

DCA13MR002
Conrail - Shared Assets
Derailment/Hazardous Material Release
Paulsboro, New Jersey
November 30, 2012

NTSB - Interview of Gloucester County Emergency Response Technician

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of:

*

*

CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS

*

MATERIAL RELEASE

*

Docket No.: DCA-13-MR-002

PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY

*

NOVEMBER 30, 2012

*

*

* * * * *

Interview of: ANDREW HALTER

Gloucester County Emergency Response
1200 N. Delsea Drive
Clayton, New Jersey

Thursday,
January 31, 2013

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI
Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

MUHAMED EL-ZOGHBI, Accident Investigator
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594

** PII **

** PII **

PAUL L. STANCIL, Senior Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Investigations
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594

** PII **

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Andrew Halter:		
By Mr. El-Zoghbi		4
By Mr. Stancil		18
By Mr. El-Zoghbi		20
By Mr. Stancil		23
By Mr. El-Zoghbi		23

I N T E R V I E W

(10:10 a.m.)

1
2
3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: This is Muhamed El-Zoghbi, a Hazardous
4 Materials Accident Investigator with the National Transportation
5 Safety Board. Today is January 31st, 2013. We are at the
6 Gloucester County Emergency Management Department offices in a
7 conference room conducting an interview related to the Paulsboro,
8 New Jersey derailment that occurred on November 30th, 2012. It is
9 currently 10:10 a.m.

10 And we'll start off with going around the room. Please
11 introduce yourself.

12 MR. HALTER: My name is Andrew Halter from Gloucester
13 County Emergency Response.

14 MR. STANCIL: Paul Stancil. I'm a Hazardous Materials
15 Accident Investigator with the National Transportation Safety
16 Board.

INTERVIEW OF ANDREW HALTER

BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

18 Q. Mr. Halter, if you could describe to us your experience
19 with hazardous materials and your responsibilities with the county
20 emergency management?
21

22 A. Sure, I'm a technician on our team. I support the team
23 in any kind of aspect or functionality that we need to do when we
24 have incidents, whatever that may be. You know, I report -- or I
25 adhere to whatever the command is advising me to do at that time.

1 Obviously they would change depending upon the incident that's at
2 hand. And pretty much that's how each incident goes. You just,
3 you know, you go to the incident and whatever the command is
4 asking for at that time, you just kind of follow suit accordingly.

5 Q. What level of hazmat are you trained to?

6 A. Technician level.

7 Q. Technician level?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. Excellent. Now, I'd like to take us to November
10 30th, 2012 and the Paulsboro derailment. And if you -- in your
11 own words, could you just describe to us your involvement with the
12 derailment and the incident response, as well as any observations
13 that you had that day?

14 A. Okay. From the beginning, like I said, we were
15 dispatched into the call for our hazardous materials team to
16 respond in. We initially report to a staging area for whatever
17 the call may be. We have a couple of them designated in the
18 county. And then from that staging area we would maybe go on to a
19 secondary staging area or to the incident, depending on what's
20 appropriate.

21 That particular day we reported to one of our staging
22 areas, which was the Fire Academy in Clarksboro, and from there
23 there was a check-in process there, some medical monitoring, a
24 quick baseline of vitals and such. And then from there we went on
25 to -- well, we were told to go for our staging area in Paulsboro,

1 in the borough.

2 From in there, that's where the team met up. And at
3 that point it was pretty unclear what we had, what the involvement
4 is besides just hearing some radio traffic. And, you know, you
5 can kind of get a decent picture listening to the radio what's
6 going on from some of the other response personnel, firefighters
7 and such that were on scene. So you kind of put it together like
8 that. Not really knowing what's in the cars and so forth like
9 that, that was some, you know, some areas of question that, you
10 know, we had not knowing exactly what we were getting into at that
11 point. But, you know, there was information coming into us.

12 So while we were in this other staging area it was, it
13 was then told to us that we were going to have some personnel of
14 some type of a company that was directly involved in the incident,
15 contaminated per se, and they were going to be coming over to our
16 location to be, you know, either (a) monitored, deconned, whatever
17 was necessary, treated, transported to a hospital if appropriate.

18 At that point, from the area where we were, we set up
19 the medical station there for anybody that had to be deconned.

20 Q. Uh-huh.

21 A. Our unit that's responsible for the decontamination side
22 put up the showers and such, whatever we were going to need. And
23 we provided, you know, the appropriate after-clothing for the
24 gentlemen as well. And that's one of these, these -- I believe
25 they were contractors from an outside agency. I don't know what

1 their involvement was prior to the incident, but they were
2 contractors that were supposedly directly affected in the cloud,
3 in the cloud or in the field.

4 And I want to say there was somewhere in the area, I'm
5 going to estimate, maybe a dozen or dozen, dozen and a half
6 members from this outside company. And they all had varying
7 levels of complaints to -- some to extremely minor to others of,
8 you know, respiratory distress, acute -- some had dissipated but a
9 lot of them were affected in that field from where they were.

10 At that time, you know, we segregated them into, you
11 know, the ones that were directly affected the most and so forth
12 and the ones that really weren't involved in the cloud as much as
13 they thought. It was an understanding from their safety manager
14 that all of them had to come over and at least be looked at and
15 questioned and evaluated.

16 At that point the ones that were complaining of the most
17 distress and so forth, the ones that were all in there, they were
18 all -- went through the decon process. You know, they were
19 monitored and then, I believe, sent to a hospital for further
20 evaluation.

21 From there we staged there for a while longer just
22 awaiting word of what was to take place next. Other members of
23 the team arrived, you know, accordingly. And then it was after
24 that point is when we got sent into the scene closer to the hot
25 zone area for further orders at that point for further testing or

1 whatever was necessary.

2 When we got into the scene there, we were staged along
3 near the site, along Mantua Avenue, I believe it's called --
4 Commerce Street. I guess it's the same road. And that's where
5 one of the staging areas we had took place. And at that point,
6 for my role, my aspect of the team, it was just pretty much wait
7 on -- for other orders, what was necessary. If this was -- there
8 was a lot of other, I would say agencies and companies it seemed
9 like, milling about the scene at that point doing whatever they're
10 supposed to be doing also. And we were just there in any type of
11 support aspect or functionality that we could provide to them as
12 far as any type of metering or monitoring, things like that. And
13 pretty much just -- to me it seemed like we were just awaiting
14 some bigger units and obviously some clean-up companies and to see
15 what, if anything, was going to be our responsibility at that
16 point from the Gloucester County hazmat.

17 So, yeah, we were staged in that area pretty much for
18 the rest of that day. I didn't leave that area until
19 approximately 2200 hours that evening. So that was from the early
20 morning hours of -- you know, from 9:00 on, we'll say, 9 a.m. on.
21 And that's the area that we were, that we were directly at the
22 entire time.

23 From -- on my side, there was not much that we, that we
24 were asked to do. There was a lot of waiting around, which is
25 sometimes very typical of incidents, large incidents and things

1 like that. We also assisted other units and other agencies with
2 monitoring, so it was more so would be their support. We would go
3 out in teams of two or three and do some monitoring in the, in the
4 direct area, a few block radius. Some of those were the team
5 members from the Paulsboro Refinery. They were, they were at that
6 site prior to my arrival, prior to the group that I came over
7 with; they were already there. So we assisted some of those folks
8 in the monitoring that they were doing and, you know, just
9 reporting back and things like that. And that's pretty much how
10 that day took place for us. It was kind of waiting around to see
11 what was necessary.

12 Later on in the -- towards the evening hours, we did
13 make some, what I would call some entries into the hot zone area.
14 We were flowing some water and so forth, assisting with keeping
15 some of the vapors down and whatnot and any type of other
16 flammability issues or hazardous toxic issues that there may have
17 been. So we were, you know, down at the site along the creek bed
18 assisting with that.

19 And that -- like I said, I don't know the exact times
20 offhand but I do know it was later into the day. And that was one
21 of the first times really that we had -- the group that I was
22 with, anyway, had direct involvement, it seemed like more so of a
23 more defensive attack on or defensive operation of what was going
24 on.

25 Q. If you could elaborate a little more on the period --

1 about the period when you first arrived to -- on Commerce Street?

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. And what were you tasked with? Also you mentioned that
4 there was air monitoring. If you could you just elaborate a
5 little more on, on those activities?

6 A. Like I said, there wasn't -- there was nothing in
7 particular at the very initial stage that we were tasked with.
8 And, like I said, that is typical sometimes. It's, you know,
9 await your orders and things like that. So one of the first
10 things that we were tasked with is, like I said, was the air
11 monitoring, along with the other folks from -- you know, with
12 Paulsboro, or the refinery hazmat technicians and so forth who
13 were there.

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. And we got partnered up with them.

16 Q. How did that process develop? I mean, was it typical to
17 -- for you to partner up with them or do you normally show up with
18 your own capabilities and --

19 A. Yeah, we would show up with our own capabilities. Other
20 times, like I said, when incidents are larger such as something
21 like that -- you know, we can handle small incidents and things
22 like that and then when there's something larger you're going to
23 get extra help from outside agencies as well. And that was one of
24 the things, you know, when they were there we -- they were going
25 to begin some of the monitoring from our folks and things like

1 that, and then there were other guys there and then we just kind
2 of ended up joining up with them. And that, that could be typical
3 depending upon the situation. That's, that's, from past
4 experience, kind of depending on what is necessary and what is
5 needed.

6 But, yeah, that was -- it was -- you know, you follow
7 the command structure of whoever was -- the gentleman that was in
8 charge there that day, you know, asked what was needed and would
9 come back to us -- as he's reporting back to the command, the
10 Incident Command.

11 Q. Uh-huh.

12 A. And that's, and that's when we were given our orders as
13 to what type of monitoring was needed and so forth like that.

14 Q. Did you accompany the Paulsboro Refinery team's
15 conducting some of the monitoring?

16 A. I did accompany at one point, yes.

17 Q. What type of monitoring were you performing or was being
18 performed?

19 A. I'm not exactly sure what type of monitoring those guys
20 were -- had their monitors with them. Like I said, we were going
21 out in teams of three or four at that point, I want to say, and
22 just basically reporting back to whatever levels that they were
23 saying they were getting. I know a couple of different guys had
24 different area monitors and whatnot, so I'm not -- I'm not exactly
25 certain what Paulsboro was using at that point, the refinery team.

1 Q. Do you recall any readings or -- that were being
2 collected and then who were they being reported to?

3 A. They were being recorded -- or reported back to our
4 hazmat branch, which was basically our command that was directly
5 on site there.

6 Q. Uh-huh.

7 A. The hazmat branch would then take those readings and go
8 back to the Incident Command with that and so forth.

9 Q. Was this the Gloucester County hazmat branch --

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. -- or the Paulsboro Refinery?

12 A. This would have been the Gloucester County hazmat branch
13 at that point.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. To my -- I believe that the -- I think that the
16 Paulsboro had their own command structure that they followed and
17 things like that, and then they assisted us under -- and so forth.
18 We basically assisted each other at that point.

19 Q. Uh-huh.

20 A. But like -- yeah, so we were going out and we were doing
21 different monitoring from -- you know, down to the creek, the
22 water bed from where the nearest houses were, you know, down to
23 that area, all the way back to -- you know, into the neighborhood,
24 you know, two, three blocks over --

25 Q. Uh-huh.

1 A. -- doing different meter -- monitoring rather. You
2 know, we were getting higher levels down near the site itself,
3 much higher levels down that way and it seemed to be dissipating
4 as we got on -- you know, farther out into the area.

5 Q. Can you describe the time, roughly the time frame and
6 what readings were you obtaining?

7 A. Okay. I'd say the time frame of -- that would have to
8 be in the area of probably, I'm going to estimate 10 or 11 in the
9 morning --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- somewhere in that neighborhood. Because -- I'm
12 trying to backtrack a little bit and my thought process for the
13 time would have been, we would have been at that first site in the
14 area of 8:00 or so, 8:30. And then that's when those personnel
15 from the outside contracting agency came to us. And we were on
16 that site for, I would say, a good hour to maybe even 2 hours, I
17 mean, it seemed like, because there was, there was a waiting
18 period, then the gentleman arrived. There was the evaluation and
19 decon period. Then there was another waiting period until we got
20 sent into the scene further.

21 So I would say at, you know, probably at best that would
22 be like late morning, I want to say. My best estimate on that
23 would be late morning is when we were down at the site. And,
24 again, there was another waiting period and a period of, you know,
25 orders and what was necessary at that point when we got down

1 there. So, it would have been, I would say, late morning to, you
2 know, right midday is when we got down there. And, you know, some
3 of the levels we were getting were, you know, in the high teens,
4 low 20s, closer down to the creek bed where the nearest house was
5 along the side street. And then, you know, the levels seemed to
6 gradually decrease as we got farther away from the direct site.

7 Q. Were these using a PID? Do you know if you were
8 measuring like volatile organic compounds or were these like vinyl
9 chloride-specific monitors?

10 A. I don't believe they were -- to my knowledge, I don't
11 believe that they were vinyl chloride specific.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. I know a lot of it was -- you know, like I said, PIDs we
14 were using, to my knowledge it was not vinyl chloride specific.

15 Q. Okay. And you were reporting these readings or they
16 were being reported via radio?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. And do you specifically remember to whom at the hazmat
19 command?

20 A. No, I do not remember to exactly whom that would have
21 been at the time. I know for the -- for most of the morning our
22 hazmat branch at that point was our team -- one of our tea
23 lieutenants.

24 Q. Uh-huh.

25 A. That's who we were reporting back to, I would say, 95

1 percent of the time. You know, at which point that was taking
2 place, I don't remember. But I know one of our team lieutenants
3 basically had our direct command out there on site.

4 Q. Now, I know Paulsboro Refinery, they have different
5 radios and I guess they're using a different frequency than you
6 guys are --

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. -- and you're not all on the same radio. Who was
9 reporting those numbers -- was it Paulsboro Refinery or your
10 personnel to your command structure, I guess?

11 A. Right. I can't speak for Paulsboro Refinery because I
12 don't know how that's done on their end. As far as our guys, it
13 would be our hazmat branch. The guy -- the lead, branch leader
14 that was out there for hazmat, and he was going back into the IC.

15 Q. Uh-huh.

16 A. That was typically how it was taking place from what I
17 heard through the radio traffic through the day. But, like I
18 said, I can't speak for the Paulsboro guys. I don't know how --
19 they do operate on a different channel. They have capabilities to
20 operate with us, but, you know, I think they were -- they had
21 their own team and so forth at that point.

22 Q. So on your radio communication you were reporting
23 numbers as well?

24 A. Correct. Yeah.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. We would report back to our hazmat branch --

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. -- and from there that branch would report back to the
4 IC in some capacity.

5 Q. Okay.

6 MR. STANCIL: What sort of decisions were being made
7 based on the readings you were getting as far as establishing,
8 delineating the hot zone, for instance, was that going on?

9 MR. HALTER: There wasn't too much going on at that
10 point. It was deemed that where we were was in a safe area. That
11 was, that was coming back from a couple of the different agencies
12 that were out there. There was no, there was no real person or
13 persons, you know, saying, you know, move back, set up a different
14 zone, take these proper precautions. I mean, we all had our PPE
15 with us, as necessary, but there was no, there was no real order,
16 I should say, being given down to, you know, as far as taking
17 different precautions on what we were doing.

18 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

19 Q. As you were taking these measurements and you were
20 getting these readings, did you have knowledge of the chemical
21 and, you know, some of the exposure levels and things of that
22 nature at that time?

23 A. At that time, no. I mean, obviously there was some
24 brief -- briefing done in the earlier hours. And, I think, just
25 like anything else, you learn more as you go throughout the day

1 and so forth. And there were some, you know, private
2 investigating -- I shouldn't say it's private, but, you know,
3 investigating done on each person's own time and so forth trying
4 to get a better grasp and so forth and things like that.

5 And I think one of the reasons -- one of the things also
6 that, you know, I remember seeing was that there was so many other
7 personnel from different agencies that I couldn't begin to
8 remember at this point there, that were utilizing the same
9 protection as we were, which was nothing else, you know, at the
10 time. You know, guys that to me looked to be this was something
11 they may work with or deal with everybody were in and around the
12 cars and the tracks and so forth with limited to no other
13 protection on whatsoever.

14 So, yeah, as far -- I mean, and that was, that was an
15 observation of my own, you know. I wasn't asked to make any kind
16 of report or basis on that. It was just an observation I had seen
17 on my own.

18 Q. So would you say that -- you know, when you had these
19 readings you really weren't sure if they were safe or not at the
20 time they were being reported? I mean --

21 A. Yeah. I would say, you know, I wasn't completely sure
22 of what was an immediate danger and what was a safe zone and what
23 was a working limit at that point, you know. It was -- you find
24 that out more throughout the day and I guess the coming days also.
25 But, yeah, there wasn't a -- at the time it was deemed to be and

1 thought to be a safe area, a safe, safe working area for us but --

2 BY MR. STANCIL:

3 Q. You mentioned that initially you were sent into the hot
4 zone area. How was that delineated?

5 A. Basically just by the -- as far as I know, it was by the
6 road that came alongside of where the track bed started towards
7 the water. That was pretty much the best area I could come up
8 with.

9 Q. Was that officially designated by anyone or that --

10 A. It was not at the time. That didn't take place until
11 sometime quite later into the day, I would say. At that point it
12 was more of a -- and then in the coming days also there was much
13 more of a strict check-in process and so forth.

14 Q. Right. So throughout the first day, did the boundaries
15 of the hot zone change at all or --

16 A. I'm going to say, no, that I can remember off of the
17 first day, they didn't seem to change too much because we pretty
18 much kept our positions through that entire operation period,
19 because even into the evening hours we were in that same position
20 where we started from. So those zones didn't change at all that
21 day that I was aware of.

22 Q. Did your team receive a safety briefing from anyone upon
23 your arrival?

24 A. No, no, we didn't receive any such briefing.

25 Q. Any information about the nature of the materials, the

1 hazards?

2 A. Well, let me backtrack for one second. I mean, the
3 briefing that we received was from my hazmat branch direct, you
4 know, leader. So, yes, there was a quick briefing. I didn't know
5 if you had meant from an outside agency or some --

6 Q. From outside, yeah, a --

7 A. Yeah, nothing that I received from an outside agency.
8 It was pretty much our team educating other members of our team as
9 to what we were there for. So if that answers better.

10 Q. Uh-huh.

11 A. Yeah, there was no other, no other agency that we were,
12 you know, adhering to and listening to at that point.

13 Q. Did you have any interaction with the chemical
14 manufacturer, OxyVinyls?

15 A. No. Did I have any -- say it again, please?

16 Q. Did you have any interaction with the manufacturer of
17 the chemical? The company's name, I believe, is OxyVinyls or --

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. Did anyone provide any vinyl chloride-specific
20 monitoring equipment to your team?

21 A. Not to my knowledge.

22 Q. No? Okay.

23 A. If that was done, that was done on a next step level
24 from what I was privy to at that point, so --

25 Q. All right.

1 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

2 Q. So you say you went down towards the water edge?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And you said you observed folks on the tracks at the
5 time?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Could you describe that a little more and what type of
8 PPE and other type of protection they were using?

9 A. Like I said, for the first while of it there was no PPE
10 being used by most all of the personnel I saw there. You know, I
11 would describe it as a lot of personnel in, you know, white hard
12 hats and such, some of which said CONRAIL, some of which had
13 acronyms I wasn't familiar with and so forth.

14 Q. Uh-huh.

15 A. But, yeah, I mean, there was -- you know, they had
16 personnel on both sides of the track between the breached zone of
17 the track, you know, on both sides of the bridge, moving all about
18 the scene. All in that area there was quite a large number of
19 vehicles between where it was later designated a -- more of a hot
20 zone and where the check-in process was more -- that whole stone
21 bed yard there, there was quite a number of vehicles, and
22 everybody was between the vehicles and their -- the creek bed.

23 Q. Uh-huh.

24 A. So, yeah, that was -- like I said, it wasn't until later
25 on in the day where we were going in with, you know, full

1 respiration -- respirator and so forth and air packs and whatnot.
2 It was -- I don't have a time in my head when that was. I'm sure
3 that would be laid out in our forms, but it was quite some time
4 into the day.

5 MR. STANCIL: What, what caused that change to occur?

6 MR. HALTER: From what I witnessed was, from one of the
7 leaders of CSX, I believe, when he got there he pretty much took
8 more of a direct command role and pretty much ordered all the
9 vehicles and personnel that were between the Commerce Street and
10 the creek out of there, and immediately issued for everybody to be
11 on respirator -- respiration protection and so forth like that,
12 that was in that area. That was the first time that I really
13 noticed that there was an active and very quick change in whatever
14 type of operation was going on. So he was from, like I said, he
15 was from CSX hazmat.

16 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

17 Q. When you were getting readings, were you concerned at
18 all about, you know, the levels that you were detecting? Did you
19 ask for input on, you know, are we in the safe zone or not, or did
20 anybody in that group that you were with?

21 A. I think it was very mildly discussed at best. I think
22 that -- you know, I guess it was under my assumption -- I can't
23 speak for other personnel, but it was under my assumption that,
24 you know, if we were going in doing monitoring with either no
25 respiratory or whatever, that it was a safer zone at that point or

1 it was, I guess, unknown, I could say.

2 Q. Uh-huh.

3 A. Nobody ever said you're 100 percent fine, go in and do
4 this, and nobody ever said you're in 100 percent in danger, go in
5 and do this. It was -- you know, you're given a task, an
6 operation; what type of protection do we need? None at this
7 point, you know. So that's kind of just how we were moving all
8 about the scene at the -- for the first while.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. You know, I guess, you know, maybe in hindsight looking
11 back on it, yeah, maybe that you could say there's a level of
12 concern or things like that. But, you know, at the time there
13 wasn't -- the thought process really wasn't there as much, I
14 guess. Kind of following suit, when -- especially from our
15 experience, you're seeing folks that you would say do this on a
16 more every single day basis, where, you know, they would be more
17 specific to each chemical and each incident that would take place.
18 Whereas, we'd see such a broad spectrum of incidents, you know,
19 it's difficult to hone on each one until you -- and usually you
20 learn about that as you have an incident.

21 So, yeah, I think it was more so following suit and just
22 a general observation of the area that it was okay in nature per
23 se. And then later on is -- like I said, once the guy from CSX
24 hazmat got there is when pretty much everything changed pretty
25 rapidly.

1 BY MR. STANCIL:

2 Q. How did that initial decision come about that you were
3 okay without respiratory protection?

4 A. I don't know the answer to that. I'm not sure who
5 actually made it. If there was a -- if there was somebody that
6 actually made it or if there was just nobody that said you needed
7 this, that and the other.

8 Q. Was there a level of comfort provided because other
9 people were not wearing PPE?

10 A. I think you would say that. Absolutely, yeah. I feel
11 that way for myself. Like I said, maybe I'm not speaking for
12 everybody, but, yeah, I mean, you look -- like I say, you look
13 around and you see folks closer to and more so than what you were.
14 Okay, well, maybe I'm okay too then, so --

15 Q. Right, right.

16 MR. STANCIL: I don't have anything else.

17 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Nor do I.

18 BY MR. EL-ZOGHBI:

19 Q. I guess, from your experience, and would you -- what
20 would you say were lessons learned from this response?

21 A. Definitely some of the lessons learned, I mean, you
22 know, no matter what the chemical or material is that you're
23 working with, a better knowledge probably would be best for
24 everybody suited, involved.

25 You know, I think that's probably one of the biggest

1 things, you know, having a better idea of exactly -- maybe talking
2 to some more experts as far as, you know, every -- there's
3 somebody an expert in pretty much every area, for the most part,
4 of different things that are out there. So I think that would be
5 one thing I, you know, I would have liked to have seen, you know,
6 maybe a better understanding as to what we were dealing with,
7 exactly what was on there. Because that, I think, would be one
8 thing that would be best.

9 Maybe better communication of what was going on out
10 there and who was -- who had this area and who had this area, and
11 who the -- who all the personnel were. I mean, you know, I knew
12 who my personnel are and the people that I work with day in and
13 day out, but, you know, obviously I don't know all these other
14 teams and units and why they're there and what they do, what their
15 concerns are. They have different concerns of what I would have
16 as a concern. You know, and sometimes they have concerns that I
17 would have no idea why they have a concern obviously. So I would
18 want to know what -- you know, what more so -- especially if,
19 should there ever be an incident like that again in our area, you
20 know, what exactly we're dealing with and what's necessary.

21 MR. STANCIL: Okay.

22 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Do you have anything else to add at all
23 or --

24 MR. HALTER: No, not at this time.

25 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Well, excellent. Great.

1 MR. STANCIL: Well, thank you for your time and thank
2 you for your assistance.

3 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Yeah, thank you again.

4 MR. HALTER: Thank you folks.

5 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: And, we're going to terminate the
6 interview at -- it's roughly 10:40 a.m.

7 MR. HALTER: Okay.

8 MR. EL-ZOGHBI: Thank you.

9 (Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: CONRAIL DERAILMENT/HAZARDOUS
 MATERIAL RELEASE
 PAULSBORO, NEW JERSEY
 NOVEMBER 30, 2012
 Interview of Andrew Halter

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-13-MR-002

PLACE: Clayton, New Jersey

DATE: January 31, 2013

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Cheryl Farner Donovan
Transcriber