

# National Transportation Safety Board Office of Railroad, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Investigations Washington, D.C. 20594

# Derailment & Hazardous Materials Release with Fire of Train UEGKOT-09

Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) Unit Train

Graettinger, Iowa

March 10, 2017

Mechanical Group Factual Report

## Accident

NTSB Accident Number:	DCA17MR007
Date of Accident:	March 10, 2017
Time of Accident:	12:50 a.m. (CDT)
Type of Trains:	UEGKOT-09 (Unit Train)
Railroad Owner:	UP
Train Operator:	UP
Fatalities:	0
Injuries:	0
Location of Accident:	Graettinger, Iowa

#### **Mechanical Group Members**

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) James Southworth 490 L Enfant Plaza SW Washington, D.C. 20594

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Joseph C. Berry Railroad Safety Inspector Motive Power & Equipment

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Patrick Holderby Railroad Safety Inspector Motive Power & Equipment

Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) Rex Beck General Manager Freight Car

### **Accident Summary**

For a summary of the accident, refer to the *Accident Summary* report, within this docket, NTSB Docket DCA17MR007.

#### **Train Consist**

Train UEGKOT-09 consisted of two locomotives units at the front of the train, 98 loaded tank cars, 2 buffer cars full of sand (one at the front and one at the rear) and a locomotive at the rear of the train configured as a distributed power unit (DPU). The train weighed 12,699 trailing tons and was 6,215 feet in length. The train was hauling ethanol.

#### **Pre-Accident Inspection**

The train crew for Train UEGKOT-09 performed a Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Class I brake test - initial terminal inspection at Great Plains LLC in Superior, Iowa, on March 9, 2017 at 10:22 pm CST. Superior is just less than 20 miles from the accident location. The train destination was Texas City, Texas, scheduled to arrive on March 13, 2017. A required Class IA – 1000-mile brake test was scheduled en route at Parsons, Kansas. Records showed there were no exceptions were recorded in the collected records.

#### **Records Review**

During the on-scene phase of this investigation, investigators collected the daily and periodic inspection records from all locomotives involved in the accident. The daily inspection requirements are outlined in 49 CFR 229.21. This Federal regulation requires that each locomotive in use shall be inspected at least once during each calendar day. A written report of the inspection shall be made. This report shall contain the name of the carrier; the initials and number of the locomotive; the place, date and time of the inspection; a description of the non-complying conditions disclosed by the inspection; and the signature of the employee making the inspection.

Investigators reviewed the daily inspection records for all locomotives in the train consist. The records were in compliance with Federal regulations. The last documented inspections were performed March 10, 2017, at 12:01 a.m., in Superior (DR069) where the train originated. A required inspection at an interval not to exceed 33 days was performed by a qualified mechanical inspector (QMI) on March 8, 2017.

Periodic inspection requirements for locomotives are outlined in 49 CFR 229.23. Each periodic inspection is to be recorded on FRA form F6180-49A. The interval between any two periodic inspections cannot exceed 92-days unless the locomotive is equipped with advanced micro-

processor based on-board electronic condition monitoring controls. The interval for such locomotives types is 184-days.

Investigators reviewed the periodic maintenance records for all locomotives in the train consist. The records were in compliance with the Federal regulations. The required inspections were performed on March 3, 2017, at South Morrill, Nebraska (lead locomotive), on January 10, 2017, at Houston, Texas (trailing locomotive), and on January 13, 2017, at North Little Rock, Arkansas (DPU).

#### Wreckage Description

A review of the leading locomotive's event recorder showed Train UEGKOT-09 was approaching the timber bridge over Jack Creek located at MP 57 traveling at about 28 MPH. About 12:50 a.m., an unintended emergency brake was initiated. The train separated between the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> cars. During the emergency response, the train crew moved the locomotives and the non-derailed cars away from the point-of-derailment (POD) and the fire that resulted from the train accident.

As a result of the accident the  $21^{st}$  through the  $40^{th}$  cars in the train were detailed (see summary below):

- 1. DBUX 301674 (sequence 21) burned, lying on left side
- 2. TAEX 2893 (sequence 22) burned, breached, nearly inverted, lying in Jack Creek
- 3. TILX 199147 (sequence 23) burned, lying on side in Jack Creek
- 4. TCBX 198194 (sequence 24) burned, nearly inverted, lying in Jack Creek
- 5. CTCX 732108 (sequence 25) burned, overturned about 90 degrees, partially underneath sequence 28
- 6. TILX 197694 (sequence 26) burned, overturned about 90 degrees
- 7. DBUX 302834 (sequence 27) breached, nearly inverted
- 8. DBUX 302746 (sequence 28) overriding, listing about 45 degrees, lying in Jack Creek
- 9. TAEX 2909 (sequence 29) burned, AEI read issue with GATX 203812
- 10. WCHX 30078 (sequence 30) active fire, breached, severely buckled, listing about 10 degrees
- 11. WCHX 30098 (sequence 31) active fire, overriding
- 12. TILX 199819 (sequence 32) burned, breached
- 13. TILX 195202 (sequence 33) burned, breached, listing about 22 degrees
- 14. CTCX 731383 (sequence 34) burned, upright
- 15. TILX 195386 (sequence 35) A-end, end crushed (no apparent penetration)
- 16. CTCX 731997 (sequence 36) burned, breached, listing about 22 degrees
- 17. TILX 197615 (sequence 37) A-end, B-end, derailed upright
- 18. TILX 199168 (sequence 38) A-end, B-end, derailed, listing about 22 degrees
- 19. TILX 191239 (sequence 39) A-end, B-end, derailed, upright
- 20. DBUX 301606 (sequence 40) B-end (lead truck), derailed, upright



Figure 1-Aerial Photograph of accident location



Figure 2-Aerial photograph of the derailed tank cars

### **Equipment Post Accident Inspections**

On March 10, 2017, investigators inspected the lead locomotive consist at the point where they were repositioned east of the derailment site. The inspections of the locomotives revealed that one of two headlights were inoperative (burned out) on the lead locomotive. The rear continuous barrier chain was improperly secured on the trailing locomotive.

Investigators also inspected the distributive power unit (DPU) locomotive that was the end of the train and moved west of the derailment site. Investigators found that the air compressor governor was defective on the DPU causing the unit to continuously run and vent excess pressure. This condition did not affect the charging or maintaining of brake pipe pressure.

None of these conditions were causal to the train accident

On March 11, 2017, investigators inspected the non-derailed cars (1<sup>st</sup> through the 20<sup>th</sup>). The locomotives and the cars were oriented just as they were after passing over the timber bridge. The train was travelling in an easterly direction—right-side wheels of the lead locomotive (and trailing locomotives) and tank cars were running on the south rail. Several wheels on the south side of the train exhibited fresh horizontal damage on the wheel tread (e.g. impressions perpendicular to the wheel tread). Investigators did not observe any horizontal damage to the tread on the wheels that traveled over the north rail. The wheel damage observed was more pronounced on south side

wheels of tank cars further from the locomotive consist. (see Figure 7 at the end of this report for recorded notes from Mechanical Group inspections)

The series of photographs below (figures 3 through 6) document the location and position of remarkable horizontal damage on a southside wheel tread (on TCBX 198115) that traveled over the point-of-derailment (POD). In the photographs, note that there are two marks on the tread.



On March 11, 2017, investigators completed a mechanical walking inspection and an FRA Class 1 brake test on all cars that did not derail. Post-accident inspections and tests of the non-derailed cars in the train revealed very few exceptions (defects). All cars inspected and tested revealed good integrity of the train air brake system. All brakes applied and released as designed. None of the conditions observed on the cars were causal regarding the train accident.

Investigators examined the derailed tank cars, truck assemblies and 80-wheel sets after the post recovery. All wheels were found to be intact except for two broken wheels found to be fractured (derailment damage). Several wheels showed indications of thermal exposure consistent with the

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tank car fire. None of the wheels from cars behind the 20<sup>th</sup> car from the lead locomotives exhibited any horizontal wheel marks on the wheel tread.

#### **Damage Estimates**

UP has estimated the damage to the equipment about \$1.4 million.

#### **In-Service Tank Car Net Braking Ratio Testing**

On June 19, 2017, two NTSB investigators traveled to the Trinity Rail tank car maintenance facility in Saginaw, TX to witness in-service tank car net braking ratio (NBR) tests on three (3) exemplar undamaged tank cars from accident train UEGKOT-09. The brake system tests were conducted in response to an NTSB request to quantify tank car NBR values for representative inservice cars. The results of the testing are presented in the official docket for this investigation.

					1	Deliver to: OSUE531		
S	Site Monitor's AEI Consist Information							
	(Head to Rear)							
-		,						
Train ID: UE	GKOT 09		Date	e/Tim	ie: 03/1	10/17 00:26		
Site: 509 Est	therville East		Circ	7: DR	058			
-								
Locomotive	5							
SEQ NBR	CAR NBR TYPE EC	).OR	AXLE	S FU	EL SPER	ED_TAG ST		
001	UP 005666 D A	6	N/A	23	G			
002	UP 008376 D A	6	N/A	23	G			
103	LIP 008037 D B	6	N/A	30	G			
-	01 00000.0 2							
Rail Equipm	ent							
SEO NBR	CAR NBR TYPE FC	OR	AXLE	S PLT	FFM SPF	FED TAG ST CVR/DYN/RAW		
001	GACX 056766 R A	4	1	24	G			
002	CITX 220168 B B	4	1	24	G	Sequence numbers (non-derailed front portion of		
003	TCRY 192256 R A	4	1	24	G	Train Symbol UEGKOT-09) in yellow highlight		
004	TCRX 193731 R R	4	1	24	G	exhibited horizontal marks on the wheel tread		
005	TCRY 192230 R A	4	1	24	G	(south rail) as follows:		
005	TUY 220113 R R	4	1	24	G	004 - L2, L3		
007		4	1	24	G	007 - L2		
007	TILV 109242 P	4	1	24	G	008 - L2		
008		4	1	24	G	010 - R4, R3		
009		4	1	24	G	011 - R4, R3, R2, R1		
010		4	1	24	G	012 - R4, R2		
011		4	1	24	G	013 - R4, R2, R1		
012	DBUX 302558 KA	4	1	25	G	014 - L1, L2, L3		
013	TILX 199805 K A	4	1	25	G	015 - L1, L4		
014	TILX 318593 K B	4	1	25	G	016 - L1, L2, L4		
015	DBUX 301604 KB	4	1	25	G	017 - L1, L2, L3, L4		
016	TILX 199046 R B	4	1	25	G	019 - L1, L3, L4		
017	TCBX 198068 R B	4	1	25	G	020 - R4, R3, R2, R1; B-end, knuckle broke		
018	TILX 198094 R B	4	1	25	G			
019	DBUX 302412 R B	4	1	25	G			
020	TCBX 198115 R A	4	1	25	G			
021	DBUX 301674 R A	4	1	25	G	Sequence numbers 21 through 29 were derailed		
022	TAEX 002893 R A	4	1	26	G	as follows:		
023	TILX 199147 R A	4	1	26	G	21 - burned, lving on left side		
024	TCBX 198194 R A	4	1	26	G	22 - burned, breached, nearly inverted, in water		
025	CTCX 732108 R B	4	1	26	G	23 - burned. lving on its side, in water		
026	TILX 197694 R A	4	1	26	G	24 - burned, nearly inverted, in water		
027	DBUX 302834 R B	4	1	26	G	25 - burned, overturned about 90 degrees, partially		
028	DBUX 302746 R B	4	1	26	G	underneath 28		
029	TAEX 002909 R B	4	1	26	G	26 - burned, overturned about 90 degrees		
						27 - breached, nearly inverted		
						28 - overriding listing about 45 degrees in water		

29 - burned, AEI read issue with GATX 203812

							as follow 30 - activ
030	WCHX 030078 R		Δ	4	1	26	about 10
031	WCHX 030098 R		Α	4	1	26	31 - activ
032	TILX 199819 R A	4	1	26	G		32 - burn
033	TILX 195202 R A	4	1	26	G		33 - burn
034	CTCX 731383 B B	4	1	27	G		34 - burn
035	TILX 195386 B A	4	1	27	G		35 - A-er
036	CTCX 731997 B A	4	1	27	G		36 - burn
037	TILX 197615 R Δ	4	1	27	G		37 - A-er
038	TILX 199168 R R	4	1	27	G		38 - A-er
039	TILX 191239 B B	4	1	27	G		degrees
040	DBUX 301606 B B	4	1	27	Ğ		39 - A-er
040	TILX 199067 B A	4	1	27	G		40 - B-er
042	DBUX 302766 R B	4	1	27	G		
042	TCRY 198257 R A	4	1	27	G		0
043	TILX 199462 R R	4	1	27	G		Sequend
044	WCHX 030062 R	-	R	4	1	27	deralled.
046	UTLX 210649 R A	4	1	27	Ĝ	27	
047	TCBX 198147 R A	4	1	27	G		
048	CTCX 731722 R B	4	1	27	G		
049	TILX 198350 R B	4	1	28	G		
050	TILX 194940 R A	4	1	28	G		
051	TILX 197761 R B	4	1	28	Ğ		
052	CTCX 731432 R A	4	1	28	G		
053	TILX 198216 R A	4	1	28	G		
054	TILX 198282 R A	4	1	28	G		
055	TILX 194948 R A	4	1	28	G		
056	TILX 198035 R A	4	1	28	G		
057	TILX 192027 R A	4	1	28	G		
058	DBUX 302744 R B	4	1	28	G		
059	DBUX 302714 R A	4	1	28	G		
060	TILX 198364 R B	4	1	28	G		
061	TILX 195238 R A	4	1	28	G		
062	CTCX 732482 R A	4	1	28	G		
063	DBUX 300569 R B	4	1	28	G		
064	TILX 199980 R A	4	1	28	G		
065	WCHX 030063 R		А	4	1	28	G
066	TCBX 197606 R B	4	1	29	G		
067	TEIX 030133 R B	4	1	29	G		
068	TILX 198681 R B	4	1	29	G		
069	TILX 194336 R A	4	1	29	G		
070	DBUX 302767 R A	4	1	29	G		
071	TILX 199160 R A	4	1	29	G		
072	CTCX 731749 R B	4	1	29	G		
073	TCBX 198126 R A	4	1	29	G		

Sequence numbers 30 through 40 were derailed
as follows:
30 - active fire, breached, severely buckled, listing
about 10 degrees
31 - active fire, overriding
32 - burned, breached
33 - burned, breached, listing about 22 degrees
34 - burned, upright
35 - A-end, end crushed (no apparent penetration)
36 - burned, breached, listing about 22 degrees
37 - A-end, B-end, derailed, upright
38 - A-end, B-end, derailed, listing about 22
degrees
39 - A-end, B-end, derailed, upright
40 - B-end (lead truck), derailed, upright

Sequence numbers 41 through 100 were not derailed.

074	TCBX 197631 R B	4	1	29	G
075	TILX 320122 R B	4	1	29	G
076	DBUX 300858 R A	4	1	29	G
077	TILX 198558 R B	4	1	29	G
078	SHPX 208992 R A	4	1	29	G
079	TILX 195016 R A	4	1	29	G
080	TILX 198660 R B	4	1	29	G
081	CITX 220196 R A	4	1	29	G
082	SHPX 208987 R B	4	1	29	G
083	TILX 198279 R B	4	1	30	G
084	TILX 197582 R B	4	1	30	G
085	TILX 195097 R A	4	1	30	G
086	CTCX 731430 R B	4	1	30	G
087	TILX 198160 R A	4	1	30	G
088	TCBX 198183 R A	4	1	30	G
089	TILX 199577 R A	4	1	30	G
090	TILX 199545 R B	4	1	30	G
091	TCBX 199295 R A	4	1	30	G
092	TAEX 001134 R B	4	1	30	G
093	TAEX 001187 R A	4	1	30	R
094	TCBX 198191 R B	4	1	30	G
095	DBUX 208809 R A	4	1	30	G
096	TILX 199808 R B	4	1	30	G
097	TILX 199176 R B	4	1	30	G
098	TILX 193912 R B	4	1	30	G
099	DBUX 302126 R B	4	1	30	G
100	MP 718012 R A	4	1	30	G

End Of Train Equipment NONE.

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