

Docket No. SA-532

Exhibit No. 2-H

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C.

Operations/Human Performance Group Chairmen
Interview Summaries – Additional Interviews

(14 Pages)

Attachment 7

to Operations / Human Performance Group Factual Report

DCA09MA026

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS

Interview: Jonathan R. Stickle, First Officer - American Eagle Airlines

Date: February 4, 2009

Time: 0805 EDT

Location: Phone interview

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

In the interview, First Officer Stickle stated the following information:

He was 28 years old and was a First Officer at American Eagle Airlines. He had been in this position for about 4 years. He was qualified on the E135, E140, and E145. He had previously flown the ATR-72 for 15 months when he was first hired at American Eagle Airlines and had spent some time flying in the Caribbean. He had logged about 4,000 hours total time.

First Officer Stickle was flying American Eagle Airlines flight 4718 on January 15, 2009, and was the next airplane after US Airways flight 1549 to depart from LaGuardia airport.

He said US Airways was held in position for 3-4 minutes on the runway while vehicles were clearing the runway.

After US Airways departed, he said his flight was launched and he heard US Airways on departure frequency. He did not recall if he heard the US Airways flight get their frequency change.

He said he did not hear anything abnormal on tower frequency and everything looked normal for the US Airways airbus departure in front of him. He said his airplane had the same departure path and heading and he heard US Airways on departure frequency when his airplane was switched over to it.

First Officer Stickle said he leveled off at 5,000 feet and he never saw the US Airways airplane once he was on departure frequency. He thought ATC had vectored him over the top of the US Airways airplane.

He said later his flight was cleared farther south, directly over the river. He said he heard US Airways ask for Teterboro so he and his captain were looking in that direction. He said the first thing he heard was US Airways asking for an airport and the controller cleared them for runway 4 at LGA. He said the US Airways flight said they would not make it. He said then ATC gave the US Airways flight runway 1 at TEB and US Airways said they would not make it; they were landing in the Hudson.

First Officer Stickle said he heard ATC transmit that US Airways reported a double bird strike. He did not recall seeing any birds and he did not think the captain had seen any either, because they both looked at each other and shrugged. He said he was looking for

the US Airways aircraft more than anything else. He did not recall any one else mentioning birds, he only heard ATC report the bird strike.

He said after US Airways stopped transmitting, ATC gave him a turn, a climb, and a hand over to another frequency.

He thought LGA was landing on runway 31 when he departed. He did not hear any PIREPS for birds. There were snow plows on the runway and they were holding departures for a few minutes. US Airways was held in position on the runway for a few minutes so there were no departures for a while.

First Officer Stickle said he flew in and out of LGA quite often and it was quite common to see sparrows and seagulls when landing on runway 22 at LGA because the approach comes in over the water. He said they were normally lower than the birds because they would be on short final. He said the birds around LGA were not more than at any other airport.

Interview ended 0822.

Interview: William Joseph Panerello, Captain - American Eagle Airlines

Date: February 4, 2009

Time: 0845 EDT

Location: Phone interview

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

In the interview, Captain Panerello stated the following information:

He was 52 years old and was a captain on the E-135, E-140, and E-145. He had been employed by American Eagle Airlines for 22 years and had been a captain for 20 years. He had logged approximately 20,000 hours total time.

Captain Panerello read from a personal journal entry he had made after the event.

”Just a few lines to share my experience and help others understand what I witnessed. Number 2 in line at LaGuardia airport behind the US Air flight that ditched in the Hudson. We were held in position due to a piece of ice that broke loose when another aircraft landed on a crossing runway. It took about 90 second to have the truck remove the ice and the US Air launched towards the birds. I lined up next and as he turned towards the north east I took off to follow the same flight path. As I changed from the tower to approach control he asked for the closest airport. They cleared him to land at Teterboro. My copilot and myself knowing of his situation waited to hear his decision. He immediately said he wouldn’t make Teterboro. The controller continued to give him directions not knowing his fate. The captain reported he was landing in the river but the

controller did not realize it. I radioed the controller he was landing in the river. About one minute later he was in the river. A lot happens really fast in jet airplanes and I was amazed and elated by his confident tone on the radio. It sounded like the water landing was just another approach he would accomplish with success. The next few seconds were extremely difficult for me as my own jet had to be navigated thru the congested airspace. Another controller came on the frequency and I asked him how US Air made out. He told me the aircraft was in one piece. As I accelerated to over 500 miles per hour I thought about the piece of ice that kept me from that fate possibly and thanked God for a confident man that was in charge of those lives. What a blessing to have wisdom and knowledge to that level that at any moment you will be called upon to continue life. Even through the intensity of those few minutes I knew by the tone of his voice that he was prepared. Afterward I wondered about why God allowed the 90 second delay that put US Air where I was intended to be, and in my spirit I knew God was trying to impress something on me. Then I realized that God allowed me to witness that as an object lesson that he requires us to study and be thoroughly prepared to work for him...”

Captain Panerello said he took off from LGA right after US Airways flight 1549. He said they had been held while a plow removed a piece of ice from the runway that had slid on the runway during the landing of another airplane on the crossing runway.

Captain Panerello said flight 1549 appeared normal for the takeoff and climb. He did not hear them talk about the event on tower frequency. When he was handed over to approach control, he heard the crew of flight 1549 report the event.

He said he was trying to pay attention to what he was doing because he was monitoring and the first officer was flying but he was listening on the frequency. The controller was doing what he had to do to try to get them to TEB. He said the controller did not realize he was going in the river. CA Panerello said he told the controller “he’s going in the river” just to let him have some breathing room so he could get done what he needed to do instead of trying to respond to the controller.

He said they received a turn to the south towards WHITE intersection and at that point they were in the river. It was a matter of a minute or two and it was over. He said he remarked to his FO “do you believe the confidence of this man”. He said he thought there was no one better to handle this situation than the two that were in that airplane.

He said he did not hear anyone else on the radio. He did not hear any reports of birds. He said he had been flying in and out of the area for 20 years and he knew it was a migratory track for the geese. He said he had seen them flying around Manhattan during the winter. He said it was something he was always aware of and conscious of.

CA Panerello said on this particular day, he had not seen any flocks of birds. He said ATC typically reported when they knew of flocks of birds. He said it was not on the ATIS when he departed LGA but it was on the ATIS when he flew back in later that day. He said he had in the past heard reports from the tower that they had radar contacts moving up the river, but he did not recall hearing any of those reports on that day.

Interview: Scott A. Metz, First Officer - US Airways

Date: February 4, 2009

Time: 1001

Location: Telephone interview

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Lori Cline – US Airways; Larry Rooney – US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), Ricky Daniel – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

First Officer Metz was represented by Captain Tom Kubik (USAPA)

In the interview, FO Metz stated the following information:

He was 46 years old. He had been a first officer at US Airways for about 20 years and with the company for about 22 years. At US Airways, he had flown as a second officer on the B-727 and a first officer on the B-737 200 and 300 and the Airbus series. He had about 15,500 hours total time and 1900 hours on the Airbus.

FO Metz flew with Captain Sullenberger for the first and only time during the last week of December 2008. It was a 4-day pairing that began on December 28, 2008. They flew six legs total in and out of SFO once and ORD twice. FO Metz stated that Capt. Sullenberger flew three of the six legs. He said there was nothing unusual about any of the legs.

When asked about Captain Sullenberger's proficiency as a pilot and CRM, FO Metz said they were excellent. He said Capt. Sullenberger was exceptionally intelligent, polite and professional.

Asked about US Airways training for ditching, FO Metz said there was training for it but it was minimal and he did not recall any ditching scenarios in the simulator.

Asked how often he flew in and out of the New York area, he said "fairly regularly" and he could not recall having any issues with birds in that area.

FO Metz was asked about how it was determined who would fly the aircraft and who would be the decision maker in the aircraft during an abnormal event. He stated that the captain was the decision maker and the captain made the decision of who would fly the aircraft. He said the pilot flying when the abnormal occurred would continue to fly until the captain made that decision.

FO Metz indicated that he had initial Airbus training two years ago and his last recurrent training was in April 2008.

Asked if his training covered procedures for an engine failure, he said possibly in ground school. He stated that the procedures were probably covered in initial school's CBT and they had multiple scenarios for engine failures in the simulator. He did not recall if training included dual engine failures.

He said to the best of his recollection with Capt. Sullenberger, it was just a normal trip.

Asked if FO Metz had ever experienced an engine failure when flying, he said no.

FO Metz had experienced several bird strikes. He did not know the type of birds but said they were relatively small. Asked about the seriousness of the bird strikes, he said none of them were.

Asked if he had ever experienced a compressor stall, he said he thought he had on the 727 but not as a FO.

He said he would report the bird strike to ATC and make a note in the maintenance logbook.

FO Metz said he had never been a captain at US Airways. Asked if there were rules for low time FOs to alert the captain, he said there were restrictions but he did not know where it fell. He said he just knew that FOs were supposed to tell the captain.

FO Metz stated his ground school was a part of AQP.

The interview ended at 1019.

Interview: David N. Walker, First Officer - US Airways

Interview date: February 4, 2009

Time: 1025

Location: Telephone interview

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Lori Cline – US Airways; Larry Rooney – US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), Ricky Daniel – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

First officer Walker was represented by Captain Tom Kubik (USAPA)

In the interview, FO Walker stated the following information:

He was 46 years old. He was a first officer for US Airways based in Charlotte. He was hired by US Airways in 1987, and was a flight engineer for about a year and a half before becoming a FO. At US Airways, he had flown as an FO on the B-737, B-757, B-767, F-100, and the Airbus. He was flight engineer on the B-727. He had about 16,000 hours

total time. He said he started flying the Airbus in 2001 and had about 3800-4000 hours in type.

He stated he flew with Captain Sullenberger on a 4-day trip in December 2008. They flew CLT-SFO, SFO-CLT-JAX, JAX-CLT-MCI, and MCI-CLT. He said he and Capt. Sullenberger split the legs flown and if there was an odd number of legs, than Capt. Sullenberger would have flown one additional leg than him. He said all of the legs were very uneventful.

Asked about the kind of person Captain Sullenberger was, FO Walker stated he was genuine, a true gentleman and compassionate towards others. Asked about Captain Sullenberger's proficiency as a pilot, FO Walker said he was a consummate professional. He said Captain Sullenberger's CRM was tremendous, he looked out for the entire crew, his procedures were disciplined and he was a pleasure to work with.

FO Walker was asked how often he flew in the New York area; he said it varied but about 1-2 times a quarter. He said he had never had a bird strike in the area but he knew to look for birds in the area in the spring and fall.

Asked if he had ever had a bird strike in general, he said he had had bird strikes before but they were negligible. He said one made a mark on the nose cone in the spring. Asked if bird strikes were discussed in training, he said it was discussed as a part of general safety.

FO Walker was asked about the training and procedures provided by US Airways on ditching. He said the QRH had a 'read and do' checklist that was referenced during training and they discussed industry issues. Asked to elaborate on the training he received for ditching and bird strikes, FO Walker said that they had discussed in the past how radar might be a factor for ameliorating a bird strike possibility.

FO Walker stated his last training was in September 2008 and was a requalification on the Airbus. He said he had been bumped to the B-757 and then he went back to the Airbus. He said the training he received was an abbreviated course which was dependent on how long a pilot was away from the aircraft.

He did not recall if his training included dual engine failures.

Asked if he had received any operations bulletins or alerts about the event in New York, he said he could not recall anything other than updates from the company on what they had learned.

He said he had not talked to Captain Sullenberger since the accident.

Asked how he felt about the training provided at US Airways, FO Walker stated he felt good and that the training was very detailed. He said it was at the top as far as airline training goes. He said US Airways had dedicated people in the training department who

did a good job disseminating information related to the pilots' jobs and company procedures.

FO Walker had never experienced an engine failure or a compressor stall.

Asked about Captain Sullenberger's qualities beyond the cockpit, FO Walker said he was "such a kind person".

FO Walker did not know FO Skiles.

The interview ended at 1045.

Interview: Neal T. Schaefer, Captain - US Airways

Interview date: February 4, 2009

Time: 1127

Location: Telephone interview

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Lori Cline – US Airways; Larry Rooney – US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), Ricky Daniel – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

Captain Schaefer was represented by Captain Tom Kubik (USAPA)

In the interview, Captain Schaefer stated the following information:

He was 56 years old. He was based in PHL as a B-737 Captain for US Airways. He had been a captain on the B-737 since the summer of 2001 and had been with the company for about 26 years. He had flown the B-737 and DC-9. He had about 22,000 hours total time and about 4000 hours on the 737.

Captain Schaefer flew with FO Skiles quite frequently on the 737 and thought they may have flown together on the DC-9. He said his last pairing with FO Skiles was a 4-day trip the week before Thanksgiving. He said they flew 3-4 legs each day and they rotated who flew every other leg. He said there was nothing unusual about any of the legs.

Asked about FO Skiles' proficiency as a pilot, Captain Schaefer said he was very good, very intelligent, a good technician and a good pilot. He said his CRM was at company standards. He said he had never had any problems with FO Skiles on previous trips. Asked about his personality, he said FO Skiles was friendly, intelligent, and worked good with the crew.

Captain Schaefer said that he and FO Skiles had become friends but they did not associate outside of the company. Captain Schaefer indicated that he had not heard anything negative about FO Skiles from others.

Asked if he could recall having anything abnormal occur on a flight with FO Skiles, he said he did not remember any.

Captain Schaefer stated his last training was in October 2008 and was CQT (continuing qualification training).

Asked if he recalled any guidance provided on ditching, he said not in the last CQT but there was one sequence where it was covered before because the 737 started doing some oceanic flying.

Asked if he received training on dual engine failures, Captain Schaefer said he only remembered receiving it during initial training on the 737. He said the “copilot made it and I didn’t”. Asked to elaborate on when it was introduced, Captain Schaefer said they were at a decent altitude, doing an overhead 270 above the field, when the flight instructor introduced the dual engine failure. There was no relight.

Captain Schaefer was asked about US Airways’ procedures on bird strikes. He said there was a discussion about it when they went to the new radars. He said in the old days using the old radars with the high output, he was always taught to leave it on. The new radars had narrow beams and low output and were not as effective a tool.

Asked if he flew in and out of the New York area, he said in the years past he had quite a bit but in the last 5 or so years he had not.

Captain Schaefer said he had had a bird strike before. Asked about his most serious incident, he said that he never had a failure due to one but had an ingestion when he was flying a 737. He said there was no problem with the engine but they just had an awful smell. The ingestion occurred on a go around and they came back around and landed.

He said the 737 had CFM 56 engines.

Asked if he had ever experienced a compressor stall, Captain Schaefer said not on a 737 but on a DC-9, mostly on landing when in reverse. He could not recall one occurring during flight. Asked how he recognized that it was a compressor stall, he said there was noise and vibrations.

Captain Schaefer had not talked to FO Skiles since the accident. He did not know Captain Sullenberger.

The interview ended at 1151.

Interview: William P. Arkins, First Officer - US Airways
Date: February 4, 2009
Time: 1200 EDT
Location: Phone interview

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Lori Cline – US Airways; Larry Rooney – US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), Ricky Daniel – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Terry Lutz - Airbus

First Officer Arkins was represented by Captain Tom Kubik - USAPA.

In the interview, FO Arkins stated the following information:

He was 59 years old. He was a First Officer (FO) on the A320 series at US Airways. He was hired on July 20, 1987, and had been with the company about 22 years. He had flown the airbus since April 2008. At US Airways, he had flown the F-28 as an FO for 3 months. He was a 727 FO for 2 years, 737-200 for about 1 ½ yrs, then he was a 727 flight engineer for less than a year then he was on the B-737-200 as an FO until 2000 then the 737-300 until last April 2008. He had about 16,000 hours total time and about 500 hours in the Airbus.

FO Arkins indicated that he flew the accident aircraft, N106US, two days before the accident. He said he was the flying pilot out of LGA. After takeoff they were given a SSW heading and were turned to the west at 17,000 feet followed by a turn back to the left and a clearance direct to an intersection. The flight was cleared to climb up to 23,000 feet. He said he inputted the direct to intersection, selected the altitude and pressed managed climb and started to climb. While the engines came up and in the turn, they experienced a compressor stall. He heard a loud bang. FO Arkins saw engine 2 rpm coming back up and then heard a second bang followed by the same indications. He said the captain assumed pilot flying duties and FO Arkins got out the QRH and went through the procedures. He said he checked to see if it was an immediate action item and it was not. He checked to see if it was an ECAM exception and it was not. He checked to see if there was an ECAM indication and there was not. He said he went through the procedure and the engine recovered so they continued.

Asked if the loud bang was his first indication of an abnormal, he said yes. When asked what he saw on the displays, he said N1 and N2 were coming back up to climb power. Asked if he heard a single bang, he said he heard one bang then 5-10 seconds later he heard a second bang and saw the same indications. He said he could not recall if there were more bangs after that.

Asked what procedures he followed, he said the Engine (1 or 2) Stall. He said he completed the checklist. Asked at what point during the procedures did the engine respond, he said “if engine parameters normal” item (c) thrust lever affected engine slowly advance and no other indication of stall.

Asked what happened after the engine recovered, FO Arkins said that the captain gave him the aircraft back and the captain communicated with the company, flight attendants, and passengers.

FO Arkins said the captain took over the aircraft after the first stall indications. Asked what the procedure was for that, FO Arkins said the captain said “My aircraft” and FO Arkins responded “Your aircraft”.

FO Arkins stated after the event that they continued the flight to CLT. He said the captain communicated with the company via ACARS and also did a phone patch through Philadelphia Operations. He said the rest of the flight was uneventful.

Asked what they did after landing in CLT, he said it was normal and the captain entered the information in to the maintenance logbook.

FO Arkins said that this flight was their last flight of the day.

He said he did not receive any follow up until “well after” the event when he was asked to submit an Event Report to the Safety Department about one week later.

FO Arkins said he had experienced a compressor stall before on the B727. He said the indications were the same; a load bang and the engine went down in performance and then came back up.

He could not recall any training he had for a compressor stall or engine stall. He could not recall if he had ever received a compressor stall in a flight simulator.

He said he submitted the Event Report online and did not talk with the Safety Department after he filed the report. FO Arkins said there was a list of items that required a report contained in the company manuals and he thought a compressor stall was on that list.

FO Arkins said he did not fly out of LGA very often and estimated that it was a couple of times every few months. He did not recall any issues he had with birds or flocks of birds when flying in that area.

When asked about the company guidance regarding who should fly the airplane during an abnormal procedure he stated that it was the captain’s discretion to assign the pilot flying duties.

He said he did not know Captain Sullenberger or First Officer Skiles and had not heard anyone say anything either good or bad about them.

He said he had not flown the Airbus before his training in April 2008 and he thought he had logged less than 500 hours on the Airbus. He said he did not discuss the captain’s Airbus experience with him.

FO Arkins said during training he occupied the right seat and his training partner was a captain who was upgrading or transitioning to the Airbus. He said when he received engine failure scenarios during training in the simulator he usually kept the flying duties.

FO Arkins said when the engine stall occurred the airspeed was about 300 knots and they had just started to climb when the first stall occurred. He said the power setting when both stalls occurred was close to climb thrust.

He said there were no MEL (minimum equipment list) items for bleed system or engine, the airplane was in a normal bleed configuration. It was a clear day and the engine anti ice had not been on. He said they did not discuss the DFDR (digital Flight Data Recorder) or quick access recorder data access and he had no knowledge of access to the PFR data.

FO Arkins said he had not received any training regarding DFDR or PFR data. He said he was not aware of an event button on the airplane.

He said he did not think an event report was required but was contacted by the Safety Department and asked to complete an event report. He thought an Event Report was required within 48 hours of the event.

Interview ended at 1228.

Interview: James Alcy Johnson, Captain - US Airways

Date: February 4, 2009

Time: 1232 EDT

Location: Phone interview

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Lori Cline – US Airways; Larry Rooney – US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), Ricky Daniel – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Terry Lutz - Airbus

Captain Johnson was represented by Captain Tom Kubik - USAPA.

In the interview, Captain Johnson stated the following information:

He was 56 years old. He had been employed by US Airways for 24 years and 6 months and had been an Airbus captain for 2 years and 2 months. While employed by US Airways, he had been a flight engineer on the B727, and had flown the F28, F100, and B737 200 and 300. He had logged about 17,000 hours total time and about 1,400 hours on the Airbus A320.

Captain Johnson said he was flying airplane N106US on January 13, 2009, and encountered an abnormal event. He said the airplane had a compressor stall while climbing from 17,000 feet and approaching 18,000 feet. The first officer Bill Arkins was the pilot flying.

He said there was a vibration and he heard a popping noise. He did not notice the engine indications at that time. He said he advised ATC (Air Traffic Control) they needed to

level off and they went through the procedure. He said Bill (First Officer Arkins) had “spotted the number 2 engine” indications.

Captain Johnson said they performed the quick reference handbook (QRH). He said they went through the first 3 phases then transferred airplane controls. He said he flew the airplane while FO Arkins performed the procedure. He said the first 3 phases were recognition, check to see if abnormal condition was an immediate action item, check to see if it was an ECAM exception, and check to see if there were electric ECAM alerts. He said that lead them to the QRH. At that time, they transferred controls.

He said there was the initial stall and then no reoccurrence. After completing the QRH procedure, they discussed the results and determined the engine was operating normally. Captain Johnson advised dispatch through ACARS, called the flight attendants, and briefed the passengers. The flight continued to Charlotte (CLT).

Captain Johnson said after the flight he made a logbook entry stating that the number 2 engine had a compressor stall. He said after the event, it was a normal flight to CLT. He did a standard post flight walk around and called maintenance. He said that was their last flight of the day.

Captain Johnson sent an Event Report to US Airways Safety in Phoenix, AZ. He said he sent a copy of the first page via facsimile and also sent an explanation in PDF format via email.

Captain Johnson said he had previously experienced a compressor stall on a B727 and on a Learjet. He recalled that the events were very similar with the popping noise and vibrations.

He recalled that he had received an engine surge scenario on takeoff climb during simulator training but could not recall which airplane he was training for at the time. He said he was not sure if the engine surge and stall meant the same thing in the simulator. He said when he received the engine surge scenario in the simulator; it was very similar to the event he experienced in the airplane.

When asked to clarify if he heard one or multiple pops he said “not multiple pops”.

When asked about the transfer of controls, Captain Johnson said basically the pilot flying continued to fly and after the first few items of the procedure, then the captain assigned the flying duties. He said it was a judgment call.

Captain Johnson thought the Event Report was a mandatory report. He said an engine stall was not specifically listed but he said it was covered under the category of “engine disturbances”. He said he completed the report two days after the event.

He said he flew out of LGA fairly often but had not had any issues with birds.

He said he did not know Captain Sullenberger or First Officer Skiles and had not heard anything about them from others.

When asked if he had received any information from the company regarding the accident on January 15, he said there were messages sent via email and there was an operations board in the crew room that provided general information about the flight crew and updates about the accident.

Captain Johnson thought he had had dual engine failure training but could not recall.

The engine stall occurred on the 4th day of a four day trip. It was the third and last leg of the day. He recalled that the first officer had mentioned that he had been on the Airbus for almost a year and was starting to study for his recurrent training.

Captain Johnson said he received a call from the Safety Department requesting that he submit an Event Report.

When asked if the transfer of controls was US Airways SOP he said he would have to look at the QRH for the event but basically you looked at the event and determined when you were in a safe phase of flight to transfer controls. He was asked if, during simulator training, the controls were transferred during an emergency when the FO was flying. He said it was the captains' discretion depending on the nature of the event.

He was asked why he took the controls in this case. Captain Johnson said he took the controls because Bill (FO Arkins) had seen the engine indications and recognized the problem as the number 2 engine. He said they discussed and confirmed what he had seen before they applied the procedure. He said he did not take the controls because of FO Arkins experience, he felt in this situation that the crew coordination worked better.

He said they leveled at 18,000 feet and after the procedure was completed, climbed to 23,000 initially then continued the climb to cruise altitude. He said they were level at 18,000 for about 5 minutes. He did not recall if they were leveled again at 23,000 feet before continuing the climb. He said all parameters were normal and there was no reoccurrence during the remainder of the flight.

After landing, Captain Johnson called maintenance on the radio, relayed a message via phone patch through dispatch, and made a logbook entry. He said it was about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and he did not know if the airplane flew later that day.

When asked, Captain Johnson confirmed that the engine stall occurred in the number 2 engine.

Captain Johnson said the airplane was in the normal bleed configuration and that they had not encountered icing conditions or used the anti ice system.

Captain Johnson believed that they had flown the same airplane on the previous two legs that day but was not certain. He said the previous two legs were uneventful, normal operations.

Regarding company procedures for transfer of control, Captain Johnson stated that he thought it was the captain's discretion depending on the situation.

Interview ended at 1305.