

DCA13MR002
Conrail - Shared Assets
Derailment/Hazardous Material Release
Paulsboro, New Jersey
November 30, 2012

NTSB - Interview of Paulsboro Refining
Company Safety Engineer - Industrial
Hygienist

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS
MATERIAL RELEASE
PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY
NOVEMBER 30, 2012

Docket No.: DCA-13-MR-002

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Interview of: RAVI JARECHA

PBF Energy, Paulsboro Refining
Company
800 Billingsport Road
Paulsboro, New Jersey

Friday,
January 18, 2013

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI
Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI, Accident Investigator
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594

** PII **

** PII **

PAUL L. STANCIL, Senior Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Investigations
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594

** PII **

ARTHUR WARDEN, Senior Counsel
PBF Holding Company, LLC

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:55 p.m.)

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2
3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: All right. We are here. This is
4 Muhamed El-Zoghbi, Hazardous Materials Investigator with the
5 National Transportation Safety Board. Today is January 18th. It
6 is currently around 5 to 2 p.m. We are in Paulsboro, New Jersey
7 at the PBF -- in a PBF conference room.

8 We're going to go around the table and have all the
9 members introduce themselves.

10 MR. STANCIL: Yes. My name is Paul Stancil, Hazardous
11 Materials Accident Investigator, National Transportation Safety
12 Board.

13 MR. JARECHA: Ravi Jarecha, Safety Engineer/Industrial
14 Hygienist, Paulsboro Refining Company.

15 MR. WARDEN: Art Warden, Senior Counsel, PBF Holding
16 Company, LLC.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Excellent.

INTERVIEW OF RAVI JARECHA

18
19 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

20 Q. I'm going to ask -- if you don't mind me saying Ravi --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- calling you Ravi? Just if you could recollect -- you
23 know, look back on the morning of November 30th and describe to us
24 your involvement and what you observed in a narrative format.

25 Thank you.

1 A. Okay. The timings that I'm going to use are rough
2 timings. I've provided documentation to you gentlemen via e-mail
3 or through Kevin Fetchko that had a more detailed timeline. So if
4 there's a few minutes here or there, forgive me, since I'm not
5 looking at my notes.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Off of recollection, during the morning of November 30th
8 of 2012, the refinery requested -- or through RSAN, which is an
9 e-mail notification system, we were asked to respond to an oil
10 spill response as well as a hazardous materials or hazmat team
11 response for mutual aid.

12 I am on both of those teams, so I responded first to the
13 oil spill team because I actually co-head that. So we were
14 actually told to stand down by the Delaware River Basin Committee,
15 DRBC, in conversation with -- my understanding, it was the Coast
16 Guard. So the oil spill was -- we stood down and I went over and
17 joined the hazmat team as a responder. That was at a different
18 location and we were asked to go on scene.

19 We did that. We arrived on scene shortly after 8:30.
20 It was a foggy morning, and other than that there was really
21 nothing unusual about it. There was no -- nothing else visible
22 other than the fog, which happens around this time because it's a
23 low laying area, a lot of water.

24 We were asked to respond to the location via the e-mail
25 and the text that went out. And when we arrived on location there

1 was, I believe, a few other personnel with us. We had
2 instrumentation. We had done some research and we knew that it
3 was vinyl chloride by about 7:40. Doing the research, I knew that
4 we had some detection capabilities. So we arrived on scene and we
5 immediately got three errors on our instrumentation when we
6 attempted to zero our meters. And what zeroing does is it
7 calibrates it to clean air. So it would read your normal oxygen,
8 zero LEL, PID, and anything else that happens to be on that
9 specific instrument.

10 We obtained three PID failures. We started up a fourth
11 PID without going into the zero mode and it immediately went into
12 alarm, at which time there was nothing obvious in the air other
13 than a fog, at which time the hazmat team realized that we were
14 probably in a hot zone.

15 The team wanted to evacuate. I requested that they hold
16 up. And I went into the command area, which was the annex of the
17 church. I walked into that room and there was about 20 or so
18 people in that room, almost all of which I did not know; however,
19 they were just gathering at that moment. How long they had been
20 there, I don't know since I had just gotten there about 8:35
21 roughly.

22 I told them what happened with our instrumentation.
23 They asked us how high the numbers were, so I reported that. And
24 I had everybody's attention because it was very quiet. Everybody
25 was looking at me. So, whoever was in that room -- and I don't

1 again, don't have that exact list -- they were all aware that the
2 numbers were over 500 parts per million as read on my PID
3 uncorrected for vinyl chloride. They had asked me what the
4 threshold was. I had said the only threshold that I know right
5 now is the OSHA PEL, Permissible Exposure Limit, is 1 part per
6 million. That's all I have to reference, so I'm guessing that
7 we're in an area that you shouldn't be.

8 And then myself and the rest of the responding hazmat
9 team retreated west. We got to an area that was -- to an area
10 where we could zero our instruments and they all successfully
11 zeroed. Within about five or so minutes, the meters then went
12 into alarm. The PID did not reach 500. It was reading just over
13 100. At that time the team and I retreated north towards the high
14 school, Paulsboro High School. I'm using the river as north, here
15 in the refinery.

16 Q. Uh-huh.

17 A. The numbers were reduced below 100 and eventually got
18 down to zero, at which time we returned to the scene, as
19 requested. Returned to the scene and the fog had lifted and,
20 looking at the data, as did any vinyl chloride that was in the
21 air.

22 The balance of the day we had a variety of monitoring
23 teams located in various directions calling into me. And it's
24 well established the Gloucester County CBRNE was also to either
25 take it over or also feed their results in to me, and they were

1 reported to have no instrumentation working, so that the
2 instrumentation that we had was it. NuStar was also reporting
3 some results. I don't know the means in which they were measuring
4 nor do I know their location. They were just texting those to me.

5 At about 12:00 there was a meeting of the minds at the
6 Paulsboro Borough Hall. A number of different agencies were
7 there: EPA, DEP, CONRAIL, possibly NTSB, and they discussed a
8 plan on moving forward.

9 After that meeting let out, I informed the refinery
10 leadership team here about what was happening on scene. Pat was
11 very -- Pat Robinson was very busy with the command structure and
12 that, and the leadership team was trying to get ahold of him;
13 however, in that particular area he did not have cell phone
14 coverage. So I called in and reported the details about what was
15 going on, the preliminary plan, and possible impact to business
16 and health, wellbeing and all that, all those details. They were
17 happy with my report.

18 And then somewhere around -- between 1:30 and 2:00, we
19 returned to the scene. About 2 p.m. Gloucester County CBRNE was
20 able to get ahold of some instrumentation and they told us our
21 involvement there can be over. And then we really started seeing
22 more ramp up of the EPA bus driving around. So we were
23 essentially standing by most of the afternoon until about 3:30 or
24 4:00, and which we returned to the refinery and no other response
25 personnel, including myself, returned to the scene.

1 Q. Now, if you could go back and think of when you were --
2 you said you first arrived on scene -- who was there, who was with
3 you, what did you observe, what were your -- you know, I think you
4 said there was a cloud or a fog?

5 A. There was a fog.

6 Q. Uh-huh.

7 A. Yeah. There was no other visible appearance that there
8 was any sort of vinyl chloride in the air or anything like that
9 other than a fog.

10 We responded with the refinery hazmat team, not the
11 entire team, select members. There was a number of people in the
12 room and on scene, and I don't know who they were. Like I told
13 Kevin, they were all taller than me and had guns. That's about
14 all I can recollect. There were various law enforcement, county
15 -- from what I'm told, politicians there as well, a number of
16 individuals that there would really be no need for me to know who
17 they are or ask them.

18 Q. And when you entered and you said you spoke to about 20
19 or so individuals in there, did you specifically identify that the
20 incident commander was there or did you -- and did you communicate
21 these directly to him or was it just to the group as a whole?

22 A. It was to the group as a whole, not knowing specifically
23 who was in charge at that moment.

24 Q. Uh-huh, okay.

25 A. When I did walk in they knew I was from the refinery

1 and, you know, I had their attention.

2 Q. Can you recall any specific questions they may have
3 asked beyond the reading numbers that you mentioned? Did they ask
4 for any other input into --

5 A. The only question that I was asked was, what is any
6 limits? And the only one that I was able to research or locate
7 was the OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit of 1 part per million.

8 Q. And what did you think -- how did they receive this
9 information? I mean, was it -- was there alarm in the room? Did
10 people seem --

11 A. No, there was no alarm in the room whatsoever.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. It's not -- there was nothing imminent that appeared
14 that anybody was experiencing anything or there was nothing --
15 nobody was -- there was no other actual signs. It was -- if
16 anything, they were probably surprised that the levels were what
17 they were. But, no, everybody was very calm at the incident and I
18 assume that's because of their training, being firefighters and
19 law enforcement and that sort of --

20 BY MR. STANCIL:

21 Q. When you were meeting with these individuals at the
22 command post, did you give them any advice as to whether or not
23 they should be retreating?

24 A. Yes, I told them that they were in the hot zone and they
25 shouldn't be there.

1 Q. And was there any discussion following that?

2 A. I was there for about 30 seconds because my team was
3 very eager to also retreat, not knowing specifically what was
4 happening, and so I reported my information and I left. That
5 exchange was less than one minute.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. I don't know what happened after I left. I don't know
8 how long they stayed.

9 Q. Okay. You mentioned that you retreated west. Where did
10 you go from -- where to the west?

11 A. It was on, as I recall -- and it was on the notes, by
12 the Heritage's in Paulsboro, which I believe that intersection
13 triangles at Delaware and Billings Road.

14 Q. Okay.

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And did you note any observations while
16 you were driving up there or moving up there about -- did things
17 look clearer?

18 MR. JARECHA: Just the fog. Just the normal fog that
19 was present really on any foggy morning around this area.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. So the fog was still in that area
21 where you -- the Heritage area? Was there a visible fog at that
22 point?

23 MR. JARECHA: I don't, I don't recall enough to compare
24 fogginess.

25 BY MR. STANCIL:

1 Q. So why, why did you retreat from the Incident Command?
2 Were you instructed to go to this area or what was the purpose for
3 you leaving?

4 A. So that we could get out of the area that had our
5 instrumentations go into alarm, and also so that we could zero our
6 instrumentation. If we were going to continue to use those, I
7 needed to verify that those instrumentations are reading valid
8 numbers. Zeroing is something that is done on instrumentation so
9 that they are indeed reading accurately.

10 Q. Okay. You mentioned that you had done some research
11 prior to arriving on scene and that you knew that vinyl chloride
12 was released; is that correct?

13 A. Yes. We were probably about -- shortly after we got the
14 page there was knowledge that there was -- that the rail cars that
15 we were -- that was involved contained vinyl chloride.

16 Q. Okay. What sort of things did you learn from your
17 research about vinyl chloride?

18 A. I learned that the ionization potential is about 9.99 or
19 10 and our PIDs, or photoionization detectors, will detect vinyl
20 chloride. So, of course, vinyl chloride, not being something that
21 the refinery's used to, I did not know if we had the capabilities
22 to detect that and assist in that scenario.

23 As it turns out our PIDs would be helpful. So I did
24 look at that. I looked at some other physical and chemical
25 properties. I determined it was a gas; it's heavier than air, 2.2

1 specific gravity, 25 percent solubility in water, not much. I did
2 look for IDLH and there was no research available for IDLH, so
3 that is why I looked at the OSHA permissible exposure limit. I
4 did also learn that the threshold is very low because of the long-
5 term cancer hazard. Probably very little IDLH information out
6 there so they probably did not establish that. So my concern was,
7 okay, there's no IDLH, more of a long term issue, people aren't --
8 no need to go really causing any more of a panic in this situation
9 that would probably lead to more harm.

10 It was very basic information: Can we detect it? What
11 are the numbers that we're comparing it to? Where might it go
12 released into the environment? Nothing that -- everything that we
13 would do in any other situation --

14 Q. Right.

15 A. -- in Hazmat 101 size up.

16 Q. Right. And regarding personal protective equipment, did
17 you look into that issue?

18 A. Not specifically. I knew we had the capabilities to
19 detect it. I did not.

20 Q. Okay. When you arrived on scene did you observe any
21 responders wearing personal protective equipment?

22 A. I did not. Many hours later I saw a certain personnel
23 which -- who I don't know who they were -- wearing it around their
24 neck, full face, air purifying respirator. But I did not see
25 anybody during the entire event wearing respiratory protection

1 equipment in my involvement.

2 Q. Did you make any recommendations to anyone concerning
3 that?

4 A. I did not. We retreated two times when I felt that the
5 team was in an area that was higher than they needed to be. The
6 decision that I chose was to retreat twice rather than don
7 personal protective equipment and go closer. At that point we
8 were there as a resource and we really didn't have a need to go
9 closer. It wasn't our responsibility.

10 Q. So how close did you approach when you were getting your
11 readings, how close to the rail tank cars?

12 A. Initially?

13 Q. Anytime during the size up of your -- of the incident?

14 A. Personally, I went -- I saw personnel sometime later on
15 the north side of the tracks or the river side of the tracks west.
16 CONRAIL has a little shack. And I saw personnel standing there
17 and I walked over and took some readings in that area. That's as
18 close that I got.

19 Q. Uh-huh. Where was the highest reading obtained?

20 A. The highest reading was obtained at Jefferson and
21 Commerce right when we had arrived, which was at the corner by the
22 church.

23 Q. And over by the church where the Incident Command was
24 meeting, did you make any readings in that area?

25 A. Only what was at that corner and then I walked into the

1 annex. I did not continue to take readings because I knew what
2 readings I had there at the corner and they were actually a half a
3 block closer. I did not have any indication that it would be much
4 higher or much lower just half a block away.

5 Q. And what was that reading half a block away?

6 A. At what location?

7 Q. No, what was the reading, the PID, the VOC or the vinyl
8 chloride reading in parts per million?

9 A. At what location?

10 Q. The closest point to the Incident Command where you
11 measured it.

12 A. Somewhere on my notes I have that written down. It was
13 -- I had initially reported over 500. After we looked at the data
14 log it looked to be somewhere over 700. I did not continue to
15 watch the instrument to see how high it went. The initial reading
16 went to 500 and I went straight to Incident Command, so -- I later
17 found out it went to 700 but I reported over 500.

18 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

19 Q. Just for clarification purposes, you reported the raw
20 data, correct?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. You did the correction factors or the response factors
23 post-incident?

24 A. I did not do as much research to say -- I knew that the
25 PID, photoionization detector, would respond. I did not look to

1 see what the response factor was until later on.

2 Q. If you can describe to us sort of what you observed as
3 you were coming to the scene about scene control and site control
4 and -- you know, at the beginning of the incident? And my
5 understanding is you arrived around 8:30, 8:35 or so in the
6 morning? If you could just sort of describe just what --

7 A. Yes, I did arrive around 8:35. I had limited view. I
8 was in the back of one of our hazmat responding vehicles so I was
9 not in the passenger seat. There's actually only a very small
10 window looking out the back. So my observations most of the time
11 was actually where we just came from not where we were going. The
12 only thing that I can tell you of note was that Broad Street was
13 blocked off at Delaware Ave. We were actually diverted south, I
14 guess, away from the river and then we had to make a left onto
15 Commerce and cross over Delaware that way.

16 Q. Okay. And if you could take a moment and sort of
17 discuss what some of your responsibilities are here and your
18 experience with hazmat control here, you know, within Paulsboro
19 Refinery and sort of what's your experience and training and other
20 things like that, if you could?

21 MR. STANCIL: Are you asking him for his background?

22 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

23 Q. Yeah, just some background information.

24 A. Here at the refinery?

25 Q. Uh-huh.

1 A. I'll go back a little bit. I studied at Rutgers
2 University, Environmental Science. And my concentration of
3 coursework was in environmental occupational health.

4 I've been in -- working in a variety of industries,
5 primarily consulting prior -- for 10 years prior to arriving here
6 at the refinery in 2007. My practice -- and I'm certified in
7 industrial hygiene. I got my certified, industrial hygiene
8 certification in 2006. And primarily that's the reason I was
9 hired here at the refinery was to be the refinery's IH.

10 So my -- prior to arriving here, I've had a 40-hour
11 HAZWOPER -- hazmat, HAZWOPER training, as well as the 8-hour
12 refreshers, and have done a number of studies at a variety of
13 workplaces on a variety of hazards.

14 Here at the refinery I'm here to -- what I like to tell
15 people, to try to protect the workers here from physical and
16 chemical hazards that we have present here at the oil refinery.

17 Q. I know there's a mutual aid agreement between the
18 refinery and -- well, within the county for hazmat response. Did
19 you ever exercise or have you participated in any exercises with
20 the Paulsboro Fire Department or any other communities in the
21 area?

22 A. Yes. They do come in annually and there was a mutual
23 aid drill here at the refinery that was hosted -- I don't have the
24 date, but it was in 2012.

25 Q. Uh-huh. And can you elaborate a little more on what was

1 actually -- was it more of a meet and greet or did you -- was
2 there a demonstration of like equipment and capabilities and maybe
3 a tabletop exercise or something --

4 A. There was a -- there was a tabletop. In this particular
5 scenario we had an incident here as a drill and we had called
6 mutual aid in for assistance. So we were actually the host as
7 opposed to how this CONRAIL incident was. And the responding
8 mutual aid companies came in and hooked up to our hydrants and,
9 you know, helped us extinguish a fictitious fire for drill
10 purposes.

11 Q. And was the Paulsboro Fire Department involved in that
12 or any of the other townships, if you can recall --

13 A. I can't recall specifically who was there.

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Okay. Do you have anything?

15 BY MR. STANCIL:

16 Q. Going back to when the CBRNE team came in and your
17 interaction with them. Could you describe in a little more detail
18 what occurred between you and the CBRNE team?

19 A. I had two interactions with the CBRNE team. One was
20 mid-morning about 9:30, and I was instructed that -- I was
21 informed that some air monitoring data from the CBRNE team would
22 be coming in to me and that I should be the recorder of that, as
23 the data that I provided the gentlemen, the NTSB. However, when I
24 interacted with the Gloucester County CBRNE members, they -- I was
25 informed that their instrumentation was not working and there was

1 some disappointment on their end. And that was about it for that
2 interaction until roughly 2:00 when, I mentioned earlier, that
3 they did get ahold of some instrumentation and we were told to,
4 you know, essentially stand down.

5 Q. Okay. And until that point of time when they obtained
6 their instrumentation, was yours the only instrumentation
7 available on scene?

8 A. I cannot say for sure.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I don't know what else anybody else had.

11 Q. Okay.

12 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

13 Q. Can you elaborate on how were you communicating? I know
14 the team was going out and sampling. Were you communicating via
15 radio to --

16 A. Radio communication.

17 Q. -- and to whom specifically? Was it Pat Robinson?

18 A. I was just taking the readings down. After the initial
19 reports the readings were significantly lower. So it was just a
20 matter of documenting for documentation purposes if there was
21 anything else odd that was occurring.

22 Q. But you weren't doing real-time reporting to --

23 A. We were.

24 Q. Okay, so --

25 A. Our monitoring teams were reporting in to me via radio.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. With the exception of NuStar, which was reporting via
3 text messages on phones.

4 Q. And how were you communicating that to your liaison with
5 the Incident Command, beyond what you said of you showing up
6 there?

7 A. If there was nothing extraordinary to report, there was
8 no further communication from the initial report until the 11:30
9 meeting.

10 Q. And did you receive any requests from the Incident
11 Command or in particular like, I believe, it was Calvin -- was it
12 Calvin Hargie (ph.) or Pat Robinson about additional support, if
13 they need any support in locations, or did you get any requests
14 for assistance from them beyond, you know, that initial
15 notification? Nobody contacted you for additional support or
16 anything like that?

17 A. Nobody contacted me. I did hear over the radio that
18 there was a report of something that happened at the old Ames
19 parking lot they call it. It's -- at Billingsport and Delaware,
20 there's a large empty parking lot. I had heard over the radio
21 that there was a report of an EMS call there and which turned out
22 to be, from what I know, unfounded; however, we did send a
23 monitoring team there.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. That's the only additional request that I received.

1 Additionally, one other request was to go along Mantua Creek on
2 either side of the tracks if there were any extraordinary
3 readings, and those readings were all zero later on in the morning
4 or low. I shouldn't say all zero, but they were very low.
5 Nothing like the initial 8:30 numbers that were received.

6 Q. Did any -- did you have concerns about your health and
7 safety or did anybody on the team have any concerns? I mean,
8 while there, you know, did you feel like you were obtaining
9 adequate instructions as well from the Incident Command and, you
10 know --

11 A. Well, we left because, as the hazmat team is aware, we
12 weren't -- we didn't need to be there. And my role and knowing
13 what I know and being part of the team, I agreed with the team;
14 however, I felt a responsibility to inform Incident Command. I
15 informed them and left after my message was received.

16 BY MR. STANCIL:

17 Q. Did you have any concerns about any other work practices
18 that were ongoing?

19 A. There was no work practices from what I saw. The only
20 thing I saw was they were -- there was a team on the boat and they
21 boomed off either side of the tracks. At that point the readings
22 that we were getting were very, very low on the banks of the
23 Mantua Creek.

24 I don't know who authorized that work or who told them,
25 but I certainly know that I had no -- nobody asked me if it was

1 safe for them to go. They just simply went. At whose direction I
2 don't know.

3 Q. So were you functioning as a safety officer or as a
4 resource?

5 A. Not in an official capacity. I was not wearing a vest
6 or any title -- sort of title that said I was anything on scene.

7 Q. You were functioning as a resource to the Incident
8 Command for air monitoring only?

9 A. I guess you could say that.

10 Q. Well, I'm asking you.

11 A. We took it upon ourselves to obtain air monitoring
12 readings. Nobody instructed us specifically to obtain air
13 monitoring readings. When I found out the material of concern was
14 vinyl chloride and we had detection capabilities, that is when we
15 took our instrumentation along on our call.

16 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

17 Q. So you weren't specifically requested to conduct air
18 monitoring by anybody other than, you know, initiative on your
19 behalf?

20 A. Yeah. There was no outside party that spoke to me that
21 said, we need air monitoring. It was our refinery hazmat team
22 that took the initiative to obtain those results.

23 Q. When you say you interacted as well with the county
24 hazmat team or the CBRNE team, do you recall who specifically you
25 were dealing with?

1 A. I was introduced to Pat Dolgos, and I don't know the
2 spelling or if I'm pronouncing his name correctly. I was
3 introduced to Pat Dolgos in the morning about 9:30.

4 Q. Is he the individual that notified you that they don't
5 have the sampling capabilities, or --

6 A. I was told that I was going to be getting some air
7 monitoring information from him specifically.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. And that is when I had determined that their
10 instrumentation was not functioning properly.

11 Q. Were you aware that folks from OxyVinyl were on scene at
12 all? Did anybody --

13 A. Not at the time.

14 Q. No?

15 A. I had heard much later that there was somebody in the
16 room. Whether they were in the room when I was there or not, I
17 don't know. I had heard that somebody was there. I can't verify
18 that. Was it OxyVinyl?

19 Q. Or Occidental Chemicals. That's their name.

20 A. Oh, so, I'm sorry. No.

21 Q. No, they're both -- because I know OxyVinyl, -Vinyls
22 ended up sending two monitors on scene. I believe it was around
23 9:30 or so. And from what we were told is that one of them was
24 handed over to the Gloucester County Emergency Management and they
25 held onto one. Did you get any --

1 A. No.

2 Q. -- feedback from them about --

3 A. No, I -- you know, I want to say that I don't know that
4 company.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I don't know that they were there. I did state earlier
7 that Gloucester County CBRNE, about 2:00, had some -- two
8 instruments. I believe it was two instruments. I don't know
9 where they got them, which is what I said earlier. I don't know
10 how they got instruments, but they did.

11 BY MR. STANCIL:

12 Q. So what was your overall impression of the way things
13 were being handled that morning?

14 A. My opinion?

15 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah. I mean, this is --

16 MR. STANCIL: Yeah.

17 MR. ELZOGHIBI: What did you think? I mean, you have
18 experience with hazardous -- well, hazmat incidents and such.

19 MR. JARECHA: I don't if my opinion really much matters.

20 BY MR. STANCIL:

21 Q. Well, let me rephrase the question. If you were to
22 advise -- if the incident had occurred on your property, how would
23 you have handled it? Would you have handled it any differently?

24 A. It sounds like a very straight forward question;
25 however, we don't have residents living on our property.

1 Q. Uh-huh.

2 A. So, you know, who's in control? How our first
3 responders, firemen, how are they able to deal with this scenario?
4 A very different question. So I wish I could answer you and give
5 you a nice answer; however, it's like comparing two things that
6 are not comparable.

7 Q. Well, do you think the isolation distance or the hot
8 zone was appropriate?

9 A. I don't know their criteria so I cannot comment on that.
10 If there's guidelines that they were using, then they were using
11 those guidelines, but I'm not -- I did not do any research or ask
12 questions on --

13 Q. You didn't have anything to do with establishing the hot
14 zone?

15 A. I had nothing. Not at all. My only initial report was
16 that where they -- gentlemen were in the room, they probably
17 shouldn't be in that room. As far as residential evacuations, I
18 don't know who established that. That's nothing that I was
19 involved with.

20 Q. Okay.

21 MR. STANCIL: That's all I have, Muhamed.

22 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

23 Q. I was going to say, in terms of, are you familiar with
24 the AEGLs and the ERPGs and other things like that?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. You didn't have an opportunity to take a look at any of
2 that before you showed up on scene?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Okay. Nobody asked for other information, I mean, later
5 on in the incident about sort of community exposure issues or
6 any --

7 A. Can you rephrase the question? Did anybody --

8 Q. I guess I'm asking you, did anybody ask about like, you
9 know, can someone look at community exposure levels; what is
10 acceptable, what is not? So you didn't have any requests for that
11 type of support?

12 A. No requests whatsoever. Nobody asked about our data.
13 We provided it. We left it behind, but nobody asked for it.

14 Q. I guess, if you can describe some of the capabilities
15 that you had while you were on scene in terms of PPE, any other
16 sampling instrumentations, or things of that nature that you took
17 with you on scene? Like did you have SCBAs if you needed them?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You do. Okay. If you can describe sort of the
20 capabilities on the hazmat truck?

21 A. We have a number of different equipment. I don't have
22 the full inventory of what was on that particular apparatus.
23 We're going to have a number of generators, lights. We may have
24 things to control spills, booms, personal protective equipment,
25 Level A, B suits, air purifying respirators, color metric tubes,

1 that sort of thing.

2 Q. Okay, okay.

3 A. The tools of the trade.

4 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: That's it. That's all I have.

5 MR. STANCIL: Yeah.

6 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Unless you have anything else?

7 MR. STANCIL: Do you have anything to add that you think
8 might be of interest?

9 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

10 Q. Any even lessons learned that you -- things that you
11 think could have -- with your experience in emergency response and
12 hazardous materials, is there anything that -- like information
13 that would have been useful to have or things that could have
14 helped shape or maybe lead to different -- or that you would have
15 liked to have when you were on the incident during the response?

16 A. Well, I understand there was a window of uncertainty
17 between 7 a.m. and at least 8:30. I don't know what happened in
18 that time. And trying to recreate that, if you could get some
19 sort of -- or maybe there are already models of where the stuff
20 went. I can tell you though that the data that we provided did
21 show a certain amount in one location, a little bit later to
22 another location less so, and then to another location slightly
23 less than that. Trying to get somebody to recreate where the
24 stuff started, I think they could probably finish our data that we
25 provided.

1 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: All right. We'd like to thank you so
2 much for your assistance and we will terminate the interview at --
3 it is 2:35. Thank you.

4 (Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS
 MATERIAL RELEASE
 PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY
 NOVEMBER 30, 2012
 Interview of Ravi Jarecha

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-13-MR-002

PLACE: Paulsboro, New Jersey

DATE: January 18, 2013

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Cheryl Farner Donovan
Transcriber