

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN

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Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007

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Interview of: BILL CAVERS

Crowne Plaza Hotel
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada

Thursday,
February 2, 2012

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MATTHEW NICHOLSON
Investigator-In-Charge

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, and
Hazardous Materials Investigations
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

BARRY STRAUCH, Ph.D.
Supervisory Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

KALU KELLY EMEABA, Group Chair
SCADA Operations
National Transportation Safety Board

[REDACTED]

KAREN BUTLER, Supervisor
Accident Investigations

[REDACTED]

JAY JOHNSON, Supervisor
U.S. Compliance
Enbridge Pipelines

[REDACTED]

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I N T E R V I E W

1
2 MR. NICHOLSON: This is NTSB Pipeline Case Number DCA-
3 10-MP-007, Enbridge Energy July 2010 crude oil release in
4 Marshall, Michigan. These are the Human Factors Group interviews
5 being conducted at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Edmonton, Alberta,
6 Canada. Today is Thursday, February 2nd, 2012.

7 This interview is being recorded for transcription at a
8 later date. Copies of the transcripts will be provided to the
9 parties and the witness for review once completed.

10 For the record, Bill, please state your full name with
11 spelling, employer name, and job title.

12 MR. CAVERS: My name is Bill Cavers. I've -- work for
13 Enbridge Pipelines, and I've worked for Enbridge for 27 years.

14 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. Can you spell your name for the
15 record, please?

16 MR. CAVERS: B-i-l-l, and last name Cavers,
17 C-a-v-e-r-s.

18 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. And your title?

19 MR. CAVERS: Control Center Operator Number 3.

20 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. For the record, Bill, please
21 provide a business contact phone number and e-mail address.

22 MR. CAVERS: [REDACTED]

23 MR. NICHOLSON: Thanks. Bill, you're allowed to have
24 one other person of your choice present during this interview.
25 This other person may be an attorney, friend, family member,

1 co-worker, or no one at all. If you would, please indicate whom
2 you've chosen to be present during this interview.

3 MR. CAVERS: No one.

4 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. We'll go around the room now and
5 have each person introduce themselves for the record.

6 My name is Matthew Nicholson, spelled M-a-t-t-h-e-w,
7 N-i-c-h-o-l-s-o-n. I am the NTSB IIC. My phone number is [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] My e-mail is [REDACTED]

9 MR. EMEABA: My name is Kalu Kelly Emeaba. Spell that
10 K-a-l-u, K-e-l-l-y, E-m-e-a-b-a. My contacts are: phone number
11 [REDACTED] I'm -- in this project, I'm the SCADA Operation
12 Group Chair. My e-mail address is [REDACTED]

13 MR. JOHNSON: Jay Johnson, Enbridge, Supervisor of U.S.
14 Compliance. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

15 MS. BUTLER: Karen Butler, K-a-r-e-n, B-u-t-l-e-r. I am
16 the Supervisor of Accident Investigations for PHMSA, which is the
17 Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration located [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]. I can be reached
19 at [REDACTED]

20 DR. STRAUCH: I'm Barry Strauch with the NTSB. That's
21 B-a-r-r-y, S-t-r-a-u-c-h. My phone number is [REDACTED] The area
22 code is [REDACTED]. My e-mail address is [REDACTED]

23 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. I think to start with, we'll let
24 Barry lead the questions, since these are human factors
25 interviews.

1 INTERVIEW OF BILL CAVERS

2 BY DR. STRAUCH:

3 Q. Bill, you've been with Enbridge for 27 years, you say?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. How many years of that were you a control center
6 operator?

7 A. Control center operator, 6 years.

8 Q. Six years. Okay. Can you tell us what you did before
9 that?

10 A. I worked at the Edmonton Terminal as a control center
11 operator out of the terminal.

12 Q. Okay. How many years did you do that?

13 A. Approximately almost 20 years.

14 Q. Okay. And now are you a terminal control or a
15 pipeline --

16 A. Terminal.

17 Q. Terminal. Okay. And at the time of the Marshall
18 incident, were you on duty?

19 A. I was on shift that evening.

20 Q. Okay. Which terminal were you operating?

21 A. Clearbrook/Regina Terminal.

22 Q. Okay. And which lines were you working with?

23 A. I was working with Lines 2, 3, 4, 13 and -- I think
24 that's it at the time.

25 Q. Okay. Were you anywhere near Line 6B?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Okay. Were you in a position to observe any of the
3 things that were going on?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Okay. In the time that you've been in the control
6 center here in Edmonton, in your 6 years, what kind of changes
7 have you seen in the way the control center has been operated?

8 A. I've seen more so changes after 6B incident, just on the
9 way the pipelines have been regulated and for pressures and so
10 forth.

11 Q. In what way has it changed?

12 A. Just the way the operators operate the lines and systems
13 now. They're under tighter restrictions in running their systems.

14 Q. How would you describe the relationship between shift
15 leads and controllers before the Marshall incident?

16 A. I think they were good, and I think everybody, depending
17 on which shift lead it is and what individual it is, I think have
18 different views on each other.

19 Q. And did that relationship change at any point from the
20 time you started to the Marshall incident and beyond?

21 A. Yes, I believe it has.

22 Q. Okay. In what way?

23 A. I think communication's better now than it was before.

24 Q. And by before, you're referring to the Marshall
25 incident?

1 A. Before the Marshall incident, yeah.

2 Q. Okay. And how has it improved?

3 A. I think in some ways just the shift leads themselves, I
4 think, have taken a different approach on the way they approach
5 people and so forth, so --

6 Q. What kind of approach do they take now as opposed to
7 before?

8 A. A little more relaxed approach, not seem to be as
9 intimidating as they used to be.

10 Q. Um-hum. Were they intimidating to everybody or just
11 more to some people than others?

12 A. I think it all depended on the individual and what the
13 circumstances -- what they were actually coming to investigate at
14 the time.

15 Q. What would bring about this kind of intimidation from
16 the shift leads?

17 A. It could be with a line being shut down and
18 investigating to find out why it was shut down and --

19 Q. And this is before the Marshall incident?

20 A. Right.

21 Q. So, it sounds like that shutting down a line could bring
22 some kind of negative attention from the shift leads?

23 A. It does in certain -- yeah, because they were, I guess,
24 basically looking at trying to get that pipeline up and running as
25 quick as possible, so they were -- even though they were following

1 the rules and regulations that they needed to follow, they were
2 still also trying to get that pipeline up and running as quick as
3 possible again.

4 Q. What would an operator have to go through under those
5 circumstances to shut a line down? Once the line was shut down,
6 what would -- during -- what would they do in response or what
7 they have to do or say?

8 A. Well, basically, they -- when they do shut it down, of
9 course, the supervisor has to be notified immediately that they're
10 shutting this line down and the reason why they're shutting it
11 down.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. Maybe there's a valve not reacting properly or whatever
14 the situation is, and then from there, the supervisor will come
15 and investigate and try and troubleshoot and find out what was
16 going on and what the reason was.

17 Q. And did -- would operators have to explain the motives
18 in shutting a line down?

19 A. Not necessarily, no. Basically, what they had to
20 explain is why they shut it down basically on, on the certain
21 circumstance. It could be, like I said, a valve not operating
22 properly, a control valve, or it could be maybe a batch line-up
23 not lining up properly with the densitometer, so they just need to
24 do further investigation to track it and find out that is the
25 proper batch, those kind of things.

1 Q. Suppose a shift lead disagreed with an operator as to
2 whether or not the line should be shut down, what would happen as
3 a result?

4 A. Generally speaking, they really -- because we all have
5 the right to shut it down if we feel it's not safe or whatever, we
6 can shut that line down. So, really, there isn't a lot of
7 repercussions that came out of that.

8 Q. Um-hum.

9 A. Basically, I think the big concern was is how long is it
10 going to be down for and how can you speed this process up to get
11 it up and running again.

12 Q. Okay. And again, this was before Marshall?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. And how has that changed now?

15 A. Now, I find they're more relaxed. They will shut the
16 line down and if it takes 2 hours to investigate it, then they'll
17 take 2 hours to investigate it.

18 Q. Where do you think this emphasis on restarting the line
19 came from pre-Marshall?

20 A. I think it's throughput. Basically, I think it was
21 throughput that was indicated through management, that the more --
22 longer the line's down, the less throughput they're going to have.

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. So in this case, I believe it was just upper management
25 wanting to make sure the lines were running.

1 Q. What level of management are you referring to when you
2 say upper management?

3 A. It could be management in our own department that is
4 above the supervisors.

5 Q. Okay. That would be specifically Curt Goeson, Ian
6 Milligan and those fellows?

7 A. Correct, yes.

8 Q. But, again, you don't see that now?

9 A. Not as much, no. It's changed quite a bit in that
10 aspect of it.

11 Q. Okay. Do you see any difference between the way women
12 operators are treated than men operators?

13 A. I don't see difference in the way they're treated, no.
14 Not at all, no.

15 Q. Okay. Do you see any difference between some operators
16 were treated and others?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Some were treated better than others?

19 A. In some respect, yes.

20 Q. And what do you think would cause that or did cause that
21 difference?

22 A. I think it just depends on personalities. Some people
23 get along better with other people, and if your supervisor gets
24 along better with you, I think you're treated a little better.

25 Q. Okay. And how would this difference in treatment

1 manifest itself?

2 A. Just in some cases you can -- people -- some people get
3 just different -- you find different things. They may get a
4 better schedule. They may get promotions. Those kind of things.

5 Q. Do you think if -- let's say someone who was treated
6 better than somebody else who was treated not so well, if those
7 two people committed the same errors, is it possible that one
8 error would be classified as one way and the other differently?

9 A. Yes. I'd say there was discrepancies in that.

10 Q. And you've observed that yourself?

11 A. I have, yes.

12 Q. And again, the people who made errors that weren't
13 documented as errors, what accounted for that documentation not as
14 errors, in your opinion?

15 A. Could you explain that again?

16 Q. Well, what do you think accounts for the difference?
17 Why someone's errors are not documented as errors, why do you
18 think that person was able to get away with not having an error
19 documented and somebody else did get it documented?

20 A. That I don't -- I couldn't answer that to be honest with
21 you.

22 Q. Oh. Were you -- did you have a chance to work with
23 either Ghazal Derhami and Tim Chubb?

24 A. Yes, I've worked with both of them.

25 Q. How would you describe Ghazal's performance as an

1 operator?

2 A. I would say Ghazal was an average operator.

3 Q. Um-hum. And what about Tim Chubb?

4 A. I would say Tim would be about the same, other than Tim
5 had a little more experience than Ghazal did, being there longer.

6 Q. In your opinion, were they treated the same or was one
7 of them on one side of this, kind of, divide and the other on the
8 other?

9 A. I would say yes, they were -- there was some dividing
10 stuff going on there between them.

11 Q. Who is the person who was treated less well? Which of
12 those two?

13 A. I would say Ghazal was.

14 Q. Why do you think that was?

15 A. That, I couldn't answer --

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. -- because I didn't work with that group. But I did see
18 some, you know, stuff going on that didn't seem right.

19 Q. Did Ghazal ever talk to you about it?

20 A. She has, yes.

21 Q. But in your experience, you can't account for that? You
22 don't have any explanation for that?

23 A. No, because I wasn't involved with what occurred at that
24 time. I just -- what she has told me through as a third party.

25 Q. Okay. Well, if you could put a pattern on it or, you

1 know, sort of tie it all together, did you see any relationship
2 between the way she was treated, let's say unfairly, and others
3 who were treated in the same way? You know, any similarity among
4 them that would cause that?

5 A. In that case, Ghazal isn't the only one that's been
6 treated unfairly. I would have to say there's others as well that
7 have been treated unfairly, and I've seen it over my 27 years with
8 Enbridge, and I really can't answer what the reason behind it. It
9 may be some people are more outspoken than others.

10 Q. Um-hum.

11 A. And it might be just a personality thing.

12 Q. Okay. Is it a man/woman thing?

13 A. I don't think so. I really don't see that in the room.

14 Q. Okay. Has this changed at all, this kind of
15 differential treatment of people, has that changed at all since
16 Marshall?

17 A. No, I don't think it has.

18 Q. So, as you speak now, there are people that you believe
19 are still being treated differently than others in the same room?

20 A. That's correct, yes.

21 DR. STRAUCH: That's all for now.

22 MR. NICHOLSON: Karen?

23 MS. BUTLER: I'd like to just ask you a couple of
24 questions.

25 BY MS. BUTLER:

1 Q. Are you ever aware of pod mates asking to change their
2 schedules?

3 A. Could you explain?

4 Q. Say, two people are on the same shift and they are
5 cross-trained to cover each other and they don't really get along
6 or there's something --

7 A. I see.

8 Q. -- wrong with their family life and one of them asks to
9 change --

10 A. To a different pod?

11 Q. -- their schedule or a different -- right.

12 A. I've heard of people asking that before, yes.

13 Q. Do you know if it was -- is it granted or were they
14 worked with or --

15 A. And that I don't really know if they have. I know if
16 those people which I've heard have asked, I haven't ever seen them
17 be moved to a different pod, no.

18 Q. Okay. So, to your knowledge, nothing changed?

19 A. That part, no. Like I don't know the whole particulars
20 behind it all --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- because maybe they -- I don't know what they talked
23 about with the supervisor.

24 Q. Okay. I want to -- because you are a controller and
25 controllers are frequently in unique situations in that they're

1 able to talk to the field or they hear, say, things going on in
2 the field, you mentioned that there could have been previous to
3 Marshall kind of a pressure to push -- get the throughput moving.

4 A. Um-hum.

5 Q. Do you think that pressure also existed regarding field
6 work or integrity work where they were pressured or under the gun
7 to get it up and running as well?

8 A. And that, I couldn't answer that question.

9 Q. Okay. So, there's nothing that correlates that way?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. All right. Is there anything that's happened
12 regarding, like malfunction, or things that really impacted you as
13 a controller that have happened in the control room recently?

14 A. Myself, no.

15 Q. Okay. When you answer that, does that mean you're aware
16 of it happening to others?

17 A. And that's possible. I'm not aware of it.

18 Q. Okay. So, there's nothing that --

19 A. No.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. And is there anything that you would like to tell us
23 that you think could improve how the control functions, either at
24 the time of Marshall or today?

25 A. Improvements? I really think improvements could be on

1 getting more experience, not only on the consoles, but also in our
2 supervisory aspect of the control center. We do have a very young
3 group in our supervisor level with very little experience and very
4 little time with the company.

5 Q. When you use the word experience, would it have to be,
6 in your mind, time with Enbridge or could it be industry time that
7 could help also?

8 A. I think both.

9 Q. Okay. Okay, is there anything else that you want --

10 A. No.

11 Q. All right. Thank you.

12 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay, Jay.

13 MR. JOHNSON: This kind of all runs together, Bill. I
14 apologize here. We kind of ask a lot of the same questions. I
15 don't know that I have any, Bill. Don't be disappointed.

16 MR. CAVERS: I'm not at all.

17 MR. NICHOLSON: Kelly, you got anything?

18 MR. EMEABA: Okay, just a -- one quick one.

19 BY MR. EMEABA:

20 Q. You gave one of your instances at first to be that
21 sometimes the reason a pipeline could be shut down if there isn't
22 a -- a valve not responding?

23 A. Right.

24 Q. So, if, as an operator, if you shut down for that
25 reason, what does the shift lead ask you to do? Do they ask you

1 to restart it, or do they ask you why did you shut it down?

2 A. Okay, with me, I'm not a pipeline operator.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I'm a terminal operator, so I don't run pipelines. But
5 just from what I can see is, what they do is they will do an
6 on-call to get a maintenance person out to the field to try and
7 get that valve rectified as quick as possible so that they can get
8 the pipeline up and running again.

9 Q. Okay. Okay. So, you never actually -- from what you
10 mentioned, it's part of their process, procedure?

11 A. There is, yes.

12 Q. Okay. Not that the shift lead would ask them to restart
13 without calling somebody at the field?

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Okay. Thank you.

16 MR. NICHOLSON: You done? Barry? Karen?

17 MS. BUTLER: Nothing.

18 MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. I guess with that, we'll conclude
19 this interview. Thanks so much, Bill.

20 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ENBRIDGE - LINE 6B RUPTURE IN
 MARSHALL, MICHIGAN
 Interview of Bill Cavers

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-10-MP-007

PLACE: Edmonton, Alberta, Canada

DATE: February 2, 2012

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Aileen Hajmosi
Transcriber