

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: \*

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ENBRIDGE OIL SPILL \*  
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN

\* Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007.

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Interview of: BLAINE REINBOLT

Crowne  
Edmonton,

Plaza Hotel  
Canada

Friday,  
December

17, 2010

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MATTHEW NICHOLSON  
Investigator-in-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge  
National Transportation Safety Board  
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and  
Hazardous Materials Investigations

[REDACTED]

RAVINDRA CHHATRE, Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board  
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and  
Hazardous Materials Investigations

[REDACTED]

JAY JOHNSON, Senior Compliance Specialist  
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc.

[REDACTED]

KAREN BUTLER, Supervisor of Accident Investigation

[REDACTED]

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I N T E R V I E W

1  
2 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Good afternoon. Today is Friday,  
3 December 17th. My name is Matthew Nicholson, and I'm an  
4 investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board in  
5 Washington, D.C. We are currently in Edmonton, Canada at the  
6 Crowne Plaza Hotel and are meeting in regards to the pipeline  
7 spill in Marshall, Michigan that occurred on the 25th of July  
8 2010. This is case DCA-10-MP-007.

9 Before we begin, Blaine, I'd like you to please state  
10 your full name and whether we have permission to record this  
11 interview.

12 MR. REINBOLT: My name is Blaine Reinbolt, and you have  
13 permission.

14 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Also, if you would like, you are  
15 permitted to have one other person present during these  
16 interviews. This is a person of your choice: a supervisor,  
17 friend, family, nobody at all. Please confirm on the record whom  
18 you have chosen to be present during these interviews.

19 MR. REINBOLT: My choice is to have no one.

20 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. All right at this time we'll go  
21 around the room and have each person introduce themselves, state  
22 your name, the spelling, organization you represent, your title,  
23 and a business e-mail or a business phone number. I'll start.

24 My name is Matthew Nicholson, M-a-t-t-h-e-w  
25 N-i-c-h-o-l-s-o-n. I'm the IIC for the Marshal Michigan release

1 for the NTSB. And I can be reached at [REDACTED]

2 MR. JOHNSON: Jay Johnson, Senior Compliance Specialist  
3 in the pipeline safety compliance group of Enbridge Pipelines in  
4 [REDACTED]. Contact is [REDACTED] That's

5 [REDACTED]

6 MR. REINBOLT: Blaine Reinbolt, B-l-a-i-n-e  
7 R-e-i-n-b-o-l-t. I'm a supervisor for the control center in  
8 Edmonton. My -- I can be contacted at

9 [REDACTED].

10 MR. CHHATRE: My name is Ravi Chhatre. I'm with the  
11 National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C., accident  
12 investigator in pipeline division. My contact e-mail is

13 [REDACTED]

14 [REDACTED]

15 MS. BUTLER: My name is Karen Butler. I work with  
16 PHMSA, [REDACTED]. I am the  
17 supervisor over accident investigations, and my e-mail address is

18 [REDACTED]

19 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. So at this time I think we'll  
20 start with Karen and go around the room, about 30 minutes apiece.  
21 And go ahead, Karen, and start.

22 MS. BUTLER: Yeah, Blaine, I don't have a lot of  
23 questions for you, so that should be a little different in this  
24 type of interview that we've been conducting.

25

INTERVIEW OF BLAINE REINBOLT

1 BY MS. BUTLER:

2 Q. But a couple things that I just found out, and I really  
3 didn't understand, is I guess there are pipeline coordinators that  
4 report to you, is that correct?

5 A. That's correct. There's -- basically I'm the supervisor  
6 of technical services. So that group is -- consists of a pipeline  
7 coordinator, a terminal coordinator, a pipeline analyst, a  
8 terminal analyst, and a measurement analyst, and a quality  
9 analyst.

10 Q. So what does a pipeline coordinator do?

11 A. A pipeline coordinator is there to support the operators  
12 in the control room on a day-to-day basis.

13 Q. So would they be -- are they previous operators?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Would they like help them diagnose a problem or check  
16 into something?

17 A. They -- yes. They have in the past, yes, and they do  
18 today, yes.

19 Q. Do you know did they ask them to help on Line 6A? Or  
20 6B, I'm sorry?

21 A. At what time?

22 Q. Any of the shifts that would have been involved.

23 A. I don't believe they did. The startup was in the early  
24 morning, so they don't work shift work. The coordinators work  
25 five days a week, eight hours a day.

1 Q. Are they located in the control room?

2 A. No, they're not.

3 Q. Okay. Are they close to the control room?

4 A. Just around the corner from it, yes.

5 Q. Okay. Then you said you have a pipeline analyst, is  
6 that right?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And what does a pipeline analyst do?

9 A. Very similar to the coordinator. The way the  
10 coordinator rules used to be in the past is they had people  
11 underneath them, reporting to them. And that's evolved into not  
12 having people and basically just focused on the technical aspect  
13 of the job.

14 Q. So are they previous operators also?

15 A. They are, yes.

16 Q. And are they there as a technical resource as well?

17 A. Absolutely, yes.

18 Q. So if the control room doesn't call them in an event  
19 like this, what are the typical things they would be doing during  
20 the dayshift?

21 A. They act as a coordinator between the field, any field  
22 issues, any problem, equipment escalation repairs, types of things  
23 that the operators themselves have tried to follow up on and  
24 repair but just need assistance in getting it up to the next  
25 level.

1 Q. So are they like taking say Facman Alpha and then  
2 briefing that, prioritizing it, and trying to get someone to move  
3 on it, or?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. Is there any other system they interface with  
6 besides Facman?

7 A. As analysts they, they interface with pie data (ph.),  
8 SCADA data, Facman, maximal (ph.), those types of data.

9 Q. Are they analyzing operator performance at all?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. Do they provide any stats back to say the shift  
12 leads or anything like that?

13 A. In regards to performance?

14 Q. It could be like say pressure control valves have caused  
15 us problems on restart 10 of the last 20 times for this month.

16 A. Not on a regular basis, Karen.

17 Q. Okay. So would they like -- if somebody wanted them to  
18 check into something specific, would they do that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you for clarifying that. I'm  
21 glad to know those resources are back there, I guess. So the only  
22 thing that I can really think that I wanted to follow up on with  
23 you is -- is in the area of training or in the area of  
24 enhancement. So based on the fact that you had some involvement  
25 on Line 6B's event at Marshall, is there anything that you would



1 like to see enhanced in any area that you believe could help lead  
2 to a different outcome in the future that you'd like to tell us  
3 about? And let me clarify where I'm coming from so --

4 A. Sure.

5 Q. -- you don't question that. We are really about seeking  
6 out what happened and getting the facts of what happened, but also  
7 about making sure that something's put in place to make sure this  
8 never happens again, so that the public is safer in the end, but  
9 also so that people like controllers or shift leads or individuals  
10 like yourself that get called are not put in the same position.

11 A. Right.

12 Q. And so when we ask those question, it is asked in the  
13 flavor of things that might be done to allow a person to never be  
14 in this position again and to further protect the public. It is  
15 not about trying to locate blame or look at what you did as right  
16 or wrong.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. Okay. All right.

19 A. Okay. Thanks for clarifying that. Yeah, I do believe  
20 -- I believe there could be some procedure enhancements. I  
21 believe that -- I believe there could be some training, some  
22 hydraulics training, refresher training, refresher on column  
23 separation, awareness on 10-minute rules. Those types of things  
24 that we've discussed, brainstormed on, and hopefully can get into  
25 play as soon as possible.

1 Q. Are there particular procedures that come to mind in  
2 that, Blaine?

3 A. Well, I'm not sure about more so procedures as, you  
4 know, even rules and responsibilities within the room. Yeah,  
5 column sep. -- column sep. procedures possibly.

6 Q. Okay. So in regards to everything in that strain I can  
7 see impacting everybody. I can see that impacting operators. I  
8 can see that impacting shift leads. I can see that impacting  
9 supervisors and people that are on call. I can see that being a  
10 total package.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Is there any one thing or more than one thing that you  
13 personally in your position would be unique to helping with a  
14 similar position?

15 A. I'm not sure I understand the question here.

16 Q. Okay. Yeah, it was poorly phrased. I apologize. In  
17 the event that someone like yourself is called and asked specific  
18 information or has to ask questions in order to get specific  
19 information, is there any specific training or any specific  
20 enhancement along that vein that you would want to bring to our  
21 attention?

22 A. I think being on call in a supervisory role we can't, as  
23 myself, I guess I should speak for, has to rely on the people --  
24 with the information in the room as the technical experts. So if  
25 we're lacking something there, I'd like to see that enhanced.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. To try and train people that are on call to know the  
3 technical and of everything, I think would be difficult.

4 Q. Okay. Is there -- we talked about enhancements and then  
5 we went into to try to train the people on the call would be  
6 difficult. So is there training that could be provided to the  
7 people on call as well as the people that are technical experts in  
8 a certain area, like communications training or anything that  
9 comes to mind in that vein?

10 A. I think -- and we've discussed it as a leadership group,  
11 that we could do better with our on call training.

12 Q. Okay. Any particular aspect of that, that you discussed  
13 as a group, that could be better?

14 A. I think a work decision making process, flow charts,  
15 those types of things.

16 Q. Okay. And really, Blaine, that was all that I wanted to  
17 ask you.

18 A. Great.

19 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, let's go to Ravi.

20 MR. CHHATRE: Okay.

21 BY MR. CHHATRE:

22 Q. You've been the supervisor of the control center.  
23 What -- is there a specific job description for each employee as  
24 to what these descriptions would be, what the operator's job  
25 description versus specialist job description?

1 A. There's specific job --

2 Q. Descriptions (indiscernible).

3 A. -- descriptions for each position, yes.

4 Q. So -- and all my questions pertain to the time of the  
5 accident, not afterwards.

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. So I just want you to know that. So what was supposed  
8 to be the role of the, I guess your lead detection -- not that,  
9 but mass valve specialist, or I don't know what the exact title  
10 is, but?

11 A. What was his role?

12 Q. I mean as a position, not the person's role. The  
13 position's role. What is the role of the specialist?

14 A. I think you would need to ask him that. I don't, I  
15 don't know his role or his job profile.

16 Q. What in the job description tells his supervisor? I  
17 mean I just want to find out -- I'm not trying to find out what he  
18 did that day. I'm just trying to --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- find out as a supervisor what you see --

21 A. What his --

22 Q. -- as his roll --

23 A. What his role is?

24 Q. Role is, yes.

25 A. His role is to advise the operators --

1 Q. Uh-hmm.

2 A. -- when the material balance system isn't balancing.

3 Q. Okay. What else?

4 A. Um.

5 Q. Or that's the only role you see?

6 A. That's the role I see.

7 Q. There is nothing more that he or she is expected to do?

8 Just tell whether the mass balance, you know, based on the mass

9 balance software program and whatever calculations they do,

10 whether the -- and I'm not sure if I'm phrasing it right, but

11 whether there is a column separation or not and if the column

12 separation is there, then the data is not -- the system is no

13 longer operational. Is that all you expect him to do?

14 A. The role is to respond to any MBS alarms.

15 Q. Okay. And respond meaning what?

16 A. Respond meaning telling the operator whether the model

17 is functioning properly or not.

18 Q. Okay. And what?

19 A. And that's it, in my mind.

20 Q. So all they are going to tell the operator is the model

21 is working or the model is not working?

22 A. In the event of an alarm situation.

23 Q. Correct.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. What else? In a non-alarm situation, do they have any

1 tasks at all?

2 A. You would need to ask them that. I don't know what --

3 Q. No, I'm asking the supervisor. (Indiscernible) have  
4 somebody on their job performance as a supervisor, as signing on  
5 the job performance review, which I presume you will be doing  
6 since you're a supervisor, you will have to do the final --

7 A. No.

8 Q. -- end year review?

9 A. No, I do not.

10 Q. So as a supervisor, what is your role? I thought you  
11 said you are -- you supervise the specialists in the control  
12 center. So as a supervisor, what do you expect of your employees?

13 A. I did not say that I --

14 Q. Okay, then I stand corrected. So --

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. So the specialists are not under your chain of command?

17 A. What I said was there's two coordinators under me, two,  
18 and four analysts.

19 Q. And the analysts are mass balance?

20 A. No, they're not.

21 Q. They are not?

22 A. They're not.

23 Q. So what are -- maybe I got confused with those people.  
24 Sometimes --

25 A. Right.

1 Q. Okay. What are the analysts supposed to be doing there,  
2 the ones that you referred to?

3 A. My analysts?

4 Q. Right.

5 A. So I have a pipeline analyst --

6 Q. Uh-hmm.

7 A. -- that supports the operators.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. On day-to-day pipeline issues.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. I have the same with a terminal analyst.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. And there's a measurement analyst that deals with  
14 measurement issues.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. And there's a quality analyst that deals with quality  
17 issues.

18 Q. Okay. And what do the pipeline analysts support? How  
19 does the pipeline analysts supports the operators?

20 A. As I mentioned to Karen, they would work on day-to-day  
21 problems, whether they're coordinating field requests, requests  
22 from the operators, equipment escalation repairs, those types of  
23 things. Facman issues, equipment they can't get fixed, alarms  
24 that won't go away.

25 Q. Okay.

1           A.    You know, those types of things.  More investigating,  
2 analyzing.

3           Q.    So including the mass balance alarms and column  
4 separations or not?

5           A.    Not.

6           Q.    Okay.  What does the -- and I believe you've been  
7 (indiscernible) on this, and the next one I guess is the quality  
8 you said?

9           A.    The quality analyst?

10          Q.    Um-hum.

11          A.    He works closely with our quality department.

12          Q.    Okay.

13          A.    We have a quality department.

14          Q.    All right.

15          A.    And he would be the -- he would coordinate work with the  
16 operators and the quality groups.  So any kind of request from the  
17 quality group, he would be the kind of go between guy.  Special  
18 sampling, special batch cuts, those types of things based on --

19          Q.    On quality?

20          A.    -- the quality.  Quality of the oil.

21          Q.    Oh, the quality of the oil.  That's something else.

22          A.    Yeah.

23          Q.    The quality of the oil.  Okay.

24          A.    Yeah.

25          Q.    Two-minute sampling analysis and --



1 A. You bet.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Cut points.

4 Q. And the third one you said was it --

5 A. Measurement?

6 Q. Measurement, yeah.

7 A. Right. So all the custody transfer measurement of the  
8 oil, all the proving of meters, ticketing.

9 Q. That person is the (indiscernible)?

10 A. That person would, right.

11 Q. So who would provide assistance to the operators on  
12 issues like column separation, leak detection, and that sort of  
13 area?

14 A. We would look -- I would think the operators would look  
15 to the MBS analyst on shift for that.

16 Q. Mass balance. But I thought you look at the mass  
17 balance analyst for only stating whether the model is working or  
18 not working.

19 A. Right.

20 Q. So just because the model is working or not working, if  
21 the operator needs further assistance in understanding alarm or  
22 getting rid of the alarm, who do they turn to for the technical  
23 support?

24 A. In that -- in that case they would -- like if an invalid  
25 alarm keep ringing in or something, is that what you're asking?

1 Q. Well, I mean if they have any question about that. Like  
2 in this particular case, the alarm went away and, you know, there  
3 was a 10-minute, 20-minute shutdown mode and they are still not  
4 getting pressure.

5 A. Um-hum.

6 Q. You know, anything else like that, when they have a  
7 problem that they cannot not solve or not getting the results they  
8 want --

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. -- who do they turn to for technical assistance?

11 A. I'm unsure. The -- if -- you might be better off asking  
12 the operator in that case. Did he turn to the analyst, did he  
13 turn to the shift lead? I'm not sure.

14 Q. Okay. And I'm looking at you as the supervisor --

15 A. Um-hum.

16 Q. -- these people who work under you, and if they have an  
17 issue or do you have any guidelines for them? Look, if you cannot  
18 solve something, go to this supervisor?

19 A. So --

20 Q. I guess what I'm saying is in your organization --

21 A. Right.

22 Q. -- are you providing any support for the analysts,  
23 technical support for the analysts if they seeing any problem on  
24 shift or they have to try finding it on their own?

25 A. Which analysts?

1 Q. The -- in this particular case like operator for the --  
2 (indiscernible) operator. Are you providing any support for the  
3 pipeline operators in a situation like --

4 A. So as --

5 Q. -- (indiscernible)?

6 A. So as a supervisor of technical services, I don't -- the  
7 operators don't report up to me.

8 Q. Right.

9 A. They would report to the shift lead.

10 Q. Correct. I understand that.

11 A. So for any assistance on shift, they would -- they would  
12 request that through the shift lead, not through me.

13 Q. No, maybe I need to clarify a little more. So you have  
14 all these four different groups of people, and like pipeline  
15 operator, and you have pipeline analyst and also --

16 A. I don't -- not pipeline operators.

17 Q. So who do pipe -- are the pipeline operators not under  
18 your umbrella? They do not report to you directly, but are they  
19 or are they not under your umbrella? I'm getting confused a  
20 little bit, so bear with me.

21 A. So to me, they would report to the shift leads, who do  
22 their performance documents.

23 Q. Right. But are they under umbrella of your management?  
24 They may not report directly to you, but --

25 A. So there's two supervisors.

1 Q. Right.

2 A. Curt Goeson and myself.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. The technical services and the training group report up  
5 through me.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. The shift leads report to Curt.

8 Q. Good, okay.

9 A. Underneath the shift leads would be --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- all the operators reporting up to the shift leads.

12 Q. Okay. Then I guess my position -- why you were  
13 contacted on that day -- should they be contacting Curt then?

14 A. Because I was on call, and it's an on call rotation. So  
15 we all --

16 Q. So either --

17 A. -- take turns.

18 Q. Either of you can handle that duty?

19 A. The on call duty?

20 Q. Right.

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Okay.

23 MR. NICHOLSON: How many others? This is yourself and  
24 Curt?

25 MR. REINBOLT: No, there's --

1 MR. NICHOLSON: In the whole team?

2 MR. REINBOLT: -- a group of -- so the coordinators are  
3 also on call.

4 MR. NICHOLSON: The pipeline --

5 MR. REINBOLT: The pipeline terminal coordinators.

6 MR. NICHOLSON: Coordinators, okay.

7 MR. REINBOLT: Our engineering team lead, James Martin,  
8 is also on call. Myself, Curt, and at the time there was a group  
9 of engineers that were also included in the on call, because there  
10 was only one person on call at a time. So there was a pool of say  
11 10 or 12 people. Since then we've had -- we now have an admin  
12 person, we call ourselves, or a supervisor or coordinator on call  
13 along with an engineer.

14 MR. NICHOLSON: That's since Marshall?

15 MR. REINBOLT: Yeah. Yes.

16 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. So it's yourself and then an  
17 engineer?

18 MR. REINBOLT: That's correct.

19 MR. NICHOLSON: So now you've got kind of a technical --

20 MR. REINBOLT: That's correct.

21 MR. CHHATRE: A technical backup now?

22 MR. REINBOLT: Right. And we did have one prior to  
23 Marshall. It just wasn't -- it was always the same person. So  
24 we've always called an engineering team lead.

25 MR. NICHOLSON: Who was that?

1 MR. REINBOLT: James Martin.

2 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

3 MR. REINBOLT: So --

4 MR. NICHOLSON: But he wasn't called in this event?

5 MR. REINBOLT: He was not.

6 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

7 MR. REINBOLT: No, he was not.

8 MR. NICHOLSON: And he would be called by the shift  
9 leads?

10 MR. REINBOLT: If deemed --

11 MR. NICHOLSON: Directly.

12 MR. REINBOLT: -- necessary. Right.

13 MR. NICHOLSON: But that's not a procedure, though, is  
14 it?

15 MR. REINBOLT: No. I don't think it is. No. They call  
16 us and if -- actually, they call us, the on call person, and if we  
17 feel we need engineering support, then we would in turn call the  
18 engineer.

19 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

20 MR. REINBOLT: Now, today, there's one on call. An  
21 engineering support person along with one of us.

22 MR. NICHOLSON: And the procedure now is to call?

23 MR. REINBOLT: Still call us.

24 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

25 MR. REINBOLT: But we just know now there's always

1 somebody available. There will be somebody available.

2 MR. NICHOLSON: But they don't need you to say it's okay  
3 to call this -- they can call this engineer --

4 MR. REINBOLT: They can.

5 MR. NICHOLSON: -- directly?

6 MR. REINBOLT: Yes.

7 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

8 MR. JOHNSON: As long as they notify you too?

9 MR. REINBOLT: Right.

10 MR. JOHNSON: Sorry, go ahead.

11 MR. CHHATRE: No, that's okay.

12 BY MR. CHHATRE:

13 Q. So then on call, as you do the on call, at what level  
14 they are elevated to your level for permission or authorization?  
15 What -- up to what level they can take the decision on their own  
16 lead operators, and what level it has to be elevated to your  
17 level? And I understand that there was a conference call and  
18 decisions made to go another round of 10-minute startup.

19 A. I don't understand your question.

20 Q. Okay. At one point the lead to the decision of  
21 extending or breaking, if you would, their 10-minute rule and  
22 continuing the startup for an additional 12 minutes?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Then sometime later they came to you for permission to  
25 continue the startup or go another -- go at it?

1 A. Correct. What --

2 Q. And my question is --

3 A. Well, no --

4 Q. -- usually at some level the decision can be made at the  
5 lead level and at some level it has to be elevated to the on call  
6 person.

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And I'm just trying to find out is that clearly spelled  
9 out as to what level they do need permission from the on call  
10 person versus the decisions they're taking by themselves.

11 A. Right. So they need --

12 Q. That's what I'm trying to understand.

13 A. Sure. So then the procedure states they need to -- if  
14 they go past 10 minutes, they need permission. They need our  
15 approval.

16 Q. But the first time they went beyond 10 minutes and they  
17 did not come to you?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. That was the confusing part for me. That's why I'm  
20 asking you.

21 A. That's correct. They did not.

22 Q. And was that a part of your discussion with them?

23 A. In the transcripts? Did you read the transcripts?

24 Q. I went through that, but I'm just trying to understand  
25 what was discussed. I mean not sure if the transcript's saying



1 that clearly to me. Because I guess my question is did you  
2 question -- did you ask them why they did not come to you? I  
3 didn't see that in the transcript?

4 A. No, I asked them about the 10-minute rule and if they  
5 followed procedure. And what they told me was they had calculated  
6 a time that it would take to fill in the column.

7 Q. So at that time you did not know that they went 20  
8 minutes?

9 A. No, I knew they had tried to fill in the column on the  
10 first attempt and failed.

11 Q. So in your opinion, did they break the 10-minute rule or  
12 did they not break the 10-minute rule?

13 A. On the first attempt they --

14 Q. Correct.

15 A. -- broke the 10-minute rule.

16 MR. NICHOLSON: I'm sorry, repeat that.

17 MR. REINBOLT: On the first attempt, they broke the 10-  
18 minute rule.

19 BY MR. CHHATRE:

20 Q. And was there any discussion on your part asking them  
21 what happened, why, or did you justify that, breaking the 10-  
22 minute rule?

23 A. No.

24 Q. So did that occur to you unusual that they went up to 20  
25 minutes and you're not contacted and another attempt had been

1 requested?

2 A. My background isn't pipeline operation; it's terminal  
3 operation.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. So questions to the shift leads were: are we following  
6 procedure, and basically just getting their thought process on  
7 what had happened and what occurred and steps going forward. So  
8 I --

9 Q. So was there any discussion or thought process went in  
10 your mind about contacting this person James Martin, who you used  
11 to contact before, at that time as technical support?

12 A. That did not come up. No.

13 Q. Did the lead know about Mr. Martin, that they can  
14 contact?

15 A. Did the lead?

16 Q. Did they know -- have you started lead, you meaning, you  
17 know, whoever is on call for technical difficulties, and you being  
18 on call that day, did you ask them to contact or at least get Jim  
19 Martin in the loop?

20 A. No.

21 Q. I'm not trying to second-guess you, but I'm just trying  
22 to understand the logic as to any particular reason you felt you  
23 had everything, every permission you need or you feel comfortable  
24 that the first 20 minutes didn't do it, and you're able to make  
25 another attempt, a 10-minute for the startup?

1           A.    So the information that was presented to me, I felt they  
2 had thought through what they were doing, were following  
3 procedure, appeared to make sense to me at the time. There was  
4 issues with bypassing a station upstream. There was excessive  
5 drain on the line. There was issues was with the startup --  
6 starting a unit too early. So the information that was presented  
7 to me at the time made sense.

8           Q.    Now if you wanted to, could you contact the mass balance  
9 analyst to confirm or to get input as to why they think there is a  
10 column separation?

11          A.    So if --

12          Q.    (Indiscernible) that is asking for the input.

13          A.    In the transcripts and the voice recordings?

14          Q.    (Indiscernible) to that, but I mean --

15          A.    The shift leads bring the analysts in -- Jim Knudson  
16 into the conversation very early on.

17          Q.    Did he --

18          A.    Yes.

19          Q.    One thing -- are you able -- your answer to the question  
20 was something to do with the analyst about the column separation,  
21 whether it confirmed or not confirmed, something to the effect.

22          A.    Um-hum.

23          Q.    In the discussion. And in your mind did you feel before  
24 you -- I guess I'm trying to find out the seriousness of the  
25 problem in your mind at that time that another discussion with the

1 analyst was necessary, are you happy with column separation being  
2 adequate explanation?

3 A. In my position, in my position I was trusting the shift  
4 leads to make sure that -- to ensure they knew what was going on.  
5 So I mean my trust was within them, within the shift leads.

6 Q. Okay. So I just -- were you aware of the column  
7 separation situation during the initial shutdown or you were not  
8 aware of that problem?

9 A. The initial shutdown?

10 Q. No, during the shutdown of the line.

11 A. The day before?

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. Sorry, that afternoon. Was I aware of it? No.

14 Q. When the people came or called you or talked to you  
15 or --

16 A. Right, right.

17 Q. At that time were you aware that there was some kind of  
18 column separation problem at the beginning of this process when  
19 the pipeline was being shut down?

20 A. Um-hum.

21 Q. The very first time?

22 A. In the transcripts and on the phone recordings you'll  
23 hear them tell me that there was excess drain on the shutdown. So  
24 there was more than usual drain, drain away, and that was causing  
25 the -- what they said -- they thought the column separation. So

1 that's the only discussion about it is the excessive drain on the  
2 shutdown.

3 Q. So you were aware of the column separation at that first  
4 time during the initial shutdown?

5 A. No, I didn't say that. I said that there was excessive  
6 drain.

7 Q. But what does that mean -- what does that means to you  
8 in your mind? I mean you could have a drain with no column  
9 separation meaning -- could you not?

10 A. I wouldn't know that.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I wouldn't know that. To me it just meant it was going  
13 to take longer to fill in or to pack the line. That's all.

14 Q. Are you responsible to any -- again, you meaning in your  
15 position, in your --

16 A. The training group reports up through me.

17 Q. Through you?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And what are the procedures when you want to send  
20 somebody to the training on the -- as an operator?

21 A. What is the procedure or?

22 Q. Well, I mean what kind of paperwork, procedure, what is  
23 the setup? If you want to send John Doe --

24 A. Um-hum.

25 Q. -- as a trainee in the -- as a controller, in one of the

1 pipelines, what procedure has to be followed?

2 A. So the training -- the training program, is that what  
3 you're more interested in?

4 Q. No, if you want to send John Doe for a training --

5 A. A new hire?

6 Q. -- as an operator? Yeah, a new hire or a transferee.  
7 It doesn't have to be a new hire to the company.

8 A. Right. So I can give you a basic plan that we use.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. To get into the details, I'd prefer you talk to Jim --

11 Q. No, no. I mean I just want the big picture.

12 A. The big picture is somebody new off the street would  
13 start probably and spend two weeks with our training group going  
14 through computer-based modules.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Procedures, reviews, those types of things.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Then they're assigned a mentor.

19 Q. Say that --

20 A. A mentor.

21 Q. Okay. And who assigns the mentor?

22 A. It's typically a discussion within the training group.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. So the training group and potentially supervisors. The  
25 training group will typically suggest someone, one or two people

1 to the supervisors, and then we would approve that person as a  
2 mentor.

3 Q. Okay, supervisor meaning the lead --

4 A. No, meaning me.

5 Q. Oh, okay.

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Or Curt.

9 Q. Okay. And then you guys would approve?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Then what happens? Then what happens?

12 A. So then this person works through five phases of  
13 training.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. With his mentor.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. With the training group checking in.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Through each phase. Eventually getting checked off to  
20 be an operator.

21 Q. Okay. And who does that checking off?

22 A. The mentor.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And --

25 Q. So --

1 A. -- parts of the training group also.

2 Q. So who informs the mentor that somebody is going to be  
3 coming during a shift and that he or she is a mentor for that  
4 person and here is a checklist that you have to --

5 A. That would be the responsibility of the training group.  
6 Yes.

7 Q. And who in the -- does the training group have an  
8 umbrella and (indiscernible)?

9 A. There's, yeah.

10 Q. Cooperative?

11 A. Yeah, it's kind of a co-op. I would talk to Jim about  
12 that and how that's divide out, but typically there's two  
13 facilitators that would manage that within the training group.

14 Q. But the information would come upwards to you saying  
15 last month or last week we had four trainees and -- not  
16 necessarily for your approval, but for your information. Would it  
17 come to you at all that we have sent four trainees to these five  
18 mentors or three have completed training and --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- now are ready to take (indiscernible)?

21 A. To move into the room? Typically they would communicate  
22 that through the shift lead, because the shift lead would manage  
23 the schedule.

24 Q. Right. But you wouldn't get any information at all on  
25 that side?



1 A. No.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. No.

4 Q. Would you find out if the training group did say  
5 (indiscernible) at all or anything?

6 MR. JOHNSON: We're going to be meeting with them next.

7 MR. CHHATRE: Oh, we are? Okay.

8 MR. JOHNSON: Yes.

9 MR. CHHATRE: Okay.

10 MR. REINBOLT: What were you looking for?

11 MR. CHHATRE: Well, I wondered if there was a trainee  
12 that -- Mr. Dave, was it?

13 MR. JOHNSON: Dave was training --

14 MR. CHHATRE: Yeah.

15 MR. JOHNSON: -- under Theresa.

16 MR. CHHATRE: And Theresa was the mentor and from --

17 MR. REINBOLT: Yes.

18 MR. CHHATRE: -- what I learned so far that Theresa has  
19 no idea that she was supposed to be mentoring or what she was  
20 supposed to mentoring, nor did (indiscernible) have any specific  
21 idea as to what Dave was doing and what he --

22 MR. REINBOLT: Okay.

23 MR. CHHATRE: -- (indiscernible). So that's a --

24 MR. REINBOLT: That's a good question for Jim. You can  
25 ask Jim that.

1 MR. CHHATRE: And that's all I have. Thank you so much.

2 MR. REINBOLT: Thank you.

3 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, I guess I'm up.

4 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

5 Q. Blaine, I just pretty much want to go through  
6 transcripts and clear up some timeline --

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. -- conversation issues. Most of which you had in your  
9 first interviews is fairly clear to me.

10 A. All right.

11 Q. But I am looking at the control room transcripts. Do  
12 you have a copy of those as well, the phone transcripts?

13 A. I don't. No.

14 Q. Have you looked at them?

15 A. The phone? I've listened to my phone transcript.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But that was probably about four months ago or so.

20 Q. Now you touched on it a while ago. You said during that  
21 phone call that Darin makes to you --

22 A. Sure.

23 Q. -- that Jim joins into.

24 A. Um-hum.

25 Q. I'm sure you're more than aware of that phone call.

1 That you were notified of the 10-minute rule during that phone  
2 call?

3 A. Can I --

4 Q. You mentioned it just a while ago, and it's --

5 A. Right.

6 Q. It's actually in your first interview transcripts as  
7 well that that was explained to you.

8 A. Can I reference that? Under 6 on this transcript, is  
9 that what you're talking about?

10 Q. Which transcript do you have there? Is that your first  
11 interview or?

12 A. This is my first interview.

13 Q. Okay. What page are you on?

14 A. Um.

15 Q. I didn't make notations this time around.

16 A. Page 5, but I think it might be printed different.

17 Q. Yeah. But can you read to me what do you have there?  
18 What line are you going to read from?

19 A. So just from the start of the conversation basically. I  
20 got a call from Darin Parsons. It would have been around 3:30  
21 M.S.T and --

22 Q. Yeah, right. Okay.

23 A. -- he basically explained to me he was starting up, or  
24 they were having problems with Line 6B.

25 Q. That's not the -- that conversation doesn't seem to

1 capture -- well, let's just start with your recollection.

2 A. Um-hum.

3 Q. Were you notified about exceeding the 10-minute rule  
4 when they called you or not?

5 A. Right.

6 Q. I thought I heard you just a while ago answer Ravi that  
7 you were made aware of that.

8 A. Yeah. Basically what they had told me is they had gone  
9 past 10 minutes, and they had done a calculation on how much was  
10 drained up and how much they felt needed to be packed in, and that  
11 they had calculated a time that they thought they'd get the column  
12 back together.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And it worked out to be more than the 10 minutes, but  
15 they didn't have luck putting it back together because they felt  
16 there was an issue bypassing an upstream station and a poor  
17 startup by the operator.

18 Q. Yeah, okay. Now I don't see -- when I go through the  
19 control room transcripts, I don't see that part of the  
20 conversation. If -- I guess if you don't have a copy in front of  
21 you, I can give you mine.

22 A. Um-hum.

23 Q. I guess my confusion is there some talk about a 10-  
24 minute rule in here, but it seems to be in regards to the second  
25 startup, not the first startup.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. So and I think I know what you're getting at.

4 Q. So I'm just trying to figure out. We talked about --  
5 the one you just described, I've heard about as well, but you're  
6 saying that was explained to you on the phone.

7 A. Right.

8 Q. Okay. I don't get that. Could it not have been  
9 recorded or left out?

10 A. Well, I don't think the 10-minute rule was mentioned in  
11 the first part of the conversation from Darin. It was basically  
12 him telling me they were unsuccessful --

13 Q. Oh.

14 A. Unsuccessful on the start -- the first startup.

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. And that it had taken this much time, based on excessive  
17 drain and bypassing --

18 Q. Okay, so he's --

19 A. -- (indiscernible).

20 Q. He's not saying it in some many words that --

21 A. Right.

22 Q. -- (indiscernible) minutes.

23 A. He didn't say -- he didn't specifically say I went past  
24 the 10-minute rule. No.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. No, he did not.

2 Q. You just knew from method he was describing and the --

3 A. Well, no. I actually -- if you listen to those  
4 transcripts, I bring it up later, and I say isn't there a 10-  
5 minute -- isn't there some kind of 10-minute rule or something.  
6 Right?

7 Q. That is -- and again that's where I get confused. Now  
8 to me that takes place around the same time you guys are  
9 discussing how you're going to restart the line.

10 A. Right.

11 Q. And you have him read the procedure.

12 A. Well, and he said, no, we -- and really I was relating  
13 to notifying the region.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. And saying okay is there some sort of 10-minute here and  
16 do we have to notify anybody before we do this.

17 Q. But that's in relationship to the second startup is what  
18 it sounds like.

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. That's right.

22 Q. I'm going back to the -- when they called you, it was  
23 just after the unsuccessful startup.

24 A. Right. And it was my non-technical knowledge, knowing  
25 that -- that really shouldn't have gone past that 10 minutes.

1 Q. The first time?

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And that's why I questioned the second time saying isn't  
5 there some sort of 10-minute rule here.

6 Q. Okay. So it wasn't -- it was never really talked about  
7 in the first one; it only --

8 A. It wasn't --

9 Q. -- triggered you on the second discussion?

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And it only triggered me to say is there some sort of --  
13 do we need to talk to somebody, do we need to tell someone, you  
14 know.

15 Q. So I don't know if you've reviewed it since or if you  
16 knew it before. It sounds like maybe you didn't. But there's a  
17 lot of references to the 10-minute rule.

18 A. Right. So -- yeah.

19 Q. So I don't have a copy of a 10-minute rule. I've got an  
20 MBS alarm.

21 A. Right. So there isn't a specific procedure that says  
22 10-minute rule. I think that 10-minute rule is intertwined into  
23 different procedures.

24 Q. Okay. Is one of those -- what procedure was -- were  
25 Darin and Aaron referring to on startup that allowed them to go 10

1 plus 20? Do you know?

2 A. Well, I know now.

3 Q. Well --

4 A. I didn't know at the time. So they were referring to, I  
5 believe, a proposed procedure change that would allow them to go  
6 past this --

7 Q. And that was a --

8 A. -- 10-minute rule.

9 Q. -- proposed change to which procedure?

10 A. The 10-minute rule.

11 Q. Which is in the MBS alarm -- it would have updated all  
12 references to 10 minutes?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Okay. Because my next question was isn't that -- isn't  
15 that a violation of the MBS alarm protocol if you add 20 minutes?  
16 Because --

17 A. Right.

18 Q. -- your analyst only gets 10 minutes before you're  
19 supposed to shut this --

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Right. So if you had added another 20 --

22 A. Right, so --

23 Q. -- you're in conflict.

24 A. Yeah. So what we do today is we have them calculate out  
25 how long it's going to take to fill the -- fill a column



1 separation. Right? Sometimes it goes past 10 minutes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. So I think --

4 Q. And what does that do to this MBS alarm procedure, which  
5 says you only have 10 minutes for an analyst to get you an answer  
6 back? Or maybe they're independent at this point?

7 A. They're independent.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Well, are they though? If I have a column break and I  
11 have an MBS alarm that's gone to the analyst, and he hasn't gotten  
12 back to me in the 10 minutes --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. I can still exceed that --

15 A. That's on our --

16 Q. -- while I try and fill my column?

17 A. On our running line, right?

18 Q. Is that what that is?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. So the analyst has -- so you don't shut down. The  
22 analyst, I believe, has time -- 10 minutes to explain that alarm,  
23 and whether his model is valid or not.

24 Q. Right. And if he doesn't get back to you in 10 minutes,  
25 you're supposed to shut down?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Right. But if you're still trying to fill a column  
3 outside that 10 minutes?

4 A. Well, you'd shut down.

5 Q. Uh-huh.

6 A. You'd calculate how long it's going to take you.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. And if it goes outside the 10 minutes, then you need  
9 approval.

10 Q. So you shut down in between there?

11 A. Right.

12 Q. Okay. Okay. And that exceeding the 10-minute rule  
13 then, because it was a proposed standard, I guess that's not  
14 something you had seen of or heard of before? Or I'm just asking  
15 you in your past, have you ever seen it?

16 A. My experience, though, is very limited to that 10-minute  
17 rule. So I was relying on the shift leads to know their  
18 procedures.

19 Q. Let's see. So in this discussion with Jim and Darin,  
20 Jim seems to go beyond maybe that typical MSB analyst rule and he  
21 starts talking about line pack and how the line started. Do you  
22 typically get that kind of information from an MBS analyst? Were  
23 you expecting that?

24 A. I would have to say no.

25 Q. You've been called before? You're on on call, right?

1           A.    That's right. This is the first time the analyst was  
2 brought in, in any of my conversations.

3           Q.    Okay. And at one point even in this conversation you  
4 say hey we've either got a leak or it's like you say, it's line  
5 pack. So even -- it looks like you even had a brief glimmer of  
6 what might be going on, but then you seem to be talked out of that  
7 and of trying to --

8           A.    Right, and if --

9           Q.    -- put that together. You know, how did that  
10 conversation get swayed? It looked like there were several  
11 opportunities for you guys to --

12          A.    Yeah, and I think what kept coming up was the odd --  
13 bypassing the station.

14          Q.    Okay.

15          A.    The excessive drain on the shutdown. And the fact that  
16 they felt the operator had a pretty shaky startup, and started the  
17 unit upstream of Marshall too early, and reduced the chances of  
18 putting that column back together. So with that presented me, I  
19 kept going back thinking but we put 1,600 cubes in and we only got  
20 300 cubes out, and is that normal. Right?

21          Q.    Okay, right. Yeah, that's brought up by yourself and I  
22 think even Darin kind of wonders.

23          A.    Right. So --

24          Q.    But it looked like Jim took a stance where he was going  
25 to explain all that.

1           A.    Yes.  And if you listen to the conversations, if I can  
2 remember correctly, I did ask are you, you know, are your sure  
3 these alarms are invalid.

4           Q.           Yeah.

5           A.    And yes, I am.  So I mean, yeah, it was convincing.

6           Q.    So were you deferring -- I can't tell from a written  
7 transcript.  Were you deferring more to Jim than you were your own  
8 shift lead or how does that work for you?

9           A.    It was a conference call, so it was like we were just  
10 all talking.

11          Q.    But Jim doesn't report to you, right?

12          A.           Does not.

13          Q.           Okay.

14          A.           Right.

15          Q.    So at the end of the day, you know, you've got two  
16 people talking to you.  Were you more inclined to go with your  
17 shift leads assessment or are you going to go with your MBS?

18          A.    It seemed to me at the end of the conversation that they  
19 were both in agree -- in agreement to startup.  So --

20          Q.           Okay.

21          A.    -- I kind of went with both.

22          Q.    Okay.  Looking back at it now, did Jim or did the MBS  
23 analyst overstep bounds?

24          A.    I believe so, yeah.  Roles and responsibilities need to  
25 be defined there.

1 MR. CHHATRE: When you say Jim, you mean Jim Knudson?

2 MR. NICHOLSON: I am speaking of Jim Knudson.

3 MR. CHHATRE: I just wanted to make sure.

4 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

5 Q. When -- while don't we go back to that part of the phone  
6 call when you -- you actually have them bring up the procedure and  
7 read it to you, and it's read to you verbatim. And at one point  
8 in this procedure it does ask that -- that the MBS support advised  
9 that the alarm was valid or if the alarm was false.

10 A. Um-hum.

11 Q. Right. And as you mentioned, Jim does -- Jim makes a  
12 call and he says just call it false. And you asked him again, are  
13 you sure it's false. But when I show this procedure to Jim, Jim  
14 takes no ownership or the mass balance analyst will take no  
15 ownership of this procedure. And I believe his statement was that  
16 this procedure is a control center procedure, not an MBS  
17 procedure.

18 A. Um-hum.

19 Q. So that creates a little disconnect for me. And I guess  
20 what I'm trying to figure out is that true? Can the MBS divorce  
21 themselves from this and say those aren't my words, those are --  
22 that's their procedure? I mean --

23 A. And they can say that now. I think.

24 Q. That's --

25 A. Right?

1 Q. Yeah. Well --

2 MR. CHHATRE: Didn't he say that he did not even call it  
3 false?

4 MR. NICHOLSON: Well, he -- that's where they got.

5 MR. CHHATRE: He once told me directly -- I mean he said  
6 he didn't call it false. He simply said the model; he would no  
7 longer rely on it.

8 MR. NICHOLSON: He won't call their -- he says they  
9 won't -- these are control center operator's terms, and not --

10 MR. REINBOLT: Okay.

11 MR. NICHOLSON: -- MBS terms.

12 MR. REINBOLT: Well, we --

13 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

14 Q. Well, I guess I'm just asking you to speak to that.

15 A. And he has a point. Those are our procedures.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And if you want to find out what he said, just listen to  
18 the phone conversation.

19 Q. I know what he said.

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. And I guess I'm trying to think if you can't pull their  
22 feet to the fire with this, then what good are these. Do you need  
23 buy in from the MBS group? Is there some kind of disconnect  
24 between these two communities that --

25 A. I -- you know, I'll agree that there needs to be some

1 work there. It's new to have an MBS analyst in the room.

2 Q. (Indiscernible).

3 A. So, yeah. Maybe. And that's why part of our  
4 enhancements is to define rules and responsibilities.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And I think that's very important.

7 Q. It doesn't seem like -- just from the few conversations  
8 I've had, it doesn't seem like there's much ownership by the MBS  
9 group. They don't seem as vested in --

10 A. Right.

11 Q. -- this process. So it would probably be good to see  
12 that shorter.

13 A. Um-hum.

14 Q. And we just touched on this, but I'll ask it another way  
15 or I'll --

16 A. Sure.

17 Q. -- add to it. You said, you know, you had the ability  
18 to say, well, this is either a leak or we need to pack the line.  
19 I mean what is the risk of just going into suspected leak mode at  
20 that point?

21 A. No risk.

22 Q. It's very minimal, right?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Because at that point, really what they have to do is go  
25 to look at leak triggers?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. They've got to basically disprove a leak at that point,  
3 right?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Okay. So you could have done that with very little  
6 repercussion?

7 A. In hindsight, yes.

8 Q. And I fully expect that in hindsight. The fact that you  
9 said you wanted to kind of defer to line pack -- I mean the shift  
10 leads were doing the same thing. It looked like everyone wanted  
11 to go down the line pack road.

12 A. Um-hum.

13 Q. Is that kind of the path of least resistance? Is  
14 that -- or is it just that you see that most commonly in your jobs  
15 and it's second nature to you?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Ninety-nine percent of the time these columns come back  
19 together.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. So I think that the thought of it actually being a leak  
22 was, you know, you consider it, but it will come back together.

23 Q. Okay. Can you -- since you're the on call, can you log  
24 in remotely to your SCADA to pull a screen up?

25 A. No.



1 Q. They don't give you like a Citrix account or something?

2 A. When I was coordinator, yes, we had that ability. But  
3 we don't get into that detail as a supervisor.

4 Q. Would you want it, if you're the guy making the call?

5 A. No.

6 Q. No?

7 A. Absolutely not.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. I have to rely on the operators and the people in the  
10 room for their technical expertise.

11 Q. Was there enough technical expertise in that room at  
12 3:30 in the morning on Monday the 26th?

13 A. Obviously not.

14 Q. Okay. I mean there could have been elsewhere. It might  
15 not have been the technical expertise that phoned you up, but was  
16 that technical expertise in a corner somewhere that just wasn't  
17 utilized?

18 A. Um.

19 Q. I mean you obviously not, but it might not be obvious.

20 A. Right.

21 Q. It could be that there was someone there that just  
22 wasn't utilized.

23 A. That's a good question for the shift leads and who was  
24 on, I'm not sure, and the (indiscernible) there.

25 Q. Okay.

1 MR. NICHOLSON: Karen, do you have any other questions?

2 MS. BUTLER: Yes, I do.

3 MR. NICHOLSON: Go ahead. I'm drawing a blank.

4 MS. BUTLER: You kind of knew I would, huh?

5 MR. NICHOLSON: Oh, yes. Yes.

6 BY MS. BUTLER:

7 Q. Okay, Blaine, were you interviewed internally by the  
8 internal Enbridge accident investigation team?

9 A. I was.

10 Q. And was that transcribed, do you know?

11 A. I haven't seen anything from that.

12 Q. Was it --

13 A. I believe it was recorded, yes.

14 Q. Okay. All right. And forgive me, but I've got to take  
15 notes a little bit here at the same time.

16 A. So.

17 Q. So it takes me a little longer in between my questions.  
18 So just be patient with me.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. So the pipeline coordinators or the pipeline analysts,  
21 can they directly interface with either the shift leads or the  
22 operators or both, or are they required to go through the shift  
23 leads?

24 A. They interact with both.

25 Q. Is there involvement mainly with the field like after

1 the fact, so to speak? Like we've had a problem on this  
2 particular piece of equipment, and then so the operators raise it  
3 to the shift leads, and then somehow it gets into Facman, and then  
4 they come in after the fact. Is the majority of that field to  
5 pipeline coordinator or a pipeline analyst involvement after the  
6 fact?

7 A. It can be after, Karen, and it can be jobs coming up,  
8 reviewing of jobs that are coming up that require outages that may  
9 affect equipment. So they review those types of jobs also.

10 Q. So like new pipe coming on line or new facilities or new  
11 equipment?

12 A. Some of that but also smaller work within a terminal.  
13 Taking a piece of equipment out of service and how it's going to  
14 affect the operations and the operators.

15 Q. With all the integrity management work that's been going  
16 on, are they getting interface with that?

17 A. That's more so the engineering group.

18 Q. Okay. So that I understand what you said previously in  
19 this part -- and I'm not sure I did, when you said the first  
20 attempt broke the 10-minute rule, what aspect of that was broken  
21 in your mind?

22 A. Well, in my mind at the time I don't think I realized  
23 it.

24 Q. Okay. But now after the fact, what do you think was  
25 actually broken in that?

1           A.    Well, I think just the fact that they went past 10  
2 minutes without getting approval.

3           Q.    So in your mind the procedures are clear about whether  
4 they are allowed to continue to run or not during their  
5 calculation time?

6           A.    I'm not sure, Karen.

7           Q.    Okay.

8           MR. NICHOLSON:  But is there a calculation?  There  
9 wasn't a calculation time.

10          MR. REINBOLT:  There was in this case.

11          MR. NICHOLSON:  But that was --

12          MR. REINBOLT:  But that was on the line --

13          MR. NICHOLSON:  -- a proposed --

14          MR. REINBOLT:  -- that wasn't -- that was on a line that  
15 wasn't running.  So the line was shut down.

16          BY            MS. BUTLER:

17          Q.    Right.  But let me explain that I think I understand  
18 about the event.

19          A.    Okay.

20          Q.    And you tell me where I went wrong, okay?  So we have a  
21 normal scheduled shutdown that starts the shift before?

22          A.    Correct.

23          Q.    And that normal scheduled shutdown, there wasn't  
24 anything that they caught at that time that triggered their  
25 attention to a leak?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. And it did result in a column sep, and it did result  
3 in -- that first shutdown did result in a leak alarm for five  
4 minutes, but that leak alarm cleared itself?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Okay. So then we move into the second shift, and they  
7 had a scheduled start planned for 1:00 in morning or --

8 A. 1:00 in the morning.

9 Q. -- somewhere thereabouts or something. And they started  
10 the pipeline?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And then they continued to run, and they were trying to  
13 pull that column sep. together, but they told the shift lead that  
14 and the operator called the shift lead and told him that, and the  
15 shift lead was busy trying to run some calcs to determine what was  
16 going on?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. And they continued while those calcs were going on and  
19 then shut down?

20 A. Right. They continued past the 10 minutes.

21 Q. Right, but they --

22 A. Well, hang on, Karen.

23 MR. NICHOLSON: Well, I mean Blaine should answer, but I  
24 don't -- they didn't run the calcs and then shut down. They ran  
25 the calcs and got a new number.

1 MR. REINBOLT: And continued to run.

2 MS. BUTLER: Right.

3 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

4 MS. BUTLER: But the procedure allowed them to run  
5 calcs, did it not?

6 MR. NICHOLSON: Go ahead and answer, Blaine. Blaine's  
7 shaking his head no --

8 MR. REINBOLT: No.

9 MR. NICHOLSON: -- just for the record.

10 BY MS. BUTLER

11 Q. Okay, so the procedure is very clear in your mind that  
12 at 10 minutes they shut down, and it actually says that?

13 A. Correct. And correct me if I'm wrong, Karen, and I  
14 shouldn't make assumptions. I believe the shift lead was using a  
15 proposed procedure.

16 Q. Okay. So that's where it came into play?

17 A. Right.

18 Q. Was that the difference between the proposed -- was that  
19 different in the proposed procedure versus the actual procedure?

20 A. I believe so. I believe the proposed procedure, which  
21 never got approved, stated that you could past the 10 minutes with  
22 a calculation.

23 Q. Okay. All right.

24 A. I'm not 100 percent sure on that, Karen. I'd have to go  
25 back and look, and I think --

1 Q. That's fine. They mentioned that they grabbed the  
2 proposed procedure.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. But I'm going to be very honest that it's very difficult  
5 to follow which procedure is being talked about when by everyone.

6 A. Okay.

7 Q. Procedures and their titles are not well understood.

8 A. Okay. And I think one of the information requests that  
9 I'm responding to will give you both procedures.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. So you'll be able to see the difference.

12 Q. Right. So now I understand. In your mind the aspect  
13 that was broken was they ran past the 10-minute rule, and the 10  
14 minutes meant in your mind that the previous procedure said that  
15 after 10 minutes you have to shut down. The revised procedure  
16 that they pulled up by mistake, or pulled up for whatever --  
17 whatever reason, may have been the only they had access to. We  
18 don't know, right? But they pulled up the revised procedure, and  
19 as a result, in the revised procedure it said that they continue  
20 on while they were calculating.

21 A. And you'd have to confirm that with them.

22 Q. Okay. Well, I think that that's matching things that --

23 A. Okay.

24 Q. -- people have told us. I think you just put a missing  
25 piece together for us.

1           A.    The only thing I'd be careful is it's not a revised. It  
2 was a proposed procedure.

3           Q.    Okay. It was a proposed?

4           A.    Yeah.

5           Q.    Draft revision. How's that?

6           A.    That's great.

7           Q.    Okay. All right. Thank you for that.

8           A.    Okay.

9           Q.    All right. So I think I get it now that that's why you  
10 would say one thing, and I would say, well, they clearly did  
11 discuss the 10-minute rule, it's in the transcript, but it's a  
12 difference in what they were supposed to do from the 10-minute  
13 rule by depending upon which version you were looking at.

14          A.    Correct.

15          Q.    Okay.

16          A.    Keeping in mind when they first called me at the time of  
17 the incident, I had limited experience with the 10-minute rule.

18          Q.    Okay.

19          A.    So I kind of knew there was something out there but  
20 really didn't understand it or know about it.

21          Q.    All right. That's --

22          A.    And that would be confirmed in my questioning to Darin,  
23 and isn't there a 10-minute rule or something and we have to  
24 contact people. So --

25          Q.    Okay. That -- great. So now I'm going to shift gears a



1 little bit on you. I understand that part and that was crucial  
2 for my -- for me to understand.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. All right. So regarding training --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay, so are you handling training for all different  
7 types of positions that hold vision or just for like controllers?

8 A. It's training specifically for controllers.

9 Q. Okay. And so controllers and shift leads, right?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Okay. All right, and how many people do you have doing  
12 training? Like are all these pipeline coordinators and analysts  
13 also helping with training or not?

14 A. For the most part not. They will get asked to do  
15 specific little presentations as part of emergency response  
16 training. They come in and do a little bit of measurement or  
17 quality training at these sessions. But typically they're not  
18 involved.

19 Q. Okay. So how many people are doing the training?

20 A. We have Jim Johnston (ph.) leads the group.

21 Q. Uh-huh.

22 A. Paula Orest (ph.) -- Paula Orest and Teagan (ph.) are  
23 facilitators.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And Melissa is our document specialist.

1 Q. Okay. And are any of those -- Jim, Paula Orest, Teagan,  
2 and Melissa, are they -- any of those controllers?

3 A. Were they controllers?

4 Q. Yeah, I should say ex-controllers.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Melissa was not and Teagan was not.

8 Q. Okay. All right. And so are you in charge of the  
9 simulations then?

10 A. The training group would be responsible for those, yes.

11 Q. Okay. And do you know do the simulations include now  
12 the interface between the leak detection system or the MBS system?

13 A. Karen, you'd have to ask Jim that question.

14 Q. Okay. And since you're over these groups, what have we  
15 identified as high priorities for upcoming projects for the  
16 training department?

17 A. Some of the priorities that are -- that have come up are  
18 a column separation course to better understand and identify  
19 column separations and suspected leaks.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. We've conducted a workshop with the 6B operators to  
22 share issues and solutions.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. We moved the operation of Line 3 from 6B to another  
25 console because of the increase integrity activity on 6A and 6B.

1 So we tried to reduce some of that workload.

2 Q. All right.

3 A. On 6B and, well, on 6B specifically on that console  
4 we've rolled out a common shift change report.

5 Q. All right.

6 A. A column separation analysis form.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. What else have we done? I think that's all I got for  
9 now, Karen.

10 Q. Okay. What about high priorities on other systems?

11 A. So that's our focus today.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Is what we've done on 6B is we've started to roll out a  
14 common shift change report and column separation analysis form to  
15 the other consoles.

16 Q. Okay. So are there any other high priorities before I  
17 go into a little more detail in the column separation?

18 A. Our next -- in the new year we'll be looking at a  
19 hydraulics course for all pipeline operators.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. So that -- our goal is to get that complete in the first  
22 quarter.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And Jim may be able to touch on a few other initiatives  
25 that are on the go there.

1 Q. Okay. Under the column separation analysis form, whose  
2 idea was that?

3 A. I believe, Karen, it was part of a requirement for the  
4 startup.

5 Q. Okay. So you're thinking about based on what they had  
6 to do initially and then carried it forward?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Okay, gotcha. All right, well, are you still thinking  
9 that you're going to continue with that for lines that on every  
10 shutdown have a column separation?

11 A. That's a good question. We are planning -- like we are  
12 in the process of training all the other consoles on how to fill  
13 this form out, and so I would have to say yes.

14 Q. When you enacted that on a regular requirement basis,  
15 did you look at console workload and how that would impact some of  
16 the consoles?

17 A. We considered -- definitely it's a consideration.  
18 Really our thoughts were with the line shut down, prior to  
19 starting up, we want operators to start, you know, investigating  
20 all avenues there.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. So --

23 Q. No, I understand. I just -- some systems clearly in the  
24 control room, 6 being one of them, 6B, are going to have column  
25 seps almost every time they shut down.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. So it's going to be more impactful to those consoles,  
3 and I just wanted to make sure that total workload has been  
4 studied in that event. Okay. So would you be responsible then  
5 for the OQ records?

6 A. Jim Johnston.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. And Melissa as a compliance --

9 Q. Okay. And as a result of that, are they the ones that  
10 would be required to explain the significance of span and control  
11 to operators or people that would be viewed as mentors to people  
12 in training?

13 A. I'm not sure I get your question, Karen.

14 Q. Okay. Well, in OQ there's some very specific  
15 requirements for span of control.

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. And in the process of doing interviews, that term has  
18 not been understood at all nor has the significance of the  
19 concept.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. From what we've gathered. So I just wanted to make sure  
22 that Jim and Melissa would be the ones that would be training  
23 people to understand the significance.

24 A. I'd prefer you ask Jim that question.

25 Q. I will. Thank you.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. All right. Just a general question, and because it's  
3 always easier to look in hindsight and think about what could have  
4 been done, but was there any specific reason that comes to mind  
5 why on the telephone call you had with the shift leads and Jim  
6 that you didn't get the operator involved?

7 A. I'm just trying to think back on my on call history, and  
8 I've got to say in all occasions we typically deal with the shift  
9 lead and not the operator.

10 Q. Okay. Do you see that continuing that way?

11 A. That's a good question.

12 Q. Okay. You don't have to have an answer.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Okay, so then I'm going to shift just -- it's a similar  
15 question, but I want to make sure I understand how people think  
16 through these issues.

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. So not only did we not call the operator that night, but  
19 we didn't call James Martin, right?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. And we didn't call anybody else on your own staff,  
22 right?

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Do you think that's just because they're traditionally  
25 not on shifts or not on that call out at 4:00 in the morning or

1 whenever?

2 A. No. There has been -- there has been other -- other  
3 times that we'll have to get -- like I'll call Curt Goeson or I'll  
4 call Ian Milligan (ph.). We will get engineering involved. So  
5 there --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- has been -- on other occasions we have gotten them  
8 involved.

9 Q. Okay. So then I -- that leads me to the next thought,  
10 which is we didn't do it in this case.

11 A. Um-hum.

12 Q. So is that because we really kind of thought that the  
13 MBS expert had it under control?

14 A. I think it played a part in convincing me, yes.

15 Q. Okay. So if I were to record that as the MBS expert did  
16 have an influence in the call, is that a fair statement?

17 A. That is a true statement.

18 Q. Okay. Okay. I do want to make sure of one thing, and  
19 that is on the field calls, do a lot of the field interface calls  
20 go to the shift leads, to your knowledge, or do you have a working  
21 knowledge of the control room in that regard?

22 A. I wouldn't say a lot --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- go in. I think a lot of the field calls go into the  
25 consoles.

1 Q. Okay. So if your people also needed information from  
2 the operator, would they typically, since they're not in the same  
3 room, just pick up the phone and call them also?

4 A. Or walk into the control room, yes.

5 Q. Okay. All right. So is there a thought that you have  
6 regarding why the operators and the shift leads in the control  
7 room did not ask your people for help?

8 A. When?

9 Q. Just during any one of those shifts. Do you think it  
10 was just simply because a lot of it occurred in the evening, or do  
11 you think it's -- they just didn't think about it, or --

12 A. So typically they wouldn't call those people on --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. After hours.

15 Q. Okay. All right. So during hours, when it's like a  
16 dayshift -- you know, because part of this would have been during  
17 that time; not all of it, though. I guess the shutdown they  
18 wouldn't recognize. So --

19 A. Well, and the shutdown was on a Sunday.

20 Q. Yeah, right. Right. Okay. Okay, so this may be  
21 relative. I'm going to ask you for your opinion, but you may not  
22 think as a result of when this occurred that it would be relative.  
23 But your individuals had been in the same room, sitting in the  
24 same room, do you think that would have made any difference?

25 A. When?



1 Q. During their shifts. You know, sometimes even though a  
2 desk is there, if it's empty, you think about it.

3 A. That's a good one. I'm not sure. I'd be -- I'd be  
4 guessing at that one, Karen.

5 Q. Okay. All right. Is there any plans -- I think you're  
6 building a new control room, right?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Are there any plans to put you guys in the control  
9 there?

10 A. They will all be in the control room.

11 Q. Okay. So is that also going to include the analysts,  
12 the MBS analysts?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Okay. So --

15 A. That includes the pipeline terminal coordinators and the  
16 pipeline terminal analyst, the measurement --

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. -- and quality analysts.

19 Q. Is training still separate?

20 A. Training's separate.

21 Q. Okay. Do you consider your group of training then to be  
22 the ones that actually train on the procedures or do you consider  
23 that to be the mentors in the control room?

24 A. I think the mentors would play more of a role.

25 Q. Okay. Have you ever had your training crew review the

1 procedures that the operators are required to use and the shift  
2 leads and just reviewed if they think they're clear?

3 A. You can check with Jim on that workflow, but I believe  
4 they're part of the review process.

5 Q. Okay. Okay, I think that's -- I guess the only other  
6 question I have is have you ever asked the operators and the shift  
7 leads for their perspective on how they utilize your team?

8 A. Yes, actually. We have info sessions. We try to have  
9 two a year. We try to sell our group and tell them what they're  
10 there for. Always suggest we have an open door policy. And  
11 really, with my group, I've made -- we had specific objectives  
12 this year to spend more time in the room supporting the operators.

13 Q. Um-hum.

14 A. So I mean it's our goal to interface with them and share  
15 the knowledge of the group. So, yeah, we try.

16 Q. So have you asked the question why haven't they?

17 A. Why haven't they what?

18 Q. Utilized you guys as resources more frequently.

19 A. Well, I think they are.

20 Q. Okay. All right. Is that something you're actually  
21 measuring?

22 A. We -- I had my people, a few of my people keep track of  
23 how much time they're spending in the room and what they're  
24 actually spending it with the operators on.

25 Q. Okay. Has any one thing surfaced?

1 A. In a lot of cases it's more terminal related.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Tank farm and measurement questions.

4 Q. Uh-huh.

5 A. A lot of that, yeah.

6 Q. Do you have a specific training module on the LPM  
7 System, do you know?

8 A. You need to ask Jim that.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I think there is.

11 Q. All right. That was the end of my questions, so thank  
12 you very much.

13 A. Okay.

14 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, Ravi?

15 MR. CHHATRE: Well, I want to give a chance to other  
16 parties first, to Jay.

17 MR. JOHNSON: You know, yeah.

18 BY MR. JOHNSON:

19 Q. I did -- you know I can't say I read all your  
20 transcripts, Blaine.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. You know we talked about the first time they called you.  
23 Did they call you a second time?

24 A. No. So how it worked is they called me at, I believe  
25 about 3:30. We had our discussions. I went back to bed. And

1 then got up and about an hour later and called in to see how  
2 things went. So I initiated the second call. And they hadn't  
3 started up yet. They were still reviewing pressures.

4 Q. At what point in time was the decision made to call  
5 operations? How was that -- how did -- are you an integral part  
6 of that, to answer that?

7 A. Operations in the field?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. So what happened, Jay, is we -- they started up the  
10 second time, obviously, and went 10 minutes and didn't -- again  
11 were unsuccessful, shut down. By that time, we were rolling into  
12 work. So Curt and I had come in, and there was some discussions  
13 going on, on whether we had enough power to put this column back  
14 together actually. And there was discussion with -- oh, boy, I  
15 forget. What's his name in the Chicago region?

16 Q. Tom Fridel?

17 A. Tom Fridel. There was discussions with him about what  
18 was going on. So that would have been the first talk with that.  
19 Around the same time there was somebody at Marshall Station, I  
20 think an electrician or an instrumentation guy, that they had  
21 talked to there and asked if there was any signs of anything wrong  
22 there and there wasn't

23 Q. Yeah, that was Brian Whittaker.

24 A. Brian Whittaker, correct.

25 Q. I just didn't -- I didn't quite know the chain of events

1 on that, and so --

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. -- thank you for that.

4 A. No problem.

5 MR. JOHNSON: That was my question, Ravi.

6 BY MR. CHHATRE:

7 Q. I guess you mentioned during the earlier conversation  
8 that you depend upon the technical expertise of operators and  
9 leads in making the decision because you are not familiar with the  
10 pipeline?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Now if I understand correctly, I was told that the leads  
13 are not basically a technical expert and they are people people?

14 A. That's the direction we're heading, yes.

15 Q. So at the time of accident, was that direction in place?

16 A. For the most part, yes.

17 Q. So --

18 A. I believe we were more relying on the operators for the  
19 technical expertise, so --

20 Q. So really then the answer boils down to not the  
21 technical expertise of leads but only the operators, because there  
22 is no other technical support for them as the things stood at the  
23 time of accident?

24 A. Right. So the team leads still have their technical  
25 knowledge because most of them were controllers. So their

1 direction was to push back the technical decisions back onto the  
2 console and get them thinking more technically, right, for  
3 themselves and not always coming up and having them solve their  
4 problems. And more focused on the people leading aspect.

5 Q. Right. So I guess what I'm saying is so your decision  
6 is based on the technical expertise of your operators, because  
7 your leads are people people?

8 A. Well, they're both. In most situations of our team  
9 leads, they have the technical background.

10 Q. The team leads are telling us in the interview that they  
11 are people people.

12 A. Right.

13 Q. And that they are not technical. So now I'm getting  
14 conflicting information a little bit. But having said that --

15 A. So the direction --

16 Q. -- do you know --

17 A. Sorry. The direction is for them to be people leaders  
18 and not technical experts.

19 Q. It's correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. So I guess at 3 o'clock or 4 o'clock, whatever time you  
22 are making decisions --

23 A. Right.

24 Q. -- your decisions were really based on the technical  
25 expertise of your operator, because your leads are people people

1 and there is no other technical expertise in the control center,  
2 as I understand it?

3 A. So my decisions were made based on what the tech -- the  
4 team --

5 Q. So the initial technical expertise --

6 A. Well, can I answer, please?

7 Q. Sure.

8 A. Okay. So my decisions were made based on the shift  
9 lead's description of the event. I had no interaction with the  
10 operator.

11 Q. Right. But your earlier answer was that you were making  
12 decisions based on the technical expertise of your --

13 A. I was --

14 Q. -- leads and operators.

15 A. I was --

16 Q. Because you said you had not technical expertise on the  
17 pipeline.

18 A. Right. Limited.

19 Q. Right.

20 A. But my interface is with the shift lead.

21 Q. No, I understand. But your decision still doesn't  
22 matter which -- through what channel it comes to you. It's still  
23 only based on the operator's technical expertise, as the things  
24 stood at the time of the accident?

25 A. I can't say whether that information was transferred

1 from the operators to the shift lead or if it was the shift lead's  
2 decisions that were being made. All I know is I got the  
3 information from the shift lead.

4 Q. Well, that part is quite clear to me that you got --

5 A. Okay.

6 Q. -- the information from the leads.

7 A. Right.

8 Q. But I'm going back to answer when you say that your  
9 decisions were based on the technical expertise of your people,  
10 operators and leads.

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. So what I'm saying is the decision you based on was  
13 based on technical expertise of operators and leads of which leads  
14 are people people. So here it is de facto based on the operator's  
15 technical expertise. Is that a correct statement or not?

16 A. The shift leads are there as people leaders.

17 Q. I mean that's what they tell us.

18 A. Right. They're --

19 Q. They are not --

20 A. -- people leaders with technical backgrounds. So when I  
21 ask them a question, they're not going to say I don't know, I'd  
22 have to go ask the operator. They have some technical expertise.

23 Q. So they are considered as technical experts in --

24 A. No, they're considered people leaders in the room with  
25 technical expertise. They have some expertise.



1 Q. Okay.

2 A. They were controllers, so you don't --

3 Q. I (indiscernible) that.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. I mean I think I get the gist of it. My question is did  
6 you know that at that time that the operators may be the trainees  
7 being watched by the mentors?

8 A. Which time?

9 Q. Any time.

10 A. Well, the time I was called there wasn't a trainee on.

11 Q. Well, I understand that. I understand that. But I'm  
12 just saying since people are coming to you for a final decision --

13 A. Sure.

14 Q. -- and you are going to base that essentially, primarily  
15 on, using your term, as technical -- having technical expertise of  
16 people people and the operators --

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. -- could that operator be a trainee? And if you do not  
19 ask that question, you really wouldn't know?

20 A. If there's a trainee on, though, there's still an  
21 operator that's responsible for that console. Not the trainee.

22 Q. You mean the mentor?

23 A. Pardon?

24 Q. You mean the mentor?

25 A. Right.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. So really he'd be responsible for that console, not the  
3 trainee.

4 Q. But I guess --

5 A. So the night I got called I asked the question, I  
6 believe, who the operator was, and they told me it was Tim Taub  
7 (ph.). So I knew he wasn't a trainee.

8 Q. Wasn't a trainee.

9 A. If that's what you're asking.

10 Q. Okay. Now the last question is --

11 A. Um-hum.

12 Q. -- since I mean the situation can be completely reversed  
13 and a pipeline background person may be on call, and the question  
14 may come up --

15 A. Right.

16 Q. And the question may come up about the terminal.

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. And would that have helped to have a pipeline and  
19 terminal person on call for different -- it looks like from the  
20 gist I'm getting from you is if you don't have the background that  
21 you are going to depend so much on the staff you have --

22 A. Um-hum

23 Q. -- but you are the one who is making the decision.

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. So is that --

1           A.    We're relying on --

2           Q.    I mean you are making a decision based on somebody  
3 else's brain, if you would?

4           A.    Correct.  We're relying on the technical expertise in  
5 the room, whether it's the operator, whether it's an operator on  
6 another console, or whether it's the shift lead.

7           Q.    And my question to you is based on this incident and on  
8 your past incidents.  Is that a better practice or you would  
9 prefer to have both pipeline and technical people on call,  
10 depending upon where the decision is needed?

11          A.    I think we need to have the structure in place to have  
12 the expertise there in the room.

13          Q.    So you don't see a need for a person with the background  
14 making the decision, and it is okay to make the decision based on  
15 the information provided to you, even though you may not have a  
16 background in pipeline?  Or you would prefer to have two people on  
17 call with different levels of background making the decision?

18          A.    I think with the -- I think with the volume and the --  
19 how many different facilities and pipelines and setups there are,  
20 it would be impossible for two people to have all that technical  
21 expertise to be able to take that away from the actual people in  
22 the room.  I don't think that's possible.  I think it better  
23 belongs there.

24          Q.    Okay.  I'm done.  Thanks.

25          A.    No problem.

1 MR. NICHOLSON: All right, Blaine, I've got a couple  
2 here.

3 MR. REINBOLT: Okay.

4 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

5 Q. This is the first time I've heard this term about these  
6 pipeline analysts that report to you.

7 A. Okay.

8 Q. Would a pipeline analyst be someone that would, and I'll  
9 be specific, in this case we knew Niles was going down to a pig  
10 run. I guess in fact every station --

11 A. Just to bypass it.

12 Q. -- to get passed it.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Is there someone on staff, maybe this pipeline analyst  
15 that would run the hydraulics prior to that kind of work being  
16 done to say you were going to be a reduced throughput or no, we  
17 can sustain flows?

18 A. That's all done in -- within our engineering group.

19 Q. Is it done?

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. Okay. So when these shift leads and the MBS analysts  
22 got into this whole routine about not having enough pump power  
23 and --

24 A. Um-hum.

25 Q. -- needing to start a different way. They're really

1 chasing something that was probably already looked at prior to the  
2 pig run?

3 A. Yeah, and I'm not sure, if it's --

4 Q. Right.

5 A. That would be a question for Richard. I'm not sure.

6 Q. Fokuma (ph.).

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Okay, that was another question I had. So when you  
9 finally did get into work and everyone was kind of in suspected  
10 leak mode -- eventually I know Richard was involved.

11 A. We were more in not enough power mode, I think.

12 Q. You were still in not enough power mode?

13 A. When we got Richard involved.

14 Q. But Richard's instructions -- I thought from your  
15 interview or his interview was to examine the pressure treads.

16 A. Right.

17 Q. I thought he was looking for something -- some anomaly  
18 in the --

19 A. Yeah. I think it was a little bit of both.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. It was do we start up again, do we need more power. We  
22 had people in the field looking at units.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. Right. So we were thinking of going down that road.

25 And then the dayshift was coming in, and they were saying, well,

1 hang on here, we've bypassed before and never had an issue.

2 Q. I think that was Greg --

3 A. Greg --

4 Q. -- that sort of started that conversation.

5 A. -- Pullen (ph.). Right. So then we have his shift lead  
6 saying go back and look at how this line was shut down, basically,  
7 and see if there's any anomalies, and he recognized that. And  
8 then I think in -- while all that was going on, we get Richard  
9 involved to start checking pressures and see if everything looks  
10 okay, I guess.

11 Q. Well, so I want to back up for a minute. Is what I said  
12 the first time true at all? Did someone look at -- if there's  
13 going to be a known bypass or station shutdown, is there some  
14 engineering done up front?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And definitely talk to Richard. But absolutely.

18 Q. Okay, that's good.

19 A. I think all those pig runs are -- yeah, that's all --

20 Q. They're not just --

21 A. -- planned.

22 Q. -- thrown out there --

23 A. No.

24 Q. -- to the operators to --

25 A. No, no.

1 Q. -- deal with this?

2 A. No, it's all planned out.

3 Q. Okay. So I guess to me that would have seemed odd that  
4 an MBS analyst and a shift lead were trying to rework hydraulics  
5 at the last minute. It just seems like it, you know, that  
6 shouldn't have been --

7 A. Yeah, it's almost --

8 Q. It should have been their last resort and maybe not  
9 their first resort to second-guess the system.

10 A. Agreed.

11 Q. Back to what we were just talking about, when you got  
12 into work, when did the control center go into suspected leak  
13 mode? I'm not sure I have a really good pinpoint on my timeline.

14 A. I think there was --

15 Q. Was it when Greg brought the trend to the shift lead?

16 A. I'm not sure. It's then or when we got a call in from  
17 the field.

18 Q. Oh, it was as late as that, which was 11:18?

19 A. No, it wasn't as late as that. No, it was more --

20 Q. Well, that's East Coast time. I'm sorry. I should  
21 qualify.

22 A. Right. So that's --

23 Q. So it would have been 9:00 --

24 A. 9:00.

25 Q. -- Mountain daylight.

1 A. Well, hang on here. I thought I had something there.

2 Q. I pinpointed it on my layout. I think it was just after  
3 9:00. That sounds right to me, but I wanted to confirm it. It  
4 does -- it seems like there's convergence on that whole topic  
5 really. About the time he calls in, I think you guys are kind of  
6 coming to the same conclusion.

7 A. Okay. I'm not sure.

8 Q. And if you don't have a time, if you could give me an  
9 estimate of, you know, just some kind of event that would help  
10 me --

11 A. You know --

12 Q. -- be able to pinpoint when you guys were sort of --

13 A. I think -- I believe when Greg came on --

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. -- shift. So the dayshift coming in --

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. -- would have been about 6:00 a.m. local time. And in  
18 conjunction with his shift lead, and when they started looking  
19 back historically and seeing that zero pressure, what was very  
20 abnormal.

21 Q. Um-hum.

22 A. I believe then would have been when we --

23 Q. Okay. Well, I think that's what I've got.

24 A. Um-hum.

25 Q. The pinpoint is basically when Greg sees that zero



1 pressure --

2 A. Yeah, and that just --

3 Q. -- notifies the shift lead.

4 A. Right. This doesn't look right.

5 Q. Okay. Is there anything -- I don't know if it's fair or  
6 not, and I think Curt said that Greg's performance was more the  
7 norm than the exception. But was there -- did Greg just have the  
8 benefit of inertia to have understood the abnormality just because  
9 so many people at that point were kind of thinking leak?

10 A. Hum.

11 Q. Did have that benefit or is there something about Greg  
12 and what he did to research that that the other operators should  
13 be doing?

14 A. I wouldn't call it something special, to be able to find  
15 that. I think Curt's probably pretty accurate in saying most of  
16 the room would have -- would have recognized that.

17 Q. So it's just because we had some many involved at that  
18 point, two startups later?

19 A. I'd be --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. I'm not sure.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I'd be speculating there. But to me it's -- it wasn't  
24 a -- it wasn't a spectacular thing for him to have found that.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. To say he was -- he went above and beyond or he had  
2 special training to be able to find that, no.

3 Q. Okay. So should -- if that's the case, then Tim should  
4 have found it?

5 A. If he was looking back, yeah.

6 Q. So the difference between Greg and Tim is that Greg had  
7 more of a reason than Tim?

8 A. Greg may have got direction from the shift lead to go  
9 back and look.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. See what happened here. Something's not right. Go back  
12 and look and see how this line was shut down.

13 Q. Who was the -- I'm trying to -- was that Brad?

14 A. Brad Ashcroft, yeah.

15 Q. Is there something about Brad that's not equivalent to  
16 Darin and Aaron? Does Brad have more operational experience, more  
17 technical background?

18 A. I'm not sure. I think --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Well, I think --

21 Q. (Indiscernible).

22 A. -- Brad and Darin must be very similar and --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- and Darin might not have as much.

25 Q. It doesn't seem very fair, when I go through these

1 procedures, that you give an MBS analyst a 10-minute cut off  
2 before the line's shut down --

3 A. Um-hum.

4 Q. -- but Darin and Aaron got an hour-and-a-half before  
5 they had to call you.

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Should there be a time limit between when a shift lead  
8 has to call a supervisor?

9 A. Darin and Aaron broke procedure.

10 Q. Is the procedure then that they call you immediately  
11 after having to shut the line down?

12 A. They should have shut the line down at 10 minutes and  
13 called.

14 Q. And called, not spent an hour-and-a-half researching it  
15 and then calling you?

16 A. Well, they could have shut the line down and researched  
17 it and then called me.

18 Q. They can research it for three or four hours? Can they  
19 research it until their shift's over and then hand it off?

20 A. No. That's not --

21 Q. But there's really no time limit? They're not  
22 constrained like you constrain the MBS analyst?

23 A. That's correct. Yeah, the procedure doesn't --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Doesn't do that. You're right.

1 Q. Were you amazed when you called back at 4:30 or 5:00  
2 that they were unsuccessful, and they had spent 10 minutes  
3 starting up I think around 4 o'clock and then --

4 A. Well, when I called back, they hadn't started up yet.

5 Q. Oh, okay. I thought it was after the second attempt.

6 A. No. So, yeah, when I called back, after I had given the  
7 approval and went back to bed --

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. -- I got up and called back maybe an hour later, and  
10 they hadn't started up yet.

11 Q. They were still investigating?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. They were still going --

15 Q. Did that surprise you?

16 A. Well, I just said why haven't you guys started up, and  
17 no, we're just making sure and we're going through these numbers  
18 again. And I thought okay, good.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And then I -- when I got into work, I had found out they  
21 had tried again and it still didn't work.

22 Q. And there was no requirement for them to follow it up  
23 with you?

24 A. They probably thought I was going to be in soon.

25 Q. Okay. Do you think that's something that needs to be

1 changed? Do you think -- or does it do you any good to be called  
2 right away if it failed, if they don't have all the information?

3 A. Well, and I believe the procedure says that -- to shut  
4 down and isolate, so --

5 Q. But that shut down and isolate could be a ruptured line?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. So --

8 A. Right.

9 Q. -- time is sort of essence still?

10 A. Yeah, I believe there could be some improvement there.

11 Q. Okay, I'm finished.

12 MR. NICHOLSON: Jay, do you want to ask anything else of  
13 Blaine?

14 MR. JOHNSON: No, that was it.

15 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, Karen, any more questions?

16 MS. BUTLER: No, thank you.

17 MR. NICHOLSON: Ravi?

18 MR. CHHATRE: Thank you so much.

19 MR. NICHOLSON: All right.

20 MR. CHHATRE: You'll see I'm starting to wrap up, so I  
21 have no more questions.

22 MR. NICHOLSON: Thank you, Blaine. I appreciate your  
23 time, and --

24 MR. JOHNSON: Blaine, could we get a copy? And then  
25 we're going to be over with Jim --

1           MR. NICHOLSON: I think we'll go ahead and conclude the  
2 interview.

3           MR. REINBOLT: Okay, thank you.

4           MR. JOHNSON: Can get a copy of --

5           (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:           ENBRIDGE OIL SPILL  
                  MARSHALL,                            MICHIGAN  
                  Interview                              of Blaine Reinbolt

DOCKET NUMBER:               DCA-10-MP-007.

PLACE:           Edmonton,                            Canada

DATE:             December 17, 2010

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to  
the recording accomplished at the hearing.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Kimberly  
Transcriber

A. Hawkins