NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Office of Aviation Safety Washington, D.C. 20594

October 16, 2002

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE INTERVIEW

DCA00MA026

A. ACCIDENT

Location:

Rancho Cordova, California

Date:

February 16, 2000

Time:

1950 Pacific Standard Time (PST)

Aircraft:

Douglas DC-8-71F, N8079U, Emery Worldwide Airlines,

Flight 17

B. DETAILS OF SUMMARY

Attached are interview summaries with Emery Air Maintenance Personnel conducted by Stephen Carbone. These interviews were conducted as follows:

Mr. Gregory Lusk Lead Mechanic

August 12, 2002

Mr. Norbert Drees Maintenance Technician October 8, 2002

Mr. John Carson Maintenance Technician July 22, 2002

Stephen Carbone

Group Chairman - Aircraft Maintenande

Interview of Gregory Lusk

Interview performed on August 12, 2002 as a phone interview. Also party to the call were William Elder, Legal Counsel, and Bruce Robbins, Emery Representative. Mr. Lusk understood that a NTSB investigator conducted the interview and that the information acquired was to be used to close out issues with the Emery accident – DCA00MA026.

The questioning centered on the night of November 25, 1999, the night that Emery mechanics allegedly switched two elevator dampers from their former positions to their correct positions. Mr. Lusk was a Lead/Inspector-performing Required Inspection duties for the maintenance tasks accomplished.

Information, as a result of questioning, provided by Mr. Lusk, is as follows:

Mr. Lusk stated he was the Lead mechanic that night and that he was a Lead for several aircraft that night. The crew assigned to N8079U that night consisted of one Lead (himself) and three maintenance technicians. He did not remember if an inbound flight crew turnover was received or if anyone spoke of receiving one. Mr. Lusk could not remember the configuration of the aircraft on the gate and whether the gust lock was installed.

When asked what he remembered about troubleshooting accomplished on the write-up, Mr. Lusk stated that he personally ran the elevators through to verify that there was a problem. The maintenance crew visually inspected the movements of the elevators at this time. Mr. Lusk's supervisor had noted that there was a problem with the dampers and that the mechanical operation wasn't correct. After this discovery, the crew started to look through the Illustrated Parts Catalog for the part numbers of the dampers to confirm that the parts that were installed were correct.

Mr. Lusk stated that, to his knowledge, no one:

- 'broke-into' the elevator control system.
- had checked the cable tensions.
- accessed the control tab pushrod fairing.
- had rigged the control tab or the geared tab.
- found any obstructions to movement of the control column.

Mr. Lusk had left at the end of his shift, prior to the tasks being completed, so he was unaware of freedom of movement checks, post-repair range of travel checks, or cable friction checks.

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Mr. Lusk felt that the swapping of the dampers was a good direction that they had followed.

The information documented is accurate per the interview.

Greg Lusk

Stephen Carbone
Air Safety Investigator
AS-40

Norbert Drees Statement of work accomplished On N8079U November 25th 1999

October 8, 2002

I participated in the switching of the left and right hand elevator dampers to their correct positions.

On that night Greg Lusk was the Lead Mechanic for the third shift, at the end of the third shift Greg Lusk went home and was replaced by Shawn Dukes as the Lead mechanic. As far as I can recall the troubleshooting began with us, Greg Lusk and I, comparing the feel of the flight control with another DC-8. We then ran the flight controls through several times visually looking for something, such as binding, we may have looked at some of the cable runs.

With the help of Don Mader and Dana Andrews, both of these were the Line Maintenance Supervisors on duty that night, we quickly came to realize visually looking up at the left and right elevator dampers that the damper linkage appeared to be improperly installed. We then put man lifts in place and performed a closer visual inspection. We compared the part numbers recorded from the dampers with the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC). The IPC showed that both dampers were located in the wrong position, right hand damper in the left position and the left hand damper in the right position.

The Dampers being installed in the wrong position was why it appeared that the linkage was incorrect, when it was actually the dampers that were installed in the reverse positions.

We then proceeded to remove and swap the dampers to the correct positions using the maintenance manual for guidance. The job was nearly finished when Greg Lusk left and Shawn Dukes took over as Lead Mechanic. Once the dampers were placed into the correct position no further maintenance was done to the aircraft beyond a visual inspection and checking the feel of the flight controls. It seems to me that the flight controls, after swapping of the dampers, felt smoother, however, I depended on the experience of my Leads and Supervisors for verification.

From my perspective the flight controls worked properly after the damper reversals were completed. The rigging was never disturbed and therefore, no further maintenance action was taken.

One final note I would like to point out is that this experience in troubleshooting and working on the dampers, I now feel very confident that I could, from the ground, spot the dampers being reversed.

Norbert Drees

10-11-02

Date

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Interview of John Carson

Interview performed on July 22, 2002 as a phone interview. Mr. Carson understood that a NTSB investigator was conducting the interview and that the information acquired was to be used to close out issues with the Emery accident – DCA00MA026.

20th OR 21st

The questioning centered on January 44,2000, the day that Emery mechanics performed a B-2 check on the accident aircraft. Mr. Carson was a mechanic performing the maintenance task cards on the tail.

Information, as a result of questioning, provided by Mr. Carson is as follows:

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John Carson stated that the B009 card, which required an inspection of the horizontal stabilizer and elevator attach points, did not require a panel removal to access visually the elevator attach points.

Mr. Carson stated that the Emery Technical Training department did not instruct that removal of the panel was necessary during the execution of that particular B009 work card.

John Carson

Stephen Carbone
Air Safety Investigator
AS-40