

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of:

*

*

ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN

*

*

*

Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007

* * * * *

Interview of: DARCY VANDERWOLF

Crowne Plaza Hotel
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada

Thursday,
November 17, 2011

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MATTHEW NICHOLSON
Investigator-in-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and
Hazardous Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

BARRY STRAUCH, Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

BRIAN PIERZINA, Accident Investigator
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA)

[REDACTED]

KAREN BUTLER, Supervisor
Accident Investigations
PHMSA

[REDACTED]

JAY JOHNSON, Supervisor
Audits and Inspections
Enbridge Pipelines

[REDACTED]

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Darcy Vanderwolf:		
By Mr. Nicholson		6
By Mr. Strauch		40
By Mr. Pierzina		40
By Mr. Nicholson		48

I N T E R V I E W

1
2 MR. NICHOLSON: Record this here. Okay. This is NTSB
3 Pipeline case number DCA10MP007, Enbridge Energy July 2010 crude
4 oil release in Marshall, Michigan. These are the Human Factors
5 Group interviews being conducted at the -- this is actually an
6 Operations Group interview being conducted at the Crowne Plaza
7 Hotel in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. Today is Thursday, November
8 17th, 2011.

9 This interview is being recorded for transcription at a
10 later date. Copies of the transcripts will be provided to the
11 parties and the witness for review once completed.

12 And for the record, Darcy, please state your full name,
13 with spelling, employer name, and job title.

14 MR. VANDERWOLF: My name is Darcy Vanderwolf. That's D-
15 a-r-c-y, V-a-n-d-e-r-w-o-l-f. I work for Enbridge Pipelines. I
16 am in the controls and operations group, and I am a Sarnia
17 pipeline and terminal operator.

18 MR. NICHOLSON: Thanks. And, for the record, please
19 provide a contact phone number and e-mail address that you can be
20 reached at.

21 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah. My work e-mail address is
22 [REDACTED] same spelling as my name. And my
23 phone number at work is [REDACTED]

24 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Could you repeat that, please?

1 MR. VANDERWOLF: [REDACTED]

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

3 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, Darcy, you're allowed to have one
4 other person of your choice present during this interview. This
5 other person can be an attorney, friend, family member, co-worker,
6 or no one at all. If you would, please indicate whom you have
7 chosen to be present with you during this interview.

8 MR. VANDERWOLF: I've chosen Curt Goeson, my manager.

9 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. All right. We will now go around
10 the room, excuse me, have each person introduce themselves for the
11 record. Please include your name, with spelling, your employer's
12 name and contact phone number and e-mail address. I will start,
13 we'll progress clockwise, starting from my left. My name is
14 Matthew Nicholson, spelled M-a-t-t-h-e-w, N-i-c-h-o-l-s-o-n. I am
15 the NTSB IIC. My phone number is [REDACTED] My e-mail is

16 [REDACTED]

17 MR. PIERZINA: And I'm Brian Pierzina, B-r-i-a-n P-i-e-
18 r-z-i-n-a. I'm with the PHMSA [REDACTED].
19 I'm an accident investigator, and my e-mail is

20 [REDACTED]

21 MR. JOHNSON: Jay Johnson, Enbridge Pipelines,

22 [REDACTED]

23 MR. GOESON: My name's Curt Goeson, C-u-r-t, G-o-e-s-o-
24 n. I'm -- work for Enbridge Pipelines, Inc. I'm a manager of
25 pipelines and pipeline control. My phone number is [REDACTED]

1 and my contact e-mail is [REDACTED]

2 MR. STRAUCH: And I'm Barry Strauch with the NTSB, B-a-
3 r-r-y, S-t-r-a-u-c-h. My e-mail is [REDACTED] and my phone
4 is [REDACTED]

5 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

6 INTERVIEW OF DARCY VANDERWOLF

7 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

8 Q. To begin with, Darcy, I think we'd like to get a little
9 bit of your background first just to put us in place. Can you
10 give me a little bit about your educational background and
11 positions you've held prior to coming to Enbridge?

12 A. Sure. I went to NAIT. I studied chemical engineering
13 technology, which is a 2-year course there at NAIT. I worked at a
14 sub chemical company in Leduc, Umicore Chemicals. I was an
15 operator there for about 9 months. Was hired on at Enbridge in
16 2005 and I have worked there ever since. Within Enbridge, I've
17 been a operator of the Sarnia console. I've learned both
18 consoles: the Sarnia pipelines and the Sarnia terminals. And,
19 yeah, I'm just, well, doing that.

20 Q. Okay. So if you could explain -- you're a terminal
21 operator, right? Is that --

22 A. And a pipeline operator, yes.

23 Q. Can you kind of explain your role as a terminal
24 operator? What your duties are and --

25 A. Yeah. As a terminal operator, I run the Sarnia console.

1 That basically involves the Sarnia terminal, our tanks there. It
2 involves the incoming lines, line 5 and 6B, as well as line 9
3 coming into that terminal, and 9C which is a reversal line that
4 pumps product back up to the shippers mountain, you know,
5 Marysville, Sun and Shell, along the way to the terminal. It's
6 kind of hard to describe it --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- without actually seeing the schematics. Within that
9 I do provings, I swing tanks, I open valves. I raise and lower
10 pressures depending on if the line operator requests it. I've
11 trained people, on occasion. I, you know, do all sorts of
12 operations, things. Little bit nervous. I'm sorry.

13 Q. No, that's fine. It's perfect. And I want you to feel
14 comfortable and just give us a narrative when we ask and --

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. -- just any details is --

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. -- great for us, so don't hold back. That's fine. You
19 mentioned you did some training. Have you ever acted as a mentor
20 to other controllers?

21 A. I have -- not a full mentor from -- to the very
22 beginning and end, but that's simply due to circumstances, like
23 somebody was mentoring the person and, you know, left for various
24 reasons, you know, medical leave or something, and I've taken --
25 taken over. But yeah, I have contributed in mentoring employees.

1 Q. Okay. When someone else wasn't available --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- then you can come in, and you're --

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. -- okay, filled that void. You mentioned raise and
6 lower pressures if requested by an operator. Is that typical of
7 your duties, everything is being told you --

8 A. Well, not --

9 Q. -- from someone else?

10 A. -- not always told to me. There's a lot of parts of my
11 job that I'm fully in control of, that I make decisions on.
12 That's just one aspect if it, so, for instance, like line 5 and 6.
13 Those lines are run into the Sarnia terminal. I do all the swings
14 at my bottom end to wherever the crude has to be delivered.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But if the line operator does request a higher pressure
17 or lower pressure, they can ask me and I will do what they --
18 whichever they want. I do have some discretion on, you know, how
19 high or how low depending on if they make it clear or not, but
20 again, it's -- that's part of my role.

21 Q. Would there ever be a time they ask you to raise or
22 lower pressure that you disagree with or think they're making a
23 wrong decision, or --

24 A. There has been, but we'll discuss it, if that's the
25 case. Lots of times they do trust my decisions on what pressure

1 to raise it to because they'll be, okay, raise the pressure to
2 around 80. Well, then I'll pick 85, 86, 79, somewhere around
3 there.

4 Q. Oh, okay.

5 A. Also, when I do the swings, the maneuvers, I do have
6 control on the pressure. I'd open another site, you know, open
7 the valves, lower the pressure so the oil goes in that direction.
8 Other side I'm closing off on I'd raise the pressure on the PCVs,
9 close the valves and, you know, it would redirect flow into
10 whatever side it needed to be at the time. So I do have some
11 control, but usually I set it back to whatever the operator wanted
12 it at, or whatever the -- it was running at to begin with.

13 Q. So I don't understand terminals very well --

14 A. All right.

15 Q. -- but I kind of know pipelines, and you mentioned you
16 had the pressure control valve.

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. That's at the tank?

19 A. At each delivery location. So off line 6B, for
20 instance, we deliver to Marysville, we deliver to LaSalle, Nova,
21 and Sarnia. Each one of those delivery sites has its own PCV. It
22 also has meters at the delivery locations and the tanks are -- you
23 know, they have barracks that show how much the level is of the
24 tank. So whatever location we're in, we do have a PCV available
25 that can, you know, pressure control the site.

1 Q. That's pressure control into the tank?

2 A. Pressure control --

3 Q. Or back pressure?

4 A. It's pressure control as the line's going into the area.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. So, you know, say, I want to raise the pressure on the
7 line, I'd, you know, set a set point at the PCV for that site, you
8 know, and it would close. (Indiscernible) would go down,
9 indicating that it's closing a little bit. It would back pressure
10 into the line and, you know, that's how that works.

11 Q. Okay. So you were on shift at the same time that the
12 start-up was being done on July 26th; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I was on that night shift.

16 Q. And what was your involvement? Can you kind of just
17 walk us through the events of that shift, beginning with the
18 start-up of how you would have interacted, what was said to you?

19 A. Well, again, it's so many months passed.

20 Q. I totally understand. Fifteen months, it's --

21 A. And like line 6B is just one aspect of what I do. Like
22 I do -- I have line 5 to deal with and --

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. -- my own Sarnia sub. But that night typically at
25 start-up the line operator would tell us ahead of time, whether

1 over the phone or in person, that we're starting up at this time.
2 I'd do some of my CMT paperwork, you know, opening the
3 transactions and such. They usually call when they want to open
4 the site. They -- well, they will call when they want to open the
5 site. They'd ask me to open the valves and confirm flow, which I
6 would. Then they'll have me hold the pressures that they want --
7 or that would be normally indicated. You know, the pressures are
8 normally put in according to procedure, you know, in normal
9 operations.

10 MR. JOHNSON: When you say open the site, you mean
11 you --

12 MR. VANDERWOLF: The site -- yes, the site, depending on
13 where we last resumed from. Like, say, we're in the Sarnia
14 terminal. I'd resume back to the Sarnia terminal. If we shut
15 down when we were in the Marysville site, I would resume back into
16 that site.

17 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. That helps.

18 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah.

19 MR. JOHNSON: I didn't quite understand that.

20 MR. VANDERWOLF: Because it's not just one location.
21 There's, you know, 6B and then there's multiple locations.

22 MR. JOHNSON: So you could be going to Stockbridge,
23 Marysville or --

24 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yes.

25 MR. JOHNSON: All right. Thank you.

1 MR. VANDERWOLF: Correct.

2 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

3 Q. And you would control all of those?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Marysville -- oh, okay.

6 A. I control what site we're going to and the meters at the
7 sites and, you know, I have contact with the external customers,
8 depending on the -- if it's Marysville or Shell or whomever.

9 Q. Okay. So let's go back to the --

10 A. Sure.

11 Q. -- this first start-up, then. Based on what you've
12 said, and I believe -- was it Tim Chubb that was doing the
13 start-up?

14 A. Yeah. Tim Chubb was operating 6B that day.

15 Q. So he would have phoned you to open valves at Sarnia,
16 Marysville, wherever?

17 A. Yeah. I think we were into Marysville that particular
18 night.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And, yeah, he would have contacted me to open up and I
21 would have opened the valves, you know, verified I was open by,
22 you know, a small pressure drop and then also flow in the meters,
23 you know, residual flow that would go in once you open the valves.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And then I would wait their next instructions. Do you

1 want me to, you know, keep going?

2 Q. Sure, keep going. Tell me what you know.

3 A. Well, yeah, they would ask me do they want to keep the
4 holding where it is. They'd tell me to lower the holding if they
5 wish. They'd ask me if I'm open, you know, that sort of deal.
6 Whatever the procedure entails.

7 Q. And I imagine this happens -- if they shut the line
8 down, they also contact you?

9 A. Yes. It'd be the same operations, almost in reverse.
10 They'd ask me to raise the pressure. Then they'd start shutting
11 off pumps and they'd close their valves. I'd close off my valve
12 once they indicate they're closed and so on.

13 Q. Okay. So we're aware that there was problems on
14 start-up the morning of the 26th and eventually that led to the
15 line getting shut back down. Were you following all those events?
16 Did --

17 A. I was not, no. I wasn't aware of anything that happened
18 that day at the time. Like, I came on shift to my console, took
19 relief. I started going over my operations that I have to do that
20 night. The 6B start-up was just one item on my night's agenda.
21 As for what went on with their -- the pipeline actual start-up or
22 shutdown the morning of, I wasn't aware of anything that went on
23 that morning.

24 Q. The shut-down. What about the start-up, though? You
25 weren't --

1 A. Well the start-up that I was on, like on shift that
2 night, of course, I was aware of.

3 Q. Well, that's what I'm asking.

4 A. Yeah. Okay.

5 Q. The start-up that Tim Chubb was doing. In fact, it
6 might help me, if you could, can you kind of draw a sketch of
7 where you were in the control room relative to 6B?

8 A. Oh, of course.

9 Q. Are you right next to -- I've been in the control room,
10 so --

11 A. So I would have been at the Sarnia console here.

12 Q. Okay. Where are the shift leads? I'm a little bit
13 lost.

14 A. Shift leads would be in their room here or at the --
15 they had a front console here.

16 Q. Where is the MBS analyst?

17 A. MBS analyst would have been right there.

18 Q. Oh, got you, okay.

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. So where's Tim Chubb and 6B?

21 A. 6B would have been right here.

22 Q. Can you write 6B next to it, too?

23 A. Sure.

24 Q. And can you put your name or Sarnia there?

25 A. Yeah, sure.

1 Q. Okay. So you're way at the back of the room, or --

2 A. Yeah, and there --

3 Q. Well, or you're only --

4 A. -- here there'd be another console and then another
5 console there.

6 Q. You're one row back, it looks like, right? There's just
7 one set of pods between you and --

8 A. There's a POD here, POD here, and then over here --

9 Q. Yeah. Okay.

10 A. It's not enough to just talk verbally to each other.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. You have to use the phone for the most part or walk over
13 and discuss things.

14 Q. Okay. So back to the question. When he was doing the
15 start-up, could you hear the -- were you aware of the problems
16 they were facing on the start-up?

17 A. Not right away.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I could see there were -- you know, eventually there
20 were people over there, but I wasn't aware of what they were doing
21 or talking about.

22 Q. And you weren't communicating?

23 A. They would only call me if they needed me to -- you
24 know, I was -- again, as my operations, I have other things to
25 worry about. If I was watching the pipeline, because I have a

1 screen --

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. -- behind me, so I'm watching, you know, what they're
4 doing. I'm watching my flow into the site. I'm watching my
5 pressures into the site, percentage of my PCV, stuff that I'm in
6 charge of, stuff that I can control. But for the most part,
7 they're -- the pipeline operators, if they need some assistance --
8 like if they need my -- me to do anything, they would contact me.

9 Q. So you're saying you had the 6B line up on monitors --

10 A. Yes. On our back screens -- we have one screen behind
11 us.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. I have line 5 and 6B, and the reason we do that is
14 simply we can see if they're having upsets. You can see the pump
15 configurations they're using. I can see the pressures and the
16 flows, and it's helpful in our operations because if there is a
17 problem, I can kind of -- and using my pipeline knowledge that I
18 have, I can see that there's going to be an issue at Sarnia
19 because might have to do something with the PCVs or contact the
20 shipper that -- or the delivery site, you know, that the flow's
21 going to drop off or something like that.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. So that's why we watch it. It's kind of an extra --

24 Q. That makes sense.

25 A. -- you know, extra eyes on things.

1 Q. So then you probably saw the problems that -- you could
2 see right away if you had the screen there that there was no
3 pressure building downstream --

4 A. I could see --

5 Q. -- at Marshall?

6 A. Yeah, and I'm not sure if I went up there and asked him
7 about anything. You know, hey, you guys having any issues, or if
8 I called about it. I can't recall. But I was watching it --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- you know, right on my screen there. And wasn't
11 watching it, you know, 100 percent, because I was doing other
12 tasks, but --

13 MR. JOHNSON: So, you had 5 -- line 5 coming in. Do you
14 operate some of the lines going out of there?

15 MR. VANDERWOLF: I operate line 9C, which goes -- it's
16 just a small transfer line. And then the other console across
17 from me, the other operator that's 4 feet away, he operates the
18 Sarnia pipelines.

19 MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

20 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah. Which are the ones coming out of
21 Sarnia and then going into Westover terminal.

22 MR. JOHNSON: All right.

23 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

24 Q. Okay. So you were looking at the screen enough to know
25 that there was no pressure building downstream in Marshall; is

1 that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Okay. All right. But you weren't directly involved
4 with Tim Chubb?

5 A. No.

6 Q. But you did see activity going on over there, you said;
7 is that correct?

8 A. Yes. Yes, I seen activity going on, but there's
9 activity around the room normally.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. So, you know, I -- something was -- you know, okay,
12 there's something going on there, but there's always something
13 around the room going on. The shift leads do have a lot on their
14 plate.

15 Q. And at some point, then, they had you shut the valves at
16 Sarnia because they had just given up on the first attempt?

17 A. Yeah. I was keeping them notified of my PC percentage
18 and I was keeping them notified of how much was delivered into my
19 site, you know, and I think I was asking them -- I wasn't sure of
20 the time frame, but, you know, hey, what's going on. I'm not sure
21 if I called or if I went over there. But I was trying to keep
22 track of it a little bit.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. You were expecting to see a certain amount? Because

1 you've got deliveries to make, right?

2 A. Yeah. I got deliveries to make and I, again, I've done
3 that maneuver dozens, hundreds of times, I'm not even sure how
4 many. And it was taking abnormally long.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And the pressures did not look adequate.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah. And the flow and the percentage are PCV, but the
9 response I was getting on my side wasn't normal either, and I did
10 indicate that to them. And also, when we shut down, after we had
11 shut down, I, you know, said, hey, here's how much I got at
12 Marysville. So when we do our CMT gauging hour you could see
13 exactly on our computer here's how much went into the line, here's
14 how much went out of the line.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And generally on a start-up there's a bit of a pack.
17 You know, they start up and it packs a bit of oil in. But there
18 was an abnormally large differential of volumes.

19 Q. And you said you notified them. Who was them?

20 A. I think I went to Tim and talked to him. I also talked
21 to the shift leads and saying, hey, here's how much I got at
22 Marysville. It looks like, according to these numbers, this is
23 how much came into the line; this isn't normal.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I also verified, you know, the numbers, just to make

1 sure mine are right. You know, went, got the meters, checked, and
2 my numbers were correct. So I was like, okay, well, here's all I
3 got, you know, we've been pumping for X amount of time. This
4 doesn't seem right.

5 Q. So you went to see them, and this was all verbal? None
6 of this was over the phone?

7 A. Yeah. Like the phone calls, again, are for convenience
8 while we're starting up simply because I have other things to look
9 at and I can't have him go away from his line because that would
10 take him away from the task, and I can't go over there because I
11 have to be there to react. So -- but for the -- once we're shut
12 down, we don't have to necessarily use the phones because, you
13 know, I'm shut down. I can actually get over there and show him,
14 here's what I'm getting, here's the numbers I have, here's what I
15 think.

16 Q. And what kind of conversation did you have once you were
17 telling them that the numbers were low and it didn't -- wasn't
18 looking right? Did they say anything to you or --

19 A. Yeah. They asked me to verify it.

20 Q. Oh, okay.

21 A. Make sure my numbers are right. So I checked --

22 Q. And once you'd done that?

23 A. Once I did that I went up and said, hey, you know, this
24 doesn't look right. But later on throughout the night I did
25 indicate that I did think there was a leak.

1 Q. You did?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I think that's even on the transcript, probably.

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Yeah. That's much -- we're not quite there yet.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay. Right. Okay. So that's first start-up. They
10 ask you to shut down. You confirm your numbers.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Talk to them. But then at some point there's a second
13 start-up, right?

14 A. Yes, at some point throughout the night there was a
15 second start.

16 Q. Were you involved in the decision to start the line up
17 in any way?

18 A. No. I wasn't involved in that decision. I was -- I had
19 brought up to my shift leads, and even to the MBS analyst who was
20 involved in that night, here's what I think. Here's the numbers I
21 get. This doesn't look right.

22 Q. Did they engage you? Did they -- were they wanting your
23 input or --

24 A. Well, I -- as a like an -- I'm a terminal operator. My
25 job is to open up and ask.

1 Q. Yeah.

2 A. But as a pipeline operations, I also know that side.

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. I do have some insight in how the line runs a little
5 bit, but I wasn't involved in getting the line started up by any
6 means. I was supporting, you know, here's what I -- here's my
7 numbers. Here's my findings. Here's my information. I'm just
8 letting them know.

9 Q. But you said something didn't look right, right? Isn't
10 that what you just said?

11 A. Yeah. The pressures didn't look right. The volume that
12 went into the line compared to what went out didn't look right.
13 My PCV was reacting and -- like there was no flow getting to the
14 site.

15 Q. And you communicated that to the shift --

16 A. Yes, I communicated --

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. And did you use the term at that point leak, or --

20 A. I used the term leak, yes.

21 Q. You did? Okay. But no one was taking that as a
22 possibility?

23 A. Well, the shift leads -- again, being 3 a.m., you know,
24 it's a hard time of the night to --

25 Q. It's late. Yeah.

1 A. Yeah. They were, throughout the night, working with --
2 over at Tim's console. They were also handling other things in
3 the room. And the MBS analyst was also involved with some of the
4 comments and decision-making processes involved that night.

5 Q. Okay. Does the MBS analyst override any decision you
6 might have or any opinion you might have?

7 A. Well, I wouldn't say override, but he does -- he, you
8 know, he's been at Enbridge for quite a long time. He's worked
9 there --

10 Q. Oh, okay.

11 A. -- long-term employee. He has worked in pipelines
12 before. So he, again, he would have previous experience in how
13 pipelines may have been run. And, you know, he's right across
14 from me so I could hear what his conversations were and he can
15 hear what mine were, and, you know, I was simply being told that,
16 you know, it's not what you think, in so many words.

17 Q. Did you agree? Did he --

18 A. I didn't --

19 Q. -- convince you that it wasn't?

20 A. Did he convince me?

21 Q. Yeah. I mean, what was the -- he said what you think is
22 not correct.

23 A. He didn't say those specific words --

24 Q. Oh, okay.

25 A. -- but yes, that's the gist of it.

1 Q. And did you --

2 A. I --

3 Q. -- believe that, or --

4 A. No, I didn't.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. But at the end of the day, I have other operations to
7 take care of. I can't sit there and discuss it with him, and if
8 they want -- if he wanted to push his ideas, then that's the way
9 it is.

10 Q. Um-hum.

11 A. I can't really -- like I'm not saying I don't have a
12 voice --

13 Q. Right.

14 A. -- but I did try to voice my opinions and I felt a
15 little bit dismissed.

16 Q. So what we've heard in other interviews is that the
17 operator has the final word on safe operation of their pipeline.

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. Is that true?

20 A. I guess the operator has the final decisions on their
21 operations, yes.

22 Q. So had that been your pipeline and you still felt
23 strongly it was a leak, but you had this MBS guy telling you
24 something else, would you have --

25 A. Well, it's hard to sit in a person's shoes like that,

1 because I --

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. -- I wasn't the pipeline operator that night, thank --
4 you know, I'm glad I wasn't. I don't know how things would have
5 played out with a different pipeline operator or a different MBS
6 analyst or different shift leads. All I can really comment on is
7 what I seen in --

8 Q. Sure.

9 A. -- my console. I don't know how I would have handled
10 it. I would like to think I would have handled it differently,
11 but again, it's hindsight. You can't really --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- you know, theoretically what would have happened.

14 Q. So moving on from there, then, so it sounds like early
15 on you kind of had a suspicion that maybe this was a leak --

16 A. Um-hum.

17 Q. -- just from the limited information you had. Because
18 you do -- there is a point in the transcripts that we have, I
19 think, just before the second start-up --

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. -- Tim Chubb calls you up and asks you, I believe, to
22 open the valves, and I think your response to Tim is something
23 along the lines of, yeah, okay, are you actually serious? I think
24 that's -- those were the words you used.

25 A. Yeah. By that point in the night, I had, again, voiced

1 what I seen to the only people that I could voice to, my shift
2 leads, and Jim when he was trying to decide on what to do for some
3 reason, and it was met with a lot of, you know, we're handling it,
4 you know, go back to your console. You know, thanks for your
5 input, but, you know. So, by the end of the night I was like they
6 can decide what they would like to do. And I know I might sound a
7 bit sarcastic on that conversation. I wish I'd been -- I'd said
8 things a little differently. I might have also been a little bit
9 unprofessional manner sometimes. However, the circumstances, it
10 was just -- it was getting out of hand a little bit and I felt
11 that, hey, you know, I am only here to open up when instructed, by
12 the end of the night. And even though I see what I see and I have
13 these numbers, I have other things to operate. I can't be -- you
14 know, I can't change things sometimes.

15 Q. So I heard you say you talked to the MBS, you were
16 talking to the shift leads. Were you talking to Tim Chubb? Did
17 you ask --

18 A. Tim was very busy.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Tim had a lot on his plate already. I -- other than my
21 conversations on the phone, I don't think I went over a whole lot.
22 Like they had a lot on their plate already. I didn't want to
23 intervene over there more than I needed to. Plus, I couldn't leave
24 my console much. I did have a busy shift otherwise, on top of
25 that 6B stuff.

1 Q. There was another operator there, I think. Was Ghazal
2 on shift that night?

3 A. Yeah. She was across from Tim.

4 Q. So was she expressing any similar concerns or --

5 A. I'm not really sure what went on with their
6 conversations. I wasn't over there.

7 Q. Were there any other operators that shared your concerns
8 that might have been on the front end of the system opening valves
9 or --

10 A. Again, I -- other than my POD mate that I was with that
11 night, he was kind of looking at it a little bit just to, hey,
12 this looks interesting. But he was busy with his stuff, so he
13 didn't really have any comments on what went on. I was at my end
14 of the line. I had my numbers. I seen what I seen on my screens.
15 Those are my comments. But I don't know what went on at Tim's
16 console. And I don't know really what went on at the shift lead
17 console, because I wasn't over there. And even from the most part
18 with Jim doing his thing around the room, I don't know -- but I
19 kind of tuned it out after a while because it just went on all
20 night and I had other things to do.

21 Q. Yeah, I understand. So who was your POD mate?

22 A. Michael Phung was on that night.

23 Q. Michael?

24 A. Phung, P-h-u-n-g.

25 Q. Oh, okay. I think we --

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. And what was -- he's a terminal or a pipe --

3 A. He's a pipeline, Sarnia pipeline operations operator.

4 Q. Oh, got you.

5 A. Yep. He really didn't have much to say other than just,
6 you know, he was like, oh, okay, what's going on? You know, oh,
7 you guys are shut down again. But really, realistically, he was
8 basically doing his things.

9 MR. JOHNSON: Because he can operate his whole system --

10 MR. VANDERWOLF: He can --

11 MR. JOHNSON: -- with the crew he's got?

12 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah. Tim -- or no, who are we talking
13 about?

14 MR. JOHNSON: Michael, is it?

15 MR. VANDERWOLF: Michael Phung, yeah. Mike is a
16 qualified pipelines operator. He can operate all the Sarnia
17 pipelines stuff.

18 MR. JOHNSON: But he doesn't need 6B coming in to --

19 MR. VANDERWOLF: No, no.

20 MR. JOHNSON: -- to be -- okay.

21 MR. VANDERWOLF: His operations are just the terminal
22 once it gets there, all the oil product, and then outwards from
23 there to his sites. So he --

24 MR. JOHNSON: So --

25 MR. VANDERWOLF: -- he doesn't have much contact with

1 anybody else in the room because he's pretty self-contained.

2 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah.

3 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah.

4 MR. JOHNSON: So 6B being down doesn't affect him; he's
5 still got a full workload?

6 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yes. 6B has no impact on his
7 operations, other than maybe the crude isn't getting to the
8 tankage. But even that night we weren't going to Sarnia tankage,
9 we were going to Marysville. So, you know --

10 MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

11 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

12 Q. I just wanted -- a couple of questions, then I'll pass
13 it off --

14 A. Yeah, okay.

15 Q. -- to Brian here. Were you interviewed as part of the
16 internal interview for Enbridge?

17 A. I was interviewed, yeah, about a week or so after the
18 incident, but other than that, I hadn't been interviewed.

19 Q. A week after?

20 A. About a week or so. I don't think it --

21 Q. Approximately?

22 A. I don't really remember exactly.

23 Q. Who interviewed you?

24 A. There was Al Botwinder (ph.) and then there was somebody
25 else, but I don't recall, involved. He was in the room. I don't

1 remember if he was doing the talking or not, though. I -- again,
2 it's 18 months ago.

3 Q. Was Bonnie there, do you know? Bonnie --

4 A. That doesn't ring a bell.

5 Q. Okay.

6 MR. JOHNSON: Or Matt Faith (ph.)?

7 MR. VANDERWOLF: I'm bad with names.

8 MR. JOHNSON: And that's okay.

9 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

10 Q. That's, yeah, that's perfectly fine. Was it a recorded
11 interview? Did they record you like we're doing today?

12 A. They either transcribed it maybe directly. They might
13 have had somebody in the room transcribing it or --

14 Q. A court reporter, somebody official?

15 A. Yeah, I don't really recall. I was pretty nervous --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- and I just answered the questions for the, whatever,
18 half an hour or so they wanted. I wasn't too aware of what was
19 around, even.

20 Q. Was there -- were you subjected to any disciplinary
21 actions or was there any kind of fallout after Marshall that you
22 were part of?

23 A. Disciplinary as in?

24 Q. Discussions with supervisors, shift leads of, hey, you
25 shouldn't have been doing this or that or any type of --

1 A. Well, I think for the most part, other than maybe what
2 was said on the phone, like a couple of the impertinent, you know,
3 I wasn't really talked to at all, to be honest.

4 Q. Oh, okay.

5 A. I -- Ian Melligan (ph.) had talked to me, just that,
6 say, hey, you have this interview with the internal guys. You
7 know, go upstairs and say what happened and be honest and, you
8 know, tell what you saw, which is what I did. And, you know, I
9 didn't do anything wrong, for instance. I opened the valves when
10 instructed and, you know, my operations were, well, they were
11 operated correctly.

12 Q. Yeah. Did they -- when you came in here you mentioned
13 -- I heard you say something about the lawyers contacted you for
14 this interview.

15 A. It wasn't the lawyers necessarily. It was a conference
16 on our end, which is --

17 Q. Well, why was there a conference call regarding our
18 interview?

19 MR. JOHNSON: I'm involved with that. We --

20 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah. It was just --

21 MR. JOHNSON: -- did do a prep session. We just --

22 MR. NICHOLSON: So it's a prep session?

23 MR. JOHNSON: So we do about 15, 20 minutes. We talk
24 about the same thing you do up front; you can have someone with
25 you.

1 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

2 MR. JOHNSON: You, you know, this person, this person,
3 if you work for Enbridge, you -- you know, Enbridge would pay for
4 your attorney, outside attorney. Answer the questions honestly,
5 to the best of your ability. If you can redirect, you know. So
6 basically a bit of a session like you give at the beginning and
7 then if they have any questions, you can ask questions.

8 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

9 Q. Is that accurate?

10 A. Exactly.

11 Q. Is that kind of what it was?

12 A. Yeah. I basically went on the phone call and listened
13 the whole time because it was just the exact same sense, just,
14 hey --

15 Q. Right.

16 A. -- be honest, you know, everybody has these interviews
17 next week, and that's it. And then it took about, I don't know,
18 half an hour, hour or so, and I had it on mute the whole time
19 because I was just listening in and that was about it.

20 MR. JOHNSON: Hmm.

21 MR. VANDERWOLF: Well --

22 MR. NICHOLSON: You said be honest.

23 MR. VANDERWOLF: Well, you guys had a --

24 MR. JOHNSON: Oh, that's right. He's -- you're being
25 honest now. Okay.

1 MR. VANDERWOLF: Well, what am I going to say? I --

2 MR. JOHNSON: It is --

3 MR. VANDERWOLF: -- I didn't have anything to say
4 anyway.

5 MR. JOHNSON: -- but that's all right. So we start
6 those. It's, you know, just to put -- because, as you know,
7 people are maybe not the most at ease to come in --

8 MR. NICHOLSON: I understand.

9 MR. JOHNSON: -- to this interview.

10 MR. NICHOLSON: I wanted to hear it from Darcy.

11 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah.

12 MR. NICHOLSON: I just want to be sure.

13 MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

14 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

15 Q. So there was nothing said --

16 A. No, it was --

17 Q. -- don't talk about this, don't --

18 A. -- just a thing just to help ease you and say, you know,
19 just relax or it's nice and calm and, you know --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. -- it's, you know --

22 Q. All right.

23 A. -- nothing to worry about.

24 MR. NICHOLSON: I think in the interest of time, I'll
25 let Barry ask a few questions. Thank you, Darcy.

1 MR. VANDERWOLF: Yeah.

2 BY MR. STRAUCH:

3 Q. Who are the shift leads that you talked to that night?

4 A. That night was Aaron Zimmel and Darren Peters (ph.).

5 Q. Okay. And what exactly did you tell them?

6 A. Well, I talked to them about a lot of things that night,
7 but -- I can't paraphrase exactly or say exactly what I said
8 because, again, it's 18 months ago.

9 Q. Right, but --

10 A. But in the general, I showed them my numbers, here's
11 what I got at Marysville.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. Here's what I think, you know. So we're shut down, you
14 know, what's going on next. But then they're busy at their own
15 thing. They don't have a whole lot --

16 Q. Right.

17 A. -- to talk about to me as an operator.

18 Q. Right. So but you expressed your concern about what was
19 going on?

20 A. I did express my concerns, yes.

21 Q. Okay. And how would you characterize their attitude to
22 you when you expressed your concern?

23 A. Busy.

24 Q. Okay. Now, had you done a situation like that before
25 with them where you expressed concern about something?

1 A. Yeah. Like there's -- we have things going all the time
2 at Enbridge. There's tanks that are out. There's pumps that go
3 off. And for the most part they have the time to, okay, you know,
4 what's going on? They come over and look at it.

5 Q. Um-hum.

6 A. And they did. Like, they looked at the -- you know,
7 hey, here's your numbers, okay, did you double check them? But
8 other than that, they're more with Tim and, you know, and Jim and
9 -- over at that console.

10 Q. Okay. How do you see the role of the shift leads?

11 A. Now or then?

12 Q. Then.

13 A. Well, then they were, you know, shift leads in the room
14 that we'd tell them if we have any issues. They'd come over and
15 help us work through it and -- you know, they're our leaders, our
16 people leaders.

17 Q. Okay. Would you turn to them if you had technical
18 questions?

19 A. Yeah. But then again, we're also trained to deal with
20 -- do our job. I don't personally have a whole lot of technical
21 questions to ask very often. But yes, if I had technical
22 questions, I would go to them. But nowadays we do have technical
23 advisors that will be on shift at some point that will help aid us
24 in our technical, you know, problems.

25 Q. Well, if the shift lead gave you technical advice under

1 the old regime, what would your reaction to that be?

2 A. Well, depends on what kind of technical advice. Like
3 they're not qualified to run my area. Like, but they can give you
4 insight on how, you know, hey, well, you should call this person;
5 yeah, you should call up that guy; maybe it's this problem. But
6 it's still -- I have the final say in what to do.

7 Q. Okay. Have you ever been overridden by a shift lead?

8 A. I haven't, no.

9 Q. Have other people, to your knowledge?

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. You ever been citing for committing an error?

12 A. No, I've been error free.

13 Q. Have other people been cited?

14 A. Oh, yeah. There's errors in the room.

15 Q. Um-hum. And what's your view of the system of citing
16 people for errors?

17 A. Well the old system, you know, people do errors, they
18 get written up for it and, you know, we talk about them at safety
19 meetings. You know, we find out the consequences; we find out the
20 -- what the events led up to it. We try to learn off of the
21 errors. That's the whole point of the review process.

22 The new process is even nicer because everybody gets
23 e-mailed the, you know, awareness program e-mails, you know,
24 here's what led up to it, here's what happened, here's the impact.
25 And people -- well, I read those every time and it gives you

1 insight on, hey, I can put myself in those shoes and, you know, I
2 can see that happening. I'll learn from it.

3 Q. And when did this change take place?

4 A. Oh, they've always done OAPs, but we had just a database
5 that you would read and we'd bring them up at safety meetings, but
6 now they get sent out every single time. Now the shift leads send
7 them out.

8 Q. Um-hum.

9 A. Which is a nice process because then we not only just
10 read them on the e-mails, but anything that really comes out of
11 them, we have our -- like I'm a safety rep this year at our shift,
12 and our safety meetings, we go over all sorts of -- fatigue
13 management; we go over, you know, things that are going on in the
14 room and it's just to get information around.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. How would you describe the atmosphere in the control
18 room, the work environment, the morale?

19 A. Now or before?

20 Q. Both.

21 A. Well, again, morale comes and goes. Like some people --
22 when people leave or things are happening, sometimes morale goes
23 down, but right now morale's better than ever. I mean, we have
24 our new control center. We've got new fatigue management programs
25 going on. The way our roles have been defined is a lot nicer, so

1 it's less in the air of who's, you know, who's responsible for
2 this, who's responsible for that. Everybody's -- here's what the
3 shift leads do; here's what the MBS group does; here's what the
4 operators do. You know, our operations have been never smoother.
5 You know, we take procedures -- those are reviewed all the time
6 now. You know, they get -- there's e-mail sent out -- e-mails
7 sent out and we comment on them all the time and the processes
8 have vast improved. I think the operations is smoother.

9 Q. How was morale at the time of the incident?

10 A. Well, around the room, you know, it was fine. Like,
11 well -- it wasn't bad by any means, but, you know, we were waiting
12 for our new control center and it around the time and, you know,
13 sometimes salaries come up or days off come up, you know, people
14 working lots of overtime and they can't get -- you know, oh, they
15 got to come in. I'm forced to come in; I'm looking forward to my
16 days off. But that's typical operations, I guess. You know,
17 again, it depends on the time of year. It depends on those sort
18 of deals. But my morale's been good, you know, and I think across
19 the room people have been pretty happy.

20 Q. Good. The -- and just -- I'll make it fast in the
21 interest of time.

22 A. Sure.

23 Q. There was -- the night of the incident, the 10-minute
24 rule was violated. Had you seen that occur before?

25 A. I haven't, no.

1 Q. Have you heard of it?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Why do you think it was violated that night?

4 A. I don't -- well, I found out later on that there was a
5 procedure that was brought up on, here is a procedure that might
6 come up, like one of those ones that are review that should
7 have -- like it was brought up that night, that should have been
8 procedure for the 10-minute rule, but it was a different one, a
9 procedure under advisement or something like that, and that
10 procedure had some different information on it. I wasn't privy to
11 what was on it, but it -- that might have been one of the
12 contributing factors. I don't really know. I'm not sure why the
13 10-minute rule didn't occur. As far as I was concerned, it's
14 always been a absolute standard. Like that's, 10-minute rule,
15 that's the one procedure you make sure you memorize. Like, you
16 make sure you have up (indiscernible) you look at it and --

17 Q. Now, since the accident, have you seen any procedure
18 being violated?

19 A. Any procedure being violated?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. Not in -- not purposely, but some procedures are not
22 always updated correctly to the equipment that's going on. But
23 for the most part, the procedures are adhered to very well. We
24 have -- like now that we're getting our procedures updated as much
25 as possible, they will be to a point where they're exactly the

1 same as our operations. Like just the other day we -- I was
2 sitting down with somebody and we were going over every valve.
3 This one, like they're the same valve, but they were worded
4 different in different -- one procedure and this, but everybody
5 knew what they meant, but now we're standardizing everything
6 perfectly and, you know, the procedures have never been reviewed
7 as diligently as they are now.

8 Q. Okay. Thank you.

9 MR. NICHOLSON: Brian?

10 BY MR. PIERZINA:

11 Q. I know we're short on time.

12 A. That's all right.

13 Q. I wanted to ask you about if you're familiar with the
14 overpressure event that occurred sometime -- maybe May or June, at
15 the Sarnia terminal where it went into a closed valve?

16 A. Again, I wasn't on that shift. I have heard of there
17 being an overpressure, but I'm not really privy to what details
18 went on.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Like even the OAP, I remember reading over it, but I
21 don't -- I didn't talk to the operator about what happened or
22 anything like that. I'm not sure.

23 Q. Yeah. Well, I was kind of curious, being that that was
24 at the terminal that you operate --

25 A. Um-hum.

1 Q. -- you probably looked at the OAP --

2 A. Yeah, of course.

3 Q. -- pretty closely?

4 A. Yeah, I did read over it, and -- but referencing now,
5 okay, what happened in May, I don't remember the -- exactly the
6 circumstances or even which operator did it.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. But yeah, I do remember that that had occurred.

9 Q. And I -- that's something that they submit to us, and
10 so --

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. -- as I recall looking at it, there was a change between
13 switching from Marysville to Sarnia or something like that where
14 maybe a valve was closed going into Sarnia and then when the
15 start-up happened the path wasn't open.

16 A. Yes, there -- I'm not sure if the wrong valve was
17 closed, or -- I can't remember exactly what happened there, but
18 yeah, I think I know what you're referencing.

19 Q. I remember thinking to myself when I looked at that
20 situation that, if somebody else closed the valve --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. -- but then the operator is responsible for opening --
23 knowing that valve is open?

24 A. Well --

25 Q. Have you run into situations like that?

1 A. There's a few things with that. Like when you come on
2 shift, one of the first things you do is you read over the shift
3 notes, what valves are open, what valves are closed. There are
4 things that are in the wrong status, but if, say, something was
5 done accidentally, that wouldn't be in there.

6 Next thing you do, you go through every one of your
7 panels. You go through all your manifolds and you skim over all
8 the valves, okay, right, right, this is leading here. You check
9 your flow path is what you do. Check your flow path is my best
10 operating practices. Everybody does it, as far as I know. And
11 that should have shown which valves are in the wrong spot.

12 On top of that, we view Baker sim (ph.) panels. They --
13 you know, we have an older version and a newer version. The older
14 version didn't have that option, but checking your full path would
15 have shown it. The new version does have it on it. So every
16 single valve that you flow through or don't flow through,
17 everything that could be in the path is brought up on that so now
18 you can see exactly -- you know, and prevent incidences like that.

19 Q. Okay. So was that part of the issue in this deal, you
20 had two versions? You had a old --

21 A. That wasn't the issue. More the bigger issue was best
22 operating practices weren't followed, because there's also
23 consoles who don't have sim panels or some panels don't work
24 correctly. And the panel -- you don't necessarily need a sim
25 panel to do your job. It's just a -- more of a consolidation of

1 the valves you're going to open anyway. The main thing is you
2 have a manifold, you have a line, you have whatever you're doing.
3 You got to make sure that you're aware of what valves are open or
4 closed. That's part of your job.

5 Q. Sure.

6 A. And you should follow from the beginning, okay, go,
7 good, good, good, oh, there's something here. If you're not
8 checking those, that could be -- that's not doing your job.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And whether you do that before you open or before shift
11 or both, you know, you should always be checking your flow panels.
12 That's number one.

13 Q. Okay. Since the Marshall accident --

14 A. Well, I actually want to continue a little bit on.

15 Q. No, yeah, please.

16 A. On top of that, even when opening up into Sarnia, there
17 would be indicators that pressures weren't correct. Your PCV
18 wouldn't react the right way, you wouldn't get the flow on the
19 site that you wanted. You know, even -- there'd be a few
20 indicators, for sure. And I'm not sure exactly what was missed or
21 what happened, but I know myself there has been lots of times
22 where a valve shows open where it's closed. Something happens in
23 the field and on their screen it's showing open. So you can't
24 just look at them and say, oh, the valve's open, and assume it is.
25 That's why we have pressures. That's why we have flow indicators,

1 so you can see these and go, well, I can see the valve says open
2 but it's obviously not, because I've been trained and I know what
3 to look for.

4 Q. Sure.

5 A. It's doing your job. And that's why we have ERT
6 sessions. That's why we have these emergency response things,
7 which, you know, obstruction, that's one of the main things that
8 comes up. You know what signs to look for. Same with leaks, you
9 know what signs to look for.

10 Q. Um-hum.

11 A. Anyways, go on, I'm sorry to interrupt you there.

12 Q. No. Nope, I appreciate your input there. When you
13 talked about the amount of oil that you had landed at --

14 A. Marysville.

15 Q. -- Marysville --

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. -- how is that volume arrived at?

18 A. How is it arrived at?

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. On our Datex systems we have a totalizer, so it shows
21 here's the accumulated volume. We also have meters. We can see
22 the volume that goes through each individual meter. So I can see
23 what meters have flow on them, and I can see the total volume that
24 we've put in there since we opened up. So we open up at zero
25 volume or whatever we resume from. So I can see it started here,

1 you know, in this many minutes we only put this much in there;
2 that's the volume I have.

3 Q. Okay. Are those meters accurate on a slow drain-in type
4 of situation?

5 A. They'd be less accurate, but they'd still be pretty
6 accurate. Because, like if you have a lower volume, you know,
7 it's out of that 20 percent range that your meter's approved for,
8 and you could close the meters if the rate's going to be
9 permanently low like that, but on a start-up because it's, you
10 know, usually a temporary thing, if you have your meters open,
11 they'd be a little bit less accurate according to, you know, the
12 parameters on the meters, but not that much.

13 Q. Okay. Is it going into tankage at that point?

14 A. It's going into, yeah, Marysville Sun's tankage. And
15 I'm not sure what system they use, if they have barracks or subs
16 or level indicators, but yes, it is going into their tanks.

17 Q. Okay. And you can't see their tank levels?

18 A. No one --

19 Q. Or can you?

20 A. No, we're not privy to their tank level information. We
21 do get alarms if they hit a high level or a high-high level.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. But that's about it.

24 Q. All right. So the only -- that's your only volume
25 determination is their -- is your meters?

1 A. Yeah. Coming off the line I have a flow meter and I
2 have my meters and I have -- you know, but here's the total volume
3 that the meters add up to.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And that's sufficient. It's accurate. It's waterproof
6 meters.

7 Q. Okay. Since the accident and the pressure changes --
8 operational changes on 6B, have you seen changes in how that
9 affects your operations at the Sarnia terminal?

10 A. So since Marshall has my operations changed?

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. The operations as far as my job is very similar, but I
13 do a lot more -- like I do more shift change review stuff. So we
14 do fill out this form, here's what's happened throughout the day.
15 But we were doing that kind of anyway on a Excel spreadsheet. We
16 had a log we'd type up every day at Sarnia.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. You know, we do a lot more fatigue management stuff
19 with, you know, are you fatigued, how are you feeling, you know,
20 and people are more aware of it now. We have -- procedure reviews
21 are a constant thing. But they were before too, but at least now
22 they're more, they're more focused on. Communication -- I always
23 thought communication across our -- at least our console has been
24 very good, so that hasn't changed at all. Ours is still, you
25 know, showing an excellence in communication. But, yeah, the

1 culture across the room has gotten better. There's more openness.
2 There's more asking for help from other operators that might show
3 technical expertise. There's more role definition. There's, you
4 know, a lot of good things have come.

5 Q. Great. Thanks a lot, Darcy.

6 A. Okay.

7 MR. NICHOLSON: Karen, you got anything?

8 MS. BUTLER: I don't think it's fair since I wasn't --

9 MR. VANDERWOLF: I'm sorry.

10 MS. BUTLER: -- here for the whole thing. No, I'm
11 sorry, I would like to introduce myself to you.

12 MR. NICHOLSON: Oh, and I -- yeah, we should get you on
13 the record. I'm sure --

14 MS. BUTLER: Karen Butler, PHMSA Central Region office.

15 MR. VANDERWOLF: Okay.

16 MS. BUTLER: Supervisor of accident investigations.

17 Telephone number is (816) 329-3835. I can be reached at the
18 following e-mail address: karen.butler@dot.gov. And I'm sorry I
19 missed the beginning, Darcy, but thanks for talking to us.

20 MR. VANDERWOLF: That's fine.

21 MS. BUTLER: I think I caught enough that Brian, my
22 counterpart, would have picked up the necessary questions.

23 MR. PIERZINA: Yeah. We're just pushing up against the
24 clock so much that --

25 MR. NICHOLSON: Anything else? I'm going to just ask a

1 couple --

2 MR. JOHNSON: I mentioned --

3 MR. NICHOLSON: Well, I'm sorry, Jay.

4 MR. JOHNSON: I mentioned to Leon we'd be about 15
5 minutes late because I thought we were getting there, so, please.

6 MR. NICHOLSON: I just have --

7 MR. JOHNSON: I don't have any questions.

8 MR. NICHOLSON: -- two small ones here.

9 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

10 Q. You mentioned earlier you didn't see it but you were
11 aware that a wrong procedure was pulled?

12 A. I found out, yeah, at some point --

13 Q. Yeah, how'd --

14 A. -- later on.

15 Q. -- how'd you find out?

16 A. People just talking or, I -- maybe I was over-listening
17 a conversation or something. I'm not sure who I heard it from.

18 Q. Okay. Other controllers, probably, or other operators?

19 A. It was more of a rumor. It was more of a rumor than
20 anything. I am not sure that it was brought up wrong. I just
21 heard something --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- over the course of the last year. I shouldn't be,
24 you know, I shouldn't even talk about rumors because they're
25 rumors. I don't know if it's true or not even.

1 Q. Well, it's -- you heard it somewhere. That's valid.

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Have you ever seen a shift lead reprimand or discipline
4 another controller in front of the group?

5 A. Discipline? Like a -- no, the -- like, the shift leads
6 are very conscious about how -- like they got to be polite. They
7 got to bring the person into another room --

8 Q. Um-hum.

9 A. -- talk about what happened. There's not a whole lot of
10 public discipline, like --

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. You know, it's all very professional. You know, like
13 even within our -- I don't know anybody that's been publicly
14 disciplined. It's usually done, you know, pull into the office,
15 let's talk. And that's fair. Like nobody wants to be disciplined
16 in front of everybody. It brings down morale.

17 Q. Right. Now, you mentioned -- when you talked about the
18 events of the evening, well, with the restart --

19 A. Sure.

20 Q. -- and the second restart, and I'm just curious, and
21 then you were talking about the new control center, which I've had
22 a chance to see, and it --

23 A. It's awesome.

24 Q. -- it's very great. It's nice. Yeah, beautiful. That
25 X-Box is --

1 A. Nobody gets to use it because it's -- most consoles
2 aren't cross-trained. We don't have the coverage to --

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. Because I personally don't like to be away from my
5 console. I'd rather more things be brought to the console that I
6 can do while viewing my screens.

7 Q. That's a good start. Eventually you'll get a feed out
8 to your console, but --

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. I'm just curious --

11 A. Yeah, right.

12 Q. -- if we go forward now into the new control center
13 with, I think there's technical advisors now, you mentioned?

14 A. There's, yeah, they've been --

15 Q. How would things have played out differently in the new
16 control center, do you think? What's changed now that your
17 conversation with the shift leads and the MBS isn't going to
18 get --

19 A. Well, it is a --

20 Q. -- thrown off?

21 A. Well, like the MBS, their roles -- like their role was
22 to do MBS up before.

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. You know, Jim may have stepped out of his role a little
25 bit. But, like nowadays, everybody, okay, I'm the MBS, I'll tell

1 about the model, that's it. The shift leads will go over there
2 and see what's going on, but the operator, he's the guy who
3 decides his -- he knows his -- we're trained on hydraulics, you
4 know, we're qualified to do it. That's why we get -- that's why
5 we have our jobs. So you would be the one who decides -- and
6 reviews your shift notes and, you know, okay, is this -- does this
7 look good, is this normal, you know, and same with the terminal
8 operator. From my point, my job wouldn't be a whole lot
9 different. I'd still open up when they ask. If I seen something
10 I wasn't sure of, I'd question it.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Just like I did. People might -- we have these big,
13 beautiful screens that apparently are for bringing up the
14 information so if other operators haven't faced -- if we've got
15 something that's weird, we should bring them up here; do you guys
16 have any comments, stuff like that. The new shift change reports
17 would be great for any abnormal information that's, you know,
18 that's happened throughout the shift before. So if anything's
19 going on, I can just review -- okay, review it. This person
20 signed off on whatever information's valid. I sign off that I
21 read it. It's -- you know, there's more checks in place, is what
22 I'd say.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. You know, it's just a -- it's a little bit different,
25 but it's better. It's more, you know, numbers, hands on. Like,

1 and I'm not sure how to define it, but --

2 Q. No, I think you did fine. Okay. Sounds like roles and
3 responsibilities are probably the biggest change?

4 A. I -- yeah. I do say that it probably wouldn't happen
5 again in our new control center because people now are more aware
6 of everything, even column subs, we do more on column sub
7 calculations, you know, like the -- there's been a huge change
8 in --

9 MR. JOHNSON: Culture?

10 MR. VANDERWOLF: -- culture. Yeah. That's a good one,
11 yeah.

12 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

13 Q. That was Jay's word.

14 A. That's a good word, though.

15 Q. Agree with that?

16 A. Call it culture. Like, not that we were doing a bad job
17 before, but there were things we, I guess, could work on, and now
18 we've worked on a lot of it. And everybody's participated, you
19 know, had feedback on it and, you know, it's good.

20 Q. Do you feel like you have better access to the
21 supervisors and management now?

22 A. Yeah. I -- like, even -- well, they weren't far away
23 before, but I feel that they're more open now.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I feel our managers being -- you know, without a door

1 between the control centers is nice because I can just walk up to
2 Curt, you know, here's what I think, here's what -- he'll take it
3 under advisement anyway. They have a lot on their plate too.

4 Q. Right.

5 A. No, I think everything is more open now.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Okay. That's --

9 MR. NICHOLSON: Anything else? Jay? No?

10 MR. JOHNSON: No.

11 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, Darcy, I really appreciate it. If
12 you think of anything else, you've got my -- well, you got Barry's
13 card. I'll give you my card and you're more than welcome to
14 contact us. I know --

15 MR. VANDERWOLF: Okay.

16 MR. NICHOLSON: -- after leaving here you're going to
17 think, oh, I should have said --

18 MR. VANDERWOLF: Well, of course, you're going to --

19 MR. NICHOLSON: -- X or Y, you know, and --

20 MR. VANDERWOLF: Oh, I should have been more clear on
21 this, and --

22 MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah. You can get those for Jay --
23 route those through Jay or you can just e-mail them directly to me
24 or --

25 MR. VANDERWOLF: I'm sure if you have more questions

1 you'll just ask me too, so --

2 MR. NICHOLSON: What's that?

3 MR. VANDERWOLF: I'm sure if you have more questions
4 you'll be --

5 MR. NICHOLSON: Oh, yeah.

6 MR. VANDERWOLF: -- contacting me too.

7 MR. NICHOLSON: No, we know where to find you.

8 MR. JOHNSON: No, Brian would do that, because he's
9 usually the last one. Oh --

10 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN ENERGY
 MARSHALL, MICHIGAN
 Interview of Darcy Vanderwolf

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA10MP007

PLACE: Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

DATE: November 17, 2011

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to
the recording accomplished at the hearing.

Patricia M. Noell
Transcriber