

DCA13MR002
Conrail - Shared Assets
Derailment/Hazardous Material Release
Paulsboro, New Jersey
November 30, 2012

NTSB - Interview of Gloucester County Lieutenant and Shift Supervisor for 911

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS

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MATERIAL RELEASE

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Docket No.: DCA-13-MR-002

PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY

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NOVEMBER 30, 2012

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Interview of: JIM HAUCK

Gloucester County Emergency Response
1200 North Delsea Drive
Clayton, New Jersey

Thursday,
January 31, 2013

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI
Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI, Accident Investigator
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
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PAUL L. STANCIL, Senior Accident Investigator
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I N T E R V I E W

(11:13 a.m.)

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3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: This is Muhamed El-Zoghbi, a Hazardous
4 Materials Accident Investigator with the National Transportation
5 Safety Board. Today is January 31, 2013. It is currently 11:13,
6 or so, a.m. We are at the Gloucester County Emergency Management
7 Department offices. We are in one of the conference rooms that
8 they provided for us to conduct interviews related to the
9 Paulsboro, New Jersey derailment that occurred on November 30,
10 2012.

11 And, we'll start off with going around the room and
12 introducing ourselves.

13 MR. HAUCK: My name is Jim Hauck. For Gloucester
14 County, I am a lieutenant shift supervisor for 911 and my actual
15 civil service title is Senior Public Safety Telecommunicator.
16 I've been here 23 years and a little over 30 years in the fire
17 department.

18 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Great.

19 MR. STANCIL: My name is Paul Stancil. I'm a Hazardous
20 Materials Accident Investigator with the National Transportation
21 Safety Board.

INTERVIEW OF JIM HAUCK

22
23 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

24 Q. Mr. Hauck, if you could elaborate a little more on your
25 hazmat experience and your position here?

1 A. How I got into hazmat is back in the military. I am a
2 graduate from the U.S. Army Chemical School back in 1984. I was
3 in the military for 5 years, and that gave me somewhat of a basic
4 background of how to do things. It's a lot different from
5 military world versus the civilian world but, you know. And then
6 when the chance arose for the county to do a hazmat team, I just
7 jumped on board and I've been with them ever since.

8 I'm a part of the assessment team, meaning that we're
9 the first one to go out on any type of pages and then we go assess
10 what needs to be done and then we decide to the level that we're
11 going to respond to. The way the chain of command works though is
12 I'm more in a support role within the assessment, and there are
13 other people above me that make the decision of how we're going to
14 respond and what we're going to do.

15 Q. Excellent. I'd like to discuss the events of November
16 30, 2012. If you could, in your own words, describe to us your
17 involvement and your observations of that day.

18 A. Okay. On that particular day, I had arrived at the Fire
19 Academy, was there for my last day of my communications tech
20 class. Myself and another student, we were actually pulled out of
21 the class because we're both hazmat techs. So we were pulled out
22 of the class. They did our vitals and they said you need to go to
23 Paulsboro to staging. Got at the staging. That was after trying
24 to get through traffic and the traffic and the fog and everything
25 else, and the officers just trying to figure out what in the world

1 to do and where to send people. So we finally arrived at staging,
2 and we see all these people that are lined up against the
3 building, and apparently they were the ones that were initially in
4 the plume. And nobody was talking to them or nobody knew exactly
5 what to do with them or how to actually go and say, do we need to
6 decon them, do we need to strip them, do we need to do whatever?

7 Q. Uh-huh.

8 A. So there was a lot of confusion that was going on over
9 there. And I'm like, EMS was over there and the ambulance was
10 there, the ambulance was checking them, so we just stayed away
11 from that area.

12 As the day progressed, the first representatives I spoke
13 to were DuPont. They showed up on the scene and said, hey, we're
14 DuPont, we think we can help you with this. I reached out to a
15 person that I knew was in the command post. Unfortunately, he
16 never answered, so we ended up having to call on the radio, and
17 then we told the DuPont people where the command post was and we
18 sent them up.

19 A little while later, representatives from a company
20 called PolyOne, which this was their product, actually showed upon
21 on scene, and they're like, hey, we have four meters; we can help
22 you with this; it's our product. They needed two of our techs.
23 So we called the command post again and the command post said,
24 fine, bring them up, and we also brought two techs, myself and
25 another gentleman.

1 So we were in the command post for the last half of the
2 briefing. They talked with the PolyOne folks. I was told to
3 bring hazmat and CBRNE to the scene, and after the briefing was
4 done, myself and Bob from county hazmat actually went with the
5 PolyOne group and we just walked around.

6 I started over in West Deptford at Crown Point and
7 Natural Grove by the trailer park there and where the utilities
8 authority is, and we actually walked back towards the incident
9 scene, just doing metering and monitoring, one, basically to
10 appease West Deptford because they were concerned of how close the
11 trailer park was and the utilities authority. So we just walked
12 with both of us going toward Paulsboro and then walked down
13 Commerce Street towards the incident. We did metering and
14 monitoring, you know, on both sides, you know, on the marine
15 terminal side as well as on the residential side.

16 Later on that day, the PolyOne guys were like, we're
17 leaving, you guys can hold onto our meters, just, you know, just
18 give us a call later on. They did touch base with me throughout
19 the day because I had their cell phone number and, you know, we
20 talked and we told them what was going on and what was the plan of
21 action and what was going on.

22 Later on in the day after that, getting closer to the
23 evening hours, it seemed like the semblance of order was getting
24 better. They started the controlled access point. They started
25 the water curtain. There was a lot of confusion as far as that

1 end of it, you know. When -- my wife's a police officer. So she
2 has the analogy of if she can't see the hazmat incident through
3 the hole of a donut, she's way too close. I told her from the
4 hazmat tech side, I'm supposed to be inside that donut, you know.
5 But one of my impressions initially was the command post was
6 basically adjacent to the train wreck.

7 Q. Uh-huh.

8 A. And I'm like we're all here. The thing is off-gassing,
9 you know, whatever the parts per million and wherever the level of
10 response is, I really don't think we should have been there, but
11 it's not my call, you know. Speaking with the PolyOne guys, you
12 know, they were like, well, watch your meter, if it stays at this
13 and it's consistent, then we have a problem. You know, with the
14 wind gusts, we were raising the levels but after the wind gust was
15 done, the levels would go back down to zero. So they weren't
16 really concerned as far as, you know, that end or rather that
17 aspect of it.

18 And then, like I said, you know, later on in the day,
19 they did the controlled access point and then they went through
20 telling the Conrail to actually leave the area because they were
21 still working, you know, with the initial train derailment. They
22 were still up there working and doing their own stuff, walking up
23 to the train and everything else. I'm like, I think somebody
24 should be telling them no, but that's not my place.

25 So -- and then we just sat around and waited. You know,

1 we waited for some type of instruction and what else we were going
2 to do next, what was going to be the operational period, what was
3 going to be our roles and responsibilities from that point
4 forward. Is it just metering and monitoring? You know, was it
5 just going to be just kind of a support role? Because we're
6 taught as a county hazmat team, we are a support function of
7 whoever calls us. We advise them of what we think they should do
8 but it's their call to make what they're going to do.

9 BY MR. STANCIL:

10 Q. Okay. So when you got on scene, was there any
11 establishment of a hot zone or delineation of a standoff area?

12 A. Of the actual scene itself?

13 Q. Yes, sir.

14 A. No. We had people that were just walking all -- and
15 Gary Stevenson, where his house was right there. We had people
16 that were just coming up that little street there and walking
17 right up to his house and walking down through the waterway. You
18 know, there was a police officer that was standing at the edge of
19 the driveway, but he wasn't like stopping anybody or challenging
20 anybody or anything like that.

21 Q. So what do you think about that situation?

22 A. I was comfortable in the fact that I had the PolyOne
23 guys with me and they're telling me we're okay, but I think to the
24 normal layperson, they should have been concerned because they
25 don't know. There should have been more of a controlled access

1 point either from the driveway as well as from the railroad tracks
2 but that just didn't happen. But it's also a support function
3 where I go, hey, I think, but it's their call to make.

4 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

5 Q. What time was PolyVinyl, what time were they on the
6 scene? Do you recall?

7 A. Yeah, because actually I have it on tape of when they
8 got there. DuPont got on location at 9:23. I got to the command
9 post at 10:00. At 10:05 I was told to bring the hazmat team to
10 the scene. So I was just coming from staging to there. So
11 somewhere between 9:30, 9:45-ish.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Because like I said, we sent the DuPont reps to the
14 command post at 9:25, and they were shortly after, and I showed up
15 at the command post right around 10:00.

16 Q. And were these monitors vinyl chloride specific?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are they PIDs with -- or do you know what type of
19 instrumentation they were?

20 A. I think they were PID but, you know, it was handheld,
21 had a wand. I believe they're PID.

22 Q. And what levels did they say were safe?

23 A. He said that the parts per million is a 1 but it's
24 consistent over an 8 hour, you know, as the work hour. But he
25 said -- I would get a 40 and down to a 0, you know. He's like

1 unless it stays consistent, we really don't have an issue, you
2 know, but -- and that's kind of -- I felt -- because it's his
3 product, I felt comfortability with him of him telling me that.

4 Q. What type of readings -- so you said you were getting --

5 A. I was getting 40, you know. It depended on how strong
6 the wind gust was as far as the higher the numbers went, you know.
7 I was getting them -- I don't know if you were actually at the
8 scene --

9 Q. Uh-huh.

10 A. -- but there was -- there's Gary's house. There was a
11 flagpole. Well, when the winds shifted where it was coming across
12 the tank and towards that area, I would get the rise then. But
13 when I was -- in the morning, I was actually able to get waterway
14 closer to the tank and I wasn't getting anything but there also
15 wasn't any wind. The wind was coming the other way, you know. So
16 it was blowing towards the marina.

17 Q. Uh-huh.

18 A. And that area had already been evacuated and the
19 employees were moved. Those were the employees that were down at
20 Ames.

21 I know there's a picture of me holding the meter because
22 they were asking me whose meter is that, and I'm like that's
23 PolyOne's, you know. So I know that, you know, there's a picture,
24 if you need to actually see it, I know they have one that exists.

25 Q. Okay.

1 BY MR. STANCIL

2 Q. How were you reporting the readings you were getting?

3 A. I was just reporting them to the PolyOne gentleman.

4 Q. Was he forwarding that information to anyone?

5 A. They were talking to somebody on the phone, but I
6 honestly don't know who they were talking to.

7 Q. Was your information getting to the incident commander?

8 A. That part I don't know. Like I said, I was talking with
9 him. I don't know who he had on the phone. I know when -- back
10 in the command post, when they got there -- we got there for about
11 the second half, maybe the last quarter of the debrief that was
12 going on for what the incident -- what was going to be the plan.
13 There was two or three people that came over to them and were
14 talking to them, but I wasn't part of that conversation. So I
15 don't know what was actually -- you know, hey, call me, you know,
16 here's my number, I don't know.

17 Q. What was the purpose, as you saw it, for the air
18 monitoring that you were doing?

19 A. Just to kind of get levels, see where we're at, you
20 know, if it's going to be something where we actually have to do a
21 vapor suppression. Is it somewhere where we need to actually
22 establish a safe zone, you know, that kind of stuff. But like I
23 said, that stuff didn't happen until later as far as the actual
24 response to that.

25 Q. Were there any decisions made as a result of the numbers

1 you were getting?

2 A. No. No.

3 Q. And how close were you to the accident scene when you
4 were monitoring? I remember you said on the marine terminal and
5 the residential side. So --

6 A. Yeah, I mean, I was -- on Gary Stevenson's side, I was
7 at the waterway because obviously I can't get across the water.
8 You know, I was at the waterway. I was down on the dock.

9 On the railroad track side, I was actually up at the
10 tracks. I was up against where the car that was carrying the wood
11 pellets and stuff were?

12 Q. Uh-huh.

13 A. Just a little bit past there.

14 Q. Is that where you were getting the highest readings?

15 A. No. I was getting the high readings on the wind gusts
16 and that was standing at the flagpole.

17 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

18 Q. I'm producing sort of a map of the location, and this is
19 St. James Church and this is Gary Stevenson's house and that's
20 where the derailment was --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. -- right here. So you say you were taking readings back
23 here?

24 A. Yeah, I was over here at the flagpole.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. There was one of your co-workers from NTSB that said
2 what are you getting as a level, and I was like I just got a wind
3 gust and it was showing like 50. He's like, well, the response is
4 1. I'm like -- and I wasn't going to have a debate with him about
5 it, but I was like, well, isn't that 1 over an 8-hour period
6 because it's TLVs? And he's just like the response is 1. Leave
7 it at 1. I'm like okay.

8 So and then the next thing you know, they started
9 cordoning off the area and we went from there. But I mean I was
10 in this area. I had gone around here. I was actually behind here
11 at the railcars, and I actually started over here and walked all
12 this.

13 Q. Oh, across Route 44?

14 A. Yeah. Down over here is utilities authority and down
15 over here is a trailer park, and they were concerned as far as
16 vapors heading this way.

17 Q. Okay. And is that generally, the wind direction, was it
18 heading down towards Route 44 --

19 A. In the morning, yeah.

20 Q. -- in the morning?

21 A. And then it kind of shifted over this way and it was
22 coming across.

23 Q. Okay. And were you getting any --

24 A. I got nothing.

25 Q. -- signal here? No readings --

1 A. No readings at all.

2 Q. -- on either side? How about when you were coming
3 across Route 44?

4 A. No, we didn't get anything. I mean, we walked all the
5 way down Route 44 across the bridge and then back down Commerce.
6 You know, it wasn't until -- I mean, we got some stuff over at
7 Ziggy's Boat Yard, you know, when the winds came and shifted a
8 little bit, but it wasn't anything that was, you know, the PolyOne
9 guy wasn't worried about.

10 Q. Okay. You said when the winds were occurring --

11 A. Because the winds were out of this direction --

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. -- and they shifted and it came around this direction.

14 Q. And when you were doing that, your meter would detect --

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. -- about 40 parts per millions or so --

17 A. Yeah.

18 Q. -- and then it would drop --

19 A. And then it would just drop back down to zero.

20 Q. -- back down to zero?

21 A. Yeah.

22 BY MR. STANCIL:

23 Q. You said there was another tech also doing monitoring.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Were they with you or in a different location?

1 A. They were in a different area.

2 Q. What sort of data were they collecting?

3 A. Bob and Otis, I don't know exactly what they were doing.
4 I know what they were doing, but I don't know the area where they
5 were walking.

6 Q. And similarly, they were providing the information to
7 the Oxy representative who was telephoning the data to someone?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I just don't know who that someone was.

11 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

12 Q. And so you -- nobody was reporting those to your -- is
13 it Pat Dolgos who is the team lieutenant there at the time?

14 A. Pat was there in the EOC and Jay Jones was there in the
15 EOC.

16 Q. But you're not aware that that information was
17 particularly relayed over to them?

18 A. That I don't know. I don't know if it -- you know, I
19 don't know who, one, they talked to and if that actually got back
20 to Pat.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I know when I saw Pat at certain points of the day, I
23 would tell him what my readings were, and then when the PolyOne
24 guys left, I had called or they had stopped over to see me going,
25 hey, what's your readings now? What are you getting?

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. You know, but that was when I was just staying in the
3 area of Gary Stevenson's front yard and the flag post at that
4 point because everything over here, there were just so much people
5 that were up here and, you know. There was cars and people just
6 walking all over the place.

7 Q. So you'd say that PolyVinyl didn't really -- wasn't
8 alarmed by any of the readings --

9 A. No.

10 Q. -- or weren't disturbed by that?

11 A. No.

12 Q. And didn't provide any guidance?

13 A. Yeah, I mean, I asked them, I'm like do I need to bring
14 my mask and they're like no.

15 Q. Okay.

16 Q. Did you attend -- you said you arrived towards the end
17 of the briefing?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you recall what was being discussed in that briefing
20 at all?

21 A. CSX was there as far as police. There was somebody
22 there from CSX hazmat. I believe LoBiondo was there. I know
23 Paulsboro's fire chief, emergency management, county OEM, they
24 were all in there and it was kind of -- they were trying to figure
25 out, you know, who's going to do what, what was going to happen,

1 you know, when the next briefing was going to be, who was going to
2 talk to the press, that kind of stuff.

3 Q. Uh-huh. But there was no discussion of monitoring
4 results or --

5 A. I know Valero was already there so I'm sure that they
6 were already doing monitoring --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- but I don't know what their, you know, levels were or
9 what was reported or documented, because Valero was actually --
10 they were on Commerce. This is Gary's house.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. Valero was parked like right here. They actually had a
13 fire apparatus and people that there sitting, and they had meters
14 and all, and they were there well before we even got into
15 Paulsboro.

16 Q. Okay. And none of their -- do you recall meeting an
17 industrial hygienist or anything like that coming in and reporting
18 any numbers in the church?

19 A. No.

20 Q. No? Okay.

21 A. You know, I was probably there for like the last 10
22 minutes of the meeting so I don't know what discussed prior to
23 that.

24 Q. Absolutely. No, I understand. Did you have any
25 interaction with the Paulsboro Refinery team? Did they discuss

1 any readings or anything of their --

2 A. I would assume that they would, and I know how assume
3 can be, but I would think that they would have talked to Pat since
4 he was the CBRNE rep for the county, but I didn't actually have
5 any interaction.

6 Q. All right. Okay.

7 BY MR. STANCIL:

8 Q. Was there any problems with the equipment that was on
9 the CBRNE truck?

10 A. We were told -- I didn't actually go and grab one
11 because, like I said, I had my meter from PolyOne, but I was told
12 that the meters were dead. But we have -- through our training,
13 we're told, you know, there's batteries in there and there's
14 additional ways of getting the meters up and running; you know, we
15 know where they are. So I can't explain why they didn't do that.

16 Q. Okay. So you had the -- the PolyOne tech was there
17 before you even needed the --

18 A. Oh, yeah.

19 Q. Okay. Okay.

20 MR. STANCIL: Anything else?

21 BY EL-ZOGHBI:

22 Q. I was going to say, how long did you conduct the
23 monitoring for again?

24 A. I was there until they told us, okay, go home that
25 night.

1 Q. Uh-huh.

2 A. You know, they had me -- later on in the night as it got
3 dark, they had me walking down here and just doing some
4 monitoring, and this was just local monitoring with me and the
5 fire department and the guy who was in the command vehicle that
6 was right about here. And they were concerned because my meter
7 had been running all day that I possibly had a saturation issue,
8 and I'm like I don't know, you know. I took it and I walked down
9 this way into what I considered to be a clean area, turned it off,
10 purged it, and restarted it again, you know. But, you know, it
11 was just one of those -- we had two meters from them and we had
12 them until that weekend, but we only used them that particular
13 day.

14 Q. Okay. And how late into the evening were you still
15 getting these spikes? Was that sort of consistent throughout the
16 day as winds would pick up, you'd get these spikes of 40 or so
17 parts per million, or was it you could just sort of --

18 A. As they started to get -- and I carefully say this,
19 their rack together --

20 Q. Uh-huh.

21 A. -- and one of the guys was walking down the tracks going
22 this way, he's like, look, my levels are staying high; they're not
23 going down. Is when they were like, okay, well, we need to cordon
24 off this area and then start working our way to what's going to be
25 the actual evacuation zone. I was monitoring, you know, until

1 that night when they said, okay, we're done.

2 Q. When was that when they started getting consistent
3 readings?

4 A. It was still daylight but later in the evening. I want
5 to say it was probably around 4:30, 5:00 maybe.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Yeah, that would be about right.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Then that was one of the Washington Township guys that
10 were saying, hey, I'm still getting readings and they're coming
11 out this way.

12 Q. Were you getting any input from -- I know that some of
13 your other team members were augmenting, I guess, Paulsboro Fire
14 to do some grid monitoring of the area. Were you hearing any of
15 the numbers they were getting?

16 A. No, the only thing after we started the water curtain,
17 we were just being told that, okay, we're going to send in a tech
18 and a backup every so often and we were going in to do metering of
19 vapor, you know, just to get an idea of what was left --

20 Q. Uh-huh.

21 A. -- and then we were reporting back. But other than
22 that, I didn't get any numbers of what was being done as far as
23 grid monitoring.

24 Q. Okay. So would you say -- I mean, I guess you had
25 concerns, you expressed, when you first arrived, you know,

1 proximity to the location.

2 A. Well, my concern initially was like, okay, I'm -- other
3 than trying to get there, because it was just -- you know,
4 everybody else was trying to go out and the police were doing
5 their controlled access. It was like, okay, one, what am I
6 driving in? I don't know if I'm truly driving in fog or am I
7 driving in vapors that are coming off the railroad car?

8 Q. Uh-huh.

9 A. You know, we weren't actually told this is how to travel
10 into Paulsboro to get around it. We were just told, get to
11 Paulsboro. So that was a concern. You know, which way the wind
12 direction was, you know, were we in the proper staging area? You
13 know, should the staging area have been somewhere else?

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. The command post definitely was a concern because, like
16 I said, it's right there. But those are all things like, okay,
17 yeah, you have thoughts about them, but I have to rely on the
18 people that are going, "We're fine."

19 Q. So who are the folks who told you it's fine? I mean,
20 you said PolyVinyl seemed to --

21 A. PolyVinyl, when I got my meter in there, and they're
22 like, if it stays at 1-hour levels, then we've got to worry about
23 it. I'm like, okay. But as far as the actual staging and who
24 called for the staging, that I don't know. And as far as who
25 called for the command post to be right there, I had lots of

1 concern about that one, but, you know, that -- if I was anything,
2 I would have taken the command post and put it back over in this
3 area. You know, you just take Commerce and Broad and just say,
4 okay, nothing down this way and just put it over there or at the
5 firehouse, to initially start out, because you don't know how big
6 that incident's going to get.

7 Q. Uh-huh. Okay.

8 MR. STANCIL: I have nothing else.

9 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

10 Q. Now, do you have anything else that you think we should
11 be aware of that you want to share with us regarding the
12 activities that day or concerns?

13 A. My concern about the command post and where it was
14 initially. I know later on in the day, they're like, okay, East
15 Greenwich is open and everybody's going back there and Coast Guard
16 is taking jurisdiction. And I think there was some -- because of
17 it being over a waterway and that whole thing of going, okay,
18 we're jurisdiction, everything has to go through us, I think there
19 was some confusion in that way as far as like, okay, so does that
20 mean we're limited or we have to get further approval to do
21 something? And those are things that me, as the worker, I know I
22 really don't have to worry about that because I'm just told, okay,
23 this is what you do and this is your job assignment, you know.
24 But I'm sure, you know, from me the assessment side or me as a
25 supervisor side, like, you know, that interaction, how -- you

1 know, I'd like to learn more and want to know exactly how that's
2 supposed to work.

3 Q. Uh-huh.

4 A. This way I learn from that and maybe if I'm in that role
5 next time, I'd get an idea of like, okay, this is what I'm
6 supposed to do or this is what I'm supposed to ask.

7 Q. Uh-huh.

8 A. There was concerns as far as from me from the response
9 side. When we got done that night, we were told, okay, everybody
10 goes back to Clarksboro. Everybody was worried about being in the
11 so-called exposure area for a prolonged amount of time, and the
12 Washington Township Fire guys were all told, well, we're going
13 back and getting tested now.

14 The county people were told you're not being tested
15 until the county approves you being tested, so -- and as luck
16 would have it, a couple of days later, I got, okay, go get tested.
17 Unfortunately, somehow or other, my urine sample broke in the
18 plastic baggie in the cooler and they said they couldn't sample
19 it, so I had to get a whole new physical. I don't understand how
20 it breaks but --

21 Q. Would you say, are there any lessons learned from your
22 perspective about this incident?

23 A. As far as from me personally?

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 A. I think that some initial intelligence of like, okay,

1 you know, for the hazmat tech group, Ames is going to be over
2 here. We want you guys to access from this area because the rest
3 of Paulsboro was just so congested, we're trying to get that way.
4 You know, knowing, you know, more of that type of intelligence, of
5 how to get there or knowing more about the product -- yeah, I got
6 the product information from the PolyOne guys and, yeah, we have
7 manuals and stuff that are on the truck and we have research
8 material and that kind of stuff. But by the time the truck had
9 got there, PolyOne was already there, so I already knew what was
10 going on.

11 But I think from the other guys that were antsy and
12 going, well, we don't know what we're dealing with -- it's there,
13 it's just that we kind of just didn't have that information as far
14 as to say this is what it is or this is the code we're to use to
15 get to look up the information. So I think they were more
16 concerned as far as that end and not knowing.

17 Q. Knowing what you now about the incident, do you feel
18 that, you know, PolyVinyl was perhaps too comfortable with the
19 situation? Do you think you would have wanted something different
20 in terms of their response or --

21 A. I think from their aspect, because they know the
22 chemical, they anticipate to be comfortable with it. You know,
23 they know their working environment in it, and I think that they
24 were doing that to reassure us to say, you know, you guys are
25 okay, you know.

1 Q. Uh-huh. Do you feel that you were okay --

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. -- at this point?

4 A. Yeah. I mean, walking around with these guys, I felt
5 fine, you know. There wasn't -- I wasn't feeling antsy or pressed
6 or anything like that. You know, the guy was forthcoming and, you
7 know, he was like this is what it is and this is how it works and
8 that kind of stuff, so --

9 Q. Okay.

10 MR. STANCIL: Good.

11 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Excellent. Well, if that's all you have
12 to share with us and we don't have any further questions, we will
13 terminate the interview at -- it's currently 11:43 a.m. Thank
14 you.

15 (Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS
 MATERIAL RELEASE
 PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY
 NOVEMBER 30, 2012
 Interview of Jim Hauck

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-13-MR-002

PLACE: Clayton, New Jersey

DATE: January 31, 2013

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Kathryn A. Mirfin
Transcriber