

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: \*

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ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN  
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN

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Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007

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Interview of: CURT GOESON

Enbridge Headquarters  
Edmonton, Alberta  
Canada

Tuesday,  
November 15, 2011

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MATTHEW NICHOLSON  
Investigator-in-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge  
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and  
Hazardous Materials Investigations  
N y Board

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

BARRY STRAUCH, Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

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Accide ons  
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Audits and Inspections  
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[Redacted]

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I N T E R V I E W

1  
2 MR. NICHOLSON: All right. This is NTSB Pipeline Case  
3 Number DCA 10-MP-007, Enbridge Energy, July 2010 Crude Oil Release  
4 in Marshall, Michigan. These are the human factor groups  
5 interviews being conducted at the Enbridge Headquarters in  
6 Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. Today is Tuesday, November 15, 2011.

7 This interview is being recorded for transcription at a  
8 later date. Copies of the transcripts will be provided to the  
9 parties and the witness for review once completed. For the  
10 record, Curt, please state your full name with spelling, employer  
11 name and job title as it was in 2010 and as it is today?

12 MR. GOESON: My name is Curt Goeson, C-u-r-t Goeson,  
13 G-o-e-s-o-n, e-mail contact is [REDACTED] My  
14 position at the time of Marshall was Supervisor, Control Center  
15 Operations. Today, my title is Manager, Pipelines, Control Center  
16 Operations.

17 MR. NICHOLSON: And for the record, please provide a  
18 contact phone number and e-mail address that we can reach you at.

19 MR. GOESON: My contact phone number is [REDACTED] and  
20 I've stated my e-mail.

21 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Curt, you're allowed to have one  
22 other person of your choice present during this interview. This  
23 other person can be an attorney, friend, family member, co-worker  
24 or no one at all. If you would, please indicate whom you have  
25 chosen to be present with you during this interview?

1 MR. GOESON: Nobody present other than Jay.

2 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. We will now go around the room  
3 and have each person introduce themselves for the record. Please  
4 include your name with spelling, your employer's name and contact  
5 phone number and e-mail address. I will start and we'll progress  
6 clockwise starting from my left. My name is Matthew Nichoson, M-  
7 a-t-t-h-e-w N-i-c-h-o-l-s-o-n. I'm with the NTSB. My contact  
8 phone number is [REDACTED] and my e-mail is

9 [REDACTED]

10 MS. BUTLER: Karen Butler, K-a-r-e-n B-u-t-l-e-r. I'm  
11 with PHMSA [REDACTED]. And that's

12 PHMSA, phone number is [REDACTED] E-mail address is Karen, [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 MR. PIERZINA: I'm Brian Pierzina, B-r-i-a-n P-i-e-r-z-  
15 i-n-a [REDACTED]. E-mail

16 [REDACTED] Phone number: [REDACTED]

17 MR. JOHNSON: Jay Johnson, Enbridge, [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED] Contact cell: [REDACTED]

19 MR. STRAUCH: Barry Strauch, B-a-r-r-y, S-t-r-a-u-c-h,  
20 NTSB. My phone number is [REDACTED]

21 INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

22 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

23 Q. Okay. Curt, to begin with since we're coming at this  
24 kind of new, you can start with just describing your duties back  
25 in 2010 and who you reported to, who you interacted with, that

1 sort of thing.

2 A. So back in 2010, I reported to Manager of Control Center  
3 Operations Ian Melligan (ph.) who reported to Sonya Bais (ph.), VP  
4 of Customer Service. My overall responsibilities included overall  
5 administration of all control central operations. So to be clear,  
6 that included the shift fleet group and all the control central  
7 operators who reported up through them. General responsibilities,  
8 like I said it was administrative performance management for the  
9 shift fleets and general direction of the department within  
10 customer service.

11 Q. And can you give us a little bit about your background?  
12 When you started with Enbridge? Positions you've held? How long  
13 you've been here? That sort of thing.

14 A. Sure. I started with Enbridge in 1992. I'm a graduate  
15 of chemical engineering out of Nate here in the city. Started  
16 with the company, like I said, in 1992 at the Terminal. I held  
17 positions of utility person engager. In 1995, I transferred into  
18 control center operations as an operator. Held a number of  
19 different operating positions within the department, including the  
20 liquid mainline system, Enbridge Gas Distribution, Vector  
21 Transmission. For a period in Enbridge history we also operated  
22 some of the other gas transmission systems that are currently in  
23 Houston, Allenton Pipeline, Kansas City and then from there I  
24 moved into a shift lead role for a short period of time, probably  
25 around a year. I then transitioned off of shift work into an

1 administrative role as an operations coordinator. And then,  
2 probably most recently in the last 3 years, probably 3 years ago,  
3 I was promoted into a supervisory role. And that was my current  
4 role in 2010 at Marshall. And then most recently here in the new  
5 year I had a title change to Manager of Pipelines, a little more  
6 specific role.

7 Q. Can you talk a little bit about the role you have now?  
8 What is it you do in that role?

9 A. Sure. It's administrative duties. It's a split from my  
10 previous role. We've created pipeline administration into  
11 terminal administration positions. Given my background, I am in  
12 the pipeline role and, again, provide administrative performance  
13 management to the pipeline side of the business. And that  
14 includes key performance and working on initiatives within the  
15 department.

16 Q. So what is -- the pipeline group consists of who? The  
17 controller?

18 A. Yes, so what we've done, Matt, is we've taken a group,  
19 control center operations, which reported up through two shift  
20 leads and one supervisor and we've taken that group and created a  
21 pipeline side and a terminal side. So each division has its own  
22 manager. It'll have its own supervisor, and it'll also have its  
23 own technical support on shift.

24 Q. What generated this split? I mean, what was the nexus  
25 that caused you guys to want to split this?

1           A.    Oh, I think it's something that we realized from 2010  
2 that we needed to do to provide additional support to the  
3 operators.

4           Q.    Was this a correction from Marshall?

5           A.    Matt, I wouldn't be able to comment on if it was a  
6 correction or not.

7           Q.    Okay. All right. At this point, I guess I'll hand it  
8 over to Barry so he can ask questions.

9           MR. STRAUCH: Thank you.

10                                   INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

11           BY MR. STRAUCH:

12           Q.    Just a follow-up on what Matt just asked you. You said  
13 that you think the split was done to provide additional support to  
14 customers?

15           A.    No, to our operators, to operate to our staff.

16           Q.    Okay. How does the split result in additional support  
17 to the operators?

18           A.    Well, I'll walk you through kind of the transition of  
19 the last few years to give you the best answer that I know. You  
20 know, probably 3 years ago we had a shift lead supervisory group  
21 who was very technically strong and they were put in leadership  
22 positions because they were technically strong, very good at what  
23 they do. And through the growth in the control center, we found  
24 that there was a need for "people" leadership. Okay? And so over  
25 the years, there was a, what I would interpret as a, force to



1 create a "people" leadership position. We needed "people"  
2 leaders. We had 150 people and we needed "people" leadership.  
3 But at the same time, you still had the technical draws on the  
4 position as well from the staff. And so, you know, we had always  
5 envisioned, probably in around '09, to create a technical support  
6 position on shift. But I will be quite candid and I think that it  
7 was very apparent from 2010 that we needed to split up of those  
8 two groups. So essentially what we did is, we took that leadership  
9 position, the shift lead position, and we broke it up into two --  
10 a true "people" leader who could concentrate on performance  
11 management and the leadership of the people and a technical  
12 leadership position. So that's the future here at Control Center.  
13 So you have pipeline and terminal staff and then you have a  
14 pipeline and terminal-specific technical leadership position. And  
15 then you have a "people" leadership position. That's the future.

16 Q. So are you "people" or are you technical kind of a guy?

17 A. I'm in a manager position. It's a "people" position.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I don't, I don't --

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Maybe you were in the shift lead  
21 supervisor, now he's manager of those that are split.

22 A. Oh, I have a technical background from a pipeline  
23 background. But my current role today is around "people"  
24 leadership so I'm providing guidance and performance management.

25 Q. What was it that first got Enbridge to recognize a need

1 to have manager supervisors with "people" leadership skills over  
2 and above technical skills?

3 A. I think we recognized that pull on individuals probably  
4 shortly after '08, after the growth. You know, probably more like  
5 '07, '08, Barry, where the economy here was booming and the  
6 recruiting of individuals was at its highest ever and the  
7 experience levels in, not just in our Control Center, but  
8 everywhere were going down the drain as the organization expanded.  
9 Experienced people moved out of the Control Center into the  
10 positions created. You know, your experience level is going down.  
11 It was then the demand of those individuals on the different  
12 technical knowledge that first really brought it to light,  
13 probably somewhere around '08, '09. We had it built in the  
14 workforce plan probably in 2010; probably would have started that  
15 in '09. You know, Marshall wasn't the catalyst for that. It sure  
16 made us expedite it.

17 Q. Is that a move towards increased --

18 A. Increased technical support.

19 Q. But initially, from what I understand, initially were  
20 promoted for their technical skills? And at some point it was  
21 recognized that there was a need to identify people's management  
22 skills as well? Is that correct?

23 A. That's correct. And that was based on the size of the  
24 room. As the room grew, more people dynamics, more people issues,  
25 those kind of factors.

1 Q. So, and that was about '07, '08 when hiring got into  
2 high gear?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Then because of the growth in the Control Room it was  
5 recognized that people who were going to be managers and  
6 supervisors in the Control Room needed "people" management skills?  
7 Is that correct?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay. But as a result of the Marshall incident or maybe  
10 the Marshall incident expedited it. It sounds like after it you  
11 realized it you came up with the technical skills as well and that  
12 people who were going to supervise had to have technical abilities  
13 also? Is that correct?

14 A. Yeah, but I would say it was a catalyst to expedite it.  
15 It was in our workforce plan prior to Marshall.

16 Q. Okay. At the time of Marshall, the team leaders were  
17 considered "people" persons or "technical" persons?

18 A. They were technical people with "people" leadership  
19 expectations on them.

20 Q. Okay. And at the time of Marshall, the Control Room was  
21 organized into operators and their immediate supervisors who were  
22 technical, sort of (ph.) shift lead.

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. And they were NBS (ph.) analysts off on the side?

25 A. Um-hmm.

1 Q. Were there any other people in the Control Room at that  
2 time?

3 A. No. The support mechanisms, support groups, were  
4 outside of the room?

5 Q. Okay. So in the Control Room were either NBS analysts,  
6 operators or shift lead supervisors?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Okay. Did you have at the time of Marshall any  
9 oversight of the NBS analysts?

10 A. No. They fell under the IT leadership group  
11 (INDISCERNIBLE).

12 Q. So your stand of supervision was only the operators and  
13 the shift lead supervisors?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. How is that today?

16 A. That's the same.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Other than we've decreased kind of the span of control.  
19 For me personally, it's half of what it was prior to Marshall for  
20 people.

21 Q. In what way is it --

22 A. Because we took -- we segregated the pipeline  
23 individuals from the terminal side.

24 Q. So if you go into the Control Room today -

25 A. Um-hmm?

1 Q. The operators and shift lead supervisors are not all  
2 going to report to you?

3 A. No. Half of them.

4 Q. The other half reports to whom?

5 A. Blaine Wright (ph.).

6 Q. Okay. Has there ever been a situation under the old  
7 system where the NBS analysts gave poor information? The  
8 information that was (INDISCERNIBLE) seemed to be incorrect to an  
9 operator?

10 A. Not to my knowledge.

11 Q. If that happened, what would you have done?

12 A. What would be the poor information?

13 Q. He miss-diagnosed something.

14 A. We would default to our procedures and probably move  
15 forward as analyzed (ph.). The responses from, I'm not sure of  
16 the question you're asking but, the responses in my history from  
17 an NBS analyst have been bare minimum.

18 Q. Um-hmm. Okay. Let me give you a situation. You have a  
19 dynamic situation. An operator is trying to figure out is this a  
20 column separation or is it something else? What is the operator  
21 expected to do to make that determination at the time of the  
22 Marshall incident?

23 A. The short answer is default to his procedures, Barry.  
24 If he has a situation, he has X amount of time to analyze it. He  
25 is expected to, in this case, have an NBS analyst provide feedback

1 regarding an alarm. We have a set of lead triggers, which we  
2 should be looking for. Okay? Not just a suspected column sep.  
3 That would initiate an analysis by the group. And I say the group  
4 meaning the Room. And if we can't prove the integrity of the line  
5 within 10 minutes, we shut it down.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. So the procedures called for input from the NBS analyst  
8 analysis factoring (ph.) and then if the problem isn't identified  
9 in the 10 minutes allotted I shut down.

10 Q. Correct. Okay. Now who makes the decision?

11 A. Which decision?

12 Q. Well, the NBS analyst provides input, the group analyzes  
13 it. At some point at the analysis there's going to be a decision?  
14 Right? And the decision is either to do nothing or to do  
15 something?

16 A. Um-hmm.

17 Q. Who's going to make that decision?

18 A. The operator has full responsibility to shut down and to  
19 fold as per procedure.

20 Q. The operator makes that decision to shut down?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. (INDISCERNIBLE) to do something or to do nothing is the  
23 decision? It's going to be one of those two decisions? Right?

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Okay. What about the shift fleet leader? What's he

1 going to do at this time?

2 A. You know, a shift leader's responsibility in the event,  
3 or any event, is to coordinate analysis, is to coordinate  
4 activities between internal state polars (ph.), (INDISCERNIBLE)  
5 verify an emergency with external parties.

6 Q. Okay. The shift leader is strictly a coordinator?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Who's the decision maker? The operator?

9 A. Yep.

10 Q. Now suppose the analysis by group, their input is going  
11 to be what they see on the scanner (ph.) displays and what  
12 analysis the NBS analyst provides? Is that correct?

13 A. Um-hmm.

14 Q. Will the shift lead provide any input into this  
15 decision? Or to this analysis?

16 A. The intent is that he doesn't. He's a coordinator of  
17 that event.

18 Q. Now a lot of that analysis is going to be the analysis  
19 by the group. It's going to be a function of the analysis of the  
20 NBS operator? Is that correct?

21 A. The NBS analyst?

22 Q. I'm sorry.

23 A. Will only provide information related to his monitor.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Not operational information.

1 Q. So the only thing the NBS analyst does is say whether or  
2 not the model is valid or not.

3 A. That was the expectation then.

4 Q. Okay. Is that what happened in Marshall?

5 A. To my understanding? No.

6 Q. Okay. What happened in Marshall?

7 A. I believe the NBS analyst provided more information than  
8 was required.

9 Q. Okay. The NBS analyst, I believe his name was Shane.  
10 Is that correct?

11 A. Well --

12 Q. The initial analysis?

13 A. (INDISCERNIBLE)?

14 Q. Yep, the first analyst was Shane Lynch (ph.).

15 MR. NICHOLSON: The first one. You guys are talking  
16 different shifts here, I think.

17 MR. GOESON: (INDISCERNIBLE) the first shift. Okay?

18 MR. STRAUCH: Let's clarify it.

19 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

20 Q. The first shift.

21 A. The only analysis that the NBS analyst was expected to  
22 provide is whether or not the model is valid.

23 Q. Correct.

24 A. What you're saying is he provided more information?

25 Q. No, I was referring to another shift.



1 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Which shift are you referring to?

2 MR. STRAUCH: The second shift.

3 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

4 BY MR. STRAUCH:

5 Q. So we can answer the answer question with respect to the  
6 first shift?

7 A. Okay. You're talking about on the shut down?

8 Q. Yes. The first shift, did the NBS analyst follow the  
9 procedures?

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. Okay. So let's talk about the second shift? The one  
12 you're referring to that he went beyond the procedures? Okay.  
13 What did he do that was beyond the procedures?

14 A. I think he, in my opinion, he stepped outside what his  
15 role was, I think. And he utilized previous experience to help  
16 somebody make a decision.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And I believe he incorrectly analyzed the situation and  
19 communicated that.

20 Q. Instead of providing the information that says whether  
21 or not the model was effective, he was saying earlier that it was  
22 a column separation?

23 A. Or whether or not it was a (INDISCERNIBLE).

24 Q. Had he followed the procedures, he would have told the  
25 operators what?

1 A. Whether it was valid or not.

2 Q. Okay. If he said the model is valid, what would you  
3 have expected the operators to do then?

4 A. To follow their call and set procedures and look for  
5 additional triggers.

6 Q. Okay. What would those additional triggers --

7 A. And if they couldn't -- pressure drops, flow rate  
8 changes, equipment status changes.

9 Q. So, in all situations, the operators follow the  
10 procedures and they arrive at the right decision?

11 A. We expect that that's where we end up.

12 Q. Because the decision making is strictly a result of  
13 following the procedures?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Because if you follow the right procedures you will end  
16 up with the right decision?

17 A. Um-hmm.

18 Q. That's what you're saying?

19 A. Yep.

20 Q. Okay. How does the operator ultimately make the  
21 determination that it's got a leak and not a column separation?

22 A. From data.

23 Q. Okay. And what data would tell the person that?

24 A. Pressures, flows.

25 Q. Okay. There is no analysis. You just look at it and

1 see the pressure is down and that the flows are altered?

2 A. No. We can use whatever resources we want in that 10-  
3 minute timeframe. We can look at historical information, we can  
4 look at trends, we can get feedback from our peers.

5 Q. What was the role of onsite information that verified,  
6 or it failed to verify? What role should that have played in the  
7 operators' interpretation of the data?

8 A. Onsite?

9 Q. Yeah. Somebody at Marshall called in or did not call in  
10 and say there's product on the ground. Now, in the this case the  
11 initial call-in is negative, that the person he sent down to  
12 identify a gas leak said there was no gas leak. So the call was  
13 negative finding. What role did that play? Should that have  
14 played in the operator's determination of whether it was a leak or  
15 a column separation on the ground? They had all the information  
16 they needed to have sent to him onsite for verification.

17 A. From a data analysis perspective, I think so. Yeah.

18 Q. No, as coordinators of the group, shouldn't the shift  
19 lead supervisors have recognized that the operators had gotten  
20 information from the NBS analyst that went above what the NBS  
21 analysis was supposed to provide?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So shouldn't they have been told, the operators, you  
24 can't go with this information because he's stepped outside of his  
25 -- what he should have provided you?

1 A. It's hindsight, Barry. But, yeah.

2 Q. Okay. Do you know why they didn't?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Had they been "technical" people instead of "people"  
5 people, do you think that they would have recognized that the NBS  
6 analyst had stepped beyond his area of expertise? Or stepped  
7 beyond what he should have provided?

8 A. Perhaps. But I want to be clear. They had technical  
9 backgrounds.

10 Q. Okay. So do you know why they didn't say --

11 A. No, I don't.

12 Q. Okay. Now had you, in your span of control, overseen  
13 the NBS analyst, what would you have told the NBS analyst after  
14 the fact?

15 A. After the fact?

16 Q. Yes. After you learned that he had given the operators  
17 more information than he should have?

18 A. Well I think there would become apparent that there's a  
19 lack of understanding about what was their responsibilities. We  
20 would have to revisit it.

21 Q. Has that been done?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And how? Do you know that was done? Have you followed  
24 up on it?

25 A. Yep. It's been dock (ph.) commanded. It's been

1 communicated. It's been built into procedures. There's a number  
2 of initiatives to do that.

3 Q. The line was started up again right after it had been  
4 shut down for like, what, 10 hours or something?

5 A. Yep. A scheduled start-up. Right?

6 Q. Did that violate any procedures? The start-up?

7 A. Yep.

8 Q. Okay. What procedures were those?

9 A. Notification of management to go over the 10-minute  
10 rule.

11 Q. Okay. Had the procedures been followed, what would have  
12 that have been?

13 A. Well I'd like to think that there would be a second set  
14 of thought process involved, some due diligence questions. Why?

15 Q. Who would have asked those questions?

16 A. It's the on-call. On-call individual. Whoever's on the  
17 call. At the time it would have been either myself or Blaine  
18 Reinbolt, Ian Milligan (ph.) or James Horn (ph.).

19 Q. Blaine Reinbolt was called?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Were you called?

22 A. No. I was advised in the morning.

23 Q. Okay. What information did Blaine provide?

24 A. What information did Blaine provide?

25 Q. No, it's when he was called. Did he ask the questions

1 that you would have asked?

2 A. It's hindsight again.

3 Q. That's what investigations are.

4 A. No. Probably not.

5 Q. Okay. Do you why not?

6 A. Because he didn't have the technical background.

7 Q. Because he was a "people" person?

8 A. And he had a terminal background. Yeah.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: One clarification. When they  
10 went to start the line-up, 10 hours later, starting it was -- by  
11 starting it they weren't out of procedures.

12 MR. GOESON: Nope.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It was during the start-up?

14 MR. GOESON: It was shortly after the start-up.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I just wanted to clarify that.

16 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. And just again to be pursue this.  
17 What procedures were violated?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No. See, 10 hours later when  
19 they started, you said, when they started the line were there any  
20 procedures not followed?

21 MR. NICHOLSON: It was after.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It was afterwards. During the  
23 start-up, the 10-minute? So I just wanted to make sure that when  
24 they went to start the line up 10 hours later, they were doing  
25 that per procedure?

1 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: All right.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Matt, and I know you said you  
4 don't want to do this, but I think it kind of fits in with this  
5 point. When we were talking about Shane and Gomo (ph.) and did  
6 that simulation, you did bad shut-down, you had the suction or you  
7 had the pressure in the blue range and Shane said that he would  
8 have needed to get approval prior to restarting the line, based on  
9 that low pressure. And so when you said that I wondered, Curt, if  
10 you didn't mean because when the line's XP (ph.) is restarted at  
11 1:00, you know, you got Marshall in the blue, I imagine, because  
12 it was like zero PSI, should that have gotten some type of, by  
13 procedure, should that have gotten some type of approval?

14 MR. STRAUCH: At the time?

15 MR. GOESON: So I have to answer at the time? I think  
16 what Shane was referring to is it was an abnormal situation and it  
17 would have, for most individuals, could have caused a flag to  
18 investigate.

19 MS. BUTHER: Even if were pigging (ph.) and bypassed  
20 certain places on the line?

21 MR. GOESON: No matter what the circumstances were.  
22 What Shane was saying is that was an abnormal situation. And  
23 during that time, it would probably provoke some type of analysis  
24 because he had mentioned it's an abnormal elevation  
25 (INDISCERNIBLE). His reference to procedure was post-Marshall.

1 Okay. Where in the event, probably a week post-Marshall, in the  
2 event of a column sep. situation, you need management approval.  
3 They have to initiate a, and it's to the formal extent where  
4 there's a paperwork, I think we talked about it back in the  
5 original investigation, do an analysis. If that analysis  
6 determines that they're going over 10 minutes, we have a  
7 conversation with management for approval. And it's to force  
8 individuals of what we assumed was knowledge. It was to force  
9 individuals to think of the lead first.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (INDISCERNIBLE).

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. Thanks.

12 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

13 Q. So part of the procedure is that the operators call an  
14 outside person, the person on-call?

15 A. Shift leads.

16 Q. Well the shift leads are there? Aren't they?

17 A. Um-hmm. The shift leads call an outside person.

18 Q. Okay. Shift leads call the outside person. And that's  
19 either Blaine or you?

20 A. There's a number of individuals: James Martin,  
21 Ian Milligan, Blaine or myself.

22 Q. Okay. So if we look at the structure of the  
23 decisionmaking in the Control Room, there's a third level.  
24 There's the operator, there's the shift lead and then there's the  
25 person on-call?



1 A. Correct.

2 Q. Is there anybody else involved in signaling (ph.)? Or  
3 is it just these three levels?

4 A. Just those three levels.

5 Q. Okay. In the event that the operators are uncertain,  
6 they call the shift leader, then if the shift leader is uncertain,  
7 then he or she calls the person on-call?

8 A. Um-hmm.

9 Q. And there're also certain procedures that require the  
10 shift lead to call the person on-call? Is that correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. One of those procedures is the start-up? As happened in  
13 Marshall?

14 A. One of those is within the start-up. Not the start-up  
15 itself, but once we hit an unknown situation --

16 Q. Um-hmm.

17 A. -- that would determine that we could call it -

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think you're missing one. Is  
19 there one more then? Or you would go to the regional management?

20 MR. GOESON: On start-up? Not on the start-up. We  
21 would involve external parties, yeah. That's the role of the  
22 shift lead. They would advise. But not in the decision making  
23 around the 10-minute rule.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. In the 10-minute rule, or?

25 MR. GOESON: Yep.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. I just -- because I  
2 thought you were trying to go down each path and I thought, maybe  
3 that had been forgotten or something.

4 MR. GOESON: We had the start-up, which is scheduled  
5 start-up, no notification required. When they ran into an  
6 abnormal event, okay, and now we triggered -- now we're into  
7 analysis mode as we reach that 10-minute mark. And we still  
8 haven't had an answer. We would shut down. We would make some  
9 notifications to the regions and to our management to advise. And  
10 then we could continue with our analysis.

11 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

12 Q. Okay. So the line would shut down, and when it's in the  
13 interval when it's restarted --

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. -- the problem had not been fully identified? Is that  
16 correct?

17 A. It had been identified. There wasn't a solution.

18 Q. Oh, okay. So that start-up procedure required that the  
19 shift lead call the person on call, who at that time was Blaine?

20 A. No. You've got the order -- we had a scheduled start-  
21 up. We went over our 10-minute rule -- I'm talking -- when I said  
22 -- my comments are about what should happen as per procedure. So  
23 what did happen is I think we pumped past the 10 minutes. I think  
24 to the extent of 40. I want to throw that out there. We shut  
25 down. Then they called management for approval to start up.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. That's when they talked to Blaine.

3 Q. So, they shut down when they went to that point?

4 A. Yeah. They went to 40 minutes, shut down.

5 Q. X amount of time in between?

6 A. X amount. They were analyzing, then they phoned Blaine  
7 and presented the information to Blaine and that's where the  
8 analyst, where I feel at the time, went outside his role and  
9 presented information to Blaine and they made a decision to start  
10 up again. No.

11 Q. Okay. So let's talk about Blaine's decision?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Ultimately, he was the decision maker?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. According to procedures?

16 A. Yep.

17 Q. Okay. And he relied on the operator's input and the NBS  
18 analyst's input?

19 A. Shift leads and the analyst. Yeah.

20 Q. Right. Was that appropriate?

21 A. He didn't have any other -- I mean, he had to. He  
22 didn't have any background or knowledge in pipeline operations.  
23 He had to rely on the information he was given.

24 Q. The input he's getting is wrong. He doesn't have any  
25 background to question it?

1           A.    That's correct.

2           Q.    Okay.  So, therefore, there is no rule of check and  
3 balance in that situation?

4           A.    Not in this particular case.

5           Q.    Okay.  Has that been addressed?

6           A.    Yes, it has.

7           Q.    And how has it been addressed?

8           A.    So the split of the rules where you have managers with  
9 respective technical background.  Okay.  We've also created a on-  
10 call, call it a, guideline book where for every situation that the  
11 on-call that the on-call is going to default, he has checks and  
12 balances to ask appropriate questions.  And sometimes it's a case  
13 of policy whether it's HR 18 or drug and alcohol testing.  
14 Sometimes it's a case of just procedure to make sure the  
15 appropriate steps and balances are taking place.

16          Q.    Okay.  In your opinion, had Blaine or whoever was on  
17 call that night had the proper technical background, what should  
18 he have done with the information that he was getting?

19          A.    What should he have done with the information?  Well, I  
20 believe there is -- well, there's a couple of things, Barry.  He  
21 would have been able to interpret the information better  
22 regardless of if it came from the analyst or from a shift lead.  
23 He would have been able to recognize where people crossed the  
24 rules of responsibilities.  And I think, and it's hindsight, if  
25 you had some pipeline experience, you would have been able to

1 recognize if there's doubt and at Enbridge when there's doubt, we  
2 shut down.

3 Q. Okay. Now the other error we talked about was hubbing  
4 beyond 10 minutes?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Okay. Somebody didn't make a decision to shut down  
7 after 10 minutes that they should have?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Who made that decision?

10 A. Originally it was the operator. Again, operators have  
11 full responsibility to shut down if they're not comfortable; and  
12 to follow procedure.

13 Q. So the default mode in the procedures is shut down,  
14 rather than keep going?

15 A. Absolutely.

16 Q. Okay. Why did they continue to pump beyond 10 minutes?

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. Okay. Why were the procedures not followed?

19 A. I have to say I don't know.

20 Q. Okay. Shouldn't the shift lead, whose responsibility  
21 is, I would imagine, to enforce the procedures of the operators,  
22 have gone over there after a couple of minutes and said, this is  
23 the procedure you're going to follow, and give him an interim  
24 (ph.) procedure?

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. Why didn't he do that?

2 A. I don't know.

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Would he have known it?

4 MR. GOESON: Yes.

5 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

6 Q. When he didn't know it, he was responsible to know it?

7 Wasn't he?

8 A. The procedure?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. Yep.

11 Q. He was responsible to know that the ship shut down?

12 A. Um-hmm.

13 Q. With the number of consults on your shift lead, if he  
14 wasn't told would he know that someone is running past 10 minutes?

15 A. Oh, no, he wouldn't.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. But once he became aware.

18 Q. Once he became aware?

19 A. It was his responsibility to -

20 Q. So at 10 minutes, he doesn't get an alert that would say  
21 go over to that and see what's going on?

22 A. No. He gets a phone call.

23 Q. If they called him?

24 A. They did.

25 Q. Okay.

1 MS. BUTLER: Does anyone get an alert after 10 minutes?

2 MR. GOESON: No. I think, you know, part of the  
3 procedures is when we start this analysis, when we enter into the  
4 unknown, we set a timer and scan.

5 MR. NICHOLSON: So who --

6 MS. BUTLER: Excuse me. The operator sets the timer?

7 MR. GOESON: Yeah. It's not automatically set on  
8 software. Somebody has to physically do it.

9 BY MR. NICHOLSON:

10 Q. Okay. How many -- the team is two operators? Right?  
11 Pod mates?

12 A. In most cases.

13 Q. Okay. How many teams does the shipping supervisor  
14 oversee?

15 A. We have 23 consults (ph.). So roughly, half of that.

16 Q. Twenty-three, so 12 teams? So I would imagine that if  
17 the 10 minutes is approaching, even with 12 teams, the team shift  
18 lead should know about it? Right? You would expect that?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did he know about it? Did he know that they were even  
21 approaching the 10 minutes?

22 A. No, I don't believe he knew until he was advised at the  
23 10-minute mark, if I remember correctly.

24 Q. Who advised him?

25 A. The operator.

1 Q. So at that point, because he's a shift lead, he has to  
2 know the procedures?

3 A. Correct.

4 Q. Okay. And why didn't he enforce the procedures?

5 A. I don't know.

6 Q. Was he aware of the procedures?

7 A. Yep.

8 Q. Was he considered a "people" person or a "technical"  
9 person?

10 A. He was actually one of our strongest "technical" people.

11 Q. Okay. Shouldn't the shift lead at that point had called  
12 the on-call person also, or was that required?

13 A. Well, the actions that I feel they should have went  
14 through is once he became aware that they were over the 10-minute,  
15 they should have shut down, and at that point advised.

16 Q. Okay. Now I'm going to shift gears and I'll ask a  
17 couple of other questions. And if you're not the right person to  
18 answer it, I understand. Just say so.

19 A. Sure.

20 Q. What physical requirements do you have, or physical  
21 and/or medical requirements does Enbridge establish over the  
22 control operators and shift lead supervisors?

23 A. At the time of hire?

24 Q. At the time of the accident. For someone to remain on  
25 duty? What physical requirements do they have to meet? Physical



1 and/or medical requirements?

2 A. I think the only restrictions we have are on color  
3 blindness.

4 Q. And you're tested for color blindness?

5 A. When hired.

6 Q. Okay. Is it possible that someone could develop color  
7 blindness after they're hired?

8 A. Yep.

9 Q. Okay. So do you test people after they're hired for  
10 color blindness?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Do you think you should?

13 A. I think we would recognize it through probably ERTs  
14 sessions and operating.

15 Q. I'm sorry, ERT is?

16 A. Oh. Annual training.

17 Q. Okay. If an operator is taking medication that has some  
18 pretty strong side effects, let's say some pain medications?

19 A. Um-hmm.

20 Q. Would this require the operator to report that to you?

21 A. It is a requirement.

22 Q. That he report what to you?

23 A. Any medication that may impact the operation.

24 Q. Okay. Who makes the choice as to whether or not the  
25 medication may impact the operation before it needs to be

1 reported?

2 A. I think within policy, the drug and alcohol policy, it's  
3 outlined that the individual does.

4 Q. He makes the determination? So if the individual  
5 determines that this medication will not affect his performance,  
6 but somebody learns that he or she is taking some medication. In  
7 fact, it does affect their performance, would that person be  
8 violating policy by not reporting?

9 A. Not if they weren't aware of it.

10 Q. Okay. Is the company okay with that policy?

11 A. No, we would remove -- when we became aware of it. I  
12 can't answer for the company on their policy.

13 Q. Okay. Now the schedule is, as I understand it, the  
14 operators work 12-hour shifts and they work, what? Daytime and  
15 then they go to nighttime? Is that -- could you just kind of walk  
16 us through how that works?

17 A. Sure. It's a 12-week cycle and it is rotating days and  
18 nights, as you stated. And it repeats so you have a series of  
19 shifts. They're nights and days back-to-back. So you'll have,  
20 say for example, three day shifts: Friday, Saturday, Sunday.  
21 Followed by two night shifts: Monday, Tuesday.

22 Q. Okay. And what happens --

23 A. Then you have a break.

24 Q. How long?

25 A. Usually 4 or 5 days.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. So in the case you would return to work the following  
3 Monday, you'd work 2 days: Monday, Tuesday; Wednesday, Thursday  
4 night.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. You'd have a 5-day break. You'd come back Wednesday;  
7 you'd work 2 days, 3 nights. And then it just rotates through  
8 that cycle.

9 Q. Does anybody ever familiar with the research  
10 (INDISCERNIBLE) what a schedule like that does to people's  
11 cognitive performance?

12 A. I think Jim Johnson who will be later today will be able  
13 to answer that better.

14 Q. Okay. What's the requirement when a shift is completed  
15 and new people come aboard for the shift? What's the requirement  
16 on information given from the departing shift to the incoming  
17 shift?

18 A. At the time of Marshall in 2010, I think we were still  
19 at, know, where it was still conversation, word of mouth, through  
20 training and experience and informal notes, information  
21 transferred. Post-Marshall, then it's part of the CRM initiative.  
22 We developed a formal shift change. Documented a piece of paper  
23 that identified areas of discussion.

24 Q. Okay. CRM initiative stands for what?

25 A. Control of Your Management.

1 Q. Okay. So now there is a documented checklist, if you  
2 will, for items that are to be discussed?

3 A. Yep.

4 Q. Okay. And what kind of items are to be discussed in  
5 this checklist?

6 A. Well, I don't know the details to be honest, Barry. I  
7 know it's, you know, upcoming maneuvers, communication, ongoing  
8 things and alarms, active alarms, those types of things.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Just to ensure consistency in our communication area.

11 Q. Had this particular procedure for shift changes been in  
12 place at the Marshall, what information would have been exchanged  
13 at the time that was not exchanged?

14 A. I'm hoping it would have information regarding the  
15 detection alarms that had activated and then gone away, line  
16 pressure conditions. In hindsight, it would have been nice to see  
17 some abnormal line conditions transferred to cross shift change.

18 Q. Okay. And the last question I have. You said you  
19 graduated (INDISCERNIBLE). What is that (INDISCERNIBLE) about?

20 A. Northern Alberta Institute of Technology.

21 Q. Okay. Fine. That's it.

22 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, Brian?

23

## 1 INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

2 BY MR. PIERZINA:

3 Q. I just have a couple, Curt. A couple of times when we  
4 talked about, if you can't confirm the integrity within 10  
5 minutes, shut down the line. I'd just like you to clarify what  
6 shut down the line means?

7 A. Stop delivery.

8 Q. Okay. If you can't confirm the integrity within 10  
9 minutes, that initiates a procedure? Right? Which includes  
10 shutting down the line and --

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. -- notifications and -

13 A. It really allows us to continue with our analysis in  
14 safe mode. We wouldn't stop analysis at that time.

15 Q. Oh, all right. What I was getting at was, prior to  
16 Marshall, and I'm assuming post-Marshall, your procedures would  
17 require notification to the region, notification to on-call field  
18 personnel --

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. -- to start looking for a leak? Correct?

21 A. Yeah, potentially. The initial call would probably  
22 consist of advising individuals that this is the situation. We're  
23 continuing with our analysis. And if we were unable to come to  
24 come to conclusions, then we'd probably enter into discussions  
25 about mitigative steps, flying the line, leaving the line until

1 morning, flying the line, walking the line, trying to improve the  
2 integrity, yeah.

3 Q. Yes, I guess my understanding would be that within, you  
4 know, when you reach that 10 minutes, that initiates your  
5 suspected leak procedure?

6 A. Well the initial trigger, and whether that's a pressure  
7 drop or an NBS alarm, that triggers a suspected leak. And then  
8 the remainder of that time is validating that.

9 Q. Okay. So the suspected leak procedure requires the  
10 operator shut down the line at every -- No?

11 A. Maybe -- because Jim will be coming in. You were gone  
12 that Friday afternoon when we did that. We walked through the  
13 existing procedures, which Jim can -- he'll tell you right down to  
14 the valise (ph.) it would have closed.

15 Q. Okay.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So maybe that's better than  
17 working off of Curt's memory as we actually see the procedure.

18 MS. BUTLER: Can I ask for a point in clarification for  
19 what Brian was asking? If there was an NBS alarm and it was  
20 declared faults, would they still go to the suspected leak  
21 procedure? Or is it only if the NBS alarm is declared as valid?  
22 Or do you remember?

23 MR GOESON: Yeah, (INDISCERNIBLE). No' we'd have to --

24 MS. BUTLER: That's fine. Thank you.

25 MR. PIERZINA: Okay. Now we can follow up on that

1 later, but I've gone through the list and it's kind of the way I  
2 had interpreted that as, you know, there was a point at which the  
3 region should have been notified and the on-call personnel should  
4 have been launched to look for a leak that didn't happen. But the  
5 first, I think one of the first steps was, shut down the line.  
6 And because the line was already shut down, it seemed like maybe,  
7 you know, the rest of the procedure wasn't followed because the  
8 line was shut down. We can get into that. I want to -- so when  
9 we talked previously in December, you had mentioned the need for  
10 technical support in the Control Center that had been identified  
11 previously. What precipitated the split between terminal versus  
12 pipeline and technicals? I didn't get the sense that that was  
13 necessarily tied to the identification need for technical support.

14 A. The split?

15 Q. Right. The split between pipeline and terminals.

16 A. Probably a question for higher up.

17 Q. Oh, okay.

18 A. We will be talking at some point with somebody higher  
19 up.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well who's higher up? Ian?

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ian.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ian and Mel Allen (ph.). We're  
24 talking to both.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Leon?

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Leon, I mean Sonya.

2 BY MR. PIERZINA:

3 Q. Okay. Well is it fair to ask you for your understanding  
4 of why that --

5 A. Specific technical background to, you know, if we take  
6 Blaine's position, for example, prevent that in the future.

7 Q. Okay, so --

8 A. Span of control.

9 Q. Right. So, now when a situation comes up requiring on-  
10 call approval, is there an on-call "pipeline" person and an on-  
11 call "terminal" person?

12 A. Not yet. Not yet. We're working towards that. Today  
13 we'll support each other. If we're presented with like a, if  
14 myself, if I'm presented with a terminal situation, I'll consult  
15 Blaine, whether I'm on call or not, or whether he's on call or  
16 not.

17 Q. And vice-versa.

18 A. And vice-versa.

19 Q. Okay. Thanks.

20 MR. NICHOLSON: Oh, have you got anything, Karen?

21 MS. BUTLER: Yes. A couple of minor points of  
22 clarification, I think.

23 INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

24 BY MS. BUTLER:

25 Q. On a 10-minute timer, is that manually required to be



1 set by procedure? Or is that just something that everybody does?

2 A. I believe it's procedure-based, Karen. I'd confirm with  
3 Jim this afternoon.

4 Q. And when they do that, where they do that?

5 A. It's on skata (ph.) clock.

6 Q. On the skata clock itself? So is that like on their  
7 main screen? They can just reach down and set a feature on the --

8 A. It's like a right-hand click command on the background.

9 Q. Okay. And a couple of things that I recall unique to  
10 the Marshall situation and I just want to make sure that I've  
11 understood it correctly, because maybe I don't. We had pigs (ph.)  
12 and we had had a normal shut down. We had Niles (ph.) Station  
13 bypassed? Is that correct on our first ship out?

14 A. I believe so.

15 Q. And we had some power factor elements on the second  
16 start-up? Is that correct? Where we had hit a power max at one  
17 of the facilities.

18 A. Perceived.

19 Q. Perceived. So it didn't necessarily indicate that on  
20 the screen, or a alarm didn't necessarily trigger or go red?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. It was perceived to be a shortage of power.

24 Q. Okay. Was that perceived as the result of maintenance?

25 A. When you shortage of power, do you mean electricity? Or

1 horsepower in our units?

2 Q. Well, all I remember is the transcript read something  
3 like, there was a power shortage and I didn't see necessarily  
4 anything that correlated to it. So I didn't know if it was  
5 maintenance or electrical power, or --

6 A. So my interpretation of that, Karen, was they had  
7 available units --

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. -- pumps, but they didn't have available power.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And so I suspect, based on what I've read, is they were  
12 trying to get more allowable power to bring on another unit.

13 Q. Okay. And to do that, do they have anything within  
14 their control as a controller to get more allowable power?

15 A. It's an area that's managed by another department, so  
16 they can make a request.

17 Q. Typically takes a while, or is it a short turnaround to  
18 elevate (ph.)?

19 A. A short turnaround.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. It's a phone call. It can be just a phone call.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. But it's going to depend on contracts, those types of  
24 things.

25 Q. Okay. So the hydraulic situation upon the restart if I

1 characterize it as a bit complicated, is that fair?

2 A. No.

3 Q. How would you characterize it?

4 A. I think it was interpreted to be complicated. I think  
5 it was perceived to be complicated (INDISCERNIBLE).

6 Q. Okay. Shifting gears. I reviewed the internal accident  
7 report. I think that was submitted by Enbridge?

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. And in it there was a statement that pressure had  
10 dropped below 25 pounds, I believe. So it would have put the  
11 indicator in blue twice at Marshall within so many reviews. I  
12 can't tell you how many times. And in looking at that, were you  
13 involved in that review? You were not.

14 A. The internal investigation?

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The internal investigation.

16 BY MS. BUTLER:

17 Q. Yes.

18 A. I was involved as I was interviewed.

19 Q. Okay. Do you recall the conditions that would have  
20 caused it to go below 25 pounds one other previous time? What the  
21 unique elements would have been? Okay. All right. When the line  
22 is actually down, what do you believe besides the blue indicators  
23 on the screen tells an operator or controller whether they might  
24 be losing product or not?

25 A. Just the associated alarms.

1 Q. Okay. And along that, a little different line, if a  
2 controller knows that they've gone past 10 minutes and they tell  
3 the shift lead, and the shift lead begins to do some assessing of  
4 the situation, and the NBS analyst talks to the shift lead and  
5 they wind up calling on-call, does anybody ever go back to the  
6 operator and tell them what they've discussed? Or how does that  
7 flow?

8 A. How is that supposed to flow?

9 Q. Yeah. How is it supposed to flow? Thank you. Thank  
10 you for correcting my statement. How's it supposed to flow?

11 A. The operator should have viewed, or operators should  
12 have been viewed as the technical experts. It's why as  
13 coordinators of that event you utilize as much resources as you  
14 can, as much experience as you can. Whatever information is  
15 gathered, yes, as part of the normal decision making, we'll call  
16 it leadership if you will, should be reviewed with the operator.  
17 At least the decision.

18 Q. So would you, to use the operator as the subject matter  
19 expert because I'm not sure how you traditionally do that in the  
20 controller. Would you typically like, plug them into the  
21 conversation and they'd be on the line. Or would you stop where  
22 you are, go talk to them and then come back and provide more  
23 information to Blaine? I'm trying to figure out how that dynamic  
24 would work?

25 A. Well, in my experience in the Room it was as a group.

1 It was you're making a decision as a group. It's, you know, if  
2 you as a leader, you identify somebody with more experience it's  
3 like, you come into this conversation.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. You, I need you in this conversation. A decision's  
6 made, including the operator, that a decision should be made. And  
7 then it was the shift lead's responsibility to relay that  
8 information.

9 Q. Was there happening on the console during that decision  
10 with Blaine to do a second restart? On the second shift that you  
11 are aware of, that would have prevented them from bringing the  
12 operator into the conversation?

13 A. No, I'm not aware of any.

14 Q. That's it. Thank you.

15 INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

16 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

17 Q. On the first shift, the NBS alarm went off as they were  
18 shutting down and then did it not close itself or, for lack of a  
19 better term, clear itself when it was down?

20 A. It did. The answer is yes.

21 Q. Yes. So that information wouldn't -- I mean, the fact  
22 you get an NBS alarm and it clears itself, so that information is  
23 shared at a shift change, wouldn't necessarily be unheard of?

24 A. No. I think what's missing there is an understanding of  
25 that would typically -- if there was the understanding of what

1 that meant that there was a potential for an issue that would be  
2 passed along.

3 Q. Okay. A shift lead at the time, did they have the  
4 authority to overrule an operator?

5 A. Overrule in what manner?

6 Q. I guess hierarchy?

7 A. (INDISCERNIBLE)?

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. Operating, operations.

10 Q. Oh, okay. So the operator. Basically he can be told to  
11 keep operating and pass the 10-minute mark?

12 A. He shouldn't be.

13 Q. (INDISCERNIBLE)?

14 MS. BUTLER: But he can be told to shut down?

15 MR. GOESON: He can be told to shut down. Yep.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He can be told to shut down, but  
17 he can't be told to continue past --

18 MR. GOESON: Not if he's uncomfortable.

19 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

20 Q. Okay. So that was my understanding. So, essentially  
21 management or people above him, if he's not comfortable with  
22 running a line, they don't have the power to say keep running?

23 A. No.

24 Q. It's his line. It's his decision to say this line is  
25 down until these factors are addressed?

1 A. He's a qualified operator.

2 Q. Right. But if he says I think this line is good, the  
3 shift lead can say, I'm not comfortable with it, it's going down?

4 A. Yep.

5 Q. So and then - all right. So, and I understand the  
6 "people" versus "technical" leader, when you get a strong, when  
7 you have a strong operator and you have a strong technical shift  
8 lead and maybe a strong NBS person in that vintage -- I don't want  
9 you to speculate, but can that in itself be a bit of an issue  
10 because they're looking at what the issue is rather than just  
11 defaulting to a procedure?

12 A. More people tend to default to their --

13 Q. Strength?

14 A. -- to their strengths. Yeah. Yes. So --

15 Q. At what point in time in this "per the procedures" do  
16 they call region management to start up again? And did they do  
17 that? (INDISCERNIBLE)

18 A. I don't think they called until the second start up.

19 Q. Great. So in order to the second start up they'd had to  
20 have permission from region management?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. So in that point in time they followed the procedure of  
23 region management?

24 A. At that point, no.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. So you know we kind of talked about perhaps some of the  
3 things they didn't do. I know on the second start up, they did --

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Second start up is when they  
5 spoke to Blaine. And you're saying they actually contacted  
6 regional management?

7 MR. GOESON: As well, yeah.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Which was Tom Fredell?

9 MR. GOESON: Yeah.

10 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

11 Q. And that's from a Blaine standpoint, he said contact  
12 region management?

13 A. I don't recall the --

14 Q. You know I didn't know if you knew that or not. But I  
15 new region management was contacted before starting the line up  
16 one of the times. The second time.

17 A. I believe it was the second time.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. But I'm not a hundred percent sure.

20 Q. And Blaine will be here tomorrow. We could ask Blaine  
21 tomorrow.

22 A. I know Tom was talked to in the morning. So I'm a  
23 hundred percent (INDISCERNIBLE).

24 Q. It -- you know and it is a fair amount of time ago --

25 A. Absolutely.



1 Q. -- and I'm just trying to pull some of these things  
2 together, but --

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, that should be checked  
4 against controller transcripts because I don't recall Tom Fredell  
5 being involved in second start up.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I recall listening to the  
7 conversation.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And you can recall what?

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He was?

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yep.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. Because that's, I think,  
14 when he talked about not having any lead calls.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Um-hmm.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He turned it on to do his lead  
18 calls.

19 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

20 Q. I have to get back because I don't know if I understood  
21 the question or the answer that well. Is it your expectation that  
22 the line 6B operator after the shift leads and the NBS analyst  
23 talk to the on-call, Control Center on-call supervisor and agree  
24 to restart line 6B, that the operator should say no?

25 A. If he's uncomfortable with the situation, yes. That's

1 correct.

2 Q. Well. I'm just trying to think. I mean, he was  
3 uncomfortable -- I think he was uncomfortable as soon as he'd  
4 gotten into his 10 minutes and the line didn't pack. I don't know  
5 that he ever got comfortable after that. But I'm just thinking  
6 from a practical standpoint if my boss and my boss' boss are  
7 talking over something and tell me we're going to get another  
8 shot, I'd have to be really, really uncomfortable before I said  
9 no, I'm not going to do that.

10 A. We've done it in the past.

11 Q. Okay. I can applaud somebody for doing that, but I  
12 don't know if it's a reasonable expectation in most circumstances.

13 MR. NICHOLSON: Jay, were you finished?

14 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, I was.

15 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Barry wants to get back in.

16 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah. I just have a couple of follow-up  
17 questions. It may take a while, a couple more minutes. Are you  
18 okay? You need a break at all?

19 MR. GOESON: No, I don't.

20 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

21 INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

22 BY MR. STRAUCH:

23 Q. At some point the transcript records, I believe it's the  
24 second shift operators saying that they suspected a leak, but they  
25 were going off duty and therefore didn't really care; something to

1 that effect. It's in the transcript.

2 A. So is that a question?

3 Q. Are you familiar with that?

4 A. I'm familiar with the perception that they didn't care.

5 Q. (INDISCERNIBLE)

6 A. That's still, that's still someone else's statement.

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I've got the transcript.

8 MR. GOESON: It certainly not what Curt would have been  
9 ordered.

10 BY MR. STRAUCH:

11 Q. Right. Well my question again is from what you said,  
12 the operators had the final say at the time of Marshall, and my  
13 question is if they suspected a leak why didn't they act on their  
14 authority and tell the next person we got a leak? But they never  
15 did that.

16 A. I don't know.

17 Q. Okay. Have the procedures been changed as a result of  
18 that?

19 A. Oh?

20 Q. As a result of that particular --

21 A. Conversation?

22 Q. -- discussion between the second and third shift, I  
23 believe?

24 A. Not in relation to that conversation, no.

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Maybe one of the IRs we need,

1 Matt, is the shift change paperwork. I don't know that you have  
2 that?

3 MR. GOESON: Yeah.

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think that would define what  
5 would have been shared between those operators. I mean, we can't  
6 -- if what we do know --

7 MR. GOESON: That's what we do now. So now we have  
8 documentation when we do shift change.

9 MS. BUTLER: We ask for the shift change information at  
10 the time of the event.

11 MR. GOESON: Okay. But you haven't asked for the new --

12 MS. BUTLER: No.

13 MR. GOESON: -- procedure? Procedure and a  
14 documentation of now when we do shift changes.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You actually had a procedure  
16 before, as I recall, for system change?

17 MR. GOESON: (INDISCERNIBLE) But not a document --

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well let me read the transcript.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think you had one prior to --

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's on page 30 of the  
21 transcript.

22 MS. BUTLER: Could you state whose transcript?

23 INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

24 BY MR. JOHNSON:

25 Q. This is the Enbridge transcript of the Control

1 conversations. Speaker 2 is saying, well neither have I -- well,  
2 okay, let me backtrack a little bit. Again, page 30, Speaker 2:  
3 Have you ever done this? Speaker 1: No, not like this. Speaker  
4 2: Well, neither have I and to me it looks like a leak. Speaker  
5 1: Oh for sure. Speaker 2: Now I'm like, "holy cow," that's  
6 amazing and I never ever heard of. Speaker 1: I can dump, I can  
7 pump as hard as I want and I never overpressure the lines.  
8 Speaker 2: Yeah, but it doesn't seem messed up like eventually  
9 the water has to go somewhere. Speaker 1: It has to. Speaker 2:  
10 Like I don't know. I don't know, something about this just feels  
11 wrong. Speaker 1: Yeah. Speaker 2: Whatever. We're going  
12 home. We're off for a few days. Speaker 1: Exactly. We're  
13 done. Speaker 2: Well let's not worry about it anymore.

14                   Okay. Given that they suspected a leak, under the  
15 procedures that were existing at the time, what should they have  
16 done instead of saying whatever, we're going home?

17           A. Well, Speaker 2 should have approached the shift lead.  
18 Speaker 1 should have stood his ground and not start up. And I  
19 think probably the, you know, my initial interpretation of that  
20 conversation, and it's not the first time I heard it, is that they  
21 weren't sure that it was a leak. The verbiage you hear there from  
22 I guess, Speaker 1 about pumping forever, I think, I believe in  
23 his mind, it was almost a dead hit kind of situation, in his mind.  
24 And again, probably my interpretation would probably be defused  
25 (ph.) by the bypass and the power issues. Again, they made it

1 into more than it was. So they're actually, in my opinion,  
2 talking about something that they didn't completely understand.  
3 Speaker 2, you can ask him on Wednesday.

4 Q. And did they -- and I think we'll fit in here -- were  
5 they not provided by a person very technical, information that  
6 said, with this line you're going to need this much horsepower to  
7 get a line pack (ph.)?

8 A. Well again, back to roles and responsibilities. Jay,  
9 yeah, they looked to Aaron and Darron (ph.), I believe, and the  
10 analyst at the time to be technical experts and didn't question  
11 them.

12 Q. Well, I mean, there's two things that trouble me about  
13 this. One is your diagnosis of "they didn't act on it --

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. -- except within themselves." And two, they appeared to  
16 manifest attitudes, "it's not my problem. I'm going off duty."  
17 So the first item I believe you addressed --

18 A. Yeah.

19 Q. -- "they misdiagnosed it. They didn't have all the  
20 information" is kind of what you said.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. What about the second issue?

23 A. The second issue, to be quite candid, actually sounds  
24 even worse when you listen to the phone transcript. Again, these  
25 are, you know, you can ask Darcy (ph.) when you talk to him but

1 these are two individuals who, they're friends outside of work.  
2 You know, sometimes it's 4 in the morning. They're certainly not  
3 having a professional discussion. It's more of a buddy-buddy  
4 discussion.

5 Q. Okay. Well since this incident and since this  
6 recording, what changes has Enbridge made to improve things? This  
7 kind of attitude from being manifested in the operators?

8 A. What have we done? Specific to attitude, to be honest,  
9 Barry, following Marshall everybody sat up straight in their  
10 chair. There was no communication specific to this conversation  
11 to our people. We didn't need to.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. We've -- you know, Enbridge has done an immense amount  
14 of work in relation to many of the things following Marshall. The  
15 attitude, that type of attitude took care of itself.

16 Q. So how satisfied are you in your position that 5 years  
17 from now absent any other changes in the policies, oversight and  
18 training that this same conversation won't occur?

19 A. As far as roles and responsibilities, there was some  
20 counting (ph.) for the systems very possible. Attitudes, I can't  
21 say I'm a hundred percent sure, Barry. We hire a lot of people.  
22 We do very well in our recruiting. Our recruiting is focused on  
23 fit and attitude towards the team as well as the technical  
24 background. I can tell you today with 100 percent confidently  
25 that if we're aware of those attitudes in our Control Center that

1 we would deal with it.

2 Q. Right. But the problem, of course, is that you can't be  
3 aware of all times, that all times what people were saying. You  
4 know, if it were people thinking then that's my question. Is 5  
5 years from now, how do you know that the same "sitting up straight  
6 approach" that is there now or was after the accident  
7 (INDISCERNIBLE)? Dissipate over time as people forget about this  
8 incident?

9 A. I've gone this cycle before. It was around post-1992  
10 and I know well beyond 5 years, we've been setting up straight  
11 (ph.) mariner training (ph.).

12 Q. Okay. All right. You talked about hiring.

13 A. Um-hmm.

14 Q. Would you feel confident answering questions about the  
15 type of hiring you do, hiring criteria?

16 A. With respect to the department, yeah.

17 Q. Okay. All right. What does it take to be selected as  
18 an audit control operator?

19 A. The typical controller operator, we've got two markets,  
20 Barry. We have experienced individuals coming from industry. And  
21 then we also have a pool of technical kids. And those kids coming  
22 out of the technical schools that mate and seek southern Alberta.  
23 They're 2-year diploma programs and they focus on fluid, mechanics  
24 and hydraulics, so those types of activities. So there's really  
25 two pools. So with your background you could probably perform



1 either one of those. The first requirement is either experience  
2 or geared toward education. The other requirement is that you  
3 possess a certain skill or aptitude which we test for in Cobra  
4 (ph.). It's a simulation test. I think it's quite common in  
5 industry. And then the third criteria is you go through an  
6 interview process. I mean, you know I could comment on if we've  
7 made changes as well before and after.

8 Today there's a large focus. And like I said earlier,  
9 there's a large focus on team values. Values period prior to, you  
10 know, Marshall we're looking probably the focus was on initiators  
11 of change, you know, for mind. We promoted movement within the  
12 company and, to be quite honest, that movement isn't fair to the  
13 people that stay behind and who have to fill that void.

14 Today we talked about commitment to this department. We  
15 talked about 5 to 7 year commitments because we don't want people  
16 leaving and leaving us shorthanded, leaving their team  
17 shorthanded. So the commitment today is really on job fit. Four  
18 years ago it was around experience.

19 Q. But the proportion of applicants are hired?

20 A. Depends on what the economy's like. I've seen it go  
21 from the early 2000s where it's probably one of 50 applicants.  
22 No, that's exaggerating. We had 300, 350 applicants for one  
23 position to where there was a boom in the '08 where the company  
24 was expanding during high economy time and we have 30 applicants  
25 for five positions to where it circled almost full circle where

1 we're getting probably hundreds of applicants for a position.

2 Q. Okay. I want to talk about promotions promoting people  
3 from operator to another level to be the person or somebody else  
4 who does things better?

5 A. I'll be happy to help you with that.

6 Q. Okay. When someone is promoted from an operator then  
7 would go to the next level would it be shift team lead or shift  
8 lead supervisor?

9 A. At the time of Marshall it was shift lead. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay. And what kind of -- what would it take for  
11 somebody to be promoted?

12 A. At the time of Marshall, again we had been focusing on  
13 the people side. So we were looking for those competencies of  
14 people leadership, the ability to coach and lead and those types  
15 of competencies, rather than a technical competency.

16 Q. And today, based on what you said, you've changed and  
17 now you have designs (ph.) for one supervisory control with the  
18 technical, the other side is the people? Is that correct?

19 A. Yes. So you have a layer of people leaders and you have  
20 the technical leadership --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- layers.

23 Q. Now does someone have to apply? Or does someone tap a  
24 person on the shoulder and say, you know, you'd make a really good  
25 supervisor?

1           A.    We like to prevent shoulder tapping.  We try to give  
2 people equal opportunity to sit down at the table to have a  
3 discussion.

4           Q.    Are the people who don't apply for supervisory positions  
5 and take shift?

6           A.    Yep.

7           Q.    What does that tell you about them?

8           A.    They like where they are.

9           Q.    Even if someone's been doing a good job for 20 plus  
10 years?

11          A.    Yes.  We've seen it.

12          Q.    Okay.

13          A.    We need those people in their current roles.

14          Q.    Now you said that since the accident there's been a  
15 change, I guess, in when and the emphasis is to when people who  
16 are on call, such as yourself get a call?  Is that correct?

17          A.    Yes, sir.

18          Q.    Okay.  Since the accident, how many times have you been  
19 on call?

20          A.    About 10.

21          Q.    Okay.  How many calls have you done?

22          A.    50, 60.

23          Q.    Before the accident, do you think you would have gotten  
24 the same number of calls?

25          A.    No.

1 Q. Okay. What changed?

2 A. Our procedures changed specific to column separation.

3 It created a huge volume of calls.

4 Q. So now if you're on call, you're going to get called?

5 A. However, that was immediately after Marshall.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. As a result -- I believe as a result of that procedure,  
8 our operations were better. We have less call upsets (ph.)  
9 because of operating. As a result of operating we have less call  
10 upsets because of the focus on equipment and repair of that  
11 equipment and it's led to less calculations for start-up. And  
12 we've seen it. We went from one or two a day post-Marshall to  
13 maybe one or two a month.

14 Q. And you're attributing that to what? That it decreased?

15 A. To good operating, better operation. Like I said,  
16 better equipment.

17 Q. (INDISCERNIBLE)?

18 A. No, sitting up in your chair.

19 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: A mindset?

20 A. Yeah.

21 BY MR. JOHNSON:

22 Q. Okay. I only have one final question. Do you know how  
23 the 10-minute rule came about?

24 A. Yeah, I believe so.

25 Q. How did it come about?

1           A.    It was a product out of the Grand Rapids leak and it was  
2 one of the changes we implemented in the Control Center. I  
3 believe it was based on line 4 at the time and I'm not sure that  
4 who calculated what the acceptable volume was at that time, but it  
5 was based on the volume, acceptable volume out of worst case  
6 scenario and we compared it to the time. And it became, it  
7 started as a Control Center golden rule and I know even today  
8 Pat Daniels' of our 10-minute rule. And it was quickly became an  
9 (INDISCERNIBLE).

10          Q.    Okay. Do you think now in hindsight that 10 minutes is  
11 okay? Or should it be 5 minutes or 15 minutes or?

12          A.    I think, you know, if there's been any discussion about  
13 modifying the 10-minute rule it was really to make it line-  
14 specific.

15          Q.    Okay.

16          A.    That's it.

17               MR. NICHOLSON: Brian, have you got anything else?

18               MR. PIERZINA: No.

19               MR. NICHOLSON: Karen?

20               MS. BUTLER: A couple (INDISCERNIBLE). I just want to  
21 make sure I understand a couple of things --

22               MR. GOESON: Sure.

23               MS. BUTLER: -- I think you just said -- when you said  
24 your operations are better, are you keeping a higher pressure on  
25 the line? Or what does that really mean?

1           MR. GOESON: I think there is more focus on our shut-  
2 downs.

3           MS. BUTLER: So higher pressure can maintain so there's  
4 less column sep?

5           MR. GOESON: Timing.

6           MR. NICHOLSON: Well, what do you mean by timing?

7           MR. GOESON: You have to find (ph.) in everything you do  
8 and I think whether it was a result of an experience or what,  
9 maybe the result of training, I think we had situations where  
10 operators didn't plan on -- you can shut down a pipeline one or  
11 two ways Matt. You can send out six commands, stop six pumps. Or  
12 you can plan in advance and you utilize your pressure control  
13 valves just like Shane did this morning and series of commands and  
14 do it in a controlled fashion. And I believe that we're seeing  
15 more of the plan in the controlled fashion.

16           MR. NICHOLSON: So when he was talking about this  
17 morning, he was like beat (ph.) between 125 and 150 and then keeps  
18 lying back. So he brought it down much smoother? And he can  
19 obviously talk to that better. But that, yeah -- so on start-up  
20 then because he's bringing it down that way on shut-down? So  
21 start-up you don't have the column loss?

22           MR. GOESON: You don't have a column loss. I said it in  
23 when we met before regarding the shut down that it wasn't the  
24 normal Enbridge shut down.

25           BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

1 Q. Right.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. And you've said that and I was not able to recognize  
4 what was so bad about --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- that shut down other than I -- rupturing.

7 A. I plan (ph.) rupture aside.

8 Q. So based on what Shane saw, you're saying that by -- and  
9 Scott when he did that shut down he was adjusting his set points?  
10 Right? I don't know if he was doing it well enough or whatever,  
11 but I didn't see, you know, call it a hard shut down, I didn't see  
12 that as such a hard shut down. But you do.

13 A. I do.

14 Q. Okay. And that was -- help me understand why that was  
15 not --

16 MR. GOESON: It wasn't the hardest shut down we have.  
17 That's an emergency shut down on one command.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

19 (INDISCERNIBLE). It wasn't -- we start pipelines and  
20 shut pipelines up in phases. And it wasn't phased. It wasn't  
21 phased. It wasn't - there wasn't nearly enough commands going  
22 out. It didn't take the elevation into account, which we do on a  
23 shut down just like we do a start up. If he did make the set  
24 point changes they were minimal. And then he just shut pumps off  
25 and (INDISCERNIBLE) in the series. When we shut a system down and

1 shut pumps off it should be done in recognition of static.  
2 Recognition with the reading of the elevation. As you slow your  
3 line down you should be able to select, pump select based on your  
4 elevation, not just a random shutting down of the pumps. That's  
5 what I mean about pipe shut down.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. I'm just -- so, at the  
7 time line 6B was shut down by the rupture, you were delivering  
8 into Stockbridge so you don't have the serenade of hail (ph.) to  
9 worry about that it's like the biggest elevation problem you have  
10 on 6B? Right?

11 MR. GOESON: Um-hmm.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

13 Q. So he's increased the holding pressure at Stockbridge  
14 to help maintain line pack? Right?

15 A. Yep.

16 Q. Just -- so I'm just wondering if it's just Griffith to  
17 Stockbridge?

18 A. The same philosophy should apply.

19 Q. So the way he shut it down, is there specific data that  
20 we can look at to compare that shut down versus the Shane  
21 approach, which is nicer to the pipeline, let's say, or to the  
22 equipment. Is there data that we can look at to see what the  
23 difference is?

24 BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

25 Q. Well I would interject because we asked for that data



1 and you gave it to us. And when I compared a normal shut down to  
2 Dave Scott's shut down, I got to tell you his looked more phased  
3 than what you guys submitted to us as a normal shut down. So I'm  
4 still hard-pressed to understand what was wrong with Dave Scott's  
5 approach versus what you had submitted to us as a typical, so --

6 A. I don't know what we submitted.

7 Q. Okay. Well I can show you.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think we asked for a second  
9 one. I haven't looked at the second one.

10 MS. BUTLER: Yeah, we did.

11 MR. GOESON: So my opinion is that it was an aggressive  
12 shut down.

13 INTERVIEW OF CURT GOESON

14 BY MS. BUTLER:

15 Q. Okay. So can we backtrack a little bit because we  
16 started down that path on operational and I said higher pressures  
17 might be part of it? And you reflected in timing? Right? I  
18 said, what have we done operationally to change and make it better  
19 and I'm just reflecting back so we can get back to where we --

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. -- quit and then we hit this timing and Brian took off  
22 on a hard shut down. And I recall that we definitely asked for  
23 specific comparisons and we did look at them and didn't see a  
24 difference. So I'm going to go to the next level which is have  
25 you proceduralized start up and shut downs such that they go in a

1 specific order and if certain things are out of service or certain  
2 complications occur, there's still a specific order and  
3 requirement that you're looking at for those set point ranges?

4 A. You know, and it's probably easier said than done,  
5 Karen, on a batch system because there's always going to be  
6 differences. Right. There is a, you know what, in best operating  
7 practice training there is the phased approach where depending on  
8 what those flow rates are there are typical pump selection for  
9 those flow rates. It's built in training. We have since  
10 Marshall, in general, I think there's a few things that stood out  
11 that required hydraulics training. But we have done an extensive  
12 day-long hydraulics training for all of our pipeline staff since  
13 Marshall.

14 Q. All right. So you've told me a little bit and you make  
15 some training adjustments. Maybe not so much procedural, but you  
16 made some training adjustments.

17 A. And then Pat wants to take that training and try to make  
18 it sustain.

19 Q. Okay and it was also my understanding from, of memory of  
20 our questioning previously that there wasn't necessarily a station  
21 order by which you needed to shut down or start up, because I  
22 remember one controller said every other station. Somebody else  
23 said every station in order and as I recall, we talked through  
24 that. There wasn't necessarily an order at that time. Is there  
25 now?

1 A. No.

2 Q. An order?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. It's still based on experience. It's based on your  
6 elevation. It's based on where (INDISCERNIBLE) --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. What I -- my point was Karen is that, there are norming  
9 (ph.) in operations whether it's yep you're used to operating this  
10 line and you know that this elevation, this pump will be the first  
11 to come off or to go on.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. It's part of that knowledge.

14 Q. So a couple of other questions.

15 A. Yep.

16 Q. I believe originally after Marshall there were five  
17 people that were pulled out of the Control Room and that was  
18 before I knew that Gazelle had quit, so that would conceivably be  
19 a sixth change that didn't happen until February, I think is when  
20 she quit or something. But that would be like six different  
21 people involved in the Marshall review. Of those six -- obviously  
22 Gazelle is not back in the Control Room but are the other five?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Are any of the other five back in the Control Room? Are  
25 they still with Enbridge?

1 A. Not all of them.

2 Q. So who's no longer with Enbridge?

3 A. Dave Scott and Patrice McDonald retired.

4 Q. Was that a forced retirement?

5 A. Probably a question for (INDISCERNIBLE).

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry for?

7 MR. GOESON: Probably corporate.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It would be, yeah, Ian or --

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Ian? Okay.

11 MS. BUTLER: So Leon? Right?

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I think Leon's probably the best  
13 of them.

14 BY MS. BUTLER:

15 Q. Okay. All right. Okay. Besides those two and Ms. El  
16 (ph.). And I may be saying her name wrong, so forgive me.

17 A. Ms. El.

18 Q. Okay. Is there any other change that you're aware of  
19 associated with the Control Room that may have been specific to  
20 what happened at line B? Or line 6B?

21 A. Are there any other changes structurally?

22 Q. Specific people changes?

23 A. You're talking about personnel. Just the structure of  
24 the department.

25 Q. Okay. All right. So no shift --

1 A. We had lots of changes.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. (INDISCERNIBLE).

4 Q. Okay. I meant to qualify personnel associated with the  
5 event.

6 A. No, lots of movement again.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Some people are in different roles. Shane Gamo (ph.)  
9 isn't an operator any more. Right? He's part of our integration  
10 (ph.) group technically, lots of changes with respect to that.

11 Q. What about with the NBS analysts?

12 A. I don't think Jim (INDISCERNIBLE) passed down his role.  
13 Well I know he's not.

14 Q. Was he asked to leave it?

15 A. I believe so. Once again let's insert Curt's questions  
16 here.

17 Q. That's fair. I'm asking for a general understanding.  
18 Any other NBS analyst changes, or is that the only ones that  
19 you're aware of.

20 A. The only ones that I'm aware of.

21 Q. Okay. All right. As I was reviewing Enbridge internal  
22 accident investigation, there was also an element that referred to  
23 the procedure that was in a revised state that allowed them to  
24 continue conceivably to pump longer that had never really been  
25 approved, but was pulled up for whatever reason on that day and it

1 was mentioned in that report that that had actually been used once  
2 before.

3 A. I had heard that since, yeah.

4 Q. Do you know when it was used and what the conditions  
5 were?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Do you know if it was being tested?

8 A. It's not my understanding of the --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. But Jim will be up. You can ask Jim.

11 Q. Jim?

12 A. Johnston will be in this afternoon.

13 Q. And I would ask him because?

14 A. Well, he's in charge of procedures and he can tell you  
15 if you would have a fluid tested.

16 Q. Okay. So just specific to the testing?

17 A. To the test. Targets we don't test procedures. Yeah,  
18 that's well and I think that's what Jim would read also.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. But Jim is not that person to ask if that could had been  
21 used somewhere else.

22 Q. Okay. So let me know clarify --

23 A. Someone told you that or?

24 Q. It was in your internal accident report -

25 A. Okay.

1 Q. -- that it had been used more than once.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I can, I can help I think I saw  
3 in the information that we just received here in the last couple  
4 of weeks, I believe it was used on line 3 and I believe because  
5 Gazelle talked about using it. I don't know when. I don't know  
6 of any other circumstances, but --

7 Q. So do we, do you have any knowledge of anybody else in  
8 the Control Room using it?

9 A. Other than that?

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. No.

12 Q. Okay. All right. I need to ask for another point of  
13 clarification and that is the speaker wanted speaker 2 that we  
14 were talking about previously in the transcript. One of those was  
15 the console operator? Is that correct?

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. Okay. And was that speaker 1?

18 A. I think so.

19 Q. Okay. So I'd like to kind of connect the time line.  
20 Would that conversation conceivably have been after the restart  
21 involving Blaine's approval? And you can just say what you think.

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. So is it plausible that that conversation may  
24 have been said in a sarcastic tone from the standpoint of he  
25 wasn't involved as the console operator and the decision to

1 restart. But they did restart and so he was made to feel as if he  
2 could just could keep pumping and it's not going to matter and  
3 let's just go home because --

4 A. I would think because we --

5 Q. Hang on.

6 A. No, because that's asking him an opinion. We've got  
7 specific ones --

8 Q. I said is it possible --

9 A. -- of Tim Chuff (ph.).

10 Q. I know. I said --

11 MR. NICHOLSON: Do you want specific time for that?

12 MS. BUTLER: Yes.

13 MR. NICHOLSON: It's 04:54.

14 BY MS. BUTLER:

15 Q. So that was after the decision to restart? Right?  
16 Where he was not involved?

17 A. Yes, it's right after.

18 Q. And so there could be reflected in that conversation a  
19 sarcastic tone that has to do with the fact he wasn't involved  
20 with the decision and he feels like he was put in the position  
21 where it didn't matter?

22 A. Not to my knowledge.

23 Q. Okay. Fair enough. Okay. If you were a controller and  
24 somebody made the decision to restart around you and you were not  
25 consulted, would that frustrate you?



1 A. If I was in Tim Jones' shoes?

2 Q. If you were a controller, in general, it doesn't have to  
3 be on the day of the leak, and you're viewed as being the subject  
4 matter expert and people in management make a decision to restart  
5 without asking you and you're uncomfortable already, would that  
6 frustrate you?

7 A. I'd have an expectation that they'd consult me.

8 Q. Okay. That's fair. Are you --

9 A. And still have the right to say no.

10 Q. And I want to reflect on that for just a minute. Has  
11 anybody ever talked to you about an experiment that was done many,  
12 many years ago that talks about leadership culture and what  
13 someone will be willing to do before they go against leadership?  
14 Has anybody ever talked to you about an electrical experiment that  
15 was done in leadership con? Anybody ever said anything?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Okay. All right. So --

18 A. (INDISCERNIBLE) a psychology course years ago.

19 Q. So is it just your thought that because everybody here  
20 knows they can stand up and their job is not in jeopardy that they  
21 can do that at any time?

22 A. That was our thought.

23 Q. Okay. That's it.

24 A. And we have the transcripts in from when we were here,  
25 Karen. I know you were dialed in. It was harder probably for

1 you. Every operator said they didn't feel pressure when they were  
2 shutting down the line and they didn't feel pressure when the line  
3 was down to bring it back up, every operator we talked to. So to  
4 me that in itself, and it's in the transcripts, should basically  
5 support the fact that people are in charge of their line.

6 Q. Okay.

7 MR. NICHOLSON: Are we done? Are we done? J ay do you  
8 have anything?

9 MR. JOHNSON: No.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sounds like Brian's --

11 BY MR. PIERZINA:

12 Q. -- just you know Barry had asked the question about  
13 cognitive performance and that whether or not Curt was familiar  
14 with it and I think we had decided that was a Jim Johnston  
15 question, but I had to do a shift schedules and I actually thought  
16 that was a pretty valid question for the manager of pipeline  
17 control center operations. I think the question was whether or  
18 not you were familiar with the effect that that type of schedule  
19 has and --

20 A. I'm aware of the type the effect on fatigue that that  
21 schedule has, if that's the question and we've scientifically  
22 proven it.

23 A. Okay, the fleet has multiple effects. One of the  
24 effects is (INDISCERNIBLE) the cognitive performance. It's been  
25 pretty well established in the literature. People were tired,

1 slow down and have reduced ability in vigilance reaction time and  
2 perception in decision making. That's what I was getting at in  
3 terms of cognitive performance. It's not just that they feel  
4 tired. (INDISCERNIBLE). So I'm aware not aware of it.

5 Q. You're not?

6 A. I'm not aware of any impacts of the schedule on  
7 cognitive performance.

8 MS. BUTLER: Are you aware to phrase it differently, are  
9 you aware of any effect fatigue has on your ability to accept risk  
10 or your risk threshold?

11 MR. GOESON: Not that specific, no. I'm aware of the  
12 fatigue issues around shift work. I'm aware of recommendations  
13 from some of our consultants on how to mitigate that through,  
14 whether it's scheduling or sleep patterns or diet or bright  
15 lights, the use of bright lights on a shift. But that would be  
16 the extent of it.

17 MR. PIERZINA: Thanks.

18 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Anything else? I guess this  
19 concludes our interview with Curt Goeson. We'll stop at this  
20 point. Thank you, Curt.

21 MR. GOESON: Okay.

22 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

23

24

25

26

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:           ENBRIDGE LINE 6B Rupture  
                                  MARSHALL, MICHIGAN  
                                  Interview of Curt Goeson

DOCKET NUMBER:           DCA-10-MP-007

PLACE:                    Marshall, Michigan

DATE:                     October 27, 2010

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to  
the recording accomplished at the hearing as recorded by Amy  
Shankleton-Novess, certified electronic reporter.

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Vanita Tildon  
Transcriber