STATEMENT FROM JOHN SCOTT WEDEMEYER

28 AUGUST 2012

G550 INCIDENT ON 14 FERUARY 2011

I am providing a new statement because I was told to give my original statement to my boss, Randy Gaston, the executive V.P. of Flight Operations at Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation (GAC). Due to subsequent events, I am not sure whether he or anyone else may have altered it prior to its submission to the NTSB. Mr. Gaston told me that he needed to "Protect the Brand." I was later terminated because of this incident. My co-pilot was not. I am a highly decorated former Marine Corps fighter pilot. I had over a twenty- year record as a Marine Corps aviator. I have in excess of 6500 flight hours, 4700 hours in F/A - 18 fighter jets - one of the most of any pilot in the world. I was a former Blue Angel - having served in this capacity between 1997 and 1999. I have over 600 hours of combat flight time - having done three tours of duty in Iraq and/or Afghanistan and one in Bosnia Herzegovina. After retiring from the Marine Corps, I began work as a production test pilot for GAC in June of 2007. I received all my training and type ratings in the GIV and GV at Flight Safety in Savannah, Georgia. I scored 100% on every test given to me while there; I was an outstanding student. At Naval Flight School, I was number one in my class. I have attached a current Resume.

On February 14, 2011, James T. Hicks and I were flying a G-550 (Gulfstream Aerospace GV-SP N535A) as part of our duties as Production Test Pilots for Gulfstream Aerospace. The purpose of this flight was to test the airplane's flightworthiness prior to

final delivery to its owner, Paul Allen and/or his flight management company of Seattle, Washington. During the flight, the gear was cycled approximately six times for different systems tests. As the airplane was on final approach to Appleton, Wisconsin the gear was lowered one last time. A couple seconds later the “Hydraulic quantity low” light came on. I pulled up the Hydraulic Page on the #2 Display Unit. The left hydraulics fluid was leaking. We had no way to know from where and at what rate. We already had the gear down and flaps at ½ and less than 1000’ AGL. Consequently, I thought it was best to try to land the airplane and use the Auxiliary (Secondary) brake system. As I pointed at the Hydraulic page I told the co-pilot all I cared about were the brakes. My training taught me to land. This training included that gained in FlightSafety’s simulators and Gulfstream’s own emergency directives, which provides “1. Find nearest suitable airport and land.” I attempted to land and stop the airplane using the secondary braking system. All indicators showed that the secondary braking system was working when I last looked at the hydraulics display. My co-pilot NEVER said a word. After downloading the flight data recorder, I was told that the system failed at 2’ above the ground.

When I saw I had 3000 feet remaining and the secondary brakes were not working I had to make a quick decision. My options: to either go around or pull the emergency brakes (parking brake) and hang on. The only training we ever received at Flight Safety with the parking brake used as a means to stop the airplane was on a 12,000 foot runway with no flaps which 50% of the time resulted in blown tires and departing the runway. There was never a scenario where you would use them on a

short runway or as a last result type situation (100+ knots with 3000' remaining) so I decided to go around. The Flight Data Recorder said I had the throttles up with 2000 feet remaining. I knew from my training at Flight Safety that I only needed 1500 feet remaining to safely get the aircraft back in the air if I was going 100kts. I had preformed this several times before the incident and after the incident. During the time I was grounded at Gulfstream, I replicated on scores of occasions the conditions present at Appleton, Wisconsin at the time immediately before the incident occurred. On each of those occasions I was able to successfully land and then immediately take off without incident. I brought people from Flight Safety in the simulator with me and they thought I made the right decision. I informed Randy Gaston of these results in the Flight Safety simulators. Mr. Gaston told me that these simulators were not accurate indicators of the Gulfstream plane's actual performance. I replied to Mr. Gaston, "isn't that a problem?" We use that simulator for all our type ratings and emergency procedures. The FAA certifies these simulators.

My co-pilot pulled back the throttles with only 998 feet remaining as he did not think we were going to make it. Again, I had a decision to make: steer the airplane with the rudder and one good thrust reverser to try not to hit anything or pull the parking brake and hang on. We had a ditch to the left, approach lights in front and a small building to the far right. There was a small level opening to the right so I stomped on the right rudder and aimed there and the airplane departed the runway at the end going 100 knots. We were lucky.

Unfortunately, a defective swivel assembly had been installed in the nose wheel assemblage. A weld on the swivel cracked. The cracking of this part caused the airplane to lose hydraulic power and its primary braking system, spoilers, nose wheel steering, the left thrust reverser and the secondary braking system. The incident was caused by a defective landing gear. There had been numerous other incidents involving defective landing gear on similar Gulfstream aircrafts. This information, however, was not disseminated among its test pilots and I was unaware of these prior incidents.

Gulfstream assigned Randy Gaston to do a report on the Allen G-550 wreck. I was not permitted to review Gulfstream's internal investigation or review the presentation put together by Randy Gaston, although I requested this. Gulfstream conveyed to me again that it would protect its product (the G-550 line).

Despite never having been involved in an aircraft incident or accident, and, despite receiving a raise and positive recommendation during the pendency of Gulfstream's investigation, I was terminated by Gulfstream and escorted from the premises on April 1, 2011.

I relied upon my training in Flight Safety simulators. I specifically called upon it at the time of the Allen wreck. I was never informed the G-V / G550 simulators at Flight Safety were not accurate predictors of those airplanes' performance until Randy Gaston informed me in March of 2011.

I am a Naval Post Graduate Safety School trained pilot and accident investigator. I have conducted several aircraft accidents investigation. As such, the questions I ask and try to answer are as follows:

1. Was I trained for this incident? NO. I have four type ratings and I have never been given an emergency inside the final approach fix where the thought process was to go around and keep flying to see what happens next.
2. Should I go around instead of landing when I put the gear down? I took a poll of over 100 pilots and asked what would you do in this situation. 95% said they would have landed.
3. What would have happened if we had gone around instead of landing? Unknown. Gulfstream says with a left hydraulic loss and working emergency brakes (parking brake) expect “major damage.” Gulfstream says with no brakes expect “catastrophic damage.” Again, we were lucky.
4. How is the checklist written for hydraulic emergencies? Since the incident Gulfstream has totally re-written the hydraulic procedures. Logically, they think the procedures needed to be changed.
5. What was the co-pilot doing from gear down until he said “are we going to stop?” That's a great question. I would submit he was no help in this incident. It is a crew airplane.
6. Once on the runway, why make the decision to go around? I have been told that an engineer at Gulfstream said we needed 2500’ to go around. I ask the question “at what rotation speed and at what rate of pitch?” The airplane in that configuration would have flown at 87 knots; we were going 100 knots. The engines were at full power for over 6 seconds before the co-pilot pulled the throttles back. At 166’ a second we had another 6 seconds before the end of the

runway. I was holding the airplane on the ground waiting for the engines to spool up. The engines should have spooled up by then (12 seconds) and I would have pulled the airplane into the air faster than a normal rotation. For all of these reasons, I think it was the right decision based on my training and experience.

7. Once on the runway, should I have pulled the emergency brake? Possibly, but I was not trained for that nor can we say the outcome would have been different. In fact, the outcome could have been catastrophic. The tires could have caught fire and caused further damage. The airplane could have gone off the runway causing further damage. Again, I was lucky.

Despite no longer working at Gulfstream, I know after this incident and the G650 crash lots of things have changed over there in regards to safety.

Respectfully,

John Scott Wedemeyer

JOHN SCOTT WEDEMEYER

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PROFILE

Results oriented pilot with over twenty-four years of hands-on experience in diverse and complex situations. Successful professional pilot with international experience. Excels in dynamic and demanding environments. Possesses extensive operational resource management skills. Expressive and experienced spokesperson with recognized technical, communication and presentation skills at all levels.

FLIGHT RATINGS

AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT (AMEL)
Commercial Privileges (AMEL, ASEL, INST)
GIV TYPE
GV TYPE
CE-500 TYPE
BE-300 TYPE
Flight Engineer Written Exam
FAA Class-1 Medical Certification (No Limitations)

FLIGHT EXPERIENCE

TOTAL TIME	6440	Instructor	2535
Pilot-In-Command	5413	Instrument	1178
Multi-Engine	5538	Night	539

AIRCRAFT FLOWN

GIV, GV, G350, G450, G550, G150, F/A-18 A/B/C/D, UC-35 (CE-560), T34C, TA-4J, T-2C, F-5, King Air-350, CE-150, CE-152, CE-172, PA-44, Cirrus SR-20

WORK EXPERIENCE

June 2012-Prescent: OCONUS Pilot

April 2011-Present: Weeds Aviation LLC, Savannah, Ga, GIV, GV, G450, and G550 Pilot
Consultant/Coach for Check-6 incorporated and Contact Pilot for GIV, GV, G450 and G550 aircraft. Georgia State employee, Part-time Pilot for Georgia Aviation Authority.

June 2007-April 2011: Gulfstream Senior Production Test Pilot, Savannah, Ga, GIV, GV, G450, and G550 Pilot
Conducted Production and Completion Test Flights for G450 and G550 Aircraft. Conducted Post Maintenance Flights for GIV and GV Aircraft. Flew Customer acceptance flights and delivered New Aircraft around the world to varied group of customers including Kings, foreign dignitaries and prominent businessmen. As Corporate Pilot spokesperson at many Air Shows worldwide answered questions on the aircraft from features to safety issues. Served as International Captain and Co-Pilot when Required. Maintained RVSM on all Production Airplanes and Publications for all Aircrew

February 2005-June 2007: Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, N.C. F/A-18 A/C/D, and UC-35 Pilot
Served as Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point Director of Safety and Standardization. Supervised staff of twenty safety professionals in overseeing all aspects of ground safety to include hazardous materials, ergonomics, ammunition depot, and maintenance facilities. As Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point Aviation Safety Officer, conducted safety inspections of all squadrons and subordinate units. Trusted with position of Marine Corps Installations East (MCIEAST) Aviation Safety Officer wherein responsibilities included conducting annual inspections of all Marine Corps aviation facilities east of the Mississippi River and briefed Three Star Generals on the results of the same.

February 2001-February 2005: MAG-31, MCAS Beaufort, SC, F/A-18 Pilot

Selected and named Marine Aircraft Group 31 Director of Safety and Standardization due to three fatal mishaps in one month's time. Crafted policies and altered procedures resulting in dramatic reduction in reported mishaps. Completely rewrote NATOPS and instrument check procedures and instituted weekly NATOPS quiz promoting system knowledge. As VMFA(AW)-533 Executive Officer during Operation Iraqi Freedom jointly orchestrated twenty-four hour combat operations in a cooperative fashion with the Commanding Officer. Responsible for over 13,000 flights hours, and $70 million budget and squadron training and readiness in capacity as Marine Aircraft Group 31 Operation Officer. 22MEU (SOC) LNO at the CAOC during Operation Mountain Storm and Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Tirelessly served as 2d MAW TACC Battle Captain in Al Asad, Iraq for seven month stint working twelve hours shifts, seven days a week. Oversaw multi task force components such as special forces, search and rescue, and all helicopter and fixed wing aircraft activities. Position demanded responsibility for all aircraft in vast Marine Corps area of responsibility.

October 1999 – February 2001: MAG-46, MCAS Miramar, CA, F/A-18 Pilot.

Multitasked as Marine Air Group 46 Director of Safety and Standardization, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing F/A-18 NATOPS Unit Evaluator, and VMFAT-101 Instructor Pilot. Described as superb field officer who accomplishes all jobs with ease of effort and professionally. In an undermanned operations department credited by senior officers as the reason for mission accomplishment and simultaneously classified as highly energetic. Oversight of planning and inspection of all MAG 46 and all F/A-18 Marine Corps Reserve units.

August 1997 – September 1999: The Blue Angels, NAS Pensacola, FL, F/A-18 Pilot.

Selected as Blue Angel #2 pilot, right wing position, and served as the single U.S. Marine Corps demonstration pilot. Flew in countless air shows across the United States while also speaking at various schools to inspire America's youth.

March 1995 – August 1997: VMFAT-101, MCAS El Toro, CA, F/A-18 Instructor Pilot.

Standardization and Instructor Under Training Officer. Supervised all new instructors, evaluating progress and managing all qualifications. Instructed in every phase of F/A-18 flight and ground training.

June 1991 – March 1995: VMFA-333, VMFA-451, VMFA(AW)-224, MCAS Beaufort, SC, F/A-18 Pilot.

Fleet Marine Force pilot deployed throughout the world.

August 1989 – June 1991: U.S. Navy Flight Training, Student Naval Aviator, FL and TX.

Completed F/A-18 initial training, T-2C and TA-4J intermediate and advanced jet training, T-34C primary training and Aviation Indoctrination.

AWARDS:

Meritorious Service Medal
Air Medal with Bronze Star and Combat Distinguishing Device "V"
Air Medal with Strike Flight Numeral "9" for Operation Deny Flight/Provide Promise and Operation Iraqi Freedom**.**
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal Fifth award one with Combat "V"
Navy/Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Iraq Campaign Medal
Afghanistan Campaign Medal
NATO Medal
6200+ Accident Free Flight Hours

EDUCATION:

Naval Postgraduate School, Aviation Safety School, Monterey, CA, 2000
Commander's Safety Course, Pensacola, FL, 2006
Navy Security Manager's Course, Jacksonville, FL, 2002
Naval Aviation Maintenance Program Management Course, 2002
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1999
Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, 1994
The Citadel, Bachelor of Science, Physical Education, Charleston, SC, 1987

PERSONAL DATA:

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Height/Weight: 70”/ 210lbs.

Health: Excellent/Nonsmoker

Security Clearance: Top Secret