

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN

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Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007

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Interview of: THERESA MACDONALD

Crowne Plaza Hotel
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada

Wednesday,
February 1, 2012

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MATTHEW NICHOLSON
Investigator-in-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and
Hazardous Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

BARRY STRAUCH, Ph.D.
Supervisory Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

KAREN BUTLER, Supervisor
Accident Investigations
PHMSA

[REDACTED]

JAY JOHNSON, Supervisor
U.S. Compliance
Enbridge Pipelines

[REDACTED]

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Theresa Macdonald:		
By Dr. Strauch		5
By Ms. Butler		17
By Mr. Johnson		25
By Mr. Nicholson		27
By Dr. Strauch		28

I N T E R V I E W

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2 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. This is NTSB Pipeline Case No.
3 DCA10MP007, Enbridge Energy, July 2010, crude oil release in
4 Marshall, Michigan. These are the Human Factors Group interviews
5 being conducted at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Edmonton, Alberta,
6 Canada. Today is Wednesday, February 1st, 2012.

7 This interview is being recorded for transcription at a
8 later date. Copies of the transcripts will be provided to the
9 parties and the witness for review once completed.

10 For the record, Theresa, please state your full name,
11 with spelling, employer name, and job title.

12 MS. MACDONALD: Theresa Macdonald, T-H-E-R-E-S-A, M-A-C-
13 D-O-N-A-L-D. I'm currently retired.

14 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. And you have already provided me
15 your contact information. I appreciate that. Theresa, you're
16 allowed to have one other person of your choice present during
17 this interview. This other person may be an attorney, friend,
18 family member, coworker, or no one at all. If you would for the
19 record, please indicate whom you've chosen to be present.

20 MS. MACDONALD: No one.

21 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. We'll go around the room now and
22 have each person introduce themselves for the record. My name is
23 Matthew Nicholson, M-A-T-T-H-E-W, N-I-C-H-O-L-S-O-N. I am the
24 NTSB IIC. My phone number is [REDACTED]. My e-mail is

25 [REDACTED]

1 MR. JOHNSON: Jay Johnson, Enbridge, Supervisor of U.S.
2 Compliance, [REDACTED]

3 MS. BUTLER: Karen Butler, K-A-R-E-N, B-U-T-L-E-R. I am
4 the Supervisor of Accident Investigations for PHMSA, which is the
5 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]. I can be reached at [REDACTED],
7 and [REDACTED]

8 DR. STRAUCH: I'm Barry Strauch with the NTSB. That's
9 B-A-R-R-Y, S-T-R-A-U-C-H. The phone number is [REDACTED], and
10 my email is [REDACTED]

11 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Theresa, these are Human Factors
12 interviews and Barry Strauch is the group chair, so I think we'll
13 lead off with his questions. Why don't you go ahead, Barry.

14 DR. STRAUCH: Okay.

15 INTERVIEW OF THERESA MACDONALD

16 BY DR. STRAUCH:

17 Q. Theresa, I know you've been interviewed before. Did we
18 go through your background and experience at that time?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. Just to summarize briefly, how long did you work
21 at Enbridge?

22 A. 31 ½ years.

23 Q. And when did you begin as a controller, a pipeline
24 controller?

25 A. 1981.

1 Q. And your last job at Enbridge was?

2 A. Pipeline operator.

3 Q. Okay. And when did you leave Enbridge or when did you
4 retire?

5 A. November 31st.

6 Q. Of?

7 A. 2011.

8 Q. Okay. In that time, other than growth of the control
9 center, what kind of changes did you see in the way things were
10 run in the control room?

11 A. We -- of course, we had all kinds of new technology
12 coming in at all times which made it easier for us to do our jobs
13 and just general -- it was always different growths, like new
14 control systems, just all kinds of stuff like that.

15 Q. Okay. Did you see any changes in the nature of the
16 supervision at Enbridge?

17 A. Certainly, as we grew. Like when I first started, there
18 was like five people in the room. There was four operators and
19 one supervisor. And so by the time I was done, there was like 25
20 people in the room and like two supervisors in the room at all
21 times.

22 So I think basically what happened was, when I first
23 started, we always had our supervisors to go to if -- you know, if
24 there was a problem or some kind of thing like that. As the years
25 went on and we got more experience, of course, we would handle

1 most of those problems ourselves, and so we weren't using our
2 supervisors as much as we did in the past. So basically, unless
3 something really bad was going on, we really -- you know, we
4 pretty well looked after everything ourselves.

5 Q. Okay. And how did the supervisors change other than the
6 fact that there were fewer of them relative to the number of
7 operators? Did they change in any way in addition to the fact
8 that you had gained more experience? Did you see -- did they
9 treat people differently? Did they manage people differently than
10 when you started?

11 A. Well, I think as I personally got more experience, they
12 would -- you know, we were -- they were more comfortable with us
13 making our own decisions and stuff like that --

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. -- so basically their job was more of -- became more as
16 reporting to like their supervisors and like -- rather than, you
17 know, getting hands on and stuff like that unless there was a
18 problem. If there was a problem, they would certainly be there
19 hands on and doing whatever they could to help us solve whatever
20 the problem was.

21 Q. Okay. Did you have any negative experiences at all with
22 supervisors in general?

23 A. Not really, no. Like every once in awhile, there'd be
24 disagreements on certain things, but it's always something we came
25 around to agree on and make the best decision.

1 Q. Okay. How would you characterize the operating
2 environment in the control room?

3 A. Now or --

4 Q. Let's say at the time of the accident.

5 A. At the time of the accident? There was a lot of new
6 people --

7 Q. Um-hum.

8 A. -- and there was a lot of training going on at all the
9 different consoles, like terminal and pipeline. It seemed like we
10 were growing too fast for my opinion, but -- you know, there was
11 people that were very stressed out with all the training and stuff
12 that was going on. Like it was constant and it was, you know,
13 very stressful at times.

14 Q. Now how would this increased training stress people out?

15 A. Well, just because you were expected to do your job plus
16 train someone else.

17 Q. Um-hum.

18 A. Plus there was other factors. Once you got up into the
19 number of years I'd been there, there would be certain other
20 things you were expected to do, certain projects you were expected
21 to take on, and that kind of thing either through training or
22 developing new ways to do stuff or things like that. So, you
23 know, it just got -- it's very stressful, especially in the last
24 year there, when we were doing all the work.

25 So on the lines that I was running, of course, we would

1 get 15 to 20 phone calls every morning for people that are working
2 on the line and we had to make sure that we kept in contact with
3 them if anything ever happened, so we would have to make all those
4 phone calls plus still doing all the other stuff we had to do.
5 Like it just -- it was very busy.

6 Q. Now what kinds of projects were you working on in
7 addition to serving as a pipeline operator at the time of the
8 accident?

9 A. I was working on a project to -- I don't know how to put
10 this. Basically, what I was doing was taking the pipe tags of
11 every batch that went into the system on my line and graphing them
12 out so that you could follow them as they went down the line, so
13 that's what I was -- I was developing this program.

14 Q. Were you asked to do that?

15 A. It came of interest to me because they did it manually
16 on line 1. Like every time a batch would get shipped on line 1,
17 the operator would have to build this graph, and I thought well,
18 you know what, we -- this is the 20th century, we can get our
19 computers to do this for us. We just have to get all the
20 information that we need for them to -- because all the pipe tags
21 are in the system already, so I just had wanted to develop a
22 program that would graph them, put them in graph form, and then I
23 could lay it on my terminal operator's desk and say, okay, here
24 are the batches that were pumped out today, here are the batches
25 that you're going to be receiving today, this is what they looked

1 like when they were pumped out so they would have a better idea of
2 where to cut the batches.

3 Q. Okay. So, you kind of volunteered for that?

4 A. Um-hum. Well, it was -- yeah basically, yeah.

5 Q. Okay. And how -- given the responsibilities of the
6 pipelines, how were you able to work on that and control the flow
7 at the same time?

8 A. Well, if your line is running nice and steady and
9 everything's going great, then you have a little bit of extra
10 time, and it was already in our console. It's like the computers
11 are right there, so it's not like you could, you know, miss an
12 alarm or anything like that because you were sitting right there
13 watching your pipeline as you were doing these kind of things.

14 Q. And what pipelines were you operating at the time?

15 A. Line 6, line 3, line 17, and I also operated line 4 and
16 line 14.

17 Q. So if you had the time, assuming things were running in
18 a steady state to work on this additional project, that means your
19 workload was okay? How would you characterize your workload?

20 A. It would -- like I said, if the lines were running
21 great, we had a little extra time because we also had our CMT to
22 do and the training to do. But, you know, if you had your trainee
23 doing the CMT and your lines were nice and steady, then you could
24 get on the other computer and do some work.

25 Q. Now at the time of the accident, you were in a training

1 capacity as well --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- correct? You were training Dave Stock (ph.)?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And he had been full-time as a trainee for like, I
6 think, several weeks before the accident?

7 A. Um-hum.

8 Q. How did that affect your workload?

9 A. It wasn't so bad with Dave because he was already a
10 pipeline operator. He had just been off for a year with an
11 illness. So, it wasn't like he didn't know what he was doing. He
12 did. He just more so needed help with some of the newer aspects
13 that were coming in like the newer programs that we had and that
14 kind of thing. So basically, he was a qualified operator. So,
15 you know, just teaching him the new stuff and that kind of thing
16 and, you know, making sure that he wasn't getting exhausted and
17 that kind of thing.

18 Q. Okay. So it sounds like it didn't overtly increase your
19 workload that much, working with Dave.

20 A. At certain times because I was -- because his illness
21 was quite bad. Like he died. I mean it was scary. We were
22 worried about the fact that he was getting back into shift work
23 and stuff like that. We wanted to make sure he wasn't getting
24 exhausted, so I was keeping a close eye on how he was handling
25 things and if he was getting frustrated with stuff and that kind

1 of thing, but I wouldn't say it was -- it was easier than if I'd
2 had a brand new trainee who knew nothing at all. That's for sure.

3 Q. Were you on the same shift as Ghazal Derhami and Tim
4 Chubb?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Okay. Did you -- had you had an occasion to work with
7 them or observe them?

8 A. Oh, yes, um-hum.

9 Q. Okay. How would you characterize -- let's start with
10 Tim. What kind of operator was he?

11 A. Tim was very careful, very meticulous. Like he took a
12 long -- he took his time doing stuff to make sure that it was
13 correct and that kind of thing. Ghazal, I have never worked --
14 like I actually trained Tim when he first came in, so I knew what
15 kind of work he was. Ghazal, I never actually watched her operate
16 or trained with her or anything like that, so she seemed a little
17 more nervous. Like Tim would be like -- because Tim was so
18 methodical. He would get nervous, but he would work himself back
19 into calming down about it and just relaxing, and I found that she
20 was a little more high-strung and seemed to get a little bit more
21 excited about stuff she didn't really need to.

22 Q. Okay. What kind of reputation did each of them have?

23 A. As far as I know, as far as Tim goes for sure because I
24 worked with him more than I did with Ghazal, he had a reputation
25 of being very meticulous, like I said. And as far as Ghazal, like

1 I said, she was a little bit more excitable and possibly a little
2 bit more vocal in her thoughts on things I guess.

3 Q. Do you think as a result of being more vocal, there was
4 any -- she was treated any differently than anybody else?

5 A. I don't think so. As far as I know, she wasn't.

6 Q. As a woman working in the control room, did you
7 experience any differences in the way men were treated?

8 A. When I first -- I was the second woman that ever worked
9 in that control room, so when I first started there, there was a
10 definite difference, but over the years, it's changed a lot and we
11 were pretty well all treated the same.

12 Q. Okay. So by the time of the accident, how would you
13 characterize the way women were treated as compared to how men
14 were treated in the control room?

15 A. Basically the same.

16 Q. Okay. What about people who were vocal, were they
17 treated any differently than people who weren't?

18 A. I don't really think so. They may have had more -- how
19 can I put this? They may have had more influence on the other
20 operators because they would -- you know, if they didn't feel
21 something was right, then they would definitely vocalize it, and
22 so it was better that way, I thought, than somebody thinking
23 something's not right and not saying anything at all about it --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- that kind of thing, so --

1 Q. Okay. Did you ever observe supervisors criticize
2 operators?

3 A. Not in a group, I don't think, no. Like I think
4 individually, they did during our appraisals and stuff like that,
5 but --

6 Q. What I'm getting at is did you see anybody being
7 criticized in front of others?

8 A. I didn't, no.

9 Q. Did you hear of such things?

10 A. Oh, I've heard of such things, yes.

11 Q. Did it occur among particular supervisors or just in
12 general?

13 A. I think just in general.

14 Q. Okay. And what was the result of that?

15 A. There was some anger about it, of course, because -- I
16 mean nobody should be criticized in front of other people. I
17 don't -- if they got a problem with it, they should be taken into
18 the back room and spoke to if there's a problem. So anybody
19 saying anything in front of all the people you work with is not a
20 good thing, so there was a little bit of dissension that way with
21 certain people, yes.

22 Q. Okay. Did you see that happen to some people more than
23 others?

24 A. I don't really think so because basically, if -- like I
25 said, if there was a problem, you definitely heard that, you know,

1 oh, I just got called into the back room and that kind of thing,
2 but I don't think there was any people that were particularly, you
3 know, made over and over and over again as far as I could see.

4 Q. In the time you were there, did the -- was there a
5 change in the degree to which controllers could say that they did
6 not wish to operate a line and wanted to shut it down?

7 A. We had that choice at all times.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. If we didn't feel something was right, we had the choice
10 to shut it down, and then we would take it to our supervisor and
11 say okay, this is what I see, this is why I shut it down, that
12 kind of thing.

13 Q. And what was their reaction when you did that?

14 A. They basically would -- they would honor our decision to
15 do that.

16 Q. Was there any change in the way they reacted over time
17 to controllers' desires to shut a line down or not to operate it?

18 A. I don't think so, not that I really felt. Like no one
19 ever -- I never got into any trouble for ever shutting a pipeline
20 down.

21 Q. Okay. Did others?

22 A. I don't know. I --

23 Q. Okay. If somebody say your daughter's age or someone
24 wanted to do what you did and be a controller at Enbridge, what
25 advice would you give them?

1 A. I think I would advise them to take some engineering --
2 some kind of engineering programming and -- to get a real
3 understanding of how it works. Like when I was trained at
4 Enbridge, it was right there. You were immediately put in front
5 of the pipeline, and then, you know, there was -- the hydraulics
6 and stuff came later, right, but as, you know, starting out, we
7 were just put in front of the pipeline and whoever was training us
8 was telling us what we were seeing and what we were supposed to be
9 looking for and that kind of thing. But nowadays, the kids that
10 are going into there, they have a lot more knowledge of the actual
11 hydraulics and the -- even before they sit in front of a console,
12 so they definitely have an advantage to what we did.

13 Q. Now, when you retired from Enbridge, was it something
14 you wanted to do at the time it happened or your schedule changed?

15 A. It was definitely something I wanted to do. I've got a
16 lot of golfing to do and -- I'm currently working at a -- for the
17 spring season, I'm working at a greenhouse because I've always
18 been a gardener and it's always been an interest of mine, so yeah,
19 I was looking forward to it.

20 Q. And was this the time that you had planned on retiring
21 all along?

22 A. I hadn't really made the decision, but then I thought,
23 why not, this is -- why not go when I can go, so --

24 Q. Could you have gone earlier than this?

25 A. No, no. That was when my -- I had my 85, so --

1 Q. Okay. All right. I have no further questions.

2 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Karen?

3 BY MS. BUTLER:

4 Q. Theresa, would you consider yourself vocal?

5 A. I was very vocal, yes.

6 Q. Okay. And do you think that your input was listened to
7 much?

8 A. Absolutely, especially towards the last few years
9 because like I had a lot of experience and a lot of things that a
10 lot of people hadn't even seen before. I had been able to, you
11 know, talk to people about it and say well, you know, like the
12 loops and that kind of thing that, you know, the new kids didn't
13 even know anything about.

14 Q. Okay. So do you think in the control room there was a
15 tendency to listen to those that were experienced more than those
16 that weren't experienced?

17 A. It would depend on what the subject was. Like if it had
18 anything to do with the pipeline as far as, you know, things that
19 happened and that kind of thing, then the operator definitely with
20 more experience would know a lot more about that. But then some
21 of the younger kids had more of a concept as far as the hydraulics
22 and how the electricals work and that kind of thing, so -- and the
23 new programs. Like they were -- like they'd snap those new
24 programs and learn them so fast whereas us old guys were kind of
25 like -- we were a little slower at it than the kids, so we, of

1 course -- if it had anything to do with that kind of stuff we
2 would, of course, you know, ask them about it, get them to show us
3 stuff and --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I think it was very interactive both ways.

6 Q. Okay. What about shift leads. Did you notice any
7 difference about how they were receptive to input or not, were
8 there some that were more than others?

9 A. I suppose there were some that were more than others.
10 Some -- how can I put this without sounding too bad? There were
11 some that agreed with the concept that, you know, the longer you
12 worked there the more experience you have, then, you know, being
13 more likely to listen to them, and some had, you know, kind of
14 abrasive attitudes and some like that, so you had to kind of --
15 how should I put this, kind of watch how you approached them about
16 certain things.

17 Q. Okay. You've mentioned that you always had the freedom
18 to shut down.

19 A. Um-hum.

20 Q. Do you feel that you were ever pushed to restart
21 quickly?

22 A. Sometimes, especially on line 3 they would -- because it
23 was such a hard line to run and that kind of thing, but they would
24 let us take our time. We could -- nobody ever said okay, you have
25 to be faster at that or anything like that.

1 Q. So when you said line 3 was difficult, what do you think
2 made it difficult?

3 A. Just the fact of the pressure restrictions we had and --
4 like any line, it went right through a return, so it was like you
5 wanted to be really careful when you were starting up so that you
6 weren't pressuring any cases and, you know, just basically the
7 configuration of the whole line.

8 Q. Okay. So if I were to ask you what consoles in the room
9 were the most difficult or you would really struggle with running
10 it, you knew that you would need more experience to run that
11 console --

12 A. They all had their own peculiar difficulties. Like line
13 1, we were running MGLs and crudes, so that had its own problems.
14 And line 5, of course, had a huge hill and -- like they all had
15 their own different things.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Like at one point we used to operate all the pipelines,
18 so we would come in and go through all of them, so I've ran line
19 2, I've ran line 5, and each one has their own peculiar problems.

20 Q. Okay. When it comes to MBS alarms, have you seen MBS
21 alarms clear frequently?

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. So just an MBS alarm coming in and then clearing on its
24 own wouldn't be something that would cause you to think this is
25 outside of the norm?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Okay. Have you ever known anybody to request a change
3 regarding their pod mate?

4 A. Not really, not that I know of. I don't know if anybody
5 didn't work with me or not.

6 Q. Okay. That's fine. Did you -- have you had a chance to
7 read or see Enbridge's internal accident investigation?

8 A. No, I have not.

9 Q. Okay. And these last three questions are kind of
10 connected with what was going on on that day or how the responses
11 are looking in hindsight.

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. Do you remember at all being busy with any line 4
14 activities on July the 26th?

15 A. There were some -- there was a shutdown I believe and
16 there was some action going on on line 4. I wasn't paying that
17 much attention to it because I wasn't running it. But they were
18 -- they seemed like they were fairly busy.

19 Q. Did you have to fill in for anybody on any -- or take
20 any field calls that you remember on line 4?

21 A. For line 4? I don't remember, no.

22 Q. Okay. So as far as you know you didn't have to step in
23 for a period of time while somebody took a break or --

24 A. Not that I know of, no.

25 Q. Okay. All right. Is there anything in hindsight after

1 you've left these interviews that you've had time to reflect on
2 that you wish you could tell us or that you wished we'd asked
3 about?

4 A. We would certainly like to -- like I would love to read
5 the report that Enbridge has put out about the accident because
6 that's something we -- you know, we don't -- we knew what was
7 happening and we got information as to how the cleanup was going
8 and all that kind of stuff, but as far as, you know, anything else
9 we weren't given any information about that. It just seemed like
10 nobody seemed to know what was going on or how long the
11 investigation was going to take. Like it would have been nice to
12 have a little bit more of that information.

13 Q. When they came in and pulled everybody off shift right
14 away were you surprised by that?

15 A. I was, yes.

16 Q. Was that typical or not or have you seen anything
17 similar?

18 A. They had just started doing the testing whereas if you
19 had an incident you would be replaced on the line and go for the
20 test, like the blood test, so they'd only been implementing that
21 for about oh, maybe -- I guess maybe a year or so before this, so
22 it was a new thing. It was stressful when it happened, that kind
23 of thing, but you didn't have to worry about it that much really.

24 Q. Okay. So when they pulled other people off the consoles
25 they typically leave them out of the control room for so long --

1 A. No.

2 Q. -- or do they just train them with the --

3 A. Just they would have a -- go through a bunch of --
4 basically what would happen was if there was an instant and they
5 were taken off the line, they'd go for their test. They'd come
6 back in the next day or something and go through all the steps
7 that you go through to qualify yourself back as an operator.

8 Q. So, did anybody ever explain to you why this was one was
9 different?

10 A. I think it was just the size and the circumstances, but
11 nobody actually sat us down and said okay, this is why we're doing
12 it this way. Basically it was we don't know anything and until we
13 do this is the way it has to be kind of.

14 Q. Did anything about who was pulled off of the shift or
15 who was pulled out of the control room seem odd to you?

16 A. There were a couple of odd things that happened. The
17 fellow that was on MBS the day after the line was shut down, he
18 was never pulled off his job. He just went to a different job,
19 and I really feel that his impact on what was going on that day
20 was probably crucial because he'd been there almost as long as I
21 had and he was talking to an operator that only had a few years
22 in, so I'm pretty sure he influenced what was going on that day --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- so I don't think -- I think he should have been
25 treated the very same way as the rest of us was.

1 Q. Okay. What about anything else? You said a couple of
2 things happened.

3 A. I didn't understand why they kept the supervisors off as
4 long as they did.

5 Q. Okay. Meaning shift leads, is that who --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. I really thought they would be going back to work a lot
9 sooner than we were.

10 Q. Okay. And did they go back to work sooner than you did?

11 A. Not as far as I know. They're still not.

12 Q. Okay. All right. Anything else strike you as odd about
13 it?

14 A. Just the fact that they did -- they -- the thing was
15 they restricted our movements as far as they encouraged us not to
16 go into the control room, and they would not let us do any
17 training which was a failed opportunity as far as I'm concerned
18 because we could have done a whole year of training for them, that
19 kind of thing. Like they just really would not let us get
20 involved with anything that was going on in the control center.

21 Q. Do you think there was any one thing that led to that
22 decision or any one person that made that decision?

23 A. I really don't know how they came up with that.

24 Q. All right. So, they never explained it to you?

25 A. No.

1 Q. All right. Okay. So, one last question. So many
2 people over multiple shifts looked at this and didn't see it as a
3 leak. Can you -- is there any one thing that stands out to you
4 that is the answer to why?

5 A. We didn't see it -- Dave and I didn't see it as a leak
6 because the alarms went in and then cleared. What happened the
7 next day where they pumped into it for so long, now I think I
8 would have been saying, you know, why are we doing this, why are
9 we -- it's not a low area, why are we pumping into this for so
10 long and not shutting it down and finding out what's going on, but
11 that's just what I would ask.

12 Knowing Tim, the way he is, he would have started the
13 line and watched it and watched it, and then he would have got
14 other people involved, and it's the other people that would have
15 been making the decisions after that point.

16 Q. So you think Tim would have relied on the shift leads --

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. -- the MBS analysts to make that decision?

19 A. Absolutely, yes.

20 Q. Okay. Any further thoughts through the starting process
21 or --

22 A. Well, like I was saying, Jim who was on MBS that day, he
23 has a lot of pipeline experience and a lot of operating experience
24 before he went to MBS. I think even the shift leads that were on
25 that day would have deferred to what he said.

1 Q. Okay. Do you have any thought as to why he was
2 convinced it wasn't a leak?

3 A. I have no idea. I haven't talked to him since the
4 incident.

5 Q. Okay. All right, fair enough. I think that's all I
6 had.

7 MR. NICHOLSON: Jay?

8 BY MR. JOHNSON:

9 Q. Yeah. Hi. I have one question. Thank God Barry asked
10 it. So if someone was going to start at the Enbridge control
11 center you thought if they had some engineering and hydraulic
12 background, which a lot of them do because they come out of with a
13 certification, but based on your experience on the Enbridge
14 control center would you recommend someone -- if they called you
15 and said geez, I'm thinking of applying as a control center
16 operator what would you say?

17 A. Well, I think it would depend on what kind of person
18 they were because you have to be a certain -- you have to have a
19 certain edge to be a good pipeline operator, and if you're very
20 nervous or, you know, that kind of person, it's going to drive you
21 crazy because it is so intense at times that you're -- you know,
22 and you have to be really practical and, you know, that kind of
23 thing, don't get panicked and that kind of thing, so --

24 I do think that some of the people that they hired in
25 the last few years are a little bit too -- I don't want to say

1 high-strung. They just don't have the calmness that you need.
2 Like you can't panic. It's not a -- it's got to be a person that
3 doesn't panic that makes a good pipeline operator because if you
4 panic you just make it worse. But yeah, I would recommend it to
5 people I thought could handle the pressure and that kind of thing,
6 sure.

7 Q. Okay. And then when you were -- am I correct you were
8 qualifying Tim for training? So you were --

9 A. Oh, no. I was training Dave Stock,

10 Q. Dave. Excuse me. I got the name wrong.

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. See, I knew that, too. So you were qualifying him. So
13 that's basically two experienced operators were running the line
14 at the time?

15 A. Um-hum, yes.

16 Q. Were you ever aware of a line, I'll say, releasing on
17 shutdown in the past?

18 A. On shutdown? I've seen it happen on the startups. I
19 haven't really seen one on a shutdown --

20 Q. So the fact that it --

21 A. -- but it had happened for sure.

22 Q. It appears that that's what happened, so it's nothing
23 that -- you know, a fair number of years in the control center
24 that you'd ever -- no one had ever seen or had shared with you?

25 A. Oh, I'm not saying no one had ever seen it. I just -- I

1 personally have not experienced it.

2 Q. And then probably Dave either? Of course, you can't
3 speak for Dave, so that's not a fair question.

4 A. No, I can't speak for Dave, so I don't know.

5 Q. Okay. That's all I had.

6 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

7 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

8 Q. You mentioned the MBS analyst wasn't taken out of the
9 control room. You said he was moved to another job.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Do you know what that other job or position was?

12 A. It was something to do in the MBS area.

13 Q. In the control center?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Okay. Now --

16 A. No. It was in like a totally different building.

17 That's why I said I hadn't spoke to him since the incident because
18 he was over in this other building and we didn't have contact with
19 him.

20 Q. Okay. Karen asked you a question about looking back on
21 it and what you could have done different, and I heard you say
22 that you didn't -- Dave and you hadn't taken any action because
23 the MBS alarm cleared, but I didn't hear any reference to the
24 pressures. Was there anything you wanted to add to looking back,
25 having known that you had low pressures there? Was there anything

1 --

2 A. Well, the thing is --

3 Q. -- should have triggered with you?

4 A. I think the reason we didn't look at it more than what
5 we would have -- like if that alarm hadn't of cleared then we
6 definitely would have looked at it more --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- because then we would have been questioning well, why
9 is this alarm here, but it cleared like within, I don't know, 30
10 seconds or something. Like it was very fast. It came and then it
11 cleared and we never got any more.

12 Q. I see. So the fact that the MBS alarm cleared negated
13 you looking into any kind of pressures or --

14 A. Um-hum, pretty well.

15 Q. -- questioning the pressures?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay, good. That's all I have.

18 MR. NICHOLSON: Barry, you want to --

19 DR. STRAUCH: Yes. I have just a couple of follow-up
20 questions.

21 BY DR. STRAUCH:

22 Q. Have you been in contact with Dave since the incident?

23 A. Dave and I had lunch mid-December.

24 Q. How do you characterize the way both of you were treated
25 by Enbridge after the accident?

1 A. Well, I guess we thought they were doing what they had
2 -- what they felt they had to do. I feel like they didn't utilize
3 us as much as they could have. I mean for that whole year that we
4 did administrative duty we could have been doing training and we
5 could have been doing -- I mean they wouldn't let me work on my
6 project for a good four months, and then I finally said well, why
7 can't I continue working on this project that I was working on
8 before, I can get this, you know, settled. I'd been working on it
9 for two years because, like I said, you only worked on it when you
10 had a little bit of time, so it was taking a long time and I was
11 working with one of the computer guys to get everything set up for
12 me and that kind of thing.

13 Like they could have let me work on that full-time
14 rather than, you know, they got me doing just administrative stuff
15 and getting new books for the new control center and that kind of
16 thing. Dave they had working on some kind of training game or
17 something. Like they just did not use our experience to their
18 advantage as far as I'm concerned.

19 Q. And if they had used your experience or Dave's
20 experience the way you felt they should have where you really
21 could have contributed something, would you have retired when you
22 did?

23 A. Possibly not.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I just didn't feel like I was doing anything useful, so,

1 you know, why should I be going there every day just to do silly
2 -- I mean I'm not a secretary. Sorry.

3 Q. That's -- yeah, I'd agree with that. Do you think you,
4 Dave or any of the other people involved were made sort of
5 scapegoats for that?

6 A. I don't know what's happened with the other guys. I
7 know Dave and I are both retired now, so -- like I said, I haven't
8 read the report or what they -- what came out of it, so I don't
9 know whether they used us as scapegoats or not.

10 Q. Why do you feel -- do you feel you were used as a
11 scapegoat?

12 A. It's possible, yeah.

13 Q. But if you could assign responsibility for this who
14 would you assign it to?

15 A. Personally I think it's MBS.

16 Q. In particular Jim Knudson?

17 A. Well, not particularly, no, the whole system, the whole
18 MBS system.

19 Q. Okay. And what is it about the system that you would
20 assign responsibility for?

21 A. Well, because of the fact that it cleared the alarm. It
22 should never had cleared the alarm, right? If that alarm hadn't
23 cleared -- like I said, if that alarm hadn't cleared we would have
24 been looking at that a lot closer the day -- like as soon as it
25 happened rather than that they never would have got started up for

1 sure until someone was out there walking it. If that alarm hadn't
2 cleared it would have been so different.

3 Q. And in talking to Dave, I know it's unfair to ask you to
4 speak with him, but do you think he's feel the same way you do
5 about this, what we just talked about?

6 A. I think so.

7 Q. Okay. And one final question. I know you were -- well,
8 were you interviewed by Enbridge people as part of the internal
9 investigation?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. And were you assured confidentiality of your
12 response during the interview?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In any way do you feel that that assurance of
15 confidentiality was violated?

16 A. No, I don't.

17 Q. Okay. I have no further questions.

18 MS. BUTLER: I don't think I do either.

19 MR. JOHNSON: No.

20 MR. NICHOLSON: No. Still no? Okay. I guess with that
21 we'll conclude this interview. Thanks so much, Theresa.

22 MS. MACDONALD: You're welcome.

23 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN
 MARSHALL, MICHIGAN
 Interview of Theresa Macdonald

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PLACE: Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

DATE: February 1, 2012

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Cheryl L. Phipps
Transcriber