

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

\* \* \* \* \*

Investigation of:

\*

\*

ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN  
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN

\*

\*

\*

Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007

\* \* \* \* \*

Interview of: STUART HORAN

Crowne Plaza Hotel  
Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada

Thursday,  
February 2, 2012

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MATTHEW NICHOLSON  
Investigator-in-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge  
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and  
Hazardous Materials Investigations  
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

BARRY STRAUCH, Ph.D.  
Supervisory Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

KALU KELLY EMEABA, Group Chair  
SCADA Operations  
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

KAREN BUTLER, Supervisor  
Accident Investigations  
PHMSA

[REDACTED]

JAY JOHNSON, Supervisor  
U.S. Compliance  
Enbridge Pipelines

[REDACTED]

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>I N D E X</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Stuart Horan:		
By Dr. Strauch		6
By Ms. Butler		18
By Dr. Strauch		22
By Ms. Butler		24
By Mr. Nicholson		28
By Dr. Strauch		32
By Ms. Butler		35
By Mr. Nicholson		37
By Ms. Butler		38

I N T E R V I E W

1  
2 MR. NICHOLSON: This is NTSB pipeline case number DCA-  
3 10-MP-007, Enbridge Energy July 2010 crude oil release in  
4 Marshall, Michigan. These are the Human Factors Group interviews  
5 being conducted at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Edmonton, Alberta,  
6 Canada. Today is Thursday, February 2nd, 2012.

7 This interview is being recorded for transcription at a  
8 later date. Copies of the transcripts will be provided to the  
9 parties and the witness for review once completed.

10 For the record, Stu, please state your full name with  
11 spelling, employer name, and job title.

12 MR. HORAN: Stuart Horan, S-t-u-a-r-t, H-o-r-a-n, and  
13 I'm a control center operator.

14 MR. NICHOLSON: And you're employed with Enbridge?

15 MR. HORAN: Enbridge Pipelines, yes.

16 MR. NICHOLSON: And you spelled your name, right?

17 MR. HORAN: Yes.

18 MR. NICHOLSON: Thank you. Stu, for the record, please  
19 provide a contact phone number and e-mail address.

20 MR. HORAN: E-mail address is [REDACTED] (ph.)  
21 and [REDACTED].

22 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Stu, you're allowed to have one  
23 other person of your choice present during this interview. This  
24 other person may be an attorney, friend, family member, co-worker,  
25 or no one at all. If you would, please indicate whom you've

1 chosen to be present during this interview.

2 MR. HORAN: I'm fine by myself, I guess.

3 MR. NICHOLSON: Yourself. No one else? Okay.

4 All right. We'll go around the room at this time and  
5 have each person introduce themselves for the record. My name is  
6 Matthew Nicholson. That's spelled M-a-t-t-h-e-w, N-i-c-h-o-l-s-o-  
7 n. I am the NTSB IIC. My phone number is [REDACTED]. My e-  
8 mail is [REDACTED].

9 MR. EMEABA: My name is Kalu Kelly Emeaba, spelled K-a-  
10 l-u, K-e-l-l-y, E-m-e-a-b-a. I'm the SCADA Operation Group Chair.  
11 My contact number is [REDACTED] and my e-mail address is

12 [REDACTED]

13 MR. JOHNSON: I'm Jay Johnson, Enbridge, Supervisor of  
14 U.S. Compliance, [REDACTED]

15 MS. BUTLER: Karen Butler, K-a-r-e-n, B-u-t-l-e-r. I am  
16 the PHMSA, which is the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety  
17 Administration, Supervisor of Accident Investigations, [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]. I can be reached at

19 [REDACTED].

20 DR. STRAUCH: I'm Barry Strauch with the NTSB, B-a-r-r-  
21 y, S-t-r-a-u-c-h. My e-mail is [REDACTED]. My phone number  
22 is [REDACTED].

23 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. These are primarily human factors  
24 interviews, so we'll let Barry start the interview.

25 INTERVIEW OF STUART HORAN

1 BY DR. STRAUCH:

2 Q. Okay. Are you called Stuart or Stu?

3 A. Doesn't matter, Stuart or Stu. It doesn't matter.

4 Q. Okay. Could you kind of walk us through your  
5 experience, both before and up to the present, from the time,  
6 let's say, you finished school, kind of what positions you held  
7 and what --

8 A. I started at Enbridge. I was a mechanic for 6 months.  
9 Then I -- or it was Interprovincial Pipeline at the time. And  
10 then I transferred into the control center as a gauger. I was  
11 there for 6 months -- or I should say the terminal. I was gauger  
12 for 6 months. Then I bid into the operations and was a senior  
13 gauger at the time. That's the title it was, and I held it until  
14 I went to the control center.

15 Q. Okay. And around when did you start at Enbridge?

16 A. I started in 1980, July 2nd, 1980.

17 Q. Okay. And when did you join the control center?

18 A. Control center, was probably about 11 years ago.

19 Q. So it would have been in about 2000 or so?

20 A. Yeah, somewhere in there.

21 Q. Okay. Did you work anyplace else before you joined  
22 Enbridge in 1980?

23 A. I came from down East.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. I moved from down East and came to Alberta to find a job

1 and been here since.

2 Q. Okay. What kind of changes have you seen in the control  
3 room in the 11 years that you've been there?

4 A. I've seen positive changes and I've seen negative.

5 Q. Okay. Could you tell us some of the positive changes  
6 you've seen?

7 A. Positive changes, geez. We had -- well, when I first  
8 started, there was a -- the bosses were really good with the  
9 people. Like, there was a positive attitude. Everybody was like  
10 a -- it was like a real good team. People stood up for each  
11 other, they helped each other. It was a good atmosphere.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. And as things progressed with different management  
14 things kind of went downhill. Promises made that were not kept,  
15 you know, just -- as you all -- well, I'm sure everybody sees in  
16 companies different management. The direction was safety all the  
17 time regardless of the management.

18 At first it was like, you know, you do -- your customer  
19 is primary with the company, your integrity of your product and  
20 delivery to your customer. And then it kind of went let's get the  
21 oil out of here as fast as possible and as much as possible and  
22 that's kind of when things went downhill a bit.

23 Q. Okay. About when did this happen?

24 A. When Ian Milligan was brought in and Sonya Buys took  
25 over. It kind of like was more let's get as much oil as we can

1 out of here -- well, not as much oil, but it was -- the integrity  
2 of the product was not as crucial as it was before. They kind of  
3 like changed our way of -- philosophy of operating.

4 Q. From what to what?

5 A. Well, it was -- me, from the way I was taught, you take  
6 pride in what you do and if you -- instead of -- there was, for  
7 degradation and contamination, delivering product and that, it was  
8 like, okay, it was now you open fully before you close the valve  
9 type thing, instead of like you can start a valve, you see it  
10 traveling, you start the other valve to close, like open and close  
11 type thing.

12 Then it got to a point where because a few -- some --  
13 occasionally you had valves that failed, which you don't know  
14 whether they're going to fail or not, whether they'll show that  
15 they're open or not. They may still be closed, right, because all  
16 you're doing is relying on a piece of equipment that you're  
17 seeing. You sit here watching a screen. That doesn't mean that  
18 the equipment's actually functioning.

19 Q. Um-hum.

20 A. So all of a sudden it was like, okay, fully open, fully  
21 closed, whether they have a full tank or not, you get degradation  
22 going from one tank to the next. Okay? That's what we were told  
23 is, like, regardless of the fact, this is the way we should  
24 operate from now on. We've gotten -- we changed to where we start  
25 pumps against closed valves, which we never did in the past,



1 because new pipe has been put in. The engineering department  
2 didn't put in the right specs according to what we were told and  
3 now we have to do a little different philosophy, and they've done  
4 studies and found out that the -- some of the pipe that's been in  
5 there for years we've been overpressuring for a while because it  
6 isn't -- because of the way we've been operating, and we just find  
7 this all -- stuff out now. So --

8 Q. And Sonya and Ian both have both left supervisory  
9 positions over the control room.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. How has the new management affected the types of things  
12 that you're talking about?

13 A. It's gotten better. There's still a little -- there's a  
14 few things like, you know, like there's some intimidation for some  
15 factors. Okay? They -- do it my way or else type thing.

16 Q. And who would be the people that were intimidating  
17 others?

18 A. Well, yeah -- Blaine, Curt, you know. They have their  
19 ways of doing things, like, I mean --

20 Q. Have you ever yourself been on the receiving end of this  
21 intimidation?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Could you give us examples?

24 A. Okay. I've had a few errors and so basically I was  
25 hauled in and told that -- explain the errors and that and then to

1 sign a paper. And I says, what if I don't sign? Well, if you  
2 don't sign, then you could be fired. And on your next error you  
3 could possibly be fired. Which is fine. I mean, that's, you  
4 know. But, you know, never told that I could have somebody -- HR  
5 or anybody with me at the time when they were discussing all that  
6 stuff.

7 Q. Um-hum.

8 A. So it happened a few times. Errors -- like some errors,  
9 they'd be -- error process changed over the -- certain -- at  
10 different times. You know, there was no shared errors before.  
11 Then all of a sudden there became shared errors, and now they're  
12 not called errors, they're called near misses. So --

13 Q. Okay. I'm not sure I understand the difference between  
14 a shared error and an error.

15 A. Well, shared error, okay. I came in on shift, I had a  
16 valve open for 8 hours and one -- on a manifold. I came in. I  
17 relieved the guy. I -- and he was pumping out of a different  
18 manifold. I came in. I started to go -- I went to the new  
19 manifold to swing my batch. I noticed that there was a tank  
20 migrating because I opened a valve. I closed it immediately when  
21 I realized what was going on and went through my manifold, and I  
22 got hit with an error saying that it was my fault, yet this guy  
23 had 8 hours on his shift to see that his valve was open. I'm the  
24 one that took the full blame.

25 So then I mentioned, like, you know, I'm not the only

1 one involved in this, so nothing was -- I -- like I said, I'm the  
2 one that got the full blame. Then they changed the process so if  
3 two people are involved it was a shared error.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. And then that changed again to being, you know, as a ---  
6 not calling errors now; they call them near misses. Certain  
7 people get away with stuff; certain people don't get away with  
8 that much.

9 Q. And how would you characterize yourself? One of those  
10 who gets away, one of those that --

11 A. No, I don't get away with nothing. I'm not afraid to  
12 accept my blame. When I do something wrong, I'm more than willing  
13 to accept it and take the fall -- or not the fall, but the brunt  
14 of it because it is my error, you know, my lack of judgment or  
15 whatever you want to call it.

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. I take it. I never have backed down for anything that  
18 I've done wrong. I'll accept it.

19 Q. What do you think creates the difference between those  
20 who get away with it and those who don't?

21 A. Well, you get the outspoken ones, which I am outspoken.  
22 If I see something that I disagree with, I will voice my opinion.  
23 I may not always be right, but I'm not always wrong. It's how a  
24 person interprets what you say.

25 Q. Who have you voiced your opinion to?

1           A.    Oh, I voice it to Blaine. I've voiced it to Curt  
2 before, you know. I had a meeting with Ian and Curt -- not Ian  
3 and Curt, but Ian and Blaine when they -- at first. Like I was  
4 called at home. I had just finished my shift. I was going on  
5 holidays. I got called at home just before I went on holidays  
6 from Blaine. I had just finished a night shift and he told me  
7 that my next error I would be fired. So I go on my holidays, I  
8 come back, and he said this was directions from Ian and Sonya.  
9 Which I said, okay, fine. So then he said all I'm doing is  
10 looking out for you. And I said, okay, that's cool, you know. I  
11 go on my holidays, I come back, I go to work.

12                    So then I went to HR and I found -- I wanted to know  
13 what was going on. She told me, I'm not here to help you; I'm  
14 just here to advise you. Okay. Which is fine, but I thought HR  
15 was there to help a person. But then she said if you want, you  
16 should get a meeting with Blaine and Ian and discuss it. So I  
17 did.

18                    I went in there and then we had a meeting and I asked --  
19 and when I said it to Blaine and repeated what he told me on the  
20 phone, he says, well, you didn't -- I didn't say that. And I  
21 said, yes, you did. When you tell a person that you're going to  
22 be fired on your next error, that's pretty straightforward to me.  
23 So then he tells me I misunderstood what he said. Well, I don't  
24 think that was very misunderstood, you know.

25                    So then we discussed it and things got better. I was

1 wondering why Ian -- Ian would basically -- wouldn't really talk  
2 to anybody. He'd go in, he'd talk to the control center guys,  
3 like the CCOCs, the operators -- or not the operators, but the  
4 shift leads --

5 Q. Um-hum.

6 A. -- but he wouldn't really talk to anybody in the room.  
7 Which our previous management would come in in the mornings,  
8 they'd come on -- they'd come in in the morning before they  
9 started their work. They'd come in. They'd do a tour of the  
10 room. They'd say good morning to everybody, you know. Made  
11 everybody feel welcome, you know, which was a good atmosphere.  
12 But then when the management changed, it just went differently,  
13 you know.

14 Q. Have you ever lost your OQs?

15 A. No. I've had to requalify. Well, I mean, you do your  
16 requalifications all the time, every 3 years, you got to --

17 Q. Right. But have you ever had to requalify outside for  
18 your schedule?

19 A. Maybe once. Like I went for a pee test because I  
20 overpressured a line.

21 Q. Oh, okay.

22 A. There was a valve closed, had the booster going. I  
23 opened up the valve and it overpressured line at the units, so I  
24 had to go for pee test.

25 Q. Did you lose your OQs?

1           A.    No, I didn't lose my -- I don't think I lost my OQs.

2           Q.    Oh, so it just -- okay.  You said there were promises  
3 made?

4           A.    There's always promises made and, you know, for the  
5 safety stuff and that we were going to get our equipment, we're  
6 going to get our swing panels, are all going to be up to date and  
7 they're all going to be done and everything like that, and, you  
8 know, we're still fighting to get swing panels done.  And this is  
9 before the Marshall thing and even after, you know.

10          Q.    Um-hum.

11          A.    I know they're working on it and everything like that  
12 and -- but they get a guy on a project, he starts doing the stuff,  
13 and then they take him off the project to put him on another  
14 project.  They get a new guy on there, and we're basically  
15 starting from scratch again, you know?

16                We asked for certain things on swing panels.  They told  
17 us after the Marshall thing that money was no object, there'd be  
18 lots of money to get all these swing panels done and all that  
19 stuff.  We're still waiting for stuff, you know?  I mean, they  
20 want us to use the swing panels.  We have used swing panels  
21 before.  We're using a new swing -- some of the new swing panels,  
22 which are good, but we'd like to have new -- or more stuff on them  
23 that we can use for our operations, but --

24          Q.    Okay.

25          A.    -- there seems to be delays.

1 Q. Have you been on the same line, operating the same lines  
2 in the time you were in the control center?

3 A. I started off I was working -- I was working  
4 Cromer/Regina, Line 2, 3 and 4 and Line 1. And then they moved me  
5 to Milden, Milden/Gretna. Then from Milden/Gretna I went to Line  
6 1, which went from Edmonton to Superior, and then I went to --  
7 which I am now currently now an Edmonton operation -- or Edmonton  
8 terminal.

9 Q. Okay, so you're a terminal operator now?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Okay. Did you have occasion to work with either Tim  
12 Chubb or Ghazal Derhami?

13 A. They were on shift every once in a while.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Like I wasn't directly on shift with them, but --

16 Q. I see.

17 A. -- because of swing shift and that every once in a while  
18 people end up on the same shift for overtime. The come in on  
19 overtime or I go on overtime.

20 Q. Okay. Were you able to form an opinion about either of  
21 them in terms of their technical abilities --

22 A. I really hadn't -- haven't done -- had any much to do  
23 with Tim other than talk once in a while. Ghazal, we talked a bit  
24 once in a while, yeah.

25 Q. Um-hum. And how would you characterize her performance?

1           A.    I thought she was good.  I mean, she -- everybody has  
2 struggles every once in a while.  Not everybody's perfect on line  
3 operating.  I mean, everybody does different things.  I don't  
4 think I'd be the greatest line operator.  That's why I'm on  
5 terminals, you know?

6           Q.    Um-hum.

7           A.    She tried, from what I could see, you know?  I didn't  
8 have any problems with her.

9           Q.    Okay.  How do you think she was treated?

10          A.    She voiced a few things to me that she wasn't being  
11 treated very well by certain people.

12          Q.    Are these the same people that you cited for  
13 intimidating others?

14          A.    Well, I remember her once coming out of -- well, coming  
15 back in because our offices were outside of the control room.

16          Q.    Um-hum.

17          A.    She came back in and she was wiping tears and she said  
18 she just came out of Curt's office.  So that's -- and I don't know  
19 -- I can't remember the rest of the conversation, but she said  
20 that, you know, she wasn't being treated very well.

21          Q.    Was there any misinterpretation of the fact that she was  
22 in tears?

23          A.    Like I said, she just told me that she wasn't being  
24 treated fairly and that's all I can tell you, I mean, because I  
25 don't remember the rest of the conversation.



1 Q. Okay. But you said she was wiping tears?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. Could anybody else who observed that been mistaken that  
4 she was -- had been crying?

5 A. I don't know. Like, we had just come in -- she just  
6 walked in the control room and we were like -- our Edmonton  
7 controls is right at the very beginning of the door when people  
8 walked in, so we seen everybody when they first walked in the  
9 control room, so --

10 Q. Okay. Do you think the fact that she was a woman had  
11 anything to do with the way she was treated?

12 A. No. I don't think so.

13 Q. Okay. Have you ever observed shift leads or other  
14 supervisors correcting or referring to errors of operators in  
15 front of others?

16 A. Well, I don't know. Like, I wouldn't say no -- I would  
17 say no.

18 Q. Okay. All right. That's all the questions I have.  
19 Thanks.

20 A. Okay.

21 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Karen?

22 MS. BUTLER: Yes. I thought you were wanting to step  
23 in. But you're ready for me?

24 MR. NICHOLSON: No, go ahead, Karen.

25 MS. BUTLER: Okay.

1 MR. NICHOLSON: I'm sorry.

2 MS. BUTLER: All right.

3 BY MS. BUTLER:

4 Q. Do you feel like you have more pressure to restart  
5 certain circumstances now?

6 A. What do you mean by that?

7 Q. You've mentioned there's been a change, I think, in the  
8 culture from when you first started. It was more -- I think your  
9 words might have been that when Sonya and Ian were in charge you  
10 had to get the oil out of here?

11 A. Um-hum.

12 Q. I would take it out of the terminal or out of --

13 A. Well, it was -- it just seemed like the operations  
14 changed from it was the customer and the company, like the  
15 integrity of the oil and everything like that was first priority.  
16 When they came in, it was more like let's get it out.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. You know?

19 Q. So could that have been sensed by a pipeline operator as  
20 a requirement to keep the lines running or to keep -- if they have  
21 to shut down, to start back quickly?

22 A. No, I wouldn't say that.

23 Q. Okay. All right. I wanted to make sure I understood  
24 better --

25 A. No.

1 Q. -- what you were or were not saying, so thank you for  
2 that.

3 Has the shared error concept that's translated to near  
4 miss, are you still required to share it if it happens?

5 A. No -- well, I've never had any shared errors with other  
6 people, but I've walked in on -- I mean, I've had a few errors  
7 where I've walked in on people -- on stuff that people have left  
8 me and I always end up taking the full hit all the time.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. So, I mean, it's like --

11 Q. So, obviously that's very concerning for me that you  
12 would find a problem and address it and bring it, conceivably, to  
13 someone's attention --

14 A. Well, I -- I've proven to them that I wasn't -- my last  
15 error, okay -- or that was brought upon me, I went in -- it was in  
16 the morning. I was doing my shift. Then I had to go to a ERT.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. A quick course. I had my stuff set up the way it was  
19 supposed to be. The line was shut down. I went for my meeting.  
20 I came back. The other guy that relieved me was anxious to go to  
21 a dinner with his wife --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- and for some odd reason he had another valve open on  
24 a different tank and opposite of what I had left. My new -- I  
25 don't -- I wasn't there to change the screens or anything like

1 that. So I came in and he said all you have to do is hit the  
2 boosters when Tecky (ph.) asks you to and start the line. Okay.  
3 I went over my numbers to make sure all the numbers jived. I went  
4 into the kitchen to get my lunch because it was noon. I sat down.  
5 Tecky says hit the boosters. I hit the boosters. I noticed right  
6 away that the wrong valve. So I told Tecky, shut the line down  
7 now.

8 I went to my control -- my shift lead. I asked him, I  
9 says, find out when -- call Les Reschnia [sic] -- or --

10 Q. Right.

11 A. -- Reschny to find out when this valve was opened.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. So he went and checked, and the valve was opened 5  
14 minutes before I walked in the room.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. I still got the whole blame because they're saying you  
17 assumed responsibility, you sat in that chair, so it's your fault.  
18 Whether someone did it or not.

19 Q. All right. So if we were to correct that, how does that  
20 look to you? What would change about the internal processes that  
21 would make that equitable or fair?

22 A. It may have depended on who had opened it.

23 Q. Okay. See that's the thing. There are certain people  
24 who can do things -- who have had incidents happen to them and  
25 it's kind of like, brushed aside.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Other people will go, you know --

3 Q. Okay. So based off of what I think you just told me,  
4 I'm going to paraphrase what I think could be the answer to the  
5 question.

6 A. All right.

7 Q. Which is, if everybody was treated equally, regardless  
8 of who was doing certain things or not doing certain things --

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. -- then that would take away this problem?

11 A. Well, isn't that what everything's supposed to be? You  
12 have an error, it's your error. If you leave something for  
13 someone, you should take -- assume as much responsibility as that  
14 person that's sitting in that chair.

15 Q. Okay. So I want to make sure that I'm --

16 A. That's the way I see it.

17 Q. -- that I'm understanding everything you're trying to  
18 tell me.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. And that is, I think you're feeling as if you've taken  
21 blame for something that you did clearly not do.

22 A. Well, part of the blame, yes, is my responsibility  
23 because I assumed -- when I sit in that chair, it's part my  
24 responsibility. But if I have something that's been sitting there  
25 for 8 hours that's blatant, and I walk in there and I've had 5

1 minutes to deal with it --

2 Q. Right.

3 A. -- I think I'm getting screwed.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. You know?

6 Q. Got it. I completely get it at last. Thank you.

7 A. You know? And if someone opens a valve when -- and then  
8 I walk in and he says all you got to do is hit the booster and  
9 everything's -- everything's ready to go, all you got to do is hit  
10 the booster, and all I have time to do is sit down, look at the  
11 paperwork, and then the guy calls me and tells me hit the booster  
12 and I start it and I realize that the wrong valve was opened --

13 Q. Got you.

14 DR. STRAUCH: I want to jump in here.

15 BY DR. STRAUCH:

16 Q. Wouldn't that be handled through a shift pass-down, that  
17 sort of thing?

18 A. The thing was, at that time, because the first time the  
19 guy was doing a bunch of -- trying to please everybody by doing  
20 other -- work for some other people. He had his panels all  
21 covered up with other screens because I -- on our tap, you can  
22 bring panel upon panel, right? So he had a whole bunch of stuff  
23 covered up. He was in a different manifold altogether, which that  
24 first manifold that he was in, he would have never seen because he  
25 had it all covered up doing other stuff.

1           So when I came on shift, I started clearing panels away.  
2 I got called by one of the operators and said, okay, we're  
3 starting up; get yourself set up. He was finishing one -- that  
4 batch that he was swinging, so I went to a different manifold; I  
5 opened a valve, getting ready for my next swing. All of a sudden  
6 I noticed one of my other tanks moving up. And I says, hey,  
7 what's going on? So I started clearing all his crap away and I  
8 noticed that there was two valves open. One tank was pumped down  
9 to near -- it was at working bottoms and the other tank was  
10 totally full, so -- and in a 42-inch pipe, you get a lot of  
11 migration.

12           Q.    Okay.

13           A.    And at a fast speed. All I had time to do was close the  
14 valve of the tank that was originally opened, and then I went back  
15 to check to see when it, that valve -- or that valve had last been  
16 opened, and which was 8 hours prior to me walking in that room.  
17 There was, I mean, 600 or some 700 cubes of oil went in from one  
18 tank to the next and they told me, it's your fault.

19           Q.    But so, in a typical pass down between shifts, you guys  
20 don't talk? You wouldn't say --

21           A.    Yes.

22           Q.    -- I've got these two valves open --

23           A.    Yes, we do talk, but the thing is he did not close his  
24 valve. He did not go over all his equipment --

25           Q.    Okay.

1 A. -- and set me up properly when I came on shift.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Okay? I'm not blaming the guy.

4 Q. Right. But he didn't -- there's no written log, like  
5 these valves have been opened or --

6 A. Well, usually when you open a valve, you close the other  
7 one.

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. Doesn't matter what -- if you're going from one manifold  
10 to the next.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Unless you were -- you're going back to another  
13 manifold, that -- our process has changed since that case.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. You know? Our shift run down has changed because of  
16 that too. But I got nailed for the whole thing.

17 Q. Right. Okay. Thank you.

18 DR. STRAUCH: I'm sorry. Go ahead.

19 MS. BUTLER: Okay.

20 BY MS. BUTLER:

21 Q. So were you ever told why the swing panels have been  
22 delayed?

23 A. Well, at first they told us there was -- well, they were  
24 in the process of doing -- they were difficult to work on so they  
25 changed, apparently they changed the way things were -- a new



1 format in making them, stuff like that. And then after that  
2 Marshall thing, they told us there was lots of money in the budget  
3 to do them, and then when we asked to get them done, all of a  
4 sudden no money.

5 Q. Okay. So basically it's been relayed as the dollars  
6 weren't unavailable; is that correct?

7 A. Yep.

8 Q. All right.

9 A. And like I said, they keep changing the people that are  
10 doing these things, so --

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. -- it keeps getting delayed. And they prioritize what  
13 they figure is important.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Whether we -- on my console, there's certain things that  
16 I feel that are important for my swing panels, which we asked for,  
17 and they prioritize it that way.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. So basically, I've given up on the swing panels.

20 Q. So did they ever explain to you the overall priority?  
21 Did they ever say like --

22 A. No, they just said they're -- they prioritize them the  
23 way they feel, so --

24 Q. Okay. So they don't go through that with you?

25 A. Nope. No.

1 Q. Okay. I can see that would lead to frustration. Do you  
2 know of other consoles in the room that have requested things like  
3 swing panels or changes that they think are important and they've  
4 been delayed?

5 A. Every -- at first I think Ian wanted every swing panel  
6 to be generic. And it's fine to have -- like every terminal are  
7 similar; not every terminal's the same. Every terminal has its  
8 little idiosyncrasies that need certain things addressed for that  
9 terminal.

10 Q. Um-hum.

11 A. You can have them 90 percent generic, but you can't have  
12 them 100 percent generic because it doesn't work.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Okay? Everybody's asked for certain things on their  
15 consoles.

16 Q. Okay. So in the process of being -- of asking for  
17 changes, have they behaved differently on other consoles, where  
18 they've actually come back to them and said "we can't do this now  
19 because", that you're aware of?

20 A. You hear things, but, I mean, I'm not --

21 Q. Okay. All right. And are you familiar at all with what  
22 happened at Marshall?

23 A. Hearsay. I was on shift when Dave Scott shut the line  
24 down.

25 Q. Okay. And --

1           A.    He brought it -- he mentioned that things didn't look  
2 right. They went to MBS. They looked at it and they said it was  
3 column sep. So, that's where it ended.

4           Q.    Okay.

5           A.    We were in the middle of a safety meeting when it  
6 happened.

7           Q.    Was everybody in that safety meeting?

8           A.    Yes, we were all at the safety meeting.

9           Q.    And do you -- if we were to request records of that  
10 safety meeting having occurred, would there be any that you're  
11 aware of?

12          A.    Well, there's always minutes taken. I don't know --

13          Q.    There was minutes taken?

14          A.    I'm not saying that that was put into the minutes.

15          Q.    Okay, but --

16          A.    But we were at the thing --

17          Q.    -- but there would be minutes --

18          A.    -- we were at the safety meeting. During the minutes --

19          Q.    All right.

20          A.    -- Dave shut the line down.

21          Q.    Okay.

22          A.    After the line shut down, he mentioned --

23          Q.    Right.

24          A.    -- or he -- after the meeting he mentioned that things  
25 didn't look right, so Allister and Bob got involved. They looked.

1 The MBS guy looked at it. They figured it was a column sep.

2 Q. Okay. On that safety meeting, do you remember what the  
3 topic of the day was, or what --

4 A. Oh, I have no idea.

5 Q. Okay. I just was -- if things stood out, I wanted to --

6 A. No.

7 Q. -- give you the opportunity to explain the details.

8 A. We discuss all kinds of different things.

9 Q. Okay. All right. So based on hearsay in the control  
10 room or a conversation that occurred that may not be hearsay  
11 because Dave Scott -- obviously you had some connection with him  
12 because you were on shift at the same time, has anybody discussed  
13 the fact that so many people through so many different shifts had  
14 the opportunity to see a leak and didn't think leak? Has there  
15 been discussion amongst controllers --

16 A. There may have been, but I'm not --

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. -- yeah, I'm not the pipeliner, so --

19 Q. Okay. That's great. Thank you.

20 A. It wouldn't be fair for me to say anything.

21 Q. That's all I have.

22 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

23 Q. Stu, since you were there that night, can you draw for  
24 me where your console is in relation to 6B? Not now, but then?  
25 It would help me to know.

1           A.    Our console is here.  There's a credenza here.  There's  
2 another console here, and he was over here.  We were all standing  
3 at the credenza and around the -- so this would be 6B here.

4           Q.    Um-hum.

5           A.    This is Line -- this was Line 4 or Line -- yeah, Line 3  
6 or Line 4.  Hardesty and --

7           Q.    Griffith.

8           A.    -- Griffith there.  We were standing around here or at  
9 the credenza and he shut his line down.  There's other consoles.  
10 There's a console here.

11          Q.    So the MBS and the shift leads are back towards you --

12          A.    MBS is way over here.  Shift leads are over here.

13          Q.    Can you label yourself there?

14          A.    Okay.  This is Edmonton.  And then there's --

15          Q.    Okay.

16          A.    There was -- this is an empty console, and this was a  
17 Cromer.

18          Q.    So you left your console --

19          A.    Not Cromer --

20          Q.    -- for the safety meeting?

21          A.    Yeah, well, we're -- it's not that far.

22          Q.    No, I know.  I've been out there.  Okay.

23          A.    So we just --

24          Q.    But Dave was still at his -- he didn't leave?

25          A.    Dave was sitting right at his console when it happened.

1 Q. Where was Theresa?

2 A. Theresa was right beside him, here.

3 Q. Okay. Who was on line 4; do you know?

4 A. Jesus, who was on line 4?

5 Q. I'm pushing it, I know. Okay. That's fine.

6 A. It could have been Tecky. I'm not sure.

7 Q. Okay. And who was conducting the safety meeting? Both  
8 leads or just one?

9 A. Well, everybody gets involved. Like, I mean, we each --  
10 some people pick topics --

11 Q. Oh, okay.

12 A. -- we talk about topics and stuff like that. Bob and  
13 Allister have their, their stuff that they got to relate to us,  
14 you know?

15 Q. So where were Bob -- Bob and Allister were at the front  
16 of the room?

17 A. Bob and Allister were basically here.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. There's a few of us here, you know.

20 Q. They do one side of the room and then the other side of  
21 the room?

22 A. No, no, no.

23 Q. Okay. The whole --

24 A. Everybody -- a few people stay at their consoles.

25 Q. Okay.

1           A.    Basically there's one or two people stay at their  
2 consoles.  The rest of the people crowd around if there's nothing  
3 going on anything.  If there's something going on, they stay at  
4 their consoles.

5           Q.    Okay.

6           A.    Nothing going on at the moment, people gather round.  
7 Phones ring, people go.

8           Q.    Okay.

9           A.    Alarms ring, people go.  If we need something that we're  
10 -- that's coming up, another guy will bring up another screen on  
11 his console.

12          Q.    Okay.  But you -- so you observed Dave Scott getting the  
13 MBS alarm during that safety meeting?

14          A.    I observed him shutting the line down.

15          Q.    Okay.

16          A.    Then we continue with the meeting.  As the meeting  
17 finished, he looked, he says, I think there's something wrong.  
18 Then he got hold of Bob and Allister.  They both went over, they  
19 got the MBS guy to check.  They came back and they said it was a  
20 -- figured it was a column sep.  That's where it ended.  We went  
21 home.  It was the end of our shift, went home.  The next day we  
22 come on.  That's when we heard all hell broke loose.

23          Q.    Does 6B -- is your terminal part of 6B?

24          A.    No.

25          Q.    Does 6B go in or out?  Okay.

1 A. No. I'm just strictly -- I'm at the beginning --

2 Q. Yeah, you're at the front of the line.

3 A. -- the beginning of thing, and we ship it down.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I got Line 2 and 3 that I operate.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And incoming on the other side into the tank.

8 Q. Right. Okay, thank you.

9 MR. NICHOLSON: Kelly, do you have --

10 MR. EMEABA: No, I don't have any questions at this  
11 time.

12 MR. NICHOLSON: -- follow-up?

13 MR. NICHOLSON: Jay, do you have --

14 MR. JOHNSON: No, I don't.

15 MR. NICHOLSON: Barry?

16 DR. STRAUCH: Just a couple of questions.

17 MR. HORAN: Sure.

18 BY DR. STRAUCH:

19 Q. I want to get back to this shared errors. And I  
20 understand the difference now between shared errors and unshared  
21 errors. Has, in your opinion, has the frequency of shared errors  
22 changed at all since Enbridge has instituted written procedures  
23 for handovers? Shift handovers?

24 A. There still is errors. I mean, it doesn't matter the  
25 process, you're -- human errors are going to happen. I mean,



1 that's a fact, you know? I mean, equipment failure, that happens.  
2 It's not going to -- it's never going to be eliminated. As much  
3 as we'd love to be in a perfect world, it doesn't exist.

4 Q. Right.

5 A. I'm sorry, but that's just the way it is.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. You know? I mean, errors, if a person has an error --  
8 it's going to happen. I don't care if -- we got so much --  
9 there's been such a turnaround of young people and new people in  
10 that room, you know, you're going to get it. It's just --

11 Q. But it sounds like some of the shared errors result from  
12 people not fully communicating information.

13 A. That's a good possibility. Yeah, that happens.

14 Q. So with the new procedures requiring written information  
15 to be communicated between shifts, I'm just wondering --

16 A. I've had an error as well that was -- after all this  
17 process was done, a guy told me that he had swung the ticket,  
18 swung the tank, which I took for granted because, you know, we're  
19 doing our process here. And it happened during the day. I came  
20 in. He had cut the ticket. He had started a new ticket, but he  
21 hadn't swung his tank.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. We received the product in it, realized it was going in  
24 the wrong tank, swung the tank, reported it. They basically --  
25 and it was basically the same kind of product. I got an error,

1 but then they migrated the amount that I put in that one tank to  
2 the other tank and I still got nailed with an error. Zero cost to  
3 the company, but I got the error.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. On the last couple errors I had were zero cost to the  
6 company, but I still got nailed with them. So it's like, you  
7 know, you're damned if you do; you're damned if you don't. You  
8 know? I'm not going to cover anything up because if you get  
9 covered -- you try to cover something up, you get screwed; you get  
10 fired. I mean, why would I risk my job for something like that?

11 Q. Sure.

12 A. I'm not afraid to admit when I do something wrong. You  
13 know?

14 Q. Okay. Now, I -- and I'm paraphrasing now, so please  
15 correct me if I'm saying something that you don't agree with, but  
16 it sounds like you're describing an atmosphere in the control room  
17 of intimidation and retaliation.

18 A. For certain people, yes.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Because if you're outspoken, you will be checked.

21 Q. Did this atmosphere, in your opinion, affect the outcome  
22 of the Marshall accident in any way?

23 A. I couldn't say. People -- there's certain people that  
24 are intimidated, okay? The young people, new houses and new cars,  
25 no one's going to give up that, you know? You lose your job, what

1 the hell have they got? They got nothing, you know?

2 I mean, there is a factor in there, to me, there is an  
3 intimidation where people won't say stuff because they're afraid  
4 of retaliation. I've spoken up; I've been nailed. I mean, it's  
5 just the way it is, you know? I mean, I don't always see what  
6 they do with -- I don't always feel what happens is right. I'll  
7 speak out. You know, I mean, it's -- like I said, it's my  
8 opinion. They can take it the way they want. If they  
9 misinterpret it, so be it. You know? I may not interpret what  
10 they tell me the same way. Everybody has their way -- their own  
11 way of interpreting things, you know?

12 Q. Okay. All right. Thanks.

13 BY MS. BUTLER:

14 Q. I think I just want to ask you one last question, and  
15 that would be on this last example that you gave us of swinging --  
16 he hadn't really swung the tank --

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. -- as well as he portrayed in words, or she portrayed  
19 in words. Do you -- were they -- is that the type of error that  
20 occurs through inexperience or --

21 A. I think it's just a lack of paying attention. Like, you  
22 know, you're doing stuff, the phone rings -- you're in the middle  
23 of doing something, you may forget it. Go to do it and something  
24 else happens, something -- another phone call, someone starts  
25 talking to you, you forget what you're doing.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And when your writing your notes down, yeah, okay, I did  
3 this, this, this and this, and all of a sudden someone walks in,  
4 and it's like, okay, it's done, done, done. Okay. You sit down,  
5 you have a few minutes to react, and then you get caught.

6 Q. Okay. So if you were to think about the things that  
7 you've been put up against when you come in, the things that have  
8 gone not as well as they should have --

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. -- could we characterize a general statement about the  
11 console workload or is that not --

12 A. Not in this case, no.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. No.

15 Q. That's -- thanks.

16 A. This is totally different.

17 Q. Thank you. That was it.

18 A. They're still addressing console workload issues on  
19 certain consoles.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 MR. NICHOLSON: Nothing? Kelly, you got -- you're  
22 writing over there. Nothing? Barry, nothing?

23 MS. BUTLER: I guess --

24 MR. NICHOLSON: I might have missed -- well, let me --

25 MS. BUTLER: After you're done.

1 MR. HORAN: Sure.

2 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

3 Q. You mentioned that when Ian and Sonya had taken over the  
4 control center it became more about just getting the product  
5 through and prior to that it was the quality of the product. Who  
6 was in charge prior to Ian and Sonya? Who was running it?

7 A. Dave Milton was there and before him was Dave Bryson.

8 Q. Oh, okay. And --

9 A. You know? And then --

10 Q. Was that under operations or did that roll up under --

11 A. Well, they were --

12 Q. -- customer service?

13 A. When I first started it in there, there was Al  
14 Baumgartner was there. There was Dave Bryson, a couple other  
15 guys; I can't remember their name. But, you know, in the mornings  
16 they'd walk in. They'd talk to the people. They'd stop. They'd  
17 chitchat with everybody at the consoles. They'd say good morning,  
18 you know. It was a nice routine. Everybody -- you got to know  
19 everybody. You saw your boss. He talked.

20 When Ian got there, it was just like all of a sudden  
21 it's like (makes noise) in and out, in and out. He'd walk by.  
22 People would -- some guys said they never even talked to him the  
23 whole time they were there.

24 Q. And when did Ian come in? I missed that part. What --  
25 when was --

1 A. He came in when Dave Milton left.

2 Q. Which was what --

3 A. Oh.

4 Q. -- year about? You don't remember?

5 A. Ian just left. Probably he was there, probably like 3,  
6 4 years.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Four years.

9 MR. JOHNSON: Was it Dave Bryson or Dave Milton he  
10 replaced? I get those --

11 MR. HORAN: Dave Milton because Bryson took off and then  
12 Dave Milton came in his place.

13 MR. JOHNSON: Okay.

14 MR. HORAN: And then I think Lisa Doberstein kind of did  
15 half and half with Dave Milton. Then when Milton left, she did  
16 part with Milligan. Then she left and Milligan took over, and  
17 then Curt and Blaine type thing, so --

18 MR. NICOHOLSON: Okay. Yeah, Karen, I'm sorry. Go  
19 ahead.

20 MS. BUTLER: Just one more.

21 BY MS. BUTLER:

22 Q. Is there anything else that you'd like to take this  
23 opportunity to tell us about how the control room's functioning or  
24 things that have not gone well or things that have gone well?

25 A. I think -- I don't know. This new control room's great.

1 Like, I mean, it's a better atmosphere to be in. I still think  
2 there's an intimidation factor there. I mean, I've seen one of my  
3 co-workers get raked through the coals where I thought it was  
4 pretty nasty what happened to him and it was all misinterpretation  
5 by two other -- by two shift leads, you know? And he was -- had  
6 to sign a paper and he was threatened about being fired if he  
7 didn't sign this paper, and to change his attitude. And no one  
8 had a problem with him except for these two shift leads.

9 Q. So --

10 A. Which I thought was pretty nasty.

11 Q. Okay. So on the shift leads' response, did they ever  
12 come back and apologize?

13 A. One guy apologized -- one of them apologized to him and  
14 told him that, yeah, he misinterpreted and, you know, he was  
15 intimidated by the operator.

16 Q. Okay. So one apologized?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did they both kind of gang up in the episode or --

19 A. I think they did. Because one of the shift leads was a  
20 new shift lead, fairly new. He got promoted. And they always  
21 told us, if we don't have an answer, we'll go get an answer and  
22 we'll bring it back to you. So this was those PHMSA papers that  
23 we have to sign, okay?

24 Q. Got you.

25 A. He was just putting his initials on there. And then

1 they were doing an audit. They came back -- this shift lead came  
2 back and said you have to sign this. He says, why? Because.  
3 Well, why? Because. And he says, well, that's not really an  
4 answer; I want to know why we got to do it. Because if you don't,  
5 you can't operate.

6           So then he wrote up a -- he wrote him up on it. And the  
7 operator, my co-worker, said I don't have a problem signing it; I  
8 just wanted to know why. So instead of going and getting an  
9 answer and saying because it's a regulation by PHMSA, which would  
10 have been, well, okay, no big deal, you know, he gets written up  
11 and he gets hauled in there saying he's belligerent, he refuses to  
12 listen to orders and stuff like that. And I thought, you know,  
13 that's pretty skanky. Like, really, that is not very nice at all.  
14 You destroy a person's -- I don't know he -- they tore him, they  
15 tore him -- I've never seen a guy so down and out after he walked  
16 out of the office.

17           Q.    So did that happen in front of you?

18           A.    Not in front of me. He came by that office and that --  
19 and then I've never seen a person so tore up. Like, I mean, he  
20 just sat there and, like, just a blank stare on his face.

21           Q.    So who were the shift leads? You don't want to say?  
22 That's fine.

23           A.    I'm not saying.

24           Q.    All right. I -- that's --

25           A.    I mean --



1           Q.    -- that's fair.  After this, I would like to go off the  
2 record after we're finished to explain to you some background on  
3 that.

4           A.    All right.

5           MR. NICHOLSON:  Barry?

6           DR. STRAUCH:  Did this incident happen before Marshall  
7 or after Marshall?

8           MR. HORAN:  Not too long ago, actually.

9           DR. STRAUCH:  Okay.  All right.  I have no further  
10 questions.

11           MR. NICHOLSON:  Jay?  Kelly, no.  Matt, no.  Karen?  
12 Another round anybody?  Okay.  At this point I think we'll  
13 conclude the interview.  Thanks so much, Stu.

14           MR. HORAN:  Okay.  Thank you.

15           (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN  
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN  
Interview of Stuart Horan

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-10-MP-007

PLACE: Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

DATE: February 2, 2012

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

---

Patricia M. Noell  
Transcriber