

Memorandum of Conversation



Date: 29 December 2017

Time: 1330 central standard time

Conversation Including: Mr. Daniel Shure
Pilot of Cessna 310F (N6770X)

Duration of Call: 30 Minutes

Summary & Factual Information from Conversation:

On 29 December 2017, at 1330 central standard time, I conducted a follow-up interview with Mr. Shure, the pilot who survived the accident, and his attorney to obtain clarifications to Mr. Shure's original written statement that he previously provided.

I asked Mr. Shure what the purpose of the cross-feed engine start was and why did the designated pilot examiner perform the procedure versus him. Mr. Shure replied that he doesn't recall why the examiner performed the cross-feed engine start, nor could he recall if the examiner was only demonstrating the procedure or if it was required for some other reason. Mr. Shure stated that he "honestly can't recall why" the cross-feed engine start was performed.

I asked Mr. Shure about the position of the fuel selectors and auxiliary fuel pumps following the cross-feed engine start and before takeoff. Mr. Shure stated that following the cross-feed engine start he visually checked and felt for the detent on both fuel selectors to ensure that they were properly selected to the respective fuel tanks (i.e. right engine to right fuel tank, and left engine to left fuel tank). Mr. Shure also confirmed that the airplane only had tip-tanks (i.e. no auxiliary fuel tanks). Mr. Shure stated that he verbally confirmed the proper fuel selector positions with the examiner before taxiing the airplane from the ramp. Mr. Shure stated that he then completed the applicable before-takeoff checklist before taxiing onto the runway. He indicated that everything was positioned "correctly" per the before-takeoff checklist. I asked what position the three-position auxiliary fuel pump switches were in before takeoff, and he stated that they were in the normal "on" position.

I asked Mr. Shure if he had performed a propeller feather check before takeoff, if so, what were his observations. Mr. Shure stated that he verified each propeller feather operation by independently retarding the respective propeller control lever. He indicated that he heard an audible change and observed a corresponding decrease in propeller speed when he moved the propeller controls aft. Mr. Shure also stated that he did not observe any indications that the propellers were not working normally during his before-takeoff engine checks.

I asked Mr. Shure to clarify at what point in the flight did he attempt to feather the left engine. Mr. Shure stated that the left engine experienced a partial loss of engine power at about 700 ft msl as the airplane climbed on the upwind. He stated that he heard a decrease in engine tone, perceived a noticeable left yaw, and observed the left engine was still rotating at about 2,200 rpm. Mr. Shure told the examiner that he intended to keep the left engine running because it was still providing "positive thrust" and that the examiner verbally concurred with his decision to keep the left engine running. Mr. Shure stated that the airplane was able to climb to about 800 ft msl before he made a left turn from the upwind leg to downwind leg. After turning onto

downwind leg the airplane was still at 800 ft msl and the left engine was still operating at reduced power. Mr. Shure stated that it was during the downwind leg that the left engine began to lose additional power and eventually was no longer producing “positive thrust.” Without positive thrust from the left engine, while the airplane was still on the downwind leg, Mr. Shure attempted to feather the left propeller by moving the left propeller control full aft. Mr. Shure does not believe the propeller feathered because it still required his full right aileron input and full right rudder input to maintain control of the airplane. After Mr. Shure attempted to feather the left engine, he made a left turn from downwind leg toward the airport.

I asked Mr. Shure if he secured the left engine after attempting to feather the left engine. Mr. Shure replied that he moved the left throttle and left propeller control full aft when he attempted to feather the left engine; however, he was uncertain if he retarded the mixture control for the left engine.

I can attest that the above summary and factual information was taken on the above stated day, and is correct to the best of my knowledge:

Signed: _ Andrew Todd Fox _

Dated: _ 29 December 2017 _

Andrew Todd Fox
National Transportation Safety Board
Air Safety Investigator