UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
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ENBRIDGE OIL SPILL	*	Docket No.: DCA-10-MP-007
MARSHALL, MICHIGAN	*	
	*	

Interview of: BRIAN BUCK

Conference Room
Holiday Inn Express
630 East Chicago Street
Coldwater, Michigan

Thursday,
July 29, 2010

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice, at 1:56 p.m.

BEFORE: KARL GUNTHER
Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

KARL GUNTHER, Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
[redacted]

MATTHEW R. NICHOLSON, Investigator-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of Railroad, Pipeline, &
Hazardous Materials Investigations
[redacted]

JAMES BUNN, General Engineer
BRIAN PIERZINA, General Engineer
U.S. Department of Transportation
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[redacted])

JAY A. JOHNSON, Senior Compliance Specialist
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc.
[redacted]

TOM TIDWELL
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
[redacted]

I N D E X

I N T E R V I E W

(1:56 p.m.)

MR. GUNTHER: I'm Karl Gunther from the NTSB, and we are investigating an oil spill that occurred on July 26, 2010 in Marshall, Michigan.

INTERVIEW OF BRIAN BUCK

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q. Could you please give your name, address, and phone number for the record?

A. Brian Buck. Address is [redacted], [redacted].

Q. And could you give your job title and company affiliation?

A. My job title is technical supervisor and I'm responsible for the mechanics and electricians that operate the stations in lines 5, 6B, 17 in Michigan. I've got a business card. I don't know if anyone's interested in it.

Q. Yeah.

MR. JOHNSON: That's for Enbridge for affiliation.

MR. BUCK: Correct. Sorry about that.

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. We kind of knew that, but for the record.

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q. What formal training do you have?

A. Formal training. Well, I pretty much --

MR. JOHNSON: You're an engineer to start with.

MR. BUCK: Well, that's correct. I'm a licensed professional engineer. But as far as like formal Enbridge training, pretty much if you look at our O&A manual, the safety training matrix, all the training is applicable to technical supervisor, I pretty much have gone through that. Extra training, you know, I've gone through supervisor safety training, the DNV incident investigation process training, but I guess if you want the most of it you'd have to pull my training records or look at the safety training matrix and O&M manual.

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q. Are you qualified under your company's OQ program?

A. I'm a -- I've been trained as an OQ evaluator.

Q. Okay. Could you discuss the procedures that you have expertise in?

A. The procedures that I have expertise in: high voltage safety, just general pipeline operation, pipeline engineering and design, project management, incident investigation training; just, those are a few that just --

MR. JOHNSON: Probably some of the ones that you OQ your people in.

MR. BUCK: OQ tasks. Yeah, like, I'm trying to think. Well, for the electricians we've got two senior electricians that are also OQ evaluators, and those guys OQ the electricians, and I have been mainly focusing on OQ'ing the mechanics. So I've OQ'd

the mechanics on like their corrosion inhibitor injection OQ task. Off the top of my head I'm drawing a blank here on what all their OQ tasks are, but I've OQ'd the mechanics on pretty much all their cover tasks, but the electricians had been evaluated by other OQ evaluators.

BY MR. GUNTHER:

Q. Okay, now what action would one of your employees take in response to an oil leak such as what happened in Marshall?

A. Yeah, given that it's AOC. You know, a confirmed oil leak, call the control center. If it needs to have the area isolated, they would have notified any public, and then contact myself if it's confirmed, and then I would have notified, you know, up the chain of command.

Q. What kind of equipment does one of your employees -- would have in their vehicle?

A. Safety equipment or work tools or?

Q. Both.

A. You're going to have personal gas monitors. They've got half-mask respirators. They have, you know, just hand tools, but mostly focused on tools for operation and maintenance of the pipeline in the stations.

Q. What actions would be prudent when there's a major oil spill into the waterway?

A. What actions would be prudent for -- what was that?

Q. If you have a major oil spill into a waterway as opposed

into the ground?

A. Right. Well, for someone that's responding or somebody in my position?

Q. Well, I could use both. I'll just say both.

A. Well, obviously, containment, notifying anyone nearby that's affected, verifying the pipeline is isolated and shutdown, monitoring the immediate area, keep the public out. Personal worker safety and then the safety of the public first and foremost and then the environment, you know, third.

Q. Do you go out like, for example, and do an evacuation? Do you alert home owners in case of something?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Do you have a procedure for that?

A. I don't know if there's a set procedure for actually notifying landowners, but our people are instructed that if it's determined -- and they are trained, you know, to make that determination. If they think they need to notify landowners, evacuate landowners or anyone else, general public, they will certainly do that.

Q. Again, under what circumstances would an employee contact the fire or police department?

A. If they've confirmed hydrocarbon or hydrocarbon vapors in the area that would be a threat to the public.

Q. What would by a typical response time after being contacted about a major oil leak?

A. Typical response time for?
Q. For Enbridge.
A. For Enbridge?
Q. Or people in your, you know, group.
A. So again, what was the question? What would be the typical --
Q. What would be a typical response time after being contacted about a major oil leak?
A. It'd be immediate. But then, you know, beyond that, it'd be -- you know, it's just a matter of how far the individual is from where the leak's being reported; that would be travel time.
Q. So, you know, do you have anything like in minutes, 30 minutes, an hour?
A. It could be within a minute to -- I think maybe we're spread out to where it could be up to a half hour to an hour, depending on location.
Q. What training and testing do your employees undergo regarding actions to be taken in case of a major oil leak both in and out of a waterway?
A. You know, they undergo a yearly HAZWOPER training. You know, they're evaluated, they go through the OQ evaluation to recognize AOCs. We do tabletop exercises quarterly that they participate in for dealing with emergency situations like this. I think those would be the main ones.

Q. And what steps are taken to ensure that the person will understand the procedures?

A. What steps are taken to understand the person will understand procedures?

Q. Tests, training, quizzes, tests?

A. Well, yeah, we review our O&M manuals monthly at our safety meetings. HAZWOPER, there's a, I think, question and answer session as part of our HAZWOPER to make sure that people understand that material. The OQ evaluation process, obviously. I'm not sure if I can add anything else at least off the top of my head beyond that.

Q. Do you have goals for a leak incident response time?

A. Well, there's required notifications and certain timelines you have to notify, you know, a supervisor, control center -- I think the agency is within certain time periods, and that's detailed out in our O&M manual.

Q. And do you have a maximum response time for a leak call? In other words, no more than this?

A. I think those would be the same, you know, those would be outlined in the O&M manual as far as, you know, contact these people, you know, no later than say an hour or a day, and then also then the agency requirements.

Q. And can you describe what you did on the day of the leak?

A. Okay.

Q. Just start from the beginning.

A. On Monday -- I can start from Sunday. I was involved --

Q. Go ahead.

A. I was in contact with Darrell. On Sunday they were in the process of running two pigs in the pipeline: one was a batch pig and the other one was a smart tool. I was concerned because my employees were responsible for bypassing the stations, and the schedule had changed so much. I had been monitoring my e-mails. We'd been getting updates from the pig trackers, a contractor, giving us the status of where the tools were at. I got an e-mail Sunday afternoon that stated that the line was going to be scheduled for a shutdown, I think 1600 MST, that evening into the early morning hours on Monday morning. So when I got that e-mail I phoned Darrell Carter, and I said, "Hey, did you get this e-mail? There's a scheduled shutdown." And he said, "Yes, I did; I know about the shutdown. They want me to go to Niles station," and he said he believed it would be that evening if they wanted him to bypass the station before the pigs get there and then they're going to shut the line down. I said great. Went to bed.

Monday morning I woke up. I spoke to Darrell and he said that the line was still down and he indicated to me that he didn't know when the line was going to start back up. I got another e-mail later that morning that said that the line was shut down. They had started the line sometime in the night for a certain period of time. It was a short duration like 15, 20

minutes. They shut down. The e-mail said that then they started the line back up for a certain period of time and then shut down, and then the line was still shut down.

So when I got that I said, "Hey, Darrell, what's going on with this?" And he said that he had spoken to the operator, and the operator indicated to him that there was some problems. He didn't, you know, tell me what they were. It sounded like they were operational problems with the tool run.

I got in contact with Brian Whittaker shortly after that. He was at Marshall station, and he told me that his pressures were low or near zero at Marshall station. So Brian Whittaker and I discussed that. He was wondering what, you know, maybe what some of his next steps should be. And I said, "Well, what's the control center telling you? You know, have they told you to stay at the station? Have they told you to go out and investigate?" He said no, that he was just going to be at the station, you know, waiting to talk to the control center next, and he instructed me, he told me that he had gone around the station and checked out his station, made sure everything was looking good there. He didn't see any abnormal condition at a station.

We had a discussion. He asked me if he thought he should maybe go out and start checking some of the valve sites up and down the station, and I told him that I thought that was a great idea. I told him, "Don't get too far from the station just in case the control center calls you back up if they want to start

back up again for this tool run," and so he said okay. And then I think that's when Brian went out and started, you know, on his way to checking some of the valves that he ran into the pipeline maintenance crew and then they discovered the actual oil.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay. Matt you got any questions?

MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah, just a follow-up from some of what I've heard.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. So your title is technical supervisor?

A. Yep.

Q. And how many people report to you?

A. Ten.

Q. So what kind of area do you, how are you -- there's other technical supervisors I take it, along the pipeline?

A. Yeah, for this area --

Q. Or do you cover an area or?

A. Yeah, I mean, I basically --

Q. Or do you cover an area?

A. Yeah, I mean I basically cover line 6B in Michigan, line 5 in Michigan, line 17, which is mostly Michigan. There's a small portion in Ohio, and then that's it.

Q. So you're assigned by line or by territory?

A. By stations really, because my employees are responsible for certain stations.

Q. So which stations would that encompass? How many

stations, I guess I should ask first?

A. I can name them off. There's approximately 13 stations and there's a couple of metering sites, a small tank farm in Stockbridge. So the metering sites on line 17, I don't know if you'd consider them a station. There's a metering site at Marysville. It's not a station.

MR. JOHNSON: So Niles, Menden, and Marshall --

MR. NICHOLSON: Are all three.

MR. JOHNSON: -- are all three --

MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah. Okay, I got that.

MR. JOHNSON: Basically, where we entered Michigan, pretty much your territory would be Michigan. It just includes three lines.

MR. NICHOLSON: Is that part of Ohio, I think was also --

MR. JOHNSON: A little bit where 17 goes in there.

MR. PIERZINA: That's line 17 not line 6B.

MR. NICHOLSON: Not 6B, right.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. So I thought I heard something about emergency conditions or --

MR. JOHNSON: The AOCs?

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. The AOCs. I thought I heard you say Brian did not see any AOCs?

A. Yeah, Brian --

Q. He didn't see anything abnormal?

A. -- when we first were discussing the incident, Brian Whittaker and myself, he had walked around his station, looked at all the valves and he didn't observe any --

Q. So that's just the perimeter?

A. Inside the fence at the station, right.

Q. He hadn't looked at gauges or anything like that?

A. You know, I talked to Brian several times that morning, and I think it was that conversation that he had told me that and, like I had mentioned, that he had low to no pressure. I can't remember if he had like two or four pounds on his transmitters, and that's what prompted him to do, you know, a walk around and check out his site.

Q. Okay, so he saw the low pressure and he reported that to you?

A. Correct.

Q. So you were aware of it?

A. Yep, and then the further discussion then, he was wondering, "Well, should I go up and down the line, check some valve sites? What should I do? The control center is not directing me what to do." I said, "That's a great idea." I said, "Don't get too far from your station just in case they want to try starting it up. They may want you at the station." And then that's when he had made the decision to go ahead and leave the

station and start investigating up and down the pipeline.

MR. JOHNSON: So when Brian talked earlier he talked about, and we always assume everyone knows what we're talking about, he said he checked the panel view. It's our programmable logic controller --

MR. NICHOLSON: Right.

MR. JOHNSON: -- so all of our pressures and temperatures, they come in from transmitters.

MR. NICHOLSON: Right.

MR. JOHNSON: So you wouldn't go out and check gauges. You check the --

MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah, okay.

MR. JOHNSON: So you check those.

MR. NICHOLSON: Not in this day and age, right.

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. Oh, no. We've got some stuff down in Oklahoma, but --

MR. BUCK: Yeah, and I guess I, you know, I don't know how Brian checked those, if he physically checked them, because they do have a digital readout on each individual transmitter or if he just looked at the panel view.

MR. JOHNSON: He talked about going to the panel view.

MR. BUCK: Okay.

MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah, you got the local display.

MR. JOHNSON: Exactly.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. So it was alarming to you that you had no suction pressure on the line?

A. Yeah, I thought -- I mean I had never seen anything that -- in my few years here, I had never, you know, seen or had anyone having reported that kind of situation to me, and so that's when Brian and I had a discussion, you know, "Did you walk around your station, check things out?" "Yes, I did." "Should I check some things out further?" "Yes, please do." "What's the control center telling you?" He said they hadn't really been telling him anything, and they hadn't instructed him to go out and check.

I think Brian told me that the control center operator thought that there were some issues going on with the tool run and column separation maybe was mentioned, but, you know, what Brian observed on his transmitters and what he told me he wanted to do, I totally agreed that he was doing the right thing and I agreed with what he was doing as far as checking the station and then going out to the nearest valve sites.

Q. When he's checking the station he's checking like maybe a valve shut or --

A. Well, that, and then also if there's a release at a station.

Q. So he's thinking rupture or loss of oil?

A. Yeah, absolutely, yeah.

Q. So you had it in your mind. I've heard this term and I'm not from your industry, so what is column separation? Can you

define that for me?

A. I guess if you're operating the pipeline and it gets below a certain pressure and there's -- you know, pipeline follows the ground profile elevation, if there's hills or valleys. The pipeline shuts down, there's possibly like the oil can run away from the high points if it's not pressurized, and then there's, you know, column separation. Basically it's a hydraulic term.

Q. Sure. And you end up with air in the line? Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: Or also a heavily batched -- different batches in our lines so you can get basically the batches will separate and you get -- so then you'll want to get line pack. So we go into a turbulent flow, so you'll have that and you'll pump against that for a while until you pack the line, if you will, that column separation.

MR. NICHOLSON: Okay. You can call that?

MR. JOHNSON: Your column separation, so now you're pumping and you're not seeing your suction on your downstream side, and your pressure's going up --

MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah, until you pack it.

MR. JOHNSON: -- until you get that line pack.

MR. NICHOLSON: Compress the gap in there and pressurize the other end of it.

MR. BUCK: So, I mean, that was something that, you know, I had never heard of that condition happening on our line 6B. But again, that wasn't -- I didn't have direct contact to the

control center. That was just information through Brian.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. Where were they suspecting column separation?

A. Obviously somewhere around Marshall if that's where they were seeing low pressure, but --

MR. JOHNSON: That's probably going to come out in the interview that was conducted yesterday as far as where that was. You'll probably get that from your control center ones, because I honestly haven't heard where. I heard they considered column separation, but I don't know where they thought it might be, you know, and I don't -- you know, they've got the profiles up there too in Edmonton, so they may be looking and --

MR. BUCK: I thought it was odd. At the time I thought, well, maybe there's something going on with the tool run because we did have two tools in the line, but --

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. Two tools in the line?

A. That's correct.

Q. Oh, I didn't realize.

A. There's two. Ahead of the smart pig there was a batch pig, a cup pig, so --

Q. A batch pig and a smart pig? Is that what --

A. Yeah, correct. I don't know if it was an MFL tool or --

MR. JOHNSON: I think it was a crack tool.

MR. BUCK: A crack tool? Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: Tom will be able to tell us here in a little bit.

MR. NICHOLSON: I mean, to me, the column separation should have a pretty distinct signature on SCADA, right? I mean, see the pressure drop?

MR. JOHNSON: I honestly don't know. I don't know if you do, Brian.

MR. BUCK: Yeah, I wouldn't -- they would show it, yeah.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. So that's not something you could pull at the station?

A. No, we don't have that kind of display, no.

Q. Brian can't pull --

MR. JOHNSON: No, we only have right at the station.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. But didn't Darrell pull trends at a station?

A. Pressure from his instrumentation. Just pressure readings. You can't see like a hydraulic profile of the whole line at an individual station.

Q. But the profiles in the pressure should tell you if you had column separation, right?

A. No, not necessarily. If you have zero pressure at Marshall and you have zero pressure at Stockbridge, the line could be static and, you know, that doesn't --

Q. That would have been 350, 400, and then falling off where the separation occurred?

A. Maybe.

MR. JOHNSON: We don't have pressure transmitters along the line.

MR. NICHOLSON: I know.

MR. JOHNSON: We have them at the station.

MR. NICHOLSON: You have them at the station.

MR. BUCK: But one station you're only going to get the information for that station.

MR. NICHOLSON: For that station, true. So it's hard to draw conclusions. Okay.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. The AOCs, what kind of training do your guys have for AOCs, or do they go through AOC training out in the field? The field guys?

A. Well, you know, AOC identification, it's obviously covered as part of OQ. You know, when someone's OQ'd, there's the task-specific AOCs that are discussed for that task, and then there's also general AOCs which are covered for every -- for every OQ task you also cover general AOCs, and that's in the OQSG training, those modules that we have gone with for, you know, for AOC testing as part of our OQ evaluation.

Q. And that's been yearly?

MR. JOHNSON: Every three years. You have to take your general AOCs, unless there's a specific one that has to be done more frequently, default's to three.

MR. BUCK: Or there's a change.

MR. JOHNSON: Or there's a change.

MR. PIERZINA: And let's be careful with AOCs because in our regulations they have a couple meanings, right? You've got your task specific or general AOCs related to OQ, but you've also got your pipeline abnormal operating conditions which are indications of problems along the pipeline, and I think your question meant -- had to do with the pipeline AOCs pressure drops, unexpected changes in operating conditions?

MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSON: Those --

MR. NICHOLSON: It doesn't necessarily have to be a pressure drop.

MR. JOHNSON: Those AOCs are spelled out. They're recognized by the control center.

MR. NICHOLSON: Yeah, and I wanted to make a distinction. I'm not talking control center here, not necessarily.

MR. PIERZINA: Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: So then --

MR. NICHOLSON: I was curious what --

MR. JOHNSON: So that's how he does that. That's every three years the general AOCs.

MR. NICHOLSON: The general AOCs.

MR. JOHNSON: And then every time they OQ on a task,

there's test-specific AOCs.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. And I'm interested too that you said Brian mentioned he wasn't getting any direction from the control room?

A. As far as if he should, like, stay at a station or if they wanted him to go out on the line and check things out.

Q. So he talked to the control room. Did they share with him that the valves were isolated at Marshall?

A. I believe that the line was isolated after that. I believe it was one of the pipeline maintenance employees phoned in and confirmed, "Yeah, we've got oil on the ground." Then they isolated the station. So that would have been after Brian and I had that discussion.

I mean, Brian saw that there was low or no pressure at Marshall. He was thinking something may have been happening, and that's when we had the conversation about whether he should go and check things out beyond the station. They hadn't isolated it at that time.

Q. They had not?

A. They had not.

MR. JOHNSON: And then if you remember what -- Brian then was out getting ready to go upstream and downstream to the two valves when Ben Camp, who we talked to first, saw the oil, called it in, and they isolated it.

MR. BUCK: And that's -- right.

MR. JOHNSON: So then by the time Brian got -- you saw trucks by the time you got to them. They said, "We already called it in; they isolated the station."

MR. BUCK: Yep.

MR. JOHNSON: And Darrell had went in and --

MR. BUCK: Yeah, Darrell was on his way and Darrell came up and confirmed the valve was isolated just as a safety precaution.

MR. NICHOLSON: That's all I've got for now.

MR. JOHNSON: Starting to track it here a little bit in my mind.

MR. PIERZINA: Brian Pierzina with PHMSA Central Region. I've got a few of them, Brian.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. Previously, we discussed with Brian Whittaker, you know, how his Monday started. And he first arrived at the PLM shop about 7:30 and got word that there were pressure problems at Marshall station. And do we know how, whichever personnel at Marshall station were aware of pressure problems, how they were aware of those pressure problems?

A. I don't know. That's a good question. I'm wondering the same thing myself, like who -- obviously, someone at the Marshall PLM spoke to control center.

Q. And if I misspoke, I may have said Marshall station. I meant Marshall PLM.

A. Right.

Q. Okay, so you're not aware of any communication coming into Marshall PLM that indicated a pressure problem? Basically, your first knowledge of pressure problem was the call from Brian Whittaker?

A. From Brian Whittaker, yes.

Q. Thank you.

MR. JOHNSON: Just to -- there is a mechanic based at Marshall PLM that's not part of the PLM.

MR. PIERZINA: And we'll have to --

MR. BUCK: And I think my first, the first person I talked to on Monday morning was with Darrell. Darrell told me that the line was not running and that there is a problem with Marshall. He didn't tell me about the pressure problems at Marshall. That's all he had told me. So when I actually heard they had low or no pressure at Marshall, that was from Brian Whittaker. Darrell may have mentioned that there'd been an issue at Marshall station, but I didn't know if it was like a unit that couldn't run or I -- you know.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. As far as the batch pig and the smart pig, which one, it's smart pig and batch pig following?

A. Batch pig first, smart pig following.

Q. All right.

A. And approximately -- from the information I got from

Darrell it was a two to three hour separation and that they were -- I thought they were close to Niles when they shut the line down, but I think they were still an hour or two upstream of Niles.

Q. Right. And that would be the batch pig?

A. Correct.

MR. NICHOLSON: An hour or two upstream of where?

MR. BUCK: Niles. And that was where Darrell was located.

MR. PIERZINA: Where Darrell was isolating the Niles station, so, yeah. All right, that helps because I don't know stuff about that.

MR. BUCK: And I couldn't tell you why they decided to run a batch pig ahead of that smart tool. I don't know, someone from integrity would have to fill you in on that.

MR. JOHNSON: We've got him coming in.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. And I think one of Karl's questions tried to get to this, and may give you another chance, I think, to kind of -- if you could discuss your emergency response training program? What, you know, what you guys do for that?

A. Well, you know, we have our yearly HAZWOPER training. We've got -- you know, we do emergency response exercises. I conduct with my employees quarterly tabletop emergency response exercises. We invite officials to those. You know, I have

supervisor safety training. I've gone to incident investigation training. We hire a consultant, DNV, to come and do its investigation training.

Q. Do you, you know, as part of this training or your personnel training, do you do land and water exercises or do you concentrate on facilities?

A. Yeah, we certainly concentrate on the facilities of my employees because they're based at the stations. Some of my employees have participated in boom deployment exercises. It's not a requirement, but we encourage them when the maintenance crews do the water exercise that they participate.

Q. Do you or your personnel have responsibilities regarding integrity assessments that might be going on along the main line?

A. No. The only involvement is the bypassing and the operation of the stations to help facilitate those.

Q. Of the actual inspection? I was talking more about anomaly digs and stuff like that.

A. No, we're not involved with the dig program at all.

MR. PIERZINA: I think that's good for me.

MR. JOHNSON: Jay Johnson with Enbridge.

BY MR. JOHNSON:

Q. Maybe, Brian, to clear things up, your group is not the emergency response group?

A. Correct.

Q. But you provide support to the emergency response group

and you take all the training they have so you're prepared, so like in an incident like this, so they can -- you know, they've had the full HAZWOPER, so they can be utilized when we're basically pulling out our stop.

MR. JOHNSON: But his people are not the emergency responders that we list. That's the pipeline maintenance crew.

MR. NICHOLSON: That's the pipeline maintenance crew.

MR. JOHNSON: The pipeline maintenance crew that are emergency responders. He has the technicians, so they're -- I mean, even though they get all the same training, that's not their focus. So they provide support during emergency response.

MR. NICHOLSON: Right.

MR. JOHNSON: And like in this case, I mean literally, they're there, they're trained. We don't need you to do anything at the station; we need you on this boom, therefore they're trained. So, and I know the question you asked Brian as far as, you know, what is your emergency response times, your goals, that's not Brian's people. His people aren't situated with the boom trailers and the vac trucks, the gang trucks. His people are technicians with technicians' vehicles that are not geared up to do response. They can pull a boom trailer.

MR. BUCK: Yeah, like they questioned about what kind of equipment they have on their trucks. I mean, they don't have -- maybe to help further answer that question, they don't have emergency response equipment on their trucks. It's mostly tools

and work equipment. They do have their personal safety equipment like the personal monitors, but they're not outfitted with the absorbent pads or anything like that or any kind of emergency response gear.

MR. NICHOLSON: So their truck is just like a pickup truck or something?

MR. BUCK: Correct.

MR. NICHOLSON: It's smaller. And the people that are emergency responders would drive much larger utility --

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, one tons and, you know --

MR. BUCK: Stake beds.

MR. JOHNSON: Stake beds and semi-trailers.

MR. GUNTHER: Crew trucks, yeah.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. Brian, I'm getting notorious for this, but --

MR. JOHNSON: He's doing his Colombo.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. Yeah. You got an e-mail that the line was scheduled for a shutdown at 1600 MST?

A. Yes. The e-mail was sent about noon local on -- or maybe 1:00 local on Sunday.

Q. And 1600 MST, as far as you know, that time, what is that local?

A. 1600 MST?

Q. Yeah.

A. Is going to be plus three: 7:00 p.m. local.

Q. 7:00 p.m. local.

A. And then another e-mail was actually -- and now I remember this. There's an e-mail on Sunday about noon or 1:00 saying the line's going to be shut down. They sent out another one at about 8:00 p.m. and said the line is shut down.

Q. The line is shut down?

A. They -- you know, so they just confirmed that the scheduled shutdown happened. And those communications and those e-mails came from the pig tracking contractor, the ones that were actively tracking the pigs.

Q. Oh, okay. And so that, I suppose -- is there a hard shutdown and a soft shutdown, you know?

MR. PIERZINA: Karl, if you could let Brian see that pressure chart?

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. And that's what we got from Marshall station with Darrell Tuesday.

A. All right.

Q. And just -- we're thinking that that chart indicates, you know, in any event, you know, something different than a planned shutdown, and maybe with the electrical technicians that you have, you know, you may be familiar with the charts and stuff. I guess I'd just like your interpretation of the chart and the time and that -- I mean, I guess I want to ascertain whether or

not this planned shutdown was actually -- if somebody believes that they commanded a shutdown or if the SCADA controls shut the pipeline down due to an event?

A. You know, I guess there's a couple of things I would -- off the top of my head I don't know if I could tell you if -- you know, that this looks like a planned controlled shutdown or an uncontrolled shutdown. I mean, you know, one question I have is what set of transmitters does this come from? At the station there's several transmitters, right?

MR. JOHNSON: Right.

MR. NICHOLSON: So you can't tell from any of this? There's no tag --

MR. BUCK: That's what I'm looking at.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. I will tell you -- I was with Darrell when we printed it out.

A. I assume a discharge at the station, which is pretty much main line pressure.

Q. And it's actually a suction case and discharge and --

A. Oh, they're all together?

Q. -- and both sets of transmitters read the same, whether we were looking at one or two.

A. You know what I do, is just look at like -- you know, line 6B gets shut down all the time. I would compare this to some of the other planned shutdowns and --

Q. Okay, so we can find some of those.

A. Yeah, you can probably go to like last -- you know, they shut the line down, I don't want to say frequently, but you could probably go back within the last week and say, "Oh, here was a planned shutdown, look at this, look at this; okay, do they look the same?" I don't -- you know, I do sometimes look at these charts but not in detail, and I think there's a way if you talk to the folks that are responsible for the SCADA system you can like, you know, get a -- increase the scale and look at it --

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, we're going to talk to Bill tomorrow if you're going on that.

MR. PIERZINA: We've got those guys coming in, but --

MR. BUCK: But from this scale of what this is, I can't tell whether that's planned or unplanned to be honest with you.

MR. NICHOLSON: You can't tell from that straight vertical line and pressure whether that's a planned shutdown or not?

MR. BUCK: No.

MR. NICHOLSON: Okay.

MR. BUCK: But it's pretty clear that the pressure went, you know --

MR. NICHOLSON: All the way to zero.

MR. BUCK: Or close to it.

MR. GUNTHER: Like two, four pounds.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. The other related to that chart, and I realize that a planned shutdown for 1600 MST may -- you know, chances are it may not take place exactly at 1600 MST, but on that chart where is 1600 MST?

A. It's going to be -- well, here's 7-25, 0. There's 12:00. It's going to be -- so it's right around in there. I don't know. It probably is pretty close to where that's indicating right there.

Q. Okay. And we understand that it might not be perfectly --

A. To me this looks like it's very well in line with 1600 MST. The one thing I will add that might look a little bit out of the ordinary to me, which we discussed, was that, you know, Whittaker reported zero or no pressure, and that's what this confirms, and typically when the line shut down, it'll still hold 50 or 60.

Q. Thanks. I'm glad you clarified that because that's I think what we would expect as well.

A. Yeah, the line is shut down, you know, it's going to hold I would say 50 or 60 pounds.

MR. GUNTHER: It's going to hold something. And it would tend to taper, I would think.

MR. JOHNSON: And depending on how they capture it, and in the Yokogawa they capture the pressures pretty regular. We've got the folks coming from --

MR. NICHOLSON: You said five seconds, right?

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. I'm thinking in the three to five second range, so --

MR. BUCK: I would -- yeah, go ahead, Jay. Sorry.

MR. JOHNSON: So, you know, that's why as soon as we got talking about that last evening and these questions you had about that, we need to get the experts in reading these and can train them, and they're going to be in tune tomorrow.

MR. GUNTHER: That's fine. Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: We've told them what we're looking for. Hopefully, we can get some printouts from you. Well, we are going to get some printouts for you, not hopefully. And have the right people in to answer those questions.

MR. PIERZINA: Yeah, and that's fair enough.

BY MR. PIERZINA:

Q. I just -- you know, with the electrical technician working with me to get those and you're being their supervisor, you know, I wasn't sure how much experience you had with the displays and charts.

A. You know, they're responsible for maintaining those and making sure that the chart recorders are operational. We recently have gone to the smart chip instead of the actual paper recorders. We don't get involved with looking at the charts very often, if at all.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, we're supposed to confirm that through working and but to analyze the data, that's just something that we're not involved with.

BY MR. NICHOLSON:

Q. You don't use them for troubleshooting pumps or --

A. What's that?

Q. You don't use these in troubleshooting equipment?

A. You know, we've got all kinds of other information, like, for example, for pumps we've got vibration data we rely on. We do use pressure readings. We'll use tabular actual numbers for troubleshooting. You know, if a pump's operating at 435 and now it's only putting out 400 pounds, we'll use the actual number data for troubleshooting pumps rather than a chart where it's kind of like a scale, like because that 400 -- or, you know, we'll use actual readout numbers and record readout numbers for like troubleshooting pumps versus like a chart like that.

Q. You'll have someone sit there and just read the local gauge?

A. Yeah, we do. If you look at our stations, we have a weekly -- well, it's not a weekly, it's just whenever a station technician is on site at a station, they'll pencil -- they'll hand write the pressures that they observe at that time, and we just add that up for just kind of off-the-cuff troubleshooting.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay, any more questions?

MR. NICHOLSON: So we're sure that, I'm sorry, that 1600

Mountain Standard Time is 7:00 p.m. local, right? That's what you said, Brian? I just want to -- I guess I got my notes wrong somewhere.

MR. PIERZINA: Darrell had said 1600 was --

MR. JOHNSON: 1600 is 4:00, plus three hours.

MR. BUCK: Seven.

MR. JOHNSON: So I would agree with you.

MR. NICHOLSON: I would too, actually, because --

MR. PIERZINA: Is it one of those things that changes every six months for Daylight Savings Time to get --

MR. BUCK: It gets really confusing.

MR. PIERZINA: The pipeline does not change for Daylight Savings Time, correct?

MR. JOHNSON: Mountain Standard Time is what pipeline time is.

MR. BUCK: So like right now, Edmonton is the same time as MST?

MR. JOHNSON: No.

MR. BUCK: It's an hour off.

MR. JOHNSON: Because it's Mountain Daylight Time.

MR. PIERZINA: So this period of the year between spring and fall should be three hours, and fall to spring at two hours?

MR. BUCK: Yes.

MR. PIERZINA: This may help us for a long time.

MR. GUNTHER: Okay, any more questions? All right, cut

it.

(Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	ENBRIDGE OIL SPILL MARSHALL, MICHIGAN Interview of Brian Buck
DOCKET NUMBER:	DCA-10-MP-007
PLACE:	Coldwater, Michigan
DATE:	July 29, 2010

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to the recording accomplished at the hearing.

_____
Amy Shankleton-Novess
Official Reporter

_____
Kristen Shankleton
Transcriber