

CUI

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CUI

(b) (6)

17 Aug 30

Interview with (b) (6) (USN)

Date of Interview: 17 Aug 30

Time of Interview: 1421

Interviewers: (b) (6) (USCG), (b) (6) (USCG), (b) (6)

(NCOE), (b) (6) (USN)

Respondent: (b) (6)

interviewer: So Again, good afternoon, I'm (b) (6). I'm the senior investigating officer for US Coast Guard Activities Far East. Under the authorities of title 46 US code 6301 and title 46 CFR part 4, an investigation is being conducted into the circumstances of the collision between the USS John S McCain and the ALNIC MC which occurred on August 21, 2017. This investigation is intended to determine the cause of the casualty to the extent possible and to obtain information for the purpose of preventing similar casualties in the future. To assist with the accuracy of our investigation we will be recording today's interview which is taking place on August 30, 2017 at 1421. The members of our team here today will go ahead and introduce themselves.

interviewer: I am (b) (6), deck watch officer SME from Coast Guard headquarters.

interviewer: I'm (b) (6) with the Investigations National Center of Expertise in New Orleans.

interviewer: (b) (6). I'm with SURFPAC Safety. I'm part of the safety investigation board.

interviewer: So, to begin here, if you could please state your name and spellings and then your day-to-day assignment as well as your watch standing billet.

respondent: I'm (b) (6), supervise the E3 and below deck seaman. Underway stand Boatswain Mate of the Watch.

interviewer: How long have you been in the Navy?

respondent: A little over two years.

interviewer: And is the McCain your first vessel?

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respondent: Uh, no. I'm just TAD.

interviewer: What is your normal vessel then?

respondent: The USS Antietam.

interviewer: So, you hang out with [REDACTED]?

respondent: That is correct.

interviewer: And so, when did you come aboard the McCain?

respondent: The first day of the underway, I want to say May 27th.

interviewer: So, you've had a couple uh couple months here getting used to the destroyer, seeing their different routes and the work they do. Uh if you could, what what's your day daily work like regards to watch and just deck work?

respondent: So normally between watches and doing topside preservation, painting, scraping paint, and then you're watch you have about two watches a day, three watch sections, 5 on, 10 off.

interviewer: Okay. And so, this daily routine in the past week or so, have you had anything out of the ordinary like extra drills or things keeping you up 20 hours a day, special operations, anything?

respondent: In this past week since we've been here nothing.

interviewer: Okay. And let me clarify, the week before arriving in Singapore

respondent: The week before arriving in Singapore?

interviewer: Before the collision.

interviewer: Before the collision?

respondent: Before the collision? No, not not anything. Actually, we do general quarters every Saturday, but that's normal, once a week.

interviewer: Okay. So so more or less reveille to 1600 you've got something to do and then afterwards it's if you have watch you have watch, otherwise some rest periods.

respondent: Right.

interviewer: So, you again were Boatswain Mate of the Watch. What was your watch period on the 21st?

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respondent: Like the time?

interviewer: uh-um.

respondent: 2 to 7.

interviewer: 2 to 7. okay. And your duties as Boatswain Mate of the Watch are primarily?

respondent: Make sure the off-going section gets relieved, make sure the oncoming section is in the correct uniform, clean appearance. Make sure they are on time, doing what they are supposed to be doing.

interviewer: Uh-um. So, managing the other watch, the enlisted watch standers?

respondent: Right.

interviewer: Uh, when you when you had your changeover, who was the previous Boatswain Mate of the Watch?

respondent: The Boatswain Mate of the Watch I relieved was [REDACTED].

interviewer: And when you relieved [REDACTED] anything particular in the watch changeover that uh, anything unusual, either equipment failures or anything that just was out of the ordinary?

respondent: Uh, I mean, there was you know a lot of contacts, very heavy traffic.

interviewer: uh-um. Is that one of the things that, do you ever like check your watch standers and say, do you go out on the (incomprehensible) yourself and look at contacts or?

respondent: Uh, occasionally.

interviewer: And as I'm sure you could see on the bridge from your position itself would you say, agree traffic was pretty busy?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: In your two years of sailing would you say it was a little higher than normal or?

respondent: Higher than like normal out at sea, yes. I mean, I understand it is like a shipping area so.

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Interviewer: Have you been to Singapore before?

respondent: Pulled in twice, never got to explore. It was only both times just in here for a day and then out.

Interviewer: Okay. Would you say the traffic looked normal for Singapore based on previous experiences?

respondent: Um, it was like over a year ago. I don't really remember.

Interviewer: That's fine.

Interviewer: You took over (clearing throat), you had the watch essentially the entire time of the incident, right?

respondent: Right.

Interviewer: Well before, um, can you start talking me through about half an hour to an hour before the collision, just cycling people through the watch. I understand that there were people that showed up earlier for chow reliefs and that sort of thing and just things that jumped out at you leading up to.

respondent: Um, yeah so, I guess you know reveille was an hour early so we needed, had to be up there early to relieve the watch so they could eat. Not anything that jumped out at me. Not like, there was nothing out of the ordinary. Uh, so yeah, I guess like the oncoming watch section was just starting to trickle in like you know one at a time and then they had maybe not even been up there five minutes before the incident.

Interviewer: Okay. So, talk me through.

respondent: So basically, [REDACTED] was out on the bridge wing, on the port bridge wing. He came in to, to relieve [REDACTED] who was on the helm and they wanted, as they after they turned over the Junior Officer Watch Team, well the Officer of the Deck, they wanted somebody standing by the lee helm to help with maneuvers and speed changes cause we were doing a lot. So, they had [REDACTED] stand at the lee helm and I said, or I asked the OOD so would it make sense for us to change thrust control from the helm to lee helm so one can focus on turn, like maneuvering and another can focus on speed changes, and they said go ahead and do that. And we were in the middle of switching port thrust control. So, I had pressed the button to send control of the port thrust to from helm to lee helm and that's when [REDACTED] called a loss of steering. And the OOD told me to pass it on the 1MC so I ran to the 1MC, passed loss of steering, man aft steering and within within a minute I think it was manned. [REDACTED] called and he asked me what was our distance to shoal water so I went to the Quartermaster of the Watch and asked him. He said about 2.2 nautical miles. And then I went back to the phone, told [REDACTED], and he said, he asked if we needed to man up the

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anchor detail. I said wait one, I set down the phone, and then I turned around, maybe took a step and before I could even ask was when we got hit.

interviewer: Okay. Are you, is it clear to you that or do you know whether the loss of steering if they went through trying to switch to HPUs or emergency manual before going to aft steering?

respondent: No because I went to, like I had to go to the 1MC, you know, so I was busy like passing words so I wasn't sure what.

interviewer: So, you're not totally sure okay. How much time would you estimate between [REDACTED] reporting the loss of steering and then the...?

respondent: The collision?

interviewer: The collision, yeah.

respondent: Um, not even two minutes.

interviewer: Okay. (Clears throat) Um, did did you sound the collision alarm?

respondent: Uh, after we got hit the XO I think just as at that time he had stepped out onto the bridge wing and then saw the collision, and he told me to sound it, so I uh sounded the...

interviewer: Okay, so it was right after.

interviewer: So it was, you are the one who sounded it?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: And the GQ alarm as well?

respondent: Yes, after I turned off the collision alarm and then set, they told me to set general quarters, so I did.

interviewer: And so that is your responsibility if they need to hit alarm it's the Boatswain Mate of the Watch who does that?

respondent: Right.

interviewer: There's only one activation point for those alarms?

respondent: Uh, in the bridge there is only one, but there's multiple stations throughout the ship.

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interviewer: But on the bridge, itself?

respondent: But on the bridge, itself there is only that right there.

interviewer: The CO was on the bridge?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: Was he there when you, at what point did he get to the bridge, do you remember?

respondent: He was...

interviewer: Well up there for a while?

respondent: He had been up there for a while.

interviewer: Okay.

respondent: At least a good couple hours before the incident.

interviewer: Was the XO up on the bridge as well or was he, when did he arrive?

respondent: Uh, I think he came just before the collision, like during the during the loss of steering, so between the time of loss of steering and the collision.

interviewer: Did you, when was your last round of the ship before before the collision?

respondent: What do you mean, last round?

interviewer: Like, do you do you do rounds of the ship as part of your your watch or are you on the bridge the whole time?

respondent: Oh, yeah, just on the bridge the whole time.

interviewer: Are you on the bridge the whole time? Okay. Do you remember who had the Con?

respondent: It was [REDACTED].

interviewer: And the JOOD?

respondent: JOOD? Uh, I don't remember.

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interviewer: OOD?

respondent: The OOD was [REDACTED].

interviewer: Can you spell that?

respondent: Uh, to the best of my ability, it is [REDACTED].

interviewer: Okay. (sigh). Were you aware of any systems casualties on the bridge before the before the incident? Like earlier in the watch, 0200, 0300, in there?

respondent: No.

interviewer: Anything like that? Loss of Nav 1 or loss of what are the other systems?

interviewer: Con1?

interviewer: Yeah, Con1, Nav1, Nav2, Nav3, anything like that?

respondent: I do remember them passing down on 1MC.

interviewer: Okay. Um, you you had not received report of a previous steering casualty earlier in the day or anything like that?

respondent: No.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: The communications when it was switched to aft steering were you up on the, you were up on the bridge during that time, right?

respondent: Uh, yes, I was up on the bridge.

interviewer: Was there a time that they lost communication with aft steering?

respondent: After the collision.

interviewer: It wasn't before?

respondent: Not that I remember. I do, I remember a point after the collision where the uh, they had trouble getting in touch with them because IVCS phone system went down.

interviewer: So, the IVCS phone system, it was up before the collision?

respondent: Yes and probably for several maybe three to five minutes after the collision before it went down.

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interviewer: The early reveille, you said it was one hour before.

respondent: Yes, 0500.

interviewer: Is that put out in plan of the day so everything was, pretty much everyone knew.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: IVCS 35 minutes after the collision went down, as far as you remember?

respondent: Uh, it was, no, 3 to 5.

interviewer: 3 to 5 after the collision?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: So, reveille is at zero-five, the general quarters then would have been at 6:30? For, let me take that back. Sea and anchor detail was set to start at

respondent: About 6, should have been.

interviewer: So, when you are calling reveille at 5, the idea is you know, get up, get dressed, get your shower, grab some food, put your uniforms on and then by 6 you'll be ready for that sea and anchor detail?

respondent: Right.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: I have one more question on the, um, when you were switching controls from helm to lee helm was that when the loss of, was that when the failure happened?

respondent: Yes, so in the middle of switching just the port thrust control is when we lost steering.

interviewer: Was that immediate?

respondent: It was like right at the same time.

interviewer: Okay, so lee helm never had control really or...?

respondent: Uh, he he had taken control of the port thrust before I left to pass the casualty on the 1MC.

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interviewer: Um, just a couple questions that came up during your testimony here, other things, notes that I have been looking at here too. Do you know if the bright bridge was manned?

respondent: Uh, at the time it was not manned.

interviewer: Okay. Is that is that a common position that's used on board the McCain?

respondent: During special evolutions such as sea and anchor it's, it's usually manned.

interviewer: But uh this was still just a regular...

respondent: Just steaming.

interviewer: Was this Nav or Modified Nav?

respondent: We, we were at modified navigation.

interviewer: And what would be the difference between the two on board the McCain?

respondent: Uh, basically, it's just the modified navigation consists of a team of extra, uh, basically lookouts.

interviewer: So, like um...

respondent: Like a forward.

interviewer: Okay. Was there a forward lookout set up or is it that port and starboard wing lookout?

respondent: It's just, uh, the, our watch team is just like the bridge wings and back aft.

interviewer: Okay, so on a regular nav detail you might not have that port and starboard lookout?

respondent: No, on our regular watch team you have port and starboard and helm and aft lookout.

interviewer: Okay. You mentioned [REDACTED]. Is that [REDACTED]?

respondent: Yes, [REDACTED].

interviewer: Okay, so, again, we had on 1MC that there is a steering casualty. There's communications with them and aft steering that say we've got it and they are doing their work. Who was it that was asking for the distance to shore?

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respondent: [REDACTED].

interviewer: [REDACTED]. And so, he is communicating to you?

respondent: Yes, he called the phone at my station in the pilot house and asked me. I ran to the quarter master table, I asked the Quarter Master of the Watch, and then he told me, and I reported it to [REDACTED].

interviewer: Okay, so you have a specific station with a phone. He can call that up directly. And then you said the distance to shore was 2 point...?

respondent: The distance to shore water was 2.2 nautical miles.

interviewer: Okay, that's what I had written down. I wanted to make sure I heard it right. And then, uh, [REDACTED] then asked if we want to do anchor detail.

respondent: Yes, he asked if we wanted to man anchor detail in case we had to drop the anchor, and I told him wait one, set down the phone. I turned around and maybe got one or two steps and didn't even, I think I said OOD. And then I didn't even get to ask the question and then we got hit.

interviewer: Did [REDACTED] when he was on the phone with you ever mention any additional steering issues?

respondent: No.

interviewer: Alright. So as far as you know, aft steering has got the steering, everything is well and good.

respondent: Yeah. Uh, they had, I know they had switched it to aft steering and then uh I don't know, I wasn't standing next to the helm at the time.

interviewer: Uh-um.

respondent: but I just know that for some reason steering came back up to the pilot house.

interviewer: And, is that something you saw or you heard on the bridge, or is that something you found out later?

respondent: I heard. Like, I heard them physically say it.

interviewer: Did you hear any commands about reducing speed?

respondent: Uh, yes, after we had lost steering I heard.

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interviewer: Was that before the collision to reduce speed?

respondent: Yes. I heard them say, I heard them give the command to slow to 5 knots.

interviewer: And that was prior to the collision or after?

respondent: Prior.

interviewer: The collision itself, how did that feel on the bridge?

respondent: The whole ship shook and but from up there it didn't feel like, you could, you just knew like we had hit something, but it didn't feel like crazy. It wasn't that loud up there either. It sounded like a, like a lid of a dumpster closing. And then after that I realized it was worse.

interviewer: So, it wasn't like something that threw you to the floor?

respondent: Not up there, no.

interviewer: What immediately happened after the collision, after the setting of general quarters and all that?

respondent: After the setting of general quarters is ah, we, I remember uh [REDACTED] running up to the bridge. He came in the, I think he had hit his knee I think on the stairs on his way up, and he came limping in the in the bridge wing door. They set him down. Then I just kept passing Zebra time like every, in one minute intervals. And then I think everybody was trying to, you know, maintain their composure, and they were trying to make sure everything was like, people were where they needed to be. I know they were, they had told me to get aft lookout off the fantail. But when I called down to aft lookout had no COMMS. I couldn't, I guess he had left at that point already.

interviewer: Do you remember what happened as far as the ship getting unstuck from the bow?

respondent: So, the hit, their bow hit our port side aft and then we kinda, they kinda pushed us. We turned, came side to side, like so we were pretty much side by side.

interviewer: Okay.

respondent: And then we kinda floated off this way and they went, we went to the right and they went to the left.

interviewer: They still had propulsion? You still had propulsion after that?

respondent: Yeah slightly.

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interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: Do you recall any other throttle commands?

respondent: No.

interviewer: Stop of the stern?

respondent: Oh, I think they did, I think after, I want to say after the collision it came to All Stop.

interviewer: Is there any other information you can, that sticks out in your mind, anything that might be useful for us here to formulate a report that might help other ships avoid this?

respondent: I guess the only thing we need more manning.

interviewer: You just generally think that that your ship is undermanned?

respondent: It's, we only had three, well for the, for just the boats mates we had three watch sections so you're on watch for five hours, off watch for 10. In between that time, you know, you might be working. If not, you are waking up in the middle of the night for watch again.

interviewer: Uh-um.

interviewer: A question that sprung to mind here, you mentioned the throttle control, that you've got the one little unit by the helm and then there is the lee helm that is a little bit further away, give a little more space from my understanding. Again, it's it's like a screen, is that correct?

respondent: It's actually like on the same console. It's two different screens. It's like it's on the same console. There is not like a gap in between.

interviewer: Sure, but it's like one is over here and one is on this end of the same machine?

respondent: It's maybe like one is right here and then there's like a space right here and then there's like one right here. It's like it's pretty much that close.

interviewer: Alright. So, from that throttle control screen are you able to control other things such as any steering or any other parts of the machinery?

respondent: So, you can you can switch to control from either screen. Like steering, uh steering and thrust control, throttle control you can put it on either screen or you can split them up, put steering on one and thrust control on the other.

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interviewer: Okay. How does that process work? Does somebody have to like offer it and say...?

respondent: So, whichever console, whichever monitor has control you'll, there's a little drop-down menu that you click and then you can switch the location of the steering. So, say uh you are on, it's at the helm station and then you can click the drop-down menu, select lee helm, and then the person at the lee helm will have to accept it. So, there's a button that pops up and says accept.

interviewer: Okay. So, it's a matter of send and receive?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Somebody has to actively say receive?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Is there ability to take control? Cause I know like there's a big red emergency button for emergency steering, and I think that's local steering?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Does that work as well from those little sighting. Is there any ability to say I need it now and I'm taking it?

respondent: I think they can request it, but you still have to send it.

interviewer: Right. Somebody still has to transfer.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Okay. Let's talk a little bit about autopilot. Do you know if that was used anytime during the night?

respondent: During the night, during that watch, no it was not used.

interviewer: Okay. Any idea if it may have been used during the watch before?

respondent: I have no idea.

interviewer: And from what, if I wanted to go course 2-3-0 using the autopilot, is that something you can pull off of Nav1 the Voyage Management System, or is that something you have to manually key in and say 2-3-0?

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respondent: Uh, yes. You have to, so whatever station has control of the steering, like if it's a, if you set it to autopilot from the helm then you have to physically key in the numbers. I'm pretty sure there's like arrows, like up and down arrows so you can increase or decrease.

interviewer: Uh-um. Is there any other place where autopilot can be activated?

respondent: Um, I'm not sure.

interviewer: But there's there's the main one that is on that same central console as the helm throttle commands?

respondent: yes.

interviewer: Shifting gears back to the watch rotation again, how many qualified BMOWs are on the ship right now?

respondent: Qualified BMOWs, we had four.

interviewer: Four?

respondent: Four qualified.

interviewer: Are all four of them standing watch or...?

respondent: Uh, my apologies, five qualified. Two of them are not standing watch.

interviewer: Okay. They are just day working?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Looking at my notes again here. When was the collision alarm sounded?

respondent: Like a specific time?

interviewer: If you have a specific time, sure.

respondent: Roughly 5:26 or so.

interviewer: That's about the same time the XO was on the bridge wing.

respondent: I think he had stepped out onto the bridge wing like just as we hit and then he saw what happened and he yelled. He got into the pilot house and said sound the collision alarm.

interviewer: Right after it happened?

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respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Regarding the throttle commands to come down to 5 knots, which you said was prior to the collision, who gave that command?

respondent: It came down from the Captain originally. He told the Conning Officer and then the Conning Officer told Helmsmen.

interviewer: So, the Conning Officer continued to have the Con throughout the evolution or was there any point that the master said I, I have the Con.

interviewer: CO

interviewer: CO.

respondent: Negative. He didn't, he didn't take control. The Con had it the whole time.

interviewer: Was there another Boatswain Mate on the bridge?

respondent: Uh, there was [REDACTED] who just came up to like relieve, relieve me, but it was before he had relieved me.

interviewer: and what was [REDACTED] interaction on board the, during during the collision?

respondent: Uh, I want to say he was helping out with the helm.

interviewer: Was there any, any assistance you provided on the helm in terms of pumps, helm movements?

respondent: Uh, I have really no idea cause I think he was over there assisting during the loss of steering, but I am not exactly sure what he did.

interviewer: Okay. And, as for yourself, anything that you

respondent: Oh, myself. Um, the only thing I did was I switched, after getting permission from the Officer of the Deck I had switched port thrust control from the helm to lee helm station. At that same time was when we had lost steering control.

interviewer: Okay. When you are changing um. So, you are only changing the console? You're not changing like... That's a good question. So, when you go from one console to the other is there anything that you have to align? Like if you are at...? I'm sorry what speed was the vessel going at approximately?

respondent: Before the loss of steering?

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interviewer: Uh-um.

respondent: Like 20 knots.

interviewer: 20 knots, okay. So, you are on that left side of the console going 20 knots. Is there anything they have to adjust or change, like do they have to bring their console up to 20 knots, or is it just simply we are at 20 knots, we are at this station and now we are at that station?

respondent: Yes. You just switch from, you don't have to, there is nothing you have to align. You just switch from one station to the other station.

interviewer: Okay. So, it's just a nice digital screen. It reads what you're at, and it's just a matter of who has the control.

respondent: Yeah.

interviewer: And then for the actual helm, there is a physical wheel?

respondent: A physical wheel, yes.

interviewer: And so, if you were going to switch between that helm to say aft steering in an emergency situation is there anything that needs to be aligned or is it assumed that you're not going to get it aligned to switch it?

respondent: You just switch it and they take control.

interviewer: What would the Helmsmen do after they sent it to aft steering with the actual helm?

respondent: You just stand stand there in case they have to send it back or, and like pretty much you just stand by like right there.

interviewer: Would they leave it at the last order they had, would they try to match when it's going to aft steering, bring it to midships? What would be the proper course?

respondent: Ah, so as soon as soon as they take control they are going to verify that they have positive rudder control, and then if they do they'll generally ask like for orders to the helm and then, or ask the Conning Officer, whoever has Coms with aft steering will ask the Conning Officer and the Conning Officer will give the order to tell aft steering what to steer, like what course and speed, what course.

interviewer: Do you know who was doing that communication?

respondent: Uh, I am not sure. I don't remember.

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interviewer: Okay, so does the helms, the or, the Helmsmen who gave control to aft steering do they just let go or do they bring it to a certain rudder angle? Cause they don't have control anymore.

respondent: Before I think, I think you are supposed to try to bring it to midships.

interviewer: Uh-um.

respondent: but when when steering was physically switched from the pilot house to aft steering I was away from the helm and I was, so I was focused with passing words on 1MC.

interviewer: Okay. I'm just trying to dig into like your previous experience. I'm sure you stood as helmsman. If you were in that situation, what would be the appropriate action to do with your helm?

respondent: Uh, so, I would report the, like if we had steering casualty I would report it to the Officer on the Deck, the Conning Officer, and then I would ask permission to switch my HPUs. And then if that didn't, test for positive rudder control. If that didn't work then I would depress the emergency override to manual button.

interviewer: Does the emergency override give you any control at the helm or is that simply just aft steering?

respondent: No, it sets everything to, you still have control there at the helm but it sets everything back to default, and then you click the little drop-down menu and select aft steering to send it and then they'll accept it.

interviewer: And then you would bring it to, cause you don't have control anymore, what do you do with the...?

respondent: Just standby.

interviewer: Standby. Alright, so I'm going to go over this one more time just to make sure I have heard it correctly and recorded it correctly. You got on watch about 0200 as the Boatswain Mate of the Watch?

respondent: Uh, it was about 0130.

interviewer: Alright. So, you had the 0200, you got there at 0130.

respondent: So, for the watches you are relieved 15-30 minutes prior.

interviewer: Okay. So, you provide your relief. Watch was going okay. Traffic was maybe a little bit busy with all the vessels, but it sounds like your crew was doing well, keeping track of everything. Good communications with combat?

(b) (6)

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respondent: As far as I know.

interviewer: Good communications with combat. Roughly two minutes before the collision there was an announcement by the Helmsmen that they had lost steering?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: Steering was tested. There was a call made to get on on the 1MC and announce loss of steering.

respondent: No, the Helmsmen had announced the loss of steering

interviewer: Uh-um.

respondent: And then they like, the Officer of the Deck had told me to pass it on the 1MC.

interviewer: Right. So, you get on the 1MC, announce the loss of steering. [REDACTED] mans up the local steering and aft steering?

respondent: Yes. Uh, I know he was down there. I don't remember, I'm not sure who else was down there, but I know there was several people down there and they manned up and were ready to take control in aft steering in maybe a minute.

interviewer: Okay. So, a minute has passed. It's now a minute before the collision. You get a phone call from [REDACTED] that says, is asking questions about the local area, how close we are to shore. Shore or shoal? S-h-o-a-l?

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: So, he gives you a distance, or you give him a distance based on the Quartermaster, and then there is the request of "should we stand up anchor detail?" You're looking into that, collision.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: XO tells you hit the collision alarm, and we call off the collision alarm and go to GQ.

respondent: Yes.

interviewer: I have nothing else.

interviewer: There was a report of a white light hitting the vessel, that was the reason for the increase to 20 knots. Do you remember that?

(b) (5)

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respondent: I heard about it after, but I didn't physically see it.

interviewer: Okay. What about course changes? I mean, I think you said things were busy so there was a lot of changes.

respondent: I don't remember any specific, but I do remember a lot of course changes throughout the night.

interviewer: Do you know what the last course was before the loss of steering?

respondent: I don't, I don't remember.

interviewer: That's all I got.

interviewer: Okay. Well we certainly appreciate all of your time here today and answering our questions. We want to open the floor to you in case you had any questions for us, or if there is anything on your mind that didn't come up in our interview that you wanted to make sure that we are aware of.

respondent: No, I think that's about it.

interviewer: Okay. One quick question that popped in my head right now. Do you, did, did anyone take any photos or videos that you are aware of? Anything that has been rumbling around the ship that somebody might have some media of the collision?

respondent: Um, of the time it happened, I don't, I haven't heard or seen anybody that has like any photos or video of the actual collision, no.

interviewer: Excellent, okay. Thank you. In that case, that's going to be all for questions for today. If you do have any additional questions or comments later on, maybe something pops in your mind that says "I wish I had told these guys something" do feel free to reach out to us. We'd be glad to take that information. Additionally, if we do ask that as the interviews are ongoing please not to discuss this with other crew members so that we can make sure that the stories stay separate and that we don't have information mixing, that we just want to hear what people remember from the night, the events of the night.

interviewer: (low speaking) We haven't been asking anybody that. I think you will have your opportunity.

interviewer: Okay.

interviewer: Any final questions? No? Alright. Thank you again so much for your time.