

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN

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Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007

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Interview of: JONATHAN VATERS

Crowne Plaza Hotel
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada

Wednesday,
February 1, 2012

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MATTHEW NICHOLSON
Investigator-In-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and
Hazardous Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

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Supervisory Investigator
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U.S. Compliance
Enbridge Pipelines

[REDACTED]

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I N T E R V I E W

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2 MR. NICHOLSON: This is NTSB Pipeline Case Number DCA-
3 10-MP-007, Enbridge Energy July 2010 crude oil release in
4 Marshall, Michigan. These are the Human Factors Group interviews
5 being conducted at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Edmonton, Alberta,
6 Canada. Today is Wednesday, February 1st, 2012.

7 This interview is being recorded for transcription at a
8 later date. Copies of the transcripts will be provided to the
9 parties and the witness for review once completed.

10 For the record, Jon, please state your full name with
11 spelling, employer name, and job title.

12 MR. VATERS: My name is Jonathan Vaters. J-o-n-a-t-h-a-
13 n, V-a-t-e-r-s. I'm a control center operator. Do you want my
14 employee number as well?

15 MR. NICHOLSON: No, I don't need that. No, thank you.
16 And you are with Enbridge, correct?

17 MR. VATERS: Yes, I am.

18 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. And for the record, Jon, please
19 provide a contact phone number and e-mail address that you may be
20 reached at.

21 MR. VATERS: Contact phone number would be [REDACTED]
22 and e-mail would be [REDACTED]

23 MR. NICHOLSON: Is that a personal?

24 MR. VATERS: Do you want a --

25 MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah, please give me a work-related --

1 MR. VATERS: So, [REDACTED]

2 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Thank you. And, Jon, you're
3 allowed to have one other person of your choice present during
4 this interview. This other person may be an attorney, friend,
5 family member, co-worker, or no one at all. If you would, please
6 indicate whom you've chosen to be present with you during this
7 interview.

8 MR. VATERS: I've chose no one.

9 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. We'll go around the room now and
10 introduce ourselves for the record, starting with myself. I am
11 Matthew Nicholson. That's M-a-t-t-h-e-w, N-i-c-h-o-l-s-o-n. I am
12 the NTSB IIC. My phone number [REDACTED] My e-mail is

13 [REDACTED]

14 MR. JOHNSON: Jay Johnson, with Enbridge. I'm
15 Supervisor of U.S. Compliance. [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED]

17 MS. BUTLER: Karen Butler, K-a-r-e-n, B-u-t-l-e-r. I
18 work for PHMSA, [REDACTED] PHMSA is the Pipeline and
19 Hazardous Material Safety Administration [REDACTED] I
20 can be reached -- I'm the accident -- supervisor of
21 investigations, specific to accidents. I can be reached at

22 [REDACTED]

23 DR. STRAUCH: I'm Barry Strauch with the NTSB. B-a-r-r-
24 y, S-t-r-a-u-c-h. My phone number is [REDACTED] My e-mail is

25 [REDACTED]

1 INTERVIEW OF JONATHAN VATERS

2 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

3 Q. Okay, Jon, just to begin with, maybe you can give us a
4 little background about what console you worked at, which console
5 you were working at on the 26th of July 2010 and how long you've
6 been at Enbridge.

7 A. I work at the Superior Terminal. I control either
8 incoming or outgoing sides depending on day or night. We switch,
9 alternate. I've been with the company for just over 4 years now.
10 On the night of the incident, I was on injection side, so I
11 control 6A coming out of Superior.

12 Q. Okay. And can you sketch for us where you are in
13 relationship to the 6B console? I'm not familiar with every desk.

14 A. Yes. Absolutely. This is Line 6 here. This is 14 and
15 then this was me right there.

16 Q. That's you. Okay. And you're -- can you write
17 Superior. Is that what it was?

18 A. Sure. Yeah, for sure.

19 Q. Superior incoming, you say.

20 A. This is incoming. This is outgoing.

21 Q. Thank you. Also, so I can get my bearings, if you would
22 identify the MBS desk or the shift lead desk so I know where I am
23 here?

24 A. Sure.

25 Q. It doesn't have to be to scale. Just where are they,

1 roughly?

2 A. Okay. It's way the heck over here.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Yeah. So on shift leads, and MBSs.

5 Q. So, you're facing them, essentially?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Absolutely.

9 Q. And then on that night, on the 26th, you would have --
10 to your left would have been Ghazal?

11 A. Correct, yeah.

12 Q. Can you talk a little bit about the restart attempts and
13 what you observed?

14 A. I don't remember very much. I know that they tried to
15 restart two or three times, and at the time we didn't know there
16 was any big deal, I think, until the next day when we came in.
17 Yeah. It was quite a while ago. I don't remember very many
18 details.

19 Q. Okay. Did shift leads come to you that --

20 A. They didn't come to me. I handle 6A. So 6B is where it
21 happened, so I wasn't affected very, very much personally. So
22 shift leads didn't interact with me very much at all that night.
23 It was all Group 1, which is Line 6, 4, and 14.

24 Q. Can you pull the 6B pipeline up on your console?

25 A. I can. I never have.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. We can pull up any console -- or any screen on any
3 console if we wanted to.

4 Q. You didn't do it on the 26th?

5 A. No. No. I've never before.

6 Q. Okay. Were you aware or did you have any suspicions of
7 what the problem might be on 6B?

8 A. No. No suspicions at all. I thought it was business as
9 usual, trying to restart the pipeline.

10 Q. That's what business as usual would look like? I
11 mean --

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Shift leads were intervening, trying to offer support,
15 trying to get the pipeline restarted.

16 Q. Were the shift leads talking Ghazal at all? Was she
17 involved?

18 A. They were mainly talking to Tim. And Ghazal had tried
19 to help pull up procedures and, from what I remember, for the most
20 part they almost ignored her and just tried to focus on Tim.

21 Q. Okay.

22 MR. NICHOLSON: Barry, if you want to go ahead.

23 BY DR. STRAUCH:

24 Q. You said they almost ignored her. Why do you think that
25 occurred?

1 A. She was a fairly new operator at the time. I don't know
2 if they respected Tim's opinion more because he had been there for
3 quite a few years, so -- and plus, he was operating the line. So,
4 Ghazal had her own stuff on the go at the time, so that might be
5 the reason why.

6 Q. Okay. What kind of reputation did Ghazal have?

7 A. She's a fairly good operator, pretty well liked. I
8 don't think anyone really had any direct issues with her, a very
9 pleasant person for sure.

10 Q. Okay. And what about Tim, what kind of reputation did he
11 have?

12 A. Same. Pretty nice guy, yeah. A very diligent operator,
13 I would say, more so than others. Again, very pleasant to work
14 with.

15 Q. Okay. Now, they would have been the same shift as you?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So, you would know them pretty well?

18 A. Yeah. Yeah, we had a pretty good working relationship.

19 Q. Okay. Did you socialize with either one after work?

20 A. No.

21 Q. Did you socialize with other people in the control room
22 after work?

23 A. Not really.

24 Q. Okay. You have separate friends that --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. How would you characterize the working
2 relationship between Ghazal and Tim Chubb?

3 A. Stressed. It appeared that Tim didn't like Ghazal very
4 much. I'm not exactly sure why. I don't know if he -- the way
5 Ghazal kind of explained it to me, it almost seems like he has a
6 prejudice towards women. I've noticed it throughout the room with
7 other female operators. He almost doesn't value their opinion or
8 simply for the fact that they're female. But other than that, I
9 think he's a decent operator.

10 Q. Okay. So, is it fair to say that your observations with
11 Tim were that he did treat women operators differently than he did
12 treat male operators?

13 A. Slightly. Not to the point where he would blatantly
14 discriminate, but it was subtle, subtle -- almost dismissive tone
15 in conversations or not really respecting their input on
16 questions.

17 Q. And you observed this yourself?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. So, what were the circumstances under which Ghazal
20 shared her observations with you?

21 A. Just in casual passing through the control center.
22 She'd walk by and ask if I had noticed a certain situation where
23 something happened and she tried to put in her two cents and Tim
24 just kind of brushed her off and did his own thing. Or she will
25 ask for help and Tim will kind of condescendingly say, well, what

1 do you think you should do, instead of helping. So --

2 Q. Were there other operators who in your experience kind
3 of treated women the same way as Tim did, or was he unique?

4 A. Aaron Zimmel, I noticed he was a little bit prejudiced
5 towards women, and Randy A. is a little bit prejudiced as well.

6 Q. Randy Andruachuk (ph.)?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. What about Darin Parsons?

9 A. I personally haven't seen any prejudice actions towards
10 women from him.

11 Q. Okay. Now, have you worked in any additional
12 environment in addition to Enbridge?

13 A. I worked at Dow Chemical at a polyethylene plant as an
14 operator.

15 Q. How long did you work there?

16 A. For 3½ years.

17 Q. Okay. How would you describe the operating environment
18 at Enbridge compared to what you saw at Dow Chemical?

19 A. Pretty similar. Very industry -- industry mentality.
20 Primarily, it was all men at Dow. So, that might be the stigma
21 going on at Enbridge too, is it's primarily men, men workplace.

22 Q. Were there women also at Dow Chemical?

23 A. There was very, very few. My department there were only
24 a handful.

25 Q. More women at Enbridge?

1 A. Oh, absolutely. Very, very large amount more at
2 Enbridge than there was at Dow.

3 Q. Okay. How were the women treated at Dow?

4 A. They were treated like one of the guys pretty much.
5 They almost had to be.

6 Q. At Enbridge it was different?

7 A. Not so much, not blatant discrimination, but subtle.

8 Q. That's kind of interesting because at this time the vice
9 president overseeing the control room was Sonya Buys, so it would
10 seem kind of contradictory that you have a woman in charge and --

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. What do you attribute that to?

13 A. I have no idea. Yeah, we didn't -- personally, I had
14 almost no contact with Sonya. I only saw her maybe once while she
15 oversaw.

16 Q. Okay. Did you ever witness supervisors publicly
17 criticizing operators or commenting on their errors in front of
18 others?

19 A. No. I don't think I have.

20 Q. Okay. How would you describe the operating environment
21 in the control room at the time of the accident?

22 A. Business as usual, very relaxed and casual. Yeah, just
23 normal shift.

24 Q. Okay. Now, was the environment one where people would
25 feel comfortable bringing up issues with their supervisors or --

1 A. For the most part, yes. I know Ghazal personally had
2 some issues with some of the shift leads that were a little bit
3 prejudiced towards women. I know there were some incidents where
4 a male operator who was well liked by some of the shift leads had
5 made a mistake and nothing came out of it, and then Ghazal did the
6 exact same thing verbatim and she had an error because of it. So,
7 I know she was pretty distraught over that where it was very clear
8 black and white this is not right.

9 Q. And you have firsthand observation of this?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Were there other circumstances that were kind of like
12 that, where there was a double standard or --

13 A. I think that was the only one that I can recall, that it
14 was very, very evident and clear. Yeah, I think that was the one,
15 the only one that I can recall.

16 Q. Now, as a terminal controller, would you have felt any
17 pressure to keep lines running?

18 A. No. If there's ever any doubt, shut down. That's kind
19 of the mentality. Don't worry about the cost of shutdown, safety
20 is the priority above anything else. So if there's ever any
21 issues and you're uncomfortable, the first thing you do is you
22 shut down.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And then figure it out.

25 Q. All right. Now, was this the way it was before the

1 accident as well?

2 A. Yes, absolutely.

3 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. That's all the questions I have at
4 this point. Thank you.

5 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Karen?

6 BY MS. BUTLER:

7 Q. I'd just like to get your impressions. One of the
8 things that concerns me is, this particular event associated with
9 Marshall went through so many different people's eyes and yet
10 nobody thought leak.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. And so many different shifts, really.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Do you have a thought on why that was?

15 A. I think that basically it was thought that it could
16 never happen to us kind of thing. I think it was just
17 complacency. I don't know if all the factors were there
18 indicating a leak. I don't know all of the details, but I think
19 that's all it was, it was just complacency and -- or it can't be a
20 leak; it has to be something else; it has to be this; let's try
21 this.

22 Q. Do you think that that's a culture in the control room
23 or not?

24 A. Probably not so much anymore. I mean, now they're a lot
25 more cautious as opposed to before.

1 Q. Okay. So, I'm going to use a word, and it's for lack of
2 figuring out a better way to phrase it. Sometimes people get a
3 little arrogant about their technical abilities.

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Do you believe there was an arrogance towards that in
6 the control room?

7 A. I would say yes. In this particular incidence, I
8 remember the shift leads saying the phrase, oh, we just need more
9 power; we just need more power. I believe, if I remember
10 correctly, there was a column, a column separation in the pipe.
11 Basically, what that means is the pipe -- there wasn't enough
12 pressure to keep the product as a liquid and it was in a gas, so
13 essentially they need to add more power to add more pressure to
14 basically fill in that column. So, they said that a couple of
15 times, oh, we just need more power. And then I think after that,
16 the second or third try they kind of realized they might have been
17 in trouble; it wasn't that.

18 Q. Did you hear anybody around you say, could it be a leak?

19 A. I don't think so, no.

20 Q. So, what you heard was we need more power?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. That type of thing?

23 A. Yeah. I don't remember -- I don't distinctly remember
24 anytime that night anyone saying leak.

25 Q. Okay. All right. Since you've been in a different

1 control room, I'm going to take advantage of that in just a
2 second. Is there anything that you thought Dow did really well
3 that the Enbridge control room was not doing so well?

4 A. No. In my opinion, Enbridge is a far superior
5 environment than Dow was in almost every way.

6 Q. Okay. All right. And have you been party to anybody
7 asking you these types of questions regarding the control room and
8 maybe how women were treated or not treated?

9 A. No. No.

10 Q. All right. And has anybody ever asked you questions
11 about 6B and the incident at Marshall before?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Have you seen Enbridge's internal accident investigation
14 at all?

15 A. No, I have not.

16 MS. BUTLER: That's all I have.

17 MR. NICHOLSON: Jay?

18 BY MR. JOHNSON:

19 Q. In your career, you pretty much ran the Superior
20 Terminal?

21 A. Yes. That's the only terminal I've ran.

22 Q. Okay. So, you came in and you've been on Superior then
23 since when you were hired?

24 A. That's right. When I got hired, they were actually
25 splitting the console. It was one console that ran both incoming

1 and outgoing, and then when we got hired, they brought in a couple
2 new pipelines and now they've divided to one side is incoming, one
3 side is outgoing. So, it's essentially two people running the
4 same terminal.

5 Q. Okay. How is that workload?

6 A. It's manageable. It's actually very, very pleasant.
7 It's not too busy; it's not too slow. The days go by just at a
8 nice steady rate. I have nothing to complain about really.

9 Q. You have a lot of interaction because there is a lot of
10 lines coming in and out of there.

11 A. Absolutely. It's actually a very beneficial console to
12 be in, in the room because you really talk to the entire room. I
13 have five lines coming in and four going out, so that's nine
14 consoles that I get to talk to and interact with. So I have a
15 very good scope of the entire Enbridge system, so --

16 Q. Do a good job on Line 5. That runs through my backyard.

17 A. Okay.

18 MR. JOHNSON: That's all I have.

19 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

20 Q. You get to talk to, you said, nine other consoles?

21 A. Yes. Well, nine other pipelines, I guess. Some of them
22 are ran by the same console. It's changed over the years. Now,
23 Line 5 and 3 are ran by the same place and 4 and 14 are ran by the
24 same place.

25 Q. So, you only deal with pipelines. You don't deal with

1 other terminals, like Griffith?

2 A. Pretty much just the pipelines. Very rarely, we'll have
3 a conflict where we'll have to talk to terminals as well. Let's
4 say we needed to start a pipeline and we can't because there was
5 an issue at Griffith, well I can talk to Griffith and say is there
6 anything you can do to help us out so we can get started to help
7 us out, so --

8 Q. Were there any conversations on the 26th when you dealt
9 with the other pipeline operators --

10 A. No, no.

11 Q. -- about, hey, Tim's having trouble over there and it
12 looks like -- no?

13 A. It's very rare that that happens, that we have to talk
14 to other terminals.

15 Q. What about other pipelines? No one else was
16 observing his --

17 A. No, there was a --

18 Q. -- (indiscernible) and talking to you casually about it?

19 A. If I recall correctly, there was -- there were no other
20 pipeline operators assisting Tim other than Ghazal.

21 Q. Was Jim Knudson at the desk with Tim at all?

22 A. I believe so, yes. Yeah, I think he was offering his
23 support.

24 Q. Was he the person that was saying there wasn't enough
25 power or -- do you recall who was discussing that?

1 A. I can't recall. I remember either Aaron Zimmel or
2 Darin Parsons saying we don't have a -- or we just need more
3 power. It was one of the shift leads.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. One or both.

6 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Barry, anything else?

7 DR. STRAUCH: Yeah, just a couple of questions.

8 BY DR. STRAUCH:

9 Q. I'm not sure we asked you this, but how long did you
10 work at Dow?

11 A. Just over 4 years.

12 Q. Okay. And you said that Enbridge was a superior
13 company?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Now, what made it -- what makes Enbridge superior to
16 Dow?

17 A. Procedures are fantastic. Dow didn't have -- in a lot
18 of ways, didn't have very clear structured ways to do things.
19 Enbridge's procedures ensure above all else safety and it's very
20 reassuring to have that. The atmosphere in the room is -- it's
21 almost like a family atmosphere. It's very nice to enjoy going to
22 work.

23 Q. At Enbridge?

24 A. At Enbridge, for sure. Yeah.

25 Q. Um-hum. Do women experience the same attitude that you

1 do towards the environment in the control room?

2 A. Yes. For sure, yeah. For the most part, men and women
3 now are basically treated as equals. I don't see very much
4 prejudice now that Tim and Aaron and -- now that they're out of
5 the control center. I don't hear any more instances of prejudice.

6 Q. So, is it fair to say that Tim and Aaron were
7 responsible for much, if not most, of the way women were treated
8 at Enbridge in a negative way?

9 A. I would say that's fair to say.

10 Q. Okay. What kind of changes have you seen in the
11 operating room, other than Tim and Aaron are no longer there since
12 the accident?

13 A. I've seen a lot of -- a lot more diligence in people's
14 operating. I guess that sense of arrogance has kind of left the
15 room. I guess anything can happen to anybody now. Everyone is
16 kind of more aware, less complacent.

17 Q. And finally, the other thing about Ghazal is, in
18 addition to being a woman, she was not native to Canada. What
19 role, if any, did this play in the way she was treated?

20 A. Well, I think she almost had a double prejudice on her
21 being not of this country and a woman. What I -- the prejudice I
22 saw, I don't know if it -- I wouldn't say it was conscious. It
23 might be a subconscious prejudice that they didn't even know they
24 were doing it. But I think it was definitely there, her being not
25 of this country, so --

1 Q. Okay. That's all I have.

2 BY MS. BUTLER:

3 Q. Just one more, and that would be, if an analyst was
4 standing there on a console that you had been asked to operate and
5 they were giving you input and the shift leads were there and they
6 said you didn't have enough power, would you as a controller tend
7 to believe them?

8 A. Well, I think I'd have to probably look at all the
9 factors, look at the experience of the analyst and if he's fairly
10 well respected, then generally go with what he has to say.

11 Q. Okay. So, I'll ask it differently. Do you think it
12 could influence your decision?

13 A. Absolutely.

14 Q. Okay. Thanks.

15 MR. NICHOLSON: Jay?

16 BY MR. JOHNSON:

17 Q. I think that's a fair way to put it, it would influence
18 your decision. Do you think that's the way it should be, based on
19 their technical background or --

20 A. Yes, I think so. They're there to support you pretty
21 much.

22 Q. Could they influence you to start a line you don't want
23 to or not shut one down?

24 A. Well, I think in that case, in the case of starting and
25 shutting down, the operator should take responsibility and if

1 they're not comfortable, then not start it or not shut it down.

2 Q. And so that's what you would do?

3 A. Yes, for sure.

4 Q. You're not going to be influenced into a bad decision?

5 A. That's correct. Yeah, at the end of the day, the person
6 running the line is the one that's responsible.

7 Q. Is that questioned at all or is that very clear?

8 A. That's -- it's very clear.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Yeah.

11 MR. JOHNSON: That's it.

12 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

13 Q. Okay. So, based on that conversation, the ultimate
14 authority is with the operator?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. If it's a matter of safety and the question's to start
18 -- or to shut down or keep running, pretty much no one's going to
19 question you shutting down. They're not going to say, well, why
20 did you shut down; you didn't have to shut down. If they say I
21 was uncomfortable, then it's dropped.

22 Q. But that's a lot of work shutting down a line. I got to
23 call terminals and I got to call customers, don't I? Scheduling.
24 It's a huge headache.

25 A. It is, but if it's a situation where the operator has no

1 idea what's happening and they're very, very uncomfortable, shift
2 leads will not give them any flack. Ninety-nine percent of the
3 time, if they call the shift lead in an emergency and say I've
4 lost this, I've lost that -- quite often they'll be on speaker
5 phone, and I'll hear the shift lead say, okay, shut down; I'll be
6 right there. And then they'll show up and --

7 Q. Okay. So, you say that's the -- the operator's got that
8 authority. You said -- I think you said you liked Enbridge a lot
9 because the procedures are so great and they ensure above all else
10 safety.

11 A. Yep.

12 Q. And that the atmosphere is a family environment. It
13 sounds like a great control room. With all those things in place
14 then, what went wrong again on the 26th?

15 A. I'm not too sure exactly.

16 Q. Did the procedures fail or the process or did we have
17 some just bad people?

18 A. I think what happened was the shift leads -- I don't
19 want to say bullied, but influenced Tim's decision to start up.
20 Tim shouldn't have started up if he felt uncomfortable. I don't
21 know if he was confident in starting up or what the situation was,
22 but in my opinion, if Tim wasn't comfortable, he should not have
23 started up. He should not have allowed himself to be influenced
24 by the shift leads if he wasn't comfortable himself.

25 Q. But it's a family environment. Tim could have come over

1 to Jon Vaters and said, hey, help me out or what do you think
2 or --

3 A. Yeah, and then I --

4 Q. He wasn't doing that.

5 A. From what I noticed, he didn't ask help from any other
6 of the qualified pipeline operators. Ghazal offered her two
7 cents, but he dismissed it.

8 Q. So, it wasn't procedures that failed at that time?

9 A. I don't think so.

10 Q. But then again, I thought you said you didn't notice a
11 whole lot going on?

12 A. No. I was -- yeah, I was doing my own thing. From what
13 I could tell, it didn't look like a huge deal. It seemed like
14 business as usual.

15 Q. Okay. And I don't -- I didn't hear this. Maybe we
16 covered it, but was Ghazal an outspoken operator? Would she speak
17 her mind freely?

18 A. She was fairly reserved. She wasn't the most outgoing
19 person, but she wasn't overly shy.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. When she had to say something, she said it, if it was to
22 do with operating or -- she wasn't afraid to give information or
23 put her comments in.

24 Q. Even to a shift lead, someone of authority?

25 A. Shift leads, depends on the shift lead. Sometimes she

1 was almost reluctant to share a mistake because she knew that in
2 her case it would be an error, whereas another person it might not
3 be. There was almost that double standard.

4 Q. Okay. Well, that's understandable because she'd be
5 getting in trouble, I suppose, for something like that, right?
6 What about other instances where she thought a procedure or a
7 start-up was possibly timed wrong or unsafe? I mean --

8 A. She would speak up.

9 Q. She would speak up?

10 A. Yeah. For sure.

11 Q. So, do you think any of that would have had anything to
12 do with this discrimination you're --

13 A. It might have been. It might have. They might have
14 just dismissed her because of who she was. Again, she was a
15 fairly new operator. That might have played a factor as well in
16 them not choosing to listen to her.

17 Q. Okay. Would there be other operators that you could
18 think of that might be outspoken or vocal about procedures or
19 better ways of --

20 A. Nothing -- no one comes to mind right now.

21 Q. Okay. That's all I've got. Thanks.

22 DR. STRAUCH: Okay. I just have a couple of questions.

23 MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah.

24 BY DR. STRAUCH:

25 Q. Have you kept up with Ghazal since she left?

1 A. Every once in a while, we'll talk.

2 Q. Okay. Have you felt any desire to -- skip that.

3 You talked about the ability of operators to shut down a
4 line that -- you know, if they believe safety could be
5 compromised. Was it always that way in your time there?

6 A. Yes. Yeah. If there was ever any situation where the
7 operator is uncomfortable enough that they need to shut down the
8 line, there's no -- how do you put this -- you won't get in
9 trouble for shutting down the line, ever.

10 Q. Okay. So in that case, you used the word bully in
11 reference to Tim Chubb possibly.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. How do you reconcile that with what you said about
14 operators not feeling constrained in shutting down a line?

15 A. Well, it wasn't, it wasn't so much shutting down the
16 line at this -- I think he was almost bullied into starting the
17 line back up. I don't know the whole story, but -- and I'm not
18 sure if he was fully confident in starting up. I don't know if he
19 let the shift leads -- because they were both pipeline operators
20 as well. I don't know if they read his line and decided
21 themselves that it's okay, so --

22 MR. NICHOLSON: Karen, anything?

23 BY MS. BUTLER:

24 Q. I guess I'm going to ask you a question about maybe your
25 observations on other consoles. Have you ever seen anything like

1 that happening any other time where maybe a shift lead is
2 encouraging a restart and the controller is not comfortable?

3 A. No. Not that I can recall, no.

4 Q. So, you think maybe that evening was unique?

5 A. I do, actually, yes. I think that's the only time where
6 I've ever, ever seen almost an executive order given that, okay,
7 start up the line, we're okay to start up.

8 Q. Do you think that was influenced by anything that wasn't
9 obvious in the room? What I mean by that is sometimes people have
10 conversations with people that aren't represented when you're
11 standing at the console --

12 A. Right.

13 Q. -- and that could influence, say, how firmly you would
14 go after a restart or -- I'm just curious on your observations.

15 A. I didn't observe anything like that.

16 Q. Okay. All right. So, thank you for that.

17 MR. NICHOLSON: Jay?

18 MR. JOHNSON: No, that's it.

19 MR. NICHOLSON: Nothing? Barry? Okay. I think at this
20 point, we'll conclude the interview.

21 Thanks, Jon. I appreciate you coming in.

22 MR. VATERS: You're welcome.

23 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN
Interview of Jonathan Vaters

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-10-MP-007

PLACE: Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

DATE: February 1, 2012

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
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