

DCA13MR002
Conrail - Shared Assets
Derailment/Hazardous Material Release
Paulsboro, New Jersey
November 30, 2012

NTSB - Interview of Officer_1, Paulsboro Police Department

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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RAILROAD ACCIDENT/CHEMICAL SPILL
NOVEMBER 30, 2012,
PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY

Docket No.: DCA-13-MR-002

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Interview of: RODNEY RICHARDS

Paulsboro Police Department
Paulsboro, New Jersey

Saturday,
December 1, 2012

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: PAUL STANCIL
Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

PAUL STANCIL, Accident Investigator
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594

** PII **

MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI, Accident Investigator
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I N T E R V I E W

(1:11 p.m.)

1
2
3 MR. STANCIL: Okay, today is December 1st, 2012. It is
4 1:11 p.m. My name is Paul Stancil. I'm a Hazardous Materials
5 Accident Investigator with the National Transportation Safety
6 Board. We're here at the Paulsboro Police Department Headquarters
7 in Paulsboro, New Jersey, and I'm with Officer Rodney Richards,
8 who is the reporting officer for the Paulsboro Police Department.
9 And also present is Muhamed El-Zoghbi, also a Hazardous Materials
10 Accident Investigator for NTSB.

11 Just to let everyone know in the room that this
12 conversation is being recorded. Do you acknowledge that, sir?

13 MR. RICHARDS: Yes. My name is Rodney Richards, a
14 patrolman for Paulsboro Police Department, Badge No. **PII**

15 MR. STANCIL: Okay.

INTERVIEW OF RODNEY RICHARDS

16
17 BY MR. STANCIL:

18 Q. And, Officer Richards, what's your experience -- how
19 long have you been the department?

20 A. I went into the Police Academy in 2006 and have been
21 with the department ever since.

22 Q. Okay. All right, sir, if you could just give us an idea
23 of what happened from the time you were dispatched to the railroad
24 accident here in Paulsboro yesterday, on November 30th. Just give
25 us an idea of everything you can remember that occurred that day.

1 A. Okay. I'm going to start off from the point that I was
2 coming in to work because it's such a close -- in close proximity
3 of the callout time, and I believe I clocked in somewhere
4 approximately around 6:45 in the morning.

5 Coming to work, I can tell you that there was no fog in
6 the area. At approximately 7:03 hours, we got a call that there
7 was a railroad accident. As we were exiting the building, it came
8 out as well that the accident involved cars being put into the
9 water. How many cars, I don't think we were told that.

10 I got into my car, defrosted the windows with the washer
11 fluid because we didn't even have time to start our cars yet.
12 Going down East Washington Street, as I approached North Commerce
13 Street and made a left, at that point I could see far enough to
14 the railroad tracks. Visibility was fine at the point to see one
15 male standing at the railroad tracks. As I got closer, that male
16 waived me towards him. As I approached him, I could see the
17 atmosphere getting a little smoky.

18 I exited the patrol car. As soon as I exited my patrol
19 car, I could -- there was something different about the air. I
20 choked once I started speaking to who was the conductor of the
21 train. I may have his last name a little bit wrong, but it was
22 Wilbert Donovan -- Danovalen. D-a-n-o-v-a-l-e-n, I believe. A
23 tall male, very tall. Approaching him, he was very upset. You
24 could tell he was very nervous. He was very shaky. His hands
25 were very shaky. As I approached him, he let me know that the

1 railroad cars have fallen into the Mantua Creek, the bridge had
2 collapsed, and that what was involved was very serious, life-
3 threatening, and lives -- people would die from what was being
4 released.

5 I asked him -- because now the air surrounding me was
6 now getting heavier, where I could still see him but the clouds
7 were getting thicker. The breathing became more difficult and I
8 had asked -- there was another unknown gentleman that approached
9 that I'm assuming was from Conrail as well. I had asked the
10 conductor, as well as this other guy, what in fact were we -- was
11 I breathing, and they had told me a liquefied petroleum, which was
12 basically, I guess, propane.

13 The conductor told me he believes possibly placard
14 number 1987, placard 1086 -- also there was a number provided,
15 207398. Now, I'm not sure if that number was ethanol alcohol, but
16 I was told 1987 was detanol [sic] alcohol, 1086 was vinyl
17 chloride.

18 The breathing got more difficult as the smoke got
19 thicker, but being that I was told it was propane, the other
20 gentleman that was there along with me and the conductor --
21 everything was happening so fast I did not get his name -- he felt
22 it was a necessity that those engines be removed from those trains
23 due to an ignition source. Sergeant Gilcrest was on location with
24 me now. Sergeant Gilcrest ordered me to stay with the conductor.
25 I stayed with that conductor as long as I possibly could until he

1 got between the engines to disconnect the cars, got on the train,
2 and then got on the train and pulled the engines away. That's
3 when I left him and I did not see the conductor ever since.

4 Immediately at that point, I went to house, I believe,
5 901, attempted to knock on that door to get someone, but no one
6 answered that door, and I believe other officers at the time began
7 to evacuate other nearby residents.

8 From there, people started arriving. Valero, the
9 refinery, and I believe they're now PBF. I don't think they're no
10 longer considered Valero or Mobil. Calvin Hargey (ph.) and Pat
11 Robinson both were on location. I believe they were wearing red
12 suits. Identified themselves as the hazmat team. One was a
13 hazmat team lead. I believe one was chief of the hazmat team, and
14 they were both wearing red. They confirmed that the bridge did
15 collapse. Also arriving was a county hazmat, Pat Dolgos, D-o-l-g-
16 o-s. Pat was concerned with the tide charts.

17 The engine was the big concern. The engine actually has
18 not been removed yet, but right around this time, I'm going to say
19 within probably, approximately within 10 minutes, that engine was
20 removed. And that's pretty much what I have here on the initial.

21 As far as the atmosphere at that point, it just got
22 thicker and thicker. I can tell you, throughout -- as more people
23 arrived -- and I'll go through with you as many people that I can
24 tell you that arrived on location. I'm not going to be as -- I
25 can't give you specific times. I can't give you specific times,

1 probably within periods of time because as I'm taking notes, I am
2 jotting times here and there.

3 At a certain point, whatever was released from those
4 cars, the clouds did disperse at one point. The smell was very
5 strong to me. The odor was strong. I felt that at one point that
6 the air did clear, and the reason I'm saying that is, at first,
7 you could not see the bridge. At that point from when he moved
8 those trains and me going towards the location of the incident, I
9 could not see the trains.

10 I know prior, I believe, to my captain arriving, we were
11 able to stand down there and there was multiple people down there.
12 You could see the accident. I know whenever my captain did
13 arrive, it started getting thicker in the area. It was so thick
14 to the point where I would not be able to see him in front of me.
15 That's how thick it was. So where there was a second release, the
16 smoke did come in a second time.

17 Walking to 901, I was walking with Sergeant Gilcrest.
18 We called out for the Coast Guard as well as the State Police, the
19 State Police Marine Unit. Conrail hazmat was already, I believe,
20 on location, or they were to report on location, and I'm not --
21 the reason I'm saying Conrail, I don't know if Conrail and Valero,
22 I don't know if they're one or if they're separate. I don't know.
23 I do know Valero was there, Conrail hazmat. There were numerous
24 people there, so I don't know if their hazmat team was already on
25 location.

1 I was told there were four to five cars in the water. A
2 lot of the cars were vinyl chloride, believed to be stabilized,
3 which was a little frustrating because I was told I'm breathing in
4 propane and later to find out that I'm breathing in something that
5 wasn't stabilized and apparently is vinyl chloride. We were told
6 that what we we seeing was fog from the weather, and I know that
7 was not fog. There was no fog coming in when I came in to work,
8 there was no fog when I was going to my car, and then, all of a
9 sudden, the fog just rushed in. Fog does rush in, but that was
10 not fog.

11 I documented a Randall Gartner, Deputy Chief of
12 Woodbury, arrived on location to get some experience in case this
13 ever happened through his town because these trains apparently go
14 through Woodbury and it is a concern for them. He was hoping to
15 learn from how we handled this situation. Deputy Chief Gary
16 Stevenson of the Paulsboro Fire Department was on location. Chief
17 of Police -- chief for the Fire Department of Paulsboro, Alfonso,
18 was on location; Giampola is his last name. Gloucester County
19 hazmat, Jay Jones, arrived on location. Investigator Menitti,
20 Paulsboro Police, arrived on location.

21 At this point of taking my notes, I know -- I believe I
22 was told 8, 9, and 10 were in the water. One of those cars was
23 punctured. That was vinyl chloride, which I was told was
24 flammable.

25 Gloucester County hazmat, Jay Jones -- I gave you that

1 information already.

2 Command post, there was some discrepancy on where the
3 command post should have been. Should we have relocated the
4 command -- should we let the command post be right there on
5 location, should it be at the fire hall, should it be at the
6 Borough Hall? There was kind of -- I don't know if I want to say
7 it was a struggle. I think the people were -- whoever was in
8 charge of hazmat fire department was trying to make the right
9 decision, but I don't think that there was someone totally in
10 charge of that situation of picking where that command post should
11 be.

12 Neil Ferrone, Chief Hazmat -- I'm going to say he is
13 Conrail. I got a telephone number ****PII**** from him. It is
14 Conrail. I have an arrow pointing to that. He is chief hazmat
15 for Conrail. He gave a speech inside Saint James Church, right by
16 the accident scene. That's where command post was placed at one
17 point prior to being moved.

18 Gloucester County Prosecutor's Office, I have a first
19 name of Bren (ph.) -- was notified of the incident by Investigator
20 Menitti.

21 Captain Marino, Badge No. ****PII****, met with Glenn Roemmich.
22 He was arriving. Now, all of this information that I have given
23 you, I can tell you, was before 8:17 a.m. in the morning. State
24 Police Emergency Management Team, Number 217 was what his number
25 was or -- State Police Emergency Management Team Number 217 is

1 what I was told was on location.

2 Captain Marino, at 8:17, informed me that hazmat was on
3 location. At this point forwarding command post was at St. James
4 Church. That was as we were in this meeting. Captain Marino was
5 there when that discussion and that speech was going on by Neil
6 Ferrone, as well as Chief of Fire Department, Alfons Giampola, and
7 that order came from Alfons that that's where command was.

8 At this point it was 8:20 in the morning. At this
9 point, Officer Ky Belbin (ph.) was arriving in to assist us.
10 Okay, State Police OEM Greg Godish, G-o-d-i-s-h, that time was at
11 8:34 that I spoke with him and got his information, who he was
12 from the OEM of the State Police.

13 Okay, at the same time, I spoke with TSA Homeland
14 Security Kevin Gallagher. His title was either inspector or
15 investigator. At 8:42 in the morning, I have moved to Borough
16 Hall. So I don't know if they were moving to Borough Hall to
17 prepare for a meeting or what, but I have moved into Borough Hall
18 at 8:42. I can't be specific on what that is, but, at 8:42, I
19 have moved to Borough Hall.

20 Okay, out at the scene, I now saw that there were two
21 train cars on its side with plastic -- one of the trains had
22 plastic flakes coming out of the top of it. Those two railroad
23 cars I did not see at first. I had assumed, from what I had saw
24 initially, it was just these cars here in the water. I did not
25 realize that these two trains here had actually flipped over on

1 its side. The train in front of this one here had -- I believe it
2 was the one in front of this -- had two caps on the top. Those
3 two caps had come open somehow. I'm assuming it turned over and
4 the plastic pellets were on the yard of Gary Stevenson.

5 EPA responded. U.S. Coast Guard, at approximately 9:08,
6 on location. Chief Wachter is now on location as well. At 9:10
7 in the morning, Kevin Bosch, B-o-s-c-h, of the FBI is en route.
8 NJDEP is now on location as well at the same time, 9:10. There
9 was a briefing at 9:34 with Conrail.

10 The FBI did arrive. They informed me -- the FBI agent
11 was Eric, last name N-e-g-r-o-n, Negron. He gave me a cell phone
12 number, ** PII ** He informed me that he spoke with Erma
13 Stevenson (ph.) and Raelynn Stevenson, who live at this house
14 right at the wreck scene. He informed me sometime on Wednesday
15 evening that the two families in the two separate houses -- Erma
16 lives across the street -- heard a very loud bang -- a boom is
17 what he said on Wednesday evening, loud enough to shake their
18 houses. They thought maybe a train derailed. They went outside
19 and looked, but they saw no train.

20 Now, I told the FBI agent coming in we didn't have time
21 to look to see if there was a report of that incident on Wednesday
22 evening or not. You know, we don't know if they called in and
23 reported that to the police department or called county dispatch
24 to respond to that. I told him we would get that information and
25 let him know. He supplied a business card which Sergeant Grey

1 told me he believes he does have in his bag. He gave me the card.
2 I gave it to Sergeant Grey so when we found that information,
3 Sergeant Grey could reach out to Eric from the FBI.

4 Okay, I also have Pat Robinson, Valero, from Valero PBF.
5 I'm not sure if Pat was on hazmat or not. CSX Railroad Police are
6 on location. Okay, at this point, I'm being told cans 6 through
7 12 are the cars that are being affected, and this is at
8 approximately 10:30 in the morning. I have Assemblyman
9 Burzichelli also here. That's pretty much about the end of my
10 notes.

11 I'm being informed later in the day, like about at the
12 time you guys, NTSB from Washington, is en route. There was some
13 discrepancy -- Gloucester County Sheriff Officer Phil Dieser was
14 on location throughout the day, along with his boss, Detective, I
15 believe, maybe Detective Sergeant Abate. I think that's his name,
16 Abate. They were together. At some point they were told -- it
17 was put on their band on the radio that you guys were en route
18 from Washington and that they believed that you guys ordered that
19 there was going to be nobody on that railroad, no one near that
20 accident, and we weren't sure if that meant Conrail themselves.
21 You know, they own the property, so we don't know what that meant.
22 Was it okay for the owners of the railroad and the cars to be
23 allowed to view their property or was this possibly a crime scene?
24 We don't know. We didn't know at this point.

25 It was a very busy morning up until this point. There

1 were press conferences throughout the day. My task at this point,
2 once the smoke has cleared, I do know that there was monitoring
3 throughout that area. How far outside that area I couldn't tell
4 you because I did not leave that area all day. I was in this
5 proximity on this accident all day long from -- whether it was
6 from that St. James Church back to the initial accident up until
7 the point of -- not up on the tracks, but up into the river as far
8 as I went. I made sure the media didn't get through. I made sure
9 -- there was a lot of kids, a lot of adults trying to sneak up
10 through the woods trying to see what was going on. The main
11 concern was to keep them out of the area because the readings were
12 coming up high at times.

13 I was told -- I don't know what the readings mean. The
14 readings could be a 2 at one point, however, when the monitors
15 were down here blowing wind this way, they were possibly as high
16 as 16. I don't, like I said, I don't know what that meant, but
17 they were stronger into the wind.

18 What else can I tell you? I know there's a million
19 things more. I know my chief and my captain had come in. I know
20 when you guys came, the chief and the captain were with you guys,
21 with NTSB. Whether you were there or not, NTSB, they -- I know
22 they brought you, brought parties and went to location. Once you
23 guys -- I did notice once word that you -- when I got word that
24 you were coming and others got word that you were coming, I did
25 notice a lot of people did vacate.

1 Conrail was still up there and that was the concern.
2 Were they to be up there or were they not be up there? I reached
3 out to my sergeant, informed him of the concern from the county,
4 from that county officer, Abate, because they had advised us they
5 would assist us to whatever we felt was the right thing to do
6 there. I believe sergeant made the determination that he felt
7 that NTSB meant no bystanders, no civilians, no -- anyone --
8 residents near that railroad track. He didn't take it as if it
9 was Conrail employees themselves, that they owned the property.
10 So I think that that was kind of questionable, a questionable call
11 there.

12 Prior to you guys arriving, I believe a gentleman from
13 the hazmat CSX, tall guy -- I did not get his name. It got to the
14 point where I could tell something was different. People were
15 vacating. This gentleman -- and I did not get his name. He was
16 wearing a black overall coat -- a very tall male, ordered me that
17 I now needed to leave the area, that I needed to get up more
18 towards the church, I could not be where I was anymore. And I
19 don't know if that was readings. I don't know if was becoming
20 more dangerous or what, but I was told to get out of the area.

21 Captain Marino at one point told me it was okay now just
22 to -- just get into my car, go up towards Commerce Street and
23 enforce -- you know, show my presence out there. Keep people
24 away, but stay more up towards down the street. I stood by. Now,
25 that was probably around 5 -- about 1700 hours, approximately. I

1 stood by on location from 1700 hours to almost 1900 hours, as I
2 noticed more fire department crew coming in, more machines coming
3 in. I know American Red Cross had come in throughout the day and
4 supplied plenty of food. They were stationed in St. James as well
5 as a command post was also at a fire hall on Thompson Avenue. I
6 was also told at another point that command was now moved miles
7 away.

8 Now, what my concern with that was, is should that have
9 been done right away, and why is it that our community, their
10 command post is that far away? Why is our evacuation only at this
11 point one block?

12 7:00 p.m., every officer was ordered back to the police
13 station. 1900 hours, every officer was reporting back to the
14 police station, including myself. At the same time, around 1900,
15 upon me pulling in, Chief Wachter and Captain Marino pulled up and
16 ordered everyone into the conference room for a meeting. Prior to
17 me entering that building, Captain Marino asked me to please go
18 home, get some -- breath some fresh air, that I had basically been
19 exposed quite a bit today from being on -- I mean, I was there all
20 day.

21 Getting home -- I'll let you know how I felt when I got
22 home. My concern was what do I do with my family. Do I tell them
23 to leave? Do I go in the house with my clothes? You know, I walk
24 into the front door right to the washing machine, stripped down,
25 clothes went right into the wash. I showered extensively. Did

1 not touch my kid. I did touch her after I showered. I did not
2 breath on her. I did not -- I think I gave her a kiss goodnight
3 because I spent maybe 20 minutes with her before she went to bed.
4 Getting up this morning, I was a little more close to her, but
5 still kept my distance because I still don't know what is vinyl
6 chloride. I still don't know what this vinyl chloride is other
7 than getting information from the news. We do have a hazmat book
8 in there which is very vague. It doesn't give you that much
9 information. It just says that you can be -- there is affixation
10 possibly. There are some serious matters in it, nothing specific.
11 And again, we had not had time to pull MSDS sheets or anything
12 like that to find out.

13 So come in this morning. I've been informed that the
14 evacuation has now been spread from Broad to Delaware. Actually,
15 Captain Marino told me that it was going to be -- prior to him
16 telling me to go home yesterday evening -- that the evacuation was
17 going to be up to North Delaware Street. Coming in this morning,
18 it was confirmed from Broad, North Delaware Street, up to the
19 accident. That's where the evacuation was. Today was to keep
20 people out. Let them come in if they have to get a couple of
21 things, but get them right out. They were being put up in hotels,
22 however, being taken care of by Conrail.

23 Today, the reason I came in here so late is I had a
24 domestic violence incident right before you guys needed me to come
25 in here. That's why it took me so long to get up here. Say,

1 about an hour and a half ago, roughly, going through the
2 evacuation zone, I spoke with Gloucester County Officer Phil
3 Dieser who made me aware that there were some things about to
4 occur out on the wreck possibly blowing the remainder of the
5 chemicals out of the punctured unit with a different line. I
6 don't think they -- they've been blowing water on it. Apparently,
7 there was a different line being run out there and going to blow
8 the rest of this stuff out. He said the concern was, due to
9 temperature, that this being blown out would cause this chloride
10 to turn into some sort of acid. Due to the wind, everyone out
11 there would be given respirators.

12 My problem now is I'm in that area. Are officers, are
13 all officers going to provided with these respirators and who's
14 making this call and why haven't we been notified of this? And I
15 spoke to my sergeant about this and that's where we are right now.
16 If that did happen or is happening, are we going to be aware and
17 are we going to be told to stay out of the area and, even so, are
18 residents? Is this -- should this be pushed out further? Why --
19 I think -- my personal opinion is here's the wreck, this is the
20 evacuation route. There's a store right here, still open. I
21 don't think it should be, but I don't make the call.

22 I know I'm probably -- maybe with questions, if you have
23 questions, maybe it'll stir my brain a little bit more, but just
24 off the top of my head, that's where I am right now.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. That's who I have on location. You know, there are
2 other officers I know that were working that day and I'm sure
3 you'll get a list of that, a list of them, but --

4 Q. Okay, let's take you back to the time where you arrived
5 on the scene and you're talking to the train crew --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- that you saw on the scene. How many people were
8 there?

9 A. I believe I saw two, the conductor, and there was one
10 other male. I was trying to get as much information from this
11 conductor that I could. The other male, I did not get his name,
12 but the other male was the one that felt strongly to get this,
13 these two engines out of the area due to ignition, and that
14 happened right away.

15 Q. Can you go over again your conversation with these two
16 gentlemen --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- where you talked about the liquefied petroleum?

19 A. Yes. Immediately upon my approach to those railroad
20 tracks on Commerce Street, I could see who was now later
21 identified as the conductor, Wilbert -- I get his last name wrong.
22 Whatever -- Wilbert Danovaler or Danovalen, a very tall male, I
23 could see him waiving me into his area, those railroad tracks. As
24 soon as I exited that car, you could see something getting
25 thicker, the smoke getting thicker. Something was wrong. You

1 could feel it as you were breathing. I mean, it caught you off
2 breath. I knew something was wrong.

3 Talking to this -- he identified who he was, that he was
4 the conductor of those engines. My initial reaction to seeing him
5 was that I could tell that this guy was scared. Unless he has
6 some sort of complex that makes him shake like that, to me, it was
7 someone scared. You know when you're grabbing a pen and you're
8 trying to write and you're nervous and you've got something going
9 on, you're scared about something, and that's how his reaction
10 was.

11 When I asked him for those details, he was able -- those
12 code numbers of what those chemicals were, he knew what he was
13 doing. He knew where to get them, but I could tell whatever it
14 was he was reaching inside or whatever he was flipping there, that
15 he was going to give me the information, it was just he was
16 nervous about his approach on getting it. He did tell me that
17 what was on location was very dangerous to our health, it was
18 life-threatening, and that people would die.

19 I asked him as the smoke was getting heavier what in
20 fact was it that I was breathing. It's liquefied petroleum, also
21 it was propane. The decal numbers that I was giving was 1987 and
22 1086, as well as 207398. They were given to me by the conductor.
23 He identified 1987 and detanol alcohol, 1086 as vinyl chloride.

24 Q. And where did he appear to get the liquefied petroleum
25 from? Did he get that off of a piece of paper or --

1 A. That -- no, that's when it started getting thicker --
2 and I believe I was even on air, because I called for -- and when
3 I was out speaking to him, when he told me that this was life-
4 threatening to people, that people would die, I was calling for my
5 sergeant. At that point it was really getting thick and I believe
6 I even started choking when I was calling for my sergeant to come
7 out. At that point, I believe, is when I asked him exactly what
8 is it that we're breathing right now, and it was liquefied
9 petroleum, and also it was propane.

10 This other male that came up, like I said, I don't know
11 if he was wearing yellow. I want to say he was wearing yellow,
12 but I'm not positive on that. I don't know if he was from Conrail
13 or if he was from Valero -- if he was from Valero, he would be
14 wearing red -- ordered those engines away.

15 Q. But he didn't look through his paperwork before he told
16 you liquefied petroleum --

17 A. No.

18 Q. -- or just something that he said?

19 A. And as I said, when he gave me liquefied petroleum, I
20 immediately wrote that down and that was all after these were
21 given to me. So, for -- I did question that a little bit as how
22 this was propane if these were the numbers that you were giving
23 me. So, even if it was propane, I still think that's dangerous
24 enough. I mean, I don't know about the hazardous material.
25 Propane is -- that much, I would assume that a light would light

1 it up. But, to me, I did question how is this liquid -- how is
2 this propane, and these are the numbers you're giving me? You
3 know, where is it that you're telling me that --

4 Q. You asked him that?

5 A. No, I didn't ask him that. I'm thinking this to myself
6 --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- how is it propane? These -- this is what you're
9 giving me, but this is what you're telling me it is. So it didn't
10 make sense, but that's what I was told. Then to find out that
11 that's vinyl chloride. And if he told me vinyl chloride, would I
12 think that's hazardous? Probably. If I didn't know it was on
13 this train, probably not. Like these plastic pellets that are
14 laying on this front yard, would I think that's harmful? If you
15 told me it was plastic pellets, probably not, but, like I said,
16 I'm not in that field, so --

17 Q. And where were you standing when you encountered the
18 conductor?

19 A. The railroad tracks.

20 Q. At what intersection or --

21 A. Here is the police station right there, and the wreck is
22 right here, so we're talking one, two blocks. Right here is where
23 I make my left. Once I make this left right here, the conductor
24 is right here. I can see. At this point I can see. He can see
25 me and they're waiving me towards -- now, when my sergeant and the

1 other officer, Zubec, is responding, they said it became harder to
2 see me and at one point. It just got so thick that --

3 Q. How far away were you from the locomotive?

4 A. From the locomotive, from the conductor? That train
5 was, I'm going to say, in the middle of the roadway. There was at
6 least one lane open, so the train was right in the middle of the
7 road.

8 Q. The engine?

9 A. The engine, yes.

10 Q. Okay. So he was standing next to the engine?

11 A. He -- this is the middle of the road. This is the
12 engine. I'm sorry. We were basically right about here.

13 Q. Okay. So you're --

14 A. I would say probably 10, 15 feet, just right off the
15 edge of the road.

16 O. Okay. And you're standing in the cloud --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- of the material?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And what was the train crew's reaction to that?

21 A. I didn't have much interaction with the train crew.
22 Now, the reason being --

23 Q. Were they --

24 A. -- whether there was more train crew down at the other
25 end, I was more focused with the conductor and I knew --

1 Q. Yeah, the conductor, what was his reaction to you all
2 standing in the cloud? Did he --

3 A. He was just shaken.

4 Q. He didn't say we've got to get out of here or --

5 A. No, he didn't say anything. He got -- no, no, no, not
6 that we need to get out of here, just that we -- it's a very
7 dangerous situation basically, and he disconnected the engines and
8 he got out of there. Whether he came back, I don't know. I never
9 saw him again.

10 Q. Okay. So you received an explanation for what this fog
11 was.

12 A. Right.

13 Q. Who told you it was weather related fog and not chemical
14 fog?

15 A. Numerous people throughout. They -- we weren't sure
16 because you could have mistaken -- if you didn't know any better
17 -- there were so many people at this point, I mean, hazmat people
18 from everywhere, that even my captain at one point had thought
19 it's got to be fog. I mean, it was so much. I mean, you would
20 think that it could have been fog, but I knew from the way I was
21 breathing and the pain directly in my chest, which is -- I mean, I
22 can still feel the center of my chest that there's -- that there
23 was something wrong and that that's not fog. It got -- the second
24 time that I told you, it cleared where you could see the wreck,
25 but then -- I mean, you saw this. There was another release at

1 some point when that -- when those -- that smoke came back in. I
2 was like, oh, it's getting bad. It was so thick that I could not
3 see you. That's how thick it got and that was not fog. That was
4 not fog.

5 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

6 Q. You mentioned that there was like CSX hazmat and other
7 folks there too. Did any of them tell you that this was fog or
8 was it --

9 A. No, not the -- no.

10 Q. Not the hazmat --

11 A. No, no.

12 Q. -- folks there?

13 A. No.

14 BY MR. STANCIL:

15 Q. Did you learn at any point in time differently, that
16 this was a vinyl chloride cloud?

17 A. I was told today that my -- Chief Wachter at some point
18 did make reference -- I don't know where, who he was speaking to,
19 that he absolutely said there is no way this is fog. But, no, no
20 one has --

21 Q. But while you're on scene and you're standing in this
22 fog the whole time you're down there --

23 A. Right.

24 Q. -- you didn't receive anything other than it was weather
25 related?

1 A. Yeah, weather -- I was told liquefied petroleum and
2 there was times where just -- like I said, there were so many
3 people around in conversation that it could be fog. Captain even
4 felt at one point that it could have been fog, but I think after
5 standing out there, that everyone realized that it's not fog.

6 Q. Did any of the industry expert give you any information
7 about the health-related consequences there?

8 A. No, no one really kept -- I'm the reporting officer. No
9 one really, hazmat or anything, really kept me in the loop, I
10 would say, on what exactly it was. What it was, vinyl chloride.
11 From the conductor is the reason why I know vinyl chloride, and
12 how I even know when this was punctured, that's where it came
13 from. I mean, I don't -- I couldn't tell you where I even know
14 that that's what was in that container, but through speaking to
15 the officers out here, sheriff officers out there, that -- just
16 people coming in. There were so many people conversating. There
17 were people everywhere.

18 And I'm going to tell you, until the NTSB came here -- I
19 don't want to say anyone did anything wrong, but there was just a
20 lot of heads involved and making calls that I don't know if the
21 structure was appropriate, was done right. Command post is my big
22 thing. I don't think command post, in my opinion, should be that
23 close to the accident. You know, if something -- everyone
24 important that needed to be on location was within 200 feet of the
25 accident, maybe 300 feet. The command post is here and we're a

1 football field away from the accident. And this container, which
2 I understand it was this, the one that's leaning up -- no. Is
3 there one -- this one here, is that the one's that concern or is
4 this one of concern, that could possibly --

5 Q. They all are, but --

6 A. The most dangerous, is it this one?

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: They pose different --

8 MR. RICHARDS: Threats.

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- types of hazards. Yeah, this is a
10 flammable liquid.

11 MR. RICHARDS: Okay.

12 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: This is a flammable gas with health
13 effects, so --

14 MR. RICHARDS: So if this one punctured, we're dealing
15 with what we already dealt with. This one gets punctured with
16 some sort of -- I would assume it's going to -- and it don't
17 matter where this command -- this command post maybe would have a
18 shot if it's where it is now, 3 miles away, but --

19 BY MR. STANCIL:

20 Q. Who made the decision to locate the command post --

21 A. To?

22 Q. -- at the church?

23 A. Chief Giampola was pretty persistent that's where he
24 wanted it. Now, I gave you a name of a State Police OEM, State
25 Police OEM Greg Godish. Now, Greg was there, but there was

1 another gentleman from the State Police Emergency Management
2 speaking during this meeting in St. James Church when they had the
3 first conference in that building, which was around 8:30ish, 8:42.
4 The reason I'm saying it was around that time is because that's
5 when I had moved to Borough Hall. So I'm thinking that's where
6 they were having their next press conference was at Borough Hall,
7 which was going to be around 10:00, 10:30.

8 This other gentleman from State Police Emergency
9 Management, he questioned the fact. His question was if another
10 one of these units punctured, I believe, was it safe to be where
11 we were? And I believe the response from that was basically there
12 was a pause, you know, and a pause there is concern, but it was
13 still considered forward command. And then forward in command was
14 there and, at some point, command was going to be at the Borough
15 Fire Hall on Thompson Avenue. So State Police had questioned
16 whether that was safe, a safe place.

17 Q. Was anyone referring to any literature or reference
18 guide as to where to -- how far to evacuate, how far they needed
19 to pull back? Was there anything consulted to make that decision?

20 A. Not that I'm aware of, no. Whether they had them,
21 whether hazmat or the fire department has that information in
22 their cars or vehicles, I didn't see any letter for -- no, no
23 one --

24 Q. But that was discussed at the briefing?

25 A. No. No one said if, you know, you have a empty canister

1 of propane puncture and it's being released, whether, you know,
2 the standard is you need to go one mile out. No one, no.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Can I ask, at what point did they
4 determine that this is more vinyl chloride versus the LPG? When
5 did the discussion start shifting from LPG to vinyl chloride?

6 MR. RICHARDS: I think I was made aware of this -- when
7 we were first able to see the wreck is when I pretty much
8 confirmed -- and I don't know who confirmed this -- that it was
9 vinyl chloride that came out of this container and I know they
10 were able to start walking around the unit. I know I have already
11 known it was vinyl chloride because Captain Marino, when he
12 arrived he could not walk up to the unit, walk up and see the
13 scene until the atmosphere cleared up, until the atmosphere
14 cleared up.

15 BY MR. STANCIL:

16 Q. How close were you able to approach to make that
17 observation?

18 A. The first time, when it cleared the first time, I was
19 able to walk right up to the front yard of -- right to the edge of
20 the water. That's as far as I got up. I didn't go up onto the
21 bridge.

22 Q. Now, you said you saw other people up on the site, up on
23 the bridge or walking around the car?

24 A. Yeah, mostly -- I'd pretty much probably say all
25 Conrail.

1 Q. Conrail?

2 A. Yeah, and maybe Valero.

3 Q. What were they doing?

4 A. Looking, just looking around. I believe these cars -- I
5 know there was cars disconnected here, the rest of the train.
6 Once it was confirmed that it was okay to pull them out, they were
7 pulled out. But, yeah, there was people mostly walking all up in
8 here, all over here. I mean, they have boats in the water.

9 Q. Were they wearing any protective gear?

10 A. Miller Environmental was also -- Miller Environmental
11 was reached out to. Miller Environmental responded. Their
12 concern was who was going to be paying us. Where that came from,
13 I don't know, but I did hear that.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Their concern was who was paying us.

16 Q. Did any of the people that you saw on scene, were they
17 wearing any protective gear at all?

18 A. I didn't see anybody with a respirator on.

19 Q. A respirator --

20 A. No.

21 Q. -- air pack or --

22 A. No. No.

23 Q. Nothing beyond a hard hat and typical overalls?

24 A. No. We should have -- the patrol cars, I think, should
25 have some sort of mask on and, hopefully, due to this incident,

1 you know, maybe we'll be able to get some resources for that.
2 But, at this point, we don't -- we aren't usually supplied with
3 respirators.

4 Q. You mentioned a briefing with Conrail that occurred at
5 9:34. Where was that? Where did that take place? Was that at
6 the church?

7 A. In St. James Church. Is that what I said, 9:34?

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. Approximately, sometime around there. Speech, Conrail,
10 Neil Ferrone, Chief Hazmat.

11 Q. Okay. What -- can you remember what he said?

12 A. I know, in the beginning of that speech, the fire chief,
13 I believe, started off speaking, basically saying who was there,
14 what we had, cars on the water. What Neil specifically spoke
15 about I'm not, I'm not sure. I'm not positive. You know, it was
16 -- I think most of that speech was -- the only thing that's
17 sticking out to me during that speech was command post, where that
18 was going to be. That was the initial --

19 Q. Were they talking about relocating it at that point
20 or --

21 A. There was a lot of debate on where it should be. Like I
22 said, State Police, they questioned it big time if this was the
23 right place. There was a lot of people and I want to say it was
24 -- once that second smoke came in, that they said we're -- a lot
25 of people were not happy with that call in that facility. A lot

1 of people said we're out of here, and you saw people leaving. I
2 know this, Gloucester County, Jay Jones was one that said I --
3 you know, this is a -- we got to go.

4 Q. So the -- which way was the wind blowing? Was --

5 A. It shifted at one point. I believe it was blowing --
6 Paulsboro is -- in Paulsboro, north is that way, so the train
7 wreck is over here. I believe at one point the wind was blowing
8 that way. Towards the end of the day, around 5:00, the wind
9 shifted this way. It was probably a little bit before that
10 because I remembered a guy telling me the readings at one point
11 were like two or three up on top of the hill, but then when you
12 got more directly into the wind, they were as high as, I want to
13 say, 16, and I remember that's when the --

14 Q. You know, for the benefit of our recording, the wind
15 direction was going from?

16 A. The wind direction would have been shifted now south,
17 southwest --

18 Q. Southwest in the evening?

19 A. -- in towards Gibbstown, Greenwich Township --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. -- and Bridgeport.

22 Q. And that's when the cloud started moving in toward
23 Paulsboro?

24 A. At this point there was no more clouds.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. The clouds are dispersed.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. I mean, from -- the clouds pretty much dispersed early
4 morning. I mean, I would probably say by -- there was no more
5 clouds by 10:00, you know. It's pretty -- now you're dealing with
6 some smell here and there and readings.

7 Q. Was the St. James Church downwind of the derailment?

8 A. I would say at the time, no. You could see it coming in
9 towards us. I mean, I would stand -- St. James is here and I was
10 standing here. I remember watching it come towards me. So I
11 don't know -- the wind, well, it pushed at me. That's going to
12 come no matter what --

13 Q. Um-hum.

14 A. -- but I think -- I know at the end of the day, they
15 said the wind was shifted, the wind now has shifted south. So I
16 don't know if -- it really wasn't that breezy of a day, anyway.
17 If initially the wind was going to the north, I don't know. I
18 know high tide was at 2:30.

19 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

20 Q. And during the command post briefing, there was no
21 mention of any, like, safety plans, what PPE would be necessary?
22 Were there -- was anybody -- I mean, it sounds like you were --
23 there were folks who were expressing concerns about some of the
24 safety personnel on the scene?

25 A. The police -- I know as far as our police officers, our

1 concern was evacuating the immediate area. Right away, officers
2 went door to door, getting a hold of who we could get a hold of
3 and trying to get them out because we didn't know what we had,
4 what we were dealing with, what chemicals other than what we were
5 told by the conductor, what was told that was floating in the air,
6 propane. I was worried something was going to ignite.

7 Q. And following up with when you were informing the
8 residents of the evacuation, did they ask what we were exposed to?
9 Or what were you told to inform them?

10 A. I never evacuated one person only because other officers
11 were evacuating. I was told to stay with the conductor. I stayed
12 with the conductor as long as I could, until he moved those
13 engines. When I left the conductor, I went with Sergeant
14 Gilcrest. Sergeant Gilcrest was coming off of shift, so Sergeant
15 Gilcrest -- I don't know if his radio died or he didn't have his
16 radio. He didn't have his -- he was getting changed. When we
17 were coming on shift -- the call was a little after 7:00. We were
18 coming on and he's going home. Prior to him leaving, this call
19 came out. He responded with us. He did not have his radio on
20 him, so (indiscernible) call, he ran out with us, didn't have the
21 radio.

22 So when the conductor moved the car, I stayed with
23 Sergeant Gilcrest. We started walking towards -- well, the
24 wreck's here, there's a house here, the train was here, St. James
25 church here. We started walking this way towards the wreck to

1 make sure -- there was two more houses up here -- to make sure no
2 one was in there. We went to those homes, but we didn't evacuate
3 like the other officers did. They went to every other -- there
4 was only two houses up here. Our main concern at that point, we
5 were making sure that county dispatch dispatched Coast Guard,
6 State Police, the State Police Marine Unit, and any other county
7 hazmat or hazmat officials that needed to come that weren't
8 already out there. But as far as evacuating, I did not get to
9 speak to one person. And again, those two houses that we went to
10 were Gary Stevenson's wife, Raelynn, who watched the whole thing
11 from her kitchen, and her parents. Her parents were across the
12 street.

13 Q. Let me see. In terms of -- as you were experiencing
14 these medical -- you said you were coughing, choking up, or
15 anything like that, were you able to talk to anybody within the
16 department or on the scene about those -- any concerns that you
17 were having?

18 A. All of my communication I had with the department would
19 go to Sergeant Grey. It was a concern to him, concern to my
20 senior officer, Officer Zubec, as well as myself, we all
21 experienced the same congestion in the center -- and like I said,
22 you could still feel it -- the center of our chest. I know they
23 were coughing. I mean, as soon as you walk into it, it was just
24 like wait a minute. It kicks you back and it's almost like it's
25 breathtaking. End of the day, we knew we would be -- we should be

1 checked out.

2 I know a Gloucester County Sheriff's officer had told me
3 that their agency made sure that they went and got checked out.
4 Prior to me being ordered to leave, go home and get some breath
5 air, I was told that I would be evaluated today, blood and urine.
6 Whether that's enough, I don't know. I mean, from what I have
7 told, what can they do for you? It's not like they can give you a
8 pill. I don't know.

9 The sheriff officer said he went to the hospital, he was
10 evaluated, in and out within 30 minutes. He was put on a
11 breathing treatment, and that's all he pretty much told me. He
12 said he'll probably go down and give urine today. But I was told
13 initially, at the beginning of the day, it would be blood urine.
14 I'm being told now it's just a urine test. And do I feel
15 confident -- and even so, if I am -- if I do have vinyl chloride
16 in my system, am being told what can they do for you? There's not
17 much they can do for you, whether it's detrimental to your health
18 or not. Maybe in 30 years from now, but, now, what can they do
19 for you?

20 You know, I'm not very confident. I'm not very
21 confident that -- I'm told that there's doctors coming in from
22 Arkansas. Now, whose doctors are they? Are they Conrail's
23 people? I have no idea. You know, we don't know this. Should I
24 still go to the hospital at the end of this? I mean, I -- should
25 I have already been seen? I don't know. Is it my responsibility

1 to say, hey, I've got to go, I've got to leave?

2 There's only so many of us. I have responsibilities as
3 my job. You know, I can get hurt. Our job is to make sure the
4 community doesn't get hurt, but I do have a family as well. So I
5 really don't know. There's no one to really say you need to go
6 now.

7 Q. You mentioned that individuals were taking samples. Is
8 this the fire department that was doing the sampling or --

9 A. I believe. There were so many people taking samples, I
10 don't know who they were. I believe the fire department were
11 taking samples. I mean, I see people with the small rods walking
12 around. I mean, there was a ton of different agencies, from what
13 I would -- that I could recall, with -- I mean, I've seen sticks
14 that were probably 4 feet long compared to maybe, you know, 8 --
15 6, 7, 8 inches long. So who those agencies were, I don't know. I
16 mean, there were companies that I had never even recognized
17 before.

18 BY MR. STANCIL:

19 Q. What sort of hazardous materials training has been
20 provided to you by the department?

21 A. We had hazmat training in the Police Academy. We have
22 our recertification class 6 months -- every 6 months and 12
23 months. And now, with hazmat, I believe we just got -- I'm pretty
24 sure we just got the updated book, which is in my glove box, on
25 the material, but I'm not sure if hazmat is -- I want to say

1 hazmat isn't even an annual training. I want to say it's maybe
2 every -- I'm not positive. I want to say hazmat may be biennial.
3 I'm not sure, sir, you know.

4 Q. How prepared do you feel to --

5 A. I don't think you're ever going to be prepared for a
6 hazmat crises. I mean, if you're going to be prepared for a
7 hazmat crises -- I mean, if I was prepared for this scene --
8 naturally, when I'm going to arrive and I see a train conductor
9 and I see that there's something wrong, I know there's an
10 accident. I'm being told that there's cars in the water. You
11 know, I don't know that something's punctured. I don't know
12 what's in those cars. Could I have had equipment that I was
13 immediately able to grab? You know, I think, yeah, we could have
14 been better supplied there, but are you ever prepared for this? I
15 mean, I don't know. I mean, believe me, training can't help -- I
16 mean, can't not help, but --

17 Q. What was the book you mentioned? What --

18 A. It's the orange gives you --

19 Q. Emergency Response Guidebook?

20 A. -- tells you what. Like, if I want to know what this
21 is, 1987. So, say, the conductor didn't know what it was and he
22 just said, listen, alls I can tell you is 1987 and 1086 were on
23 those tankers. I could go to those books, if you had time to get
24 in your car, open the glove box, pull the book out, look for the
25 page, go to the table of contents, where's this at, go there, sit

1 there and read it for 15 minutes while, you know, 50 people are
2 out there suffocating. I mean, that's --

3 Q. Right. So that's basically not of any --

4 A. Yeah, right.

5 Q. -- use to you as a patrolman?

6 A. Yeah, that book is no use to me. I would say --
7 something useful to us would probably be being in an environment
8 with the refineries that should the refineries be reaching out to
9 us in having specific training with us on what is coming through
10 our town, what should we do. Is it always these 1015 cars coming
11 through with always, say, it has Clorox or chloride or pellet
12 chips, wood chips. Whatever it is that's coming through our town,
13 we don't know that.

14 Q. Have you ever attended any functions with the
15 railroads --

16 A. No --

17 Q. -- that they -- they provide what they call TransCare,
18 does that --

19 A. No.

20 Q. -- sound familiar to you?

21 A. Uh-uh.

22 Q. Okay. Nothing else. Do you have any questions of us?

23 A. The only thing that -- like I said, the main concern is
24 that Paulsboro itself is, I think, our department's main concern,
25 is our evacuation big enough. I would say no. Just -- I mean, I

1 don't know. If this thing were to explode, what does that mean?

2 Do you know?

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. Is 3 blocks enough?

5 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

6 Q. Let's say, at this point, the unified command with the
7 Coast Guard -- I know the first day, it tends to be a little
8 chaotic, a lot of responses. And I know currently the unified
9 command is definitely -- they have a safety plan they're
10 developing and they're -- they've been evaluating all these
11 factors in coordination with the shippers, the railroad, and the
12 fire department, and they're developing a comprehensive plan in
13 order to make sure that nothing does go wrong, that they can, you
14 know, contain what is currently -- what has been released and
15 moving forward, and that's sort of a developing process and it's
16 ongoing. But --

17 A. I mean, it's just the concerns, I guess, that what we're
18 breathing in, you know.

19 Q. Uh-huh. For --

20 A. But, you know, you throat gets -- you know, is dry at
21 one point and, I mean, your chest is congested, and you're
22 coughing. You know, what -- if you leave and go in an ambulance,
23 what do you have out here, you know? We're responsible right now.
24 So, unfortunately, that's what we're here for. But at one point
25 when is it that we're ordered? There -- you don't have a choice,

1 but you are to go to the hospital, you are to get checked out. I
2 mean, no one's saying anything to us. You know, I'm told that I
3 have till 4:00 to get a urine test. What's that mean to me? I
4 mean, I don't know.

5 MR. STANCIL: Well, it might provide some indication of
6 how severely you were exposed and whether or not some treatment is
7 appropriate.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And your occupational health specialist
9 here -- or there's an individual who's responsible for that and
10 you should be coordinating all this and also ensuring that you
11 have -- you go through the appropriate medical screening and
12 everything like that, and they'll document your exposure, and that
13 should be something -- if you don't know who that is, definitely
14 follow up to ensure you do, and they're going to be your point of
15 contact within the department --

16 MR. RICHARDS: Okay.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- to ensure that these concerns -- and
18 that's actually even beyond just this incident. If you have
19 safety concerns about exposures, hazmat, other things like that,
20 it's definitely something to highlight --

21 MR. RICHARDS: Right.

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- with regards to your worker -- the
23 worker safety, so --

24 MR. STANCIL: Yeah, you do need to document your --

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: You do need --

1 MR. STANCIL: -- your exposures --

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah, um-hum.

3 MR. STANCIL: -- in the event that something happens
4 down the line where you --

5 MR. RICHARDS: A small child, I mean, in your
6 experience, would you be around her?

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: I actually have right here --

8 MR. RICHARDS: Would you have a small child --

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: I know.

10 MR. RICHARDS: Let me ask you this. Would you have your
11 small child right now? I live approximately -- exactly 1 mile
12 from this police department. Would you have your small child at
13 home right now or would you get her out of here?

14 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: I mean, as I said, these are tough
15 questions --

16 MR. RICHARDS: Yeah.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: -- I mean, absolutely, and I completely
18 understand.

19 MR. RICHARDS: And I ask you to answer that question.

20 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. I --

21 MR. RICHARDS: What should they be telling me?

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah.

23 MR. RICHARDS: We recommend -- we don't have to, but we
24 recommend up to this point. I mean, this what -- we're aren't
25 demanding that you evacuate, but this is what we recommend, but --

1 MR. STANCIL: Make yourself a copy of this.

2 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah. I have some information, once we
3 go off, on -- I can share with you regarding vinyl chloride and
4 some of the other issues and, definitely, before we --

5 MR. RICHARDS: Make a copy and just bring this back to
6 you?

7 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Oh --

8 MR. STANCIL: Yeah.

9 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah, you can hold on to that.

10 MR. STANCIL: All right. Well, unless there's anything
11 else, we're going to go ahead and terminate the interview for now.
12 And it's 2:16 p.m. --

13 MR. RICHARDS: All right.

14 MR. STANCIL: -- and that'll be it. Thank you very
15 much.

16 MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.

17 (Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: RAILROAD ACCIDENT/CHEMICAL SPILL
 NOVEMBER 30, 2012
 PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY
 Interview of Rodney Richards

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-13-MR-002

PLACE: Paulsboro, New Jersey

DATE: December 1, 2012

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Karen M. Galvez
Transcriber