI)

Date/Time: 28 June, 2011 1050 EDT
Location: FAA FSDO office, Dulles Airport
Present: David Lawrence - NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Brooke Lewis (representative).

During the interview, Mr. Ritchey stated the following:

His name was Todd Douglas Ritchey and he was the former POI for Omega Aerial Refueling Services. When asked about his current title, he said he was on "special detail now." Previously he was the aircrew program manager for Colgan on the Saab 340. He said he began his aviation career as a flight instructor, flew a Part 91 King air, and also flew a Part 135 Navaho. He was with Atlantic Coast Airlines on the Dornier 328 when he went to the FAA in 2002. He had an ATP[1] license and was current to the end of June. He also had type ratings on the Saab 340 and Eclipse 500. When asked who previously held his position at the FAA, he said it was either Bill Osborne or Suzette Rash, but he was not sure.

When asked what his roles and responsibilities were as Omega POI, he said "not a whole lot". He said Omega was a "Part 91" operator and they had a "biz file" so they had to have someone designated as POI, although Omega did not have a work program. He said he was the POI and there if Omega had regulatory questions. He did not remember when he took over the certificate for Omega.

When asked what his oversight role was for Omega, he said he had "no oversight responsibility". Omega had a deviation to conduct experimental operations, a MMEL[2], and also a deviation for RVSM[3]. When asked why the Letter of Authorization was in Omega Air Inc.'s name and not Omega Aerial Refueling Services, he said he did not know there was a difference.

[1] Airline Transport Pilot.
[2] Master Minimum Equipment List
[3] Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums.

He said he had met Bud Orr, Chris Frasse, and Joe Schuster from Omega, and had talked to them when the contact person had changed. He had numerous conversations with Chris and Joe regarding Omega training. He had never been to Omega offices and had never been on one of their aircraft. He communicated with Omega via email or phone "probably weekly", and discussed Omega getting an internal training program started.

He said he managed "probably" 7 to 9 135 certificates, 2 or 3 141 certificates, and "7 DPEs."[4] None of the certificates he managed were similar to Omega's, and he had no other public aircraft certificates to oversee.

When he was asked about his familiarity with public aircraft operations, he said he was "getting more so." He knew about it when he investigated a Dynamic accident involving a King Air in Bridgewater. He said his understanding was that for an aircraft to be classified as a public aircraft, it had to be on a government mission, not a maintenance check flight, and that they do not have to meet regulatory requirements. There is no physical transfer of the aircraft from civilian to public aircraft operations, and repositioning flights were not public aircraft operations. He said he was told that "95% of the time" Omega operations were considered public aircraft. He stated that he was never informed of the civilian flights Omega conducted.

When asked if he ever had any conversations with FAA AFS-1 regarding Omega operations, he said yes, he had talked with AFS-210 regarding the training issues with Pan Am and the level A simulator, and the Eastern Regional office was also involved. The concern was conducting a complete Part 61.58 PIC[5] check in a level A simulator. Pan Am had an approved program "to do just that." He said the research he conducted found that 6 tasks could not be performed in the level A simulator: "normal and crosswind takeoffs and landings, normal and crosswind approaches to landing, landings from a precision approach, approaches and landings with a simulated power plant failure, landing from a circling approach and a no flap landing." He said he opened an EIR, which was an enforcement investigation report. He sent a letter of investigation to Omega informing them that an investigation was being investigated at their level, and they had 10 days to respond. When asked about the results of the investigation, he said it was "closed, no action."

He said he was informed by AFS-810 that since Omega was flying an experimental aircraft, they had no type certificate, and "the pilots did not have to complete the 61.58 check since 61.58 addresses only type certificated aircraft." He said there was no mention of a 90 day currency involving 3 takeoffs and landings. When asked how a pilot would get current on a B707, he said "I guess they go fly the airplane." He said the pilots do not have to be category and class rated to fly the B707. When asked if he agreed with the ruling to end the investigation, he said "from a regulatory standpoint, yes", but from a practical standpoint, "no." He said AFS-210 and he talked about issues regarding the level A simulator, but there was no way to have an approved program with the FAA. He said the issue began when Omega approached him with concerns that the Pan Am simulator "was not representative of their aircraft." He had never visited the Pan Am facilities, but had spoken to the TCPM[6] at Pan Am. He said AFS-210 had sent an email

[4] Designated Pilot Examiner
[5] Pilot in Command
[6] Training Center Program Manager.

to the training center that it was not in compliance with Part 61.58, but he was "not sure where that went."

He said he had never seen a copy of N707AR's experimental operating limitations since it was issued by another office. He said Omega only had a letter of deviation or LOA for deviations. He said he assumed they conducted training in the aircraft, "but not sure when or where." He was not sure if any type rides had been conducted in the aircraft, and was "not sure if you can." He said it did not include Part 61.58, per Part 91.391(h) experimental training if there was a letter of deviation from the FAA. He said Omega was specifically approved to conduct training on formation flying and inflight refueling only in the aircraft, and did not include recurrency training or type training.

He was not sure what office the DAR[7] was in. He had talked with the DAR "twice", and never discussed with the DAR the recurring 90 renewal of the aircraft airworthiness certificate.

When asked how he or the FAA ensured that the operator had determined that the aircraft was in a condition for safe operation and appropriate for the purpose intended, he said he did not know if that was done. When asked if anyone at the FAA conducted an operational inspection of Omega, he said "not that I'm aware of, no."

When asked how he or the FAA ensured that Omega aircraft were operated in accordance with applicable air traffic and general operating rules of 14 CFR[8] Part 91, he said "other than a lack of deviation for an aircraft, I don't know." He said he "never did any surveillance" of Omega.

When asked if the "No Geographical Restrictions" phrase in the experimental operating limitations allowed an Omega aircraft to operate beyond the continental United States (CONUS), he said he "was not aware of that." He said that his understanding was that "they aren't allowed beyond the 12 mile limit," and "we discussed it." Joe Shuster at Omega explained to him in a meeting the things they had to get for authorization to overfly other countries. For example, the Australian government considered them a "state aircraft." He said he did not know "how they would get beyond the 12 miles for US operations."

He said he considered Omega's operation for the Navy "for compensation." He said the carriage of non-essential persons onboard Omega aircraft was not authorized "to my knowledge." He said the FAA did not monitor the crew training or checking onboard Omega aircraft. When asked how he or the FAA would verify when an Omega aircraft was transferred from market survey of public aircraft to research and development and back, he said "I was aware that 95% of the time they were public aircraft, and the other 5% was civilian," and "the DAR may monitor that."

When asked if Omega had established a proper burden of proof to describe their public aircraft operations to the FAA, he said he didn't know whose responsibility it was to determine public use. He was not aware if the FSDO[9] had maintained appropriate oversight of Omega aircraft during their periods of international operation.

[7] Designated Airworthiness Representative.
[8] Code of Federal Regulations.
[9] Flight Standards District Office.

He said he was not aware that a Pan Am Part 142 instructor had conducted B707 type training on an Omega aircraft during public aircraft operations internationally, and on an experimental aircraft. He said that would require a letter of authorization. When asked if this instructors presence was required to perform a government function, he said the "Part 91.319(h) regulation would govern, and that's what would require training in the aircraft." He did not know the requirements if the aircraft was flying as a public aircraft, and "those things must be stipulated in the contract between the Navy and Omega."

When asked if he complied with the Federal Register Notice of Policy regarding public aircraft, he said "not to my knowledge during my time," and could not remember anything specific.

When asked if Omega had ever provided him or the FAA with a written public aircraft status declaration for applicable flights during his time as Omega POI, he said he had never seen anything for specific flights.

Interview concluded at 1200 EDT.

10.0 Witness: Robert Corriveau (Current Omega Aerial Refueling Services POI)

Date/Time: 28 June, 2011 1220 EDT
Location: FAA FSDO office, Dulles Airport
Present: David Lawrence - NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Brooke Lewis (representative).

During the interview, Mr. Corriveau stated the following:

His name was Robert Charles Corriveau. His title was Air Safety Inspector, and "POI for Omega, I guess." He said he was POI for 7 Part 135 operators and 6 designees. He did not manage the certificates of any other Part 91 operators similar to Omega. He became POI for Omega "about one and a half years ago when Todd stopped." He was a former certified flight instructor and had flown with Part 135 operator Pegasus on the Beechjet prior to coming to the FAA. He said he had been with the FAA three years in August. He holds an ATP, CFI, CFII, MEI, and A&P (AI) certificates, and was current as a requirement of his job.

He said he has had one assistant in the office, and "brand new" ASI. When asked about his roles and responsibilities, he said "for Omega, there's not much." He said they had some Part 91 LOAs, no work programs, and they operated as public aircraft. When asked about his familiarity with Omega Aerial Refueling Services, he said he believed that Omega Air Inc. "is foreign owned, and the refueling services was located somewhere nearby. I'm not sure about that."

He said his oversight role for Omega involved changes in aircraft and revision on the operations specifications. He then said that they don not have operations specifications, just LOAs. He said the letter of authorization was "basically to conduct Part 91 operations, which supposively they never do. They have government contracts for aerial refueling services."

He said he had met Omega management personnel only once. He had met Mr. Miller when he came to the FSDO offices to drop off papers concerning the accident. That was the first time he had ever met someone from Omega. He had never visited the Omega offices before, and believes they were in Alexandria. He had been on some conference call with Todd when the change over from POIs was imminent.

He said he had never inspected an Omega aircraft, and had not reviewed their records. Regarding communication between himself and Omega, he said there was "seldom communication", and could not think of when he had communicated with Omega. He said the only reason that Omega would contact him was "if they needed something."

When asked about his familiarity with public aircraft operations, he said he knew "a little about it." He said it was "normally aircraft for governmental entities, and used them under contract." He said this meant Navy used it for whatever purpose they needed, and it took Omega "out of the loop for regulatory requirements." He said "oversight is to the contracting agency, in this case the Navy." He said he had never communicated with the Navy.

When asked if he had ever had conversations with anyone at AFS-1 regarding Omega, he said "not to the best of my recollection." He had never heard of any concerns with Omega operations prior, except for concerns about the level A simulator at Pan Am and the Part 61.58 checks conducted in that simulator for large "two-crew" airplanes requiring proficiency checks. He said the concerns were with the level A simulator and the fulfilling of Part 61.58. The issue "went downtown in their hands," and "the last resolution I saw was having to get the training program to meet the requirements." He had never been to Pan Am, and never talked with the POI for Pan Am. He said "I have to refer you to downtown for ownership of that."

He said he was not familiar with the experimental operating limitations for the accident aircraft, and was not aware that the certificate of airworthiness was being renewed every 90 days over the last 10 years.

When asked if anyone at the FAA had conducted an operational inspection of Omega, he said "I haven't. Not sure about anyone else." When asked if the no geographical restriction listed in the experimental operating limitations allowed Omega to operate as a public aircraft beyond the continental United States (CONUS), he said "I can't say for sure." When asked how he or the FAA would know if the accident aircraft was properly equipped for IFR[10], he said he had never been in communication with the DAR, and "don't know who he is."

He said he was notified about the accident when he "saw it on the news." He said he spoke with one of the "designated pilots who used to be involved with them." His name was Christopher Frasse, and he was a "FedEx guy." He said he had only talked with Omega since the accident "when they dropped off a statement of the accident."

He said that to his knowledge, Omega "was 100% public aircraft," and "they were always under contract." He did not know where their maintenance facilities were. When asked if Omega maintenance flights were public aircraft operations, he said they could be, "if written in the

[10] Instrument Flight Rules

contract and if the Navy declares it." He said "he was a little unclear about who declares," and "I'm no expert on public aircraft."

He said he had oversight of another public aircraft operation called Dynamic Aviation, and some of its operations were with public aircraft. When asked who in the FAA he would go to in order to get questions answered about public aircraft, he said "there is very limited guidance, and I'm not sure who I would go to."

He said he was not aware of any training being conducted in an actual Omega aircraft, and wasn't aware of a Pan Am instructor conducting type training in an Omega aircraft. He said the LOA allowed Omega to do formation and refueling training, but did not know who performed that training. He said he did not know if type training in Omega aircraft was approved because they were experimental aircraft.

He did not know about the March, 31, 2011 Notice of Policy Change regarding public aircraft in the Federal Register. When asked if Omega had provided the FAA with a written public declaration for applicable public aircraft operations, he said "there were some letters in the file" but wasn't sure what they were.

He had no knowledge of whether instructor certification verified by the FAA for those who conducted training on Omega aircraft. When asked how the limitations and provisions of the letter of authorization were verified by the FAA, he said "there was no way for the FAA to verify them, to my knowledge."

When asked who had responsibility to oversee Omega's operation, he said that "could be an interesting answer. If they are public, they are under the governmental entity that is utilizing their services. I don't know much more than that."

When asked if the FAA knows the Navy's oversight capabilities, he said he could not answer that question. Past the 12 mile limit, "it is in international waters, and is not a public aircraft." He said that Omega never told him personally if they were public aircraft or a state aircraft, nor did he ask Omega, but he was aware that they refueled outside the 12 mile limit.

He said that since the accident, there have been no changes made to the Omega letter of authorization. He said he had not communicated with FAA flight standards since the accident, other than speaking with Mr. Bo Drake. He said he had not called anyone at flight standards.

He said this was his first accident as POI. When asked what changes he would make, he said "some of this is more witchcraft than it is technical," and "perhaps we, the FAA, need more guidance on this."

When asked if there was anything he would do differently, he said that there are "lot's of 91 LOAs, and we just don't have the manpower, especially since they are a non-regulated entity, and I don't see where we have the resources to do anything more," and "people far beyond my pay grade are making decisions on this."

Interview concluded at 1330 EDT.

G. PILOT (NON-ACCIDENT) INTERVIEWS

11.0 Witness: Jay Molyneux, Omega Air Refueling Services

Date/Time: 23 June, 2011 1200 EDT
Location: Via Conference Call
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Mike Coker, Boeing.

During the interview, Mr. Molyneux stated the following:

His name was Gawen G. Molyneux and he was 50 years old. He had been with Omega throughout their whole contract period since 2003. He had also worked for them prior to that on and off while they were getting the tanker up and running. He had started out as a flight engineer, later became a first officer and finally a captain in their B707. He had been a captain for three years, and he had become a first officer three years prior to that. He estimated his total pilot time at 4300 hours and his total PIC time at 3000 hours with 1200 of those on the B707.

He had spent twenty years in the Air Force, initially as a sheet metal mechanic. He became a load master and then an FE for the remainder of his Air Force career. After his retirement from the Air Force, he did a little bit of work for Omega on their initial flight testing. He left, flew for Pan Am #3 as FO and FE for four years, and then he returned to Omega. He said his pilot training was all civilian. He held an ATP certificate for aircraft single and multi engine land with B707 and B720 type ratings. He had commercial privileges for single engine land as well as CFI, CFII, and MEI certificates.

He received his B707 type rating through Pan Am in Florida. The training for the type rating was not all done in the simulator; they had to use an Omega aircraft to complete the check ride. To do this, they had to get approval through the FAA in D.C. with a Letter of Authorization (LOA) from the FAA. He was not sure what restriction was addressed by the LOA, but he thought part of it related to the experimental category of the aircraft. The training was done by a Pan Am instructor, and there was an Omega check airman along as well. The training was done in conjunction with a mission.

He stated that he knew the crew from the Omega 70 accident. When asked about the captain's flying ability he said that it was very good, that he was an excellent pilot, and that he was very competent. He had flown with him a fair amount as a pilot. He did not recall ever having encountered an emergency situation while flying with him other than a few abnormals of which he could not recall the specifics. He classified Captain Thurmond's handling of those abnormals as "good".

He said he would classify the FO's flying ability the same as he had the captain's. When asked if he had ever encountered an emergency situation with him, he said "nothing that sticks out." He said that his impression of him was pretty positive.

He said that he had flown with the FE, Ken McNamara, the most out of the three crew members. He said he had known him a while and that he was very knowledgeable and very experienced. He had never encountered any abnormals while flying with him.

He was asked about operational control of the aircraft and stated that it had to be the Navy that had it. They were directly responsible to the Navy and the Navy did the scheduling.

When asked about the process for signing the logbook in and out of public status, he said he would have to ask "the powers that be." It was not something they did on a regular basis. When asked if there was any kind of logbook entry that indicated the aircraft was being flown under public use, he said he believed there was a copy of it stuck at the door with the certificates where they can be seen on the aircraft. He said there was usually one in the logs as well, and that Kevin O'Neill, their chief of maintenance, would have one.

In the simulator at Pan Am, he had trained on both V1 cuts and dual engine failures. He could not recall if they had ever trained on dual engine failures on takeoff and he did not recall ever having done them during recurrent training.

In the event of an accident, he believed there was some sort of emergency response plan, but it was run through their ops guys (Ryan Murphy and Robert Proano). The ops guys would be the first people he would contact in the event of an accident.

He said he would have to refer to the office guys, but he was sure there had been audits by the Navy to oversee the operations of Omega through the main office in Alexandria.

Interview concluded at 1215 EDT.

12.0 Witness: Royce Grones, Omega Air Refueling Services

Date/Time: 23 June, 2011 1500 EDT
Location: Via Conference Call
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA

During the interview, Mr. Grones stated the following:

His name was Royce Gene Grones and he was 66 years old. He had worked for Omega for five years. He was one of their B707 captains flying aerial refueling missions. He was not dual qualified on the DC10. He started his pilot training with the Air Force in 1969 and began flying KC135s in the early spring of 1970. He had been flying B707s for more than forty years. Having gone through the Air Force test pilot school, his last job with the Air Force was as test director for the Joint Stars radar system that was in development. He retired from the Air Force in September of 1993. He went to work for a couple years on a test program with Lockheed Martin. He then went back to Joint Starts as a civilian chief test pilot, eventually becoming director of tests. He retired from there in 2005.

His total flight time was about 12,000 hours with more than 8,000 hours of PIC. His total B707 time was 10,500 hours with 8,000 hours serving as captain.

He had flown with all of the crew members involved in the Omega 70 accident. He had flown with the captain, Chris Thurmond, on several occasions. He classified the captain's flying ability as "very outstanding" and said he was particularly good in the area of crew coordination. He also said that the captain was "pleasant to fly with". He had never encountered any emergencies while flying with him, just some "minor systems stuff."

He had not flown with the first officer, Joe Becker, as much as he had with the captain or the flight engineer. They had only flown together on 3 or 4 occasions (where they would be together for seven to ten days). He said Mr. Becker was a little quieter than Mr. Thurmond but there were "no problems", and he was an "excellent guy to fly with". He had never encountered an emergency or abnormal with him either.

He had flown with the flight engineer, Ken McNamara, more than any of them. He described him as "very pleasant", "very knowledgeable", and "very competent". He had never encountered any emergencies or abnormals with Mr. McNamara either. He hadn't had any shut down engines or anything like that with Omega in general.

He said that when operating under the Navy contract, the Navy had operational control, but he got his marching orders from Omega's ops guys, Ryan Murphy on the east coast and Bob Proano on the west coast. So depending on where they were operating one of those ops guys would do the coordination to get their directions and schedules. He worked a lot with Bob Proano. When asked if Mr. Proano had the authority to cancel a flight, he said that the way it would work, the Navy would call Mr. Proano to say they didn't need a tanker, and Mr. Proano would call him to say he didn't need to fly.

He said he had been involved a couple times in making a logbook entry to put the airplane in R&D (research and development). One time they took it into R&D for a refueling test with two different baskets. He went on to explain some specifics on the test program. They put the aircraft back into public use as soon as the tests were done. The second time he put it into R&D was a couple of years ago in Brunswick, Georgia in conjunction with a test for the Unmanned Combat Aircraft System (UCAS) being developed for the Navy.

He said he had never taken the aircraft out of public status to civilian where it would operate purely under 14 CFR Part 91, and he would not know how to do that. He would not do any of it, including R&D, without getting specific directions from his management chain of command to ensure he was doing it properly. He said that as a crew member, he did not get into it very deep.

He said the number of old passenger seats on Omega's B707s was fifteen or so. He said "pretty much nobody" sat back there unless they were going cross country, in which case they sometimes took their crew chiefs and the mechanics with them. He said he had never taken an instructor or check airman or anything like that with him.

When asked about a two engine failure on takeoff at the Pan Am training facility, he said that he "wouldn't say" he had done them, but he had done V1 cuts into instrument conditions about every time he goes down there. He said if you lost two engines on takeoff with the aircraft heavy, it would not climb anyway, so it was probably unrealistic. He said they would get a second engine failure later on and they would have to bring it back and do a two-engine approach.

He said he was there the day of the accident. He had gotten there an hour before, and he rushed out to the field when he got the phone call. He went looking for the crew, but they had already been taken to the hospital so he followed them there. He was successful in seeing the crew at the hospital once the doctors got done. He said the crew was in pretty remarkable shape, "a little shook," but they were fine. The crew had been at the hospital for an hour or two at that point. When asked if any other crew members or management from Omega were at the hospital, he said he had his engineer with him, and John Banitt was there as well. He said no one had talked about getting the crew drug tested or alcohol screened, or at least not to him.

Interview concluded at 1520 EDT.

H. PAN AM TRAINING ACADEMY INTERVIEW SUMMARIES

13.0 Witness: Juan Ricardo Serrano

Date/Time: June 16, 2011 1045 EDT
Location: Pan Am Training Academy
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Mike Coker, Boeing.

During the interview, Mr. Serrano stated the following:

His name was Juan Ricardo Serrano, and he was 39 year old. He was a Training Center Evaluator (TCE)/Instructor and Flight Engineer Instructor and Evaluator. He held an ATP[11] with Type Ratings in B-707, B-720, L-1011, DC-8 and G-1159, Flight Engineer Turbojet Certificate and Class 1 Medical Certificate. He said he maintained currency on the B-707, G-II and Bonanza.

He maintained B-707 currency as Director of Operations/Chief Pilot for John Travolta. He was a B-707 FO at 18 years of age with MillionAire and flew the DC-8 and L-1011 as well. He became Captain at age 23 and earned his ATP. He had been evaluator for 6-7 years and was the only remaining B-707 evaluator at Pan Am Flight Academy.

He started flying for John Travolta in 2005 on a contract and then became Chief Pilot and took position as Director of Operations when airplane was certificated under FAR[12] Part 125. He had

[11] Airline Transport Pilot
[12] Federal Aviation Regulations

approximately 5800 hours Total Time with 4000+ in the B-707 and approximately 3000 B-707 PIC. His last B-707 flight was on 6/9/11.

He had trained other operators like NATO[13], MIT/Lincoln Lab, Principle Air Service, and Jett Clipper Johnny (Travolta).

He said he did very little actual training of Omega crews but conducted the check rides and said the last training/checking of an Omega crewmember involved in the accident was Captain Becker a couple of weeks ago and Captain Becker's performance was fine. Mr. Serrano indicated that he has conducted evaluation flights for all the Omega pilots and they all did fine with nothing standing out.

When asked if Omega crew's seat swapped during training, he said that for the most part they are all type rated captains so they did swap seats during their recurrent but received their checks from the left seat with the checks conducted in accordance with FAR P61.58

Mr. Serrano said both pilots involved in the accident received evaluations at Pan Am in the left seat and when in training they use Pan Am procedures and Pan Am checklists but use Omega checklists when in the aircraft.

When asked if he had ever been on an Omega aircraft he said he had conducted the required airplane instruction/evaluation for pilot Jay Gowan Molyneux. On that particular flight, more than 2 years ago, Omega had conducted a Navy refueling mission and on return to the airport, he had conducted the training and evaluation segments for Mr. Molyneux. When asked if he was on board during aerial refueling he replied yes. He said that was the first and only time he had been aboard an Omega airplane.

Mr. Serrano stated that the Pan Am B-707 simulator was a Level A device and as such was restricted from being used to conduct circling approaches and that takeoffs and landings were creditable in the device provided the pilot had accomplished 3 takeoff and landings in the airplane within 90 days. When asked if takeoffs in a Level A simulator were evaluated, he replied that he looked at them, but if you are asking can they fail it, I think the answer is no.

When asked if V1 cuts were trained he said yes and when asked if they were evaluated he said yes and that he looked for directional control of the airplane and the use of proper procedures as required by P 61.58. He explained that the pilot is credited for the required takeoffs, landings and V1 cuts by certifying and signing a statement on a Pan Am Academy form that he has performed 3 takeoffs and landings in the aircraft within the preceding 90 days. He further stated that there is no real check of the pilot's records beyond the required confirmation of the license, medical and passport. He stated that while the pilot's undergoing recurrent are trained on the maneuvers, for check ride purposes engine out landings and landings were creditable based on the 90 day recency. He wasn't sure if a rejected landing was a creditable event or one that could be checked in the simulator.

[13] North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Mr. Serrano said that double engine failures were trained but not on takeoff roll. They were trained by having a V1 cut followed by a climb to altitude and then a failure of the second engine on the same side when altitude and airspeed were adequate. He said he had observed no issues with Omega pilots' performance during 2 engines out scenarios.

He said an Omega pilot leaves the Pan Am Flight Academy with a P 61.58 check ride signed off but when asked if that authorized the pilot to fly an "experimental" airplane he replied that he didn't know.

Mr. Serrano said they did not conduct any aerial refueling training at Pan Am and he was not aware of any such training being conducted anywhere else.

He said he didn't think there was an actual review of FARs during the ground school portion of the Pan Am B-707 recurrent course but normal FAR restrictions such as speeds etc were covered during the training and compliance with them was incorporated into the check ride. He also stated that he had completed a FAR Part 121 instructor course when he was employed with MillionAire.

Mr. Serrano said there had been some FAA concerns about the Pan Am B-707 training course that resulted in the adoption of some revised forms and procedures. Asked if the FAA had ever expressed concerns about the conduct of Part 61.58 checks in a Level A device, he stated that had been a concern and that for a certain period of time they were prohibited from conducting such checks. That restriction had occurred within the last 2 years he said and it lasted for a period of 3-4 months and then the decision was reversed. When asked how the decision was reversed, Mr. Serrano replied that the prohibition affected all the training schools that utilized Level A devices and that Flight Safety International who was the most affected spearheaded an effort to get the mandate changed and when they were successful it eventually allowed Pan Am to resume the checking as well.

He stated that he had had some contact with management personnel from Omega. He had talked to Mr. Ed Boullianne on the phone and had been in contact with Mr. Kevin O'Neil not for Omega issues but related to the maintenance program that Omega utilizes being the same one used by the Travolta B-707 operation.

Mr. Serrano explained that the Pan Am B-707 recurrent training program was 4 days long with 2 days in ground school and 2 in the simulator; a warm-up session and a check ride. He said he is authorized to conduct evaluations through his status as a Training Center Evaluator for both pilots and flight engineers and he maintains his FAA status to check on various airplanes on an as needed basis.

When asked if Omega ever rented their airplanes he replied no.

Asked if, in his opinion, should crews be evaluated on a recurrent basis for normal, cross-wind and engine out landings as well as V1 cuts, he said these guys are safe and in his opinion the training they received at Pan Am was appropriate and sufficient as well as safe and legal.

Interview concluded at 1130 EDT.

14.0 Witness: Marcel Merino, Pan Am International Flight Academy B707 Simulator Evaluator

Date/Time: 16 June, 2011 1145 EDT
Location: Pan Am Training Academy
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Mike Coker, Boeing.

During the interview, Mr. Merino stated the following:

His name was Jaime Marcelo Merino and he was 61 years old. He was the regulatory compliance manager and he was in charge of program development. He was also an instructor on the B707, the B727, and the DC10. He was not TCE on the DC10, only on the B707 and B727. He was a professional flight engineer with a turbojet rating.

He was current and maintained his currency with his business at Pan Am and with his medical. He did not have any actual aircraft time for his recurrency, only simulator time. He had been at Pan Am since December of 2000. He started in 1976 flying B707s for an airline in South America (Equatorial Airlines). He flew the B707 for ten years until 1986. He then flew the DC10 until 1993. He then flew the B707 again for a freighter company called Aecia until 1997. He then flew for a 121 company called Falcon Air Express. He flew the B727 for Falcon Air from 2001-2006. He had been an instructor since 1985. He was the chief flight engineer for Equatorial Airlines, Aeca, and Falcon Air Express. He also served as instructor and check flight engineer for all three companies.

B707 operators he had trained at Pan Am included Principal Air, MIT, John Travolta, the Indian Presidential Fleet, NATO, and the Air Force of Columbia, Chile, Venezuela, Spain, and South Africa. They used to train Honeywell and Pratt and Whitney as well.

He stated that he had trained the flight engineer of the Omega 70 accident, Ken McNamara. The last time he had trained him was in October 2010. He provided ground school training and simulator training to Mr. McNamara, as well as the check ride. When asked about his performance, he said that Mr. McNamara was good.

He stated that when he did training in the simulator, he was just training the flight engineer. In the ground school they did the whole crew together with either a flight engineer instructor or a pilot instructor. In the simulator, they always operated with the full crew, one pilot instructor, and one flight engineer instructor.

He stated that the Omega crews were professional and pretty much standard. He did not recall any difficulties in training with any of the Omega crews as far as the flight engineers were concerned. He stated that they taught Pan Am procedures in the simulator and Pan Am checklists were used. On the actual Omega aircraft, they had their own checklists. To his understanding, Omega had one checklist specific to each airplane because of their equipment.

He stated that flight engineers were evaluated once a year and they were usually paired with the crew. He did not know if the flight engineer was in charge of aerial refueling. He did not teach aerial refueling, and the pilots were not taught formation flying at Pan Am. He had never been on one of Omega's aircraft. He believed that one of the other Pan Am instructors, Juan Serrano, had perhaps been on one of Omega's aircraft.

He completed Part 121 instructor and check airman training programs when he was working for Falcon Air. He was not aware of any concerns the FAA had expressed about the level A simulator, but stated that there was a grey area about how to read the rule of 61.58 when the check was being conducted in a level A simulator. They received a letter from someone from the FAA clarifying that last year.

He had met some managers from Omega Air, but he could not recall their names. The last time he saw one of them was last year. He could not recall the reason they were there. He had never had anyone from Omega come down to sit in the simulator and observe him or to observe the training program.

When an engineer leaves the B707 training program, they are qualified to operate as a flight engineer on a B707 or a B720. He assumed they were qualified to operate on an experimental aircraft and went on to point out that MIT had an experimental aircraft. He stated that MIT trained their pilots and flight engineers at the Pan Am facility. He could not recall the N number of the MIT airplane, but it used to be a Pan Am airplane. MIT had their last training session at Pan Am last year, but they were not planning on returning due to lack of funding. They were told last month, however, that MIT had gotten funding for the B707, so they may come back to Pan Am this year to keep current.

Interview concluded at 1230 EDT.

15.0 Witness: Herman Duran, Pan Am International Flight Academy B707 Simulator Instructor

Date/Time: 16 June, 2011 1235 EDT
Location: Pan Am Training Academy
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Mike Coker, Boeing.

During the interview, Mr. Duran stated the following:

He stated that his name was Herman Cesar Duran and he was 71 years old. He was a B707 and B747 instructor at Pan Am. He had an ATP certificate with C46, DC6, DC7, DC8, B727, B747, and B707 type ratings. He held a ground instructor certificate. He did not currently fly. He had the standard simulator check ride on the B707 to keep himself qualified.

He started flying in 1959 on the C46 for a foreign airline. He was promoted to captain on the C46 in 1968. In 1971, he got his ATP in the C46. Years later, he upgraded to the DC6, followed by the DC8, the B707, the B747, and the B727. He was introduced to training in 1964 and has

been involved in training ever since. He worked for a few airlines, eventually retiring in 1999 from Trans Continental. He had been an instructor at the Pan Am academy since 1988, originally with the Pan Am airline, but then staying and continuing after it had been sold. He had over 25,000 hours of flight time, with about 6000 hours in the B707 (all PIC).

Other than Omega, operators that had trained at Pan Am in the B707 included NATO, Pratt and Whitney, Boeing, Principal Aviation, and John Travolta. The rest of the customers were mostly military.

He was told he had instructed the captain of Omega 70 and remembered the first officer was there, but he had not reviewed the training records, nor had he been asked to do so. He had trained the captain two months ago, and he had seen them before as they had been training at Pan Am for quite a while. When asked about the captain's performance, he stated that "if I signed the forms, he did well."

In the B707, he did only training, no evaluations. He stated that Pan Am procedures were used in the simulator, but they had their own (Omega) checklists. He stated that the B707 simulator was a level A, which meant that they were not allowed to do circling approaches. He could not think of any other level A limitations. When asked if take offs and landings were certified in a level A simulator, he said, "According to the 142 regulations, 91 operators like Omega use the simulator during training and I can only tell you what I see in the simulator what they do in the simulator. If they are approved for credit all of the maneuvers they do in the simulator I'm not aware of."

He said the simulator, many years ago, had been used for take offs and landings, but that maybe that had changed. To his knowledge, everything they did in the simulator is credited to the airman. He said they absolutely trained V1 cuts in the simulator. When asked if he knew whether or not they were evaluated, he stated that he just trained them. He said that he just gave recommendations if he saw a better way of doing something. In Chris Thurmond's training, he did do V1 cuts and Chris "did good". In Chris Thurmond's last training, he did not give a two engine failure on takeoff. When asked if he had ever trained that, he stated that they usually did a two engine failure on the missed approach after the gear was up. He went on to say that they had a published procedure for a missed approach with two engines but not for takeoff.

He stated that he did teach crosswind takeoffs and landings in the simulator, typically with 20-25 knots at a direct crosswind (90 degree angle). The crosswind limitation on the B707 was 33 knots. When asked about the crosswind technique he taught for takeoff, he said rudder was used to keep the plane down the center of the runway and a little aileron was used to keep the wings level. He said the amount of aileron depended on the strength of the wind and the wind component – however much was needed to keep the wings level.

They did not teach aerial refueling or formation flying in the simulator. He had sometimes taught the ground school for the pilots. The ground school was two days; sometimes he taught one, sometimes both. The Federal Aviation Regulations were not covered in the ground school portion. Federal regulations were not part of their syllabus for the recurrence training.

He had at least two hours of flight time, including three takeoffs and landings, as sole manipulator of a B707. He was type rated on the airplane and had two hours of in-flight observation training. He had one hour of line oriented flight training as sole manipulated of the B707. He had flown the B707. He had completed part 121 instructor training programs many times.

He did not know of any concerns the FAA had with the B707 training program at Pan Am. He had never met any of the management personal of Omega. He only dealt with the crews. He was not aware of any oversight program Omega had for the training. He stated that CRM[14] was included in the ground school; it was in the syllabus. And CRM was also observed during maneuvers in the simulator.

Interview concluded at 1300 EDT.

16.0 Witness: Rick Behrle, FAA

Date/Time: 17 June, 2011 0810 EDT
Location: Pan Am Training Academy
Present: David Lawrence and Elizabeth McGrath, NTSB; Tony James, FAA; Mike Coker, Boeing.

During the interview, Mr. Behrle stated the following:

His name was Richard Thomas Behrle and he was 58 years. He was an Aviation Safety inspector for the FAA, and Training Center Program Manager for Pan Am International Flight Academy for their Part 142 training. He had been in that position since 2000. He was hired by the FAA in 1988. Prior to that he had been with regional commuters as part of their training departments, and had been a chief pilot and director of operations. He worked for Bar Harbor for 15 years flying the B99, B1900, and the Saab 340. He was Chief Pilot for Continental and Eastern Express. During a split in the operations, he stayed with Eastern Express in Miami.

He held an ATP with type ratings on the B1900, SF340, A320 and B737. He had about 11,500 total hours, and 9,000 hours PIC time. He had not flown the B707, but had been in the simulator several times for observations. He said he thought he had observed Omega crews, but could not recall.

He had one assistant in his office that had over 12,000 hours in the B707, and would send him over for B707 work. That individual also had B747 time with Atlas. In his role as TCPM, he reviewed and approved aircraft curriculum and conducted surveillance and oversight of the training center, and he had a work program to review and evaluate instructor training records. He also had surveillance of satellite centers in Las Vegas and Cincinnati. He also issued LOAs to qualified evaluators. Currently, Pan Am had one evaluator for the pilots and one for the flight engineers.

[14] Crew Resource Management

He described his workload as responsible, busy but not overwhelmed. Pan Am had bought an additional building, and he will be given another assistant and will share the workload. He said he was in the simulator 3-4 times a month, and had the opportunity to observe the B707 ground school, but concentrates on the training records and flight checks.

When asked about past concerns regarding the B707 training program, he said he met with John Miller with Omega, who Carmen referred to as the Chairman of Omega, to discuss Omega starting their own training program. Omega had wanted their own employee to be designated a B707 examiner with the intention to dry lease the Pan Am simulator, but he told them that they could not do that. He said there were no concerns about the simulator being a level A, but there had been a AFS 210 discussion about 61.58(e)(3)(i) and (ii) referring to the alternate method of compliance. He stated after that conference, 61.58 checks were not stopped, but there was a 6 month period when certain maneuvers were not creditable, but then a letter from the FAA was issued reversing that decision.

He said the PTS initial type required airplane time. There are maneuvers that are credited but not "graded". He said landings were creditable but not evaluated, and V1 cuts were evaluated. He said in his opinion, those maneuvers were not required to be evaluated if the pilot qualified, typed and enrolled in a Part 142 course. He believed it was an equivalent level of safety .

He said the only Pan Am instructor who had flown in an actual Omega B707 was Juan Serrano to do a type rating in the aircraft, but did not recall the candidate's name, nor when it was. He said that type rating was accomplished during civil aircraft operations conducting training and checking under Part 91. When asked if it was permissible for a Part 142 instructor to perform duties on a public use aircraft, he said he did not know. He said he had not been in an Omega airplane or a B707.

He had met Omega management people before, and had met with John Miller, who he described as the "Chairman", and also "Bud" Orr, who was concerned about the length of time to get a deviation for getting a type rating on an experimental aircraft.

He said there was no differentiation for experimental aircraft based on 61.58, which qualifies a pilot to operate an aircraft that requires multiple crewmembers. Since the accident, there have been changes in wording on the forms, but no changes in content or intent, and no changes in the curriculum. There had been no recent changes to the checklists, and they had all come from the manufacturer.

He said CRM was incorporated in the ground school and flight training. He said Pan Am instructors received CRM training as part of their recurrent training, and there was also a standalone course that he rated as "great".

He had no concerns going forward with the B707 program. There were no maintenance issues with the B707 simulator, and he reviewed maintenance discrepancies, noting there were very few based on the age of the simulator. He also reviewed the national simulator team's evaluation of

the device. He said there was a 4901 exemptions for flight engineers where FE LOEs[15] must be performed in the aircraft, and could now be performed in the simulator.

He said he was in daily communication with Pan Am, and visited the site twice a week. He said he did not review the accident crew's records, nor was there any need to. He said he may have met the crew, but shook hands with a lot of people, and couldn't recall. He had no recommendations for the program, and considered it standard. When asked about the "80/20" split for a type rating checkride, he said the maneuvers were credited in the simulator, and then they received an LOA from an FAA inspector to observe training and checking in an actual airplane provided by the operator.

Interview concluded at 0915 EDT.

I. NAVY CONFERENCE CALL

Group Interview: Steve Doragh – Navy Deputy Program Manager (PMA-207); Danyel McAlister – Navy Contract Officer; Charlie Myers – Navy Contract Owner; Joe Brannon – Navy PMA Senior Engineer.
Date: June 8, 2011
Location: Via Teleconference phone call
Time: 1300 EDT
Present were: David Lawrence, Paul Misencik, Elizabeth McGrath - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Robert Drake, Tony James- FAA; Michael Coker – Boeing; John Banitt – Omega Aerial Refueling Services.

During the interview, the following information was provided by the Navy group:

Mr. Doragh was in charge of Navy Commercial Air Services, and had been in that position for about 5 years. He said he helped the IPT's and program team leads operate their programs and reports to his boss, the Program Manager. He manages the "advisory" program consisting of F5's and F15's that fly advisory missions, and manages 6 contracts under commercial air services which includes the Omega contract.

He said Charlie Myers is the COR for the Omega contract and signs all the documents for the contracts. They have a twin prop contract for 6-8 passengers, one for Lear jets, one for sub-sonic military aircraft, one for super-sonic military aircraft, helicopters in Hawaii, G2 and G3 three aircraft used for range clearing, and a G1 which is a stand-off jammer. All are privately owned and privately operated.

He said they use the standard Navy source selection process for the contract bids. Bidders respond to the RFP, and in some cases they are unable to do competition bidding and the contracts are awarded "sole source". That was the case for the Omega contract, and they had to negotiate "in a different way" than those contracts that have competition. There are a number of

[15] Line Oriented Evaluation

checks and balances, based on a requirements list, to ensure bidders are able to perform services. This vetting process was performed in the Omega case. There were no concerns regarding the bid by Omega since this was their second contract with the Navy, and they had a "98% mission success rating" under the first contract.

The contract is not like "airline" scheduling, and based upon week to week needs, and the Navy has to give Omega 24 hours notice of an operation or they can deny their service. Omega does receive compensation, and are paid by the flight hour. The operator provides the aircraft and trained crews.

For maintenance, the Navy asks all of their contractors have an FAA certification level that they operate to, and in the case of Omega, that is Part 91. He said that the FAA "checks them" every 90 days at their maintenance facilities.

He said for operations, Omega is required to operate under Part 91 minimums. He said Omega operating under Part 91 is "the basis of their assurance they have an airworthy aircraft flying in the vicinity of their aircraft". He said "the FAA is the world leader in aviation safety and operations", and they used that as assurance that they are safe to fly with. In particular to Omega, they spent about $1 million "proofing" their aircraft to tankering of Navy aircraft.

Under C-16 of the Omega contract, flight crews are required to be trained under Part 91 FAR requirements. Regarding oversight of the maintenance, the Navy gets bi-weekly reports from Omega with FAA inspection reports. The Navy does not have any "direct line" to the FAA because "these are not our aircraft, these are not Navy aircraft." They receive these reports from Ryan Murphy, Operations Manager at Omega.

The Navy is "trying to figure out" how to conduct verification of FAA compliance. He said that the FAA claimed that the Navy was responsible for the aircraft since they were under public use, but the language was vague. He said they were trying to work with the contractors to develop an oversight program. They are working on this process with "ATAC" but "haven't gotten around to figuring out how to do it with Omega." They want to have a "government flight representative" to look at these verifications, and the procedure they are developing is based upon the DCMA8210.

Over the last two contracts, no Navy personnel have conducted any informal inspections of the Omega aircraft. They only check that the FAA has done their inspection and they "aren't going to second-guess" the FAA.

C-14(c) of the contract governing approval of new experimental aircraft did not apply since their operation wasn't "new" to them and had been operating with Omega since 2000, and their job has never changed since their first contract. Regarding the 90 renewal of the experimental certificate, he said they just need some acceptance that the aircraft is airworthy, and Part 91 is "acceptable" to them, and required by the contract for that certification.

When Omega is flying under "public use" under contract, they are required to maintain Part 91 minimums. It is similar to the other contracts, and added that the Lear contracts were Part 135.

He said Omega could not operate under Part 135 "based on the airframe". He said he believed the decision was made "based upon cost. 91 was cheaper to maintain," and was based on the aircraft and type of mission to be applied. He said the FAA determines "what the aircraft can be certified to."

He said for the initial contract, Omega must send the Navy the flight crew qualifications and resumes. He said the FAA checks "every 90 days that they are maintaining their qualifications."

They do not audit the flight crews training because it's "duplicate work" and "accept the FAA's clearance." He said "if the FAA has signed off Omega as a company and airplane, they take that at face value form the FAA."

Regarding training for tanking, he said Omega must maintain a minimum numbers of "plugs", and Omega has a "Chief Test Pilot that does all their training for them." They did not know the name of this test pilot. Every one of Omega pilots were tanker pilots, and some still flew in the reserves. Resumes are checked by the COR to ensure that the crews are qualified.

They rely on the FAA as the basis for the Navy approving Omega's operations. They accept that the FAA is "the aviation safety experts and worldwide leaders in that area," and is "good enough for us".

The Navy uses the Air Force AMC certification for two of their contractors, and are developing the DCMA8210, and added that AMC won't look at any Part 91 operators because AMC certification is only for passengers and cargo.

He said the pilot in command had operational control of the aircraft. The pilot is briefed on the mission before each flight. While they are out in Navy controlled airspace, they are controlled by FACSFAC (ATC guys for the warning area). "The PIC has operational command of the aircraft but takes instruction when he is in the warning area for FACSFAC."

He said that Omega has operated to Canada, Australia, and Europe under the contract. Regarding the new FAA policy of advance notification of public use aircraft, they provided the FAA with comments on the policy, but there is no current procedure since it is only a policy. When asked if they consider Omega a civil aircraft operation or a public aircraft operation with flying for the Navy, they said "officially we guess its public but the FAA language is unclear. When somebody makes that grey black, we'll understand who we are." They have been working with the FAA on this topic for 20 years, and "sometimes the they're a little more helpful than other times," but the January rule change makes it a little clearer. He said until they get the new policy, "I'm not sure what category it operates in."

When asked if they consider air to air refueling "inherently governmental", he said "I know it's not covered by the FAA, but I don't know what that means exactly." Generally the Navy would so no, but the FAA would say yes, it is governmental. When asked if the flight was operated in accordance with Title 10, adhering to military requirements and regulations for the operations, he said "they are responsible by the contract to abide by all instructions and regulations for the operation of that aircraft within the government's ranges and airfields."

After awarding of the contract, occasionally they have folks visit the maintenance sights, but not for oversight, and emphasized “these are not our aircraft.” The Navy is expecting them “to abide by the contract they signed.” The COR is the one that conducts these visits, but he doesn’t “go out and ask for the guys A&P.”

He said the warning areas where Omega operates Navy were “well more than 100 miles offshore”.

He said the 90 day oversight was based upon the 90 day renewal of the airworthiness certificate.

Interview concluded at 1352 EDT.