UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
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PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY	*	
SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 ACCIDENT	*	Docket No. DCA-10-MP-008
SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA	*	
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MGC

Interview of: ~~MARK~~ MARC CENICEROS

Anaheim Room
Marriott Hotel
San Francisco Airport
1800 Bayshore Highway
Burlingame, California 94010

Thursday,
September 16, 2010

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:48 p.m.

BEFORE: KARL GUNTHER
Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

KARL GUNTHER, Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'EnFant Plaza East, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20594

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SUNIL K. SHORI, Engineer
California Public Utilities Commission

TOM FINCH, State Liaison
PETER J. KATCHMAR, Senior Accident Investigator
U.S. Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration

ROBERT FASSETT, Director
Integrity Management and Technical Services
Pacific Gas & Electric Company

GEOFF CALDWELL, Police Sergeant
City of San Bruno Police Department

DEBBIE MAZZANTI, Business Representative
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
Local 1245

JOSHUA SPERRY, Senior Union Representative
Engineers and Scientists of California
Local 20

DANE B. JAQUES, ESQ.
(Counsel for Mr. Ceniceros)
Dombroff, Gilmore, Jaques & French
1676 International Drive, Penthouse
McLean, Virginia 22102

I N D E X

I N T E R V I E W

(2:48 p.m.)

MR. GUNTHER: I'm Karl Gunther, National Transportation Safety Board. We're investigating an accident that occurred September 9th, 2010, in San Bruno, California. It's our number DCA-10-MP-008.

The first thing I want to do is advise you that you are allowed to have a person with you of your choosing. It can be anyone you wish. Have you chosen someone?

MR. CENICEROS: Yes, I have.

MR. GUNTHER: And who is that?

MR. JAQUES: Dane Jaques, on behalf of the witness.

MR. GUNTHER: We've also been asked while we're on the record to go around the table, identify yourself and where you're from.

MR. FASSETT: Bob Fassett, PG&E, Director of Gas Engineering.

MR. SHORI: Sunil Shori with the California Public Utilities Commission.

MR. KATCHMAR: Peter Katchmar with the U.S. DOT, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

MR. GUNTHER: Karl Gunther, National Transportation Safety Board.

MS. MAZZANTI: Debbie Mazzanti, IBEW Local 1245, Business Rep.

MR. GUNTHER: And later on, Joshua Sperry, from Engineers and Scientists of California Union.

INTERVIEW OF MARK CENICEROS

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q. The first thing I want to do is get your name, address, and phone number for the record.

A. Mark Ceniceros, [redacted], [redacted], California [redacted].

Q. Okay.

COURT REPORTER: Excuse me. Could you spell the last name, please, sir.

MR. CENICEROS: C-e-n-i-c-e-r-o-s.

COURT REPORTER: Thank you.

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q. And your affiliation and your job title?

A. My job title is senior transmission coordinator. I don't understand what you mean by affiliation.

Q. What company do you work for?

A. Pacific Gas & Electric Company.

Q. I'd like to take you back to the start of September 9th, just go ahead and describe everything that you did on that day.

A. At what point in time would you like me to start?

Q. Sometime in the morning and just go on through.

A. I got up at 4:00 a.m. I went through my morning rituals. I went to work. I arrived by 5:40 a.m., or

approximately. I took the change of shift briefing. I began the ~~signing~~ PLANNING of my gas day. I presented the morning meeting. And I went about the normal business of my daily routines.

Q. And what happened after that? Was that prior to the -- you know, the explosion? Or what did you do after or during -- before, during, and after the explosion?

A. Before the explosion, I was aware of work -- I became aware of work going on at Milpitas. I was preparing to transfer our operational control of the system to our alternative gas control center, which is located in Brentwood, California, as we were going to be vacating our system gas control offices. When it became time to make the transfer, I delayed making the transfer until the difficulties that were taking place at Milpitas were resolved.

While we were working on the problem, we received reports of the pipeline rupture and we began responding to that event and I began -- I myself began making calls of notification to appropriate personnel and instructed my -- the crew in the room to do the same thing, to the people that they're responsible to notify.

Q. Okay. And these people you notified were PG&E people or outside people?

A. PG&E people.

Q. Okay. Now, you didn't call the NRC or that kind of thing?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Now, I'd like to get into either your formal education --

A. I'm a high school graduate.

Q. Okay. And then have you had any other courses, like through PG&E or other places?

A. I received many brief and short career development courses through the many years I've worked for them.

Q. And are you covered over the PG&E OQ plan?

A. Operator qualifications?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. All right.

MR. GUNTHER: Sunil, PG&E -- or, restate that -- California PUC?

MR. SHORI: I'm going to go ahead and let Peter go first on this one.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay. So Peter Katchmar of PHMSA.

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. Yes, sir. Thank you for coming in today.

As you probably know, we've been gathering a lot of paperwork from PG&E. One of the things we received was a -- I guess it's Instant Messaging log from 7:00 a.m., September 9th -- one of them is September 9th, 7:00 a.m., through the 10th at 5:41 a.m. And I just had a few questions on this. The first question

is, how many forms of communication are there at your control center to the field?

A. Normally three.

Q. Can you describe them?

A. We communicate via e-page, via telephone, and via a device known as a gas logging system.

Q. Okay. Can you further explain what e-page is?

A. It's essentially a brief message, text message that I send to either pagers or telephones with paging functions that the officers receive and their staff. And I'm limited to 220 characters. It goes off as a page on your telephone.

Q. Like a text message?

A. Similar.

Q. Okay.

MR. KATCHMAR: If I may, Dane, or if you would? I'd like for him to just look at the front page of that and see if that's what's he talking about. That's a log.

You're welcome to turn the pages. It's not hooked together, so -- the staple fell out.

MR. CENICEROS: This appears to me to be the gas logging system.

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. Oh, great. Thank you.

Okay. All right. So you've got your e-page, which is like texting. And then you have the telephone. And then the gas

logging system, how does that work?

A. The gas logging system is a typewritten message that we send across -- to each other across the room and to remote stations that are manned 24/7.

Q. Okay. Good. Why would you use one over the other -- one form of communication instead of another?

A. The nature of the communication varies. So it would be because of the nature of the communication we're making.

Q. Okay. And could you give me a sample? What would you send by e-page versus what would you send by gas logging system?

A. I would send notification to the officers -- my upper management of a gas event that would have customer effect. I would send --

Q. Via what communication?

A. Oh, excuse me, via e-page.

Q. Okay.

A. I would send a direction from myself to a gas system operator to make a setpoint change via the gas logging system.

Q. All right, great.

And how would you generally make a decision that a set point needed to be changed?

A. By observing and analyzing system conditions.

Q. Okay. So, I guess, could you give us the hierarchy of how your control room is manned and what the hierarchy is of personnel there?

A. Yes. I am the employee in charge of the shift. There is another management employee who is a transmission coordinator. And then there are IBEW bargaining unit employees who are gas system operators.

I am primarily responsible for planning and forecasting to maintain the system inventories and overseeing the other activities in the control room, amongst other things. The transmission coordinator is responsible for understanding the plans that I create and dispatching the system to ensure those goals are met. He would then send an order to -- he would communicate an order to a gas system operator to make the various setpoint changes that would achieve our goals.

Q. Okay. And then you just said before that you might send an order to change a set point directly to a gas system operator instead of maybe going through the transmission coordinator. And why would that occur, then?

A. If he were out of the room. If he was busy with other activities.

Q. Okay. And -- all right, good.

Can you explain to me what does "K2" refer to?

A. A compressor unit.

Q. Okay. And how about, "BINKNEY on shift 1900 to 0700. Good evening, K4, K5, K6, available. Rest on. BINKNEY"?

A. That's a typical beginning of shift message from an operator at a compressor station. He is letting us know who is

working -- that's himself. He's telling us which compressor units are available if we want to have them, and he's telling us which compressor units are currently running, so that we can verify.

Q. Thank you. Okay. I've got a message at 1939:38 that says, "Hello, everyone. We are moving back to San Francisco tonight, AGC will reopen tomorrow morning. Thanks and have a safe and great evening. Grant." This was September 9th at 1900 hours, 39 minutes, 38 seconds.

Can you explain that?

A. We were planning on transferring operational control of the pipeline system to our alternative system gas control, located in Brentwood. We canceled it.

Q. Oh. So you really didn't move yet?

A. That's correct.

Q. So, he's saying -- and what is 19 -- that's 7:39 p.m.?

A. Yes.

Q. He says, "We're moving back to San Francisco." What's "AGC," sir?

A. Alternate gas control.

Q. Oh, okay. So what he's saying is they're moving telemetry back over to San Francisco?

A. We were moving -- they, physically, themselves, they're moving their bodies back to San Francisco.

Q. Oh, all right. You had a second shift going over there, so that there'd be a shift here and a shift there when you made

the change?

A. Yes. Normally, they would relieve us on site, but because we were transferring to a different location, they were going to relieve us from that other location.

Q. That makes sense to me now. I was going through this the other day and I didn't know, "What's this mean?"

All right. 2045, it says, "Milpitas Station indication and control is back in service." That would be 10 -- 8:45? Okay. What does that tell you?

A. That the Milpitas controls -- the communications between Milpitas and system gas control had been restored.

Q. At Martin in San Francisco?

A. No, sir. From Milpitas terminal to system gas control.

Q. Where is system gas control?

A. In Room 1645, 77 Beale Street.

Q. In San Francisco?

A. In San Francisco.

Q. Okay. And then at 2158, it says, "Per Vern Lopez, advises we can put back Martin Station back to normal operations." And then it says, "Martin Station is back to normal ops."

A. As a result of the line rupture, we had operated the remote controls out at Martin Station, and he was indicating that we could place it back in normal position.

Q. And had they closed it?

A. We had.

Q. So they reopened it?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. Okay. All right. Now, at 2253, it says, "Per Vern Lopez at Healey, valves 38.91, valve 3 and valve 4 open. Valve 40.05-1 is open to feed Martin line 109 and valve 40.05 is closed with zero percent on the upstream."

A. I would need to read that more carefully to myself. By that time, I had left shift.

Q. Okay. Well, we can ask somebody else.

I guess I have -- a question, an overall question is what form of communication was mainly used at 6:12 when the incident occurred? After -- you know, when the incident occurred and you said that "we learned of it," number one, how did you learn of it -- of the rupture?

A. I heard a GSO report from a phone call he had received that there were reports of a sound of a jet airplane and a fire.

Q. Okay. And then what mode of communication did you use to transmit that information to your -- you know, up and down the ladder, if you will?

A. I would have made -- I did make an e-page to the officers, and I began making telephone calls to supervision and directed telephone calls to be made to support staff.

Q. Okay. Is there any log of the e-page? Is that recorded somewhere?

A. I would expect so.

Q. Okay. The other form of communication was telephone. Are all telephone calls logged?

A. There are voice loggers that have all telephone calls in them.

Q. Okay. Do they roll over at some period of time? I mean, it's been seven days. Are they still on the tapes?

A. I believe so.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't know. I should say I don't know.

MR. KATCHMAR: Okay. We need to secure that. We need to secure that real quick.

MR. JAQUES: What?

MR. KATCHMAR: The telephone logs.

Because, I mean, at some point, they might roll over. Do you know, Bob?

MR. FASSETT: No, I'm going to go make a call and tell them you want to secure them.

MR. KATCHMAR: Yes. Can we go off the record for just a second, please?

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. All right, sir. I guess my other -- my next question would have been in looking through these logs -- I've got three of them -- I don't know why I've got three of them, but I do. It --

there's no discussion at all of the event. Is that curious to you?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Why?

A. During the event we were very busy making and taking calls and communications that are flowing back and forth across the room are verbal.

Q. Okay. All right. Very good.

When you were on duty, I just wonder -- do you monitor the system at all when you're on duty?

A. Me personally?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I'm just wondering, would there have been an alarm when the pressure dropped because of the rupture? I'm just wondering why somebody at the control center didn't say, you know, "We have a problem."

A. We received the telephone call announcing the ~~call~~ RUPTURE within moments, plus or minus, of the pressure dropping.

Q. So there wasn't time for somebody to notice it here?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. That makes sense. All right.

And I think until we're able to review the other two forms of communication, I can't think of anything else to ask you. Thank you very much.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay. Sunil, California PUC?

BY MR. SHORI:

Q. Mark, just -- I guess I'm just trying to make sense of what exactly this is being acknowledged to as far as -- are these for one individual or are these -- you know, why are there two logs? They're both opened at September 9th. They're both 7:00:02. So, just to get an idea of why do we have two sets?

A. I don't know, sir. I need to see them.

MR. JAQUES: If you want an answer --

MR. CENICEROS: These are two different days, sir.

BY MR. SHORI:

Q. This particular -- the documentation of after the event, is this -- who would prepare this? Is this something that you helped in preparing?

A. I did help to prepare it.

Q. Okay. The analysis is just on the first part of it. Perhaps, if you need to see it -- can you explain in terms of what exactly this is alluding to or what this is discussing?

A. Are you -- sir, are you referring to this very first paragraph?

Q. That -- yeah, that entire paragraph under "analysis."

A. Can you repeat your question?

Q. Yeah. What is that analysis describing? What is trying to be conveyed there?

A. At the time stated, we received low, low pressure alarms

at the outgoing mains from Milpitas Terminal.

Q. Okay. And what's the time that you see there, that you got that alarm?

A. 1620.

Q. By that point had the valves already been placed while the work was taking place? Had they been placed on local control?

Sir, let me back up a little bit. Since you're seeing the alarms, the alarm is linked to SCADA. So the communications are still there, correct?

A. At -- when these alarms came in, we received several pages of alarms, many auto and manual alarms and many local control alarms from the multiple regulators. They were cascading in, in the digital change of state and, simultaneously, we received the low pressure alarms on the outgoing mains.

Q. But what was the -- and you can look at the previous one. What was the period, if any, where you had no communication coming through? At this -- I want to confirm that at 1620 --

A. Yes.

Q. -- you had communication coming through.

A. That's when it went away.

Q. At 1620?

A. Yes, sir. It returned by 1632.

Q. Would you have been communicating with folks down there after this to -- in regard to this? I mean, obviously, this thing happened.

A. Yes.

Q. You got it back.

A. Yes.

Q. And there would have been some discussion going back and forth?

A. Yes.

Q. And this -- I'm sorry, I missed the first part. These are the e-page logs?

There's nothing here between 1631 and 1638. There's no entries whatsoever on both of these sets that we have. What would cause that?

A. The communications were via telephone. And I wasn't the one making them.

Q. And I know there was some discussion earlier -- I just want to clarify again. I'm just trying to make sense of stuff myself, but Brentwood is not normally manned for your control facility?

A. That's correct.

Q. Can you explain -- I'm sorry, one more time, why that was being manned and what this whole process between moving people from San Francisco to there or back, can you go over that one more time, please?

A. Brentwood is an alternative system gas control center. A place that we would man should the system gas control center in San Francisco becomes unavailable to us.

In this case, we were doing it to allow work to take place in our control room, in gas control in San Francisco. So we were transferring control out -- we were intending to transfer control out to Brentwood, and they would have then proceeded with the normal operations from there.

Q. And what was the extent of the work that was going to be taking place at your San Francisco facility that you needed to do that?

A. I don't know the full extent. I believe it included some wiring.

Q. And that was pre-planned work or how far in advance was -- do you recall that that work was pre-planned? How much notice did you have that --

A. It was pre-planned.

Q. And so these folks from San Francisco, because of that work, for some period of time were going to be physically working in Brentwood?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you have procedures that your folks -- your controllers would operate under as far as in the event of loss of communication, what -- what the procedure is for response?

A. Yes.

Q. Who else was involved in preparing this report? You said you were -- you contributed.

A. Rick Pena.

Q. Anyone else?
A. Andy Wenzel. Fanyee Hong.
Q. Is that it?
A. To the best of my knowledge.
Q. And earlier you -- to one of the questions on OQ, you said you are OQ qualified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which covered tasks are you qualified for?
A. Start and stop compressors, make setpoint changes, issue the directions.
Q. Anything else?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. Okay.
MR. SHORI: That's it for me. Thank you.
MR. GUNTHER: Okay. PG&E?
MR. FASSETT: No questions.
MR. GUNTHER: City?
MS. MAZZANTI: Debbie Mazzanti, IBEW.
BY MS. MAZZANTI:
Q. How many years do you have with PG&E?
A. I started in 1979.
Q. What's your career history with PG&E?
A. I was a helper in pipeline operations. Then I became a terminal operator at Milpitas Gas Terminal. Then I became -- that was -- turned into a gas supply coordinator at Milpitas Terminal.

Then I became a transmission coordinator, which is a management position. And then I became a senior transmission coordinator.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay. Any questions from Engineers and Scientists of California?

MR. SPERRY: No.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay. Any more questions, Pete? Sunil?

MR. KATCHMAR: Yes.

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. Yes, sir. That same document that you were reading from --

A. Yes.

Q. -- it has some -- if you turn -- they aren't numbered, but there's some trends.

A. Um-hum.

Q. On the back there and, I guess -- well, actually, first, if we go to page 3?

A. Text or --

Q. Text. If you look up at the top here, we've got 1954. So, again, help me out, guys. That's 7:00?

A. 7:54.

Q. Okay. It says -- the last little line there, it says, "We are continuing to feed line 132."

A. Yes.

Q. Can you explain what that means, you think -- what you think that means?

A. That we have not closed any valves. That's how I would interpret that.

Q. Okay. And then 1959, it says, "The line break is at -- 39.33 and reports the following valve ops: 44.04 closed at Healey, main line valve; 38.49 upstream of Healey closed, crews opened cross-tie valves 1 and 4 at Healey between 109 and 132 to establish flow to Martin Station." Are you familiar with the valving?

A. Some of it.

Q. Do you understand what's going on there?

A. Some of it.

Q. Can you tell me?

A. Valve 40.04 is a main line valve on line 132, and main line valve 38.49 is a main line valve. Those locations are north and south, respectively, of the line break at mile 39.33. They are closing those to isolate the break.

Q. Okay. And then why would they open cross-tie valves?

A. Without the operating map, I could not say.

Q. Okay. And then 24 minutes later, 2023, someone called to verify we have taken steps to isolate the break to report to PUC.

A. Yes.

Q. And then at 2028, Mr. Ceniceros -- that's you?

A. That's me.

MGC Q. Okay. And it says, "To Dave ~~Claire~~ CLARE: OEC, GRC, and EOC

open and team mobilized. Rupture isolated on high pressure line." Can you tell me what those acronyms stand for?

A. OEC stands for operations emergency center; GRC stands for gas restoration center; and EOC stands for emergency operations center.

Q. What's the first one again?

A. Operations emergency center.

Q. GRC?

A. Gas restoration center.

Q. And EOC?

A. Emergency operations center.

Q. Where are each of those located?

A. The EOC is a division level. It was in San Carlos.

MR. FASSETT: Excuse me, point of clarification. Did you mean the OEC or the EOC?

MR. CENICEROS: I meant to say the OEC, excuse me. The OEC, division level, located in San Carlos.

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. The GRC?

A. The GRC is transmission system level, located in Walnut Creek. EOC, company-wide level, opened in 215 Market Street, San Francisco.

Q. Okay. And what is your address there where the control center is?

A. Yes.

Q. What is that address?

A. 245 -- excuse me, 77 Beale Street, Room 1645.

Q. 77 --

A. Beale, B-e-a-l-e.

Q. Room number again?

A. 1645.

Q. Okay.

MR. FASSETT: Just to clarify, 215 Market and 245 Market are the original PG&E structure. There's a mezzanine bridge deck that connects 215 and 245 Market to 77 Beale. It is essentially on the same block. Those three structures take up an entire city block.

MR. KATCHMAR: Thank you for that.

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. Okay. So as a tech -- as far as you're concerned, I guess, at 2032 the rupture was isolated; is that correct?

A. I don't know precisely what time the rupture was isolated.

Q. Okay. But you were helping put together this log.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where did you get that 2032 reading?

A. The notes were compiled by Rick Pena.

Q. And these were notes from all of the controllers?

A. Yes.

Q. Oh, okay. All righty.

So you didn't use any other -- you didn't call the guy that actually closed the valves and said, "What time did you close the valve?"

A. I did not personally, no.

Q. Okay. All righty. Because that's 8:32. And down here below, it says, "Gas transmission time," you see that?

A. Yes.

Q. 8:00 p.m. Excuse me, it says, "Valves closed and leak isolated."

A. Yes.

Q. So that was 32 minutes prior, but that's okay.

A. This is when we communicated to Ed Salas.

Q. Okay.

A. Not when the isolation occurred.

Q. Okay.

A. Two different events -- two different things.

Q. Sure. All right.

Now, getting -- if you turn one, two, three, four -- the fifth page? I'm looking at a trend that says, "MMT," underscore, "PT, 0083-Mil". I assume -- it's M-i-l-p-t-s -- Milpitas, dash, TER -- Terminal?

A. Yes.

Q. Line 132, pressure?

A. Yes.

Q. And it appears that -- and I didn't -- it says it's a

six-hour tran, starting at 99 at 1559 to 99 at 2159, six hours. But if you look at the -- it looks like 630, plus a little -- no, wait a minute, 612. It goes to 623, maybe? The pressure, 623.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Do you understand how to read these graphs?

A. Yes, I do, sir.

Q. Okay. Could you explain that pressure increase?

A. That pressure was indicating 600 -- if I recall correctly -- 623 pounds. It may have been 625 pounds. I discounted it. There was no line supplying Milpitas that had that much pressure.

Q. Okay. What was the highest pressure that Milpitas was being fed by?

A. I'm not sure.

Q. Okay. But I guess if you discount it, number one, why would you discount it and why wouldn't you think it was -- if you're discounting it, why wouldn't it be 600 or 550 or 500?

A. There were three options for feeding -- there's three pipelines that were feeding Milpitas at high pressure. The two coming from the south were in the 540 or less range. The one coming from the north was in the 550 or less range.

Q. Okay.

A. So I knew there was no available pressure at 625 pounds within the terminal itself.

Q. Right. But I guess what I'm saying is how -- do you

agree with the pressure at -- what would that be -- 1600?

A. At the beginning of the chart?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Yes, I do agree with that pressure.

Q. Do you agree that it went to zero?

A. The pressure did not go to zero. The indication went to zero.

Q. Okay. And then it went right back up --

A. Yes.

Q. -- a few minutes later to the three-whatever. And it maintained that fairly level, and then it went down a little below 300.

A. Um-hum.

Q. And then it popped way up to 625, or whatever you say.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. So are you -- do you agree with the numbers as they are level there?

A. I agree that those are the numbers that were indicated. But I knew as an operator there wasn't 625 pounds. Just as I knew as an operator it wasn't zero earlier.

Q. Okay.

A. They were both false readings.

Q. What would have caused that, do you think?

A. The communications difficulties and electronics difficulties that they were having in Milpitas.

Q. So the work that was going on down there gave you false readings?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And at some point they said Milpitas is back on line, everything's ~~nominal~~ NORMAL?

A. Yes.

Q. And when do you think that might have occurred? Does it say it back here somewhere? Because that was going on -- earlier in the day, right?

A. Yeah. It was somewhere around 8:30.

Q. So that's 2030?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. So the event --

MR. FASSETT: Point of clarification: I believe the earlier -- a bit earlier you asked that about what did 2045 mean, when it says "communication re-established." You read that out of the record.

MR. KATCHMAR: 2045? There is no 2045.

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. Anyway, okay. So, I guess, let me ask this question, then. Is there any mechanical log of pressures on this line that we could understand what the real pressures were?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Okay. So, I guess, another -- then the next question in my mind comes up, if you see that pressure or your

controller/operator sees that pressure, why -- I guess, would you call immediately out there and say, "Hey, I'm seeing 623. What's the deal?"

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So, again, we need the telephone log or the e-page log --

A. Yes.

Q. -- to know what you did.

MR. KATCHMAR: All right, sir. I guess I'm done.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay. California PUC?

BY MR. SHORI:

Q. Yeah, just, in this particular entry that was asked, you indicated that these numbers are -- or you didn't believe them to be correct, and in error, because basically the equipment had been lost or the communication had been lost, or because of issues going on down at Milpitas?

A. There are two reasons I didn't believe them. Primarily, because nowhere in the station was 625 pounds available. It did not exist. Secondarily, I knew they were having electronics and communication problems with the terminal. It's not unusual for comm problems to produce false data.

Q. And in this particular reading, as far as the ~~RKU~~ RTU board or the sensor board, it's coming from Milpitas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. And would this be the same reading going to the

devices themselves, if the -- this pressure reading is coming from SCADA to you, is that the same -- that would be the same level of pressure that would be communicated to the valve or the set points on the valve?

A. I don't know.

MR. SHORI: That's it. Thank you.

MR. GUNTHER: Anybody else have any questions?

BY MS. MAZZANTI:

Q. I have kind of a generic question, in the sense that if you're explaining this to a five year old, when you lose power to that -- to those controls -- to the mimic board and to the controls, when you lose communication with that and then it comes back on, could that be kind of compared to like if I had to turn off my computer and then I had to boot it back up? And then you might see everything kind of go to scales that maybe don't really exist, but it's just because you lost the power instantaneously and now it's booting back and it's kind of doing some cuckoo things, but it stabilizes within a very short amount of time?

MR. JAQUES: I'm going to have to object to that.

MS. MAZZANTI: Okay.

MR. JAQUES: I just don't think he's qualified to answer a technical question like that.

MS. MAZZANTI: Okay.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay.

MR. FASSETT: Excuse me. Bob Fassett, PG&E.

BY MR. FASSETT:

Q. You mentioned you had three incoming feeds to Milpitas?

A. Three high pressure incoming feeds.

Q. Three high pressure incoming feeds. You had pressure reads on those three incoming feeds at some -- the nearest points, I assume?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is there a compressor between the nearest points and Milpitas on any of those three lines?

A. No, sir.

Q. So there would be no reason to believe that there ~~couldn't~~ could have been a pressure increase from the reads on those three input lines into Milpitas?

A. Absolutely not.

MR. FASSETT: Thank you.

MR. JAQUES: I have one point I want to clarify.

BY MR. JAQUES:

Q. How about the stations downstream of Milpitas at the same time that that 623 psi reading, did you look at the downstream stations to see what the pressures were there?

A. Yes.

Q. And what were they?

A. In the 380 range, 380 to 390.

MR. JAQUES: That's all I have.

MR. GUNTHER: Any more questions? All right.

BY MR. KATCHMAR:

Q. Is there anything that we have not asked you here today that you feel we need to know about?

A. No.

Q. Okay. If, in the next few days or weeks, something does come to mind, you're going to have all of our numbers and names and contact information.

A. Okay.

Q. If you do think of something, you're welcome to call any one of us and, you know, report it.

A. Okay.

Q. We would appreciate that. Thank you.

A. Yes, sir.

BY MR. SPERRY:

Q. Could I ask a couple basic questions? And probably somebody else already answered, but I just don't know. Just some real basic stuff.

A. Sure.

Q. The pipeline 132, the gas was flowing into Milpitas?

A. No, sir. No, sir. It flows from Milpitas towards San Francisco.

Q. Okay. You mentioned it as an incoming feed, though.

A. I made reference to incoming feeds, but line 132 is a delivery line. It goes from Milpitas towards San Francisco.

Q. But the pressure that we're talking about, the one that

had the 625 reading that probably wasn't accurate, that was the pressure on line 132? That that reading was the volume we're talking about, right? The one that ruptured?

A. I don't recall within the schematic which represents the piping to the station where I saw the 625.

Q. Okay.

A. I discounted them immediately, because I knew there was no 625 pounds available to that station from any source.

Q. Right. And besides which, if that was an incoming reading, right, on one of the incoming lines, and the one that goes through San Bruno was an outgoing line, it probably wasn't even the same one. Or is that too simplistic?

MR. KATCHMAR: Sir, the graph says line 132.

MR. SPERRY: It does?

MR. KATCHMAR: Yes.

MR. SPERRY: Okay.

BY MR. SPERRY:

Q. And my other question is, then, was that pressure reading taken at Milpitas Terminal or close to it?

A. Which pressure reading are you referring to?

Q. The one that's 625.

A. Within the Milpitas Terminal.

Q. Okay. Are there any other pressure gauges that take readings between there and San Bruno?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

MR. SPERRY: Is that -- I haven't seen the document. Do we have those readings, too?

MR. GUNTHER: Yes.

MR. SPERRY: Okay. Thanks.

MR. GUNTHER: All right. Any more questions?

Okay. Would you like to make a statement for the record?

MR. CENICEROS: No, sir.

MR. GUNTHER: All right. Thank you for coming in here. It's a big help to us. We appreciate it.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY SEPTEMBER 9, 2010 ACCIDENT SAN BRUNO, CALIFORNIA Interview of Mark Ceniceros
DOCKET NUMBER:	DCA-10-MP-008
PLACE:	Burlingame, California
DATE:	September 16, 2010

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to the recording accomplished at the hearing.

[redacted] /LA

Richard Friant
Official Reporter