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Conrail - Shared Assets
Derailment/Hazardous Material Release
Paulsboro, New Jersey
November 30, 2012

NTSB - Interview of Paulsboro Police Department - Sergeant and Captain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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TRAIN DERAILMENT/CHEMICAL SPILL *

NOVEMBER 30, 2012 *

Docket No.: DCA-13-MR-002

PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY *

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Interview of: DONALD GREY

Paulsboro, New Jersey

Saturday,
December 1, 2012

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: PAUL STANCIL
Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

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MR. STANCIL: Today is December 1st, is that correct?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, that's correct.

MR. STANCIL: Today is December 1st, 2012 at about 11:00 a.m., and we are at the Paulsboro Police Station in Paulsboro, New Jersey.

My name is Paul Stancil. I'm a Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board.

We are here in the conference room with Sergeant Grey and Captain Malone [sic] of the Paulsboro Police Department. And also present Muhamed El-Zoghbi, who is also a Hazardous Materials Accident Investigator with NTSB.

Just everybody's aware that the conversation is being recorded.

MR. GREY: Yes. Sergeant Donald Grey and Captain Vern Marino.

INTERVIEW OF DONALD GREY

BY MR. STANCIL:

Q. So what we would like to do, Sergeant, we understand that you were amongst the first responders that responded to this railroad derailment. If you could sort of go through and tell us what happened on that day, everything that you observed? And we'll ask you any follow-up questions that come to mind.

A. Okay. On this day, yesterday morning about -- my shift

1 started about 0700 hours on November 30th. I came in and the
2 first thing was a call came out probably a few minutes after while
3 we were just briefing from shift change over that it was a
4 derailment at Mantua Creek train bridge.

5 I was probably the second or third officer to actually
6 get out on the scene. Patrolman Richards responded, was the first
7 one out the door. I was still communicating with the duty
8 sergeant who was coming off, Sergeant Gilcrest, and the other
9 officers, Patrolman Thigpen. Both of them also responded to the
10 scene with us for assistance.

11 When I got out to the scene, first Patrolman Richards
12 got to the scene and he made quick notification that he did notice
13 that there was a problem, some type of derailment in that area.
14 And he first made contact with the operator that was standing on
15 the corner of Commerce Street and right by the railroad tracks
16 which is near Madison Street. I don't know what that gentleman's
17 name is or anything or like that, he has that information
18 documented.

19 The gentleman told him a couple of things, that the
20 train derailed. He said he appeared very nervous and shaken. The
21 train derailed. There is a concern of the car number 8, I want to
22 say that's what he expressed to him, and that, what was it, what
23 it contained and that it is very dangerous, that lives will be
24 lost, or something like that, he said. That officer then relayed
25 that information. He also said Sergeant Grey, you copy that? At

1 this point I'm responding to the scene.

2 And now when I pulled up and maybe Patrolman Zubec is
3 the other officer working with us -- I'm sorry, I might not have
4 said all three officers working on my shift were Patrolman
5 Richards, that's the first officer who responded; Patrolman Zubec
6 was the other officer working with me for the day shift; and
7 myself, Sergeant Grey.

8 Two other officers that came out there with us with
9 the night shift, Sergeant Gilcrest and Patrolman Thigpen, all
10 right. Thigpen and Gilcrest came with us.

11 When I arrived with Gilcrest in the car with me, we
12 both, first thing we noticed was that at this point there was a
13 heavy thick cloud that's probably about a few feet off of the
14 ground, kind of coming up from the creek. So I didn't -- couldn't
15 even see anything in that direction. I couldn't really see that
16 far down the street at this point. Patrolman Richards, I couldn't
17 even see where he was it. I didn't know where he was at, at that
18 point.

19 I made it up to the corner of Commerce and Monroe where
20 the railroad tracks, and that's the first sight I was able to see
21 mainly because of the yellow vests. He -- yellow, orange vest on
22 that I kind of could see him.

23 Sergeant Gilcrest got out of the car. I parked my
24 vehicle as well. Patrolman Zubec, she was behind me because she
25 came -- I noticed her coming up behind me shortly afterwards. At

1 that point I made contact with the Conrail guy, and he expressed
2 the same thing; he identified what the concern was. I then
3 started to make notifications, requested county to give me some
4 additional officers out here. When he told me it was something
5 that, very dangerous, he's concerned, he said -- I'm looking down
6 trying to see the cars, I couldn't see it. But he initially
7 already saw that it was in that area of car 8.

8 So he's like this thing is deadly. So we quickly -- my
9 patrolman, Zubec, walked up. She was probably 15' from me and she
10 said Sarg. I said, Jen. I just started to talk to her and both
11 of us as we started to talk, our throat felt like -- evacuate.
12 I'm starting here, you start right there, go back that way, clear
13 these homes from this, going this way towards Delaware Street.

14 That was the initial, what we started to do -- Patrolman
15 Richards at that point and Sergeant Gilcrest went farther down on
16 Commerce Street just on the other side of the tracks, continued to
17 communicate with the Conrail guy and get more information. At
18 that point, we requested for, you know -- response for fire,
19 rescue for the area.

20 County was asked to make notification to our captain and
21 chief, the -- unit and then assigned Patrolman Thigpen to respond
22 to Paulsboro Fire Hall because they were asking where we're going
23 to, you know, can send these assisting agencies.

24 She was sent to Paulsboro Fire Hall to set up so when
25 they come in, they can be with her and then we can, she and Zubec

1 Zubec can communicate in reference to where they're going to go.

2 I gave her the assignment to make calls for officers to
3 come in which, in fact, she contacted, I want to say maybe three
4 officers just out of her personal cell phone. She called in
5 Patrolman Richards -- I mean, Patrolman Ridinger -- Sergeant
6 Ridinger, I'm sorry; Sergeant Ridinger, Patrolman Belvin (ph.) and
7 there's was one more, I don't -- right off the top of my head.
8 Jameson, Patrolman Jameson. For these officers to respond to the
9 police station for assistance because we had this incident.

10 I didn't see these guys till later on. I know they were
11 responding to the station and, obviously, when they got here to
12 assist us along with other outside agencies who were coming from
13 everywhere. I'm not even -- at this point, I don't know how many
14 agencies responded. I haven't got all that information together
15 yet. But they were from Mantua, Washington Township.

16 At that point ERT -- county asked if we wanted ERT to
17 respond. She made notification for them. Those guys as well were
18 called out. They responded to the same, we're able to get three,
19 four, five of them to come out and kind of coned off the area from
20 Broad Street, Delaware Street and down to Monroe to secure that
21 whole area.

22 At this point I believe the cloud had started to -- it
23 was moving. The bulk of it I think started to move across town
24 that way; I want to say towards Delaware Street and towards
25 Swedesboro Avenue going out, actually, probably, towards our fire

1 hall. I didn't notice this till later on.

2 We did see some -- I did see some pictures later on that
3 it was a heavy thick smoke just right at that intersection of
4 Broad and Delaware. You probably couldn't even see across the
5 street too well. I saw that somebody had a photo somewhere, a
6 picture or something.

7 And meanwhile as everybody responded, we remained in the
8 area. The fire department came out. They then began to set up a
9 command post at the church -- I don't recall the name of the
10 church -- right on the corner of, I want to say, Jefferson and
11 Commerce Street. I don't recall the name of the church, but
12 that's where the, once --

13 (Phone ringing.) Sorry about that.

14 And at this point, the cloud has pretty much kind of,
15 because there's that big hill coming up off the creek, and I think
16 everything's kind of like rescinded back or blew through or
17 whatever, so it's back a little bit.

18 The fire department's there, OEM; Alfonso, his last
19 name, Giampola responded to the scene. Al, see, he's now setting
20 up a command post at the church that's right there. At that point
21 he pretty much started to take over the scene in reference to this
22 incident. I pretty much made sure -- but now, I'm backed out
23 having our guys make sure this whole area's secure, keeping the
24 traffic and the people out of it. That's what I was doing for --
25 gets to that point, all day. What else?

1 Obviously, it was starting to, you know, now you're
2 talking about it's maybe 8:30 or 9:00, I started to hear calls
3 coming in for ambulance calls. I know that they switched over. I
4 hear a guy starting to respond for ambulance calls for people,
5 difficulty breathing.

6 Outside at our zone and nearby, outside in the air, we
7 were trying to address -- and I know that all officers have now
8 responded to us. Apparently, I guess there was 20-something
9 people who were going to the hospital for some type of issues
10 related to, I believe, just what they're claiming are related to
11 this incident.

12 About the -- anybody directly in the area at the time, I
13 didn't see much people out on the street right there. I believe
14 it was, well, maybe because it was so early.

15 I believe Paulsboro Packaging had, you know, they
16 normally start early; I believe they had a group of people that
17 went to the hospital. They're located up on Broad Street and
18 their property comes back right there like real close to the
19 creek. So their property comes back a good maybe 1,000 feet or
20 something like that to the back. They're out on towards the
21 location, towards Buck Street actually.

22 I'm trying to think what else.

23 See, at one point, I did communicate with the captain
24 and advised him of what we had at that point. And I did, I
25 believe I talked to the chief as well. County made these

1 contacts, and I also reached out and made contact with them and
2 advised what we had and they were obviously on their way
3 responding to this location to assess and address.

4 What else?

5 I know that there was some word outside so they're just
6 dealing with the, really the track, crowd control and all that,
7 keeping people out of the area.

8 I know, I feel like, obviously, there was an issue with
9 a command post whether, you know, when the -- as the agencies were
10 coming in, state police, I remember hearing they responded and
11 they called, you know, county's calling here asking questions.
12 The state police OEM responded; they responded to the -- I believe
13 when you were on the air, when the captain was on the air, he
14 advised the main post to be the Paulsboro Fire Hall.

15 I believe when I had first came out, that was one of the
16 first questions they had asked me, and I said Paulsboro because
17 this is -- I'm here. I said Paulsboro Firehouse. I thought it
18 had to be a good location.

19 Some time shortly after, I remember hearing the captain
20 say the exact same thing on radio. But as I said, while we were
21 there and once the OEM arrived, they made that church -- and it
22 seemed like to me a lot of people had -- no one was saying it, but
23 there were people who had some issue with that location, that it
24 being too close because of the concern.

25 They're out there trying to figure out what the placards

1 are, what's on this thing and as the fog cleared, you're able to
2 see with binoculars what we had out there. So there was a good
3 bit of people up and down trying to see what they had out there.
4 But it seemed like, but the command post kind of was fluctuating;
5 there was like a little tug of war in reference to where they're
6 going to be.

7 I did my part by making notification to advise OEM on
8 location. State police OEM was requesting the fire hall, respond
9 back to the fire hall. They were requesting to have this forward
10 post right here.

11 I know personally as a stand-in on that street by the
12 church where the forward command was, we actually had to retreat
13 back because of in the cloud, they're now, it seemed like it
14 started to come back up. You know, I can't even say that it was
15 really like an odor or anything, but it just -- it was taking some
16 of your breath away as soon as that cloud started to come back.

17 Guys are moving back. We saw them retreat back, went
18 into the -- back towards Commerce Street away from, right in that
19 -- of the smoke. Again, rescinded back, you know, dissipated in
20 the air, et cetera.

21 We believe we did have a -- our first briefing was there
22 at the church. I can't tell you what times or anything. My
23 primary officer might have a -- at the same time, he's not close
24 enough to where I can communicate and say, hey, make sure you
25 document this, document that. He was there and then pretty much,

1 I believe, and in all the meetings that was straight there. He
2 was inside so I'm getting what information I needed to get at that
3 point.

4 So after the briefing, I believe -- what else? Go all
5 the way up till the end of the evening?

6 Q. All right.

7 A. My day at ended at 2300. My night ended at 2300 hours.
8 Okay. At that point, everybody's in, they're meeting and briefing
9 at different locations. I know that location moved out to
10 Paulsboro Fire Hall. I actually made a conference room, they
11 moved here for a period of time. I wasn't in that area. I heard
12 that they were all coming out here to meet and communicate.

13 I believe they were here. I would say I was still out
14 somewhere on Commerce Street making sure that I was there to
15 answer questions and advise, you know, where the placement of
16 these officers, et cetera.

17 They're meeting and briefing and then it came to the
18 point where we came out and coned off all of that area, kind of
19 pretty much told everybody, because when it first came out, they
20 came out that it was non-toxic, somebody, you know, it was
21 non-toxic whatever the chemical was; it was non-toxic. So at this
22 point we could remain indoors, close all doors and windows.

23 I remember at a point there, there was a contact in
24 reference to the schools. I reached out to county, call the
25 schools, advise the schools to close for a day. This was earlier

1 in this incident because the kids now are also on the street
2 walking and starting to go to school.

3 I was surprised to find out a little later on that maybe
4 because it happened as early as it did that when we were given the
5 authorization to release the kids from the schools, the chief
6 called me and then advised me he talked to the superintendent, and
7 they wanted to know if we could release the kids from the school.
8 I don't know what time that was.

9 At that point he advised me the superintendent must have
10 advised him there were maybe 20 or 30 kids they were holding. I
11 thought that to be low but maybe it was possible because it
12 happened so early and the schools were notified early to just shut
13 down for the day.

14 I remember only seeing one student right here on the
15 corner of Chestnut and Monroe or Beacon Avenue because he just
16 crossed over the tracks, advising him go, please go back home, a
17 young kid. And then matter of fact, another officer asking about
18 that kid because he said, did you just advise -- yes, I sent him
19 home; I advised him to go home.

20 So the schools were released some time when things
21 cleared up a little bit. This is, you know, as per superintendent
22 and the chief contacting me, they were released. We didn't have
23 any crossing guards out because only a small amount of kids and
24 also the -- at the time we had everything coned off.

25 I advised the duty shift at that time,

1 Sergeant Ridinger, Patrolman Jameson and Patrolman Belvin,
2 actually, through Patrolman Zubec because I had her doing a few
3 things and dealing with the responding officers because she was,
4 Patrolman Thigpen was at that location at the fire hall until
5 about noon. That's where all the outside agencies were told to
6 respond. That's where the media was told to respond. That's
7 where, as far as I was concerned, that was the command post and
8 then everybody there.

9 So I told Patrolman Zubec, my senior officer that came
10 in me with me, I advised her to make sure that she, through
11 Patrolman Thigpen, when guys responded, we need somebody somewhere
12 that was the contact. She would say Patrolman Zubec would reach
13 out to Patrolman Thigpen where do you -- you know, we have
14 officers here from ERT, why -- we need somebody here, do you have
15 anybody left? That's why we were addressing our traffic
16 situation, keep that and relieving people, you know, get them out
17 of there, relieve them after so many hours and bring in new fresh
18 officers. So she was kind of dealing with that and calling the
19 call-outs for the new officers from our police department.

20 She also -- I lost the train of what I was ready to say.
21 So much stuff was going on. What else? I lost the train of my
22 thought, okay, what I was going -- about to say with that.
23 Anyhow.

24 That continued, the area was cleared out. There were a
25 few more briefings sometime around 1900 hours that evening. The

1 captain called for all officers to respond to the police
2 headquarters. We responded here, all of us, the first responders
3 and to include officers that were out on traffic post. Cones
4 would still remain on site to keep people out.

5 We all responded here. We were briefed here for a few
6 minutes in reference to the evacuation of that area, completely
7 mandatory evacuation of everybody from the creek all the way out
8 to Delaware Street. And then it was on the east side of Delaware
9 Street; the north side of Broad Street, East Broad; all the way
10 down to the railroad tracks, which is like all Monroe Street. All
11 right. That area all the way back to be mandatory evacuated.

12 I wasn't supposed to wrestle anybody out of their house
13 but strongly suggest that it was necessary. And pretty much, I
14 couldn't tell you, it might be a couple of families that may have
15 stayed behind. But the majority of everyone, no problem, we're
16 going to leave the area. A good percentage, I found out later on
17 maybe about 30 families or so went to the fire hall for assistance
18 because when I was there about 10:30, I think that was around
19 about number. I know they still had people kind of coming in that
20 was outside of that area trying to get assistance. And I guess at
21 that point it wasn't prepared or they weren't included in that.

22 Some people were a little upset but they communicate
23 with them, they went away for a bit. I want to say around 10:45,
24 they closed down the Red Cross and assisted whoever they were
25 assisting at that point.

1 Only a few that I heard later on that may have stayed
2 back. I'm thinking a few, less than five, that maybe didn't want
3 to leave there, but they were also advised clearly as instructed
4 that liability falls on you. We were telling you, this is what we
5 need you to do. That's what it was with that.

6 We made sure and reached out to all the businesses to
7 include the ones that were closed. We had county look up our
8 contact information. Wells Fargo was closed, United Check Cashing
9 was closed. I was able to communicate with Rite-Aid Pharmacy who
10 was open at the time. They could continue to open and stay open
11 till 9:00 but just for prescriptions, no customers. And they put
12 -- had a sign up on the door expressing just that.

13 We had all the bars, all the other businesses that were
14 currently open and nobody gave us no problem. They all closed and
15 cleared the area. But later on, again, I want to say -- (phone
16 ringing.)

17 I don't know how to turn this thing off.

18 I want to say between 10:00 and 11:00, I sent out
19 another notification. I asked county to make another notification
20 of listed businesses to call, their contact numbers and request
21 that they be closed tomorrow. That was -- some we couldn't
22 contact because they were closed already. Wells Fargo Bank,
23 contact was made. Rite-Aid Pharmacy, and to my understanding,
24 when I came in this morning, my understanding there was a retail
25 -- a regional manager they got in touch with that, apparently, he

1 didn't have a good attitude, but unless it was ordered by Governor
2 Christie or something like that, as far as he was concerned, he's
3 emergency facility and he don't care what the police say, I got to
4 stay open; you know, fine.

5 And matter of fact, the lady that just came in here, she
6 was from the pharmacy, and I just pretty much expressed to her we
7 did reach out and apparently county talked to her regional
8 manager. He was staying open because he's emergency.

9 I said if that's what you're going to do, I just told
10 her, you got -- recommended it; it's only for the pharmaceutical
11 stuff and you don't have to deal with extra traffic, et cetera
12 because that's inside the zone, it's right on the corner,
13 understand that.

14 So she didn't -- they make -- apparently with the other
15 locations, they didn't have any problems making contact and make
16 notification to other places that we advised them to reach out to
17 because they were closed, businesses I'm talking about.

18 I didn't mention earlier, we did a prior evacuation of
19 that very first block. It was mandatory going from Broad to the
20 railroad tracks, Commerce Street, and it was just the east side of
21 Commerce Street. So prior to that bigger one, we did that one
22 first, and we addressed those.

23 There were only a few homes. I think VFW's included in
24 that; that was already closed. Matter of fact, I'm sorry, the
25 chief may have called me and said make sure we go down to

1 Railroad, which is across the tracks. They have two buildings
2 there just on the other side of the tracks, go down a little
3 farther.

4 So I had an officer, it was actually Patrolman Richards,
5 he went over and made sure he advised them too. And at the
6 railroad construction that was located 7th and Mantua Avenue,
7 which is Commerce -- Commerce name changes from Commerce to Mantua
8 when it cross over the railroad tracks. Advised them and they
9 also as well cleared out.

10 So we cleared out everything on this side closest to the
11 -- on this side or east side of Commerce Street first earlier,
12 prior to clearing out the other stuff at 1900 hours.

13 I know I'm all over the place. I'm just trying to
14 remember all of this. Other than that, as you know I'm sure, fire
15 departments are all over the place, Commerce, all kind of
16 equipment's all over the place at this point on Commerce Street
17 all the way down, everybody's out.

18 We got a call, apparently, there was some -- a call came
19 in, and I'm trying to remember who it was from. This is, it's
20 NTSB --

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. -- advising to stay off the equipment, stay off the
23 scene. There was this data come up from Washington, D.C. I
24 remember that information coming out. I can't tell you when. I
25 know I reached out to confirm.

1 First I went to -- where does the information come from,
2 I went to Danny Abate was out on location; I remember talking to
3 him. He heard, it was over their radio. I didn't hear it on my
4 radio, but it was the fire personnel's setup. Apparently, it was
5 Alfonso that gave that information, Giampola, the OEM. He
6 apparently gave that information.

7 So once I heard that he gave that information then I
8 then reconfirmed. I believe I may have called you to confirm
9 whether or not, who's that all include, and it was not the, you
10 know, like Conrail and hazmat. So it was just make sure, and
11 there's nobody else as far as I'm concerned that should be having
12 -- but that was pretty much, I believe it, with that.

13 Everybody pretty much stayed away besides. I mean, when
14 the call came in, I remember walking out there and looking to see
15 who's even near it. Best I can tell was Conrail personnel or
16 something, I guess they're moving down their tracks kind of seeing
17 what they can see or doing whatever they were doing out there.
18 Maybe two or three people I saw on the tracks.

19 I remember earlier, a call was made when the OEM
20 initially got there too, because it was still the whole cache of
21 trains on the other end, West Deptford side that a decision was
22 made to get that.

23 They moved it actually pretty quick, get that moved, and
24 I saw and they disconnect from what you see that was left over
25 there, they disconnected and took everything the other way. I

1 don't know how many cars were there.

2 Actually, I don't even remember, I don't even recall the
3 engine leaving. Somehow through all the mess, the engine and a
4 few cars were pulled out of the area. I want to say as of 2300
5 hours later on that night is when we had a -- the officers that
6 were here that did the evacuation, I met up with those guys, I
7 called everybody in. We were clear of the fire hall right across,
8 apparently, assisted whoever they assisted at that point.

9 We all met up back here. I confirmed with everybody
10 that we covered all our streets in that zone. And we went over
11 them, got the -- got the east side of the street, their locations,
12 you know, that no one answered. You knocked on back doors too,
13 you know, I mean, bang hard, yes; nobody responded -- so we made
14 sure that at least that zone, 100% was -- all streets, everybody
15 was covered, everybody was ensuring that it was. I believe we
16 were just about done communicating then captain walked in right
17 around that 2300 hours or maybe a few minutes after that or a few
18 minutes of.

19 We cleared out the officers. I left as well at 2300
20 hours or so, right around there. And they had the duty sergeant
21 at that point, Sergeant Bish, Patrolman Vasta and
22 Patrolman Thigpen, who left at 1200 and came back at 1900. So
23 they were there for that, the 1900-hour briefing where we went out
24 and did all the evacuation, mandatory evacuation for this area.

25 And that was pretty much all we did after 1900 hours. I

1 know we met up everything was good at 2300. A good bit of us went
2 home at that point.

3 We had a guy, Patrolman Haase was assigned for an extra
4 security along with our shift to come in and to keep a check on
5 the area and the equipment and make sure everybody still remains
6 out of that zone. And also we got somebody right now doing the
7 same thing.

8 I'm sure there's more to tell, more to tell there.

9 Q. We'll see. Let's go back to the beginning. What
10 information did you receive before you responded? What did, what
11 were you told --

12 A. By dispatch?

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. Initially by dispatch, I remember hearing -- as I say I
15 was in the sergeant's office briefing with the other sergeant.
16 And then it's the patrol area where the other officers were to,
17 other four officers, and that's where the dispatch, the radio, the
18 main in-house radio's at.

19 I remember hearing the derailment of a train on Mantua
20 Creek Bridge -- bridge or train bridge or whatever they might have
21 said, but I remember hearing that. I turned. My officers started
22 grabbing their stuff. They said they just announced that there's
23 a train derailed on the bridge, cars are in the water. That's all
24 I can recall hearing from dispatch at that point.

25 That's when everybody got out the back door. That's all

1 I remember hearing from the radio: derailment, trains, trains in
2 the water. Let's get out there, let's go. I'm going to say
3 Sergeant Bish, Sergeant Gilcrest, that's who I was briefing with.
4 He grabbed his stuff as well, and we both went out, and all the
5 officers went out to the scene.

6 Q. How long after the call did you arrive on scene?

7 A. I want to say -- you're talking to me, it's not far from
8 here. I know I said on the radio Caddy (ph.) 206 on location. So
9 we got the call, I mean, I just grabbed a cover, grabbed a bag,
10 out the door. I remember grabbing my coat, putting my coat on and
11 out the door as well.

12 Matter of fact, I walked, I remember walking, I grabbed
13 the car keys. I'm used to taking the car keys, putting it
14 underneath my desk computer. The other sergeant that actually is,
15 who works my side does the same thing, but this is where we're
16 relieving the other side. So this sergeant puts it in the box
17 where it's supposed to be.

18 I remember reaching for the car keys; it wasn't there.
19 Went to the box, grabbed the car keys, walked back into my office,
20 grabbed the sergeant's cell phone off the charger, put in my
21 pocket, left the keys there, went to the back door where the keys,
22 came back in and then I went out. So, I mean, how long that takes
23 to go straight to that distance.

24 Richards responded out right away. He gave information
25 that apparently he got from the Conrail guy that was on the scene.

1 It was expressed that it was a concern, that lives could be lost.
2 I don't remember his wording but something along that line of
3 whatever he expressed to him, made him, he said just, I probably
4 most because the Conrail operator was shaking, you know, his hands
5 were shaking. He was standing there with the pamphlet in his hand
6 with all the list of items he had he was carrying.

7 Lives will be lost. I know he said something along
8 those lines. It's a hazardous or dangerous situation, lives can
9 be lost, or however he said it. I'm not sure.

10 Q. You're getting this over the radio?

11 A. Yes. Two minutes, he arrived, I arrived, you know, I
12 would say less than a minute behind him approximately; and,
13 obviously, the other officer behind myself, Patrolman Zubec.

14 Q. So how did you approach the site?

15 A. I have to say that because our streets are one-way here,
16 we probably all responded the same way, pulled right out of the
17 back parking lot. I didn't see how Richards went. He probably
18 went the exact same way I did.

19 Zubec pulled up behind me in a sense so I'm assuming she
20 did the same thing. And it's, normally, we got to call that
21 direction -- come out and just, the back parking lot is one way to
22 Commerce Street two blocks. So I know that's the way I went
23 straight, when I got to Commerce, made the left.

24 And as you went up the street, as you turn, it seemed
25 like the cloud just came in quick because I want to say okay,

1 yeah, he saw a little bit of something and you get there to the
2 corner and by the time I went from, that's Washington Street,
3 Adams, Jefferson Street. I mean, it's starting to come in so as
4 I, I had stopped at I want to say Jefferson Street, and I couldn't
5 see one block where the conductor or the operator, engineer was
6 standing.

7 He's at the railroad tracks which is like a -- one and a
8 pinch, or two blocks and a, you couldn't see him.

9 I pulled up and turned the corner onto Madison Street,
10 that's where I stopped. Zubec, I know she came behind me and
11 right there, we met at that corner is where we traded some
12 communication in reference to evacuating. And at the same time I
13 was like who can, you know, we started to talk. I know she
14 understood what I wanted her to do because she's like we got to
15 these people out of here, evac. And that's when it's like you --
16 we got to move. And then she went this way, started her that way,
17 I went that way back towards, to Commerce Street.

18 Q. Were you standing in the cloud?

19 A. Yes, I'm already in the cloud. It's one of those
20 things, it's like your officer's in it, you're in it, you know,
21 there are people here.

22 It's one of those things, you know, you go to this
23 training, yeah, be careful of the clouds, but also the need to
24 help people and make sure, you know, it's like do you back out and
25 run, or do you, you got to get in there and get the people out of

1 there, make sure they are because there are people that just, it's
2 7:00 in the morning. People are asleep or doing whatever they're
3 doing.

4 Q. So you had to rescue people?

5 A. Yeah, you had to do something. That's what we did and
6 just hope, you're hoping for the best, that's what it is.

7 Unfortunately, there's no, nothing in our vehicle, we
8 don't carry any equipment that hey, grab a mask until we know
9 better, grab your mask, there was none of that because we don't
10 carry that type of equipment.

11 Q. At that point that you're in the cloud, you receive the
12 communication that something was hazardous or deadly?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Did they tell you what it was?

15 A. No, I didn't know until I got up to the conductor, he
16 was right there, what are you, you know, he's reading off
17 chemicals.

18 Q. Tell us about the conversation with the conductor?

19 A. Pretty much Sergeant Gilcrest was on the scene as well.
20 Patrolman Richards came up because he was with the conductor. He
21 came up, I'm sorry, I don't remember what Sergeant Gilcrest was
22 doing at the time, but I know he had radioed some -- made some
23 communication to county on the radio as well.

24 But brought him over to me, what he had, I know it was
25 just mainly what is their concern. And that's one thing he had

1 pointed out. He said car, I'm sure he said, trail car, whatever
2 you call it, 8 is the concern.

3 He mentioned a chemical, he mentioned that it's, now,
4 we're starting, I wish we had an overview, we're standing in the
5 grass like that's on Monroe right by the tracks where I made that
6 turn. And when I made the turn and pulled up, well, I don't think
7 maybe let's say two car lengths off the corner, and you can see a
8 little better especially going that way.

9 He was standing there, that's where we met, and he just
10 referenced a particular chemical in train car 8, approximately
11 that's where this stuff was at and it's a concern. He also
12 expressed that it's very dangerous, it's a breathing issue or
13 something he said.

14 Q. Is this before or after you were in the cloud with the
15 other --

16 A. Oh, that's after because I came into the cloud coming
17 from the, this direction, came into the cloud and then stopped at
18 Jefferson Street. I don't know where Richards was, obviously, up
19 further. He then already went through and he was now by the
20 railroad track somewhere. He just kind of came out of that with
21 the, you know, because any -- somebody's up standing over there.

22 I see him coming out hey, and he called him over and he
23 came over, brought the gentleman, the Conrail man to us,
24 conductor, engineer, and that's when he expressed this particular
25 chemical; Richards wrote it down.

1 Zubec at that point is when she pulled up, advised her
2 look, you know, or tried to say to her, she understood what I was
3 saying, we need to evacuate this area quickly as possible.

4 MR. MALONE: Can I interrupt one second?

5 MR. STANCIL: Certainly.

6 MR. MALONE: Can I excuse myself?

7 MR. STANCIL: Uh-huh.

8 MR. MALONE: Is that okay?

9 MR. STANCIL: Sure.

10 MR. MALONE: They're texting me. I've got to run over
11 to the fire house. Is that okay?

12 MR. STANCIL: No problem.

13 MR. MALONE: Just me, running in and out after --

14 MR. GREY: Yes.

15 MR. MALONE: Thank you. I apologize.

16 MR. STANCIL: We're probably not much longer here, just
17 a few follow-up questions.

18 BY MR. STANCIL:

19 Q. Did any industry experts or hazardous materials
20 specialists talk to you --

21 A. Talk to me first?

22 Q. -- or any of your people?

23 A. Maybe as the hours went on when they tried to say hey,
24 this is what was out there, the type of chemical concern; I guess
25 this is when it's vinyl chloride or something.

1 Matter of fact, I don't even remember if that was, I
2 don't even think that was the name. It may have been one of them,
3 but I don't even think that's the name that he gave us, the
4 conductor gave us, the engineer gave us initially. I don't think
5 that was the name, I don't recall that.

6 But either way, he did express that it was a concern,
7 all right.

8 But later on I guess as more information was known, we
9 got information that there's a thing to be concerned about is this
10 and -- worry about that stuff.

11 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

12 Q. Did he mention the chlorine at all?

13 A. Chlorine?

14 Q. Chlorine.

15 A. I recall someone saying propane or it was light propane,
16 see what I mean. I don't know if that, are you talking about the
17 engineer?

18 Q. Uh-huh.

19 A. Chlorine, he may have said chlorine, he may have said
20 that. I can't say 100%. Richards was writing it down.

21 He's pretty, you know -- why he's the one who was
22 documenting all the information. He's pretty good at that. He
23 was assigned to do that. Though, unfortunately, he was the one on
24 point, and couldn't leave, why we sent him home at 19:00 hours
25 because he was the longest in the area at that point.

1 But he did document, I know, I watched him write it
2 down. He did document what he said, whatever he expressed because
3 he was standing right there. He did write it down into his notes.
4 Probably should have, make sure, is it okay for him to bring his
5 notes when he comes?

6 Q. Uh-huh.

7 A. Okay, because it's going to be probably great detail.
8 You're not going to understand that because of the detail. Let me
9 think. Maybe he said something along that, he might have
10 mentioned that, chlorine or something.

11 Q. If you could take a minute and just sort of think about
12 the cloud, and if you can describe what you saw sort of duration,
13 formation, you know, sort of direction it moved, just anything in
14 general with regards to the plume that you saw.

15 A. It was, what do you call it, sort of just low level. It
16 was just maybe 5' or 6' off the ground, maybe the bulk of it was
17 on the ground just kind of, I would say just moving along at a
18 steady pace.

19 And somehow it seems like initially that, I don't know
20 if it came and kind of like crossed Commerce Street and did this,
21 do you know what I mean, or just that it was the further it got
22 from the location, it was starting to thin out. I don't know what
23 it was, but it was, it appeared to be whitish, you know what I
24 mean, of color.

25 I can't say that there was an odor -- for us around

1 here, I mean, it's norm to have whatever odor. I can't say 100%
2 any like a really strange smell.

3 Just that it was coming from that location, whiteish,
4 low level, you know, just above the ground. I say 5', actually,
5 it could have been a little higher than that, more like 10' but
6 just kind of just waiving across Commerce Street and going towards
7 that direction.

8 But it seemed like it thinned out half way through the,
9 a little bit through the block. Maybe like I said, it was narrow
10 -- I pulled up about two cars length. It seemed like it thinned
11 out. And throughout the course of the first few hours or hour or
12 two, whatever, it seemed like it rescinded back where -- you can
13 kind of stand up because it's like that, throughout there's kind
14 of a big hill going down and there's a house on the property.

15 So on that street, I'm standing there, you're in the
16 thin of it up towards the church because it now has kind of
17 rescinded back a little bit and then you can see it at times.

18 And then traffic moved with it so it was like the more
19 the cloud kind of came back up the hill and came back towards us,
20 you see everybody that was, you know, the first responders,
21 firemen, etcetera was out there.

22 Everybody's pushing back and at the point where, same
23 thing I think when you're in the thick of it, it was kind of, you
24 know, something going on. I know for me anyway, it was like man,
25 it's in your throat, you know what I mean, it was something.

1 And then to the point when it seemed like it wasn't
2 there as much, it was down and we went into the church. When you
3 stepped out of the church, you can tell that it was a difference
4 in the air. For me and I believe one of the officers, probably
5 Richards, he felt the same thing, that it was not was noticeable
6 where we're standing but something was still in the air; hence why
7 a lot of us, the officers at least felt that this was, we were too
8 close, really we are too close.

9 BY MR. STANCIL:

10 Q. How was the decision made to establish the command post
11 at the church?

12 A. They wanted a forward post right there at that area.
13 That's all he expressed to me. Like I said, initially, when I --
14 I'm sorry.

15 Q. Who expressed that?

16 A. This is the OEM which was Alfonso Giampola. Are you
17 going to ask me the spelling on that?

18 Q. You don't have to.

19 A. He probably wanted that as a location, I guess he called
20 it his forward command, whatever.

21 To me, personally like -- county reached out to me and
22 advised me that, I'm saying county, I could be wrong here. It
23 could be, it could have been my officer that was stationed at the
24 Paulsboro Fire Hall.

25 One of them reached out to me and expressed that the

1 state police OEM was now at the fire hall and are requesting
2 everyone to come there for that to be the command post, something
3 along those lines. Okay.

4 I went to the OEM look, state police is out at this, at
5 the fire hall, and they're requesting everybody to come there as
6 the command post.

7 He looked at me. I said look, I'm just relaying the
8 information. He looked at me, I think he turned away and I think
9 he made a phone call to them that it's what he expressed to me.
10 And I said thank you for doing that because I don't want to be
11 stuck in the middle, you know, you got two of you guys, you want
12 it here, they say there, I'm making notification to you. He said
13 well, I talked to them and it's been addressed, okay.

14 That's all I know about that. To me, it just seemed
15 like it was a little tug of war in reference to where this command
16 post should be. I felt that it should be, personally felt that it
17 should have probably been a little further away. I understand why
18 he would want it somewhat close, but that's a little too close for
19 my comfort.

20 So everybody was sent that way. Initially, I believe
21 when county asked me when I was, just send everybody to the fire
22 hall, that'll be, you know, where is your command post is what she
23 asked me. And I said it's going to be the Paulsboro Fire House.

24 And that was really early on because now we could
25 request an officer where do you want them to go, 217 which is

1 Patrolman Thigpen, was sent to that location; that's where it's
2 going to be. And where do you want the media to go; that, I want
3 them go there.

4 So early on and then the captain advised like when he
5 got here, I remember hearing him saying on the radio, command post
6 is at this, you know, the fire hall. I said well, I got that one
7 right.

8 And then afterwards it was what it was. So when
9 everybody responded, when state police got there to that location,
10 I don't know if they responded, I'm assuming they did. I mean,
11 there were so many people out there. I knew state police was out
12 there, but I didn't, you know, so I'm assuming they did make it to
13 this, to the forward post.

14 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

15 Q. It was the county OEM that established the post at the
16 church, or was this the New Jersey, the state?

17 A. This was, no, they were, the state was out at --

18 Q. The state was --

19 A. -- there initially. I believe they may have come here
20 after talking to our OEM which is Alfonso --

21 Q. So that was Gloucester County?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay, just making sure.

24 A. So I guess he'd established that post.

25 Q. Another question for you. Did at any point did you

1 receive any safety PPE or Personal Protective Equipment guidance,
2 or anything in terms of procedures that need to be taken for the
3 protection of your staff, other personnel in the area, or any
4 guidance?

5 A. Afterwards or during?

6 Q. At any --

7 A. During?

8 Q. Yeah, at any point during your shift?

9 A. I don't recall anybody coming up to me and expressing
10 that hey, you know, and besides that okay, there's something to be
11 concerned with this particular vinyl chloride, it's something to
12 be concerned with. There was nobody handing out masks or doing
13 anything different.

14 As a supervisor, I have feelings about this because we
15 work in the area where's there's refineries. But I understand
16 budget's always an issue, but we work in area of refinery, and
17 whatever the expense is, we have, we need to have that because I
18 really, you know, I could have just gone out there and dropped
19 dead myself on the street and not able to help any of the
20 residents.

21 I guess we did what we felt we needed to do at that
22 point, but I also thought that we needed to have something until
23 we know for sure what we have. We can just grab it and put it on,
24 and hope that's enough to do something to at least help people.

25 So that wasn't there and maybe there'd be a change after

1 today or after this incident. I at least hope that is something
2 someone seriously looks at and makes a change.

3 Q. One other question. You mentioned that at one point
4 either there was an initial evacuation clearing that immediate
5 area, Commerce, Broad and the railroad tracks --

6 A. The railroad tracks. On the east side of Commerce, yes.

7 Q. And you said that there was, received notice that at one
8 point this is non-toxic, not a concern.

9 If you can tell me when, you know, describe what had
10 occurred and how that information came about?

11 A. I want to say it could have come from OEM. At that
12 point, they were on the scene. This is non-toxic.

13 Then new information went out to county that they could
14 now, people could remain indoors just so long as they're outside
15 [sic] windows and doors closed, nobody could be hanging out.

16 So when that happened -- that was one of many. I don't
17 know, I couldn't even begin to tell you what time. I don't
18 remember the time. I couldn't even give you a range, let's see, I
19 would have to say prior to noon and obviously -- I don't know.

20 Q. That's fine.

21 A. I really don't, I don't remember. But the information
22 went out and that's when it was more or less okay, whoever still
23 here just remain indoors. It could have been earlier, actually,
24 because it was still stay indoors.

25 It wasn't, it was a conflict of, I guess, what the --

1 the train guy's saying, I guess, and then -- I don't want to point
2 the finger at that person, but it was someone that responded that
3 made reference to that.

4 Maybe make sure that's something for Richards because he
5 may have that written down somewhere where, you know, that
6 information. I just remember it came out that it was non-toxic,
7 just people could pretty much remain indoors and they should be
8 okay.

9 BY MR. STANCIL:

10 Q. How does your dispatch system work? Do you have a
11 combined dispatch with the fire department for the town?

12 A. Everything's up at county now. So our county dispatch,
13 dispatch for, on our zone 27 which that was something else that
14 was changed. Everybody switched over off our zone 27 to give us
15 free use of the channel. That happened early on. Everybody
16 switched to 25.

17 But on our zone, we have normally one dispatch.
18 Obviously up at county, they have the use of others if someone
19 down, and apparently things went pretty good for them. People
20 were assisting each other to get information, the phones answered
21 and all that stuff from what I'm hearing.

22 But three towns were on the zone; East Greenwich,
23 Gibbstown which is also called Greenwich, and Paulsboro. Those
24 other two towns switched over to 25 to leave us, Paulsboro, the
25 complete use of that zone to do what we were needed to do at that

1 time.

2 Q. Are they, do they know anybody --

3 A. So they also, I think that they're close enough to know
4 what's going on, I'm pretty sure. I haven't been up there, but my
5 understanding over the time since we switched over communicating
6 with them, it appears that at least, you know what I mean, it's,
7 they can be here at, on the fire side, they know what's going on.

8 Q. Have they prepared a log of the dispatch calls?

9 A. Have they at this point?

10 Q. Yeah. Is it part of your report?

11 (Phone ringing.)

12 MR. GREY: Sorry about that, all these phones. I'm
13 trying to make sure I hear them.

14 MR. STANCIL: So the question was if dispatch has
15 prepared a log, are you going to be requesting one?

16 MR. GREY: Of all the information you asked --

17 MR. STANCIL: The calls from yesterday.

18 MR. GREY: -- because we got a thick report to do.
19 Everything is obviously documented on that card, everything we
20 were doing and calling out.

21 I haven't seen that yet. I wasn't able, had the
22 opportunity yet to communicate with them, you know, can you send
23 your print outs, let me look at it and see, you know, I probably
24 wouldn't be able to line for line kind of tell you the way things
25 went down.

1 (Phone ringing.)

2 MR. GREY: It's a new phone. Can I just --

3 MR. STANCIL: Yeah, sure.

4 MR. GREY: And how things went down. I don't know how
5 to turn this thing off.

6 BY MR. STANCIL:

7 Q. So that would normally be a part of your report?

8 A. Yes, at least he's going to, the officer, Patrolman
9 Richards is going to be the initial report. He already started
10 some notes in there, but he's going to document, he's going to
11 print out what they have as, you know, just try to make sure it's
12 all documented in order how things went down.

13 County was, I'm, they normally are pretty good at
14 documenting things. Okay, at this time, I know she was busy, but
15 they're pretty good at documenting an order.

16 While the officer's doing his report, he'll make sure he
17 looks at that. I'm sure it's going to be, like for me right now,
18 it would refresh my memory with a few things and how that went
19 down.

20 Unfortunately, I haven't had the opportunity to scan
21 that at this time because, apparently, they had a, it'd been a
22 little more in order, the information. I'm sure I'm missing
23 something. There was just so much happening.

24 Trying to communicate with people, with my officers and
25 all county calling me; Sergeant Grey, Sergeant Grey, 206, 206,

1 that number, I want to change the number 206, 206.

2 Yes, there should definitely be a document log somewhere
3 in reference to it.

4 The officer would have, everyone that, you know,
5 eventually as they started to come into the scene who got, because
6 he did not leave that, like maybe as far as he got at one point,
7 he was on Commerce Street the whole time and if not, right there.

8 So he's pretty much got a line up of who came when and
9 an order, that came right to that spot. He will have some
10 information, times, you know, he's going to coordinate with
11 dispatch as well.

12 Q. All right, Sergeant Grey, could you just give us a
13 little overview of your career here with the department, how many
14 years you've been with the department, etcetera?

15 A. Seventeen years currently. I started in 1995 as a
16 patrolman, been promoted to sergeant in 2006 so I plan on being
17 here for a few years until retirement.

18 I'm training in there and community policing and to
19 handle stuff like crossing guards and stuff like that for the
20 police department.

21 Q. Have you ever received any hazardous material training?

22 A. Yes, we have received hazmat training. Yes, we have.

23 Q. Like what?

24 A. Well, we went on a whole lot of, we used to do our
25 training online. I'm trying to think what the --

1 Q. For the DOT?

2 A. Yeah, I think it was. You go on and you view all the
3 slides, you take a little test in the end and clear it out. Now,
4 you know, we carry our books with us. These are the things, you
5 heard train derailment, you know, not expecting train derailment
6 and all that cloud.

7 You see that and it's, remember I said I stopped my car,
8 I want to say Jefferson Street, that's like almost pretty much the
9 entrance is where everybody was going. And you stop your car
10 there because they have this cloud and it's like you start
11 thinking about life in a short period of time.

12 Yes, we have, I'm thinking when was our last training
13 this year.

14 Q. Is that something you receive on a periodic basis?

15 A. Yeah, I don't remember, and I have to say, I'm thinking.
16 I don't think there was anything this year. I don't remember any
17 hazmat this year.

18 We have had -- over the years, obviously. I even
19 remember going through all the slides and different things, you
20 know, I want to say we had, the cover, when they cover blood worm
21 (ph.) passengers and that one instructor came out and he talks
22 about it. He covered some hazmat stuff, placards and all that
23 stuff. That was, I don't know, going back a few months, June,
24 July, something like that.

25 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

1 Q. Have you ever, has the police department actually ever
2 received any information from the railroad about the type of
3 hazardous materials that come through the community here, or
4 potential hazardous to be aware of?

5 A. Yes. I know they do make notification. I know they do,
6 there's a catalogue that shows all the information on what each
7 carrier or company has. I know that's updated frequently. How
8 often we're in that book, you know what I mean, but we know that
9 it's there.

10 Q. But they've provided that information?

11 A. Yes, they provide, yes, they do provide the information.
12 All of the local companies that have stuff that, you know, to be
13 concerned with.

14 And, obviously, I think in that training, they went over
15 some of the items that could be exposed in your area. It's a lot
16 of information.

17 MR. STANCIL: Do you think they spent an adequate amount
18 of time covering it with you?

19 MR. GREY: Not for an area, we're Ground Zero. We are
20 in a location where it's, we're just stuck with refinery. The
21 refineries are larger than us, a few of us and probably Gibbstown.
22 They're so, granted they may consider it's mostly Gibbstown, but
23 we're on the border of all of it. We deal with all of the
24 benefits of that every day. Every time there's a little release,
25 we deal with that.

1 Again, just like with the masks, we're here. If
2 something, I mean granted, this could happen in any town because
3 they're driving from wherever getting to Point A to Point B can be
4 no -- around. That could happen anywhere.

5 Maybe they might not have nothing obviously. Here,
6 right next door, you feel like it's something that we definitely
7 should just be prepared for no matter what it costs. Have the
8 equipment, I mean, I know it can be thrown away because it expires
9 and you got to buy new stuff. But, unfortunately, that is just
10 part of it, and the expense needs to go that way because we need
11 more, definitely need more, definitely.

12 It's just also, it's what we talk about.

13 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: One last question. When you mentioned
14 the cloud, can you say how far into the day did you still visibly
15 see a plume? Was it sort of like a one-time big plume that kept
16 on coming, I mean, I know for a while was it sort of --

17 MR. GREY: I guess it was a few hours because it seemed
18 like it was, I'm trying to think at 12:00 on that, the officer
19 left. I want to say for a good while there it was clear because
20 now everybody's down on the hill, they're looking out there. I
21 know that people are coming out there and getting readings and
22 stuff like that.

23 Man, it seemed like forever, but if we're out there
24 7:05, 7:10, it definitely had to be till, at least it felt that
25 way. Obviously, I wasn't, you know, what time it is. I don't

1 even know if I had a watch on.

2 I don't know, maybe an hour, maybe two hours, the early
3 part of everything. It was there and then I recall, at the scene
4 like it rescinded down, it was down the hill. I mean, it's a big
5 hill on Monroe -- or anything, it's a big hill going down to that
6 location from that house on Jefferson.

7 It seemed like there was a time we're out there and I
8 remember it like coming closer and coming closer and then
9 rescinded. And then -- and next you know it, next thing you turn
10 around, it was clear enough to see everything. I don't know what
11 else.

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: This has been extremely helpful.

13 MR. STANCIL: Yes. We really appreciate the time you
14 spent with us and help us understanding what happened out there.

15 Do you have any concerns or any questions for us?

16 MR. GREY: When are they testing? I mean, that's --

17 MR. STANCIL: Have you had a health screening?

18 MR. GREY: No, they communicate with us in reference to
19 all the first responders that were out there in -- I guess,
20 there's going to be, they're supposed to be doing them within 24
21 hours of the, I mean, I don't know, it's only what we're hearing.

22 Their intent is to test us all to make sure it's hardly
23 zero or whatever in our system. Hopefully, there's, you know,
24 they say it's a prolong, late errors or something like that,
25 exposure. I don't know. I just want to get tested and just make

1 sure that you know you're good.

2 MR. STANCIL: Right.

3 MR. GREY: I guess it's a concern for all the, I mean,
4 here on Commerce, this is where I've seen the cloud and everything
5 and then later on realized how far it went, the seepage is that it
6 was, Broad and Delaware was, visibility was reduced. I didn't,
7 you know, I just think of -- seen it do this, is where we're
8 seeing is that, really, it was just flowing across town.

9 I wasn't part of that part, I was here. I don't what
10 else. I hope I answered all your questions. I'm sure there's
11 probably something come to mind afterwards.

12 MR. STANCIL: Well, certainly, please feel free. You
13 have our cards. You can call us any time if you think of
14 something that you think is important that we should know about.
15 We'd be more than happy to hear from you.

16 MR. GREY: Okay.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And even regardless of how minor or
18 whatever you may think it is, it's very useful information for us
19 to sort of help build a picture of events and what actually
20 occurred.

21 MR. STANCIL: And we may call you just to see --

22 MR. GREY: Recap.

23 MR. STANCIL: Right, to see if you remember, to see how
24 things are going, check in with you.

25 MR. GREY: I guess I have one question. Someone made

1 the call, I imagine, in reference to everyone staying off the
2 train and staying away from the train. To me, it was like okay,
3 there was no one else expected to be out there other than hazmat,
4 maybe Conrail OEMs right there.

5 So I did make the call to enquire to make sure I was
6 clear, and I called Captain Marino and he said that was just
7 really pertaining to outsiders, if that's correct?

8 MR. STANCIL: Well, what we did --

9 MR. GREY: Because when the call came, I mean, I'm
10 thinking everybody, the cloud, I'm ready to go out there and say
11 everybody, clear away. But I mean, it makes sense for hazmat and,
12 you know what I mean, Conrail to do their thing. I'm thinking
13 there's nobody else.

14 I know once in a while, you got just the fireman knows
15 probably the --

16 MR. STANCIL: Right, the correct instruction would be
17 that the fire department and you all would need to take whatever
18 action is necessary to protect human life and the environment and
19 the community.

20 What we didn't want happen was wreckage crews coming in
21 and starting to dismantle the scene --

22 MR. GREY: Oh, okay.

23 MR. STANCIL: -- in the even that might have occurred
24 before we got here.

25 MR. GREY: All right.

1 MR. STANCIL: Okay, sir. Thank you so much for your
2 help.

3 MR. GREY: No problem.

4 MR. STANCIL: We'll terminate the interview now. It's
5 12:14 p.m. Thank you.

6 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRAIN DERAILMENT/CHEMICAL SPILL
 NOVEMBER 30, 2012
 PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY
 Interview of Donald Grey

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA13MR002

PLACE: Paulsboro, New Jersey

DATE: December 1, 2012

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Christina H. Neilson
Transcriber