

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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GROUNDING OF THE MOTOR VESSEL
NENITA IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER
NEAR SKAMOKAWA, WASHINGTON
NOVEMBER 19, 2016

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA17FM003

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Interview of: DAVE BURNHAM

Via Telephone

Sunday,
January 31, 2017

APPEARANCES:

TRAVIS NOLEN, Lead Investigating Officer
Marine Safety Unit
United States Coast Guard

ROB JONES, Senior Marine Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

BRAD DUNN, Contract Investigator
Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots

ELROY OLSON, Pilot
Columbia River Bar Pilots

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I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Dave Burnham:	
By Mr. Nolen	6
By Mr. Jones	9
By Mr. Nolen	25
By Mr. Jones	30

I N T E R V I E W

(1:12 p.m.)

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2
3 MR. NOLEN: We can start. I do have the VDR here. So we
4 might review some things or some questions maybe about the VDR,
5 and then we can just go into wherever that directs us, or if you
6 have specific questions.

7 So, without delaying any further, the date is 31 January.
8 The time is approximately 12 minutes after 1 p.m. in the
9 afternoon.

10 My name is Travis Nolen. I'm a marine investigator with the
11 Coast Guard Marine Safety Unit, Portland, Oregon, and I'm here
12 doing the casualty on the Motor Vessel *Nenita*, which grounded.
13 And the purpose of this investigation is a Part 4 Coast Guard
14 Marine Casualty Investigation, and we'll just go around the table
15 now.

16 MR. BURNHAM: Hi, this is Dave Burnham. I am the pilot that
17 was piloting the *Nenita* on the night of the 19th of the grounding.

18 MR. DAVIS: And this is Kevin Davis. I'm the lawyer for
19 Captain Burnham and for the Columbia River Pilots. And, Rob, we
20 met when you were out on the *Sparna* investigation a year ago, I
21 guess. Yeah, last March.

22 MR. JONES: I wasn't on the *Sparna*. That was Adam Tucker, I
23 think.

24 MR. DAVIS: Oh, right. Okay. Beg your pardon.

25 MR. JONES: Not a problem.

1 MR. DAVIS: That other NTSB guy.

2 MR. DUNN: I'm Brad Dunn. I've been contracted by the Oregon
3 Board of Maritime Pilots as an independent investigator.

4 MR. OLSON: Elroy Olson, Columbia River Pilots, a board
5 member on the investigation for the Oregon Board of Maritime
6 Pilots. And it was Anne McIntyre that you had spoke to when you
7 were out here a couple of years ago.

8 MR. JONES: Okay. Thanks. Yeah, that name rings a bell and
9 -- is that there? Do you want me to announce who I am, Travis?

10 MR. NOLEN: No, we've got you; Rob Jones, NTSB.

11 MR. JONES: Okay.

12 MR. NOLEN: And you understand this is being recorded. So
13 everybody agreed, so --

14 Just to put this out there, I think -- I'm looking around the
15 table, and I think most people have had to at least review the 20-
16 minute VDR section. Did that raise any immediate questions or
17 concerns from anybody on the VDR? I think there's maybe some
18 disputable things, and I'm not sure if you've see this, Rob.

19 We noted or I noted some things in the VDR, that I could
20 probably go to the time frame of when that happened. One of the
21 things I've yet to do regarding the VDR is have an interpreter go
22 through and listen to it and try and tell me what's going on in
23 those phone conversations to the engine room. So I have to finish
24 that. Everything we put out there on the (indiscernible) drive, I
25 think everybody has access to as far as sharing of the documents.

1 INTERVIEW OF DAVE BURNHAM

2 BY MR. NOLEN:

3 Q. So one of the things I wanted to start out with is, I think
4 -- did you review any of the pictures that you -- from maybe the
5 bridge, where you see the slowdown override? Did you know
6 anything about that? Did you --

7 A. No.

8 Q. No. Okay. So you didn't notice the captain maybe push
9 anything at any time during the --

10 A. My full concentration, under the circumstances, was on the
11 bow of that ship and trying to keep it in the channel.

12 Q. Okay. So at no time when he -- when there's conversations,
13 and, you know, we can listen to that, at no other time did he tell
14 you he had the opportunity to override that condition?

15 A. Not that I recall, no.

16 Q. So this goes back to when you called for full astern and you
17 see now he's actually increased, you see an increase in ahead
18 propulsion before that happens. I don't know if you had a chance
19 to see that actually.

20 A. I seen that in the playback, but at the time I was not aware
21 that we got any ahead propulsion. I could not hear it, and no one
22 on the bridge said anything to me that we did have power. So I
23 wasn't aware of it at the time, no.

24 MR. NOLEN: Okay. Does that lead you to any questions, Rob?

25 MR. JONES: No, not right now. I don't want to pick it

1 apart, piecemeal, and I don't know if it would work better,
2 Travis, and with everybody there, if he could just -- if maybe the
3 pilot could just go from, you know, a couple minutes before and
4 just walk us through it first, and then we could go back and kind
5 of start. Like just his recollection of everything and when he
6 sensed something was wrong and -- instead of asking him individual
7 questions. But that's just my take on it, if that would work.

8 MR. BURNHAM: Okay. You know, these are approximate times.
9 I know you guys got information through the audio and the video of
10 the incident, but approximately 0232, when I started initiating a
11 turn, I heard the engine rpms drop and some alarms went off. And
12 that's when I asked the captain what was going on, you know,
13 basically what's happening; what's going on in the engine room?
14 But like I said, and then I looked up and I seen also that the
15 rpms were almost stopped.

16 So at that time, like I say, I was just getting ready to make
17 a -- I said 16, but 16 to 20-degree turn to the port. The ship
18 was not handling all that well anyway with the draft of the ship.
19 It had about a 3-inch sag in the middle of the ship, so it made it
20 a little harder to handle than most ships of that draft.

21 So when I lost those rpms, like I said, my full concentration
22 was on the bow of that ship because I was having to use hard over
23 rudder and -- which is a very dangerous thing to do. So I was --
24 all my concentration was trying to keep that ship in the middle of
25 the channel.

1 And during that course of time, I heard the captain talking
2 to the engine room, you know, trying to determine what was going
3 on. I was asking for, you know, rpms obviously to keep some
4 steerings up on the ship. And I can answer any questions that you
5 have, but I mean I -- like I said, right up until we hit, you
6 know, I -- I waited till the last minute because I was trying to
7 get below Three Tree Point. That was my goal. So I could get out
8 of the channel and over into the shoals.

9 And it looked like I was going to be able to make that happen
10 up until we got that last push there off of -- around Buoy 26
11 there. And as soon as we got that last push, I had shifted the
12 rudder hard to port, and when it became obvious that I was not
13 going to get any more turns to check out that swing and we were
14 going to hit, that's when I initiated and I told him to drop both
15 anchors, and shortly after that, emergency full astern.

16 BY MR. NOLEN:

17 Q. So after the review of the VDR and you see that you had -- I
18 mean you were never told that you actually started getting ahead
19 turns. Do you think, even if you had been given power at that
20 point, would it have made a difference, right before --

21 A. Yeah --

22 Q. -- the anchors, the order to drop anchors?

23 A. That was a fine line right there. Maybe when I initially
24 first got the push, if I would have gotten full power initially, I
25 think I could have made it. But obvious, when I -- at that point

1 I said drop both anchors, it was obvious to me, even then, it was
2 too late. Even though we could have got full power back, there
3 was no way I could have checked the bow to, you know -- I didn't
4 have enough room.

5 MR. NOLEN: Okay. Are you still on there, Rob?

6 MR. JONES: Yeah, anytime you guys want me to jump in, I'm
7 happy to. I'm just listening intently right now.

8 MR. NOLEN: Okay. Yeah, if you have some, go ahead since,
9 you know, I think most people here are aware that I have an
10 engineering background and limited time on the bridge on any of
11 the ships I've actually sailed on. So, you know, I definitely
12 rely on your expertise here.

13 MR. JONES: Okay. Well, I'll try.

14 BY MR. JONES:

15 Q. You know, Captain, this information might be somewhere else
16 already, and I apologize if we're getting redundant, but if I
17 could just do a little -- you know, I had to get out of there
18 quick, so I just -- do a little background, which is what we do
19 all the time.

20 Can you just give me a brief of your career, whether you went
21 to maritime academy, whether you went to sail deep sea, how long
22 you've been a pilot with the River Pilots, et cetera, something
23 like that?

24 A. I started on the river back in 1979 on tugboats. I did not
25 go to a maritime school. I worked my way up. Started out as a

1 deckhand on the tugboats, roughly did that for 20 years before I
2 got into the Pilots. And I am currently -- June 5th of this year,
3 it will be 17 years in the Pilots.

4 Q. Okay. Now do you have a commission or a license for the bar
5 or just the river?

6 A. Just the river.

7 Q. Okay. And that's -- basically what I've heard before is like
8 a full branch pilot or that's an unlimited endorsement you have
9 for any size ship going up and down the Columbia River?

10 A. Unlimited.

11 Q. Okay. And how old are you, sir?

12 A. 61.

13 Q. All right. So if we could just stay with like the background
14 for a minute, then we'll go back into the details of the night.
15 Was that -- had you been on duty for a while? Have you made any
16 other trips before that trip that day or did you come -- were you
17 coming from home to take that piloting assignment?

18 A. I was home when I was dispatched for the job, around 1600,
19 the evening of the 18th. I can tell you roughly 24 hours before
20 what I was doing, if that's what you're asking?

21 Q. Yeah, that would be fine. And, I mean, what we always ask
22 for is, you know, how much rest have you gotten the time before,
23 the night before, and obviously this was a nighttime assignment.
24 So, you know, did you feel well rested? Did you get enough before
25 your assignment?

1 A. I was well rested. On the 17th, about 11:00 in the morning,
2 I got a call from dispatch and took a car ride from my home in
3 Rainier to Astoria. And I believe it was around 1920, 1930, I got
4 on an inbound ship to relieve the bar pilot, and I just ran it, I
5 think it's only about 4½ miles, up to an anchorage, dropped the
6 anchor, got back on the pilot boat, back to the pilot station, and
7 then I went home shortly after that and went to bed, somewhere
8 around 10:00 on the 17th, 10:00 at night.

9 Q. And then slept until when?

10 A. Slept -- I probably, I think I got up around 8:00 the next
11 morning. Basically just kind of hung around the house, laid
12 around, watched TV most of the day. I was watching our dispatch
13 sheet. So it looked like I was going to get a night job, so I
14 kind of laid down in the afternoon there for about an hour and a
15 half or so, just resting, and like I say, then that evening on the
16 18th, around 1600, I got a call from our dispatch and was
17 dispatched for a 2300 set job on the *Nenita*.

18 Q. Okay. And what time did you report aboard? Just shortly
19 before 2300, I guess?

20 A. It was about 2230. We generally try to be -- show up on the
21 bridge of the ship around a half hour before the ship is set to
22 sail.

23 Q. Okay. And if, you know, we didn't have the accident here,
24 where would you have gotten off? Like somewhere off Astoria,
25 right?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And about what time would that have been?

3 A. Probably around, somewhere 0340, I guess. It would be
4 recorded actually, because I made a call on the VHF radio on 13 to
5 the bar pilots like we normally do, you know, for a pilot change
6 down there, but -- I don't know exactly when but it should have
7 been probably around 3:40, 0340 in the morning of the 19th.

8 Q. Okay. All right. Just a little more background. Have you
9 had BRM training, bridge resource management, for pilots?

10 A. Yes, I have.

11 Q. And do you take that recurrently with the Columbia River
12 Pilots Association?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you -- how often do you take it, do you know?

15 A. Every 5 years.

16 Q. Okay. And I'm just going to jump around here from what I
17 remember about the VDR and what you just said. When you say --
18 like that was kind of an east/west route where Three -- what's it
19 -- Three Free Point?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And you said you wanted to get below that. Do you mean to
22 the west of it?

23 A. West, and I guess it would be, yeah, a little bit north. But
24 it would be out of the channel on the Washington side of the
25 channel, completely out of the channel.

1 Q. Okay. Because it was just confusing me. It might just be
2 local jargon when you said below it.

3 A. Downriver.

4 Q. Downriver. Okay. Towards Astoria? Or no, towards Portland?

5 A. No, Astoria.

6 Q. Okay. All right. As I say, every river I'm getting to know
7 is a little different, you know.

8 And do you remember -- and I heard the part, so I mean I'm
9 not -- and if you guys have heard it differently, certainly
10 correct me if I'm wrong, but when I listened to the VDR,
11 everything seemed to be going okay. I remember you, sir, the
12 pilot, Captain Burnham, saying -- I think you said -- you're
13 right, you had just given a course initiation, like to 270, and
14 then I remember you -- I remember hearing you say, hey, what went
15 out; where's my engines? You know, do I kind of have that right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did you hear -- and I actually, from my notes, I don't
18 remember any alarms. You know, the first indication I had
19 something was wrong was you noticing something was wrong. Did you
20 feel like the vibration, too, you know, just in the deck standing
21 there or could you actually hear the engines wind down?

22 A. I could hear the engine winding down, and I believe there was
23 actually an alarm, too. But really what triggered it was I knew
24 that -- I could hear the rpms on the engine drop off.

25 Q. Okay. And before that, did the phone ring or did the captain

1 come to you or any -- did you have any other possible idea that
2 something might be up until you witnessed or felt and observed the
3 engine winding down?

4 A. I have no indication there was any issue until I heard the
5 rpms drop off and the alarm go off.

6 Q. Okay. And when you said what you said basically, you know,
7 alerting the bridge team or crew to the drop in engine revs and
8 propulsion, what did they do next? Probably the captain, but what
9 did he do next?

10 A. Well, I -- he got on the phone right away, and I'm sure he
11 was talking to the engine room. I mean, he obviously knew that
12 there was an issue with the engine and he was trying to determine
13 what was going on.

14 Q. Okay. And, you know, I'm just going by my experience. I
15 sailed for a while as captain and actually I used to bring my
16 cable ships up to Astoria for a while and into Portland for a lot
17 of work, but -- so I remember the windy river and I appreciated
18 the expertise of the pilots. But do you feel you were getting the
19 -- enough information or the information you needed from the
20 captain or --

21 A. Actually, yes. I mean, in my experience in the past, I know
22 the captain was just as concerned with the loss of the engine as I
23 was. I'm sure he was very well aware of the dangers also, and so
24 I'm sure they were doing everything in their power to get the
25 engine back.

1 Q. And I know Travis said he was trying to get an interpreter,
2 but I'm just wondering if the severity of the predicament you were
3 in was getting relayed to the engineers quick enough, you know,
4 being in a tight river and a windy river, with a loss of
5 propulsion. Because I'll tell you, when I watched the VDR back up
6 in Portland, I felt for you guys, knowing what was going on there
7 and, you know, nothing -- I didn't hear anything being rectified
8 to you. I heard you asking a lot of questions and I didn't hear
9 you getting a lot of answers, is really what I'm trying to say.

10 A. I don't know how to answer that. I felt like the captain and
11 crew was doing everything that they could, you know, to get the
12 engine back. I think listening back to the VDR, you know, I was
13 -- I probably stated it more than once, that I needed some power
14 to the wheel, you know, because I was losing steering, and I think
15 that message got through loud and clear to the captain. I think
16 they were doing everything that they could.

17 You know, like I say, my main concentration was on the bow of
18 the ship. It's a rock wall all the way down the Washington side
19 of the channel where I lost that power, so I was very concerned
20 about not letting the stern of that ship go into the beach. So I
21 had my full concentration on the bow of the ship.

22 Q. No, I understand and I appreciate your clarity with regards
23 to the crew's response. I actually maybe even said more than I
24 usually wanted to there, only because I'm here on the phone and
25 wanted to give you the opportunity to comment on whether you got

1 the answers. Like I said, I was going by the silence that I was
2 hearing, so I -- no, I do appreciate you realizing they were in
3 the situation and that you felt their response was okay.

4 Well, saying what you said about concentrating on the bow,
5 did that ship have a steering light, by any chance?

6 A. Yes, it did.

7 Q. And it was on? I guess you were using it?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. And you had mentioned the ship had a sag?

10 A. About a 3-inch midship. It was sagging in the middle, yes.

11 Q. Is that normal or --

12 A. I wouldn't say it's normal, but it's not unnormal either. We
13 run into that issue often; maybe not, you know, all the time, but
14 it does happen.

15 Q. Do a lot of those -- I mean, with a sag, and I think it was
16 almost even fore and aft -- I don't think there was much trim aft,
17 and you had a sag. Does any of the ships try to go out of there
18 with a stern trim? I mean, does that help steering? Could you
19 just walk me through that if you guys try to do that at all or is
20 it up to the load from the ship and you just, you take the ship
21 the way you get it as long as it's not unsafe?

22 A. We take ships in draft conditions all the time. It's not out
23 of the ordinary to do that. I don't know how to answer that
24 question other than the fact of being a pilot, you adjust to that.
25 We handle ships like that all the time without any incident.

1 We're accustomed to that and we adjust accordingly.

2 Q. Okay. And how much under-keel clearance did you have for
3 that? And again, is that normal?

4 A. Yes, it's normal. And the exact depths of the water, if you
5 want us to pull that up, we can, but the channel is maintained to
6 a 43-foot draft ship. And our office -- not only our office but
7 us as individual pilots, it's up to us, which I do when I got
8 dispatched for the *Nenita*, is I do research for the -- it's the
9 load max for the amount of water that is expected that I'm going
10 to have going down the river. Obviously we know where the shoal
11 problems are. And I look at all that information. So we make
12 sure that we do have plenty of under-keel clearance to sail that
13 ship.

14 Q. Okay. I had a question, and as you were describing that, I
15 lost it, and it was a good question, too. Mark my words, it was a
16 good question.

17 When we looked at the VDR, I noticed when you were going out,
18 you were at nav full. So that -- you were -- everything that
19 engine could give you, that's what you were asking for?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is that also normal to be at nav full instead of just full
22 ahead?

23 A. We use both. I -- the steam that we were making, I don't
24 believe we were -- got up -- I think it was around 11 knots. I
25 try not to go much faster than that. So it depends on whether the

1 tide is flooding, ebbing. So at times I may possibly, on a ship
2 like that, on a strong ebb tide and shoaling areas, I may drop it
3 down to half ahead. We adjust our speed accordingly. That area
4 that we were running was -- in the channel itself was fairly deep
5 water.

6 Q. Okay. Did the captain have any concerns about nav full,
7 pushing the engines too hard or overloading them by any chance?

8 A. He never expressed it to me, no.

9 Q. And I think I remember hearing you -- what was the state of
10 the current at the time of the accident? Was it just starting to
11 change to flood?

12 A. Yes. Yeah, it was just in the process of changing from
13 minimum up to a flood.

14 Q. So would you say at the time that the grounding occurred,
15 were you at slack?

16 A. I think it was starting to flood a little bit right then.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. That's why the ship stayed in the position that it did.

19 Q. About -- could you guesstimate the speed of the current?

20 A. It was very minimal at the time. I could go back and look at
21 the projected -- the currents on the load max. But it was -- it
22 had just changed, like we just talked about. But, yeah, at that
23 time it was very minimal.

24 Q. Okay. And I remember on the VDR you had asked if both
25 steering pumps were on. Did you ever get confirmation that they

1 were both on?

2 A. I don't believe that I did.

3 Q. Okay.

4 MR. NOLEN: Can I interject here? I think the question on
5 the VDR was, do you have a second pump?

6 MR. JONES: Okay. You might be right, and that's -- yeah, I
7 was just wondering if that's the case and whether they had both on
8 or not. So, yeah, I just -- we'll clarify that further down. We
9 might have to ask them do a little bit more research, but sure.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Rob, that particular ship can't
11 operate on two steering pumps at the same time.

12 MR. JONES: It can or can't?

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Cannot.

14 MR. JONES: Oh, so it's a moot point?

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes.

16 MR. JONES: Okay.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It can only be on one or the other.

18 MR. JONES: All right.

19 MR. NOLEN: And just for note, Rob, Luke spent a lot of time
20 documenting the steering gear information and stuff while he was
21 here.

22 MR. JONES: Okay. All right. That's fine.

23 BY MR. JONES:

24 Q. When you made the decision to drop the anchors -- before you
25 dropped the anchors, was it ever relayed to you that on the bridge

1 there was an override that could bypass the engine program and you
2 could --

3 A. No.

4 Q. Okay. Did you know or did you see or was it explained to you
5 by the captain that they may have used that after the fact to get
6 maybe astern revolutions or something after the accident?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. So then, just to be sure, and you did a master-pilot
9 exchange with this crew in the vessel when you boarded?

10 A. Yes. I always do.

11 Q. And that wasn't brought to your attention or anything?

12 A. No, not that I can recall.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. No.

15 Q. So when -- just walk me through your decision to drop the
16 anchors, you know. I mean, it seems like it's a, you know, an
17 obvious answer but I don't want to put words in your mouth,
18 Captain. Just tell me why you decided and when to drop the hooks.

19 A. When it became obvious to me, even if we had full power with
20 hard to port rudder, it was too late. We were going to hit the
21 rocks over at Three Tree Point. It was too late to recover.

22 Q. Okay. And did you intend to drop a certain amount of chain
23 or did you just let them both go? I mean, I know that's on the
24 VDR, but it is a little bit chaotic at that point. I didn't know
25 if you had heard the captain or was able to talk to the captain.

1 We didn't catch anything, but did you just say let them go and
2 then they, you know, they held them on the brakes at a certain
3 point or what were you trying to do?

4 A. I was trying to get both anchors out, and when I -- I heard
5 the chains going out of the chain locker there, and then I was
6 trying to -- you know, it was really a short period of time --

7 Q. Right.

8 A. -- that I had from the time I dropped anchors to the time
9 that we hit. And I was just trying to get both anchors down, and
10 we were in really deep water and I'm not so sure in that area
11 right there that it had really good holding power for the anchors.
12 I think it was kind of a rocky bottom right in there, and I -- I
13 don't know how to answer that.

14 Q. No, that's fine. And again, I'm not -- you know, this is why
15 I do like seeing you face-to-face. I'm not trying to maneuver a
16 trick -- you know, I'm just looking for your expertise and what
17 you were thinking at the time, because you're the one that's
18 there. Because my first question would be to you, and you know,
19 you certainly could answer it and show my niaveté at it.

20 I was wondering why not just drop the port anchor and, you
21 know, maybe, if it catches, pull the bow away? And why drop both
22 instead? So, you know, enlighten me on that.

23 A. Port anchor would have been, in my opinion, the worst
24 decision to make. It would have thrown the stern of the ship into
25 the rocks, and that's absolutely what I did not want to do. Early

1 on when I first lost power -- like I said, I was well aware of the
2 rock wall all the way down the Washington side and I remember
3 thinking to myself, if I was going to go aground and going to hit,
4 I want that bow to hit for sure as opposed to the stern.

5 Q. Yep. No, I'm agreed. And I wanted you to say that answer,
6 not for me to write that answer, about the stern swinging into the
7 rocks. So I appreciate it.

8 Was there any -- did you have the opportunity or was there
9 any thought to, with the rocks on the right -- the starboard side
10 or the Washington side, is it mud on the Oregon side? Was there
11 any attempt maybe if you lose steering like that, when you guys
12 talk about emergency ship handling, better to ground it in mud
13 than to possibly sheer off into rocks or anything? Was there any
14 consideration for that?

15 A. All of that, what you're speaking of, was going through my
16 mind when I lost the engine power. What I was really concerned
17 with, yes, I could have thrown the rudder hard over to port. It's
18 all sandy shoal on the Oregon side. In fact, it's a steep
19 sandbank on the Oregon side of the channel, and there's areas that
20 actually protrude out into the edge of the channel shoaling. My
21 concern was, if I did that, with the momentum of the ship, the
22 stern was going to swing to Washington, the same scenario,
23 swinging towards the rocks on the Washington side, and even though
24 we were right in the early stage of the flood tide, I think my
25 momentum -- the momentum of the ship would have probably swung the

1 ship stern downstream and, shortly after that, we would have swung
2 right back around the other way, stern upstream on the flood.
3 Believe it or not, all that scenario was playing out in my head,
4 and thinking I did not have any engine power at all, I would not
5 be able to control very well the closeness of the stern of that
6 ship on the rocks.

7 Q. Okay. No, I appreciate it. And again, I want -- I like
8 hearing you say it and not me guessing it. So I really appreciate
9 your candor.

10 Sorry for jumping around but going back to the anchors, do
11 you -- after, of course, you hit, do you remember if they ever
12 logged or how much chain they had out on each anchor, how many
13 shots on either side?

14 A. I believe that might be on the VDR. I think I asked that
15 question. I don't recall exactly. I think there was -- now this
16 is a guess on my part. I don't know.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. But it seems 5 shots of chain out on the starboard side --
19 and I may be way off on this, and there was some chain, but I
20 don't think there was as much on the port side.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I think I do remember asking that question.

23 Q. All right. Let's see. One follow-up. How long did you
24 remain aboard after the grounding, sir?

25 A. About 0600, when I got relieved by another pilot.

1 Q. Okay. Did they ever get power back to the engines? Did you
2 have to do any maneuvering just to keep it in the channel except
3 for the nose going aground, or was she a dead ship after that?

4 A. I don't believe -- no, the ship was actually, after we hit --
5 it was very deep water along the rocks there. After we initially
6 hit and we settled back, the ship was actually floating, and we
7 were just outside of the channel on the Washington side, right on
8 the edge of the channel.

9 Q. Okay. And about what time did the -- you did call for tugs.
10 I remember hearing that. And how long did it take the tugs to get
11 there? And where did they come from? Astoria I presume.

12 A. You know, they came from upriver. I don't know if one of
13 them might have come from Longview and maybe one from Portland. I
14 don't know the answer to that. I was trying to get the closest
15 tugs available down there as quickly as possible. I think I
16 called early on for tugboats shortly after I lost the engines.
17 However, when it became apparent that I -- you know, I wanted tugs
18 on the way because it looked like I was probably going to end up
19 running aground somewhere.

20 Q. Okay. And --

21 A. There was no available tugs in Astoria.

22 Q. Oh, okay. Well, so when did the first ones arrive at your
23 position?

24 A. About 6:00, right when I was getting ready to get off the
25 ship.

1 Q. Oh, so they didn't come -- I thought they might have got
2 there a little earlier, you know, racing out to assist.

3 A. No.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. That's the soonest that they could get there.

6 Q. Okay. That's all I have right now, Captain.

7 MR. JONES: If anybody has anything else, they can certainly
8 jump in, give me time to think of some more if you'd like.

9 BY MR. NOLEN:

10 Q. I have one for you, Captain, which I didn't see in there. So
11 you had mentioned this grounding and part of your -- have you been
12 involved in -- since your 17 years experience, have you been
13 involved in any other groundings?

14 A. The only one -- yes.

15 Q. About how long ago or do you remember the name of the vessel?

16 A. I have to think about the name of it. It was when I was
17 actually training.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. So it was my first year of training as a pilot, but nothing
20 since.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. We lost full power. We lost steering. We lost engine. We
23 lost everything on that particular ship.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It T-boned into our dock, wasn't it?

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's the one that (indiscernible) --

1 BY MR. NOLEN:

2 Q. Okay. I was here during that.

3 A. Okay. Yeah.

4 Q. Okay. It hit steel dock, right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Lost everything?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. It was like '99 or 2000.

9 A. '99. Well, it was actually 2000 because that was Y2, you
10 know, everybody thought the engine or the world was coming to an
11 end. And so we were extremely concerned about, you know, anchors
12 being ready to let go and all that, yes.

13 MR. NOLEN: Okay. And I can't think of the name of that
14 vessel, Rob, but I was here as an inspector on that, what the
15 Captain here is describing. It hit a steel dock in Kalama, which
16 that dock, I don't even thing there was maybe even a chip out of
17 it but --

18 MR. BURNHAM: Actually I know insurance guy. There was \$1
19 million to the dock and about \$1 million to the ship.

20 MR. NOLEN: Okay.

21 MR. BURNHAM: I do remember that.

22 MR. NOLEN: Okay. Yes, that was a total -- I remember a
23 total loss of everything, so --

24 I don't have anything else, Rob. You kind of hit everything,
25 and I think we were just going to maybe review part of the VDR and

1 discuss some of those different things in the VDR with everybody
2 here, but as far as other questions, they might arise from that
3 but I didn't know if you wanted to hang out on the phone or --

4 MR. JONES: Yeah, I'd love -- no, if no one minds, I wouldn't
5 mind just reviewing it. It could spark another question or two,
6 if that's okay with everybody. That would be great.

7 MR. NOLEN: Okay. So what I planned, and I don't know, the
8 document that I had given up or the recording didn't have all the
9 availability to jump around and switch and look at all the other
10 things because we're having VDR issues with the DVDs that I
11 burned. So now there's a corruption in the file and the only
12 original DVD was playing correct. So I took a screenshot
13 basically of this and recorded 20 minutes of roughly the thing and
14 then uploaded that so everybody could kind of review the
15 situation.

16 So I can jump around and we can look at different things on
17 the VDR. I can fast forward and move it, but I have just created
18 it here in this spot here which is -- on their VDR is roughly
19 1020.

20 (DVD of VDR played.)

21 MR. NOLEN: He entered alarm status, frankly, on this
22 (indiscernible) other systems may have. But it has
23 (indiscernible).

24 I believe you see in the VDR and radar (indiscernible) like
25 much of the other ones. We have a picture, we discussed, every,

1 what, 20 seconds (indiscernible) VDR.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Travis, is that green dot
3 (indiscernible)?

4 MR. NOLEN: On the radar?

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, right there.

6 MR. NOLEN: (Indiscernible). I have a graph down here on the
7 bottom, you should see a graph showing the maximum and the other
8 one's "A," roughly 85 and rudder (indiscernible).

9 That alarm blinking doesn't necessarily mean there's an
10 alarm?

11 MR. BURNHAM: There is an alarm, and I have a box
12 (indiscernible) but it wasn't (indiscernible).

13 MR. NOLEN: Just what you have right here, (indiscernible)
14 full system. Then there's acknowledge. Fire detection alarm.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible).

16 MR. NOLEN: (Indiscernible) company, you know.
17 (Indiscernible)

18 Hey, Rob, at 3:40 was ETA.

19 MR. JONES: Okay. Okay. Thanks.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The nice thing about (indiscernible),
21 they know right where you're at, by the (indiscernible) tank.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. (Indiscernible) here.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He didn't do it (indiscernible)
24 control. Yeah, but he didn't go astern like you asked him to and
25 then he -- but he repeated it.

1 (Playing DVD of VDR ended.)

2 MR. NOLEN: I wanted to go back because you brought up the
3 question of the brake on the anchors. Let's go back just to -- I
4 believe that's 530.

5 (Playing DVD of VDR resumed.)

6 BY MR. NOLEN:

7 Q. So you hear him say it again.

8 A. Unfortunately, he went down to -- the engine started
9 astern --

10 Q. Right.

11 A. -- which, you know, (indiscernible) throw the ship
12 (indiscernible), you know, around 4 knots, it might not have
13 started.

14 (Playing DVD of VDR ended.)

15 MR. NOLEN: What we're discussing, Rob -- are you still
16 there?

17 MR. JONES: Yep.

18 MR. NOLEN: Is, you know, when he calls for full astern and
19 then we actually get ahead revolutions, but this whole time
20 they're in bridge control. So even when he says full astern, they
21 sit there still in the ahead and there's no change in the engine
22 order telegraph until I think he's picking up the phone to talk to
23 the engine room again, instead of maybe shifting the engine order
24 telegraph to be astern and then worry about picking up the phone.

25 MR. JONES: Yeah.

1 MR. NOLEN: So I think -- yeah, I mean, just where I stopped
2 this at, on the VDR time was 10:45 roughly, 10:45 and 30 seconds
3 on the VDR, I mean, it sounds like they say they can't hold the
4 brake on the anchor. Around that same time, they're also -- there
5 they're going astern already, but prior to this is -- you know,
6 they're like at dead slow speed with the engine order telegraph in
7 slow.

8 We think, you know, that the automation actually spells out
9 in the book that it's not dead slow. It's just slow, and the
10 engine rpm at slow I think is 42 or 45, something like that, and
11 so they're well below that. They're like at dead slow speed and
12 so, you know, there's definitely something else going on with the
13 engine besides just the automation control for that temperature
14 for both, the individual cylinder and the water pump going out
15 puts the engine to slow, not dead slow. I'm going to check back
16 here real quick.

17 BY MR. JONES:

18 Q. Well, while you're checking, can we ask, Captain, did you --
19 did this, you know, stir up any different ideas you might've had
20 of anything now that you heard it? I don't know if you've heard
21 it before, but just replaying it in your mind, does this make you
22 think of anything different?

23 A. That I might have done differently?

24 Q. Well, not so much. Just if you're remembering it the way you
25 did and, again, like I had saw -- I'll just ask specifically.

1 Like what I was looking at before was, you know, I do hear you ask
2 him, Captain, are we going to get any -- you know, I need some
3 more engine revolutions, and I never hear him respond to you in
4 English. So, you know, it sounded like you're asking but you're
5 not getting any answers, and I just was -- wonder if you, do you
6 have that same assessment of that -- in that parcel of time that I
7 do?

8 A. Yeah, I can hear that. I guess my answer would be I knew the
9 captain was obviously upset and he was -- I think under the
10 circumstances, I think the captain was trying to the best of his
11 ability to answer and carry out my orders. You know, he was
12 frustrated with what was going on down in the engine room. That's
13 my take on it. And I think I, as clearly as I could, I told him
14 what I needed and I didn't want to put the captain under any more
15 pressure than he was already under. I think he was trying to do
16 what he could. That's my assessment.

17 Q. Okay. No, and I again appreciate you saying it that way and
18 not diving into, you know, possibilities or conjecture. If the
19 captain, after the accident and -- well, not -- I'm sorry. After
20 the loss of propulsion, when you realized it and once the captain
21 got on the phone -- because I'm not sure, maybe Travis has the
22 actual time from the loss of propulsion to the grounding, what's
23 it, like 12 minutes or 15, but --

24 MR. NOLEN: Hold on. I have that. It was roughly around 13,
25 14 minutes.

1 BY MR. JONES:

2 Q. But if the -- and now, of course, you know, armchair
3 quarterbacking, know what we know what happened to the engine, if
4 the chief had relayed to the captain and the captain had relayed
5 to you -- because if I'm interpreting what I'm hearing right, I
6 know you're probably anticipating or hoping you're going to get
7 revs back because you keep asking for them. What if early on the
8 captain had told you and the chief, because the chief told him,
9 no, that's it; we've lost it, you know, we're not going to get any
10 more, would you have done anything differently?

11 A. Well, it's hard to say, but probably I would have changed my
12 plans of trying to anchor up below Three Tree. You know, to me,
13 in a situation like that -- like I say, that was my original goal,
14 and if any time before I dropped the anchors, it looked like I
15 wasn't going to make it, you know, then -- I guess it's a pretty
16 fluid situation. I mean, I'd have to react to what's in front of
17 me. I felt at the time I made the best decision I could because I
18 really didn't, right up until I dropped the anchors, that I
19 thought I could make it below Three Tree.

20 Q. Yeah, and, Captain, I hope -- you know, I hope to you and the
21 other investigators there, the last thing I want to do is try to
22 put words in your mouth and -- but because we know what happened
23 to the engines, that's kind of just what I'm trying to get at. If
24 you had gotten a better assessment of that engine room and what
25 they could or couldn't do, and only a minute or so after the

1 engine loss, if they had come to you and said, that's it, we don't
2 have any power, this is all you're going to get, 20 revs, if I'm
3 assessing what you said, you probably would have reassessed and
4 tried to anchor up quicker, I guess, but you still had a lot of
5 weight on though.

6 A. Yes. Yeah.

7 Q. Yeah. And --

8 A. Again, we did have a lot of weight on and that's what --
9 obviously I needed to bleed off some of the speed, but I guess to
10 answer your question, you know, it's -- I probably would have made
11 different decisions if I would've had that information. I would
12 have probably been thinking differently.

13 You know, not to elaborate on different vessels, but in our
14 profession it's not really unusual to lose temporary power on the
15 engine or temporary lose the steering on a ship. It happens. But
16 almost -- most of the time you get that back in a short time. I
17 guess that's what's going back, through the back of my mind.
18 Usually you get that engine back, you get the steering back in a
19 short amount of time.

20 Q. Yeah. No, again, I appreciate that, and again we're looking
21 at this because we can armchair quarterback and I understand the
22 temporary loss and if you're thinking that way, you're, okay, what
23 do I have to do just to keep her steady for the time being, as
24 soon as we get power back, we'll be okay. That's what I'm -- you
25 know, again, what's here in the VDR and having these tools at our

1 disposal, you know, I'm looking more like the communication from
2 the engine room to the bridge, if they knew it was catastrophic,
3 if they knew was a fait accompli and you had had that information.
4 And again, maybe they didn't know that, and we'll research that
5 more, too. I just -- you know, information to you is power along
6 with the engine and the helm.

7 So that's all I'm trying to get at. And I'm not trying to,
8 you know, point the finger at the engine room or the communication
9 from the chief to the captain. I'm just -- if communication would
10 have helped, though, and if we know for sure the engine was not
11 going anywhere -- but they did have that override, too, it seems
12 like, because we do see that engine spike up right before you give
13 the full astern bell or the full astern order. So that's another
14 area that we've got to clear up. But anyway, I just want to get
15 your -- you're the expert there, Captain. I just wanted to push
16 you a little bit on what you could have done if you had other
17 information. That's all. I don't want to --

18 A. It would have helped obviously --

19 Q. Yeah. Yeah.

20 A. -- if I had that information, yeah.

21 Q. All right. I appreciate it. I just -- did you know if for
22 sure -- I know you asked for more men on the bow. Did they get
23 two up there and were they able to drop both anchors at the same
24 time, or did they go one and then the other?

25 A. I did see people heading towards the bow. I don't know

1 exactly how many people they had on the bow at the time I let the
2 anchors go, but -- I don't really know the -- which anchor got
3 left, let go first, to tell you the truth. I don't know.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I was -- you know, when I ordered both anchors to let go, I
6 was trying to get as much stopping power as I could. I wanted
7 both anchors down and to slow the ship down as much as possible.

8 Q. And I know, you know, we heard the VDR -- and, again, I'm
9 just looking at this for lessons learned with -- you know, you're
10 trying to coordinate with tugboats. You're trying to ask the
11 captain, you know, for more power and what's going on. So you're
12 on your pilot radio, you're giving commands, steering and helm
13 commands. Is there any chance that you could have steered out of
14 this, or once that ship sought its heading and you lost enough
15 propulsion, it was just going to go whichever way it wanted to go?

16 A. Well, the ship took its final push off just about Three Tree
17 Point there, at Buoy 26. When I let the anchors go, I mean, I was
18 -- I know there was no recovering to get the ship, turn it back to
19 port. It was too late. And that's why I ordered both anchors to
20 let go.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. That's just experience, I knew it was too late. I know -- if
23 I had to play that over again on a, you know, like a ship handling
24 school or something, yeah, I mean, if you had practiced it over
25 and over again, I guess I'm trying to answer your question, maybe

1 I would have got good enough I could have made it down through
2 there to anticipate everything that happened, but I think at the
3 time -- I mean, I'm well aware of the pushes off the shoals. I'm
4 well aware that the anchors are used in hard over rudder and
5 having to take the rudder off immediately, as soon as that bow
6 started swinging, it shifted the other way, loss of rpms, you
7 know, I'm well aware of all that. I just -- I think under the
8 circumstances, I think I did the best I could.

9 Q. No, I -- and I appreciate again the answer, and I appreciate
10 you putting up with the questions and the kind of guessing on my
11 part, but --

12 MR. JONES: That's all I have right now, gentlemen. Again, I
13 appreciate being a part of this. I'll certainly sit in if you're
14 still going to discuss more though, if you'd like.

15 MR. NOLEN: I'm just trying to pull up pictures that we have
16 from the Google Drive to discuss some things, but actually on the
17 VDR, another thing, and I just bring this up is, Keith, if you go
18 back and we can listen to that point when he gets through talking
19 with the engineer, what he relays to you is about a pipe, you
20 know. So this is why our questioning, when we went back to the
21 engineers about a pipe, well, you know, you think, oh, he's got a
22 leak in a pipe. No, it's actually, you know, catastrophic failure
23 of the liner where everything's pulling -- pouring out of that
24 cylinder. It's not some little pipe somewhere that's causing
25 that, but -- so, you know, the question is still what

1 information's really being passed --

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

3 MR. NOLEN: -- to the captain about how serious the situation
4 is. So that's there. So on these two sheets that I have whenever
5 he was talking about timeline, there is a number of alarms that
6 point in the automation for slow down. And so these red things on
7 this timesheet -- so this is just a printout from down in the
8 engine room of the alarms.

9 So you will get a combination of the high temperature, and so
10 you'll see this is the number 3 cylinder. That's the cylinder
11 that had that water jacket fracture, and then he gets a reset on
12 it shortly and, of course, the expansion tank level. So he has a
13 combination of the fresh water pump going down, losing pressure,
14 so it goes into an alarm mode. Then, you know, with that shutting
15 down, he's automatically going to get temperatures. So then he
16 gets the temperature with the -- or the alarm with the tank level.
17 Then he's back at the 90-degree Celsius outlet from the number 3
18 cylinder again. And if you look at the jacket water cooling out
19 of any one of those cylinders, you see the 90 is the high alarm,
20 right, but he's getting the slowdown from the fresh water side of
21 the automation. So he's automatically going there.

22 So if we just look right in this time frame from there to
23 when you see this alarm, that's when you grounded. So you see the
24 oil sump alarm, that's because you stop and the oil in the sump
25 went forward and the low level in the oil sump alarm triggered for

1 a split second, came back, and then you get the oil sump normal
2 again. So that's really like the time frame. So roughly 13
3 minutes from that major alarm.

4 So the question we had, and I think Luke, Rob, we had
5 discussed this is, you know, we have all these set points of when
6 it slowed down and you'll see it on the VDR, we still don't know
7 whether it's them shutting down that cylinder or what was going
8 on, and we returned several times. The captain, the first time we
9 asked him with the port captain present about the override on the
10 bridge, he said, yes, he pushed it. But then he clarified later
11 and said, no. So there's that confusion on the bridge with
12 whether he pushed the override. But the whole time they were in
13 pilothouse or bridge control.

14 MR. JONES: Yeah.

15 MR. NOLEN: So --

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Could the override be activated from
17 the engine room even if they're in bridge control?

18 MR. NOLEN: Yeah, it could be activated, from what I
19 understand, either station.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Not related to Captain Burnham, but
21 the engineer and he probably only had one other guy down there
22 with him.

23 MR. NOLEN: No, he had a lot of people in the engine room.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, did they? Anyway, you know, he's
25 not aware of the navigation situation except for what the captain

1 tells him, and he's busy looking to save his engine, and if he's
2 looking at all his cooling water gone and he hits the override, it
3 could be damaging the entire engine. So his motivations are
4 different than the captain's motivations and there's kind of a
5 battle of -- I mean, everybody has the same common goal but, you
6 know, the chief obviously has some different things going on, and
7 I think that may have affected -- you know, if the chief knew the
8 ship was going to collide, catch fire and sink, yeah, he'd
9 probably hit that button sooner. Because it looks like he hit the
10 button. Then he hits it -- you know, he did it after he went full
11 astern (indiscernible) --

12 MR. NOLEN: Exactly, when you look at the VDR.

13 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But that's why the captain is -- also
14 I notice when we visited the ship, the captain was young and the
15 chief was old, and there could be a certain amount of who's really
16 wearing the pants on that ship.

17 And then one last thing. I'm sorry. This is kind of getting
18 off the thing here, but what I wanted to ask you is, I noticed
19 that when the crew joined the ship and the initial thing, that
20 Noya was the chief mate. How long has he been a captain and has
21 he been a captain before?

22 MR. NOLEN: Yeah, we have that in our documents somewhere on
23 here.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Because he wasn't -- I'm not sure he
25 was a captain in July because he joined in April or early May, and

1 so I don't know that he had been captain for very long, at least
2 on that ship.

3 MR. NOLEN: Yeah, we have that. I just can't recall. We --
4 when Luke Wisniewski was here, the engineer from NTSB, we visited
5 the ship three additional times, gathering engineering
6 information. And then we made more trips, you know, that's when
7 we asked more questions on the bridge, documented more stuff,
8 gathered more documents, part of the SMS system, a lot of
9 different pieces of evidence were gathered. There's a huge pile
10 here still to go through and try and piece together, but we do
11 have how long he had been the captain, how long the engineer had
12 been on there, who the previous engineer was, when the last
13 maintenance, all those sort of questions.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: All of these are on -- all this, I
15 guess that still is on Google Drive for us to look at?

16 MR. NOLEN: I'm not sure if I've scanned that yet. I have --
17 you mean the master statement of facts?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

19 MR. NOLEN: No, I don't think that is on there yet.

20 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'd like to get that.

21 MR. NOLEN: I'll have to look. Yeah, it'll be on --

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

23 MR. NOLEN: -- all be on there.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It also looks like, you know, whoever
25 had it before, they run everything out to pretty much the max, and

1 then totaled the ship or turned it over to you. When it went from
2 lowland to (indiscernible).

3 MR. NOLEN: Overall, the condition of that ship, I mean,
4 because we went back and we spent 3 days basically, is pristine
5 for the age of the ship.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, I think it's in good shape, but
7 I do think that they had probably maxed out (indiscernible).
8 Maybe not gone over, but certainly it looked like from cylinder to
9 engine, things were --

10 MR. NOLEN: Yeah. And what we can go over in here a little
11 bit later is I'll show you the bolts, I'll show you the cylinder
12 stuff. I have their maintenance records in here. They had
13 completed their maintenance of that cylinder, which is -- but the
14 problem is that's not necessarily removing that jacket.

15 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right.

16 MR. NOLEN: So they can lift that whole cylinder off with
17 that jacket in place, and clearly with the bolts and the guidance
18 that's given from the manufacturer, there's some -- you know, they
19 put, they had a bulletin out, a maintenance bulletin regarding the
20 bolts. And what's interesting from a MAN thing, and this is what
21 Luke and I, we're still trying to discuss with MAN is, yeah, okay,
22 they have the service bulletin out there, it says they need to do
23 this, need to make sure they have a gap in these bolts. It's
24 pretty evident from the pictures we gathered and looking at it,
25 there was a fracture in that cover for a while. It wasn't

1 something that just happened.

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right.

3 MR. NOLEN: And it just decided to give way then. And if you
4 look at how the bolts were all put on -- now these are all
5 manufactured. It wasn't something the ship's crew went through
6 and changed the bolts to, you know, some other style of bolt. But
7 when you order a new bolt from MAN, it's bigger to prevent that.
8 Yet they make no reference in their service bulletin to any of
9 those things, but yet when you buy a new bolt, it's a different
10 bolt. So that's where I can't get them to answer. But for the
11 gear, the ship was not aware of the service bulletin either.

12 But from our pictures and stuff that are on here, there was a
13 -- we assumed it was leaking and there was a small fracture there
14 that they just kind of disregarded, much the same as the other
15 vessel, probably the same thing. So all of these bolts that we're
16 seeing is, it was like a -- they torque it in until it stops and
17 some people have even over-torqued them to where they're
18 mushrooming out of the shoulder area where they've put so much
19 power on that. And really, that's just supposed to kind of just
20 be a positioning pin, kind of just hold it in place and doesn't
21 really need -- there's another style of bolt that's just a pin so
22 it doesn't need to have a bolt head. It just, like an Allen
23 wrench head, fits through that water jacket and so it just kind of
24 positions it there. So it's able to float around.

25 So, I mean, for us we know for the root cause, it's a

1 maintenance issue and probably a bolt issue, but -- from the
2 engineering standpoint. So, yeah, we need to look at the rest and
3 look at their last maintenance, gather all those records and the
4 previous engineer, not the one that was on board, was the one who
5 did the cylinder maintenance. So there was nobody on board that
6 was involved actually when that maintenance was performed. So --

7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm just -- Rob, I'm trying to find
8 your ECDIS movie. I think that's in your -- I know it was in the
9 NTSB pictures that you put up there.

10 MR. JONES: Well, you would have got it when -- I downloaded
11 it from my --

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

13 MR. JONES: -- you know, off the -- off that flash drive.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Right there. Isn't that it? That's
15 an ECDIS picture.

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, let me see. I'm looking for it.
17 Here, this might be it.

18 MR. JONES: And, you know, just -- with all the discussion
19 that was going on, if -- we had an accident similar, not similar
20 in -- the issues I would say were similar down in Texas with a
21 couple of Houston pilots on board, and it was called the *Anna*
22 *Smile*, and instead of me getting into the analysis, if you just
23 look on our website and read that one. It was kind of similar --
24 you had a, you know, a full branch pilot on and an apprentice and
25 the engine kind of gave out on them twice, and as they're coming

1 alongside the dock, the pilots decide to -- I mean, I can talk
2 about it since it's published. But the pilots decide to say, you
3 know, let's just use the tugs and we'll push her straight in, and
4 at the same time they start moving the vessel with the tugs, the
5 engineers get the engine back.

6 Well, then they look at the -- what was the last telegraph
7 order we got? Oh, it was slow ahead. So they just give them 30
8 or 40 revs ahead and no one ever tells the master, and the master,
9 of course, because he doesn't know, can't tell the pilots. So
10 they're trying to push -- they've got both tugs, you know, pushing
11 the vessel straight into the dock and off they go at slow ahead,
12 which on that big slow speed diesel, you know, they kicked up
13 quite a -- they got some movement going forward. So it's one of
14 the things we're looking at, the communication between the engine
15 room and the bridge, you know, in addition to what physically went
16 wrong.

17 So that's kind of where, Captain, I was leading you down, you
18 know, what would you have done if you had different information or
19 sooner information than -- you know, that's why -- I don't want
20 you to think I'm trying to, you know, dance around possibilities.
21 It had a purpose. But if you read that report, you might see
22 where I was going.

23 Travis, if you don't have it, I could certainly send one back
24 to you.

25 MR. NOLEN: Well, I'm sure, I'll just have to -- I know it's

1 -- I believe you had it on here. I know you ended up going over
2 there and filming it. I'm just trying to -- I'll find it. So
3 it's not a big -- you know, it's just between all of us uploading
4 stuff in here and, you know, with -- when I was back there with
5 Luke on the ship, we gathered even, you know, a ton more of
6 engineering things and we loaded it on here, and so there's quite
7 a few files on here. I'm just trying to filter through to try and
8 find -- I think you put it in -- I think we put it in a separate
9 folder or I got it from you and I put it into a separate folder,
10 but --

11 MR. JONES: Maybe. Because, I mean, it would have been with
12 all the pictures I took, so -- and I just have it as the same
13 title that I labeled it when I was in your office, which is just
14 ECDIS in caps and replay. I mean, if you did a quick search, you
15 might find it, and it still has that traffic cone icon.

16 MR. NOLEN: Oh, okay. Yeah.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's NDS folders. That's all of
18 these are in, right?

19 MR. NOLEN: Yeah, these are -- I mean, I'll find it. Let me
20 see what this is. This is probably just -- this is probably --
21 yeah, that's -- this is just a quick capture from -- yeah, that
22 doesn't matter. That's just marine traffic, a real quick capture
23 by like watchstanders.

24 MR. JONES: And just while we're talking housekeeping,
25 gentlemen, if Luke, who is the engineering investigator, if he

1 comes up with anything, if I come up with anything more -- you
2 know, what we use for our report, we put in our public docket. It
3 won't be all the information that we've gathered. It'll just be
4 what we really used to put the report together, but -- it'll be
5 there, but anything I also have, you know, I'll share with Travis
6 and anything you need to get, you can get from him.

7 MR. NOLEN: Yeah, that will work good.

8 MR. JONES: Okay.

9 MR. NOLEN: I'll find it in here. I know this isn't it
10 because it's only 375K, so --

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Was there something in it that you
12 wanted to ask him regarding the event?

13 MR. NOLEN: No. I just wanted to be able to show the ECDIS
14 recording which we had to see if there was any other specifics
15 there, but other than that, I don't -- I don't have any other
16 questions right now. Do you have anything else, Rob?

17 MR. JONES: No, I'm fine. Thanks, guys.

18 MR. NOLEN: Okay. Well, I think then we're done here, and
19 I'll just go through -- I'm just going to spend a little bit of
20 time just going over the engineering documents that we gathered
21 and answer any of those questions on that subject.

22 MR. JONES: Okay. And I've got everybody's email, I'm pretty
23 sure, copying in these -- trying to arrange these phone calls. So
24 -- and I'm sorry. Was it Elroy and the other investigator?

25 MR. DUNN: Brad Dunn.

1 MR. JONES: Brad, are you or Elroy, did you ever try to --
2 and I apologize if I didn't get back to you between the trip to
3 Seattle and then the holidays. I thought I had seen something
4 either come across email or a message from one of you two trying
5 to get ahold of me and then -- but I couldn't find you for the
6 life of me. So I wasn't ignoring anybody. I just -- I couldn't
7 find the information to respond to if you did reach out to me
8 while I was out there.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well, I was answering some of Travis'
10 emails that you were, you know, a part of, and I did get one that
11 said it didn't send to somebody but I don't remember who it was.
12 But I think most of those were just in response of canceling the
13 investigation or the interview because of the weather or when we
14 were going to schedule it again. There wasn't -- I didn't have
15 anything else.

16 MR. JONES: Oh, okay.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I didn't either, Rob.

18 MR. JONES: Okay. That's fine then. Thanks. I just didn't
19 want to leave anybody hanging like I was ignoring you guys, but
20 all right, appreciate it.

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: So you have our email address, you do?

22 MR. JONES: I do.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

24 MR. NOLEN: I found your folder, too, Rob.

25 MR. JONES: Oh, good.

1 MR. NOLEN: So I have everything.

2 MR. JONES: Okay. Yeah, their ECDIS wasn't that bad. I'm
3 still kind of old school. I mean, if we get the hard data great,
4 but if I can sit up there and take a quick video of it, I'm going
5 to grab it. So it's a pretty good replay of the incident.

6 MR. NOLEN: Yep. Okay. Well, I think that's it, and if I
7 have anything else, I'll give you a call. I'll probably give you
8 call tomorrow anyway.

9 MR. JONES: Okay. All right. Thanks, guys. It as nice
10 talking with everybody.

11 MR. NOLEN: Thanks, Rob.

12 MR. JONES: Okay. Thanks for your time, Captain. Appreciate
13 it.

14 MR. BURNHAM: Okay. Thank you.

15 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

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
IN THE MATTER OF: GROUNDING OF THE MOTOR VESSEL
 NENITA IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER
 NEAR SKAMOKAWA, WASHINGTON
 NOVEMBER 19, 2016
 Interview of Dave Burnham

ACCIDENT NUMBER: DCA17FM003

PLACE:

DATE: January 31, 2017

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complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
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Kathryn A. Mirrin
Transcriber