

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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METRO-NORTH RAILROAD FATAL TRAIN

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CRASH, VALHALLA, NEW YORK

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Docket No.: HWY-15-MH-005

FEBRUARY 3, 2015

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Interview of: PATRICK LARKIN

Metro-North Railroad  
North White Plains, New York

Friday,  
February 6, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: DAVID BUCHER  
Railroad Accident Investigator

## APPEARANCES:

DAVID BUCHER, Railroad Accident Investigator  
National Transportation Safety Board

BRUCE PARKIN, Safety Inspector, Region 1  
Federal Railroad Administration

PATRICK VEDDER, Inspector, Region 1  
Federal Railroad Administration

KEVIN MAHONEY, Road Foreman  
Metro-North Railroad

KIRK THOMAS  
Association of Commuter Rail Employees

JOHN SCALABRINI, Representative  
Association of Commuter Rail Employees

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:40 a.m.)

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2  
3 MR. BUCHER: This is Dave Bucher, a Rail Accident  
4 Investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board.

5 It's February 6, 2015, 10:40 a.m., and this is the  
6 interview of Patrick Larkin, conductor on the Metro-North. It's  
7 in reference to the accident that occurred on February 3, 2015, at  
8 Valhalla, New York. The NTSB Accident Number is HWY-15-MH-005.

9 To my left, I have?

10 MR. THOMAS: Kirk Thomas, K-i-r-k, T-h-o-m-a-s, ACRE.

11 MR. MAHONEY: Kevin Mahoney, M-a-h-o-n-e-y, and road  
12 foreman, Metro-North.

13 MR. VEDDER: Patrick Vedder, P-a-t-r-i-c-k, V-e-d-d-e-r,  
14 FRA inspector, Region 1.

15 MR. PARKIN: Bruce Parkin, B-r-u-c-e, P-a-r-k-i-n,  
16 Federal Railroad Administration, safety inspector, Region 1.

17 MR. SCALABRINI: John Scalabrini, S-c-a-l-a-b-r-i-n-i,  
18 ACRE Union Rep.

19 MR. LARKIN: Patrick Larkin, conductor, Metro-North  
20 Railroad. Patrick Larkin, P-a-t-r-i-c-k, L-a-r-k-i-n. Metro-  
21 North Railroad.

22 MR. BUCHER: Thank you, sir.

## INTERVIEW OF PATRICK LARKIN

23  
24 BY MR. BUCHER:

25 Q. Pat, as I said earlier, if you could go back to the day

1 of the accident and just relate to us what you can from the time  
2 you were called to go on duty and take us through your day in your  
3 own words.

4 A. Okay. It was my regularly scheduled job so I wasn't  
5 really -- I wasn't called. It was my regularly scheduled job. My  
6 report time was 9:37 a.m. I showed up at about 9:30 or so, did my  
7 paperwork for the previous day's run, cash fare totals, to submit  
8 to the receiver's office. Picked up my information for the daily  
9 bulletin orders for the DTOBO.

10 The engineer walked in at that time. This was the first  
11 day I met him. Like the normal engineer was in training class for  
12 the day, so that was the first time that I met Steve Sams [sic]  
13 that day. He introduced himself. I introduce myself, and we  
14 chatted a bit about where he used -- where he was working off and  
15 on. He was like 9 months seniority, so he was bouncing around a  
16 little bit: Grand Central, on the Hudson Line, and then he worked  
17 at -- he was working that day out of Brewster.

18 The first day -- first train, everything operated  
19 normally. Left Brewster at Southeast at 10:14, and got into Grand  
20 Central at around 11:45 or so. We then had a couple of hours in  
21 between the first and second train. Second train leaves at 2:53,  
22 goes up to Mt. Kisco, and then we deadhead back into Grand Central  
23 Terminal. We turn on a platform and deadhead back to New York.

24 We got back into New York at around 5:10 or so, and the  
25 fourth train departs at 5:44. We got in. Steve went to use the

1 restroom. I went down to use the -- went down to the equipment  
2 just to make sure everything was there, and the doors were already  
3 opened. The handbrake was set in the rear car. That's what I  
4 usually go down and check. So I set my stuff up in the sixth car  
5 where I usually work out of after we leave Grand Central and get  
6 all the tickets collected.

7           The passengers started boarding up and everything was  
8 good to go and we left on schedule at 5:44. Everything was -- our  
9 first stop is Chappaqua. So basically we don't stop at 125th or  
10 White Plains. So we left Grand Central on time. When we get to  
11 North White Plains, normally we -- the schedule in the employee  
12 handbook is around 6:20 or so. So I usually check my watch to see  
13 how close we are to schedule at North White. I think we were 3 or  
14 4 minutes late maybe, possibly, if I can recall.

15           After that, we were going along and all of a sudden I  
16 heard the air rush out of the braking system. He dumped -- Steve  
17 dumped the train. Then I heard -- the train started shaking as it  
18 normally would. Once all the air pressure is dumped out, the  
19 train, you know, shakes.

20           Basically I waited until the train came to a stop before  
21 I got a hold of Steve, because I know he was up there involved in  
22 everything, so I wanted to let him control the train while we were  
23 -- while that was happening. He got on the radio and declared an  
24 emergency, and at that point, I got on the intercom and I said,  
25 Steve, are you okay? He responded, I'm okay, but we hit a car.

1 So -- and I got on the PA and I just said, I announced to the  
2 people that there was an accident at the crossing and please bear  
3 with us while we try to get more information as to what's going  
4 on. I came out of the sixth car cab and I just walked back  
5 quickly to try to determine if anyone was hurt in the rear two  
6 cars. No one appeared to be injured.

7           Then I got back to the eighth -- the last car, and  
8 District B -- I had my handheld with me -- they were calling. I  
9 think there was a little confusion as to the train number. He was  
10 asking, what train number; what train number? So then I got back  
11 -- when I got back into the cab in the eighth car, I got on and I  
12 told him the train number and I said were north of Valhalla. I  
13 wasn't exactly sure what crossing at that point. I told him we  
14 were north of Valhalla and we hit a vehicle.

15           I tried to intercom Steve again and there was a lot of  
16 confusion up front, so I didn't really -- I kind of lost some  
17 contact with him at that point.

18           There was an off-duty police officer at the -- there was  
19 someone standing on the ground at the -- on the ground in the last  
20 car. I opened the -- keyed open the door, and I asked him, I  
21 said, what street are we at? And he said Commerce Street. Then  
22 he identified himself as an off-duty police, just happened to be  
23 in the area, and he -- so he said I called it in already. So I  
24 said, well, I said I need to know what street so I can relay that  
25 message in. So I relayed that to District B.

1           Then I got on the PA and I asked people, I said I'm  
2 going to -- I'm coming through. All I want to do is find out if  
3 anybody is hurt. I'm just going to walk through. If you're hurt,  
4 please let me know.

5           So I started walking through. As I was walking through,  
6 I was still -- I was announcing that as I came through also, is  
7 anybody hurt? Is anybody hurt? Everyone appeared to be saying  
8 no, they were fine.

9           I got to the fifth car and then I couldn't go -- I  
10 couldn't go any further north. It was too crowded. So I just --  
11 there was no way I could get through. So I looked -- at that  
12 point the people were getting a little upset, and the one door on  
13 the fireman's side was open already, so I kind of looked out and I  
14 looked up and I saw someone pointed looking -- look north, and I  
15 saw that there was flames coming out, I assumed it was the  
16 automobile.

17           So then I -- people were asking, what should we do? I  
18 said just -- they were safe. The people in that fourth car, the  
19 fifth car back, there was no flames, you know, the fire was way up  
20 front. So I thought the train hit the car and the car was on  
21 fire.

22           So I -- where that door was open, it was just all full  
23 of snow, shrubs. There was no -- you know, some people were  
24 asking me, should we get off? Should we get off? And I said, no,  
25 there's no way -- I said don't get off. It's not safe. The

1 rail's electrified. I said you don't want to get off here.

2 So I basically started walking backwards back to the  
3 rear again because that last door was -- if there was an  
4 evacuation, that's where it was going to take place because it was  
5 on -- it actually -- the rear door was exactly on the crossing.  
6 So there was -- the road was right -- was there.

7 So then I was going back and as I was running back, a  
8 doctor was on -- he just said if you need me for any help, let me  
9 know; I'm a doctor; I can help; I can assist if someone's injured.  
10 I said, I'll get back to you, but right now, no.

11 Then when I got back to the rear car, there was more  
12 people back there. There was an emergency service worker. I  
13 don't know if he was police or fire, but there was someone else  
14 out there. So he -- I opened the door and I spoke to him. I said  
15 we have to -- I said there's flames up front. I said we have to  
16 start getting the people off the train.

17 He said fire personnel were up there and they were  
18 handling that situation and to -- he says it's better if -- am I  
19 speaking loud enough? Yeah, okay. It's better if the people stay  
20 on board because if they get on the ground, there's nowhere to go,  
21 it's cold, the parkway is right -- the Taconic, I believe, is  
22 right there. And then, so he says it's safer at this point if  
23 everybody stayed on.

24 So I get on the PA and I basically said -- explained  
25 that to the people. I said, you know, asked them, I said please

1 be patient. I said the fire department is up front fighting the  
2 car fire, fighting the fire, and they recommend that everyone stay  
3 on board; it's safer on board than if everybody got off.

4 From there, I'm not sure of a time frame, but the  
5 emergency personnel then -- I went back to the rear, to the rear  
6 car. I opened up the panel and I took out the ladder. I knew  
7 eventually we were going to need it, so I just took it out and  
8 placed it against the cabinet there. Then some people started  
9 asking, you know, basic questions, when are we going to evacuate  
10 and everything else. I explained that we were doing the same  
11 thing, we were waiting, and once the emergency personnel on the  
12 ground determined it was safe, we were going to be -- we were good  
13 to go.

14 And then an emergency worker walked back through the  
15 rear car. He actually took the ladder and put it onto the ground,  
16 put it outside, and they determined it was safer to evacuate the  
17 people using the -- they were climbing down off the rail. They  
18 said it would be safer with the ground wet and everything. With  
19 the ladder, they were afraid with the ladder slipping or whatever.  
20 So we just slowly started -- I started on the fireman's side  
21 exiting the people.

22 There was a New York transit worker who was in there, in  
23 that car going home. He actually came back and volunteered and  
24 started exiting the people off the engine side, the engineer's  
25 side. So there was actually two of us, but he volunteered his

1 services, and so we started exiting -- getting people off that  
2 way, both ways. I have no idea what time we even started doing  
3 that or what time it ended, so I'm not sure how long it took.

4 Q. Sure.

5 A. I believe the whole process from when we hit the vehicle  
6 was like an hour --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- before everyone was off, but that's what I'm  
9 assuming.

10 Q. You want to take a break?

11 A. A short one please.

12 Q. Not a problem.

13 A. Yes.

14 (Off the record.)

15 (On the record.)

16 MR. BUCHER: This is Dave Bucher. We're back.

17 BY MR. BUCHER:

18 Q. Just a couple of follow-up questions, Pat. The  
19 operation of the train that you can remember, there were no issues  
20 with departing Grand Central through to Valhalla in the way of  
21 train handling that you felt in the back of the train?

22 A. No, very well.

23 Q. Okay. And in -- how long have you been on this  
24 position, conductor for the --

25 A. For that run or since --

1 Q. Yeah, in that position, on that job?

2 A. Since the pick, which was first or second week of  
3 November, I believe it was.

4 Q. Okay. Okay, so obviously you go through that area  
5 regularly. Have you had any other incidents at that Commerce  
6 Street crossing or in that area?

7 A. No.

8 Q. No other --

9 A. No.

10 Q. Okay. In conversations with other co-workers, has there  
11 ever been reports of other incidents that they may have --

12 A. No.

13 Q. -- in that area?

14 A. Uh-uh. Nope.

15 Q. Okay. A little bit, just one or two questions about the  
16 safety equipment and the ladder that you mentioned. The cars  
17 were, you know, fully equipped with the proper supplies for  
18 emergency evacuation?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Great.

21 A. The eighth, the car I was on.

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay.

25 MR. BUCHER: I'm going to pass it off to Kirk and we'll

1 just go around a couple of times.

2 MR. THOMAS: Okay. Kirk Thomas, ACRE.

3 BY MR. THOMAS:

4 Q. Just a couple of questions, Pat. You said the fifth car  
5 you made it up to. So that's the fifth car from the head end?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. All right. So -- all right. So --

10 A. I got through the rear four --

11 Q. I got you.

12 A. -- I got through.

13 Q. One more question. You had help from the MTA guy, you  
14 said, to --

15 A. Evacuate.

16 Q. -- to evacuate the train?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. So you were the conductor on the train?

19 A. Yes. I was the conductor on the train.

20 Q. Okay. And one more thing. When you -- you're the one  
21 that relayed the location of the train to RTC and --

22 A. Well, there seemed to be some confusion about which  
23 train --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. -- from what I understood on the radio. So I just

1 confirmed with RTC, once I got to the rear radio and the panel,  
2 was working better than the sixth car and my handheld.

3 Q. Um-hum.

4 A. So I just confirmed with District B that it was 6-5-9  
5 and that we were north of Valhalla Station.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. Because on emergencies they want -- you know, basically  
8 you call in emergency your train number and your approximate  
9 location. So I just wanted to relay that to them to make sure  
10 that they had the proper info.

11 Q. All right. I'm good.

12 MR. THOMAS: No questions.

13 MR. MAHONEY: Kevin Mahoney, road foreman.

14 BY MR. MAHONEY:

15 Q. I just want to clarify a few things. You said you were  
16 working the sixth car. That's your normal position of where you  
17 work that train, in the sixth car?

18 A. Once the tickets are collected and we've finished the  
19 revenue part, I go back to the sixth car for a couple of reasons.  
20 Number one is Bedford Hills is a six-car platform. So I basically  
21 position myself there for that, number one; and number two, you  
22 cannot -- you can see the eighth car, the rear door right from  
23 there exactly if it's -- you can see if it's on or not, the  
24 platform, before you open the doors. So the sixth car is a  
25 vantage point for viewing and for Bedford Hills not being caught

1 in the back, having to run up to get the doors at Bedford.

2 Q. Okay. And at the time that you noticed the train went  
3 in emergency, were you in the sixth car at that time?

4 A. In the sixth car cab.

5 Q. Okay. And when you contacted or you heard the engineer  
6 making the emergency call, you were in that sixth car.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you heard it on that radio?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And then at that point, you had gone back to -- was it  
11 the eighth, towards the eighth car?

12 A. I went to the back just to make sure that people were --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. -- safe.

15 Q. And when you --

16 A. And I was trying to get back also for the radio.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. To see if it worked better.

19 Q. So when you made your transmissions to the RTC, you were  
20 doing it from the eighth car?

21 A. Eighth car.

22 Q. Okay. Also, do you normally have a trainman when you  
23 work with that --

24 A. Normally, yes. That night, no.

25 Q. Normally you do have a trainman and that night you

1 didn't. Okay. When you heard the engineer make the emergency  
2 call, and then you were discussing on the intercom, correct, not  
3 the radio?

4 A. I believe the intercom.

5 Q. Okay. And then at that point, that was your last  
6 contact with the engineer or do you --

7 A. When I walked back to the eighth car, I couldn't reach  
8 him again.

9 Q. Okay. So at that point, you had no more contact with  
10 him. Okay. Thank you very much.

11 A. Okay. You're welcome.

12 MR. VEDDER: I actually have a question. Patrick  
13 Vedder.

14 BY MR. VEDDER:

15 Q. When you walked those four cars, was there power  
16 provided to any of those cars or was it already dark after the  
17 train stopped?

18 A. It was power.

19 Q. It was power to them?

20 A. Yeah, there was power.

21 Q. To all four?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. I think so.

25 Q. All right.

1 A. I think so.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 MR. PARKIN: Bruce Parkin.

4 BY MR. PARKIN:

5 Q. Patrick, you had mentioned that there was -- you got up  
6 to the fifth car and there was a door open.

7 A. Um-hum.

8 Q. You looked out and you saw flames from that car looking  
9 forward.

10 A. At the head of the train, not in that car.

11 Q. No, right. Right. From the fifth car --

12 A. I looked --

13 Q. You looked out past --

14 A. Someone told me, someone pointed and said there's --

15 Q. Okay. And so you looked north and saw flames at the  
16 head end of the train. Which side was that on? Was that on  
17 the --

18 A. The fireman's side.

19 Q. On the fireman's side.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. You also had mentioned that the first person that  
22 -- the first person that recommended for the people to remain on  
23 the train, do you recall who that was? Was it a Metro-North  
24 official, a fire official --

25 A. No, it was an emergency worker on the ground.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Police or fire, I don't know who, but it wasn't a Metro-  
3 North person. It was an emergency worker on the ground.

4 Q. So were you ever able to get beyond the fifth car?

5 A. Only after the train was empty.

6 Q. Once the train was empty.

7 A. When everybody was evacuated and someone mentioned that  
8 -- about the cell phone up front, so I said I'll take a walk.

9 Q. Okay. So you --

10 A. I took -- you know, it was also -- I mean, emergency,  
11 they were up there, they cleared the train already. But I just  
12 felt I also should be checking to make sure no one's on that  
13 train. But at the same time, I was looking for the guy's cell  
14 phone. I can -- then I got up to the third car.

15 Q. You got up to the --

16 A. Third car.

17 Q. Third car from the head end?

18 A. From the head end.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. The first two were pitch black.

21 Q. Okay. So the third car --

22 A. And the emergency workers were in the first and second  
23 car at that point anyway. They were up there still.

24 Q. So the third car still had power?

25 A. I think the emergency lights were on.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Not -- you know, none of the regular lights.

3 Q. So you never entered the second or the first car?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. Was there any point that you did connect face-to-  
6 face with the engineer?

7 A. At the end. He was actually -- the emergency people  
8 were looking at him and he was being taken -- looked at by the --  
9 for himself.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. He had his -- he had the oxygen mask on and so I really  
12 couldn't speak with him.

13 Q. Okay. So you didn't have any conversations?

14 A. He actually, he did -- he did show up at the -- we were  
15 -- I forget. The timing is really mixed up, but he showed up and  
16 said that he evacuated some people out of the first car.

17 Q. When did that take place? Do you recall?

18 A. I think it was right around the time we started  
19 evacuating the rear, he had came. And I just asked him, I said,  
20 are you okay?

21 Q. Um-hum.

22 A. And he just looked at me like he was in shock.

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. And I said, are you okay? And he shook his head yes,  
25 and I said -- so he said that was -- you know, that was when he

1 said the train was on fire. And he just, you know --

2 Q. Okay. And --

3 A. And we started evacuating. I believe it was right  
4 around that time.

5 Q. When you started evacuating the people from the rear  
6 through the --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- last car onto the roadway --

9 A. The roadway, yeah.

10 Q. -- you did see him?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Okay. Okay.

13 A. But that was about -- you know, it wasn't a -- it was a  
14 little brief conversation and, as I said, he was in shock. You  
15 could -- I mean, I could tell he was not in a good spot.

16 Q. Okay. So would you say that the evacuation was done in  
17 an orderly manner from the cars --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- that you handled?

20 A. Um-hum.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. There was no -- no one was really -- no one was, you  
23 know, pushing to get off. Everyone, you know, took their time and  
24 no one was like rushing anybody to get off.

25 Q. Okay.

1           A.   None of the passengers were rushing to, you know, I have  
2 to get off, I have to get off. They weren't -- so --

3           Q.   Okay. After this all happened, were you transported to  
4 the hospital? Where did --

5           A.   No. They -- the operations managers from Metro-North,  
6 there were two there. So they said, how are you? I said, you  
7 know, physically, I said physically I'm fine. I just wanted to --  
8 I need to chill for a minute, you know. And I was talking to the  
9 -- one of the managers, Kevin --

10                   UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Kevin Kerney (ph.)?

11           MR. LARKIN: Kevin Kerney, exactly. I was talking to  
12 Kevin and he asked me where's the trainman? I said there wasn't  
13 -- there is none or there wasn't, you know, there was none. No  
14 one else was on board. He says, what happened, where? I said I  
15 don't know. He said (indiscernible) there. So I just told them  
16 they weren't there. And then he asked me, are you okay again, and  
17 then I said, I think so, and then -- I was outside with him and  
18 Antonio, another ops manager, and then I started getting cold. So  
19 they, actually, they brought me over to their car, and I just sat  
20 down in the car.

21                   BY MR. PARKIN:

22           Q.   So then they --

23           A.   Eventually they transported me back to North White  
24 Plains.

25           Q.   Okay. So they took you back --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- to your car?

3 A. Well, they took me to the yard. My car was up further  
4 north, but they took me back to the yard office in North White  
5 Plains.

6 Q. Okay. As part of your training, do you receive training  
7 in emergency preparedness or emergency evacuation --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- from Metro-North?

10 A. Um-hum.

11 Q. And how often do you receive that?

12 A. Book of Rules, every year you got training.

13 Q. Okay. And what you learned from that training, do you  
14 think it was helpful in, in what --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- in how you handled this situation?

17 A. They try to relay to stay calm. Sometimes it's  
18 difficult, but they try to -- you know, you've got to -- they say,  
19 you know, people are looking at you, so if you're upset and  
20 nervous, they're going to be the same. So you kind of have to  
21 portray that things are good and things are going to be okay. So  
22 you try to keep cool.

23 Q. And when you first started on the railroad, can you tell  
24 us when you started and at what craft?

25 A. I started in February of 2007, and I was a ticket

1 seller.

2 Q. A ticket agent.

3 A. A ticket agent, selling tickets for the -- at the ticket  
4 office.

5 Q. At stations?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And from there, did you --

8 A. Then I became a conductor in September of 2008.

9 Q. Okay. To the best of your knowledge, Patrick, do you  
10 feel that the equipment that you had to operate, any emergency  
11 doors from -- were working properly? Or was the last car the only  
12 door that you manually opened to evacuate?

13 A. The last -- yeah, the last car --

14 Q. The last car.

15 A. -- was the only one, the doors that I -- the one -- the  
16 fireman's side, I believe, I actually -- that I keyed open. But  
17 the engine side, I had to pull a simple lever.

18 Q. The engine side you used --

19 A. Yes. I used the lever.

20 Q. Were there any windows, emergency windows pulled on any  
21 of the cars that you saw that people tried to or may have wanted  
22 to self-evacuate?

23 A. Afterwards, when I walked up, in I think the third car  
24 there were some that were pushed out.

25 Q. Third car from the?

1 A. The windows. The front, from the front.

2 Q. From the head.

3 A. When I walked through at the end, yeah, some of them.

4 Q. All right. I have no other questions. Thank you, Pat.

5 A. Okay. Thank you.

6 MR. BUCHER: Dave Bucher.

7 BY MR. BUCHER:

8 Q. I just have a couple.

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. Just a question about your portable radio, the handset.  
11 You mentioned that it didn't contact real well, you had to go to  
12 the car radio?

13 A. It depends on where you -- you know, sometimes it  
14 depends on, you know, if you're on -- where you are location-wise,  
15 sometimes it doesn't transmit. You know, it's not always  
16 clearly --

17 Q. Okay. It depends in the car or it depends where you  
18 are --

19 A. Right, location-wise as far as --

20 Q. -- geographically?

21 A. Yes, exactly.

22 Q. Okay. Thank you.

23 A. I said some things into it. I don't know if -- you  
24 know, when I was going down there, I was, you know, speaking on  
25 it, but I don't know if I was heard or not. That was why when I

1 got back, I used the other one to make --

2 Q. Just to make sure.

3 A. -- you know, to clarify where we were.

4 Q. Okay. Great. And my final question is, having gone  
5 through the evacuation, is there anything that you think might  
6 have been -- could have been better to make it more effective,  
7 more efficient?

8 A. Not that I'm aware. I mean, it seemed, you know, we  
9 evacuated the train and no one -- as far as evacuation, no one was  
10 injured and everyone got off safely, which is really what you  
11 want.

12 Q. Okay.

13 MR. BUCHER: That's all I have.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, I'm good. No questions.

15 MR. BUCHER: Good. Okay. Well, thank you. That  
16 concludes the interview with Patrick.

17 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: METRO-NORTH RAILROAD FATAL TRAIN  
CRASH, VALHALLA, NEW YORK  
FEBRUARY 3, 2015  
Interview of Patrick Larkin

DOCKET NUMBER: HWY-15-MH-005

PLACE: North White Plains, New York

DATE: February 6, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to  
the recording accomplished at the interview.

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Kathryn A. Mirfin  
Transcriber