

Docket No. SA-532

Exhibit No. 2-E

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C.

Operations/Human Performance Group Chairmen
Interview Summaries – FAA APM and POI

(10 Pages)

Attachment 4

to Operations / Human Performance Group Factual Report

DCA09MA026

INTERVIEWS OF APM and POI

Interview: Stanley (Stan) D. Pavkovich, A320 Aircrew Program Manager (APM) - Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Date: March 2, 2009

Time: 0838

Location: via telephone

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Lori Cline – US Airways; Larry Rooney – US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), Ricky Daniel – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Terry Lutz - Airbus.

Mr. Pavkovich was represented by Captain Chuck Pastene, Designee on A320 program FAA

In the interview, Mr. Pavkovich stated the following:

He was 55 years old. He had been the APM for the A319, A320 and A321 at US Airways Certificate Management Office since November 1, 2008. He had been with the FAA since September 27, 1998. Prior to that, he was a line captain, instructor and check airman at PSA Airlines, a subsidiary of US Airways from July 1986 through September 1998. From September 1998 until June 2000, he was the Assistant Principle Operations Inspector where he did certification. From June 2000 until April 2004, he was the Airbus Assistant Aircrew Program Manager (AAPM) and a technical expert for the Airbus fleets. From April 2004 until October 2008, he was the Training Center Program Manager (TCPM) at the CMO and served as the primary operations interface between the US Airways training centers in Charlotte, NC, and Phoenix, AZ, with oversight of their ground and flight instructors of the Part 142 certificate. From November 2008 until the time of the interview, he had oversight of ground and flight instructors, 22 designees, 90 check airmen, and a fleet of about 245 airplanes.

Mr. Pavkovich had an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate and was type rated in the A320, A330, BAe-3100, B-757 / 767, DO-328, ERJ 170 and ERJ 190. He held a commercial single engine land certificate, and was a certified flight instructor with single and multi engine land and instrument ratings. He had about 14,000 hours total time.

He said US Airways corporate headquarters was in Tempe, AZ and the CMO was located in Coraopolis, PA. Asked if he was the only APM for the Airbus fleet, Mr. Pavkovich said he was the program manager and they just hired an assistant APM who was going through Airbus initial training. He also had other inspectors who assisted him – 2 in Phoenix (PHX), 1 in Philadelphia (PHL), 1 in Charlotte (CLT), and 1 in Columbus, OH.

Mr. Pavkovich said his surveillance activities were to ensure that flight crew training and testing was “by the regulations”. He did this through the ATOS (Air Transportation Oversight System) and the other inspections that were mandated by the 8910. He had oversight of the designees on an annual basis and check airmen every 24 months. He received assistance from the air carrier who also conducted surveillance on check airmen.

When asked how his workload was in his current position, Mr. Pavkovich said it was not bad. He said the numbers sounded overwhelming and he tracked APDs and check airmen so he was aware of due dates and their last rides. He had other members on his team who helped him out. On any given month, Mr. Pavkovich was on the road for 3 weeks and home for 1 week. He always carried his laptop. He divided his time between CLT and PHX. He said being new, he was trying to get his face known and get immersed in the program to have a better understanding.

Mr. Pavkovich spent a good part of his time at the training centers. He scheduled his flights between training centers on an Airbus aircraft so he could do the enroute on the equipment he oversaw.

Asked if there were any areas of special emphasis in US Airways training, Mr. Pavkovich said the program had been established for 10 years and the personnel were second to none. There were no special issues. He said they operated under AQP (Advanced Qualification Program) and the system was constantly looked and revised. He said he was re-acclimating himself to those he used to work with and was acquainting himself with the new people in Phoenix.

Mr. Pavkovich's point of contact at US Airways was the Fleet Captain followed by the 22 designees he oversaw. Although only required for the airline to hold them annually, US Airways held quarterly safety meetings which he attended. He attended the meetings in CLT and PHX.

Mr. Pavkovich said he was responsible for procedures and manuals if there was a change submitted. He would sit down with the fleet captain and discuss the change, and then a recommendation would be made to the principle operations inspector (POI). The most recent training bulletin was related to the issue of class II messages. The proposed change went through the process of the technical writers and fleet captain. After his review, he would sign a signature page and forward it to the POI for approval and then the change was made to the pilot's handbook.

Mr. Pavkovich oversaw changes to the pilot handbook for the Airbus and also for general manuals like the operations manual or the AQP manual, but only if they pertained to the Airbus itself.

Asked if he observed training or just did checking, he said he would try to mix it up with his assistants. He spent a lot of time keeping up with designees while his assistants spent more time observing the training. The week before the interview, Mr. Pavkovich was in PHX and renewed a designee, observed an SPV and LOE, observed a check airman doing CQT (Continuing Qualification Training) and observed training session #7. He also did an enroute on an Airbus to and from PHX.

Mr. Pavkovich felt that US Airways training program was second to none. He said when he was first type rated; he went through the US Airways program which was a Part 121.

He said AQP was even better. It was a well established program and the designees and check airmen had been with the company for a long time. He was very excited to work with these individuals again and his relationship with the fleet captain was very open. He was very pleased with the operations as a whole.

Asked if he had any concerns with the engine failure training provided by US Airways, he said he had no problems with it at all and it seemed to him that it was covered at almost every lesson. He said it was done continually and now with AQP it was even better.

Mr. Pavkovich had not observed session #6 (dual engine failure simulation) since he took his current position but had when he was AAPM. He said as a TCPM he would look at the curriculum and also that of other customers, not just US Airways, for example JetBlue and Chautauqua Airlines. He looked at the training procedures of many other carriers, and when comparing them to US Airways he felt the procedures at US Airways were second to none and they stood out in the top.

Mr. Pavkovich said that he had not been the APM that recommended approval of simulator session #6 in the training program; the recommendation regarding that scenario was made by his predecessor. Now that he was APM, any recommendations would come from him. He felt that the dual engine failure training in simulator session #6 was very effective and mirrored the training from the manufacturer. He said the scenario took place at FL350 but unfortunately for Flight 1549 it did not help much, "but what are you going to do".

Mr. Pavkovich did not have any knowledge of discussions regarding dual engine failures at low altitudes.

Mr. Pavkovich was familiar with the QRH (Quick Reference Handbook) and said that it mirrored what was provided by Airbus. He said in terms of ease of use, it looked straight forward but in the heat of the moment said it could be difficult but one could work through it. He did not find any difficulty with it.

Asked if he had observed training for ditching provided by US Airways, Mr. Pavkovich said yes. He said it was covered in distance learning and the QRH. He said that last April he did the distance learning module when he went through recurrent. He had experienced it and observed it. When asked to describe the ditching training, Mr. Pavkovich said in distance learning there was a series of PowerPoint slides with questions at the end of the module. There was also a ground school portion where 30-45 minutes was spent talking about ditching technique such as "what side of the swell". He said there was also training required for 121.417 regarding emergency equipment.

Since the accident, Mr. Pavkovich said there had not been any changes to surveillance or procedures.

Mr. Pavkovich was notified of the accident as he returned from a 3 day visit to the CLT training center when the POI told him. Within 15 minutes he was in the operations control center and watched it unfold for the next 5 hours. Information was sent to the Certificate Management Office and then to the regional office in NY.

Mr. Pavkovich was asked to describe the process in place to implement changes he thought were needed. He said he would pick up the phone and talk to the Fleet Captain who would talk to the Manager of AQP. Since taking his new position, he had not had to do that so far and he was very pleased with the program.

Regarding CRM training at US Airways, Mr. Pavkovich said he was very pleased. He first entered the program when it was Part 121 and everyone did CRM like a “kum ba ya event”. At the time of the interview, US Airways employed Threat and Error Management in all its lessons. Crew members were continually asked if they were in the green, yellow or red, and the models in the classroom were constantly referred to.

Mr. Pavkovich said he tracked all surveillance and observation of check airmen and designees are tracked via PTRS. He said he was also assigned Element Performance Inspections (EPI) through ATOS.

Mr. Pavkovich was asked to describe the events that he observed during his 3 week period on the road. He said he was given a schedule of events and would see which designee or check airman was due for observation, which would take precedence. He said if he went to CLT, he could watch four events, one each day. He would ask his assistants to view other parts of the curriculum to get a general sampling. He also liked to include the check airmen. Based on the schedule, he would have someone go to PHX and fly a couple of routes out there to touch base with the line check airmen there.

Asked if there was any guidance for training on bird strikes, he stated no. He said they talked about bird strike mitigation but there was not any guidance or training. He said the Fleet Captain could not remember any either.

Mr. Pavkovich did not know Captain Sullenberger or FO Skiles. He had not observed either of them in training but thought he knew of a RSI (Remote Sited Inspector) based in PHL who observed a training event with the FO.

Asked if any special emphasis was given to the ditching push button during training, Mr. Pavkovich said it was addressed in the QRH. He said it was discussed in the general systems integration into the training and it was part of the QRH procedure but there was no special emphasis besides following the checklist. He said the ditching push button was also used when deicing prior to flight.

Asked how US Airways trained which crewmember should fly during an emergency situation, Mr. Pavkovich said that it was the captain who made that decision and he would select the flying pilot.

Mr. Pavkovich was asked to describe how he got information from his assistants who visit sites for him. He said formally they had the PTRS system and informally they would send him an email with any comments, or call him if something was urgent. He said comments also were entered in the ATOS comments section which goes to the POI and then it would be fed to him and he addressed them.

Asked if there was a process for receiving feedback from others at the company if they had comments or concerns, he said he could not answer that because he had not been in the position that long.

Mr. Pavkovich was asked about crew pairings during training and what guidance was offered. He believed the precedence was to pair a captain and first officer but due to scheduling it may be a captain/captain or FO/FO. Asked if the company made that decision, he said the decision came from the POI but he had not had to look at any of that since taking his current position.

Regarding the simulator session #6 that he observed, Mr. Pavkovich stated it was a Captain/FO pairing. He said they sometime strayed from the captain/FO pairing but that did not happen often. He said there was always a fully qualified check pilot who would seat fill for a checking event; it was never another line pilot. Mr. Pavkovich could not recall if he joined the crew for the briefing prior to the simulator. He said he liked to show up at the briefing but sometimes he could not do that.

Mr. Pavkovich did not have any oversight of cabin crew training.

Asked if during the distance learning module on ditching if there was any reference to the portability of the slide rafts, Mr. Pavkovich said that would be covered in ground school and in recurrent training required by Part 121.417.

Asked how long the AQP cycle at US Airways was, Mr. Pavkovich said it was a 12 month cycle and he believed the airline was in phase 4 of AQP. He said there was no discussion or concern over the length of the program at the time of the interview.

Mr. Pavkovich was asked if, since the accident, there was any talk of abbreviating the dual engine failure check list. He said one would like to be able to cover all contingencies in training but “you just can’t cover them all”.

Asked if during session #6 whether each crew member performed the scenario, Mr. Pavkovich said that each seat got to demonstrate the scenario and said it was written on the lesson plan.

Mr. Pavkovich was asked to describe the process of how APD’s and check airmen were selected. He said a candidate would submit an application and the company would select candidates whose résumés would be forwarded to him. He would approve or deny a candidate. He said the FAA process was noted in 8900.

Mr. Pavkovich stated that he was very pleased with the training program and personnel that worked at US Airways. He received a lot of support from people, the training center and his office. He said if his manager was asked, he would say that Mr. Pavkovich had unlimited travel funds and he was probably the most spent inspector on property.

Asked if he had received any complaints or concerns, from any US Airways pilots or instructors he said he had not. Mr. Pavkovich felt he had a good reputation and open relationship with the instructors and check airmen and strived to promote openness, and he felt that he was approachable. He said there were contractual issues that people had concerns about but that was not related. He said no one had any complaints.

The interview concluded at 0934.

**Interview: Mark Mulkey, Principle Operations Inspector (POI) US Airways
Certificate Management Office (CMO) – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Interview date: March 2, 2009
Time: 0945
Location: Telephone interview**

Present were: David Helson, Katherine Wilson - National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Lori Cline – US Airways; Larry Rooney – US Airline Pilots Association (USAPA), Ricky Daniel – Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Terry Lutz - Airbus.

Mr. Mulkey was represented by Captain Chuck Pastene – US Airways

In the interview, Mr. Mulkey stated the following information:

He was almost 60 years old and was the Supervisory Principle Operations Inspector for the US Airways CMO. He had held that position for about 3 years including the time he was acting POI. He became the full time POI in about August of 2007. He had worked for the FAA since June 2001. Prior to being the POI, he held the positions of Assistant POI, Assistant Program Manager 757/ 767, and Aircrew Program Manager for the introduction of the EMB-170 at US Airways. Since joining the FAA, all of his positions had been at that office and related to the US Airways certificate. Prior to his work at the FAA, he was in the Air Force and Air Guard for 30 years and flew A-7's, F-15's, OV-10's, and the KC-135 in the Air Guard. Prior to joining the FAA, he had no FAR 121 experience. He was type rated in the B757 / B767, the EMB 170 / 190, and the 707 and he had logged about 5,000 – 6,000 hours total time, most of which was in fighter airplanes.

As the POI, he was the Operations interface between the carrier and the FAA and was responsible for oversight of the APM's and operational programs for the carrier such as ATOS (Air Transport Oversight System), ASAP (Aviation Safety Action Program), and certification of US Airways.

Mr. Mulkey was stationed at the Certificate Management Office outside of Pittsburg and had 3 assistant POI's. One located at his office and two located at the office in Phoenix, AZ. He said US Airways and America West had merged a few years ago and all oversight was now managed from the Pittsburg office.

Mr. Mulkey said he was mainly concentrating on the safety aspects of certificate management using the ATOS system and also on oversight of the APM's who oversee the check airman, instructors, and APD's (Aircrew Program Designee). He said he did not conduct the surveillance work himself. He said if he was at a training center he would conduct observations but he had no formal tasking to do so.

He said he was responsible for the changes to operational procedures manuals. He used the technical experts, APM's, to review and forward recommendations to him before approving any changes. He was charged with oversight of the training manuals, AQP volume 1, 2, and 3, Pilot Handbooks, QRH's, Ground Operations Manuals, Hazmat and all other operational procedures manuals at US Airways.

Mr. Mulkey said the manuals were in a constant state of revision dependent upon changes in requirements. The AQP training manuals were revised if there were changes to the training program. The Pilot Handbook and QRH changes were sometimes driven by AD's (Airworthiness Directives) or other requirements and were changed to meet those requirements. He said airplane specific procedures were based on the manufacturer's Airplane Flight Manuals (AFM). The manufacturer manuals were the main reference for any airplane procedural changes. Regarding emergency procedures, he said they had to follow the manufacturer recommendations unless there was a proven reason to do something different. Some procedural changes were test flown in the simulator to evaluate them depending upon what the change was.

He said US Airways was in Phase 4 AQP and changes to the training manuals were under review from FAA AFS-230. He said any changes to the training manuals were submitted to him as well as to AFS-230 and he would receive a recommendation from the people at AFS-230 before he approved any changes to the training manuals.

Mr. Mulkey said he sometimes talks to POI's of other carriers and they tried to set up meetings periodically to discuss pertinent issues. He said if there were some outstanding issues, they would compare procedures between carriers. He said the carrier's procedures, especially emergency procedures, were based on the manufacturer procedures so they were basically set.

Mr. Mulkey said they kept very busy and had a number of issues to address on a daily basis but he said the workload was not overly burdensome. He said he held monthly meetings with all of the operations personnel and had a separate meeting with the APM's. He said he had daily interaction with the APM's to discuss any pertinent issues.

Mr. Mulkey said on the day of the accident, he received a call from the regional office to ask if he knew about it. He called the regional Operations center to confirm and then set up communications with the Washington operations center and the eastern region operations center.

He said since the accident, he had not made any changes to the surveillance procedures. He said they were already doing surveillance on the flight program and there was no requirement to change that.

He said the dual engine failure procedure was derived from the procedures that were certified when the airplane was certified for the manufacturer and felt the procedure was adequate to address the issue it was intended to. He said he had not been involved in any discussions and was not aware of any discussion regarding changes to the dual engine failure procedure.

He said the ditching procedure was based on the manufacturer procedure and he was not aware of any discussion regarding changes to that procedure.

Mr. Mulkey said the APM's were required to recertify all of the approximately 81 designees on an annual basis and they also looked at the check airmen as well as the training program. In addition, they had the ATOS surveillance requirements. He said in the current quarter there were about 10 required airman cockpit observations per fleet, in addition to 5-10 training observations per fleet, EPI (Element Performance Inspection) observations and 5-10 training center observations per fleet. He said on a weekly basis, each APM had about 2-3 surveillance activities to perform.

He said he monitored the pass / fail rate of proficiency checks and line checks. He said that as part of the AQP program there was an annual meeting with the company and AFS-230 to review the data. He said he thought US Airways had a normal pass / fail ratio. He said AQP program had a "leveling" that looked at all of the evaluators and check airmen to make sure no one was outside of standards as far as the rate of failing or not failing.

Mr. Mulkey said the training program did not include training regarding birdstrike hazard or birdstrike mitigation but the Operations Manual included procedures for reporting of birdstrike events and inspection of the airplane afterwards.

He said that CRM was embedded into the AQP program. He said US Airways had Threat and Error Management that was included in all ground and flight training. He said he thought it was a very strong program and it worked very well. He said US Airways did a good job of embedding CRM into training at all levels.

Mr. Mulkey said that if the company wanted to make a change, they would first forward a copy of the proposed change to him. He would then distribute the proposal to the appropriate APM's for a review. The APM would review the proposal to ensure that it met all requirements and then send it back to him for approval. He said if it involved a change to an emergency procedure, he would also coordinate with the certification office

for review since a change in the steps, or the order of the steps in a procedure could affect the certification of the airplane.

He said if his office found an area they felt had a weakness or that needed attention, the appropriate APM, who was trained and qualified on the airplane, would coordinate with the carrier to address the issue.

Mr. Mulkey said he received feedback regarding US Airways operations from various sources such as the hotline and occasionally some written letters. He said the APM's had a good relationship with the company check airmen and line pilots and also received a lot of input. He said he had received some complaints that had been addressed. He said there were no significant issues but, for example, he said some pilots expressed a concern about fuel planning issues. He said the issue was investigated and resolved. He said in that particular case, after investigating the issue, he did not feel the complaint was valid.

Mr. Mulkey said he did not know Captain Sullenberger or First Officer Skiles personally. He could not recall if he had ever observed either of them and said he would have to look at records to determine if he had done an enroute inspection on either of them in the past.

He said he had heard some people discuss the length of the dual engine failure checklist but there had been no official discussion on the subject of a shorter version of the checklist or of changing it.

Mr. Mulkey said he tried to travel to Phoenix or one of the other US Airways training sites once per month but the APM's were the ones that did most of the on-site surveillance. He said the APM's were the experts on airplane specific procedures but if he and an APM disagreed on an issue regarding the procedures / manuals; they would discuss the differences and compare the procedure to the manufacturers' manuals and possibly enlist the aid of the certification office to resolve it.

Mr. Mulkey said ASAP was an important program, with the information exchanged, that provided important inputs for the FDAG (Flight Data Analysis Group) and FOSB (Flight Operations Standards Board) and that data drove some changes in manuals, procedures, and training. He said it was unfortunate that the program was no longer active. He said there had been some issues the union brought up that they had wanted to change some language in the MOU (Memorandum of Understanding). US Airways did not approve of the changes and the union decided to withdrawal from the ASAP program. He said he was aware of the changes that the union was trying to make.

He said the airplanes that were approved for extended over water operations were equipped to meet the requirements of the regulations. The airplanes that were not approved for extended over water operations were not required to meet the same regulations with respect to the carriage of life vests and rafts. The requirement was based on the distance off shore an airplane was to be used. He said they had surveillance over that approval and made sure the airplanes met the requirements. He said all of the airplanes met the requirements.

Regarding the FAA guidance on the company's call sign change, he said America West and US Airways had merged a few years ago and the company requested a change to use "Cactus" as the call sign. He said that request was coordinated with the people at Air Traffic Control (ATC) and approved by his office. He said there was some initial confusion on the part of ATC but those issues had been resolved. He said he was not aware of any requirement for a company to use a call sign that had some related name or information painted on the airplane for identification.

Mr. Mulkey said when the companies merged; there was a process, which took a couple of years, to combine flight operations documentation. The airline did a GAP Analysis and picked the best practice from that analysis. Initially, the two companies were operated separately and the America West CMO in Phoenix approved the changes to their documentation. There was a progressive change to the manuals and procedures so that by the time the merger was completed, the procedures would be the same. He said all of the changes were reviewed by him and by the APM's during the process. He said they also had set up a computer site to coordinate the review and sign off of various manuals and procedures.

Interview ended at 1040.