

CUI

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Standard Form 901 (11-18)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO | 32 CFR 2002

CUI

[Redacted]

17 Sep 6

Interview with [Redacted] (b) (6)

Date of Interview: 17 Sep 6

Time of Interview: 1125

Interviewers: [Redacted] (b) (6)

Respondent: [Redacted]

interviewer: Good morning. I'm [Redacted]. I am the senior investigating officer for the US Coast Guard Activities Far East. Under the authorities of Title 46 US code 6301 and Title 46 CFR Part 4 an investigation is being conducted into the circumstances of the collision between the USS John S McCain and the ALNIC MC which occurred on August 21, 2017. This investigation is intended to determine the cause of casualty to the extent possible and to obtain information for the purpose of preventing similar casualties in the future. To assist with the accuracy of our investigation we will be recording today's interview, which is taking place on September 6, 2017 at 11:25. The individuals assisting me on this investigation will now introduce themselves.

interviewer: I'm [Redacted] (b) (6), Deck Watch Officer SME from Coast Guard headquarters.

interviewer: [Redacted]. I'm part of the Navy Safety Investigation Board.

interviewer: [Redacted], US Coast Guard Investigations Center of Expertise.

interviewer: [Redacted] Investigations National Center of Expertise.

interviewer: If we could begin the interview by stating your name, your day to day position on board the vessel as well as any watch standing billets.

respondent: [Redacted]. I'm the Auxiliaries Officer and the Electrical Officer on board. That day I was standing Junior Officer of the Watch.

interviewer: How long have you been in the Navy?

respondent: Since May of 2016.

interviewer: Is the McCain your first vessel?

17 Sep 6

respondent: Yes sir.

interviewer: And when did you come on board?

respondent: August or 2016.

interviewer: Your training period, was that OCS or?

respondent: Uh, I commissioned through ROTC.

interviewer: ROTC. Okay. Officer of which program? At which school?

respondent: Uh, Marquette University.

interviewer: So you've been on board the vessel for a while now, (low speaking) August 16, 2016, okay. So, you've been on board roughly a year. You've seen the normal operations of the vessel. Explain to me what would be like a normal day.

respondent: Uh, a normal day underway?

interviewer: Uh-um.

respondent: For the vessel, for yourself?

interviewer: For yourself.

respondent: Uh, wake up, go to quarters, go to the OPS Intel brief if we're underway. Take care of any admin, lunch, watch somewhere, somewhere during the day, study for quals. That's mostly what I was doing underway.

interviewer: Okay. How would you describe the pace, the pace of work?

respondent: Uh, it's busy, depending on what we're doing.

interviewer: 20 hour days? 16? What's a standard time for a day?

[REDACTED] 17 Sep 6

respondent: Um, I guess I probably get about five or six hours of sleep a night so just throughout that, the watch and the working hours. And then again some of it was more of just staying up to study for quals, not necessarily as part of my job on board.

interviewer: Leading up to the week before the 21st, was there an increase in operations? Routine day?

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] So, busy but not moreso than usual.

interviewer: Again, you said you're the JOOW for the watch. What are the normal duties of that position?

respondent: Um, so on a normal underway watch, um, the way my bridge team broke it down, I would be doing (sneezing) the MoBoards, looking at the 73, the radar, making contact reports to the Captain, other internal communications with COMBAT or CCS.

interviewer: Okay. And so you said that's normal. On the morning of the 21st was it not normal?

respondent: Um, so we had already set the modified navigation detail, so the Shipping Officer had come to the bridge. He was an OS, so he was on the radar.

interviewer: Okay. So then what do your responsibilities become?

respondent: So, I was doing some more of the internal communications, passing speed changes to COMBAT, helping the Junior Officer of the Deck with the entering report checklist. I had been talking on bridge-to-bridge trying to get ahold of the Singapore pilots.

[REDACTED]

17 Sep 6

interviewer: So external COMMS as well?

respondent: Yes, sir.

interviewer: And when did your watch begin?

respondent: Uh, around 0140.

interviewer: So, you had the 02 to 07?

respondent: Yes sir.

interviewer: Subject matter expert will take over from here.

interviewer: Okay. Um, between about 0200 and reveille, 0500 as we understand it, um, were there any systems casualties on the bridge that you recall?

respondent: No, sir.

interviewer: Any major faults on the steering, anything like that?

respondent: No, sir.

interviewer: Okay. Following, please describe as much as you can between 0500 and the loss of steering, in as much detail as you can, understanding that what we're trying to identify here is, um, safety issues that we can point out and disseminate for people's learning to prevent these sorts of things from happening.

respondent: Um, so, personally I was, like I said, I was doing a lot of the internal communications, trying to help the JOOD run the checklist.

interviewer: Okay.

[REDACTED]

17 Sep 6

respondent: Mostly what I was doing in that window, from 0500 to the loss of steering, I spent a lot of time trying to get ahold of the Singapore pilots on bridge-to-bridge. We never did get a solid

interviewer: What channel were you on?

respondent: I think it was 12, but I'm not 100% sure.

interviewer: What, do you remember what frequencies you were monitoring on the bridge?

respondent: On bridge-to-bridge? I think 16 and 12 is what we were probably on.

interviewer: 16 and 12. How many frequencies can you monitor in the bridge?

respondent: Two.

interviewer: Two. Okay. So you were reaching out on channel 12? You're fairly confident about that?

respondent: I believe so.

interviewer: Okay. Okay. No joy.

respondent: We hear them go out to us once or twice but never in direct response to us, trying to raise them. So we never had a good, a good communications, no.

interviewer: So, heard them but heard them reach out but not in response. Okay. Do you remember roughly when you were gonna pick up the pilot?

respondent: 0630 was the pilot pick up time.

interviewer: Okay, 0630. Okay. Uh, were you for modified NAV detail were you participating in any of the contact management stuff that you normally do during underway steaming?

17 Sep 6

respondent: Um, I'd go and check with the Shipping Officer just periodically see what it looked like, but no, it was mostly

interviewer: Okay. Kind of in passing. Okay. What was your understanding of the shipping picture?

respondent: Um, it was busy.

interviewer: Sure. Okay. Um, describe to me in as much detail as you can loss of steering and your actions and your participation in helping to stabilize that situation.

respondent: Uh, so they called away loss of steering, or the CON, not the CON, the Helm reported loss of steering. Um the OOD ordered them to pass it over the 1MC which they did. The CON ordered them to switch to the standby steering units, which is accordance which is how we are supposed to handle that.

interviewer: Standby

respondent: I'm sorry the standby steering units. So we have four units, alphas and bravos. The HPU is back in back, back in aft.

interviewer: The CON ordered, okay. Did the CON order them to go into emergency, to backup manual?

respondent: Uh, he may have, but I didn't hear him at that point.

interviewer: Okay.

respondent: Um, I heard the CO turn on the tasking lights, the red over red. Me and NAV both went to do that. NAV got there first, turned them on. They came on, I saw them from the bridge wing.

interviewer: Okay.

17 Sep 6

respondent: And then I went to grab the, the headset so we could get into COMMS with whoever went back to aft steering. It was the BMOW had already grabbed the, uh, there's an IVCS, the internal phone system.

interviewer: You grab COMMS?

respondent: No, the BMOW grabbed the IVCS, the handset that kind of like a phone with a dial up pad, and he was trying to get in touch, in communications with aft steering that way. We also have, on the bridge, headsets that can plug into a jack in the wall. I went to get that.

interviewer: Okay.

respondent: Plugged that in. At some point someone jumped on the lee helm, not entirely sure who that was. So the lee helm had thrust control. Uh, I also remember the Captain ordering CON to come down in speed. I believe he ordered 5 knots.

interviewer: Okay. I'm sorry, somebody jumped on the lee helm, you're not sure who.

respondent: Yes sir.

interviewer: Okay. And then lee helm took thrust control?

respondent: Um, I don't really remember if they did the whole commission from the CON thing or not, but at some point, thrust control went to lee helm.

interviewer: When you say it went to lee helm, how do you know that it went to lee helm?

respondent: Cause the guy standing at the lee helm station was moving the, he was touching the screen to change the speed.

interviewer: Okay.

Page 7 of 25

17 Sep 6

respondent: So, I got the headset on, tried to get communications with aft steering. Uh, we never really did get a good, good COMMS established with them. Um, at one point, I remember the rudder being left, and we wanted it over right. People were trying to correct that. I don't know if that was someone in aft steering mistakenly going left instead of right or if that was, because they didn't have control. Um, the only really good, good word I got from aft steering was that they had put the LCUs in uh local, and that's how they were trying to steer. So, my impression was that when they switched it back to aft steering they never actually regained control of the console.

interviewer: So, I'm sorry, say that part of that again. You're perception is that they never...

respondent: Right, so I

interviewer: ...had console control in aft steering?

respondent: Right, because if they had I don't know why they would have put the LCUs in local.

interviewer: Okay.

respondent: Um, but I do distinctly remember getting word from aft steering LCUs are in local. And it was very shortly after that that we collided.

interviewer: Okay. Did you make any pipes? Sound any ship's whistle or make any other external broadcasts?

respondent: Prior to the collision, not that I'm aware of.

interviewer: Okay. Do you know if anybody else on the bridge did?

respondent: Not that I'm aware. I didn't, I didn't manipulate the ship's whistle or go on bridge-to-bridge or anything like that.

17 Sep 6

interviewer: Do you know who you had COMMS with on the IVCS headset?

respondent: I don't. Whoever manned up aft steering.

interviewer: Okay. What's your best estimate of time between loss of steering and collision?

respondent: Three to five minutes.

interviewer: (low speaking) BMOW, calling aft steering. Um. Did you watch, uh, walk out on the bridge wing at all so you could get visual on the approaching contact

respondent: Uh, the only time I went on the bridge wing was right when we lost it and the Captain asked for the red over red, the tasking lights to go on.

interviewer: Okay.

respondent: Right after that.

interviewer: Were you able to see the...

respondent: Yes, I was able to see the red over red. After that I went back in and...

interviewer: ...I'm sorry, not the red over red, were you able to see the, the container ship?

respondent: ...No, I went out to the starboard bridge wing.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: Do you know if the LCUs were placed back in remote at any time?

respondent: I don't know. Uh, actually they must have been because they had the console back up.

17 Sep 6

interviewer: Once the LCUs are placed in mobile, regardless of anything going up on the consoles, they cannot move the steering?

respondent: No, once the LCUs are in local that's where steering control is at.

interviewer: Okay. Immediately upon impact, immediately afterward, what was your participation in the response?

respondent: On the bridge, I didn't really have participation at that point. Um, they first sounded the collision alarm and then they sounded general quarters.

interviewer: And this is all after the collision?

respondent: It's all over the collision. Um, DCA shortly after the GQ was sounded, got on the 1MC did the whole this is Damage Control Assistant, you know, man general quarters and that's when I left the bridge to man my, my GQ station.

interviewer: Where is that?

respondent: Uh, rep 5, the repair locker.

interviewer: Okay. Did you at any point observe the console at the helm or at lee helm during this trouble shooting of loss of steering?

respondent: Not closely. I mean, I was standing behind the consoles but the Helmsman, the Lee Helmsman and the BMOW were in front of me.

interviewer: Okay. How long have you been standing the JOOW watch?

respondent: Um, not long, maybe a month.

interviewer: Um, the, um, on the bridge when you're, when you're doing watch changing that sort of thing for the enlisted side BMOW, Helm lookout, all that stuff, how does, how does that process work?

[REDACTED]

17 Sep 6

respondent: Generally for the helm we rotate through a couple different Helmsman in any one like watch period. So they'll report to the CON and they'll do the Sir, permission to relieve the Helmsman. And they'll list off the course and speed, which HPUs are online, what the plant configuration is, full power, split plant, trail shaft.

interviewer: Okay. So, the Helmsman will normally get permission to relieve directly from the Conning Officer.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Is that the same way during the initial like section swap out or is that, or does like the BMOW

respondent: Uh, so the BMOW will go to the OOD and that's how they turn it over.

interviewer: Okay.

respondent: But the CON just go to, not the CON, the Helms go to the CON.

interviewer: So BMOW goes to OOD. Helm goes to CON. How about the lookouts?

respondent: So the lookouts and the Helm are the same people. As they rotate from the Helm they go to stand the gap. It's just kinda rotates through.

interviewer: Okay. So if I'm relieving you, if you have the Helm and I'm relieving you I get permission from the CON.

respondent: And then you take the Helm.

interviewer: I take the Helm and then you...

respondent: ...go either.

interviewer: simply head out to the Helm or to the lookout?

17 Sep 6

respondent: Yes, either the bridge wings or the aft lookout. And then the BMOW rotates them through. He runs the rotation.

interviewer: But you don't, you don't relieve to be a lookout?

respondent: No.

interviewer: That's not a relief process. Okay. What about for JOOW, are you, do you relieve via the OOD?

respondent: Yes sir.

interviewer: Okay. JOOD also goes to the OOD?

respondent: Yes sir.

interviewer: And CON I assume as well.

respondent: Uh, unless we are doing a special evolution then they go to the Captain, but normally yes, the OOD.

interviewer: Okay. (speaking low) Uh, the CON, all three of them go to the CO during special evolution or just the CON?

respondent: Uh, just the, just the CON.

interviewer: Okay. Do you guys ever get busy on the bridge and do the OOD or the Conning Officer say something to the effect of relieve on station, sort of thing?

respondent: I've never heard that phrase before sir.

interviewer: Okay. You've never heard like the Conning Officer delegate to the BMOW say hey, I'm driving right now, go ahead and swap out the Helmsman?

17 Sep 6

respondent: Uh, no. Generally, if it's that busy we wouldn't be switching people out like that.

interviewer: Okay. What was the bridge, was it fairly quiet at the time? Crowded? Was it?

respondent: No, it was fairly quiet, fairly. I mean, not, not at all crowded.

interviewer: Not at all crowded.

respondent: We had the extra watch standers for the modified navigation detail but other than that it was just the normal watch standing.

interviewer: Standard watch standing, okay. You said the CO, following the loss of steering, the CO ordered 5 knots?

respondent: Uh, I believe so.

interviewer: Okay. Did you observe a change in the ship's heading or anything like that following the loss of steering?

respondent: Uh, I do remember us moving left, just by the way the lights were moving.

interviewer: Okay. Were you, uh, did you communicate that to the CO, or the CON or the OOD?

respondent: Uh, they were, they seemed to be very well aware that we were moving away from where we should be.

interviewer: Okay. It was clear to them.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Okay. That's all I got.

Page 13 of 25

17 Sep 6

interviewer: So just a couple of questions of things that came up in my notes here. Um, again you said you were reaching out to pilots on channel 12. Just for clarification, was that the, so pilots is the Singapore Pilot station for the pilots that are going to bring you into the port?

respondent: Yes, we were trying to confirm the pilot pick up time.

interviewer: Uh, that channel, that VHF channel was that in the NAV brief?

respondent: Yes, that would have been in the NAV brief.

interviewer: Then, is there also a VTS call in that needs to be done?

respondent: Um, so there is. Honestly, I don't remember the name of it, but prior to the collision I had been talking to the Navigator and he said hey at 0530 you need to call these people when we're perpendicular to this area, and he pointed on the BMS, the electronic chart. Like when we reach this spot call, and I believe that's the VTS check in you're talking about.

interviewer: So the Navigator is the one who puts up the channels for the NAV brief?

respondent: Um, he's responsible for putting the NAV brief together. I don't know where he gets the channel information from.

interviewer: But, he's responsible for putting the NAV brief together?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Would you know what channel (coughing in the room) you were supposed to be on that 0530 call.

17 Sep 6

respondent: I don't remember. It was all, I had the NAV brief there on the bridge. I was going off that so, but I don't know off the top of my head what channel was gonna be.

interviewer: So, again, you were helping to utilize the, the radio, bridge-to-bridge whatnot. Did you make any communications to any other vessels?

respondent: Um, prior to loss of steering or just in general?

interviewer: Just in general.

respondent: No, I didn't.

interviewer: Are you aware of any general announcements, uh, just to shipping in general, uh, regarding the loss of steering?

respondent: I'm not aware of any, no.

interviewer: Did you hold the bridge position for either of the previous two UNREPS with the [REDACTED]?

respondent: The [REDACTED]. Um, I believe I was Helm Safety Officer on the first one, and I was one of the Alongside CONs on the second one. Wait, no. I was definitely an Alongside CON on the immediately prior one. I can't remember where I was at for...

interviewer: Was that like the 7th day of August then?

respondent: I think so. Whatever the last UNREP we did prior to...

interviewer: So, as I understand, you had one around the 7th and one around the 15th.

respondent: That sounds about right.

17 Sep 6

interviewer: So you were Alongside CON for...?

respondent: For the most recent one. I'm not sure where I was at for the other one.

interviewer: Alongside CON. During that particular evolution do you remember any sort of feedback about any close approach or anything like that?

respondent: Close approach? Uh, I know that after the break away when we were trying to get into position for boat OPS with them I guess we crossed their bow pretty close. I wasn't actually on the bridge at that point though. After I was finished Conning, I belayed below.

interviewer: Okay. Did that get, did that particular situation get debriefed or anything like that?

respondent: It did. The entire detail a debrief so that was part of the debrief.

interviewer: That was a discussion about crossing too closely? Okay. Any other notable observations from your experience Conning alongside, for that evolution?

respondent: It seemed pretty tense, and I think that was probably due to it being a nighttime evolution.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: (incomprehensible) Are you Aux or Electric?

respondent: Uh, so I'm the Auxiliary Officer and also the Electrical Officer. They're not, it's not always combined as one job, but I just, both of those divisions, sir, are under me.

interviewer: What systems do they take care of?

respondent: So, Auxiliary side, the ACs, the reefers, the steering units, um, some of the fire pumps, some of the seawater service pumps, and a lot of the galley

17 Sep 6

equipment. As far as the electricians, I mean, really anything electrical. They have some hand in the, um, switchboards. That's most of it.

interviewer: So, they take care of the steering wheel too I imagine?

respondent: Uh, yes, that's A-gang equipment.

interviewer: Has there been any problems with the HPUs or anything like that?

respondent: Um, so we have had, we get minor and major faults. We've never lost steering from those. Sometimes we would just kick off an HPU and then the standbys would come up. Uh, that had been happening for, for a while. All the faults I always saw it was called a LAN communications error which would not have been the Auxiliary side of the house. That would have been on the ETs. We also had high hydraulic oil temps as something that was noted during our, uh, MCI inspection back in May. So that had been a problem, uh, on the bravo units. But again, it never caused a loss of steering in the past. And I don't know if it even would cause loss of steering. I don't know the technical side well enough.

interviewer: What are the thresholds between a major and a minor fault? What classifies each?

respondent: I'm not 100% sure on that. It's just what pops up on the console. It will say minor or major. I'm not sure what the criteria is though.

interviewer: Okay. Thank you.

interviewer: So you said you've been standing JOOW for about a month. What was your bridge watch standing positions before that?

respondent: Uh, Conning Officer.

interviewer: And how long were you standing that?

17 Sep 6

respondent: The rest of my time on board except for a period, in the, on the winter patrol when I was standing watch in COMBAT to get that qual.

interviewer: Okay. So all together about how much time have you stood CON?

respondent: Uh, I guess underway that would have been about six months.

interviewer: Is there CON qualification? PQS? Anything you have to go through, a board?

respondent: Uh, no, there's no board. It's the starting position for Junior Officers, BDOC, the Basic Division Officer Course. You run through simulators.

interviewer: How about for JOOW? Same thing? Any PQS?

respondent: No, there's no PQS for that.

interviewer: Were you the primary person doing external COMMS or were you just kinda helping out?

respondent: Uh, we never really designated a person for that. I was just doing it because I wasn't really doing anything else. The radar was taken by Shipping. So, I was more or less free to do that.

interviewer: Okay. You would say that you were primarily the one doing it or was it kinda like...

respondent: No, it was primarily.

interviewer: So, based on your experience as Conning Officer in the event of a loss of steering, what is your procedure?

respondent: So, um, it changes a little bit if we're in RMD but at the time we weren't so you're gonna switch to the standby power units, the standby HPUs. If the steering is not regained you switch to backup manual, and then you send it down to

17 Sep 6

[REDACTED]

aft steering. And from there if they don't regain it, LCUs, if LCUs don't regain it hit the fill and drain pump. If the fill and drain pump doesn't work you go to the hand crank. From the hand crank you go to ratchets to ratchet the rudder into position.

interviewer: So when the loss of steering was reported or called out did you, what calls do you recall being said by the CON?

respondent: Uh, I remember the CON saying switch to standby HPUs.

interviewer: Following that?

respondent: Uh, it's the only thing I recall hearing him say. But I wasn't really standing close to the CON at the time.

interviewer: Okay. Where were you standing?

respondent: Okay, so when they initially called it I was on the starboard side of the bridge, um, I don't know 5 feet back from the VMS console, kinda by the quartermaster's table.

interviewer: And where was the CON?

respondent: He would have been centerline by the Polaris.

interviewer: You said the CO was on the bridge?

respondent: Yes sir.

interviewer: And was the CO giving orders directly?

respondent: Uh, no he was not.

interviewer: So, and correct me if I'm wrong, you said the CO ordered 5 knots?

[REDACTED]

17 Sep 6

respondent: After we lost steering he, well he told the CON and the CON ordered 5 knots.

interviewer: Did you hear a call back on that, uh, 5 knots?

respondent: I believe so, sir.

interviewer: And who do you think gave the, uh, the 5-knot call back?

respondent: I think it was whoever jumped on the lee helm station.

interviewer: Do you remember who was lee helm? Or who had been on that station?

respondent: I don't know who that was.

interviewer: Can you give a description?

respondent: Uh, he was shorter than me, but I wasn't really paying attention to who he was.

interviewer: At any time did you see what the panels were showing, the control panels for helm and lee helm?

respondent: Uh, I distinctly remember at one point it having a left rudder.

interviewer: And which station was that?

respondent: Uh, that was the Helm station.

interviewer: Did you ever see anything on the lee helm station?

respondent: No, I didn't. They'll show the same, the same display.

interviewer: Do you ever look at the throttles, throttle display to see if it was 5 knots, lined up, not lined up?

17 Sep 6

respondent: No, I don't recall what the throttle indicated.

interviewer: If someone is gonna standup the lee helm station who is it that switches between the two?

respondent: I'm sorry. I don't understand the question.

interviewer: So, normal watch the Helm and lee helm is all being done by the helm station, is that correct?

respondent: Yes sir.

interviewer: Okay. So, you said somebody jumped on the lee helm station.

respondent: There really is no set procedure for someone just jumping on the lee helm station. Um, if we call away loss of steering generally a lee helm qualified person will come to the bridge just like someone will go man up aft steering. But, there's like no one on the bridge team that is designated to go man lee helm.

interviewer: Is there any reporting in that says I've got lee helm?

respondent: Yeah, so they would report thrust control to the lee helm station.

interviewer: And that's for?

respondent: That's a report to the Conning Officer.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: And then how do they, how would they take control? Is it, does the Boatswain Mate change that? Does the helm station change that? Does the lee helm get on and take it themselves? What is?

17 Sep 6

respondent: So, the helm station will offer it basically. So there is a, like a menu that shows who's got it. You click on it, and it will give you all the options who can take it. You click lee helm. It will start flashing on the lee helm station and they take it.
(Coughing)

interviewer: Okay. When you say options, do you get to like pick and choose what you want? Does it all go at once? Is there

respondent: No, it will all go at once, which station can have it, is the options I was talking about. So the helm station, lee helm station, or it can be down in central.

interviewer: Is there, so you're giving the throttles, is it one throttle at a time? Can you give both throttles? Can you, like

respondent: Like it does one, one I guess shaft at a time.

interviewer: And what about steering. If you need to change steering over, is that one pump at a time? Does the steering go over?

respondent: No, all steering goes at once.

interviewer: So, again, so throttles are one at a time. Steering is both pumps go together. Can you do steering and throttle at the same time or is that the same? So, like throttle, throttle, steering.

respondent: Right. You have to, you have to indicate that all, all separately.

interviewer: And then, uh, is there like a send all button?

respondent: No. There's an emergency override button that will send steering to aft steering, but there's no send everything to one console.

interviewer: What is that emergency override button?

17 Sep 6

respondent: Uh, so there's one on the bridge. It's just a button above, above where the Helm stands that will send steering back to aft steering.

interviewer: Is it red?

respondent: I think so. And then there's another button in aft steering that will take control.

interviewer: Okay, so pushing the red button sends it to aft steering.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: And that same button, in aft steering does the same thing, it brings it to aft steering.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: So, if you're on the bridge and you accidentally hit that button.

respondent: It would be very hard to accidentally hit it, but yes it would, it would send it.

interviewer: Okay. How do you get it back to the bridge?

respondent: Aft steering has to, well someone on the console in aft steering has to send it back to bridge.

interviewer: You can't bring it back from

respondent: No, you can't forcibly take it from aft steering.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: How do you know those procedures, as far as who sends everything back and forth?

17 Sep 6

respondent: Uh, there's an EOSS procedure for all of it, and then it's always briefed like NAV. NAV briefs the procedures for loss of steering. It's just something you're kinda expected to know as a watch stander.

interviewer: So, during this whole time, again there's quite a few people along the bridge, what was the OOD and JOOD doing on the report of loss of steering?

respondent: I honestly don't know what the JOOD was doing, I don't recall. The OOD was with the CON and the Captain. She had ordered them to pass over the 1MC loss of steering, man aft steering, which they did. And then so the OOD and the CON and the Captain at one point moved to the port bridge wing. At one point they moved back in. I don't recall if they went back out to the bridge wing or not.

interviewer: Did you realize there was a vessel aft and port to the McCain?

respondent: Uh, I knew there were vessels in that area. I couldn't have told you how close the nearest one was though.

interviewer: Was there anything on the bridge that led you to believe that a collision was imminent?

respondent: Um, no.

interviewer: Definitely appreciate your time here today and all the information you've provided to us. We want to open the floor to you in case there's any questions that you have for us, or anything information that you'd like to share that did not come up in our interview today.

respondent: No, sir, I don't think there is.

interviewer: Okay. If you do come up with any additional questions or something comes to mind, uh, later on, please feel free to reach out to us. We'd be glad to sit down and talk with you again, get that information from you. Additionally, as the investigation is ongoing we ask that you not discuss this interview with other crew



17 Sep 6

members simply to ensure that all stories and memories are kept separate and we don't start mixing details together. Thanks so much for your time.