

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

In the Matter of: )  
 )  
 )  
ANDREW J. BARBERI ) DCA 04MM001  
 )

New York, New York

Thursday,  
October 16, 2003

The above-entitled matter came on for the  
Interview of Trevor Gherardi, pursuant to Notice, at  
11:45 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

For the National Transportation Safety Board:

BRIAN CURTIS

For the United States Coast Guard:

DAVE PARKER

For the New York City Department of  
Transportation:

SEAN MCDERMOTT

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## P R O C E E D I N G S

11:55 a.m.

1  
2  
3 MR. CURTIS: Good afternoon. It's October  
4 16, 2003 and we're here to interview Trevor Gherardi  
5 regarding the accident on the Andrew J. Barberi Ferry.  
6 The time is 11:55.

7 Trevor, you're being interviewed regarding  
8 the accident because we believe you may have some  
9 information that's pertinent to the investigation as to  
10 what may have caused the accident. This investigation  
11 isn't a legal investigation, it's only to try to  
12 determine the cause and maybe prevent it from happening  
13 again in the future.

14 THE WITNESS: I understand.

15 MR. CURTIS: Excuse me?

16 THE WITNESS: I understand.

17 MR. CURTIS: What we're going to do is we're  
18 going to go around the table and identify ourselves and  
19 as we ask the questions, we'll identify ourselves for  
20 the transcriptionist so they will be able to identify  
21 who is asking the question at that time.

22 I'll just ask that as we go around, ask your  
23 questions, then the next person. If you have more  
24 questions, the next time around you can ask them.  
25 Consequently, we may have to go around the table a

1 couple of times.

2 THE WITNESS: Okay.

3 MR. CURTIS: If you want to take a break at  
4 any point for a drink of water or whatever, just feel  
5 free to jump in and we'll pause.

6 We'll get started now. My name is Brian  
7 Curtis, I'm a Marine Engineering Investigator with the  
8 NTSB.

9 MR. PARKER: My name is Dave Parker, with the  
10 Coast Guard Marine Inspections, Vessel Inspections  
11 Section.

12 THE WITNESS: Trevor Gherardi, Marine  
13 Engineer, Staten Island Ferry.

14 MR. MCDERMOTT: Sean McDermott, Chief  
15 Engineer for Staten Island Ferry.

16 EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. CURTIS:

18 Q Good morning, Trevor. We'll begin with your  
19 job title on the Andrew J. Barberi.

20 A Marine Engineer, which is the assistant to  
21 the Chief Engineer.

22 Q Okay. So you work under the direction of the  
23 Chief?

24 A Yes, I do.

25 Q What do you hold for a license?

1           A     Third Assistant Marine Engineer, any ocean,  
2 any vessel, unlimited.

3           Q     How long have you worked for the City of  
4 New York?

5           A     Twelve years.

6           Q     Has that been out of the same facility?

7           A     Various boats, various titles. Oiler,  
8 started out for the first two years, became a Marine  
9 Engineer ten years, all of the boats at different  
10 times.

11          Q     As an engineer on the vessel do you stand a  
12 particular watch or how does your rotation work?

13          A     Well, 1:30 to 9:30 was the watch that day and  
14 what I'm responsible for is making sure all the  
15 equipment is running properly, under the direction of  
16 the Chief Engineer. Basically, mostly in charge of  
17 electrical. I take care of the generators and  
18 auxiliary machinery and I do routine inspections hourly  
19 during the watch to make sure everything is running in  
20 parameters.

21          Q     So you make hourly rounds pretty much?

22          A     Hourly rounds, yes.

23          Q     What is the schedule of the ferry itself? Is  
24 it just back and forth at ascribed times?

25          A     Well, each boat has its set schedule, but

1 that's never made to be that way permanent, because  
2 things change. They can take a boat out of schedule  
3 for fixing and then you have to make different trips,  
4 so that's not something that is always the same,  
5 although they try to keep a schedule.

6 Q Do you work the 1:30 to 9:30 --

7 A The 1:30 to 9:30 is my bid for this year,  
8 which is Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday 1:30 to  
9 9:30.

10 Q Okay. So this was your second day --

11 A Second day this week.

12 Q What I'd like to do now is just have you go  
13 through from when you came on watch that afternoon and  
14 then up to the accident, then as much as you can  
15 remember what happened through the accident, up to the  
16 point where it was completed.

17 A Okay. At 1:30 I relieved the morning  
18 engineer on the watch and he told me number one  
19 generator on line, number one boiler and just gave me  
20 over the watch. Went down to the engine room, put my  
21 stuff down in the engine room, checked out the log.

22 The first thing I check out is always the  
23 generator to make sure my volts and amperage, make sure  
24 the amps aren't too high and cycled right. Then I go  
25 around, check out the engines, look around, look for

1 oil leaks, listen for any strange noises coming from  
2 the engines, check the boiler, make sure it wasn't  
3 putting steam to the deck, because it was still warm  
4 enough, it was just on getting ready for Coast Guard  
5 inspection, we were testing it. And check out the  
6 generators, oil levels, temperatures.

7           Went up on deck, went down to each end,  
8 looked around, make sure there's no water leaking, oil  
9 leaking, looking for any kind of problem, making sure  
10 my (inaudible) were open for the cooling water and  
11 returned to the engine room. That whole process took  
12 me about 20 minutes, so I was back in the engine room  
13 about 2:00.

14           Sat down, signed in and I'm not sure what  
15 time the accident happened, it was very quick. We made  
16 a couple trips. Once again I got up, looked around in  
17 the engine room and looked around outside real quick,  
18 came back down to the engine room, sat down again and  
19 I'm sitting down looking at the electrical panel, my  
20 generators, and I hear a crunch and the boat come to a  
21 halt.

22           It was a violent crash. I thought we ran  
23 aground, my first impression. The Chief Engineer sent  
24 the Oilers up and myself to check for damage in the  
25 ends, look for damage at either end. As I got up to

1 the top of the stairs we seen what really happened and  
2 I went back down and reported to the Chief.

3 The Chief tried to contact the bridge. Well,  
4 bridge was trying to contact the Chief after the crash,  
5 but the phones were down, there was no communication,  
6 so the Chief put me in charge of the engine room, he  
7 went up to the bridge to try to make contact with the  
8 bridge.

9 Secured the water to the ship, because there  
10 was water coming down the stacks, we definitely busted  
11 some water lines from the impact. Secured ship surface  
12 air to the end of the ship, double checked the boiler  
13 to make sure nothing went wrong with it.

14 I didn't want to put steam on the boat when  
15 I'm sure that we had broken steam lines. The generator  
16 did flicker for about a fraction of a second, but the  
17 lights never went out. That was probably caused by a  
18 ground or a short in the wiring where the accident  
19 happened. The lights were never lost.

20 From that point on I just stayed in the  
21 engine room and did what I was told to do.

22 Q You never lost lights then?

23 A Never lost power. Never lost control of the  
24 boat or power. All engines were running. I don't know  
25 about the controls in the Staten Island pilot house but



1 I know about the controls in the New York pilot house,  
2 because that's how the Captain brought the boat in  
3 after the accident, he drove the boat back. It piloted  
4 the boat back to the slip.

5 Q From which pilot house?

6 A The New York pilot house. After we were in,  
7 I went up on deck and tried to help the people, but the  
8 fire department and the police were there and I just  
9 went back down in the engine room to make sure  
10 everything stayed down there.

11 I was concerned with the Staten Island end,  
12 because I didn't know if I had broken oil lines or  
13 anything, because I could not get down there to make an  
14 inspection because the door was gone. I informed the  
15 Captain of that and he said as soon as we get in, I'll  
16 let know when you can secure that end.

17 Q You went up top side once to --

18 A Check the damage and there was one person --  
19 there were people digging out this one person right  
20 there outside the engine door and I went there for a  
21 second to try to help and then I said I've got to get  
22 back down in the engine room, so I went right back down  
23 in the engine room.

24 Then the Chief went up to make contact with  
25 the pilot house, because we couldn't get communication

1 with the pilot house.

2 Q Do you know of any propulsion problems with  
3 that pilot house after the accident?

4 A After the accident, no. Everything worked  
5 good. We got it in. I was concerned about an oil  
6 leak, but there was no oil leak. I never lost oil  
7 pressure or oil for the whole trip back to the slip,  
8 they pulled the New York end in and the engines  
9 responded like they were supposed to respond.

10 Q And you didn't notice any abnormal propulsion  
11 commands prior to --

12 A No, because I wasn't sitting in a position  
13 where I could see the pitch indicators. I was sitting  
14 by the generators and I never heard an engine slow down  
15 or speed up, the speed was constant the whole way  
16 across the trip and the next thing I know is we hit and  
17 after we hit, I heard the engines come down.

18 I don't know if it was because of a loss of  
19 air pressure for the controls or because the Captain  
20 slowed the engines down at that time. But after that  
21 point, from that point on the engines never came above  
22 the idle. They never brought the speed back up. He  
23 brought the boat in at an idle.

24 Q They never called you previous to hitting  
25 that --

1           A     No call, I didn't hear any ship's whistles,  
2 we can hear them in the engine room.

3           Q     How about any alarms previous?

4           A     No alarms, nothing previous.  Nothing at all.  
5     It was a very normal watch preceding the accident.

6     Everything was where it should have been, working the  
7     way it should have been and I was just preparing to do  
8     some stuff in the boiler, getting it ready for the  
9     Coast Guard inspection, which was supposed to be today.

10    I did a couple things down in the engine room in  
11    between my rounds and I returned to the engine room and  
12    then the next thing I know, we hit.

13                 Well, "engine room," I mean control room, I  
14    returned to the control room.  I was out in the engine  
15    room doing routine maintenance here and there, getting  
16    ready for the Coast Guard inspection.

17           Q     Any plant problems in the last week or two  
18    weeks of the normal propulsion lines or equipment  
19    lines?

20           A     We had a problem with number three coupling,  
21    it was a loose wire, it was fixed and it works fine.

22           Q     The coupling?

23           A     The coupling valve, hydraulic coupling valve.  
24    There was a loose wire so the valve was not shifting  
25    to its operating position, so the engine was never put

1 into the loop, but that was fixed. There was a 2692  
2 for that and the Coast Guard does know about it and it  
3 was fixed.

4 That was almost I think two weeks before  
5 that. I'm not sure of the exact date, I don't remember  
6 the exact date, but I was there for that problem and we  
7 checked it out and we fixed it.

8 Q And that hasn't reoccurred?

9 A No, it hasn't reoccurred.

10 Q Who else was in the engine room or on watch  
11 with you?

12 A My Chief Engineer that day was Charlie  
13 Covella.

14 Q Charlie, how do you spell Covella?

15 A C-o-v-e-l-l-a. He was the Chief. I had  
16 myself then as Assistant Engineer and I had the two  
17 Marine Oilers, I had Pete and --

18 MR. PARKER: Pete Koutsoulias?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can't spell his name.

20 THE WITNESS: And Richard Konig. He was the  
21 other oiler. Both the oilers were not the normal  
22 oilers of the watch, they were both there on overtime.

23 BY MR. CURTIS:

24 Q Do the oilers report to you or what are their  
25 responsibilities?

1           A     They report to me and I report to the Chief,  
2 the Chief reports to the Captain.

3           Q     The functions of your oilers?

4           A     What I tell them to do and the starter  
5 procedures. What they check is oil leaks -- they go  
6 around and do the same thing I do, they're like a  
7 second set of eyes and they inspect the engines for  
8 leaks, they inspect the ends to make sure everything is  
9 running properly.

10                   They're just another set of eyes, they go  
11 around and do the same inspection I do pretty much.  
12 They take the readings.

13           Q     All four of you are in the engine room pretty  
14 much for the whole watch?

15           A     We were in the engine room so far, except for  
16 making our rounds, to the end we are always in the  
17 engine room.

18           Q     And the Chief as well?

19           A     The Chief as well, yes. There's always an  
20 officer, a licensed officer and an oiler in the control  
21 room at all times. Just in case anything happens and  
22 we do have to take power, we like to keep two people in  
23 the control room at all times. We were all four in  
24 there for the accident, though.

25           Q     Everybody were in the engine room?

1           A     All four of us were there for the accident.

2           Q     Did any of those others say anything to you  
3 about recognizing anything abnormal previous to the  
4 accident?

5           A     Nothing. We were sitting there at the table,  
6 the Chief was on the settee in front of the control  
7 panel, I was on the table in front of the generators  
8 with one oiler sitting on the seat across from me and  
9 the other oiler standing up.

10          Q     I'm sorry, the location of the Chief was?

11          A     On a settee, we called it. Right in front of  
12 the control panel, he was watching the controls, the  
13 control board, the main engine controls. I was  
14 watching the generator panel. An oiler was sitting on  
15 their side table next to me and one of the oilers was  
16 standing up when we hit.

17                   The only indication we had of anything being  
18 wrong was the hit and the engines coming down in speed  
19 after the hit, because we can hear, when the pitch  
20 changes, the engine pitch changes. When the pitch on  
21 the (inaudible) change, the pitch changes. There was  
22 never a change in the pitch. If the load changes, we  
23 know that, we can hear it and there was never a change  
24 in anything like that.

25          Q     I just have a couple of human performance

1 questions. In the last three days or so, your work/  
2 rest cycle, the time you wake up and go to bed?

3 A Let's see, three days before that would be  
4 Saturday. I slept to about 2:00 in the afternoon.

5 Q Well rested.

6 A Because Friday I go home from work late  
7 night, do some chores around the house. It was windy  
8 that day, raining, it was raining that day too, I  
9 remember it was raining.

10 Sunday, once again I enjoyed my rest. Monday  
11 I had to get up and do some paperwork for my mother-in-  
12 law, who is over from Jordan. She lost her passport  
13 and needs a new passport to go home.

14 Q You got up roughly, just ballpark?

15 A At 8:00, 8:30. That's with a kid in the  
16 house, too. I've got to wake up for the kid, that's a  
17 beautiful thing.

18 Q And to bed?

19 A I usually get to bed midnight, 11:30 to  
20 midnight I go to bed. My wife always complains my eyes  
21 are bloodshot from being on the computer too long, so  
22 she says come to bed.

23 Q Tuesday?

24 A Tuesday was a work day. Woke up, picked up  
25 my oiler, we drive in together to work, picked him up

1 at his house, we drove in, got here at about 12:45, 45  
2 minutes before the watch starts.

3 Went down in the boat, worked until 12:00  
4 midnight, got him home at about 12:50, I made it home  
5 at about 1:05. Took a shower, went to bed.

6 Woke up the next morning at 9:30. That's my  
7 alarm. Well, my alarm goes off at 9:00, but I hit the  
8 snooze button. I hit the snooze button three times, so  
9 that's 21 minutes of snoozing. I was well rested.

10 Q The other three watch standers, no --

11 A Andy I can vouch for, but he wasn't there  
12 that day because he took that day off. But the other  
13 watch standers, I don't know what they did.

14 Q I mean just the general -- nobody seemed --

15 A They were alert. Everybody was alert, they  
16 were running around doing what they had to do. Even  
17 before the accident everybody was alert. Pete noticed  
18 some lagging falling down from the casing, you know,  
19 they were alert, they were paying attention. This was  
20 before the accident. He knows to look for lagging  
21 dropping down.

22 The stack door was open, it was windy and it  
23 probably just blew some stuff around up there and he  
24 noticed it. They noticed it. They were all awake and  
25 alert.



1           Q     The response, when you went up above you said  
2 the emergency response was pretty much there?

3           A     The first time I went up, when the Chief sent  
4 us out, like I said, it was a mess, there was  
5 screaming. I used to be an advanced EMT, so I tried to  
6 help what I could, but when I went out there and I seen  
7 them digging the people out and I saw this guy, he was  
8 pretty much folded in half like a chair and they were  
9 trying to dig him out and I said I can't help here and  
10 I went back down to the engine room, which is where I  
11 belonged. I was outside of the engine room probably a  
12 minute and a half, two minutes and then reality hit me  
13 and said get back downstairs.

14          Q     So you weren't up in the accident area for an  
15 extended period to assist in the --

16          A     No. No, I couldn't. I tried -- I did try to  
17 get into the Staten Island end, but the door was gone.  
18 That was the first time I went up and I came back down  
19 after that. On my back down is when I stopped to  
20 assist, so maybe I was out for maybe three or four  
21 minutes from the engine room.

22                    Because I did go to look at the Staten Island  
23 end and like I said, the door was gone. There was no  
24 way to get down there.

25                   MR. CURTIS: That's all the questions I have

1 right now. I'll turn it over. As you go around,  
2 identify yourself for the transcriptionist.

3 MR. PARKER: Dave Parker, Coast Guard.

4 EXAMINATION

5 BY MR. PARKER:

6 Q You answered a couple of my questions as you  
7 were talking, but after the collision, perhaps you guys  
8 felt the collision where you were sitting and the power  
9 came off at that point on the engines. Was the power  
10 coming off from the pilot house control or was it  
11 coming off the engine room?

12 A See, I don't have that -- we didn't have  
13 control of the engines in the engine room. We never  
14 took control over the engine, there's no controls in  
15 the engine room. It was never sent down to us and  
16 never was asked to be sent down to us.

17 Q Okay.

18 A Even for the trip back from where we hit to  
19 the pier the pilot in the pilot house kept control.

20 Q So whoever took the power out from one of the  
21 pilot houses then after the collision?

22 A After the collision it was either due to a  
23 loss of air pressure, maybe a ruptured line, air line,  
24 control line, or the pilot took it off. I have no way  
25 of knowing what it was. All I know is that the power

1 did come off, speed came off the engine, engine speed.

2 I wasn't able to see the pitch, so I couldn't  
3 verify what the pitch was or anything, but I know that  
4 speed did come off the engines after the hit.

5 Q The other was for communications between the  
6 engine room and the pilot house?

7 A I don't know if the communications were bad  
8 or if the Captain was busy and he rang down, the Chief  
9 went to get the phone and tried talking, he wasn't  
10 there, so the Chief said okay, I'm going to go up.

11 Q At what point was that?

12 A That was after I had come back from checking  
13 the ends. After I came back from checking the ends and  
14 seeing the door was gone and the boat was pretty much  
15 ripped apart and trying to help that one person. I  
16 went back down in the engine room and the Chief says  
17 okay, you stay here, keep control of everything, I'm  
18 going up to the pilot house to make contract.

19 Q Would normal communications be done through  
20 telephone or what?

21 A Well, the sound power phone is what we tried  
22 and they have radios, but for some reason the radios  
23 weren't working. They're always plugged in to be  
24 charged, so I don't know why they weren't working.  
25 Radios do have a problem.

1 Q So if you fellows would normally want to call  
2 one of the pilot houses --

3 A We'd use the sound power phone.

4 Q The sound power phone?

5 A Yes. That's how we contact them. Cell  
6 phones don't get signals in the engine room, so we  
7 can't call that way.

8 MR. PARKER: All right. Everything else was  
9 answered. Thanks.

10 MR. MCDERMOTT: This is Sean McDermott.

11 EXAMINATION

12 BY MR. MCDERMOTT:

13 Q Trevor, after the accident I was down below  
14 with you. At that time, after the accident, did we  
15 have communication? Were we using the sound power  
16 phone?

17 A I don't recall.

18 Q Do you remember any calls? I was picking up  
19 the phone at that time, but --

20 A Oh, yes, you were. As a matter of fact, yes,  
21 you were.

22 Q You remember the phone operating at that  
23 time?

24 A Yes. I do now. I remember the phone  
25 operating after the accident.

1           Q     So it's possible that somebody was not there  
2 at the phone or at that time they just weren't  
3 responding?

4           A     It's possible someone was not at the phone,  
5 they weren't responding. We got a ring and the phone  
6 wasn't answered right away, it took about half a minute  
7 to get to the phone, because we were busy looking  
8 around. Charlie did finally get to the phone, rang up  
9 -- answered the phone, tried to talk, rang up, there  
10 was no answer, so he decided to go make contact and  
11 see what was happening.

12          Q     Trevor, when we were in the slip after you  
13 had arrived, we continued to have propulsion?

14          A     Yes, we did. We had propulsion.

15          Q     We had propulsion on both ends?

16          A     On both ends we had propulsion.

17          Q     And we still had normal control at that time  
18 it appeared?

19          A     We still had normal control from the New York  
20 pilot house. I know we had normal control from the  
21 New York pilot house.

22          Q     You stayed working against the dock for a  
23 period of time?

24          A     Working against the dock, engines at idle,  
25 both engines pitched 50 degrees into the dock. I

1 actually went and I looked and I made sure, because I  
2 got a call that said they wanted me to take control,  
3 put the boat into neutral and I said not while you're  
4 pushing against the dock.

5 I did not take control, I left control in the  
6 pilot house and I told them I am not taking control  
7 while there is pitch on the boat pushing into the dock  
8 because I don't want the dock -- the boat pulling away  
9 from the dock. When you can prove to me that you have  
10 lines out and if I take power, I won't move the boat, I  
11 will take power.

12 MR. CURTIS: This is Brian Curtis again.

13 EXAMINATION

14 BY MR. CURTIS:

15 Q So they asked you after the accident to --

16 A After we were in the slip. It wasn't the  
17 regular Captain of the boat that called down, it was  
18 someone else that came on, I don't know who it was, and  
19 mentioned that they wanted me to take power down in the  
20 engine room and I said to him that I cannot take power  
21 in the engine room while there's pitch on the boat,  
22 keeping the boat against the slip.

23 Afterwards, about ten minutes after that I  
24 heard them say to put out lines. I'm glad I made that  
25 decision. I didn't want the boat pulling away.

1 Q You don't know who called down?

2 A I don't know who it was. He didn't identify  
3 himself as the Captain and I don't take orders from  
4 anybody but the Captain or the Chief Engineer.

5 MR. PARKER: Dave Parker with the Coast  
6 Guard.

7 EXAMINATION

8 BY MR. PARKER:

9 Q Back to the phone business, when you were  
10 talking to somebody in the pilot houses on the phones,  
11 do you know which end pilot house that was? Was it  
12 Staten Island's end or the New York end?

13 A I don't know, because the Chief was on the  
14 phone most of the time and Sean, after the accident,  
15 McDermott on the phone. They were talking to each  
16 other, I was not on the phone that much.

17 Q Do you know if the Staten Island pilot house  
18 has ever been tested since the accident?

19 A No. I was taken off the boat by the police  
20 and taken up to the 120 for investigation.

21 MR. MCDERMOTT: Dave, I don't have any  
22 information to that. I can't tell you one way or the  
23 other, I'm assuming it may have been the in shore end,  
24 I was talking to the Captain about the whole thing.

25 MR. PARKER: The New York end?

1           MR. MCDERMOTT: Yes, the shore end, the  
2 New York end.

3           MR. CURTIS: It was the New York end, which  
4 is usually the Staten Island end, so it gets confusing.

5           MR. MCDERMOTT: Right now it's turned around  
6 the other way.

7           MR. CURTIS: Yes, it was turned around  
8 backwards, so it does get a little confusing as to  
9 where you are.

10          MR. MCDERMOTT: So we're unsure at this point  
11 whether the Staten Island end is operational or not?  
12 The pilot house, the Staten Island pilot house, we  
13 don't know if it works.

14          MR. CURTIS: We're not sure.

15          MR. MCDERMOTT: Thanks.

16          THE WITNESS: It worked before the accident  
17 because they called down to make sure we had a full  
18 crew. The Captain calls down and checks to make sure  
19 everyone is on board, he has a full engineering crew  
20 and I know he called down then and he would call down  
21 from the Staten Island pilot house usually, because  
22 that's the end that's in on the first trip, when we get  
23 on board the Staten Island end is in, he will call down  
24 and make sure everybody is here. So it did work before  
25 the accident.



1 BY MR. PARKER:

2 Q If somebody in the wheel house wants to get a  
3 hold of the engine room as quick as possible, what  
4 would --

5 A Sound power phone. To take control, we have  
6 a system of cow bells. One cow bell, engine room takes  
7 control and we drill on that every week.

8 Q I'm guess or I'm just kind of thinking out  
9 loud I guess, but if a person knows he has problems,  
10 he's got trouble and he needs to get a hold of the  
11 engine room fast, right now, right this very instant --

12 A Sound power phone.

13 Q Sound power phone?

14 A It's right there, it's hooked up right in  
15 front of the control panel, you can see, take control,  
16 do whatever we've got to do right there from that  
17 phone.

18 Q Real handy to the control station?

19 A Real handy to the control, yes. Right there  
20 in front of the control station. It couldn't be in a  
21 better spot unless it was attached to your head.

22 MR. MCDERMOTT: Sean McDermott.

23 EXAMINATION

24 BY MR. MCDERMOTT:

25 Q Did you ever get any signals from the EOT or

1 anything that would --

2 A No signals from the EOT, nothing that  
3 followed the accident. Nothing on the EOT, no cow  
4 bell. No cow bell, no EOT and when we hit, I was  
5 sitting facing the cow bell, which is up to the right  
6 of where I was sitting, and the cow bell never moved,  
7 because I like to look, you know, when something  
8 happens, I look at the cow bell because you can't  
9 always hear it.

10 But you always hear -- even if you don't hear  
11 the cow bell, you do hear the EOT. It's loud and it's  
12 very prevalent. If someone moves EOT and you get a  
13 call from the pilot house, you know you've got to take  
14 control.

15 MR. CURTIS: Brian Curtis.

16 EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. CURTIS:

18 Q Just for clarification, "cow bell," that's a  
19 signal coming down from the bridge that's manually  
20 operated from the bridge?

21 A Yes, manually operated from the bridge. It's  
22 connected by cables, there's nothing electrical, it's  
23 manually operated.

24 MR. CURTIS: That's all I have right now.  
25 Anyone else Dave?

1 MR. PARKER: No. Thank you very much.

2 MR. MCDERMOTT: Is there anything we can do  
3 for you at this time, Trevor? Do you need any  
4 assistance from anybody?

5 THE WITNESS: No, I'm fine. I have the  
6 number for the counselor and I'm all set.

7 MR. CURTIS: We certainly want to thank you,  
8 Trevor, for your time today. I appreciate you coming  
9 in. I know these can be trying experiences, so we  
10 certainly appreciate your time.

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

12 MR. CURTIS: That concludes the interview.  
13 It's now 12:30 p.m.

14 (Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the interview was  
15 concluded.)

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