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ENBRIDGE PIPELINES INC.

INTERVIEW

OF

BLAINE REINBOLT

Tyler W. Tollefson, Esq. Senior Legal Counsel for Enbridge Pipelines Inc.

Curt Goeson Supervisor - Control Centre

Operations for Enbridge

Pipelines Inc.

Stephen M. Jenner, Ph.D. For National Transportation Safety Board

Rick Gulstad, PE and Karen Butler

For U.S. Department of

Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety

Administration

Carissa L. Stabbler, CSR(A) Court Reporter

Edmonton, Alberta, Canada July 30, 2010

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1	INTERVIEW	OF BL	AINE RE	INBOLT.	TAKEN	AT 9:32	A.M.

- 2 MR. JENNER: Good morning. Today is
- Friday, July 30th, 2010. My name is Stephen
- 4 Jenner. I'm an investigator with the National
- 5 Transportation Safety Board in Washington, D.C. We
- 6 are currently in Edmonton, Canada, at the Crowne
- 7 Plaza Hotel. We're here in regards to a pipeline
- 8 spill in Marshall, Michigan that occurred on
- 9 Monday, July 26, 2010.
- We'll first go around the room and have
- 11 everyone introduce themselves.
- 12 MR. GULSTAD: I'm Rick Gulstad. I'm an
- engineer with Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
- 14 Safety Administration.
- 15
- 16 MR. TOLLEFSON: Tyler Tollefson, senior legal
- 17 counsel, Enbridge Pipelines.

18 MR. GOESON: I'm Curt Goeson, control

centre supervisor, Enbridge Pipelines.

20 MR. REINBOLT: Blaine Reinbolt, control

21 centre supervisor, Enbridge Pipelines.

22 MS. BUTLER: Karen Butler, PHMSA,

, regional project manager.

24 MR. JENNER: Okay, thank you.

25 QUESTIONS BY MR. JENNER:

26 Q MR. JENNER: I'll just get a little bit

about your background. When did you start with

A.C.E. Reporting Services Inc.

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- 2 A I started with Enbridge in 1979.
- 3 Q If I can just have you give a little history of
- 4 your various jobs there.
- 5 A Sure. So I started out in a field role at Edmonton
- 6 terminal and worked shift work as an operator for
- 7 approximately 20 years. Then I had a role still at
- 8 Edmonton terminal as a coordinator for about five
- 9 years. Then the last 6 years, I've been with the
- 10 control centre in various roles from coordinator up
- 11 to supervisor.
- 12 Q How long have you been in this current position as
- 13 a supervisor?
- 14 A About a year -- maybe a year and a half, sorry.
- 15 Q How are things -- do you enjoy your current
- 16 position?
- 17 A I do.

- 18 Q Are things going smoothly for you?
- 19 A It's a great job, yeah. I enjoy it, yeah.
- 20 Q Thank you for the background.
- We're obviously focusing on the incident on
- 22 Monday. I understand that you were contacted in
- regards to issues that were happening on line 6B.
- And if you could just walk us through the moment
- 25 that you heard, that you were contacted and that
- you -- I think you were called, but I'll have you
- tell the story.

1	A Sure. So I believe early Monday morning I got a
2	call from Darin Parsons, the shift lead on. It
3	would have been around 3:30 MST, and he basically
4	explained to me that he was they were having
5	problems starting up line 6B.
6	Some of the problems that they were
7	experiencing he felt were due to a column
8	separation. He explained that there was other
9	issues going on. Basically we had a station
10	bypassed upstream of Marshall in anticipation of
11	integrity tool and that there may have been some
12	poor timing on some of the units start starting
13	up.
14	He explained that they had put in
15	approximately 1,600 cubes of oil and only taken out
16	about 300 cubes. So at that point, we brought in
17	the MBS analyst, who's Jim Knudson, and he

18 explained to us that the MBS alarms that we were 19 receiving were false. 20 So we discussed prior startups, and typically 21 what was mentioned to me was it took approximately 22 3- to 700 cubes to pack the line. So I think again 23 I asked why -- why we thought -- why they thought 24 this was happening, why this was different. 25 We went back to the shutdown, and they felt 26 there was excessive drain on the shutdown and back 27 to the bypassing of Niles station and the poor

A.C.E. Reporting Services Inc.

1	timing on the start up of units on the first
2	attempt. They also mentioned that they thought
3	that they had just about had the column together
4	and just required another another push.
5	We talked about the ten-minute rule and Darin
6	explained to me why Darin explained to me first
7	how long it took to get pressure at the upstream
8	station and then why they went past the ten
9	minutes. They had calculated about a 700-cube
10	drain to get pressure to Marshall.
11	So, in fact, they had calculated a time where
12	they felt that they should have pressure at
13	Marshall station, and I think that time was about
14	1:58 or 1:57 MST. So they got to that time; they
15	never had pressure; they commenced the shutdown
16	Q Okay.
17	Δ So yeah we did discuss the ten-minute rule. I

- asked if we needed to contact regional management.
- 19 They felt that because the MBS alarms were invalid
- that we did not need to talk to regional, and that
- was when we decided to start -- that's when I
- decided to give the okay to start up again with the
- information that was presented to me. That was the
- end of the conversation.
- 25 Q Okay, thank you. Let me go back and follow up on
- some of that. You had mentioned discussion about
- alarms which were deemed invalid.

- 1 A Mm-hm.
- 2 Q Can you elaborate on the alarms that you were told
- 3 about and why they were invalid?
- 4 A It was -- basically Jim had mentioned there was MBS
- 5 alarms occurring on the startup and during the
- 6 startup but indicated that these alarms were false.
- 7 Q And who came to that conclusion that those alarms
- 8 were false?
- 9 A He did, the MBS analyst, Jim.
- 10 Q And that was -- what was that based on? His -- how
- did he determine that to the best of your
- 12 knowledge?
- 13 A I think you'd have to talk to him about that. I'm
- 14 not sure. I just -- he told me they were false,
- and I just took it as that.
- 16 Q Does false -- does that mean that --
- 17 A Not valid.

- 18 Q Okay. Do you have any -- you were at home at this
- 19 point?
- 20 A Pardon me?
- 21 Q Were you at home when you received these calls?
- 22 A I was at home, yeah.
- 23 Q Do you have any equipment or capabilities to
- 24 access -- call in and access data if you wanted to
- look at some numbers?
- 26 A No, I don't.
- 27 Q Okay. So you rely on them to update you with all

- 1 the information?
- 2 A Yes.
- 3 Q What did you do after the phone call?
- 4 A Laid in bed and thought about what was going on.
- 5 Q You couldn't immediately fall back to sleep, huh?
- 6 A No. Yeah, thought about it for a bit. Tried to go
- 7 back to sleep. Maybe dozed off for a bit and then
- 8 got back up. And by then, it was pretty much time
- 9 to get ready to come into work.
- 10 Q Okay. How often might you receive a call while
- 11 you're at home? I understand that's part of the --
- 12 A On-call rotation.
- 13 Q -- on-call rotation. How often does that occur?
- 14 A It's -- it's funny because some -- we go on call
- 15 for about a week from a Thursday to a -- Thursday
- noon to Thursday noon, and sometimes you might not
- get called at all during that week. Sometimes you

- can get called every night.
- 19 Q Oh, is that right?
- 20 A Right.
- 21 Q Okay.
- 22 A So it's -- I'd say on average, maybe one or two
- times a week.
- 24 Q What are the nature of the calls?
- 25 A They're more just to inform us what's going on,
- anything -- any emergencies, anything safety
- 27 related, anything customer related that they feel

- 1 we may need to inform people about us.
- 2 Q Okay. Were you -- I'm sure you had a lot of
- 3 questions for them when they called. Were you
- 4 satisfied with the information that they were able
- 5 to provide at that time?
- 6 A I was satisfied with their thought process, with
- 7 Darin's thought process.
- 8 Q Was everyone in agreement about how to proceed
- 9 after your phone call discussion?
- 10 A We had agreed -- yeah, we had agreed that we --
- what they had thought was that they were very close
- to joining that column so that we just needed
- another push basically to get there. So we agreed
- that it was -- yeah, that we -- we would start up
- and try it again.
- 16 Q How can they determine if they're close to bringing
- the column together?

- 18 A I'm not sure. They just told me they were close,
- and I just took their word for that.
- 20 Q So and your understanding was they're looking at
- some information from SCADA, from other data that
- satisfies them that progress was being made in
- pushing the column together?
- 24 A Yes.
- 25 Q Okay. So after you got the phone call and you're
- 26 thinking about it for a while, did you ever pick up
- the phone and call in? Like, what did you do after

- 1 that?
- 2 A I called back at -- boy, I'm thinking around 5:30
- 3 which probably would have been 4:30, sorry, MST the
- 4 one time.
- 5 Q 4:30 MST?
- 6 A Yes.
- 7 Q All right.
- 8 A Asking how things went, and they hadn't started up
- 9 yet.
- 10 Q Who did you talk to?
- 11 A Darin. So they -- he explained to me that they
- were continuing to investigate the pressures and
- were just getting ready to start up. And that was
- it. And then I was getting ready for work, and I
- was on my way into work.
- 16 Q Were you surprised that they hadn't started up yet?
- 17 A No, just that they were still investigating whether

- or not -- what they needed to do and reviewing
- the -- reviewing the pressures.
- 20 Q Was there any new information that they
- 21 communicated to you?
- 22 A No.
- 23 Q Okay. At any point in the first or second
- conversation, was the possibility of a leak
- 25 discussed?
- 26 A Yes.
- 27 Q Okay. Can you share that conversation?

- 1 A At different points in our conversations, we kept
- 2 questioning the amount of oil that was going in and
- 3 not enough coming out and basically determined, you
- 4 know, this is either a lot of packing or a leak.
- 5 Q Okay. And --
- 6 A With the information that I was given, it -- and we
- 7 all agreed that it was -- we needed to pack more.
- 8 Q Who raised the possibility of packing? Who --
- 9 how --
- 10 A Both Darin and Jim.
- 11 Q And did they justify why they thought it was to
- 12 you?
- 13 A Yes.
- 14 Q And did they give specifics about why they went
- with the packing theory?
- 16 A Kept going back to the poor startup -- poor timing
- of units, sorry, and the fact that we were

- bypassing Niles station and the excessive drain on
- 19 shutdown.
- 20 Q Maybe you can help me explain -- understand the
- 21 excessive drain on shutdown. "Excessive" meaning
- in this sense more than -- more than typical that
- you would expect in terms of draining?
- 24 A Not sure. That's just what they told me.
- 25 Q Okay. Have you in your tenure experienced
- situations where the first startup -- let's say a
- similar situation where you're trying to resolve a

- 1 column, and first startup did not work, and the
- 2 second one was attempted and was successful.
- 3 A I was not a pipeline operator.
- 4 Q Oh, I'm sorry.
- 5 A I was a tank farm operator.
- 6 Q Tank farm operator, okay.
- 7 In your current position now, has that ever
- 8 been run by you?
- 9 A Not that I can remember.
- 10 Q Okay. So you made your way to work, and what did
- 11 you see when you arrived? And what time did you
- arrive, and what did you see?
- 13 A Probably around 6:30 -- sorry, 5:30 MST.
- 14 Q Okay.
- 15 A I believe the day shift was on, Brad, and we
- were -- there was discussions taking place on not
- having enough power to overcome this column sep.

- and join it back together.
- 19 Q Were you part of these conversations?
- 20 A Yes.
- 21 Q Okay. So what was -- what was discussed and what
- came out of that?
- 23 A There was discussions on -- on trying to get
- specific access to more power and units on --
- upstream of Marshall.
- 26 Q How -- okay.
- 27 A But --

- 1 Q I'm sorry.
- 2 A Sorry. In the meantime, we had discussed that we
- 3 would get our engineering group involved, one of
- 4 our engineers, Richard, to review the pressures.
- 5 Q So by the time you arrive, the second startup had
- 6 been attempted and --
- 7 A Right.
- 8 Q -- (INDISCERNIBLE)?
- 9 So what was the purpose of getting Richard
- involved, the engineer?
- 11 A I think it was to verify how much pressure we
- should actually see, basically try to calculate how
- much pressure should be between the stations.
- 14 Q And what would that tell you? Why is it necessary
- to know how much pressure between the stations?
- 16 A It would indicate if -- if we would require more
- power.

- 18 Q So part of his involvement is if you had decided to
- 19 give a third startup an opportunity, he is there to
- 20 help you strategize about how to approach that?
- 21 A Yes.
- 22 Q Okay. So Richard is -- you contacted him, and he
- has some numbers to crunch?
- 24 A Right. He's on his way in to work basically.
- 25 Q Okay. Was he initially contacted at home?
- 26 A I think a call went to Richard at about 6:30 MST
- 27 just wondering when he was coming in or if he was

- on his way in. That's it.
- 2 Q Okay. Okay. And then -- so the decision to get
- 3 Richard involved was discussed. And what happened
- 4 after that?
- 5 A I believe Brad had the operator on review the
- 6 shutdown and the startups.
- 7 Q What was the purpose of this review?
- 8 A To see if anything was out of the ordinary.
- 9 Q Was the possibility of a leak discussed at this
- point when you had arrived?
- 11 A I don't -- I don't recall.
- 12 Q Okay. Okay, so Brad is now talking to the
- operator, and what are you doing at this time?
- 14 A I believe I was reading e-mails in my office at
- 15 that time.
- 16 Q Okay. And then what happens after that?
- 17 A What happens after that? I think Brad came down

- and mentioned that there was -- there's abnormal
- low pressure at Marshall that was -- that was
- 20 recognized and that he was going to advise regional
- 21 management.
- 22 Q What was the significance of the abnormal low
- pressure at Marshall? What's the significance of
- 24 that that was communicated to you?
- 25 A The operator on, Greg, had reviewed the shutdown
- and recognized that the pressures had gone to zero
- and stayed at Marshall. That's what was

- 1 communicated to me and that that wasn't normal.
- 2 Q Okay. And what was going to be discussed with
- 3 regional management? What was the purpose of
- 4 calling them?
- 5 A I believe that if they were going to talk about
- 6 sending people out to start looking for any
- 7 indications.
- 8 Q Okay, then what's happening after this?
- 9 A I believe they were back in the control centre. I
- would be back reading my e-mail. So at that point,
- we'd be just -- I was waiting for an update from
- regional and the shift leads.
- 13 Q Okay. Who's the next person that you talked to?
- 14 Did regional call you? Did other leads talk to
- you?
- 16 A We talked. I believe Curt and I talked a bit about
- 17 it.

- 18 Q Okay.
- 19 MR. GOESON: This is about the time line
- 20 now where I'm coming in.
- 21 Q MR. JENNER: Okay, what was your
- discussion?
- 23 A Kind of explained things to Curt. Mentioned that
- we had advised region and that they were out
- looking, that -- I believe that right at -- there
- was someone at Marshall station that confirmed that
- everything was okay there. And I think the

- discussion went that we were going to have Richard
- 2 review our numbers before we -- we -- we did
- anything else. So basically we were waiting for
- 4 Richard to come in.
- 5 Q Okay. And -- okay. And after this discussion with
- 6 Curt, what are you -- what are you doing then?
- 7 A I can't remember. Probably discussing work, what
- 8 upcoming work we had for the week.
- 9 Q Okay. At some point, a call came in, from what
- we've understood from talking to other people, that
- they had spotted some oil on the ground. Are you
- involved in the -- this kicks into emergency
- response actions. Are you involved in this part of
- 14 the equation?
- 15 A We get notified, but the shift leads take control.
- 16 They would have informed the regional manager, Tom
- 17 Fridel, and he would have dispatched PLM.

- 18 Q Do you have an active role in this, or do you just
- 19 get updated from time to time?
- 20 A I would get updated.
- 21 Q Okay. From what you saw -- and we've heard that
- there is emergency response training -- did things
- 23 go according to expectations in terms of how things
- were organized and people doing their jobs as
- 25 expected?
- 26 A I knew that Tom Fridel was informed and called, and
- to me, that's -- that's our role.

- 1 Q Okay. Let me ask you, as your role as supervisor,
- 2 what -- just describe your general
- 3 responsibilities.
- 4 A In general, I'm a supervisor of a technical
- 5 services group. So there's a group of four, five,
- 6 six individuals that we support the control room,
- 7 day-to-day issues from pipeline to terminal issues,
- 8 from measurement to quality issues.
- 9 Q Is there -- who works -- who do you supervise?
- What are their titles?
- 11 A One is a pipeline coordinator, a terminal
- 12 coordinator, and three analysts, quality
- measurement.
- 14 Q The analysts report to you?
- 15 A And the coordinators.
- 16 Q Right.
- 17 A Correct.

- 18 MR. GOESON: And the training.
- 19 A Also the training group. So I have a coordinator
- in the -- in the training group that reports to me.
- 21 Q MR. JENNER: Did you stay on your shift for
- 22 the duration of your normal time?
- 23 A Which day?
- 24 Q On Monday.
- 25 A Monday, we probably worked a couple extra hours
- that day, yeah.
- 27 Q Does someone come in to relieve you?

- 1 A No.
- 2 MR. GOESON: These are administrative
- 3 roles, 9-to-5 type work, not shift work.
- 4 Q MR. JENNER: Okay. Well, thank you for
- 5 this information so far. I'm going to finish for
- 6 now my questions --
- 7 A Sure.
- 8 Q -- and I know others have some follow-ups. Do you
- 9 need a break?
- 10 A No. No, I'm fine.
- 11 Q Okay, great.
- 12 MR. JENNER: Karen, do you have some
- 13 questions?
- 14 MS. BUTLER: Yeah, I do.
- 15 QUESTIONS BY MS. BUTLER:
- 16 Q MS. BUTLER: Thank you for coming in,
- 17 Blaine, and for helping us get some of these

- answers here.
- When they first called you and started talking
- about the issue and explained all these issues that
- were coming into play, and they brought in the MBS
- analyst, was that decision to bring in the analyst
- prior to the call with you or after?
- 24 A Karen, basically it was Darin Parsons giving me a
- brief update on what was going on, and then
- probably a couple minutes into the phone call, he
- said, "Hang on. I'm going to get Jim on the line

- 1 to help explain what's happening."
- 2 Q Okay.
- 3 A Jim being the MBS analyst.
- 4 Q Gotcha. Okay, so into the final call, they bring
- 5 in Jim.
- 6 All right, and did Jim actually use the term
- 7 "MBS alarms were false," or is that just
- 8 something -- control room terminology? Do you
- 9 remember?
- 10 A I'm pretty sure he did, and we asked the question
- towards the end of the conversation if he was sure
- that the alarms were invalid.
- 13 Q Did he explain to you why he was sure?
- 14 A No.
- 15 Q Did anybody ask why?
- 16 A No.
- 17 Q Did he mention anything in the model not being

- brought up to the capability to bypass for pigging,
- like, Niles station?
- 20 A I believe he did mention something about
- transmitters being isolated. I believe he did.
- 22 Q Did anybody at this time that you recall mention
- any communication outages to you?
- 24 A Not that I can remember, Karen.
- 25 Q Okay. Did they discuss with you that they had done
- some historical review pressures? Did they give
- you that indication or say it in that way at all?

- 1 A No.
- 2 Q Okay. I know that you said something about you
- didn't previously work on this particular line, but
- 4 you were a terminal operator. Since you've been on
- 5 shift for a year and a half, have you had calls
- 6 regarding column separation before?
- 7 MR. GOESON: So, Karen, just -- it's Curt
- 8 here. Blaine is not on shift.
- 9 MS. BUTLER: Right. I just meant on call.
- Forgive me. I said it poorly.
- 11 MR. GOESON: Oh, okay.
- 12 MS. BUTLER: Thank you for the
- 13 clarification.
- 14 Q MS. BUTLER: When you're on call and
- 15 receiving that -- those callouts, have you received
- 16 callouts before regarding column separation?
- 17 A I don't believe so.

- 18 Q When you took your new position -- and because your
- background is obviously in terminals, and you have
- a very good familiarity, I'm sure, with liquid
- 21 movement -- did they give you any specific training
- regarding what an operator on a specific bench
- 23 might be up against or any specifics regarding what
- this line usually has concerns with?
- 25 A No.
- 26 Q In your other calls that you've received in past
- 27 experience, have there been issues upon multiple

1	restarts?
2	A Could you explain?
3	Q For example, have you received a call before where
4	it was a ten-minute rule being exceeded, and they
5	just needed another push?
6	A No, I said previously that I didn't recall being
7	called in regards to column separations.
8	Q Okay. So in your mind, that's what led to the
9	needed another push; right?
10	A That was what they were that was what was
11	presented to me.
12	Q Okay. I think you'd thrown out some numbers
13	before, and I apologize. I just couldn't capture
14	one as you said it, and that was you can't
15	explain that we put 1,600 cubes of oil in, and
16	we've taken out 300 cubes of oil, and you

referenced a number that it took to pack. Can you

- tell me what that number was again?
- 19 A I believe it was 700 cubes.
- 20 Q Okay, thank you.
- All right, you know, in thinking back since I
- triggered your memory a bit with mentioning that
- the transmitters may have been isolated at Niles
- for running the pig, did Jim reference in his
- conversation any other location that might be in
- the similar circumstance?
- 27 A Not that I recall.

- 1 Q Okay, thank you. On the ten-minute rule when they
- 2 described to you that they had done some
- 3 calculations and had extended that initial time
- 4 frame, did that surprise you, or have you heard of
- 5 that happening before?
- 6 A Well, I hadn't heard of it happening before because
- 7 I hadn't been called on it before, but the thought
- 8 process that they explained to me made sense.
- 9 Q Okay. In the process of taking callouts like you
- do, do you ever ask questions regarding what alarms
- maybe besides the leak detection have come into
- 12 play? Is that a standard question or something
- they normally provide you with background
- information on?
- 15 A That would be something that they provide us.
- 16 Q Now, did anyone in the calls make mention of the
- fact that there were low pressure alarms?

- 18 A Not that I recall, Karen.
- 19 Q And just so you know, we don't know that there were
- for a fact. I'm just saying if they had mentioned
- 21 that, that might have triggered something else. So
- another set of questions for me.
- 23 A Okay.
- 24 Q Were you aware of any pressure restrictions or any
- 25 special conditions on this particular line?
- 26 A No. The only -- the only thing they made me aware
- of was that there was integrity tools in the line

- 1 and that Niles was bypassed.
- 2 Q And they talked about the excessive drain up -- or
- drain down. Forgive me. I believe it was at
- 4 Sarnia. Did they say anything about that they
- 5 thought that starting this pump early had made that
- 6 worse? Or you mentioned some unit timings that we
- 7 didn't really ask you details on. What they were
- 8 thinking there.
- 9 A Yeah, they did. Darin thought that possibly Tim
- had started a unit too soon upstream of Marshall
- which may have resulted in not putting that column
- together sooner.
- 13 Q Was Jim on the phone at the time that you mentioned
- that? Or if you don't recall, that's fine.
- 15 A Yes, he was.
- 16 Q Okay. Did he say anything different?
- 17 A No.

- 18 Q And so I take it because they're so busy explaining
- things that they're considering, that they really
- didn't emphasize to you that a leak could have
- 21 caused something similar either? Or you mentioned
- that a leak was done in passing, and I'm just
- trying to figure out when they really started to
- pass that conversation on to you.
- 25 A I think it was just a general comment that when --
- when Darin explained to me that 1,600 cubes had
- gone in and only 2- to 300 have come out, it's one

- of two things. It's -- you know, it's packing or
- 2 it's a leak.
- 3 Q Okay. All right. In order to prevent column
- 4 separation, are you aware of some things that they
- 5 can do on the pipeline to help prevent that?
- 6 A I am not.
- 7 Q Okay. Have they ever discussed getting you some
- 8 equipment to look at regarding information from the
- 9 control room, or is that -- I know you said that
- you didn't have it, but has that ever been
- discussed with you?
- 12 A No. We rely on our people that are on the job for
- that.
- 14 Q Okay. In regards to that then, when they prepared
- 15 you for your position, did they give you, like, a
- standard set of questions that should always be
- asked or some guidance along those lines?

- 18 A No, but I believe they -- they give the shift leads
- direction on what information is required when
- they're updating us.
- 21 Q Okay. When you initially left the call that there
- would be -- well, let me back up. Prior to you
- calling back in to see how the status was going in
- following up, did they say anything to you, like,
- 25 regarding -- when the engineer was going to get
- involved, was that your idea, or was that something
- they had already thought of and were pursuing, or

- 1 how did that kind of surface?
- 2 A That came up when we were -- when I was on site at
- 3 work.
- 4 Q Okay. Okay. And that was after you had called in.
- 5 Does that make sense? You called in from home to
- 6 see if they had started up yet, and then it was
- 7 later after you had made it to the office that they
- 8 decided to call or that you discussed calling
- 9 Richard in?
- 10 A Well, I think the decision to have the engineer
- 11 review was after the second startup.
- 12 Q Okay. And just for my education, does Richard look
- at a hydraulic model, do you know, when he looks at
- profiles or pressure?
- 15 A I'm not sure.
- 16 Q Is there any reason why calling Richard in is
- different than calling the leak detection analyst

- in your mind?
- 19 A Richard would look at it from an operational point
- of view.
- 21 Q Okay, gotcha. Okay. We talked about pressure
- alarms, but did anyone ever mention anything saying
- that there were some abnormal low pressures on
- pipeline 6B?
- 25 A No. Comments were made that it seemed like there
- was an excessive drain after the shutdown.
- 27 Q Okay. But not specifically referencing pressure;

- 1 is that correct?
- 2 A That's correct.
- 3 Q Okay. Did you have other callouts that night?
- 4 A No.
- 5 Q When you said there were three analysts that report
- 6 to you, was that leak detection analysts, or is
- 7 that measurement analysts, or what's their
- 8 function?
- 9 A Measurement and quality.
- 10 Q Okay. So the engineering department and the leak
- detection services that support your efforts, those
- would be external to your oversight; right?
- 13 A That's correct.
- 14 Q And would that be true also for the batch tracking
- system or the maintenance system like FacMan?
- 16 A Yeah, they don't report to me.
- 17 Q Okay. And so batch tracking versus measurement, do

- they exchange information periodically, or how does
- 19 that work?
- 20 A No, measurement is more in-the-field measurement.
- 21 Q Okay, thank you. Were there any other
- conversations with field personnel that you had? I
- know you mentioned you talked to the one gentleman
- from Chicago -- or from the Chicago area, sorry.
- 25 A I did not have any conversations with anyone in the
- field. The shift leads would have.
- 27 Q Were you aware of anybody that was already in the

- 1 field or on the way to the field prior to you guys
- 2 having the discussion about calling the region?
- 3 A I'm not sure when we found out that there was
- 4 somebody at Marshall that had checked the Marshall
- 5 station, whether that was before Tom Fridel was
- 6 called or not. I think it was before.
- 7 Q All right.
- 8 A But that was the only other field personnel that I
- 9 was aware of.
- 10 Q Do they give you any general training regarding
- what might be considered abnormal operating
- 12 conditions on the pipeline?
- 13 A No.
- 14 Q Think that's all I had. Thank you so much.
- 15 A Okay.
- 16 MR. JENNER: Rick?
- 17 MR. GULSTAD: Oh, a couple.

18 QUESTIONS BY MR. GULSTAD:

- 19 Q MR. GULSTAD: When you're at home, do you
- 20 have pipeline system drawings at home that you can
- sort of differentiate, for example, on 6B between
- where La Porte is or Marshall is, or are you just
- so familiar that you know these systems?
- 24 A I actually rely on the shift leads to explain it.
- 25 Q Okay. I know -- one thing that Darin passed on in
- hindsight was that he wished he would have realized
- the significance of seeing a zero pressure at

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- 1 Marshall. Would that have changed your thought
- 2 process if you sort of -- if that had raised a flag
- 3 in your mind that the pressure shouldn't have been
- 4 at zero at Marshall during shutdown?
- 5 A I wouldn't have had the experience to know whether
- 6 it should be at zero or not. I would, again, rely
- 7 on the shift leads to say that it would be abnormal
- 8 for it to be at zero. Myself, I wouldn't have that
- 9 experience to know that it shouldn't be at zero.
- 10 Q So if -- if they had relayed to you that it
- shouldn't have been zero, would that have maybe
- changed your recommendation to, say, go proceed to
- start up again?
- 14 A I would be speculating on what I would have
- thought. I'm not sure.
- 16 Q Okay. Then the last thing that you -- you
- indicated then -- this is the first time we heard

- this, but Darin indicated that Tim may have started
- up the unit at Marshall a little too soon but
- 20 what --
- 21 A I think at Minden.
- 22 MR. GOESON: Minden.
- 23 Q MR. GULSTAD: Oh, at Minden?
- 24 A Yeah, upstream.
- 25 Q What is the consequence of starting that unit a
- 26 little too soon?
- 27 A What was explained to me is that he may have

- 1 pulled -- pulled pressure away too early. They
- 2 felt that if they had packed more prior to starting
- 3 that unit, it may have brought the column over the
- 4 hill and joined it.
- 5 Q Okay. So it would have put the column together --
- 6 A Quicker.
- 7 Q -- quicker?
- 8 A Right.
- 9 Q Okay.
- 10 MR. GULSTAD: All right, that's all I've
- 11 got.
- 12 MR. JENNER: Curt, do you have any
- follow-up questions or points of clarification?
- 14 MR. GOESON: No.
- 15 MR. JENNER: Great. We'll do a second very
- 16 quick round.
- 17 A Okay.

18 FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR. JENNER:

- 19 Q MR. JENNER: I don't have anymore
- 20 operational questions. I have standard questions
- about -- unrelated to this. One area is just what
- your schedule is, your work schedule. Can you tell
- 23 me what days you had worked prior to coming in on
- 24 Monday?
- 25 A Prior to coming in on Monday, I would have worked
- the previous Friday.
- 27 Q Do you have Saturdays and Sundays as your normal

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l		days off?
2	A	That's correct.
3	Q	I have some questions about your health and
4		fitness. Are you overall healthy?
5	A	Yes.
6	Q	Do you have any preexisting conditions, medical
7		conditions?
8	A	No.
9	Q	Are you taking any prescription or nonprescription
10		medications?
11	A	No.
12	Ç	Have you ever been diagnosed with sleep problems or
13		sleep disorder?
14	A	No.
15	Ç	I know you were were you awakened when you got
16		the initial call at home?
17	A	Yes.

- 18 Q And you were not able to get back to sleep until
- 19 you -- well, were you able to get back to sleep?
- 20 A I believe I dozed off a bit, but it was pretty
- close to -- you know, within -- time to get up soon
- 22 anyway, so...
- 23 Q How did you feel when you made it in to work and
- started your day?
- 25 A Good, normal.
- 26 Q Okay. Okay, thank you for that.
- 27 MR. JENNER: Karen?

1 MS. BUTLER: Just one.

- 2 FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS. BUTLER:
- 3 Q MS. BUTLER: Did they offer you any
- 4 explanation from the controller's perspective on
- 5 why he started the pump when he did?
- 6 A Only that there was enough pressure there to start
- 7 the pump.
- 8 Q Okay.
- 9 MS. BUTLER: Okay, thank you.
- 10 MR. JENNER: Rick, do you have any?
- 11 MR. GULSTAD: No.
- 12 MR. JENNER: Curt, anything else?
- 13 MR. GOESON: No.
- 14 CLOSING BY MR. JENNER:
- 15 MR. JENNER: Terrific. I'd like to thank
- 16 you for coming in and talking to us. We do
- appreciate the information.

18 I know people will go back and have done some 19 reflection on this and will continue to do so. If 20 you can think of anything at this time in terms of 21 any changes or revisions, any equipment or anything 22 that could make -- help prevent this situation from 23 happening again, we'd love to hear from you. Do 24 you have any thoughts about that? A I would prefer to go through our internal review 26 first and get everything laid out before I make any

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kind of recommendation.

1	MR. JENNER: I appreciate that. If you do,
2	if something comes to mind, I encourage you to talk
3	to officials, and we'd be happy to hear from you as
4	well. We're trying to make this system as safe as
5	possible as well. So we'll look forward to hearing
6	any suggestions you have.
7	A Absolutely.
8	MR. JENNER: Do you have any questions for
9	us?
10	A I do not, no.
11	MR. JENNER: Again, thank you very much,
12	and this interview is concluded.
13	
14	PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 10:27 A.M.
15	
16	
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A.C.E. Reporting Services Inc.

1	CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT
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3	
4	
5	I, the undersigned, hereby certify that the
6	foregoing pages are a true and faithful transcript
7	of the proceedings taken down by me in shorthand and
8	transcribed from my shorthand notes to the best of my
9	skill and ability.
10	Dated at the City of Edmonton, Province of
11	Alberta, this 11th day of August, 2010.
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18	C. L. Stabbler, CSR(A)
19	Court Reporter
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*
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ENBRIDGE OIL SPILL,	* Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN	*
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Diagon	
Interview of: BLAINE REI	NBOCI
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Date:	

NO CHANGES

NTSB Action Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007

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14	Blain Remt
15	SEAT. 01/10
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