

DCA13MR002  
Conrail - Shared Assets  
Derailment/Hazardous Material Release  
Paulsboro, New Jersey  
November 30, 2012

NTSB - Interview of Washington  
Township Fire Department Captain\_2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS  
MATERIAL RELEASE  
PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY  
NOVEMBER 30, 2012

Docket No.: DCA-13-MR-002

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Interview of: JAMES LEE

Washington Township Fire Department  
Headquarters  
213 E. Holly Avenue  
Sewell, New Jersey

Tuesday,  
January 29, 2013

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI  
Accident Investigator

## APPEARANCES:

MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI, Accident Investigator  
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous  
Materials Investigations  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20594

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PAUL L. STANCIL, Senior Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board  
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous  
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490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.  
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I N T E R V I E W

(3:10 p.m.)

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3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. I'm Muhamed El-Zoghbi, Hazardous  
4 Materials Accident Investigator with the National Transportation  
5 Safety Board. We're here in Washington Township at the Washington  
6 Township Fire Department on January 29th, 2013. It is currently  
7 around 8:10 p.m. And -- sorry, what did I say? 3:10.

8 CAPT. LEE: I was going to say, may I lost some time.

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Stand corrected. It's 3:10 p.m. With  
10 me is -- please --

11 CAPT. LEE: Captain James Lee.

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: James Lee. And we also have?

13 MR. STANCIL: Yes, I'm Paul Stancil, Hazardous Materials  
14 Accident Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board.

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And we're here to conduct this interview  
16 regarding the Paulsboro derailment that occurred on November 30th,  
17 2012.

18 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

19 Q. Captain Lee, if you don't mind me addressing you that  
20 way, if you could please give us just a brief description of your  
21 experience and involvement with hazardous materials?

22 A. I have been a firefighter since 1987. Upon becoming a  
23 fire fighter I received my awareness and operations in hazmat. I  
24 became a hazmat technician 4 years ago, so up until that point I  
25 was just operational. I became a technician and a hazmat

1 specialist in highway transportation through -- in Colorado. So  
2 that's pretty much my hazmat background.

3 I joined the hazmat team for Gloucester County upon my  
4 completion of my technician program, so I've been with the team as  
5 long as I've been a technician.

6 Q. Excellent. So now, if you could, I want you to look  
7 back on November 30th. It was Friday, November 30th, 2012 --

8 A. Uh-huh.

9 Q. -- during the Paulsboro derailment. And if you could,  
10 in your own words, tell us what you observed and your level of  
11 involvement with the activities on that day?

12 A. Okay. The station that I run out of, we start our shift  
13 at 7:00. And shortly after coming in we heard on the scanner that  
14 there was a train derailment in Paulsboro. My whole crew is --  
15 we're all hazmat techs and we're all involved with the Gloucester  
16 County hazmat team. So we -- you know, we're listening up, kind  
17 of starting to get, you know, prepared. I made a phone call to  
18 our District Chief Hoffman here, asked him if he was listening up.  
19 He said he had heard but he wasn't, you know, familiar with what  
20 was going on.

21 So we gathered up our crew. We came here. This is  
22 where our PPE is kept for the hazmat team, so this is kind of like  
23 our rally point. My crew responded here. We assembled. We  
24 gathered our gear. Chief Hoffman gave us a brief description of  
25 what he had just gotten off the Internet on vinyl chloride. We

1 knew that was the product. He gave us a quick -- I don't think it  
2 was an MSDS sheet but it was -- there was a little bit of  
3 information about the material that we were going into, so --

4 Four guys from my crew, we went over in one of the  
5 township's pickup trucks. We responded to the Gloucester County  
6 Fire Academy, where we were told it was going to be the initial  
7 staging area. We were supposed to go there for our medical  
8 monitoring.

9 We left here approximately 7:30, 7:40, responded to the  
10 Fire Academy. Very, very quick medical monitoring, where all they  
11 did was our blood pressure and our pulse ox. They didn't really  
12 do anything else other than that. There was no briefing or  
13 anything. Once we were done doing our medical monitoring, limited  
14 as it was, they told us we were going to another staging area,  
15 which was at the Ames parking lot in Paulsboro.

16 So we responded to the Ames parking lot. We got there.  
17 We were the first ones to arrive. There really hadn't been  
18 anything set up at that parking lot at this time.

19 After we were there for maybe 10 minutes other units  
20 started to arrive. The tractor trailer known as CBRNE I, which is  
21 the Gloucester County hazmat truck, arrived. We started to do  
22 truck checks. We started to do, you know, an equipment check on  
23 some of the equipment on there, some of which we found was  
24 deficient. The meters that were there were not charged. They  
25 were -- didn't appear that they were calibrated. We started

1 checking the SCBA, several PASS devices didn't have batteries,  
2 were -- just were not, were not properly functioning.

3 We were also told at that time that they were going to  
4 be delivering, I want to say the number was 17, patients from the  
5 scene that were exposed to the vinyl chloride that we were  
6 supposed to decontaminate. There was really no direction as to  
7 what kind of decontamination we were going to do, where we were  
8 putting them, if we were decontaminating them and then taking them  
9 to the hospital. It was just -- and nobody really knew who was in  
10 charge. So we couldn't really even monitor them to see if they  
11 were exposed to anything because the meters that we have, they  
12 just -- they weren't, they weren't operable.

13 So what we did, we set up some decon tents. The people  
14 that needed to be deconned, we just had them strip down. From  
15 what we were told, just by removing their clothes, was going to  
16 take a lot of the hazard away from them. So we waited until  
17 Gloucester County EMS came with -- I think they had four or five  
18 ambulances. We had the people strip down. We placed all their  
19 stuff in trash bags and then they were transported to Underwood  
20 Hospital through Gloucester County EMS.

21 Myself and another firefighter on my crew, Firefighter  
22 Sumek, Lee Sumek, we tried to establish a check-in area because a  
23 lot of people were starting to come into the staging area and  
24 nobody knew who was coming, going, who was in charge, who was --  
25 it was very uncoordinated. So we started to try and do a status



1 check-in.

2           After about 15 minutes of doing that, we were told we  
3 were moving forward to another staging area, which was at Delaware  
4 and Jefferson Streets -- no, Commerce and Jefferson. I'm sorry.  
5 Which was 500, 700 feet away from the incident itself. I'm not  
6 exactly sure. I mean, it was very, very close.

7           We arrived there. There was still no direction as to  
8 what we were doing. We stood around probably for 30 to 45  
9 minutes. Then we finally met up with members from the Paulsboro  
10 Refinery who had meters. We started doing air monitoring with  
11 them.

12           I coordinated, along with Calvin Hargie (ph.) from  
13 Paulsboro. Teams -- we broke into teams, two guys from our hazmat  
14 team and one guy from Paulsboro Refinery. We split up in a couple  
15 block area and we did a grid and we went out and just did some air  
16 monitoring throughout the borough there. That probably took 30 to  
17 45 minutes. And at that time everybody was getting negative  
18 readings on anything. We weren't getting any high levels of  
19 anything. And I'm going to say that was probably 10:00, 10:30.

20           After we did some air monitoring, it was more staging.  
21 We just, you know, stayed in our area. There was really not much  
22 direction as to what our job function was. And that continued  
23 until, for me, approximately 12:30, I got called back here to  
24 Washington Township to investigate a fire that we had on Selena  
25 Road. Myself and Steve Finn, who is my partner in the

1 investigation team, we left Paulsboro and came back here and did  
2 an investigation.

3 So, as far as the Paulsboro operation, I was there until  
4 between 12 and 12:30, and that was my only exposure at the scene.  
5 I didn't go back any other days, just that initial day for the  
6 first couple hours.

7 Q. Okay. Can you tell us who directed you to these  
8 different staging locations? Was this --

9 A. We went to the Fire Academy first and we were told from  
10 Dennis Kappler, who is, I guess, the deputy chief of the hazmat  
11 team, also a County employee, to go to the Ames staging area. But  
12 there was no direction, just go. There wasn't, you know, what our  
13 job function was going to be or anything.

14 And then from the Ames parking lot to the Commerce and  
15 Jefferson staging area was from Captain Dolgos of our department.

16 Q. Okay. And did you have any communication with the  
17 Incident Command or how was -- how did orders come through?

18 A. I did not. My only communication was with Captain  
19 Dolgos.

20 Q. Dolgos?

21 A. Right.

22 Q. He was your point of contact at that --

23 A. He was my point of contact, yeah. But there's a --  
24 there's a discrepancy as to actually what his role was, if he was  
25 the hazmat branch director -- nobody really knows. There was -- I

1 would say for the first -- probably the whole first day, nobody  
2 really knew who was, who was answering to who and who was running  
3 it, at least from my point of view. So --

4 MR. STANCIL: You mentioned that you did a grid for air  
5 monitoring and there were negative readings. How was all of that  
6 being recorded?

7 CAPT. LEE: Paulsboro Refinery told us that they were  
8 recording all that. They were calling back to -- I don't know if  
9 they were calling back to the refinery, but they were radioing  
10 into somebody what their levels, what their readings were. And,  
11 again, I don't know exactly who that was. We didn't have any  
12 functioning monitoring so we were relying on them. We were just  
13 kind of giving them support with manpower to go through the town  
14 and do the air monitoring.

15 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

16 Q. Was it primarily to be like a buddy or was it to  
17 actually, when you guys didn't --

18 A. I'll be honest with you. We were looking for something  
19 to do.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Because we didn't have any direction. So we figured  
22 since we're all here, let's -- we'll split up our guys and their  
23 guys. They had enough meters and -- they didn't have as much  
24 manpower as we did, but it was enough to take one of their guys  
25 and a couple of our guys and split up that way.

1 Q. Did the group, their -- I guess their monitoring team,  
2 did they discuss or mention that they had obtained high readings  
3 earlier that day, or --

4 A. Not to me, no.

5 Q. They didn't?

6 A. No.

7 Q. And what strategy was used for the air monitoring in  
8 terms of determining the locations to do the --

9 A. The county field com was there, the field communications  
10 unit. I was able to go in there. They pulled up a -- like a  
11 Google Earth map of the area.

12 Q. Uh-huh.

13 A. And we just did it blocks of -- like I think I had six  
14 groups and we just kind of gridded it off by -- we went two  
15 blocks, I guess, towards the river. I'm not sure what street that  
16 is. It might be Delaware.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. We went out two -- whatever street the police station is  
19 on, we went out that far. And then each group took a street along  
20 that and worked, worked out. And then they worked back doing  
21 readings also. And then we sent two groups over towards where the  
22 water tower was. It's kind of a -- it's not really a gridded  
23 street area, it's kind of -- you know, the streets are a little  
24 curvy back there, so we had two teams back in there.

25 MR. STANCIL: These were mostly residential areas?

1           CAPT. LEE: Yeah. Yeah. The two teams that went up by  
2 the water tower, it doesn't seem as populated as right in the  
3 other streets.

4           BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

5           Q. Was the wind direction or anything like that a factor at  
6 all or -- when you guys were looking at sort of where to monitor  
7 or --

8           A. Well, we didn't have the equipment for our weather  
9 station. We took a piece of fire line tape and tied it to the  
10 antenna of one of the chief's cars just to give us an idea of wind  
11 direction. It wasn't very effective, but it was something, you  
12 know.

13                   So what we did was just -- you know, they would go to  
14 one corner, stand there for a few minutes try to get a reading.  
15 Waited, you know, a few more minutes, document it, go to the next  
16 block. So it was systematic, but it wasn't probably a perfect  
17 procedure.

18           Q. Okay. And you said you got no reading, no spikes or any  
19 readings of concern?

20           A. That's what -- I stayed at the staging area.

21           Q. Okay.

22           A. And myself and Calvin Hargie from Paulsboro Refinery  
23 stayed there and we sent the teams out and they were reporting  
24 back to him and he was calling in to -- I don't know if it was Pat  
25 Robinson or somebody else from Paulsboro. But he was calling in

1 the readings and at that time I believe there was no readings at  
2 all.

3 Q. So they were calling it negative readings, not --

4 A. Zero readings, yeah.

5 Q. Zero readings. Okay.

6 Now, with regards to the state -- well, the state of the  
7 CBRNE truck, I guess, could you elaborate a little more on sort  
8 of --

9 A. It's been an ongoing thing for the last few years.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. We've approached them several times. We've put it in  
12 writing formally in 2011; these were things that were deficient.

13 Our training over the last year, year and a half has  
14 been pretty much nothing. We trained once or twice last year,  
15 which was not very effective. We didn't do our competencies. We  
16 didn't dress out in, you know, our Level B's, our Level A's. We  
17 didn't -- training was very lacking.

18 Also a problem with the equipment -- like I said, for  
19 the last year and half we've been documenting all these things  
20 that have been needing repair and needed attention, and it was  
21 kind of falling on deaf ears. You know, they -- and the guys down  
22 at the county, they wear a lot of hats, just like the rest of us  
23 do. They have other responsibilities and things like that. But  
24 when it comes to life safety, I think some of these things are  
25 things that needed to be addressed and they just weren't. So --

1 Q. So in your assessment, you did not have the tools  
2 available to you to conduct --

3 A. No. Not only the tools --

4 Q. -- let's say if you were, if you were operational, if  
5 you had to (indiscernible) --

6 A. Not only the tools, the direction.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. The upper management, leadership of the hazmat team was  
9 not there that day. There was nobody there, so we were kind of  
10 left in limbo as to who's in charge, what's our operational  
11 function, where -- you know, we had no direction. So that was my  
12 big thing that day was that we didn't know what we were even doing  
13 there, you know. And then to top it off, we didn't have all the  
14 equipment that we needed and the equipment that we did have wasn't  
15 operating properly.

16 Q. How would things have normally played out, I guess, from  
17 -- if there was management available?

18 A. At least there would have been like a -- maybe a little  
19 more clear-cut what our function was. You know, are we just going  
20 to be doing air monitoring or are we -- you know, because if it  
21 was me, I would have had that whole area cleared and nobody would  
22 have been -- like there was guys right up there, you know, at the  
23 scene. And at that point we didn't know what we had. We didn't  
24 know what in the other cars. We didn't know if anything else had  
25 been breached. You know, there was a lot of unknowns and I think

1 somebody needed to take charge and say, step back, you know, let's  
2 take a look what we have here. And instead, everybody was up  
3 there gawking and, oh, yeah, taking pictures and this and that and  
4 -- it was a serious situation and I don't think people took it  
5 that way.

6 Q. Would you describe -- how would -- would you describe it  
7 as a lack of urgency or like how would you describe the sense up  
8 there at the time?

9 A. Yeah, I guess a lack of urgency, but also -- and I guess  
10 maybe in this business people want to be in that. You know what I  
11 mean? The guys from Paulsboro -- I mean, the one guy was right at  
12 his house and, you know, he refused to leave. His wife was there  
13 the whole time and -- I mean, if it was my wife and kids I'd be,  
14 get the hell out of here. You know, I just -- and maybe they just  
15 -- they want to be in control, but I don't know that they were  
16 equipped to be in control. I don't know if that answers your  
17 question or not, but --

18 Q. No, I mean, I guess so you believe that perhaps they  
19 didn't utilize all the resources that they had there or how would  
20 you --

21 A. I think it was above all of us, to be honest with you.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I mean, I certainly wouldn't have wanted to be in charge  
24 of it. But I think that the people that were in charge of it  
25 maybe should have stepped back a little bit and maybe refocused on



1 the big picture, because I think everybody had tunnel vision at  
2 the time. I mean, there was guys up there in the vapor cloud, you  
3 know, when it first happened and I'm sure they're, you know,  
4 they're exposed to, you know, something, so --

5 MS. EL-ZOGHBI: Paul, do you have any questions?

6 BY MR. STANCIL:

7 Q. Why do you think people were on scene without any PPE,  
8 any personal protective equipment?

9 A. Why? I don't have an answer for that. I think -- I  
10 could tell you why some of the people from the hazmat team didn't  
11 have PPE. Because what we were told was the state police was  
12 doing an audit last summer, and they made everybody turn their  
13 stuff back in so the state police could audit it and some of the  
14 members didn't get their stuff back. It was never reissued back  
15 to them. So they showed up that day -- there was four or five  
16 guys that didn't have any PPE. They just showed up in street  
17 clothes. Well -- and they stayed around all day but they didn't  
18 have the proper equipment. So --

19 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: What do you mean by -- so could you just  
20 discuss this, you know, audit?

21 CAPT. LEE: We're issued -- okay, we're issued turnout  
22 gear, structural firefighting gear. We're issued an SCBA mask.  
23 And that stuff was turned in because the state police was coming  
24 down to do an audit, is what we were told.

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Are these Washington Township personnel

1 or other --

2 CAPT. LEE: Everybody on the, everybody on the CBRNE  
3 team.

4 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

5 BY MR. STANCIL:

6 Q. And the equipment was turned into whom? To the state  
7 police or --

8 A. No, it was all brought down to Clayton to Jack DeAngelo,  
9 the hazmat coordinator. I can tell you for a fact that my gear  
10 bag was never opened by anybody when they did this audit, because  
11 if they did, they put everything perfectly back the way I sent it  
12 down there. There was guys I know from Deptford and there was a  
13 couple other guys on the team that never got their gear reissued  
14 back to them, so --

15 Q. What is this audit all about? What is it for?

16 A. There's been a problem between Washington Township and  
17 the county with the hazmat team since we started bringing  
18 attention to some of the problems a year and a half ago. And I'm  
19 not saying they were playing games, but they were almost going out  
20 of their way to make it hard for us. So they took everything back  
21 and I guess for a month they had everything. And we had to call  
22 them and go down and pick it up just so we would have it again.  
23 If we didn't go down and pick it up, I don't know that we ever  
24 would have gotten it back. So --

25 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

1 Q. And you said this was a state police audit or --

2 A. That's what they told us.

3 Q. They stated that?

4 A. That's what they told us, yeah.

5 Q. Is this the first time that they had mentioned that they  
6 were -- be an audit?

7 A. Since I've been on the team, yeah. Yeah.

8 Q. So this was not a routine audit or something of that  
9 nature that you knew?

10 A. I don't know. I don't know. I'm sure if there was an  
11 audit you guys could get a copy of it.

12 Q. I was just going to ask you, did you --

13 A. I didn't see anything.

14 Q. -- or did your group receive --

15 A. No.

16 Q. -- any results of the audit or --

17 A. No. All we got was word from Jack DeAngelo saying  
18 everything was fine.

19 Q. And could you just say what time period was this?

20 A. This was in the summer, August maybe, August, September.

21 Q. Of 2012?

22 A. 2012, yes.

23 Q. Since you've been on the hazmat, county hazmat team has  
24 there -- I mean, how often do you exercise with them or, you know,  
25 train?

1           A.    It used to be monthly up until 2012. 2012, they opted  
2 to go to a -- I think it was broken down into six drills, so it  
3 would have been every other month.

4                    The first month, January, we trained. It was actually a  
5 decent drill. March I was in Indianapolis for a convention. And  
6 when I called back to check in with the guys here, they said that  
7 they went to training, but they had a call at the beginning of  
8 training and when they came back the instructor said, well, nobody  
9 else is here so we're not going to train. So that was cancelled.

10                   They cancelled the three after that. There was one in  
11 November. So, really, we trained twice in 2012. And the one in  
12 November of 2012 was kind of thrown together. The gentleman who  
13 ran the drill showed up for training that day and they said, hey,  
14 can you do this for us and this and this and this. And he kind of  
15 threw something together real quick and in less than an hour we  
16 were done. So it wasn't very effective training.

17           Q.    Have -- well, I guess, has the CBRNE team ever done its  
18 own internal audits in terms of ensuring readiness or have you  
19 guys --

20           A.    We're supposed to do proficiencies each year. 2012, we  
21 didn't do them. 2011, we may have, where we dressed out in our  
22 Level A's, Level B's, and we did some proficiencies. It's been  
23 lacking though.

24           Q.    But has that been -- so the results have not, you say,  
25 been communicated very well --

1 A. No, no.

2 Q. -- I mean, in terms of identifying these --

3 A. It's not very well communicated at all.

4 Q. -- (indiscernible) from the county. Okay.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Paul, do you have anything?

6 BY MR. STANCIL:

7 Q. You said going back for some time there were problems  
8 with equipment on the CBRNE I unit. How come those issues hadn't  
9 been resolved prior to this incident?

10 A. I don't know. The truck is stored in Clayton, so our  
11 only exposure to it is if there's an incident or if there's  
12 training. As you can see there was a lack of training. We don't  
13 run a whole lot of incidents so our exposure to the truck is very  
14 limited.

15 Now, they have several county employees that, from what  
16 I understand, they're supposed to be checking it, you know,  
17 calibrating the meters monthly, you know, changing batteries,  
18 making sure the truck's ready to go, and somewhere that fell down  
19 and I'm not exactly sure -- I don't want to point figures at  
20 anybody. I don't know where the breakdown is, but it's --

21 You know, we tried. I was sending guys from my crew  
22 down there once a month. At the end of 2011 and maybe the first  
23 month or two of 2012, I was sending guys down there to help do  
24 truck checks, and it became a problem here because we have our own  
25 responsibilities here also.

1 Q. Uh-huh.

2 A. They have full-time employees down there and it just --  
3 it wasn't getting done. I don't see that I needed to send guys  
4 down there to do that. And with staffing issues and things like  
5 that, I couldn't afford to send guys down there anymore.

6 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

7 Q. Do you know who over there is in charge of that element  
8 of ensuring equipment --

9 A. Well, it would fall under Jack DeAngelo, but I'm not  
10 exactly sure --

11 Q. Who his staff would be who handles it?

12 A. -- if it would be -- Carl Vandergrift is, he's one of  
13 the drivers for the unit down there and I know he's very familiar  
14 with, you know, the equipment on there and I think he had a part  
15 in maintaining it also. I'm not 100 percent sure though who --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. I don't want to make judgment on that because I'm not  
18 sure.

19 Q. Okay. Okay.

20 A. You know, there's some people down there that could --  
21 that have access to the truck that could do that, but I don't, I  
22 don't know exactly, yeah.

23 Q. But that's not -- that responsibility isn't clearly  
24 delineated per se --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- to the team who --

2 A. No, no.

3 MR. STANCIL: How often does the hazmat team get called  
4 out where you need that vehicle?

5 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

6 Q. Yeah. Let me say also, if I could add to that, when was  
7 the last time your group dealt -- had the vehicle out there prior  
8 to this incident?

9 A. We had an incident in Glassboro in the summer of 2011.  
10 I want to say it was August, August of 2011, which was a full team  
11 response. It's very rare that that is needed in an incident. I  
12 can think of maybe -- the few years that I've been on the team  
13 we've probably used it four or five times. We did a tanker  
14 rollover on 295 where we did a hot tap and offloaded the product.  
15 We did the Glassboro incident. There's been a couple other tanker  
16 rollovers that it's been out on, but -- you know, once or twice a  
17 year maybe.

18 They do a lot of assessment calls where they have this  
19 forward team, this assessment team, which, from what Jack says,  
20 they do a lot of calls with that. Which is just a team of guys  
21 that go out. There's, I don't know, four or five guys and I guess  
22 they do what they do without calling the whole team. I'm not  
23 sure, so --

24 MR. STANCIL: I see. So you are not part of the  
25 assessment team?

1           CAPT. LEE: I'm not part of the assessment team. I only  
2 go if it's a full team response.

3           MR. STANCIL: Who is on the assessment team?

4           BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

5           Q. Are the members of the Washington Township crew that --

6           A. Captain Dolgos was at one time.

7           Q. Okay.

8           A. But I believe within the last year he was taken off by  
9 our chief just because there was some turmoil going on and he  
10 thought it was best to pull him from that. And I don't believe  
11 that he has done any assessments in the last year, year and a  
12 half.

13          Q. Okay.

14          A. That I know of.

15          BY MR. STANCIL:

16          Q. Anyone else?

17          A. From Washington Township?

18          Q. Right.

19          A. No.

20          Q. Okay. So the assessment team would have been the  
21 Gloucester County Emergency Response folks?

22          A. Yep. It's Jack DeAngelo, Dennis Kappler, Jay Jones,  
23 Nelson Wiest, Mark Chapman. There's probably, I don't know, five  
24 or six of them.

25          Q. Let me read a list to you and tell me if any of these --



1 A. Go ahead.

2 Q. -- firefighters are on the assessment team. James

3 Hauck? Andrew --

4 A. Don't know.

5 Q. No. Andrew Halter?

6 A. No.

7 Q. James Brown?

8 A. Don't even know him.

9 Q. Mark McEvoy (ph.)?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Bruce Prigg- --

12 A. Priggemeier?

13 Q. Priggemeier?

14 A. Bryce Priggemeier? No.

15 Q. Bryce Priggemeier. Okay. Dan Schultz?

16 A. Ken Schultz?

17 Q. I have a Dan.

18 A. No, there's a Ken Schultz on the team.

19 Q. There is? Okay.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. And Robert Stiteler?

22 A. Stiteler, no.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Nope. None of those guys are on the assessment team.

25 Hauck, possibly. I'm not sure. He's a county employee. He may

1 be.

2 Q. And what sort of expertise does the assessment team have  
3 that the other members do not have?

4 A. I guess they can flip a coin better than anybody else.  
5 I don't know what their credentials are, to be honest with you.

6 Q. What specifically do they do when they do an assessment?

7 A. They have some meters. They have the hazmat ID and the  
8 HazCat.

9 Q. Uh-huh.

10 A. Where they can go out and they can identify, I guess,  
11 some different materials.

12 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

13 Q. But these are capabilities that aren't available on the  
14 CBRNE I?

15 A. No, no. We don't have access to any of that. We have  
16 area RAEs. We have a multiRAE, and I believe at one time we had a  
17 Scott scout meter.

18 Q. Uh-huh.

19 A. And but that was not available the day of the incident.

20 Q. So, I guess the full response is you just -- a team that  
21 will come after materials have been identified?

22 A. Supposedly in a full response the tractor trailer comes  
23 out with most of the equipment that we'll use as techs. It's our  
24 PPE. It's our SCBA. It's, you know, any grounding and bonding  
25 stuff, plugging, piping.

1 Q. Post-identification of everything and --

2 A. Right. It's supposed to be supported with two of the  
3 other vehicles that the county has, which didn't show up the day  
4 at Paulsboro.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. They're supposed to support, you know, us and they were  
7 not available, I guess.

8 BY MR. STANCIL:

9 Q. So the CBRNE I was more of an operations vehicle --

10 A. Oh, yeah, yeah.

11 Q. -- and there were two other --

12 A. That's not an identification.

13 Q. The two other vehicles were used mainly for --

14 A. Assessment.

15 Q. -- assessment?

16 A. Right.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And you said they did not -- they  
18 weren't on the scene?

19 CHIEF LEE: There was -- I had heard, and I didn't see  
20 it, but I had heard that Jay Jones had Jack DeAngelo's vehicle  
21 that day. If he did, none of the equipment was brought forward to  
22 us, none of the meters, none of the -- no, I didn't see it, so --

23 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Do you have other questions?

24 MR. STANCIL: No.

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay.

1 BY MR. STANCIL:

2 Q. Is there anything else you can think of that --

3 A. No. I mean, I may not be a whole lot of information. I  
4 was only there for those first few hours. We have other guys that  
5 were there until, you know, that night and they went back  
6 subsequent days. They may have more information for you.

7 I don't know if you're going to talk to Firefighter  
8 Schmidt, Joe Schmidt? He, I think, stepped up and was more  
9 involved after I left, you know, with the operation. So he might  
10 have some information for you.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Well, if that's all we have, I  
12 want to --

13 CAPT. LEE: Do you need any contact information from me?

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yes. But what I'll do is I'll -- after  
15 we terminate this I'll take down your e-mail address --

16 CAPT. LEE: Okay.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- and contact info.

18 CAPT. LEE: Sure.

19 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay?

20 MR. STANCIL: Okay.

21 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: All right. Well, thank you so much.

22 CAPT. LEE: No problem.

23 MR. STANCIL: Thank you.

24 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:            CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS  
   MATERIAL RELEASE  
   PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY  
   NOVEMBER 30, 2012  
   Interview of James Lee

DOCKET NUMBER:            DCA-13-MR-002

PLACE:                       Gloucester county, New Jersey

DATE:                        January 29, 2013

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

---

Cheryl Farner Donovan  
Transcriber