

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

**INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRASH OF
ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 263**

Wednesday, August 9, 2000
9:00 a.m.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

9:10 a.m.

INTERVIEW OF JOHN BAKER

MR. MCGILL: Johnny, have you requested Dane here as your representative?

MR. BAKER: Not really.

MR. MCGILL: What?

MR. BAKER: Not really. See, I'm an outside consultant. No --

MR. MCGILL: Do you want him here?

MR. BAKER: No.

MR. MCGILL: Okay. You're allowed to have one representative --

MR. BAKER: I don't have anybody, so --

MR. MCGILL: That's fine. Okay. Can we start out by you giving a short biographical background of your maintenance experience?

MR. BAKER: Well, I started -- I joined the Air Force in 1950 and spent four years in there as a mechanic, flight engineer, crew chief. Then I got out and had about a 13-year lapse so I couldn't get a job in aviation, so then I got on with World Airways in 1966 -- mechanic. From there I went to inspector, then supervisor, and I left there after about four years. I

1 was going to go to TWA and then they -- before I got
2 hired they laid me off. So I went back to World for
3 about seven, eight years. Then I quit and went to DSA
4 for a year, then Alaska Air for two years then -- after
5 World. And then they moved back to Washington, and I
6 put -- back there and I went to Las Vegas -- West as a
7 manager at -- and they were in bankruptcy at the time I
8 went there, and they finally shut down so I went back
9 to World. And they -- they hired me as director of
10 quality control for about a year. Then I came back to
11 Alaska after a year. I've been there for 10 years, and
12 then I retired last year, a year ago in August.

13 MR. MCGILL: Okay. So you -- you went to --
14 it's been about 10 years with Alaska Airlines?

15 MR. BAKER: Yeah. I retired a year ago,
16 August.

17 MR. MCGILL: A year ago August. Okay. All
18 of this time you -- you -- you were at -- in Oakland?
19 Based in Oakland?

20 (No response)

21 MR. MCGILL: So you were -- what year did
22 they actually start that overhaul?

23 MR. BAKER: December '89, actually. We got
24 our first airplane in January of '90.

1 MR. MCGILL: So you were there when it
2 started and spent 10 years there. And your position
3 and title of those 10 years were?

4 MR. BAKER: Inspector supervisor.

5 MR. MCGILL: Inspector supervisor. How many
6 -- how many inspectors did you have working for you?

7 MR. BAKER: I think we had four on days and
8 three on swing and two on the grave at the time. Built
9 up to about 13 then.

10 MR. MCGILL: Okay. What kind of training
11 have you received at Alaska Airlines?

12 MR. BAKER: All the aircraft except the new
13 ones, the 737, 7100, and I have the 400, the MD 80, the
14 727, the 200.

15 MR. MCGILL: Let's back up just a -- a hair.
16 We're -- we were interested in Aircraft 963, the last
17 two checks, C-5 and the C-6. Obviously, that was over
18 a year period of time, is that correct?

19 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

20 MR. MCGILL: Let's take you to the C-5 check
21 and October 27th of 1997. What can you remember about
22 that check?

23 MR. JAQUES: Do you mean September '97?

24 MR. MCGILL: Well, it -- the check was signed
25 off, as I recall, on October 27th.

1 MR. JAQUES: I think you're incorrect on the
2 date, John. I guess the records will speak for
3 themselves.

4 MR. MCGILL: What date is that?

5 MR. JAQUES: I thought the records reflected
6 September 27th of '97, but again, you might want to
7 take a quick look at the record.

8 MR. MCGILL: Yeah, might be. I just put
9 these notes down and I can't -- it could be that you're
10 right. But any rate, it was in that time frame. Can
11 you tell me what you might remember about that
12 particular aircraft?

13 MR. BAKER: No --

14 MR. MCGILL: That particular check?

15 MR. BAKER: So many of 'em come in and out, I
16 can't remember each one of them.

17 MR. MCGILL: Do you remember anything about
18 the end-play check of that?

19 MR. BAKER: No.

20 MR. MCGILL: You worked the day shift? Did
21 you work weekend shifts?

22 MR. BAKER: No, I was off Saturday and
23 Sunday.

24 MR. MCGILL: Did you review, as maintenance
25 -- as an inspector supervisor, any of the -- of the

1 work that was done by the -- by the inspectors?

2 MR. BAKER: Yeah, I reviewed everything at
3 the end -- well, during the check and then at the end.

4 I always went back through the whole package and
5 reviewed it.

6 MR. MCGILL: Do you remember when that
7 particular work -- MIG 4 had -- had said that -- to
8 replace that jack screw --

9 MR. BAKER: No.

10 MR. MCGILL: Would that have come up, you
11 think?

12 MR. BAKER: You mean did somebody mention it?

13 MR. MCGILL: Yes.

14 MR. BAKER: I don't think so.

15 MR. MCGILL: Why -- why would that not come
16 up, that type of event?

17 MR. BAKER: Because it was within limits.

18 MR. MCGILL: But at the time it was not --
19 was not -- it was a lapse of when that was written up
20 to when the second re-check was done that I was just
21 curious why, like, three days that -- but you don't
22 have any remembrance of --

23 MR. BAKER: I mean unless there was a major
24 problem with it they wouldn't bring it up to me anyway.

25 I just -- I'd probably see the MIG -- came through at

1 the end. Unless the inspector had a problem he
2 wouldn't come to any of it.

3 MR. MCGILL: Did ya'll have any type of daily
4 meetings with the management?

5 MR. BAKER: We had a -- a carryover meeting
6 between each shift, and we had a 7:30 meeting. It's
7 like a daily meeting that they planned work. So that's
8 just five days a week, nothing on the weekend.

9 MR. MCGILL: But then Monday morning you
10 would have had a -- you'd get caught up with what
11 happened over the weekend?

12 MR. BAKER: Yeah. But I don't remember
13 anything about that.

14 MR. MCGILL: If it had, as written up on the
15 initial part of the planned action, replacing that jack
16 screw assembly, what would have been the process of
17 getting that part?

18 MR. BAKER: The -- the mechanics -- they
19 always had a mechanic and they're -- ordering parts.
20 You look up the part number and put it on the back of
21 the MIG, the number -- part number that they ordered.
22 And he'd fill out a -- I guess it is --

23 MR. MCGILL: Did you have to -- would you see
24 or call on those? If -- if those kind of parts come
25 through would you be looking at that?

1 MR. BAKER: The only reason we would get
2 involved is when the shipment's received -- and we have
3 to -- the inspectors.

4 MR. MCGILL: As a supervisory capacity, did
5 you actually go on the floor and do inspection or did
6 you just supervise inspectors?

7 MR. BAKER: Just supervise 'em. They would
8 ask me if they had a problem sometimes to come and look
9 at it, but very seldom.

10 MR. MCGILL: And you were never asked?

11 MR. BAKER: No, it was mainly -- mainly paper
12 -- paperwork.

13 (Pause)

14 MR. MCGILL: By the -- again, I might have
15 wrote it down but I'm using January now of '99 for the
16 C-6 check. At the C-5 check you were very close to the
17 limit of the Acme screw and that end-play check. Would
18 there have been any reason to have a -- to look at that
19 again when it came in only two years later?

20 MR. BAKER: Not if it was not scheduled. I
21 believe that was scheduled every second C-check.

22 MR. MCGILL: Yes. So as long as it wasn't
23 scheduled, and I suppose it wasn't scheduled, was there
24 any process that inspection would look at something
25 even though it wasn't required for your check?

1 MR. BAKER: No, not unless it was deferred to
2 reinspect. It wasn't.

3 MR. MCGILL: You worked for Mr. Yancey, is
4 that right?

5 MR. BAKER: Yes.

6 MR. MCGILL: How often did ya'll communicate?

7 MR. BAKER: A couple times a week on the
8 telephone. He'd come down to Oakland two or three
9 times a year.

10 MR. MCGILL: Did you receive guidance at
11 times, direction from Mr. Yancey? What type of
12 direction?

13 MR. BAKER: Mainly supervisor instructions.

14 MR. MCGILL: Who were the -- do you recall --
15 are there other supervisory inspectors beside yourself
16 at Oakland?

17 MR. BAKER: Yes, there was. There was two of
18 us, to begin with, and now there's five. Actually,
19 four. Since I left they haven't filled my position.

20 MR. MCGILL: Well, during the last couple
21 years, who -- who were they?

22 MR. BAKER: Myself, Roy Sherfield, Cliff
23 Brode, Manny Diaz, and Bobby Recardi.

24 MR. MCGILL: Who was the last one?

1 MR. BAKER: Bobby Recardi.

2 MR. MCGILL: And they would work -- one of
3 these would be on any particular shift?

4 MR. BAKER: Usually.

5 (Pause)

6 MR. MCGILL: How was -- how did you address
7 any kind of -- any problems that might occur in the
8 pass cards themselves, poorly written, maybe not be --
9 what -- how was it? What was the sequence? How would
10 you report any -- items? How would it change --

11 MR. BAKER: Well, we make an ME-1 form out
12 and send it up to Seattle for the MR people. Or -- or
13 minor corrections on the paperwork during the check we
14 have a form that we filled out and put what was wrong
15 with it and put it with the package, what the check
16 writer's supposed to fix the problem.

17 MR. MCGILL: Did you make many ME-1's?

18 (No response)

19 MR. BAKER: What if there were concerns on
20 safety? How did the inspection, I mean, handle that?

21 MR. BAKER: What -- what kind of safety?

22 MR. MCGILL: Whatever. What -- anything that
23 might -- might reflect some degree of safety.

24 MR. JAQUES: Do you mean something in the
25 procedures or do you mean general --

1 MR. MCGILL: Generally anything in your line
2 of what you're doing as a inspector.

3 MR. BAKER: Well, if it was safety of an
4 aircraft we'd write a MIG 4.

5 MR. MCGILL: Who did that MIG 4 go to?

6 MR. BAKER: Well, it goes to -- I believe the
7 mechanic goes -- reviews it, and then it goes to the
8 foreman for approval.

9 MR. MCGILL: Did you have any association
10 with your director of safety?

11 MR. BAKER: He was -- at the time that was
12 probably Mr. Trimberger. He was my director.

13 MR. MCGILL: Did you ever communicate with
14 him?

15 MR. BAKER: Not too much. I always went
16 through the channels.

17 MR. MCGILL: Did you ever see any reason to
18 -- see anything of any concern that involved safety?

19 MR. BAKER: Not that we couldn't handle there
20 at the hangar.

21 MR. MCGILL: What's your relationship between
22 Inspection and Maintenance?

23 MR. BAKER: It's pretty good.

24 MR. MCGILL: When you say "pretty good," is
25 there --

1 MR. BAKER: We have a working relationship.
2 Besides the department there's -- they don't say
3 anything -- give us any directions.

4 MR. MCGILL: So it is --

5 MR. BAKER: We do our job and they do theirs.

6 MR. MCGILL: -- fairly independent?

7 MR. BAKER: Yeah. The manager only has, you
8 know, a clerical over us. He just does our paperwork
9 sometimes with the secretary, but that's all.

10 MR. MCGILL: What about the relationship with
11 the manager?

12 MR. BAKER: It's still a working
13 relationship.

14 MR. MCGILL: He is not your boss?

15 MR. BAKER: No.

16 MR. MCGILL: The boss is back here.

17 (No response)

18 (Pause)

19 MR. MCGILL: If there were errors in the
20 inspection process, especially paperwork, errors of
21 clerical whatever, did you see any quality assurance-
22 type coming out here to go down to re-correct ya'll's
23 duties?

24 MR. BAKER: Yeah, they came down quite often.

1 MR. MCGILL: How often?

2 MR. BAKER: About -- well, the quality --
3 quality assurance auditors came down and they give us
4 inspection of the whole hangar at least once a year,
5 sometimes twice. And they would go over our paperwork
6 to check what we were doing at the time.

7 MR. MCGILL: Was there a bunch of problems
8 with the paperwork? Was it rechecked back when they
9 got back to Seattle or was --

10 MR. BAKER: No. As far as I know, it -- no.

11 MR. MCGILL: When you finished the paperwork
12 of an aircraft, did ya'll keep the paperwork there or
13 did you send it --

14 MR. BAKER: No, it comes to Seattle. It's
15 boxed up and Fed Ex'd to Records.

16 MR. MCGILL: And then if they looked at it
17 they would look at it up here?

18 MR. BAKER: The auditors?

19 MR. MCGILL: Yes.

20 MR. BAKER: Yeah, after it's finished they
21 look through it up here. They would come there and --
22 and audit paperwork during the check. At the end it
23 was boxed up and sent to Seattle.

24 MR. MCGILL: It's not very often that there
25 were errors in this paperwork?

1 MR. BAKER: Not that I know of. 'Cause I
2 corrected them before I left.

3 MR. MCGILL: What -- as a supervisor, would -
4 - did you take your other three or four counterparts,
5 would ya'll review the entire package before it was
6 sent back?

7 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

8 MR. MCGILL: Each work part individually?

9 MR. BAKER: There's at least -- at least two,
10 sometimes three of us that went through it before it
11 ever left Oakland.

12 MR. MCGILL: What was the normal time -- a
13 typical time interval for a MD-80 C-check?

14 MR. BAKER: Anywhere from five days to a
15 couple months, depending on the aircraft.

16 MR. MCGILL: Did you have some that you had
17 two months to --

18 MR. BAKER: Find major problems with 'em,
19 have to tear it apart -- or something, a major repair.

20 MR. MCGILL: Would you bring another aircraft
21 in while that one was torn apart?

22 MR. BAKER: We had a lot of overnights come
23 in, line aircraft. Sometimes they'd run a truck into
24 one, put a hole in the -- have to repair it.

1 MR. MCGILL: But not necessarily another C-
2 check?

3 MR. BAKER: Not another C-check.

4 MR. MCGILL: So you completed each C-check
5 before another aircraft came in? How did that affect
6 overall -- a yearly plan?

7 MR. BAKER: Not really sure.

8 MR. MCGILL: Somebody else was doing that
9 here?

10 MR. BAKER: Well, our planning -- maintenance
11 and production controllers got together and had
12 meetings. They planned all the -- the time on it, how
13 many days it's going to take, how many -- how many
14 shifts. We didn't get involved in it much.

15 MR. MCGILL: Maintenance control being part
16 of the maintenance portion, and it's separated from
17 Inspection?

18 MR. BAKER: Yeah. They would get together
19 and -- and make a flow chart when they thought it was
20 going to be -- what work that had to be done.

21 MR. MCGILL: Did you have the manpower to --
22 with people to do more than one line?

23 MR. BAKER: I'm not really sure what they
24 have right now.

1 MR. MCGILL: Was there ever any planning to
2 do more than one line?

3 MR. BAKER: They had planned on it. They
4 never did start it. A couple years back, I guess, they
5 did have a manpower problem with the -- or they had a
6 problem but they brought that up and started hiring a
7 lot of people.

8 MR. MCGILL: Just observation from over the
9 years, it's pretty difficult to run one line, better to
10 cross-utilize your people with more than one, two,
11 three. I wonder if they ever planned on increasing
12 that -- base.

13 MR. BAKER: There was talk about it. I don't
14 know. I wasn't involved. They'd always talked about
15 doing second line and it never came about.

16 MR. MCGILL: You retired in December --

17 MR. BAKER: August.

18 MR. MCGILL: August?

19 MR. BAKER: A year ago.

20 MR. MCGILL: A year ago, August. What do you
21 do now?

22 MR. BAKER: Well, they brought me back up
23 once ago as a consultant in Oakland. I worked there --
24 quality control.

1 MR. MCGILL: You still working --

2 MR. BAKER: But I -- I moved to Reading about
3 four and a half -- up there --

4 MR. MCGILL: You remember the job Leotine --

5 MR. BAKER: Yeah, vaguely.

6 MR. MCGILL: What was that relationship
7 between the -- the Maintenance portion and the
8 Inspection involving the Leotine?

9 MR. BAKER: I don't think we had any
10 involvement in -- in the --

11 MR. MCGILL: Did you know John Leotine?

12 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

13 MR. MCGILL: What'd you think of him?

14 MR. BAKER: I didn't know him that much. He
15 was on the swing shift most of the time I was there.
16 He just came to day shift maybe the last year. I
17 didn't have that much dealings with him.

18 MR. MCGILL: What kind of oversight would the
19 FAA do to Oakland?

20 MR. BAKER: Well, they -- they came over
21 every couple months and asked if they could see things
22 with the -- you know, paperwork for -- maybe they want
23 to look at the airplane. If we were doing some repairs
24 they would check that out. Usually they were working
25 for the VMI up here so -- report to him.

1 MR. MCGILL: Were they airline-type or
2 geographic --

3 MR. BAKER: They were from -- airline.

4 MR. MCGILL: Did they seem knowledgeable?

5 MR. BAKER: Pretty well. I don't know if
6 there's -- a couple of 'em came from Channel Aviation,
7 but -- but just starting out.

8 MR. MCGILL: Would they deal --

9 MR. BAKER: They seemed to know what they
10 were doing.

11 MR. MCGILL: They would probably dealt more
12 with inspection, wouldn't they, than maintenance?

13 MR. BAKER: Yeah. They would usually come in
14 and see me first, and I'd take 'em over there where --
15 when they all looked at the paperwork I'd take 'em
16 there. They want to look at the airplane I'd go with
17 them.

18 MR. MCGILL: What kind of items did they
19 actually -- what were they looking at most?

20 MR. BAKER: Just to see if the paperwork was
21 correct. And they -- they -- if -- if we had a major
22 repair going on they'd go look at it, jot some things
23 down, and they'd leave. Then they'd come back and
24 check on it later.

1 MR. MCGILL: Did they ever check other areas,
2 that you noticed? Maybe --

3 MR. BAKER: They would go through the shop
4 sometimes. They'd just wander around the airplane.

5 MR. MCGILL: As Inspection, you didn't
6 necessarily get involved with the different shops, did
7 you?

8 MR. BAKER: No, only if they called me for
9 some problem, paperwork problem.

10 MR. MCGILL: Do you remember if they ever did
11 inspections of parts? Tools?

12 MR. BAKER: Well, they went through stores
13 and looked at the tool grid.

14 MR. MCGILL: Your -- was the auditing of the
15 tooling and parts, was that done from Assurance up here
16 or did --

17 MR. BAKER: We did it down there.

18 MR. MCGILL: You did it there?

19 MR. BAKER: If it was a calibrated item we
20 had to check on it all the time, make sure it was
21 calibrated.

22 MR. MCGILL: You had a --

23 MR. BAKER: Anything other than that we don't
24 get involved with it.

1 MR. MCGILL: You had a list of all calibrated
2 tools?

3 MR. BAKER: Yeah. We had a -- put on that
4 told which ones were coming up for calibration that had
5 to be sent out.

6 MR. MCGILL: If there were repairs made to
7 these tools, did anyone check how that repair was made?

8 MR. BAKER: Well, usually it was sent to the
9 Seattle tool repair for all calibrations or anything.

10 MR. MCGILL: So you didn't really do it? You
11 just took it and sent it over here? They did it and
12 sent it back to you, and it was recalibrated? Whatever
13 they did?

14 MR. BAKER: Everything was sent to Seattle
15 tool repair. If it needed calibration by an outside
16 vendor they sent it down from here.

17 MR. MCGILL: Do you know if you had -- do you
18 know what tools required calibration?

19 MR. BAKER: Not offhand. When I'm looking at
20 the list.

21 MR. MCGILL: If there had been some certain
22 instruments or tools, say an MDT type, would you have
23 known whether those tools required calibration?

24 MR. BAKER: Not without getting the list and
25 looking at the tool.

1 MR. MCGILL: Did you do that?

2 MR. BAKER: Yeah, often.

3 MR. MCGILL: The last few days we've had some
4 information about the end-play check tool. What can
5 you tell us about that?

6 MR. BAKER: I didn't get involved in that
7 'cause it was not a calibrated tool.

8 MR. MCGILL: But you used that tool, right?

9 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

10 MR. MCGILL: The inspection of that
11 particular tool -- that was the only one that Alaska
12 owned, is that correct?

13 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure. I know they had a
14 Boeing tool. I don't know how many other ones they
15 had.

16 MR. MCGILL: Did you -- had you ever
17 physically performed an end-play check?

18 MR. BAKER: No.

19 MR. MCGILL: Have you ever observed it so
20 that you could sign off as an inspector on that?

21 MR. BAKER: No, I've gone up there and -- and
22 glanced several times on what they were doing, but I
23 never -- double check.

24 MR. MCGILL: Is there anything about that
25 check now that, after the fact, that -- that you would

1 know or something that might be important that you
2 would know anything about that?

3 MR. BAKER: Not really.

4 MR. MCGILL: The lubrication was changed on
5 the lubrication card, patch card. At some point ya'll
6 were using Local 28 and you switched to Aeroshell's 33.
7 Do you remember how that transition was made?

8 MR. BAKER: No, it was just an engineering
9 change at the time was all I know. I don't know why.

10 MR. MCGILL: When the card was changed,
11 though, how did the -- did mechanics in fact switch or
12 -- when they had used up the previous inventory?

13 MR. BAKER: They only go with what was on the
14 card -- for that.

15 MR. MCGILL: So they would never -- if it
16 said Aeroshell 33 they would never go back to Local 28?

17 MR. BAKER: They shouldn't have. I can't say
18 they didn't.

19 MR. MCGILL: But your inspectors would have
20 noticed that?

21 MR. BAKER: They should have.

22 MR. MCGILL: And they would have?

23 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure if there's a write-
24 off on the cards to that or not.

1 MR. MCGILL: There's -- I don't think there's
2 --

3 (Pause)

4 MR. MCGILL: You said you started when you
5 first -- for a while there was only two of you that
6 were supervisors there? When did that number increase?
7 What year was that?

8 MR. BAKER: I can't remember. I think '94 or
9 '95.

10 MR. MCGILL: And it increased to how many?
11 Through a process? Went to three for a while or four
12 or what?

13 MR. BAKER: I think they were increased to --
14 they were talking about going to second line and they
15 wanted to have weekend coverage. I can't remember if
16 it was they just added one more or two more at the
17 time. Could have been two more.

18 MR. MCGILL: When did they go to weekend
19 coverage?

20 MR. BAKER: Whenever we got the other
21 supervisors. I can't remember exactly.

22 MR. MCGILL: So up till that point you
23 actually shut down operation for the weekend?

24 MR. BAKER: Basically, we had a skeleton crew
25 on the weekend.

1 MR. MCGILL: But not C-check type work?

2 MR. BAKER: Yeah, the -- if we didn't have a
3 -- another aircraft in, we worked the C checks on
4 weekends.

5 MR. MCGILL: Did you notice any changes when
6 extra airplanes were purchased or utilization went up
7 on those aircraft? The frequency of airplanes coming
8 through?

9 MR. BAKER: Not too much --

10 MR. MCGILL: Do they put -- when an aircraft
11 arrives, do ya'll have a planning session amongst your
12 group there?

13 MR. BAKER: Yeah, a couple days before it
14 arrives Production Control has a meeting with
15 everybody, when to work and they blow out when it's
16 going -- how much work we have to do and when it's
17 going to leave.

18 MR. MCGILL: Were you a part of that group?

19 MR. BAKER: I sat in on it, but I didn't get
20 into planning or anything. They just informed us what
21 we had to do for inspection.

22 MR. MCGILL: How long did it take normally to
23 do the inspection?

24 MR. BAKER: We planned five shifts for most
25 of them. We'd usually make that. It depended on which

1 way they worked the aircraft. Sometimes they would
2 wash it right away, sometimes they wouldn't, so that
3 would hold us up. They have to open up the whole
4 aircraft too before we could get in the areas.

5 MR. MCGILL: What phase of that would
6 normally be the lubrication?

7 MR. BAKER: Probably towards the end of the
8 shift, before they were going to close up.

9 (Pause)

10 MR. MCGILL: Did aircraft -- were aircraft
11 scheduled to come in where you might have had these
12 pre-induction meetings and then for whatever reason
13 they did not come and another aircraft would come in
14 its place?

15 MR. BAKER: I can't remember.

16 MR. MCGILL: Do you know any --

17 MR. BAKER: Might have been a couple times
18 when we didn't make -- make our aircraft and we -- they
19 sent it to an outside vendor or something like that.

20 MR. MCGILL: What -- what vendors were
21 normally used?

22 MR. BAKER: Well, we used Tramco for a while.
23 Then they went to Lake City, Florida. And now they're
24 in Phoenix too, I guess.

1 MR. MCGILL: When the aircraft went there,
2 did someone from Inspection also represent the
3 aircraft?

4 MR. BAKER: As far as I know, they didn't.

5 MR. MCGILL: But not from your area?

6 MR. BAKER: No.

7 MR. MCGILL: They would have done that at
8 Inspection from Seattle?

9 MR. BAKER: They had some consultants, I
10 think. I believe one guy was a retired Inspection
11 supervisor.

12 MR. MCGILL: Were there any times of
13 escalating that check, where it was scheduled to come
14 in and for whatever reason they would reschedule?

15 MR. BAKER: I don't know what --

16 MR. MCGILL: Well, if an aircraft couldn't
17 come in for whatever reason they would normally apply
18 for a -- an escalation or an extension --

19 MR. BAKER: Oh, yeah.

20 MR. MCGILL: -- of some time, and then they
21 would run it back through when -- when you got caught
22 up or whatever?

23 MR. BAKER: There's -- I know we've had some
24 short-timing things.

1 (Pause)

2 MR. MCGILL: Did you -- what forms were used
3 for reporting safety issues?

4 MR. BAKER: MIG 4's involved aircraft.

5 MR. MCGILL: Is that the only one?

6 MR. BAKER: Far as I know. If -- if we saw
7 something around the hangar we'd tell the manager or
8 foreman. Like, they didn't ground an aircraft, was
9 sitting there till --

10 MR. MCGILL: How often did the manager come
11 in to the hangar and observe maintenance?

12 MR. BAKER: Every day, if a plane was there.

13 MR. MCGILL: What was he actually looking
14 for?

15 MR. BAKER: Well, most of the time he was
16 talking to mechanics, seeing how they were doing.

17 MR. MCGILL: Who -- who keeps track of
18 whether this check is running on time or getting late
19 or --

20 MR. BAKER: Usually, well, Production
21 Control. When they have their meetings every day.

22 MR. MCGILL: Would --

23 MR. BAKER: Basically, it was -- if they find
24 something they know is going to take a lot of time then
25 they -- they talk it over and try to sit down and do a

1 flow -- flow chart. And then if it's going to take
2 four or five more days, then they'll notify Seattle
3 they have to take some time. Planning has to
4 reschedule the next aircraft.

5 MR. MCGILL: Do you know if -- if a -- if a
6 jack screw assembly had been ordered on 963?

7 MR. BAKER: No. I didn't get involved in any
8 of the parts ordering unless I saw it on the back --

9 (Pause)

10 MR. MCGILL: When there is a -- on the task
11 cards, there were others beside the end-play checks,
12 where there's inspection of the stabilizer, do you
13 remember any -- at any time on any of these airplanes
14 where inspectors have noticed anything unusual about
15 those -- that jack screw general inspection?

16 MR. BAKER: Not that particular inspection.

17 MR. MCGILL: That there was ever mention of
18 shavings, something loose, something dry?

19 MR. BAKER: They may have written 'em up for
20 being dry before on the primary inspection. Rusty
21 sometimes.

22 MR. MCGILL: Well, why would they write that
23 up on a primary knowing that it would be lubricated
24 during that check?

1 MR. BAKER: -- there isn't even a note unless
2 they looked at the lube cards.

3 MR. MCGILL: I see. That's a good point
4 there.

5 MR. BAKER: They've written a lot of stuff on
6 rust. They wouldn't know if it would be lubed or not.

7 MR. MCGILL: So the individual mechanic
8 normally doesn't really know what cards are coming
9 through on a check?

10 MR. BAKER: No.

11 MR. MCGILL: Does -- do most of the mechanics
12 know what the time intervals are on different areas of
13 these checks?

14 MR. BAKER: If they've worked the area before
15 they might know. Unless they get the card in their
16 hand, they -- they don't know what they're going to do.

17 MR. MCGILL: Well, even if they had the card
18 in their hand they wouldn't know the interval, though,
19 would they not? It's not stated -- it's not stated on
20 the card what the interval would be?

21 MR. BAKER: I don't believe so.

22 MR. MCGILL: So that, for instance, since
23 we're talking about a jack, if we -- you said you knew
24 it was a C-2 check, but would every mechanic know that
25 if they were doing this end-play check they wouldn't

1 -- if it's not going to be checked again till every
2 other check?

3 MR. BAKER: Most of 'em don't know, no.

4 MR. MCGILL: Are there any means -- is there
5 a means of -- where inspectors -- I want to say
6 something like recurrent training or something that
7 would bring up significant areas or areas of concern or
8 different procedures or whatever. Is there a means
9 that the inspectors are brought up-to-date on what's
10 happening in the company?

11 MR. BAKER: As far as paperwork, not really.
12 They go to school on the aircraft.

13 MR. MCGILL: If -- if -- if I -- and I don't
14 even know, but let's just say you had a -- you've done
15 an -- you've done work, you've done an inspection, you
16 got the aircraft out of the -- out of the -- check.
17 Two weeks later whatever it might be breaks, and
18 somebody reevaluates that. Is -- is there a means of
19 coming back and telling ya'll what has happened and
20 trying to figure out a way to better do this procedure
21 or --

22 MR. BAKER: They had a tracking -- 10-day
23 tracking. Production Control. They would read the
24 referrals whenever they tell us, or we could look it up
25 ourselves what happened on the aircraft for 10 days

1 after the check.

2 MR. MCGILL: Did you ever notice unusual high
3 discrepancies written up in those 10 days?

4 MR. BAKER: I can't remember.

5 MR. MCGILL: Any particular airplanes that
6 might have been worse than others?

7 MR. BAKER: We had -- the Jet America ones
8 were always worse, more write-ups.

9 MR. MCGILL: That's because they're older,
10 right?

11 MR. BAKER: Yeah. We get a lot of avionics
12 stuff that normally goes out. Can contribute to the
13 check.

14 MR. MCGILL: Do you always complete all of
15 the check cards?

16 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

17 MR. MCGILL: Nothing ever leaves that hangar
18 that everything was sent in to you as a check, attached
19 card would have been completed before the aircraft is
20 released?

21 MR. BAKER: Yeah. Unless it was not
22 applicable. Which wasn't too often.

23 MR. MCGILL: Did you ever defer any of these
24 items?

1 MR. BAKER: None that were routine, no. They
2 were just different.

3 MR. MCGILL: If you generated a non-routine
4 off of a MIG 4, could you defer that item and work on
5 it later after it departed?

6 MR. BAKER: Yeah, we -- we'd defer some
7 things that -- flap tracks deferred to next C-check for
8 plating. We had an EO from Engineering that allowed us
9 to do that.

10 MR. MCGILL: Did you also work all the MELs
11 and CDLs as they come in extra to the check package?

12 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

13 MR. MCGILL: So they were all complete every
14 time the aircraft left?

15 MR. BAKER: Usually were. It may be a CDL if
16 we didn't have a -- a part might have went back out.

17 MR. MCGILL: Did you sign off the release as
18 a supervisory inspector?

19 MR. BAKER: Most of the time.

20 MR. MCGILL: So before any aircraft was
21 released from that base normally you would have signed
22 it off, looked at the paperwork, and released it --

23 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

24 MR. MCGILL: -- for flight?

1 MR. BAKER: Along with the foreman.

2 MR. MCGILL: How -- how did the airplane then
3 get back into circulation? Did you take it over --
4 taxi it over to the --

5 MR. BAKER: The mechanics would taxi it over
6 to the line. Usually. Sometimes the crew would ferry
7 it out. They -- maybe ferry it to Portland or
8 somewhere.

9 MR. MCGILL: If the crew were there, would
10 they be going directly to the maintenance base or would
11 they still show up at the terminal?

12 MR. BAKER: Either one. Sometimes they come
13 up -- come to the hangar, sometimes they pick it up at
14 the line.

15 MR. MCGILL: Was there ever any problems
16 where the crews would show up but they anticipated a
17 delivery time and then it was not --

18 MR. BAKER: Not so much out of the C-checks.
19 Sometimes we're delayed a little bit on the flight
20 test and they have to wait.

21 MR. MCGILL: Were the airplanes flight-tested
22 after the C-check?

23 MR. BAKER: Not all of them.

24 MR. MCGILL: Who made that determination?

1 MR. BAKER: Well, it was in the -- in the
2 GMM. If the time -- if we had a double engine change
3 we had to do it.

4 MR. MCGILL: So whatever was --

5 MR. BAKER: -- do it for the stabilizer,
6 remove the stabilizer.

7 MR. MCGILL: So if it had a flight control
8 that would have been -- whatever was written in the GMM
9 that told you to do that, then it wouldn't have been?

10 MR. BAKER: If -- I don't even believe the
11 flight -- the stabilizer's even in the GMM, but we just
12 do it. I believe the only thing that's in there right
13 now is the 30-K -- 30-K requireds.

14 MR. MCGILL: I believe you're right. We
15 looked at that. How were the aircraft brought in?
16 Were they flown in and parked at the --

17 MR. BAKER: Usually they're flown in from the
18 terminal and -- an overnighter and then graveyard would
19 pick it up and taxi it to the hangar.

20 MR. MCGILL: The mechanics are stationed at
21 the airport. Do they ever work at the hangar?

22 MR. BAKER: Every once in a while they have
23 two or three over there and they have to bring one to
24 the hangar that would come over. Usually the hangar
25 takes care of it --

1 MR. MCGILL: I was trying to cross -- are
2 there any switching back and forth between mechanics
3 between the station and the Oakland facility?

4 MR. BAKER: You mean the Oakland going over
5 to the line and work?

6 MR. MCGILL: Yes.

7 MR. BAKER: Used to be a lot of it until they
8 got the -- the line started over there about a year and
9 a half ago, I guess. And we always took care of the
10 terminal too. They'd go on over and see what was
11 broke.

12 MR. MCGILL: During the inspection process if
13 you determined a -- a problem existed, how was that or
14 who handled the -- the planned action of EOs or buying
15 -- pictures or whatever needed to be done to get that
16 work done? Did -- did you get involved in that
17 process?

18 MR. BAKER: No.

19 MR. MCGILL: All would have been Maintenance?
20 And then you would have just verified whatever
21 authority that they used that it was the way it was
22 done?

23 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

24 (Pause)

1 MR. MCGILL: Why don't you start off?

2 DR. BRENNER: I'm Malcolm Brenner with the
3 Safety Board. We -- so it's a little bit different
4 emphasis.

5 What -- what happened if an airplane was late
6 coming out of a C-check?

7 MR. BAKER: Usually they'd call -- call
8 Seattle so they could schedule the next aircraft. If
9 it was going to be four or five days then they'd have
10 to send it somewhere else.

11 DR. BRENNER: And during that period, I
12 guess, '97, how often were airplanes late?

13 MR. BAKER: I don't know if we got one out on
14 time. Maybe once or twice that whole year.

15 DR. BRENNER: I see. Was there a lot of
16 concern at the headquarters about that?

17 MR. BAKER: There probably was. I couldn't
18 tell you.

19 DR. BRENNER: Okay. So you weren't in the
20 line of fire directly?

21 MR. BAKER: No.

22 DR. BRENNER: I see. And how often did it
23 happen that you'd have two mechanics take end-play
24 checks and get different readings?

1 MR. BAKER: Probably quite often. I have --
2 I know they have to take it numerous times to get a --
3 an average, I guess.

4 DR. BRENNER: How -- what's the reason for
5 that discrepancy?

6 MR. BAKER: Well, they -- I guess they wanted
7 it within a thousandth. Each reading had to be within
8 a thousandth on an average.

9 DR. BRENNER: I guess there -- was there any
10 effort to -- to -- I mean maybe -- okay. I -- I guess
11 what I'm thinking, in -- in this case because we're
12 focused on what happened here, you have two mechanics
13 who -- who converged on -- on values but they were
14 different values. They -- they were somewhat off. I
15 read that both cases they were still in compliance, but
16 what -- did that happen very often, they'd be off by
17 that many thousandths?

18 MR. BAKER: Every once in a while.

19 DR. BRENNER: I see. Would it get attention
20 or -- or not get attention as far as --

21 MR. BAKER: Yeah, they -- they'd recheck it,
22 make sure it was right.

23 DR. BRENNER: Okay. During this period, '97
24 again, how was morale at the -- the facility?

1 MR. BAKER: My department was pretty good.
2 I'm not -- I couldn't tell about the mechanics. I know
3 they had a pay thing, where the new -- new people
4 coming in, they didn't -- didn't like their pay, what
5 they started, they actually brought that out. Seemed
6 to get more people in.

7 DR. BRENNER: It was a kind of a two-tier
8 system?

9 MR. BAKER: Yeah, at the time.

10 DR. BRENNER: I see. And how was morale
11 affected, I guess, when they started the weekend
12 coverage?

13 MR. BAKER: I don't know. I didn't see much
14 difference.

15 DR. BRENNER: I see. Was this a period of
16 growth, '97?

17 MR. BAKER: Yeah, I believe so.

18 DR. BRENNER: When did the growth start?

19 MR. BAKER: Seemed like it started before
20 that. I'm not sure. I think they were anticipating
21 the second line and they were trying to build up for
22 it.

23 DR. BRENNER: How -- how was workload at that
24 time, in '97?

1 MR. BAKER: To me it didn't seem like that
2 much more. Never changed that much.

3 DR. BRENNER: How -- how was overtime during
4 that period?

5 MR. BAKER: Well, I couldn't tell you about
6 the mechanic. The inspectors I would ask for --
7 conditional primary, to get the primary done in five
8 shifts we were allowed. But other than that we didn't
9 have any.

10 DR. BRENNER: Okay. Thank you.

11 MR. MCGILL: Dean, any --

12 MR. HAMILTON: I just have a couple quick
13 questions. You said that you did the paperwork review
14 of each aircraft. Was that before the aircraft left
15 the hangar or after it was already gone?

16 MR. BAKER: Both.

17 MR. HAMILTON: Both? So there was like just
18 no routine to it? It was just whenever you could get
19 to it?

20 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

21 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. If the airplane was
22 already gone and you found discrepancies in the
23 paperwork, how would you get 'em corrected?

24 MR. BAKER: Usually it was like a signature
25 missing. Go to the mechanic and have it signed.

1 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. How about something
2 bigger than paperwork-type issues? Something that was
3 forgotten or not inspected or whatever the case may be?

4 MR. BAKER: Well, it didn't happen -- maybe
5 once or twice in maybe 10 years I know of. We'd call
6 Management Control, inspect the aircraft when it got to
7 the next --

8 MR. HAMILTON: Okay.

9 MR. BAKER: -- next base or whatever,
10 location.

11 MR. HAMILTON: And you said you're consulting
12 now in Oakland for Alaska Airlines, is that right?

13 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

14 MR. HAMILTON: Do you know -- in what
15 capacity are you consulting for 'em?

16 MR. BAKER: Inspection.

17 MR. HAMILTON: Inspection supervisor or -- or
18 --

19 MR. BAKER: They said I'm acting manager.

20 MR. HAMILTON: So you're above the
21 supervisors?

22 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

23 MR. HAMILTON: But still under the chief
24 inspector?

25 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

1 MR. HAMILTON: Do you know why they wouldn't
2 have that position filled by an in-house person?

3 MR. BAKER: Well, they're trying to. They
4 asked me to take it, come back out of retirement --
5 they have a bid up right now -- for -- for management.

6 MR. HAMILTON: Oh, so once they fill that
7 then you'll be relieved of your duty or -- or
8 consulting somewhere else? All right. That's all I
9 have.

10 MR. PAPE: I've only got one question, John.

11 In reference to Frank's question on the routine task
12 cards as far as the frequency on whether or not the
13 mechanic or the inspector would know when it was coming
14 due next, is there, excuse me, is there a document
15 that's -- that's made available before they can -- they
16 can check to see when the next interval is? Like a
17 time limit manual?

18 MR. BAKER: They have Chapter 5 of the
19 Production Control, I believe. I'm not sure if it
20 tells you --

21 MR. PAPE: That's made available to both
22 Inspection personnel and -- and Production?

23 MR. BAKER: Yeah, it's in Production Control
24 if anybody wants to look at it.

1 MR. PAPE: It's where they can go ahead and
2 -- and check to see when the task card's made
3 available and when it's scheduled next?

4 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

5 MR. PAPE: That's all I have at this time.

6 MR. MCGILL: Kristen?

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Can you go over your
8 responsibilities as Inspection supervisor? What --
9 what are your responsibilities?

10 MR. BAKER: Mainly to make sure the
11 paperwork's correct, and I supervise the inspectors,
12 that they don't have any problems.

13 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And did you have an
14 office?

15 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

16 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Where is your office
17 located?

18 MR. BAKER: In the hangar.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Where in the hangar?
20 We've been to the hangar so I think most of us in this
21 room have a little idea.

22 MR. BAKER: You know where the -- manager's
23 office, it's towards the hangar doors on the end there.

24 MS. VON KLEINSMID: It's in the -- the
25 Inspection area, where like they --

1 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- keep the -- the green
3 copies?

4 MR. BAKER: There's a -- a long -- long
5 Inspection office, and then our office is on the other
6 side of that.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. Did you often
8 frequent the -- I think it was called the Production
9 Control room?

10 MR. BAKER: Yeah, I was in there all the
11 time.

12 MS. VON KLEINSMID: All the time? And -- and
13 that's where they keep all the work cards and --

14 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

15 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And did you associate
16 quite frequently with the other supervisors?

17 MR. BAKER: When they were in there and when
18 we had meetings. Not too much otherwise.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. And that would
20 just be -- when I said supervisors, are you thinking
21 mechanic supervisors or are just thinking Inspector
22 supervisors? I mean --

23 MR. BAKER: Both.

24 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- just you, usually?

1 MR. BAKER: All of 'em.

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. So only when you
3 had meetings. And you had mentioned meetings -- there
4 was a 7:30 meeting? Did you attend that meeting?

5 MR. BAKER: Yeah. I was there.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Monday through Friday?

7 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

8 MS. VON KLEINSMID: 'Cause you were not on
9 weekends? And did you attend the -- the turnover --
10 was there a turnover-shift meeting between --

11 MR. BAKER: Between shifts, at 5:30 and one
12 at 1:45.

13 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Did you attend the 5:30
14 meeting also?

15 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

16 MS. VON KLEINSMID: What were your hours,
17 your work hours?

18 MR. BAKER: I usually got there a little
19 after five and left about 2:30.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And what about -- I
21 understand there was some sort of tele-call meeting in
22 the morning around 8:30, 8:00?

23 MR. BAKER: Yeah, there was a conference
24 call. What -- used to be at 8:00 in the manager's
25 office. Tried to -- down. I was there.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: You tried to -- so you
2 attended frequently?

3 MR. BAKER: Most of those --

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Most of those meetings?
5 And at these turnover meetings, did they go over shift
6 turnover log sheets?

7 MR. BAKER: Well, the Production Control went
8 -- went over the turnover logs. Then they came up with
9 a form of their own that they went over.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay.

11 MR. BAKER: Kind of -- it spelled out what --
12 what was done during the -- that shift and what had to
13 be carried on for the next shift.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Work items? Significant
15 work items usually or items to look at and do? Was
16 there usually a -- a shift turnover log produced for
17 each turnover meeting?

18 MR. BAKER: Not -- not in the meeting.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Not in the meeting?

20 MR. BAKER: No.

21 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Did Production Control
22 maintain some sort of document for each turnover?

23 MR. BAKER: Yeah, they have a -- well, they
24 -- they went and read the foreman's relief's
25 carryovers and made their sheet, and I guess they filed

1 that away.

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. Was that -- those
3 turnover logs, were they included in the paperwork that
4 you had to review?

5 MR. BAKER: No.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: No. So you just -- the
7 paperwork you reviewed at the end of the aircraft --

8 MR. BAKER: -- just aircraft paperwork.

9 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Was just the aircraft
10 paperwork. And those would be the work cards?

11 MR. BAKER: Yeah, work card and non-routines.

12 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And any -- what other --
13 anything else in there?

14 MR. BAKER: EOs, engineering orders,
15 engineering -- EAs they call 'em. Deferred items.
16 Incoming log book items.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: In your prior history --
18 I mean you've got a vast amount of years in quality
19 inspection -- quality assurance and inspection. Were
20 you ever responsible for inspection of base maintenance
21 at any -- anything prior to your Alaska Airlines?

22 MR. BAKER: That's like a foreman or
23 something?

24 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Yeah.

1 MR. BAKER: No.

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: No prior responsibility?
3 How did you know what to do in terms of how base
4 maintenance is it done, how you do C-checks? Did you
5 get training in that?

6 MR. BAKER: No, not really. Just working --

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Did you have --

8 MR. BAKER: -- as a mechanic and -- and as
9 inspector.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Were there any manuals
11 that you refer to?

12 MR. BAKER: We have GMM and Chapter 5.

13 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Does that call out how to
14 do base maintenance?

15 MR. BAKER: I -- it does now. It didn't at
16 the time.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: At what point did it
18 start to call out how to do base maintenance?

19 MR. BAKER: I think since I've been back, a
20 couple months.

21 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Couple months. So in
22 2000 -- the year 2000 sometime? And did you ever
23 review -- you said there's a -- you guys do the -- the
24 initial inspection. That was about five shifts?

1 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And then you would --
3 your inspectors would write up non-routines?

4 MR. BAKER: On MIG 4's.

5 MS. VON KLEINSMID: MIG 4's. And -- and then
6 the other work cards that had to -- was it tracked on
7 some sort of a board or --

8 MR. BAKER: We have a book. Recap book.
9 They log 'em in the -- in the book. Then when they're
10 worked and brought back we stamp it. And they stamp it
11 in, the stamp was completed, and then the supervisor
12 when he reviews it stamps. So there's three stamps
13 there.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So is there any type of a
15 running tally as to the open items on the aircraft by
16 areas or by category?

17 MR. BAKER: No.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And did you often review
19 -- review that?

20 MR. BAKER: Only in my -- if it had to do
21 with an inspection I would keep track of it.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. So --

23 MR. BAKER: I didn't bother with the
24 mechanic's part.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: On a given C-check for an
2 aircraft, how many times would you say you would review
3 either the book or the tracking device that was
4 maintained?

5 MR. BAKER: Well, I looked at it every day.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And in the build-up there
7 was some questions asked regarding the increase and
8 when additional aircraft were purchased and changing to
9 a seven-shift workweek or a seven-day workweek. Did
10 you notice any changes in trends regarding the open
11 items as you got closer to the end of a C-check?

12 MR. BAKER: I didn't understand.

13 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Well, just -- as -- say
14 that as we started to get utilization more on the
15 aircraft, started -- you guys were going to -- was
16 there any -- any trend --

17 MR. BAKER: Well, --

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- did you ever notice
19 any -- any items whereas you were getting three days
20 before the end of a check, all of a sudden now you have
21 150 items open whereas maybe three months ago you would
22 only see 50 items open? Did you see any increase in
23 trends in that area?

24 MR. BAKER: No, only -- only in the initial
25 primary sometimes we'd get more.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: On the initial five --
2 five-shift inspection you might get some more write-
3 ups?

4 MR. BAKER: From -- from the year before. We
5 might get more this year.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. On average, how
7 many -- and you were per shift, right? How many items
8 did your inspectors usually file off on per shift?

9 MR. BAKER: I couldn't really tell you 'cause
10 it depended on how much work was done.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Did it vary? What about
12 swing shift?

13 MR. BAKER: Sometimes they get a lot.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And grave?

15 MR. BAKER: Yeah, same.

16 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So grave was --

17 MR. BAKER: Depending on what part of the
18 check 'cause sometimes towards the end it kind of slows
19 way down.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And were more difficult
21 jobs done at the beginning of the shift or at the end
22 of the shift?

23 MR. BAKER: Usually towards the middle and
24 the end 'cause the -- we tried to get all the routine
25 out of the way first before they started on the non-

1 routines. 'Cause the routine had to be done.

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And did you notice any
3 change in trends where more non-routines were being
4 worked towards the end of a C-check in '97 time frame,
5 '98?

6 MR. BAKER: No, I don't think it ever changed
7 for me.

8 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And when was the first
9 time that you notified Seattle that the plane was going
10 to be late getting out of C-check?

11 MR. BAKER: Well, when the -- I wouldn't do
12 it. Production Control would have a meeting with --
13 with Maintenance and they'd get together and do their
14 flow chart. Then they'd -- they'd try to come up with
15 reasonable time. They didn't want to tell 'em and then
16 have to revise it, so they tried to get a good time and
17 then they would call. It might take two days into the
18 check or so.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: But you kept saying a
20 couple times that if you thought the plane was going to
21 be four or five days late. What if it was only, you
22 know, a couple days late? Would -- you'd still have to
23 notify Seattle?

24 MR. BAKER: Yes.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And as soon as possible
2 once you got a good idea what that date was going to
3 be?

4 MR. BAKER: We had to call -- if we did it.
5 We only delayed it one -- one time that we had to call
6 'em back. That was a -- too, so --

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay.

8 MR. BAKER: We didn't like to call 'em more
9 than once.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: I understand. And it was
11 Inspection's responsibility to check the -- the tools,
12 the calibration of the tools?

13 MR. BAKER: If it needed to be calibrated,
14 yes.

15 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And -- and how'd you go
16 about? Did you just check the tabs?

17 MR. BAKER: Well, we looked at the tool.
18 When we had the run to -- an audit in the computer that
19 tells you which ones are -- it lists all of 'em and
20 when they're due. If it's coming due it's shipped up
21 to Seattle to Tool --

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Did you ever checked any
23 drawings?

24 MR. BAKER: Yeah, quite often.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And you mentioned that
2 the tool that you had in Oakland was a Boeing tool?

3 MR. BAKER: What tool do you mean?

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: The -- I'm sorry. The
5 end-play -- the end-play tool that was used to -- to --
6 to measure the -- on the jack screw?

7 MR. BAKER: As far as I know.

8 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And how'd you know that
9 it would -- what would be indicators, in your opinion,
10 to make you believe that it was a Boeing tool?

11 MR. BAKER: Pretty just from what I heard.
12 It didn't need to be calibrated so I didn't get
13 involved in it.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Who's the other
15 supervisor? You mentioned another supervisor of
16 inspectors?

17 MR. BAKER: There's Cliff Brode, Roy
18 Sherfield.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And do you know why they
20 decided not to go to a second line?

21 MR. BAKER: No.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: You weren't part of any
23 meetings?

24 MR. BAKER: No.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: I think that's it for me
2 right now.

3 MR. SEYER: Lance Seyer. You said that
4 usually 8:00 in the morning the manager's office you'd
5 have this turnover meeting, is that correct?

6 MR. BAKER: Yeah, it was -- what do they call
7 'em? It was a line -- the directors got on and
8 Maintenance Control got on and all the managers during
9 the line and the two bases.

10 MR. SEYER: So this is commonly referred to
11 as a conference call? Morning conference call?

12 MR. BAKER: Yeah, morning conference call.

13 MR. SEYER: And you say you attended these
14 also?

15 MR. BAKER: Yeah, most of 'em.

16 MR. SEYER: Could you tell us who was
17 normally on these conference calls? Obviously, the
18 line directors but anyone from the executive level?

19 MR. BAKER: John Fowler used to be on. The
20 two base managers and the two directors.

21 MR. SEYER: When you say the two base
22 managers you mean Seattle and Oakland?

23 MR. BAKER: And the director of line
24 maintenance and director of base maintenance. And all
25 the -- all the managers up and down the line.

1 MR. SEYER: Do you remember any discussions
2 about availability of the jack screw? Obviously it was
3 originally written up to be replaced, and was that ever
4 discussed on a conference call that you can remember?

5 MR. BAKER: Not that --

6 MR. SEYER: Have you ever had a dispute with
7 an inspector over an inspection item?

8 MR. BAKER: You mean myself and the man that
9 inspected?

10 MR. SEYER: Yes.

11 MR. BAKER: No, not really.

12 MR. SEYER: Okay. So you've never had to
13 override an inspector's decision?

14 MR. BAKER: I've done that several times.

15 MR. SEYER: Could you give an example what
16 one might be?

17 MR. BAKER: Well, it might have been the
18 interior item that the maintenance foreman didn't want
19 to work and we'd okayed it for service. If it was
20 anything major I wouldn't overwrite it, no.

21 MR. SEYER: Are you aware of any parts that
22 were removed because they were close to limits for
23 precautionary purposes? Perhaps with a discussion with
24 Engineering?

1 MR. BAKER: I can't remember.

2 MR. JAQUES: We've been going over an hour.
3 Can we take five minutes?

4 (Brief recess)

5 MR. SEYER: Have you ever borrowed parts off
6 an inbound C-check to put on an outbound C-check if one
7 was available anywhere else?

8 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

9 MR. SEYER: Are any in-house tools made in
10 Oakland?

11 MR. BAKER: I don't know. I never got
12 involved.

13 MR. SEYER: How often did you, as a
14 supervisor, have a safety meeting? And I'm not talking
15 about crew meetings, I'm talking about dedicated safety
16 meetings.

17 MR. BAKER: I couldn't tell you that.
18 Maintenance always had their -- their -- had their
19 safety members on a team. I guess they'd have to --

20 MR. SEYER: Were you required --

21 MR. BAKER: I believe we have one inspector
22 that's --

23 MR. SEYER: Were you required to have safety
24 meetings?

1 MR. BAKER: I don't think so.

2 (Pause)

3 MR. SEYER: On the MIG 4 in question, the two
4 different readings on the end-play check for the jack
5 screw, you had -- the original write-up was -- was with
6 a inspector technician and then it was rechecked with
7 an inspector technician and they got vastly different
8 readings. When you reviewed that MIG 4, did any
9 question come to your mind that we have two inspectors
10 that are getting different readings, that this may be a
11 training issue or procedure issue that these two
12 inspectors aren't doing the same job the same way?

13 MR. BAKER: No, not really.

14 MR. SEYER: That's all I have.

15 DR. CRAWLEY: I'm Dave Crawley with the
16 Airline Pilots Association. John, who was your
17 immediate supervisor?

18 MR. BAKER: Chet Yancey.

19 DR. CRAWLEY: And so, if you had any problems
20 that you couldn't resolve yourself you would consult
21 with him? And you mentioned that you talked to him --

22 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

23 DR. CRAWLEY: -- several times a week? How
24 often would you have to call him to resolve some
25 problem?

1 MR. BAKER: Not very often. Maybe once a
2 year.

3 DR. CRAWLEY: Once a year. How did Gerald
4 Sommers, the base manager fit into problems related to
5 the checks? Did he get involved at all or would you
6 ever talk to him about problems?

7 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

8 DR. CRAWLEY: When would you go to him
9 instead of Mr. Yancey?

10 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure.

11 DR. CRAWLEY: Do you recall --

12 MR. BAKER: If it was anything to do with an
13 inspection I'd go to Chet.

14 DR. CRAWLEY: How about a delay of an
15 aircraft out at check? Would -- would he get involved
16 in something like that?

17 MR. BAKER: Yeah, that was his job.

18 DR. CRAWLEY: Do you recall many times
19 talking to him about one that you were -- saw that was
20 going to be delayed out of check?

21 MR. BAKER: Just in the -- if the foreman
22 brought it up, they have a problem maybe --

23 DR. CRAWLEY: You don't recall any specific
24 instances though? Now, Mr. McGill asked you if there
25 was any way to defer replacement of a part,

1 specifically a part that had reached its limit, in such
2 a way that -- that it could be reinspected at an
3 unscheduled time, and first you said no but then --
4 then you said only if it was deferred. And my question
5 is could you defer an item that was close to limits,
6 within limits? Could you put that on a deferral to be
7 reinspected at an unscheduled time?

8 MR. BAKER: Only if we had the Engineering
9 order.

10 DR. CRAWLEY: So it would have to go through
11 Engineering? You couldn't simply --

12 MR. BAKER: Well, if it was within limits we
13 didn't have to get anything, but --

14 DR. CRAWLEY: You didn't have to --

15 MR. BAKER: We had to --

16 DR. CRAWLEY: -- but could you? Could the
17 lead mechanic who signed off the corrective action done
18 it on his own? Deferred that item with the corrective
19 action to be reinspected in 500 hours?

20 MR. BAKER: I don't think he could unless it
21 went through Engineering. I'm not sure.

22 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. You said that your main
23 job was reviewing paperwork. I assume and I've gotten
24 from your previous answers that you not only inspected
25 the primary inspection paperwork you -- also inspected

1 the non-routine --

2 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

3 DR. CRAWLEY: -- paperwork. So basically,
4 everything?

5 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

6 DR. CRAWLEY: In going through one C-check on
7 an airplane, how many things would you find typically
8 during a C-check where there was some problems with the
9 paperwork or procedure or what -- whatever that you
10 picked up during that C-check? I mean would it be 10
11 or 100 or 200? I -- just to give us an idea.

12 MR. BAKER: Well, it would vary. Two -- two
13 to 20, maybe.

14 DR. CRAWLEY: Not -- not too many, then?
15 Things were pretty -- pretty good. And when you
16 checked this paperwork, were you checking just to see
17 that all the I's were dotted and the T's crossed and
18 every block was filled out and -- and -- was that all?
19 To make sure that the employee number was there? Is -
20 - is that all -- basically all you were doing?

21 MR. BAKER: Basically.

22 DR. CRAWLEY: Were there any what I -- what I
23 would call red flags that -- that when you looked at
24 something a red flag would go up? And -- and you'd say
25 -- look at the way something was handled and say, hey,

1 this isn't right?

2 MR. BAKER: By the way they signed it off?

3 DR. CRAWLEY: Anything, yes. Anything on a -
4 - on a non-routine work card. Would you ever have one
5 and say -- just have a red flag pop up in your mind?
6 And have to go talk --

7 MR. BAKER: Certain times the way they signed
8 it off, they wouldn't quote the right reference.

9 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. And what would you do in
10 that case?

11 MR. BAKER: I'd send it back to the mechanic.

12 DR. CRAWLEY: Any other examples besides not
13 citing the right reference for the sign-off?

14 MR. BAKER: Well, missing signatures or order
15 numbers. We require an order number on each sign-off.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, what would be the biggest
17 red flag you would ever see that most important -- more
18 important than a signature missing? Something might
19 affect safety. Did you ever have a red flag go up that
20 you thought this is a safety problem?

21 MR. BAKER: Well, like if they said they took
22 a panel off and then there -- there was no reference to
23 reinstalling it. That's probably the biggest one.

24 DR. CRAWLEY: And that would occasionally
25 happen?

1 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

2 DR. CRAWLEY: And what would you do?

3 MR. BAKER: Get with the mechanic that --
4 that cleared the MIG and the inspector that it bought
5 it off if it was bought off.

6 DR. CRAWLEY: And to take care of the
7 problem. If a part has reached its limit, however it's
8 measured, and to be more specific we'll talk about the
9 stabilizer jack screw since that's obviously what we're
10 most interested in. But for any part, if it is right
11 at its limit, does it have to be replaced on a C-check?

12 MR. BAKER: Not if it's within limits.

13 DR. CRAWLEY: If it's right at its limit it
14 doesn't need to be replaced?

15 MR. BAKER: No.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Even though you know that it's
17 going to go beyond its limit prior to the next check
18 it's still okay to let that go as long as it's --

19 MR. BAKER: I -- I don't know if it's going
20 to go over the limit.

21 (Pause)

22 DR. CRAWLEY: Let me just talk a little bit
23 about wear on parts. I'm a pilot, so I -- I -- I'm not
24 a mechanic so I don't know too much about wear on
25 parts. But there's one that I'm familiar with where a

1 part reaches its limit, and I don't know if it can
2 exactly be compared, but are you familiar with the
3 brake wear pins on the --

4 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

5 DR. CRAWLEY: -- MD 80's? Do you know what
6 the limit is on the wear pin?

7 MR. BAKER: Not offhand.

8 DR. CRAWLEY: You don't know when a brake
9 needs to be changed or when it's required to be
10 changed?

11 MR. BAKER: -- different -- different limits.
12 Some are flushed, some are a quarter of an inch.

13 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Flushed, some of 'em are
14 flushed, that's correct. When it reaches flushed, what
15 does that mean?

16 MR. BAKER: They usually change it.

17 DR. CRAWLEY: What -- what does it mean as
18 far as its limit?

19 MR. BAKER: That it's probably best to change
20 it.

21 DR. CRAWLEY: Is it required to change it
22 when it reaches its limit?

23 MR. BAKER: Per the paperwork.

24 DR. CRAWLEY: Per the paperwork it is
25 required? Because it's reached its limit?

1 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

2 DR. CRAWLEY: Mr. McGill asked you if you
3 remembered anything about the end-play check on
4 Aircraft 963 in September of 1997. And you weren't
5 able to recall anything about that. You've told us
6 that most of your work is a review of paperwork, and I
7 asked Mr. McGill if I could just show you that MIG 4 in
8 an attempt to kind of jog your memory since -- since
9 you reviewed this paperwork. Maybe you could look at
10 this MIG 4 and see if it helps with your memory, if it
11 -- if there's anything on there that might bring back
12 any recall since this is the -- been the main focus of
13 our investigation.

14 (Pause)

15 MR. BAKER: I don't remember.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Could you just read for the
17 record here what it says under the discrepancies block
18 there?

19 MR. BAKER: "Horizontal stack, Acme screw and
20 nut has maximum allowable end-play, parentheses,
21 (40,000)."

22 DR. CRAWLEY: And you don't recall ever
23 seeing that or reading that before? And that -- could
24 -- could you read what it says under the planned
25 action?

1 MR. BAKER: Well, they had "replace nut and
2 perform EO 855 dash 1C dash 01, lined out -- reevalic
3 test per work -- 24627000."

4 DR. CRAWLEY: And you don't recall seeing
5 that before?

6 MR. BAKER: I don't remember it.

7 DR. CRAWLEY: Could you read the corrective
8 action block for me?

9 MR. BAKER: "Rechecked Acme screw and nut
10 end-play for work card 24627000. Found end-play to be
11 within limits. Point 033 -- detrimental, point 001 for
12 step 12. Rechecked five times with same result."

13 DR. CRAWLEY: And this doesn't bring about
14 any recall?

15 MR. BAKER: No.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, we talked about some
17 things that would raise red flags as you reviewed
18 paperwork. Just looking at it now, if you were looking
19 at it now would you have any red flags?

20 MR. BAKER: Not really 'cause they -- they
21 said they rechecked it and it was well within limits.

22 DR. CRAWLEY: So if you were not retired and
23 you were still the inspection supervisor and you got
24 that piece of paper and you would -- there wouldn't be
25 any red flags? That would be -- everything looks okay

1 on that? You wouldn't need to go talk to anyone about
2 it?

3 (No response)

4 DR. CRAWLEY: You don't recall talking to Mr.
5 Yancey about this MIG 4?

6 MR. BAKER: No, I've never talked to anybody.

7 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. I think that's all I
8 have. Thank you.

9 MR. LASLEY: Mike Lasley. Would you tell us
10 how a mechanic and an inspector would know that they
11 had the right tool when they went -- started to
12 accomplish a card, particularly this one?

13 MR. BAKER: It's usually called out on the
14 work card.

15 MR. LASLEY: Is it also -- how's it -- how
16 would they know that the actual tool they had in their
17 hand matched what was noted on the work card?

18 MR. BAKER: Because it has a part number.

19 MR. LASLEY: On the tool? It's been found
20 that the initial tool that Alaska had plus some
21 subsequent additional tools were not for -- the design,
22 the number called out on the card. How was it
23 determine -- determined that that would have been an
24 acceptable substitute for the original design tool?

1 MR. BAKER: I don't know.

2 MR. LASLEY: Is that a responsibility of
3 Maintenance or Inspection?

4 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure.

5 MR. LASLEY: Do you or does -- does
6 Maintenance or Inspection get involved in -- in tool
7 design?

8 (No response)

9 MR. LASLEY: All right. That's all I have.
10 Thank you.

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I'm Dick Rodriguez with the
12 Safety Board.

13 (Pause)

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Early in your testimony you
15 said that the -- you would see parts coming in on
16 acceptance is what I wrote down. Is that --

17 MR. BAKER: Yeah, my inspectors have to
18 receive all the parts that come into the stores.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But not you?

20 MR. BAKER: No.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you have any sense of the
22 turnover of parts?

23 MR. BAKER: No. I don't get involved with
24 them.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did you have any working
2 relationship with the Parts Department?

3 MR. BAKER: Just the supervisor. You know,
4 friendly.

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You don't have any real
6 working knowledge of -- of the --

7 MR. BAKER: I don't know --

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- the frequency that parts
9 come through there or their budget or any of that kind
10 of thing?

11 (No response)

12 (Pause)

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And you said that -- or what
14 I understood you to say was there was no change in the
15 workload during this -- what has been observed as a
16 escalation of flight time, equipment additions, and
17 going to a seven-day check? There was no -- or seven-
18 day work week in Oakland. There was no change in your
19 work schedule or volume of work you were doing?

20 MR. BAKER: They went from a five- to a
21 seven-day work week sometime in there, but I'm not sure
22 when.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Why did they go to seven
24 days?

1 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure. That was
2 Maintenance's plan.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: If you're doing a certain
4 amount of work in five days and now you're doing the
5 same amount of work in seven days, it seems like there
6 would be less work being done on each of those seven
7 days.

8 MR. BAKER: Well, there was a skeleton crew
9 on the weekends. They didn't -- didn't really count
10 those days when they did the work flow.

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. Did you have an
12 ongoing relationship with mechanics? Personal? Did
13 you know the mechanics or talk to them on the -- eat
14 lunch with them?

15 MR. BAKER: Several of 'em. Several of 'em --

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did you have personal
17 knowledge or anything -- did you comment on the
18 allegations that were made by Mr. Leotine with respect
19 to the work there?

20 MR. BAKER: No, I never got involved in it.

21 (Pause)

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: In the checking and
23 correcting of paperwork, I want to clarify this, I
24 understand that if something wasn't initialed or
25 stamped or dated or whatever you'd go back and have

1 that done. But in the process of doing that how did
2 you assure that it was actually done?

3 MR. BAKER: Most of the times I would take it
4 to the mechanic or the lead mechanic and have him get
5 -- have him sign it off or whoever was involved in
6 it. Sometimes it went back to the Production Control
7 and they would get it done.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I understood that in certain
9 circumstances you would call ahead or call to a
10 maintenance -- or to a base and have a mechanic check
11 that it was actually done, is that what you said?

12 MR. BAKER: That's happened maybe once or
13 twice.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Once or twice. Do you recall
15 what those events were? Those items were?

16 MR. BAKER: I think one was a panel was left
17 off somewhere.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Interior or exterior?

19 MR. BAKER: I think it was interior.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And what was the resolution?

21 MR. BAKER: I believe they --

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Was it left off?

23 MR. BAKER: -- they said -- I think they sent
24 the panel to the aircraft.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So it was left off?

2 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And what was the other
4 occasion?

5 MR. BAKER: I don't remember.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But you know there was more
7 than one?

8 MR. BAKER: Not for sure. I think there was
9 but I'm not sure.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: My concern is line
11 maintenance isn't -- doesn't really -- as I understand
12 it -- I'm a dumb pilot also -- doesn't really have the
13 capability of doing work that base maintenance is
14 doing, is that correct?

15 MR. BAKER: No.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: No?

17 MR. BAKER: They have these -- where they can
18 do A-checks and on down. They don't have the -- the
19 equipment or the stamps and stuff.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So they're not capable of
21 doing the same things that base maintenance is?

22 MR. BAKER: Not everything.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know of any situations
24 or examples where you found that it was more than a
25 paperwork correction to be made and the aircraft had to

1 come back for a maintenance at Oakland?

2 MR. BAKER: I can't --

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Can't remember or it never
4 happened?

5 MR. BAKER: I can't remember.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Now, my understanding is
7 that, and I may get the terms fouled up here, but
8 Maintenance Control planned the process of the C-check,
9 is that correct? Or was it Production Control?

10 MR. BAKER: Production Control.

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's different from
12 Maintenance Control?

13 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How did the Production
15 Control plan for the maintenance -- for the C-check
16 compare with the planning that you folks gave in this
17 five-shift work?

18 MR. BAKER: I don't know.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You don't know?

20 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure what you --

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Oh, you don't understand the
22 question? I'm trying to figure out how planning
23 compared with reality. As I understand it, Production
24 Control is scheduling this aircraft through a C-check.
25 Inspectors, who are not part of Production Control,

1 are making a laundry list of things to be done on the
2 aircraft, is that correct?

3 MR. BAKER: No, they go by the paperwork that
4 is issued to them. They have routine paperwork that
5 they go by and inspect the aircraft.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Work cards?

7 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What is the five-shift check
9 that the inspectors do on the aircraft?

10 MR. BAKER: They complete all the routine
11 paperwork in the inspection.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is this in the record, Frank?

13 MR. MCGILL: Yes. Well, this is very typical
14 of every check that every airline -- that's what --
15 yes. We have got that -- I've already got this type of
16 information.

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And -- and we're -- we
18 understand --

19 MR. MCGILL: Yes, sir. I understand.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay.

21 (Pause)

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I want to clarify. In your
23 earlier testimony you -- you said that Alaska had a --
24 a fixture for measuring in-plate at Oakland and they
25 had a Boeing tool.

1 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure if it's Boeing or
2 not. That's what I heard.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How many fixtures did you
4 have?

5 MR. BAKER: Far as I know, one.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: One. You had said that you
7 inspected or expected -- I don't know. You had
8 something to do with parts on their acceptance when
9 they came in. Is that correct? Would that include
10 grease?

11 MR. BAKER: I believe it does --

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did they --

13 MR. BAKER: -- shelf life we would. If it
14 didn't we wouldn't get the --

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: In the 10 years you were at
16 Alaska did you ever inspect grease on -- on receipt?

17 MR. BAKER: Not personally.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: If it had a shelf-life some
19 inspector should have looked at it on receipt?

20 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Would that be recorded
22 somewhere?

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I believe they stamp the
24 receiving paperwork. Then Storage puts its sticker on
25 it.

1 (Pause)

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did I understand correctly --
3 I couldn't hear everything so I missed a few of these
4 things, but when you were farming out, outside-sourcing
5 the C-check the inspector either came from Seattle or a
6 retired inspector in the Phoenix area was used? Is
7 that the --

8 MR. BAKER: -- retired inspection --
9 inspection supervisor from Seattle that they've been
10 using.

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: A retired inspection
12 supervisor from Seattle? So it was one person?

13 MR. BAKER: Yeah. That's all I know. I -- I
14 don't get involved in it too much.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I understand.

16 (Pause)

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: When aircraft were going
18 through the C-check, what was the normal remedy to --
19 to the delivery date?

20 MR. BAKER: I'm not sure what you mean.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: It's scheduled to come out on
22 a certain date. What was done to bring the schedule in
23 conformance with reality, when it was going to be
24 released? What, if anything?

1 MR. BAKER: Well, they -- they'd call for
2 overtime.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Overtime?

4 MR. BAKER: A lot, and then try to get parts.

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So you would first try
6 overtime and --

7 MR. BAKER: It was a combination of
8 everything.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And parts, and if that
10 failed, then you would do what?

11 MR. BAKER: Or we --

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- still -- go ahead.

13 MR. BAKER: We'd have to reschedule it. Or
14 Maintenance would have had to.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And could you characterize
16 for me the frequency that this might happen where it
17 would be rescheduled?

18 MR. BAKER: Well, just about every one of 'em
19 the last couple years.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Was there ever any -- any
21 thought to adjusting the schedule -- anticipated
22 schedule?

23 MR. BAKER: I don't know.

24 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You don't know?

1 MR. BAKER: That was up to Maintenance.

2 (Pause)

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Were there four other
4 supervisory inspectors or just four other inspectors
5 beside yourself?

6 MR. BAKER: No, there's -- there was five up
7 until the time I left. For the last two or three
8 years.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And they were -- they were
10 equal to you?

11 MR. BAKER: Inspection supervisors. Yeah.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And all five of you worked
13 for Mr. Yancey?

14 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You had five supervisor --
16 supervisory inspectors. How were you distributed
17 through the shifts?

18 MR. BAKER: There's two on days, two swing,
19 and one graveyard.

20 (Pause)

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: As a practical matter, do you
22 know if you were involved in evaluating or inspecting
23 the paperwork for 963 in September of '97?

24 MR. BAKER: I could have -- could have. I'm
25 not sure. I don't remember.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So the supervisory inspector
2 who goes over a C-check paperwork is not recorded
3 anywhere, is that correct? How do you know it's been
4 done?

5 MR. BAKER: I don't really know. I just do
6 it.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But there's no way to know?

8 MR. BAKER: No, there's no -- no record of
9 it.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And I understand that
11 sometimes this occurs after the aircraft has left?

12 MR. BAKER: Well, it -- it occurs all during
13 the check, and then at the end too we go over it one
14 more time to make sure we haven't missed anything.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But I understood through the
16 questioning here that you said this sometimes occurs
17 after the aircraft is back in service?

18 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

19 (Pause)

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And -- and were you able to
21 characterize for me how often you may have found
22 discrepancies in this paperwork after it left the
23 facility?

24 MR. BAKER: Well, practically every time I'd
25 find a couple minor items.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But these were paperwork
2 issues and not mechanical problems or --

3 MR. BAKER: Might leave a check off of a
4 block. Work on the back, sometimes they used to --
5 left that off a little bit.

6 (Pause)

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: If they had -- if an aircraft
8 is moving through a C-check and there's a problem with
9 the -- with the progress of that C-check, are you
10 involved in the resolution of that problem in any way?

11 MR. BAKER: Not unless it was an inspection
12 problem.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, for instance, if it was
14 -- if you couldn't get something to check out, you
15 reinstalled or you manipulated or fiddled with a part
16 and now it isn't working right or you can't get it to
17 work right, if it's a write-up when it came in and it
18 still isn't working, would you be involved in that in
19 any way?

20 MR. BAKER: Depending what it was.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What parts might you be
22 involved in?

23 MR. BAKER: It was mostly interior stuff that
24 they wanted to let go. It was maybe a paint item or
25 something the foreman wanted to defer -- or not defer,

1 but just okay for service.

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: With respect to the end-play
3 check on 963 and the end-play check in general, you
4 gave what I considered a ambiguous answer. I want to
5 clarify it. How frequently did mechanics repeat the
6 end-play check?

7 MR. BAKER: I don't know. Never watched 'em
8 that much unless I walked up on the tail and glanced at
9 what they were doing. Never watched a whole thing.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How frequently has an end-
11 play check been accomplished, signed off, and then
12 redone by a different team?

13 MR. BAKER: I don't know. I don't know.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You don't know? Do you know
15 if it's ever been done?

16 MR. BAKER: -- could --

17 (Pause)

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is there a -- a turnover
19 meeting for the midnight shift?

20 MR. BAKER: Yeah. I think at 10 -- 10:30 or
21 10:45.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You didn't mention it. I was
23 just curious if they had one.

24 MR. BAKER: Yeah, between swing and grave.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And I apologize if you've
2 answered this. I think Kristen asked you. Is there a
3 difference in the manpower between day and -- and
4 midnight?

5 MR. BAKER: Yeah. There's more on days --
6 day shift.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And there's no way to
8 characterize volume of work done per mechanic on those
9 two different shifts?

10 MR. BAKER: No.

11 (Pause)

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: In response to the difference
13 in the two readings on the work cards for 963's jack
14 screw, I would like to rephrase the questions to make
15 sure I understand. But the fact that one mechanic,
16 excuse the terms, but the fact that one person got a 40
17 thousandths reading on an end-play check and that a
18 subsequent person got a 33 thousandth reading on an
19 end-play check, that you go through reviewing paperwork
20 and that sort of thing, that would -- that would be of
21 no concern to you? Or you wouldn't remember if it you
22 saw it? I don't understand what -- if you looked --
23 what I don't understand is if you look at this
24 paperwork, what would that prompt in your mind, if
25 anything, as the inspector?

1 MR. BAKER: It might have been done a
2 different way or something.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And -- and you would have --
4 you would have no concern about which one was accurate?

5 MR. BAKER: Probably -- they stated they did
6 it four or five times I would believe that more than --

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know that the work
8 card -- I think that the work card requires or
9 specifies to take multiple samples or make multiple
10 readings?

11 MR. BAKER: Yeah, I believe it does state
12 numerous.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: It does? So the fact that
14 one says "recheck five times" really means he just did
15 the procedure, right?

16 MR. BAKER: Right.

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: The same as the other one who
18 said he did the procedure? I mean they both did it
19 five times?

20 MR. BAKER: Well, I'm not sure.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well then, you would -- are
22 you saying that you would rely more on the last one
23 because he wrote down "rechecked five times" as opposed
24 to the first one where he didn't write that?

1 MR. BAKER: Yes.

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: In your 10 years there, how
3 many times have they replaced jack screws? Do you have
4 any idea?

5 MR. BAKER: I don't know.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know that they ever
7 replaced --

8 MR. BAKER: Several, probably.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Several?

10 (Pause)

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you recall when?

12 MR. BAKER: No.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Would a jack screw be a part
14 that you would evaluate when it was received?

15 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did you ever evaluate a jack
17 screw coming into the stores?

18 MR. BAKER: Not personally.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: No? Do you know anybody that
20 did?

21 MR. BAKER: One of my inspectors but I
22 wouldn't know which one.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know how many times?

24 MR. BAKER: No.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know if they carried
2 one in stock?

3 MR. BAKER: I wouldn't know.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's all the questions I
5 have. Thank you very much.

6 DR. CRAWLEY: I've got one more. John, you
7 mentioned there were five inspection supervisors all
8 together when you were there, is that correct?

9 MR. BAKER: The last couple years.

10 DR. CRAWLEY: How about in 1997?

11 MR. BAKER: Yeah, I think they were all --

12 DR. CRAWLEY: Five? And were those other
13 four, were they -- did you supervise the other four
14 inspector supervisors or were you all equal under Mr.
15 Yancey?

16 MR. BAKER: They were actually equal, but
17 Chet kind of went to me for guidance, for me to tell
18 the other ones. 'Cause I was on day shift most of the
19 time.

20 DR. CRAWLEY: So were you kind of a
21 supervisor of the supervisors then?

22 MR. BAKER: Probably.

23 DR. CRAWLEY: But as a practical matter, you
24 would divide up the paperwork on the C-checks? You
25 wouldn't look -- personally look at it all?

1 MR. BAKER: Sometimes I did.

2 DR. CRAWLEY: Were you supposed to look at it
3 all?

4 MR. BAKER: Well, that -- that was our job,
5 to make sure it was all correct.

6 DR. CRAWLEY: But you had these other --
7 there were four others, so would you divide that up or
8 --

9 MR. BAKER: Well, we looked at it all during
10 the check. And then we tried to get at least two
11 people to look at it at the end before it was sent to
12 Seattle.

13 DR. CRAWLEY: But you weren't required to
14 look at every single bit of it? It could be divided up
15 among these --

16 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

17 DR. CRAWLEY: -- inspector supervisors? So
18 one of these other four could have been the one that
19 reviewed this and not you have ever even seen it, is
20 that correct?

21 MR. BAKER: Yeah --

22 DR. CRAWLEY: Until I put it in front of you
23 across the table had you ever seen it before?

24 MR. BAKER: I don't remember.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: As far as you know --

2 MR. BAKER: I don't remember.

3 DR. CRAWLEY: As far as you know, you --
4 you'd never seen it until I put it in front of you this
5 morning?

6 MR. BAKER: Yeah.

7 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. I don't have anything
8 else.

9 MR. MCGILL: Anybody else? Yes?

10 DR. BRENNER: You mentioned John Fowler.
11 Tell me about John Fowler. What's he like?

12 MR. BAKER: I really don't get involved with
13 him too much. He's come to Oakland several times.
14 Don't know much about him.

15 DR. BRENNER: I guess you mentioned he was
16 involved in these conference calls. What was --

17 MR. BAKER: Well, he --

18 DR. BRENNER: -- he like as a manager?

19 MR. BAKER: Hmm?

20 DR. BRENNER: What was he like as a manager?
21 What were some of his strengths as a manager?

22 MR. BAKER: He seemed to be okay. They would
23 be talking on the conference call and he would
24 interject something he wanted done.

1 DR. BRENNER: What -- what kind of emphasis
2 did he -- what was his emphasis as a manager?

3 MR. BAKER: Seemed to be strict. About all I
4 can say.

5 DR. BRENNER: What do you mean by strict?

6 MR. BAKER: Well, he wanted to do the -- do
7 the work correctly and get it done.

8 DR. BRENNER: And tell me about Mr.
9 Trimberger. What's he like?

10 MR. BAKER: I really don't -- don't know him
11 too much 'cause I don't have enough involvement in that
12 -- I don't see him really often.

13 DR. BRENNER: Tell me about -- about Chet
14 Yancey. What's he like?

15 MR. BAKER: I've always had a good working
16 relationship with him.

17 DR. BRENNER: What does he emphasize as a
18 manager?

19 MR. BAKER: I thought he was pretty good.

20 DR. BRENNER: Well, what --

21 MR. BAKER: He wanted things done right.

22 DR. BRENNER: Were people scared of Mr.
23 Fowler?

24 MR. BAKER: I couldn't tell you.

1 DR. BRENNER: Were you?

2 MR. BAKER: Not really.

3 DR. BRENNER: Good. That -- that's fine.
4 Thank you. That's good.

5 MR. MCGILL: Yes, Dean?

6 MR. HAMILTON: Just a couple real quick
7 questions. Typically at the end of a check, especially
8 as you're running up against a deadline if the airplane
9 has to go on the next shift or whatever, the
10 Maintenance side of the house is generally under a lot
11 of pressure to get things going. Was there ever a
12 sense of urgency within the Inspection Department to
13 keep things rolling and get the airplane out?

14 MR. BAKER: Not too much, no. If they needed
15 us to buy something off they'd come and get us.

16 MR. HAMILTON: Did you ever use any overtime
17 during that time frame, say in the last shift or two?

18 MR. BAKER: No, we weren't really needed
19 then. We were needed at the -- the overtime was needed
20 for the primary inspection at the beginning --

21 MR. HAMILTON: Okay.

22 MR. BAKER: -- the aircraft --

23 MR. HAMILTON: And then was there any -- was
24 there any ever -- was there ever any pressure from
25 Maintenance to -- to help push airplanes, et cetera?

1 Any of your inspectors free to stop an airplane if they
2 wanted if they felt they had to?

3 (No response)

4 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. That's all.

5 MR. PAPE: Kevin Pape, Quality Assurance.
6 Just to follow on a question, Johnny, do you know if
7 the subject end-play task -- was part of the five-shift
8 primary inspection work package? Or did that fall
9 under the work package?

10 MR. BAKER: It wasn't part of our primary.
11 It was a mechanic inspector card, as far as I know.

12 MR. PAPE: Once this has been accomplished,
13 what's the involvement from a QC standpoint? Is it --
14 do they set it up? Do they just -- do they witness it?
15 They accomplish it --

16 MR. BAKER: As far as I know. I've never
17 done one, but they -- as far as I know, they just stand
18 back and watch -- take the readings.

19 MR. PAPE: They observe? Second set of eyes?

20 MR. BAKER: Again --

21 MR. PAPE: That's all.

22 MR. MCGILL: Any more questions?

23 (No response)

24 MR. MCGILL: Johnny, thank you very much,
25 sir. We appreciate you taking the time down here.

1 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

2 (Pause)

3 INTERVIEW OF GERALD SOMMERS

4 MR. MCGILL: Gerald, first off, I want to
5 make sure that your representative is Dane and you want
6 him --

7 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

8 MR. MCGILL: -- present?

9 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

10 MR. MCGILL: Okay. That's fine. Could you
11 start off by giving us a little, short biographical,
12 your background?

13 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, I got my A & P license
14 back in 1968. Got an Associate of Arts degree a couple
15 years later and started into business about 1971
16 working general aviation.

17 1976 I went with Transamerica Airlines,
18 regular airline, large air transport-type aircraft.
19 Worked with them until 1987 as a lead mechanic most of
20 the time. They ceased operation at that time.

21 I spent two or three years going from Seattle
22 Pacific Airline over to UPS. They decided they weren't
23 going to do business in Oakland at that time.

24 By 1989 I went with Alaska Airlines. I've
25 been with them ever since. I started off as a line

1 mechanic, worked about six months in San Francisco.
2 Came over in about September of '89 to help with the
3 opening of the base maintenance station there at
4 Oakland. Spent about 90 days getting the place ready
5 and hiring people, that sort of thing. And in January
6 of '90 became A & P supervisor. Worked as that up till
7 June of '96. Took over temporarily as manager. That
8 was made permanent in February of '97. That's where I
9 am today.

10 MR. MCGILL: Okay. So you started in 1989,
11 and that was the -- 1990, is that when they opened the
12 base, the Oakland --

13 MR. SOMMERS: That's when we got the first
14 airplane in. They -- they were open for several months
15 before that. We were going through a hiring process,
16 setting up equipment, getting ready for that first
17 airplane prior to that.

18 MR. MCGILL: So you've -- you've looked at it
19 since the beginning and --

20 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

21 MR. MCGILL: -- all the way through and up to
22 the current state. As manager what are your duties?

23 MR. SOMMERS: On the financial side I -- I
24 handle the budget. Any variances from that budget I
25 explain in those -- why -- compliance with the union

1 agreements that we have with the people that work
2 there. As much as I can taking care of the other
3 people that work there, even if it's just personal
4 problems. It constitutes quite a bit of the time,
5 actually, and helping with those in any way that I can.

6 Keeping my boss, the director of maintenance, informed
7 as -- as -- as to what's going on, whether it's people-
8 related or aircraft-related. Monitoring how the check
9 is going on, in general. And I'd say that's about it.

10 MR. MCGILL: Any --

11 MR. SOMMERS: There are problems that come up
12 that someone else can't handle, then I would get
13 involved with that. Maybe put the right people in
14 contact with the right people, whether it's mechanics
15 with Engineering or whatever's needed.

16 MR. MCGILL: And your boss is Hart
17 Fitzpatrick?

18 MR. SOMMERS: Yes -- no. He was up till a
19 few weeks ago. We've made some changes there.

20 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Well, at the --

21 MR. SOMMERS: At what particular time frame?

22 MR. MCGILL: Well, I was -- I was really
23 referring to the time of the accident.

24 MR. SOMMERS: That would have been Bob
25 Hindman.

1 MR. MCGILL: Bob Hindman at that time?

2 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah.

3 MR. MCGILL: Where is Bob Hindman now?

4 MR. SOMMERS: He is the director of line
5 maintenance in Seattle. At that time he was the
6 director of base maintenance in Seattle and Oakland.

7 MR. MCGILL: Uh huh. And so he took Mr.
8 Fowler's position?

9 MR. SOMMERS: No, I believe Mr. Fowler was
10 manager of Seattle-based maintenance.

11 MR. MCGILL: Okay.

12 MR. JAQUES: Folla or Foller?

13 MR. MCGILL: Falla, F-A-L-L-A?

14 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah. That's correct. He was
15 the manager of base maintenance for a while. But Bob
16 Hindman is the director, so he's above him.

17 MR. MCGILL: And today who is the -- who's --

18 MR. SOMMERS: We have a director of
19 maintenance at Oakland. Created a new position today,
20 and that's Jeff Sommers. S-O-M-M-E-R-S. No relation.

21 MR. MCGILL: Oh. It's not your son?

22 MR. SOMMERS: No.

23 (Laughter)

24 MR. MCGILL: And when did he -- when did he
25 take over as that position?

1 MR. SOMMERS: It's been a couple of months,
2 so I'd say the end of April.

3 MR. MCGILL: So he has an office in the
4 hangar now or in the building?

5 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

6 MR. MCGILL: Your office is also there?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

8 MR. MCGILL: But at the time of the accident,
9 you more or less, as manager, you were in charge of the
10 facility, is that correct?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

12 MR. MCGILL: Can we talk a little bit about
13 the -- since we keep referring to this end-play check
14 that was performed on the, I guess, September of '97
15 for the C-check, C-5 check of 963. Can you relate
16 again anything that you can remember about that
17 particular check on that airplane?

18 MR. SOMMERS: I don't -- I don't remember
19 that check in particular.

20 MR. MCGILL: After what has occurred, do you
21 -- you still don't remember anything that could have
22 happened on that check, that particular airplane?

23 MR. SOMMERS: No, I've tried --

24 MR. MCGILL: The -- the end-play task card
25 where there's been a little concern over how that was

1 performed with one time and then rechecked and -- a
2 second time, do you remember any discussions over any
3 of that?

4 MR. SOMMERS: No.

5 MR. MCGILL: Do you attend all of the shift
6 turnovers on the daytime -- day shift?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Well, between day shift and
8 swing shift, yes. Well, five days a week.

9 MR. MCGILL: But not between --

10 MR. SOMMERS: Not --

11 MR. MCGILL: -- graveyard and swing shift?

12 MR. SOMMERS: Not that time, between grave
13 and days --

14 MR. MCGILL: So -- so you come a little later
15 in the morning?

16 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, or between swing and
17 grave.

18 MR. MCGILL: What about the conference call?
19 Is that done daily?

20 MR. SOMMERS: Well, five days a week.

21 MR. MCGILL: Five days a week.

22 MR. MCGILL: Do you recall anything on the --
23 on a conference call about the -- prior to the recheck
24 of that MIG 4 or the planned action was to replace that
25 jack screw assembly?

1 MR. SOMMERS: No.

2 MR. MCGILL: Would that have been an area
3 that had -- had been replaced that you would have it
4 been -- you would know about it?

5 MR. SOMMERS: If it was something that was
6 going to impact the release time of the aircraft, yes.

7 MR. MCGILL: One second.

8 (Pause)

9 MR. SOMMERS: As a general practice I would
10 expect to be -- be informed of it.

11 MR. MCGILL: Okay. We have looked -- and of
12 course, I -- I know we -- trying to look and see if in
13 fact that ordering of the -- of a jack screw had ever
14 been made, but again, do you have any recall of ever
15 ordering that jack screw?

16 MR. SOMMERS: No.

17 MR. MCGILL: Do you recall having any
18 discussion of ordering a jack screw?

19 MR. SOMMERS: No.

20 MR. MCGILL: But that's --

21 MR. SOMMERS: That's the --

22 MR. MCGILL: When a task card like that,
23 where a different lead comes back over the initial
24 maintenance and planned action and redoes -- requests
25 to have that redone again, is that unusual? That type

1 of event?

2 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, I'd say unusual.

3 MR. MCGILL: Would that be something that --
4 after the fact that you would have looked at?

5 MR. SOMMERS: Not that unusual.

6 MR. MCGILL: How would you know just offhand,
7 then -- obviously, that's a fairly expensive -- had you
8 replaced it, it would have been an expensive item.
9 Wouldn't that be something of some concern that when
10 these things -- events like that occur that you would -
11 - that you would at least analyze what happened and
12 maybe try to keep it from happening again?

13 MR. SOMMERS: Had I know about it, maybe so.

14 MR. MCGILL: I was trying to recall exactly
15 what date. I -- I think it was, like, three days
16 passed between when it was first a planned action until
17 the second recheck, and you don't ever recall anybody
18 bringing that forth to you? Because in that three-day
19 period one would think it -- one should have been
20 ordering that part.

21 MR. SOMMERS: Well, that -- I'd have to know
22 more about what went on with it, which I'm not aware
23 of.

24 MR. MCGILL: So it was never brought to your
25 attention or at all?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

2 MR. MCGILL: If you had a similar type -- any
3 other type of change or something in the -- in the --
4 between the inspection and the maintenance portion of
5 that thing, did ya'll ever go back and look and see
6 where maybe you could have done it better? Is there
7 any process that allows you to -- to look at your
8 performance in that facility and better your jobs?

9 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I would think that we do
10 that on a -- on a regular basis, yes. I don't know
11 that there's a formal process for it, but that's the
12 smart thing to do. I mean kind of like thinking you do
13 the smart things --

14 MR. MCGILL: Well, I was just thinking, you
15 know, if I had been, say, your boss and you had in fact
16 changed out that jack screw assembly when maybe you
17 didn't need to change it out, I would have been upset
18 that you didn't catch that or ya'll would have had some
19 sort of evaluation of looking at things. And you would
20 get your people together and kind of bring up all the
21 little problems.

22 MR. SOMMERS: I would have to know if -- can
23 see that -- something that was going to affect the out-
24 date of the airplane, at what point, and was I
25 available at that time.

1 MR. MCGILL: Do you do that on every airplane
2 that comes out of that facility? Do ya'll ever go back
3 and do some sort of little sub-audit of all the cards
4 or did you do it correctly in the same -- right
5 sequence? Did you order the right parts? Did you miss
6 something or whatever?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, we --

8 MR. MCGILL: Did you ever do that?

9 MR. SOMMERS: -- we do that after each check.
10 We have a -- it's called a post-check meeting. We --
11 we try to have one. There may be some exceptions, but
12 we try in general to have that after every airplane and
13 talk about how things went and what we could do better.

14 MR. MCGILL: Do you do that immediately after
15 the aircraft leaves or would you wait through 10 days?

16 MR. SOMMERS: It -- there's no set date that
17 we wait, but it -- it does depend on the load that
18 Production Control has 'cause they're the ones that
19 usually put together the -- the -- the agenda for the
20 meeting.

21 MR. MCGILL: Are -- are they the ones who'd
22 be tracking the non-discrepancies, the pilot reports
23 created, say, 10 days after the --

24 MR. SOMMERS: For 10 days, yes. And we get
25 that report daily.

1 MR. MCGILL: So then, Production Control
2 would analyze that and then that's what'd generate a
3 meeting?

4 MR. SOMMERS: No, that meeting usually
5 focuses in on what happened during the check. The 10-
6 day report that comes out after is another issue, and
7 that's addressed each day for 10 days if there's
8 something on it to address. Well, even if there's
9 nothing on it we say that a good job was done.

10 MR. MCGILL: So you could track some sort of
11 performance whether you did a good job or a bad job on
12 a particular check? And if it's -- impacts a delay
13 time you could determine why that aircraft was, say,
14 two days later than you had planned?

15 MR. SOMMERS: That would be at the post-check
16 meeting. Yes. It's, like I say, separate than the 10-
17 day reports.

18 MR. MCGILL: So you talk about those kind of
19 issues?

20 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

21 MR. MCGILL: And I go back to that -- like
22 that jack screw assembly, just so you have -- as I
23 recall, that aircraft got out about a day and a half
24 later after the second test, but would that have been
25 able to -- that could have impacted that departure

1 date, so that was a potential problem. As to whether
2 it existed or not, it was a potential problem. It
3 could affect that airplane or another airplane. Do you
4 ever talk about those kind of things?

5 MR. SOMMERS: We try to, yeah.

6 MR. MCGILL: But nothing was ever brought up
7 on 963 specifically?

8 MR. SOMMERS: Not that I recall.

9 MR. MCGILL: Do you ever notice any -- what
10 is the relationship between Inspection and Maintenance
11 at -- in Oakland?

12 MR. SOMMERS: How do you mean their
13 relationship?

14 MR. MCGILL: The -- the relationship between
15 --

16 MR. SOMMERS: Formal relationship?

17 MR. MCGILL: Yes, --

18 MR. SOMMERS: They're -- they're a separate
19 group. I'm not in charge of that group, you might say.
20 And I -- I do the maintenance side of the house, and
21 Inspection is independent in what they do. I've got
22 what they call it an administrative relationship with
23 them. If they need an airplane ticket or something
24 I'll help 'em get it or anything like that, but nothing
25 that involves the technical side of maintenance at all.

1 MR. MCGILL: So you could go down and say
2 something to some maintenance person, make some chart
3 of a change, but for the Inspection side, even as
4 manager you wouldn't have --

5 MR. SOMMERS: Any authority over there.

6 MR. MCGILL: -- any authority at all?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

8 MR. MCGILL: Do the inspectors normally -- I
9 know this -- where they stay in the facility, is that a
10 little bit to one side, kind of by themselves
11 somewhere. Does that -- they eat lunch that a way and
12 stay over to that direction?

13 MR. SOMMERS: Well, not -- not through lunch.
14 They can stay there if wanted through lunch, but we
15 have a break room and quite often you'll see 'em in
16 there taking their break in the break room or out in
17 the parking lot or anywhere else they want to.

18 MR. MCGILL: Have you ever noticed there's
19 ever been problems between a particular inspector and a
20 particular lead mechanic, for instance?

21 MR. SOMMERS: No, I don't on a regular basis.
22 We naturally have maybe a disagreement here or there.
23 And that's settled through the ranks. But nothing
24 serious or consistent.

1 MR. MCGILL: Could you just very briefly --
2 'cause I don't want to get into a lot of this -- but
3 we've had this John Leotine mention allegations a while
4 back about the facility. Can you reflect upon -- on
5 that situation?

6 MR. JAQUES: Can you be a little more
7 specific what you're talking about?

8 MR. MCGILL: I wanted to -- to know what your
9 feelings were of what the allegations were made by John
10 Leotine.

11 MR. JAQUES: We need to take about a two-
12 minute break. I need to talk about this.

13 MR. MCGILL: Okay.

14 (Brief recess)

15 MR. MCGILL: Gerald, I would like to --
16 during the 1997 period of the C-5 check in which John
17 Leotine was the lead -- maintenance lead, can you
18 reflect from that time period anything about that MIG 4
19 card and how it was related to Aircraft 963?

20 MR. SOMMERS: Well, not at the time, not
21 being aware of it. I have seen the card yesterday
22 briefly. If I could see it now maybe I could tell you
23 something --

24 MR. MCGILL: So -- so no -- no time ever --
25 we have a copy right here. No time ever you would have

1 discussions in the -- in the -- in the facility about
2 cards like this or similar cards in which --

3 MR. SOMMERS: Oh, yeah. We may have
4 discussed similar cards or other cards at the time, but
5 I have no recollection at the time of this card.

6 MR. MCGILL: Oh, on that particular card?

7 MR. SOMMERS: This particular card, right.

8 MR. MCGILL: Okay. As you look at it right
9 now, if nothing had happened at all, for instance, and
10 this just -- this is just a card and had it been -- you
11 did not recheck that card or something like that and
12 you had installed a high-cost item on there, how --
13 what is the process? How do ya'll come back and -- I
14 wanted -- I want to kind of understand the flow and how
15 you rate yourselves and the performance of the
16 facility. Would that bring out some sort of a flag by
17 looking at that card today in retrospect?

18 MR. SOMMERS: Had -- had this been replaced?

19 MR. MCGILL: Yes.

20 MR. SOMMERS: You're saying, and obviously,
21 it shouldn't have been replaced --

22 MR. MCGILL: Yes. I mean that's -- that
23 would be a high --

24 MR. SOMMERS: That -- that would have been
25 something appropriate, yeah, to bring up at the -- a

1 post-check meeting.

2 MR. MCGILL: And --

3 MR. SOMMERS: You bet.

4 MR. MCGILL: -- does events like this happen
5 very often?

6 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I would prefer to say no,
7 but --

8 MR. MCGILL: You don't remember any things
9 that ya'll have done, maybe, costly and someone else,
10 whoever the -- your director is that would have looked
11 at that and talked about it?

12 MR. SOMMERS: You mean, we -- we replaced
13 something that we didn't need to replace --

14 MR. MCGILL: Yeah.

15 MR. SOMMERS: -- in the past at some point?

16 MR. MCGILL: Yeah, yeah.

17 MR. SOMMERS: That's --

18 MR. MCGILL: Or made any kind of -- or not
19 replaced something when you should have replaced it or
20 something similar.

21 MR. SOMMERS: I don't recall doing that
22 either way.

23 MR. MCGILL: Either way?

24 MR. SOMMERS: No.

1 MR. MCGILL: Do you have a -- we talked about
2 that morning conference calls. Do you bring up
3 problems that are occurring with this check, the flow
4 of this check?

5 MR. SOMMERS: Yes, if it's something that's
6 going to affect the out-dated airplane, yeah, that
7 would be brought up --

8 MR. MCGILL: Would something like this affect
9 the out-date of a check?

10 MR. SOMMERS: It could, yeah.

11 MR. MCGILL: If you'll notice, there's like
12 three days occurred in there, so you know, I don't know
13 that that's in fact. I'm not -- it just -- trying to
14 analyze it. I'm just trying to read what it says. And
15 when you -- when you read it like that it -- it
16 initially kind of says that like three days,
17 technically, you were trying to order a part because
18 that's what Mr. Leotine had -- had requested. He -- he
19 -- he said to -- it needed to be replaced for the
20 planned action. And it was like three days later
21 before it was rechecked. And -- and I'm thinking was -
22 - was somebody trying to purchase that part during
23 those days? Why wouldn't they have tried to purchase
24 something in those -- that time frame?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I could -- I could only
2 speculate. I don't know particularly what happened in
3 this case. A number of things that could happen.

4 MR. MCGILL: Well, like what?

5 MR. SOMMERS: It got lost for a while or --

6 MR. MCGILL: You're talking about the card?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Right. Or if it was on the
8 weekend or --

9 MR. MCGILL: Well, in fact, I think it was
10 over the weekend. So you would --

11 MR. SOMMERS: We don't have purchasing over
12 the weekend.

13 MR. MCGILL: -- but you -- but -- but Monday
14 morning you would have, right?

15 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

16 MR. MCGILL: Do you recall of a Monday
17 morning conference call that would have reflected --
18 that said, hey, two or three days now we got -- where
19 Production Control had brought this up and said, hey,
20 we -- we need this part before it was decided to
21 reinspect the end-play check?

22 MR. SOMMERS: No, I don't remember anything
23 like that.

24 (Pause)

1 MR. MCGILL: You wouldn't have had that
2 component in stock anyway, would you?

3 MR. SOMMERS: I'm not sure on that, if we
4 would have had it then or not.

5 (Pause)

6 MR. MCGILL: How is the -- how is the
7 planning -- are you sent planning schedules to you that
8 tells you what airplanes are coming and at what dates
9 and what date that airplane should finish --

10 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

11 MR. MCGILL: -- per whatever the tasks are on
12 that particular check?

13 MR. SOMMERS: Not broken down for a
14 particular task card, but to the overall check, yeah,
15 we do have a time frame, yes.

16 MR. MCGILL: So some -- some planner would
17 have said this is a seven-day check and this is a four-
18 day check and --

19 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

20 MR. MCGILL: -- this is a 14-day check and
21 whatever?

22 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

23 MR. MCGILL: And they would have run it out
24 on a --

1 MR. SOMMERS: On a schedule.

2 MR. MCGILL: -- on a schedule, the airplane
3 should come in to you. We've heard earlier that you
4 didn't hit a lot of schedules for the last couple of
5 years. I mean it was off somewhat.

6 MR. SOMMERS: It was off somewhat in '97,
7 yeah. Just a bit off.

8 MR. MCGILL: What about in '98? '99? Right
9 now? Is it -- is it running more or less as it -- did
10 it run in that --

11 MR. SOMMERS: No, they're taking longer now
12 than they predict at this -- at this time.

13 MR. MCGILL: But in '97 you think it was
14 pretty much as planned?

15 MR. SOMMERS: I'd have to go back and look
16 and see what it was and -- I don't know exactly off the
17 top of my head what it was at the time.

18 MR. MCGILL: It -- if an airplane, during the
19 inspection process, found a greater number of non-
20 routines that drove it farther into this check, when
21 did you start notifying someone back here that this --
22 this airplane is going to be two days later or
23 whatever?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Whenever we become aware of it
25 and have an idea what the impact is going to be. We

1 generally let -- I would let the director know. Or
2 over that conference call so it let everybody know.

3 MR. MCGILL: And who's all on that conference
4 call?

5 MR. SOMMERS: It's going to make it or it's
6 not going to make it. Generally, our vice president of
7 maintenance, directors of maintenance, managers in
8 Seattle as well as on the line, all around at the
9 different stations. They have a manager. They all
10 call in at that time and they're on the conference
11 call.

12 MR. MCGILL: So it's a fairly large
13 conference call?

14 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah.

15 MR. MCGILL: And the highest -- who are the
16 top two or three people with -- there that's on that
17 call?

18 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

19 MR. MCGILL: Who -- who specifically would
20 they be?

21 MR. SOMMERS: It would be our vice president
22 of maintenance.

23 MR. MCGILL: Which is?

24 MR. SOMMERS: That would be -- I believe it
25 was John Fowler at the time. I'm not sure when Bill

1 Weaver came in, exactly what month or year.

2 MR. MCGILL: But later one -- would Bill
3 Weaver also be on there and then --

4 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, later on Bill Weaver took
5 over to where he was running the meeting and John
6 Fowler was not on the calls after that time. But I'm -
7 - I don't know exactly what time that was.

8 (Pause)

9 MR. MCGILL: Do you recall the numbers of
10 short-term escalations that were sent?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Occasionally they were
12 mentioned. We're not kept up to -- up-to-date on that,
13 no, on a regular basis.

14 MR. MCGILL: You're just -- told what -- what
15 -- it is?

16 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, time to time. They would
17 mention there's -- that had to take place. But we
18 don't receive a regular report on that.

19 MR. MCGILL: Before an aircraft gets in do
20 you receive a pre-check package to go through?

21 MR. SOMMERS: We received the package if it
22 contains the maintenance that's going to be done.
23 Production Control puts together a pre-check meeting
24 that they sort of go over all the work that's -- that's
25 going to be done that they know of at the time. And --

1 MR. MCGILL: Are ADEs --

2 MR. SOMMERS: We in general try to have those
3 archived --

4 MR. MCGILL: --EAs and EMs and so forth, are
5 they added? Do you receive all that with your -- your
6 regular C-check package or that --

7 MR. SOMMERS: Well, in general they are,
8 yeah. There are times when they get added later on,
9 even during the check.

10 MR. MCGILL: So you have an idea at that time
11 of how long an airplane will be there and so forth?

12 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

13 MR. MCGILL: Is that planned for you from
14 Seattle or do ya'll set those schedules?

15 MR. SOMMERS: It's usually a joint effort.
16 We meet with Planning once a year maybe, but after that
17 the Planning handles it from then on and they do
18 refinements to it based on additional work or --

19 MR. MCGILL: Do you ever find --

20 MR. SOMMERS: -- maybe some comment.

21 MR. MCGILL: -- some conflict in where they
22 plan a total package, send it to you, and say this is
23 six days to complete this. And your experience running
24 that facility would say I can't do this in six days?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

2 MR. MCGILL: And what kind of -- how does
3 that -- how is that handled?

4 MR. SOMMERS: Well, generally, I'll call back
5 and -- and let 'em know my feelings on it, that this is
6 probably going to take longer than what you've got
7 here.

8 MR. MCGILL: So then that impacts the next
9 airplane coming past you, is that correct?

10 MR. SOMMERS: Yes, I would say so.

11 MR. MCGILL: You normally don't have two
12 airplanes at one time for checks?

13 MR. SOMMERS: Not normally.

14 MR. MCGILL: So once you start falling behind
15 they -- they're all going to kind of fall behind for a
16 period, is that correct?

17 MR. SOMMERS: In general, yeah. Unless
18 they're farmed out or something like that and we can
19 pull 'em back in --

20 MR. MCGILL: Who -- who makes those decisions
21 to -- would that be done by Mr. Weaver or Fowler to --
22 if you got too far behind to kind of get back into the
23 planning and that this particular airplane would be
24 out-sourced?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, that's done at that
2 level. With -- with Planning but not Maintenance. I
3 wouldn't be involved in a decision.

4 MR. MCGILL: You wouldn't be involved. Did
5 you feel that you had proper staffing in both
6 Maintenance and Inspection at your facility?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

8 MR. MCGILL: Was there any consideration to
9 ever increasing from one line to two lines or three
10 lines?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Depends on what you mean by
12 consideration, you know. There's talk of it but
13 nothing beyond that. Nothing official.

14 MR. MCGILL: The mechanics, obviously, were
15 rounded out enough to be able to multiple task?

16 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

17 MR. MCGILL: So that they didn't just
18 specialize in structures or this or that or the other?
19 They'd come back and could back-up another --

20 MR. SOMMERS: Well, no, we do have separate
21 skills that --

22 MR. MCGILL: You have some --

23 MR. SOMMERS: -- we do have mechanics that do
24 structures only or for the most part and A & Ps, a
25 painter, a welder, an avionics group. Each one is --

1 is separately coded, different. And in general they
2 stay within that area. But some are capable of doing -
3 - they mix -- qualified.

4 MR. MCGILL: Did you have enough shops or did
5 you have any planning to increase the number of shops
6 there of some other area? I don't even know what all
7 the shops -- I looked at 'em, but say, a hydraulics
8 shop or something?

9 MR. SOMMERS: No, there were no plans to
10 increase anything in the shop area.

11 MR. MCGILL: So whatever came up at that
12 point you would send it out or --

13 MR. SOMMERS: Oh, either our -- the shop
14 facilities we had could handle it or we would send it
15 to Seattle. Maybe they had the shop facilities to do
16 it. Or even out to a vendor if that is required.

17 MR. MCGILL: So if it's to a vendor, then
18 they would send you another component to replace that
19 one?

20 MR. SOMMERS: If that was common, yeah.

21 MR. MCGILL: If you got back --

22 MR. SOMMERS: -- wait for that.

23 MR. MCGILL: -- if you got back the original
24 one, would that -- would you get a -- who was tracking
25 the -- the overhaul portion of that --

1 MR. SOMMERS: I'd say that'd be our repairs
2 controller in Seattle.

3 MR. MCGILL: So they would go through a tear-
4 down and analyze what was done and make decision from -
5 - from that area? You didn't do that?

6 MR. SOMMERS: No.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. MCGILL: What manner -- how did ya'll --
9 what was the procedure if a safety -- an area of safety
10 existed? What was the channel that -- that would be
11 passed up the chain of command?

12 MR. SOMMERS: Depending on where it was
13 detected at. Say, at the mechanic level, he's got his
14 lead mechanic to report to. The lead mechanic has a
15 supervisor. The supervisor has me. I would go to the
16 director. That's the chain of command you would go up
17 with a -- with a safety issue. Mostly likely that
18 would be solved, if it is a safety issue staring in the
19 face, solve it right there rather than -- you know,
20 wouldn't go up the ladder. He would fix it right
21 there.

22 MR. MCGILL: Is there a formal procedure or
23 any kind of a form or anything that's filled out?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Not that I'm aware of.

1 MR. MCGILL: Do -- Mr. Trimberger, who's the
2 director safety but also other positions, but did he
3 ever come down to -- have you ever had relationships
4 with him when he wore the hat of director of safety?

5 MR. SOMMERS: He had come down on visits from
6 time to time and talked to us about various subjects.

7 MR. MCGILL: But if you ever saw a problem
8 that involved the safety of an airplane would you go to
9 that Mr. Trimberger as director of safety?

10 MR. SOMMERS: Well, if I needed to. If it
11 was something I could solve right there we wouldn't.

12 MR. MCGILL: Have you ever gone to him?

13 MR. SOMMERS: I'm -- I'm not sure in that --
14 in that we -- we have asked questions as -- as far as
15 interpretations on -- on things through our Quality
16 Control Department, which he's in charge of. And
17 whether he was involved or not with those particular
18 things we asked --

19 MR. MCGILL: So it could have been related to
20 -- the director of quality control had?

21 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

22 MR. MCGILL: What kind of training have you
23 received at Alaska Airlines?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Gotten a familiarization
25 classes on MD 80. And 727, which we flew back in '89.

1 737 which we fly now with the 400. Some of the
2 component classes, APU, familiarization,
3 troubleshooting, and -- at the Garrett facility in
4 Phoenix. Quite a bit of leadership-type training on
5 our -- personnel handling, personnel problems or
6 personal problems of personnel, that kind of thing.

7 MR. MCGILL: What kind of training do -- do
8 you set up the training for your -- the people in your
9 facility?

10 MR. SOMMERS: We have a Training Department
11 in Seattle that comes out with a monthly offering, and
12 once a year they come down and sort of predict what
13 that's going to be. At that time we make our requests
14 and --

15 MR. MCGILL: So that the people --

16 MR. SOMMERS: -- guides to go through it.
17 And then during the year we kind of refine that.

18 MR. MCGILL: Do they -- they come up here to
19 get trained or they come -- trainers go down there?

20 MR. SOMMERS: A combination. We have
21 training facilities at Oakland. Sometimes they'll come
22 down there and train a number of guys in usually sheet
23 metal or A & P side of the house. And sometimes I have
24 to send 'em north to --

1 MR. MCGILL: Is there -- is there recurrent
2 training done for mechanics?

3 MR. SOMMERS: I'm not sure on that.

4 MR. MCGILL: Have you ever received any
5 recurrent training?

6 MR. SOMMERS: No.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. SOMMERS: There is recurrent training,
9 yeah, now that I think about it. Like running taxi.
10 There's a time limit set on that in the computer and
11 you're responsible for going back in there and -- and
12 you know, making that recurrent so that you stay run-
13 taxi qualified. I know because mine's expired. And
14 other training such as blood-borne pathogens, you know,
15 health-type training would be recurrent. They indicate
16 in the computer the ones that need to be recurrent, so
17 that's what you go by.

18 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Do -- do airplanes depart
19 your facility with items still written up?

20 MR. SOMMERS: It's possible for 'em to leave
21 with items deferred, yes.

22 MR. MCGILL: From the check or from non-
23 routines generated from the check?

24 MR. SOMMERS: It can be from either one or
25 items that were written up when it came in that require

1 no action.

2 MR. MCGILL: So you work those last. So if
3 an airplane came in with six discrepancies you would
4 work your check first and then clean up the
5 discrepancies at the end?

6 MR. SOMMERS: That would be a judgement call,
7 you know. There might be an ideal time to work that.
8 If you're going to take something apart, you've already
9 got it out or whatever, now would be the time to change
10 or repair it or whatever and put it back in.

11 MR. MCGILL: Did you ever defer check items
12 that were in the package themselves?

13 (Pause)

14 MR. SOMMERS: Items that were scheduled to
15 work that we didn't --

16 MR. MCGILL: Yeah.

17 MR. SOMMERS: -- were --

18 MR. MCGILL: But the package comes in and
19 maybe it's 200 things on that check but maybe one or
20 two of 'em for whatever reason --

21 MR. SOMMERS: I -- I can't think of any that
22 we had. Generally what's scheduled we work. There are
23 items that call for you to go out and take a look at
24 'em and they continue on deferral.

1 MR. MCGILL: So only items that were -- that
2 you could defer, when the airplane is released those
3 items would have been noted as being deferred --

4 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

5 MR. MCGILL: -- catch 'em somewhere down the
6 line. Do you recall during that time frame of '97 era,
7 '96 era that you had kind of an increase in airplanes
8 and utilization of aircraft that the performance of
9 your check -- we talked earlier about some of the
10 reflections of these 10 days post-flights. Could you
11 ever identify, you know, if you were doing a good job
12 or a bad job? Or how would you rate yourself?

13 MR. SOMMERS: Excellent.

14 MR. MCGILL: At that -- in '96 and '97?

15 MR. SOMMERS: All the way down the line.
16 Even today we maintain an excellent record, I think, in
17 the quality of the work that we put out.

18 MR. MCGILL: So would it be fair that within
19 a 10-day -- what would be the average -- if you just
20 took all your MD 80's for 10 days after they come out
21 of a check, how many could be contributed to something
22 that probably could have been done better during the
23 check? Two or three or --

24 MR. SOMMERS: I'd guess less than one.

1 MR. MCGILL: Less than one? They come out of
2 there and those pilots love that airplane.

3 MR. SOMMERS: That's what they say.

4 MR. MCGILL: That's good. Did you have
5 relationships with the -- the Local or any of the FAA
6 oversight of your facility?

7 MR. SOMMERS: We had two inspectors,
8 actually, were up in the next hangar that used to come
9 around on a scheduled inspection-type basis.

10 MR. MCGILL: How often do they come around?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Every few months I would --
12 somewhere around there.

13 MR. MCGILL: Do they come in and personally
14 talk to you about anything or do they just go on the
15 floor and talk to --

16 MR. SOMMERS: No, generally, they would stop
17 by and talk to me first and tell me what they were
18 there for and what they were about to do. And they'd
19 usually get with a supervisor of inspection and walk
20 through the facility and take a look.

21 MR. MCGILL: Do you -- do you recall any --
22 any problems that they might have detected from their
23 point of view?

24 MR. SOMMERS: No.

1 MR. MCGILL: Did they seem knowledgeable in
2 the airline maintenance?

3 MR. SOMMERS: Professional. And paying
4 attention to business, that sort of thing.

5 MR. MCGILL: So other than the -- just the
6 two that were there, did you notice -- did anyone else
7 ever come through?

8 MR. SOMMERS: Not specifically, that I
9 recall.

10 MR. MCGILL: Do you know the term ATOS or Air
11 Transportation Oversight?

12 MR. SOMMERS: I've glanced at that briefly.

13 MR. MCGILL: You're -- you're carriers under
14 this oversight system at this time since '98, and I was
15 wondering if you noticed any prior -- from the old way
16 of doing stuff to the way they're doing things now that
17 you rate -- do you see any difference? Do you see any
18 -- the number of people there or less people? Or do
19 they help you out in any way? Just what are your
20 general observations?

21 MR. SOMMERS: As far as a change from -- that
22 came into play in '98?

23 MR. MCGILL: Yes.

24 MR. SOMMERS: Previous to that?

1 MR. MCGILL: As I recall, it was like October
2 of '98.

3 MR. SOMMERS: The frequency may have stepped
4 up a bit on that, maybe as often as every other month
5 or something like that.

6 MR. MCGILL: Do you think that oversight is
7 adequate?

8 MR. SOMMERS: Yes. Yes, they have come in
9 and asked questions about how this works and that works
10 and suggested some improvements -- been through there
11 with that.

12 MR. MCGILL: What kind of improvements do
13 they ask about?

14 MR. SOMMERS: Tracking our tools and how the
15 system works and that sort of thing.

16 MR. MCGILL: That's another area right now
17 that's sort of up right now, so we need to kind of
18 address. Talk about your tools 'cause that is a -- an
19 issue right now.

20 MR. SOMMERS: Our -- our tools are, in
21 general, handled by the Stores Department. They store
22 'em and they issue 'em and check 'em back in when the
23 guys are done with 'em. They're -- they get a
24 calibration report when tools need to go out for
25 calibration. And they'll let Maintenance know that

1 these items are going out for calibration so they're
2 not going to be here next week so maybe you ought to --
3 if there's anything there you're going to need next
4 week you're going to have to order it from someplace
5 else, get it down from Seattle or something like that.

6 MR. MCGILL: Is that tracked by your
7 inspectors at your facility or tracked by --

8 MR. SOMMERS: By Stores.

9 MR. MCGILL: By Stores? When you say Stores,
10 Stores in Seattle or Stores in --

11 MR. SOMMERS: Stores in Oakland and -- of
12 course, they're related. Stores in Oakland doesn't
13 work for me, they work for the Stores people in -- in
14 Seattle. The manager for them is located in Seattle.

15 MR. MCGILL: So they have a list of every
16 tool you have in your facility?

17 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

18 MR. MCGILL: And they know which tools need
19 to be calibrated?

20 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

21 MR. MCGILL: And they know when these dates
22 are coming up for calibration?

23 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

24 MR. MCGILL: When they do come up, what do
25 you do with them?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Ship 'em out for calibration
2 either to Seattle or to -- following their --
3 instructions to some other vendor.

4 MR. MCGILL: Would they ship you a
5 replacement or --

6 MR. SOMMERS: Yes. If -- if we need one.

7 MR. MCGILL: Who actually performs the audit
8 of these tools?

9 MR. SOMMERS: Stores.

10 MR. MCGILL: Would they know what tools need
11 to be calibrated?

12 MR. SOMMERS: Yes, through the calibration
13 report. There's also a code, as I recall, on -- it's a
14 dash something or other indicates that that's a tool
15 that's subject to calibration.

16 MR. MCGILL: Could it have been possible that
17 you had tools there that the manufacturer said needed
18 calibration but you didn't identify 'em as being tools
19 that needed calibration?

20 MR. SOMMERS: I wouldn't think so. Anything
21 that is is identified.

22 MR. MCGILL: We keep falling back to this
23 last few days about the -- and I don't know a whole lot
24 about it so maybe you can kind of fill us in a little
25 bit. But that -- one of those tools, the fixtures that

1 are used in that end-play check, that was under -- that
2 was in your possession in Oakland, is that correct?

3 MR. SOMMERS: I would assume so. I don't --
4 at the time, yeah. In order for us to do the job we'd
5 had to have the tool.

6 MR. MCGILL: Do you know what tool you had?
7 I mean was it -- was it a tool that was in-house built
8 or a tool that was -- how would you identify -- how
9 would you know what tools you had there? Are they
10 part-numbered?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, they have a part number
12 on them. The work card would have a part number on it,
13 so that's the tool you ask for and what you get is what
14 you get.

15 MR. MCGILL: But that -- of course, that part
16 number is your part number on your job card?

17 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

18 MR. MCGILL: So you had put that part number
19 on your own --

20 MR. SOMMERS: On the -- on the job card,
21 yeah. You would -- the mechanic would request what's
22 on the job card, and the tool would be issued to do the
23 job.

24 MR. MCGILL: What I was really trying to get,
25 what is -- obviously, that tool may or may not be, and

1 I don't know at this stage, the proper tool. This is
2 after the fact, of course. But what process do you
3 have that you would have had the right tool? Or who's
4 checking some of these tools? Or who looks at -- ever
5 looks at these tools or whatever? I -- I --

6 MR. SOMMERS: Well, if -- if there's a known
7 problem with the tool as far as, you know, its
8 condition or if it's broke or something like that we'd
9 request another one or we'd buy another one or we'd buy
10 the parts to repair that one if that's feasible.

11 MR. MCGILL: This particular tool --

12 MR. SOMMERS: But someone would have to
13 complain about the tool being broke to know that.

14 MR. MCGILL: This particular tool came into
15 your possession, I guess, when ya'll purchased -- I
16 guess. I don't know. In 1984. That's what my
17 understanding is. And that's when you bought some
18 airplanes from Jet America, so you might have come into
19 some of their tools along with the airplanes. I don't
20 know that, but I can't get that answer and I was just -
21 - since you were there at the beginning, do you -- do
22 you recall or remember anything? Did ya'll get any --

23 MR. SOMMERS: Not '84. I came along five
24 years later.

1 MR. MCGILL: Oh, oh, you're right. Yeah.
2 I'm sorry. Well, those tools -- yeah, you're right.
3 You wouldn't have known 'cause they moved those tools
4 out of San Francisco into the C-check area at Oakland
5 probably about '90, I guess. Okay. You wouldn't know
6 that.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. MCGILL: In 1995 there was a base
9 inspection. Did they come down to your facility and do
10 any inspection for the FAA?

11 MR. SOMMERS: The FAA? In '95? I don't
12 know. They've been down numerous times over the years.

13 MR. MCGILL: But you don't recall at this --
14 an ace of this sort of a -- kind of a formal group of
15 guys that come in -- you would -- you would have known
16 --

17 MR. SOMMERS: -- I remember -- taken place,
18 but I don't actually remember the event.

19 MR. MCGILL: Okay. You would have known. A
20 team would have probably come in there and looked --

21 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, we did have teams come in
22 and look at some particular time.

23 MR. MCGILL: Do you know if you were given
24 any -- do you know anything about it? Follow-up? Did
25 the company come back and point out anything? Any

1 discrepancies that could have been --

2 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I recall in general that
3 we did quite well with all the inspections that had
4 gone through there.

5 MR. MCGILL: Okay.

6 MR. SOMMERS: I don't recall specifically in
7 '95 what we may have had.

8 MR. MCGILL: Okay. So it was nothing
9 necessarily that -- said that you need to better or
10 whatever, is that correct?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Not -- not that I recall.

12 MR. MCGILL: Do you report MRRs?

13 MR. SOMMERS: No, that's generally handled by
14 the Inspection Department.

15 MR. MCGILL: Out of Oakland and they report
16 'em to Seattle?

17 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

18 (Pause)

19 MR. SOMMERS: In '97.

20 MR. MCGILL: In '97.

21 (Pause)

22 MR. MCGILL: Looks like everybody's taking
23 off, so why don't we stop here one second.

24 (Pause)

1 DR. BRENNER: In the '97 period, how would
2 you characterize the morale?

3 MR. SOMMERS: Good.

4 DR. BRENNER: And how about work load in that
5 time period?

6 MR. SOMMERS: Average.

7 DR. BRENNER: How about use of overtime?

8 MR. SOMMERS: I would have to check in there
9 and see what it was at the time.

10 DR. BRENNER: Nothing stands out with that --

11 MR. SOMMERS: No, sometimes we have it,
12 sometimes we don't.

13 DR. BRENNER: How were you impacted by the
14 change to the weekend coverage? They would have had --

15 MR. SOMMERS: How I was affected?

16 DR. BRENNER: Well, no, in terms of these
17 issues: morale and work load. What kind of effect
18 would that have?

19 MR. SOMMERS: Everyone pretty much understood
20 the necessity of it and handled it.

21 DR. BRENNER: Why -- can you give us any
22 insight as to why ASA tried to change greases? Were
23 you involved in that? How did it impact your work?

24 MR. SOMMERS: -- minimum --

1 MR. MCGILL: I'm sorry. I -- I can't even
2 hardly hear. Would you speak up?

3 DR. BRENNER: Oh, I was asking about grease
4 and the change to the -- the Aeroshell 32 and how that
5 --

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: 33.

7 DR. BRENNER: I'm sorry?

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: It's 33.

9 DR. BRENNER: 33, excuse me. 33 and how that
10 impacted the -- the work in the Oakland base --

11 MR. SOMMERS: My answer was nothing that I
12 was aware of.

13 DR. BRENNER: And I know we talked about it,
14 but the restraining fixtures, do you -- do you know
15 anything about the history of the manufacturer of that
16 -- the original one?

17 MR. SOMMERS: No.

18 DR. BRENNER: And how about after the AD came
19 out in February? I understand the company made
20 additional ones at that point. Do you know anything
21 about that?

22 MR. SOMMERS: No. I wasn't involved in that.

23 DR. BRENNER: Oh, you said the schedule in
24 1997, the schedule, the -- having the airplanes out on
25 time was a little bit off. Why is that?

1 (Pause)

2 MR. SOMMERS: I can't really say right now
3 exactly. It was a bit off at the time. Each -- each
4 plant as they get off we -- we explained each one.
5 There's a problem related to it, there's some reason it
6 takes longer than we thought it would. We explain that
7 at the time, but you know, as a general -- to look back
8 over a period of time and say -- without looking at the
9 record or more about the airplane we're talking about.

10 DR. BRENNER: Tell me about John Fowler.

11 MR. SOMMERS: What do you want to know?

12 DR. BRENNER: Well, what's he like? What's
13 he like as a person? What's he like as a manager?

14 MR. SOMMERS: Very sensible, very
15 intelligent. He's a good manager. I would say a
16 management person.

17 DR. BRENNER: What did he emphasize?

18 MR. SOMMERS: Intelligence, I would say.
19 Doing things the smart way. Some of the bases a --
20 tails, you know, looking -- looking ahead, making plans
21 before you do things, and looking back at things you've
22 done to improve things in the future.

23 DR. BRENNER: Did he ever get mad at you?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Not that I'm aware of.

1 DR. BRENNER: Did he unaware?

2 (Laughter)

3 DR. BRENNER: Okay. What about Jim
4 Trimberger? What's he like? Both manager and his
5 person.

6 MR. SOMMERS: Again, very intelligent.
7 Thoughtful, insightful, very good manager --

8 DR. BRENNER: You said he came down to the
9 facility a few times to talk about different issues.
10 What -- what kind of issues?

11 MR. SOMMERS: What's going on with the
12 airline, letting the guys know that he's available to
13 help out with anything, what he does, and that sort of
14 thing. It's sort of a visit, making himself available.

15 DR. BRENNER: Who was this -- as a safety
16 person or as a quality assurance or --

17 MR. SOMMERS: I'd say both -- just to let
18 people know there he is.

19 DR. BRENNER: Well, good.

20 MR. HAMILTON: Gerald, you've been in Oakland
21 about 10 years in various capacities?

22 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

23 MR. HAMILTON: How many times have you seen
24 jack screws replaced -- roughly?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Prior to the accident?

2 MR. HAMILTON: Yeah.

3 MR. SOMMERS: I don't know why I asked it
4 because I'm not sure exactly when the first one took
5 place.

6 (Pause)

7 MR. SOMMERS: A couple of years ago, I guess.
8 If I recall, it was Aircraft 947. Whenever that was -
9 -

10 MR. HAMILTON: I guess what I was asking was
11 quantity, how many have been changed over that 10-year
12 time frame? Prior to the --

13 MR. SOMMERS: -- yeah, well, I'm going to say
14 one.

15 MR. HAMILTON: One, okay. Do you have any
16 recollection of how long it takes to do it?

17 MR. SOMMERS: Not directly, no.

18 MR. HAMILTON: Is that -- can you give me a
19 rough guess? Is it a shift, is it three shifts?

20 MR. SOMMERS: My estimation would be no more
21 than two shifts.

22 MR. HAMILTON: Would that be a pacing item on
23 a -- if it was something that came up late in the
24 check? Do you know?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Well, if you had less than two
2 shifts left I guess it would be.

3 MR. HAMILTON: Earlier you had said that if
4 something came up late in the check it would be brought
5 up to you and discussed and whatnot. In the case of
6 963 in September of '97 it was scheduled around the
7 30th, I believe, of September, and the jack screw was
8 written up on the 27th. Would that be something that
9 would normally be brought up to you?

10 MR. SOMMERS: I think what I said is that it
11 would be brought up to me if it would affect the out-
12 date of the airplane, if it was a threat to that
13 scheduled. If it wasn't conceived as that, then it
14 wouldn't necessarily have been brought up.

15 MR. HAMILTON: I think that's all I have.

16 MR. PAPE: I have nothing at this time.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Well, let's just carry on
18 that. If -- so you don't think that the jack screw --
19 changing out a jack screw three days prior to the end
20 would be a pacing item?

21 MR. SOMMERS: If it was elected to change it
22 I imagine it could be, yeah.

23 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Hypothetically?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Hypothetically, yeah.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: It -- it might be?

2 MR. SOMMERS: Might be.

3 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And then that would have
4 been brought up to your attention?

5 MR. SOMMERS: I would hope so, yes.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Do you have Stores on
7 Friday? Is there someone in Stores available on
8 Friday?

9 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Just not on Saturday or
11 Sunday?

12 MR. SOMMERS: No, they're there Saturday and
13 Sunday also.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. I thought you had
15 stated that you had no one in Stores on the weekends?

16 MR. SOMMERS: No, that was Purchasing.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Oh, that was Purchasing.
18 So if a jack screw would have been needed to be
19 purchased then you wouldn't have had anyone to do that
20 over the weekend?

21 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: But there would have been
23 someone there on Friday?

24 MR. SOMMERS: On Purchasing, yes.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Yeah. What about on
2 swing shift on Friday? Is it just during days on --

3 MR. SOMMERS: No -- yeah.

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- Friday?

5 MR. SOMMERS: That's Leslie Burick, when she
6 works day shift, Monday through Friday.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And swing shift?

8 MR. SOMMERS: No one -- no one on swing.

9 MS. VON KLEINSMID: No one, okay. Following
10 the accident has there been a discussion in terms of --
11 I know you guys have gone through a lot of end-play
12 checks and changing out jack screws since January or
13 February of 2000. Has there been discussion amongst --
14 involving you and co-workers about how to look for
15 signs or indicators that potentially you've got a jack
16 screw that's on an excessive wear pattern or any
17 indicator as to potentially what you should look for
18 maybe changing out a jack screw?

19 MR. SOMMERS: No.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: No discussion at all
21 about -- any discussion involving -- regarding
22 potentially any wearing issues with that particular
23 jack screw?

24 MR. SOMMERS: No.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And do you check reports
2 on a daily basis in terms of open items? If it's still
3 a work item to be included on an aircraft during a C-
4 check?

5 MR. SOMMERS: No, not all the open items. I
6 depend on the supervisors to summarize what they feel
7 are -- are what we call pacing items. And if they
8 report those then we may or may not have a discussion
9 on those, depending on my understanding of where
10 they're at --

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Do you do any type of
12 trend analysis regarding how many open items you're
13 left with towards the tail-end of a -- of a C-check to
14 see if -- if the -- the trend's getting larger or
15 smaller from one aircraft to the next?

16 MR. SOMMERS: No, not from one aircraft to
17 the next.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: One year to the next?

19 MR. SOMMERS: No. Planning may do something
20 like that but that'd be out of my area.

21 MS. VON KLEINSMID: You made a statement that
22 John Fowler had -- was one of those members of the 8:00
23 teleconference -- telephone call?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, he -- he was, for a
25 period of time.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And then he was replaced?
2 Bill Weaver assumed his position?

3 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And do you know
5 approximately when that was?

6 MR. SOMMERS: No.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- two years ago, three -
8 - no idea?

9 MR. SOMMERS: I'm terrible at that.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. Fair enough. And
11 I'm a little -- the plan to go from one line to two
12 lines, there was nothing official? No --

13 MR. SOMMERS: No.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Just --

15 MR. SOMMERS: Not at my level that I'm aware
16 of. Not at my level. That I'm aware of.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Who'd you hear about it
18 from?

19 MR. SOMMERS: It's always just been
20 discussion or something generated locally that --
21 something we talked about. But nothing official.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Was the Board -- or any
23 of your fellow managers or superiors?

24 MR. SOMMERS: With just anyone. Just
25 speculation.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: No discussion in terms of
2 when you got a second line they'd be bringing on X-
3 number additional inspectors or additional mechanic
4 supervisors? You don't recall any communication about
5 --

6 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And where did you get
8 your training on -- on how to be a -- a base manager?
9 On-the-job training?

10 MR. SOMMERS: Well, leadership training, is
11 that what we're talking about? That --

12 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Well, that's more being a
13 manager. I'm talking about how to run a base
14 maintenance facility. Did you have any training on
15 that?

16 MR. SOMMERS: No. On-the-job training, just
17 experience. I've been around since '68.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Any manuals that you
19 could go refer to?

20 MR. SOMMERS: Well, we have a number of
21 manuals as far as systems regulations, maintenance and
22 engineering manuals, our GMM. Those -- all those
23 manuals are available to you for certain procedures.

24 MS. VON KLEINSMID: But in terms of how --
25 how aircraft comes into a C-check and what steps have

1 to happen while it's in there and to get it out, that's
2 -- that's listed in the manuals?

3 MR. SOMMERS: No. No, that's something you
4 learn over the years. And a lot of it's common sense.
5 You do first things first and last things last.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Were all the --

7 MR. SOMMERS: It'll certainly let you know if
8 you get it wrong.

9 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And you had talked a
10 little bit about the FAA oversight and you had
11 mentioned that there was two inspectors came around.
12 And you -- you said that was on a scheduled inspection?

13 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, as I recall. I don't
14 recall specifically what type or, you know, the exact
15 frequency of it, but you know, we're here to do our
16 ATOS inspection and let you know something like that.
17 We're going to be looking at this, that today.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Were they -- did they
19 notify you in advance or anyone else in Oakland that
20 they were going to be arriving?

21 MR. SOMMERS: On -- on some inspections they
22 have given prior notice, but we have had 'em drop by to
23 do an inspection unannounced.

24 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And you mentioned Mr. --
25 just now you mentioned ATOS. What about prior to ATOS

1 in terms of the frequency of the inspections? Were
2 they --

3 MR. SOMMERS: As I recall, there was -- there
4 was some sort of a schedule of inspections then that --
5 that they would mention. But I don't know exactly what
6 it is or what it was.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And it's your opinion
8 that the inspections or the oversight has increased
9 slightly since ATOS was implemented in '98?

10 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, I get that general
11 impression.

12 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And to be more specific,
13 do you feel it more recently, say in the year 2000, or
14 did you see it right off the bat, like in late '98,
15 '99?

16 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I'd have to say that in
17 2000, you know, it's increased to almost constant.
18 They're -- they're there on almost any time of the day
19 or night.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: What about last year?

21 MR. SOMMERS: Less so. Every few weeks or
22 few months they were around, every other month,
23 something like that.

24 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And do you know the names
25 of the inspectors that are assigned to or that stop by

1 Oakland?

2 MR. SOMMERS: Like a Jule Stefoni, mainly.
3 Let's see. In '98 Tom Tescani.

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: He's been replaced?

5 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah. I'm trying to think of
6 his last name, but it's Earl there in Oakland.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And they're out of the
8 Oakland area?

9 MR. SOMMERS: Right. And occasionally Broods
10 -- I think that's their supervisor -- comes over.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Do you know -- we've
12 talked briefly about tools. Do you guys make tools in
13 Oakland?

14 MR. SOMMERS: Not that I'm aware of on a
15 regular basis.

16 (Pause)

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Do you ever check Stores?
18 Is that anything you do? Ever go and walk through and
19 get checks of tools or parts or quantities as base --
20 manager of the base maintenance?

21 MR. SOMMERS: No, not in general.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. I think that's all
23 I have.

24 MR. SEYER: Lance Seyer. You say there's
25 Purchasing and Stores in Oakland. Do they have their

1 own supervisors or do they -- do those departments
2 report to you as base manager?

3 MR. SOMMERS: No, they have their own
4 supervisors.

5 MR. SEYER: And they report to Seattle then?

6 MR. SOMMERS: Yes. Bill Johanson.

7 MR. SEYER: And a Parts Ordering mechanic,
8 anyone wants to order a part, they would go take it to
9 the Stores/Purchasing? They wouldn't try to find it?
10 If a part was unavailable, how would the Maintenance
11 Department know that, that part was unavailable? Or
12 how does Purchasing get back in touch with the
13 Maintenance Department in Oakland?

14 MR. SOMMERS: I don't understand the
15 question. I'm sorry.

16 MR. SEYER: If I was to order a jack screw, I
17 fill out the paperwork, turn it in to Stores, and then
18 you walk away to do another task. They research if
19 they have one in stock, if they need to buy one, borrow
20 one. Goes off to Seattle or wherever it goes. While
21 we're waiting for the part we're doing other tasks.
22 Does Stores or Purchasing notify Maintenance that a
23 part is or isn't available?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

1 MR. SEYER: And how do they do that?

2 MR. SOMMERS: By that -- every day we have --
3 at 7:30 five days a week they come in and just do a --
4 sort of a status meeting of the check and it'd be
5 reported at that time.

6 MR. SEYER: You mean parts that were on order
7 --

8 MR. SOMMERS: Plus -- plus all the parts that
9 are on order. They're tracked as to their estimated
10 time of arrival, that sort of thing. They're
11 monitored. In between that meeting it would be a
12 matter of -- of Maintenance going to Purchasing and
13 checking to see how you're doing with that part.

14 MR. SEYER: Does --

15 MR. SOMMERS: When do you think we're going
16 to get it?

17 MR. SEYER: Does Purchasing tell the
18 Production Control Office? Is that the normal chain?
19 And then it goes down to the mechanic? Or how does the
20 flow go, do you know?

21 MR. SOMMERS: No. Purchasing will normally
22 tell at that meeting, unless you go to Purchasing and
23 ask them about it. And they're pretty aware of what's
24 going on too. They -- they'll come out and tell you
25 if, you know, if you tell 'em that's something you're

1 looking at. They'll keep you updated as the day goes
2 on.

3 MR. SEYER: Did you have regular, dedicated,
4 monthly safety meetings in Oakland?

5 MR. SOMMERS: Monthly?

6 MR. SEYER: Yes.

7 MR. SOMMERS: We have a combination of what
8 we call crew meetings every day in which safety is
9 brought up as part of that meeting, so they're kind of
10 labeled a crew safety meeting. That happens before
11 every shift every day. So there's three of those going
12 on every day. Formal safety meetings were scheduled, I
13 believe, it seems to me it was every three months.
14 Jeff Sommers handled those back in that -- that time
15 frame. And that would be a more formal safety-only
16 type meeting with -- with minutes and posted results
17 and that -- that sort of -- anybody that wanted could
18 come to the meeting. Whereas the other one was a
19 daily, shorter meeting, but everybody was there.

20 MR. SEYER: If a technician had a safety
21 issue, not aircraft-type, how would he report that and
22 how would it be --

23 MR. SOMMERS: Well, it would be -- he could
24 report that directly to his lead or supervisor -- on up
25 the chain till he came upon something that -- that

1 satisfied his concern.

2 MR. SEYER: So it's just verbal then?
3 There's nothing written down, nothing tracked?

4 MR. SOMMERS: No, other than the safety
5 meeting where something like that might be brought up,
6 but he would want to save something like that for a
7 meeting -- safety issue -- mention it right now.

8 MR. SEYER: And if you had any safety issues
9 that you needed to take care of you said you would
10 contact the director of safety?

11 MR. SOMMERS: No, if I had the safety issue
12 before me to take care of I would only contact my
13 director if it's something that I couldn't handle or
14 take care of right then.

15 MR. SEYER: That's all I have.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Dave Crawley with ALPA. Frank
17 McGill said here a few minutes ago, he kind of reminded
18 us of our goal to prevent another accident. And so
19 I've been sitting here kind of thinking about that. My
20 question to you is in the future what could we do to
21 prevent this same identical accident from occurring?
22 Got any ideas?

23 MR. SOMMERS: That's the one that keeps me up
24 late at night.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, what have you thought
2 about late at night?

3 MR. SOMMERS: I don't know enough about it to
4 -- to say, to feel comfortable with an answer.

5 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, one of the statements
6 that you made here a little while ago, and I've got it
7 in quotes, is you were looking at this MIG 4 on the --
8 on the horizontal stabilizer non-routine on Aircraft
9 963, and I have in quotes here you said -- you pointed
10 at it and you said, obviously it should -- should not
11 have been replaced.

12 Now, you're not the first person that I've
13 heard say that. I've heard Mr. Kelly say that and Mr.
14 Air say that and -- and other officials of the company.

15 And being in safety in some way or another for many
16 years, it bothers me that they're saying this. And so,
17 since you said that, I would like for you to look at
18 this again and tell me your basis for saying it
19 obviously shouldn't have been replaced.

20 MR. SOMMERS: Well, the original discrepancy
21 is within limits. So if something is within limits
22 then you don't play with it.

23 DR. CRAWLEY: That's it?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: There's no other
2 considerations?

3 MR. SOMMERS: No.

4 DR. CRAWLEY: None whatsoever?

5 MR. SOMMERS: That's what limits are.
6 Considerations have been made.

7 DR. CRAWLEY: Well, let me give you some more
8 information that's not on there. Do you think you have
9 everything that you need to say it obviously didn't
10 need to be replaced?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

12 DR. CRAWLEY: Right there on the MIG 4,
13 everything you could possibly want to know? There is
14 not any other questions that come up that you would
15 like to know about that jack screw to make that
16 decision that it obviously didn't need to be replaced?

17 MR. SOMMERS: No.

18 DR. CRAWLEY: In March 1985 the Acme screw
19 and nut end-play check was accomplished at 2 C-
20 intervals, which was 5000 flight hours. Then in July
21 1988 the Acme screw and nut end-play check was
22 accomplished at 2 C-intervals, which was 26 calendar
23 months or approximately 6400 flight hours. Then in
24 July 1996 the C-check was escalated to 15 calendar
25 months to where the Acme screw and nut end-play check

1 was accomplished at 2 C-intervals, which now was 30
2 calendar months, about 9955 flight hours. So we've
3 just about doubled the amount of flight hours that are
4 going on this thing before it's going to be checked
5 again. Is that information that you would consider in
6 addition in deciding whether that needs to be replaced?

7 MR. JAQUES: You mean in his role in the
8 position he's currently holding?

9 DR. CRAWLEY: His opinion. I -- I -- I know
10 that you don't make the decision. I just -- you know,
11 you're a mechanic and -- and I'm just -- want to hear
12 what's your opinion.

13 MR. JAQUES: I -- I just want to make sure
14 we're clear. It sounds to me like you're asking him to
15 make an engineering judgement based on data you're
16 providing him with. You're asking for his professional
17 opinion in an engineering capacity, and it seems like
18 it -- I have a problem with that question. If you're
19 asking him if that makes a difference as a mechanic,
20 that's fine. I want you to be clear --

21 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay.

22 MR. JAQUES: -- in what you're asking him to
23 do.

24 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. I'm not asking him as
25 the base manager of the facility at Oakland. I'm just

1 asking you as a mechanic, a knowledgeable mechanic,
2 which I'm not, if -- if that should be taken into
3 consideration.

4 MR. SOMMERS: Not as a mechanic, no.

5 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Because?

6 MR. SOMMERS: Because you have your limits.
7 Those are the limits that you live by, and you go by
8 what's in front of you.

9 DR. CRAWLEY: What are the intervals between
10 -- well, first of all, why do we do checks? Why do we
11 do these checks at all?

12 MR. SOMMERS: Because they're ordered by the
13 people who have built the maintenance package.

14 DR. CRAWLEY: Could you say that's because
15 parts wear out, on the simplest terms, and we want to
16 make sure they're -- they're not too worn out to
17 continue? Would that be a reason to do the checks?

18 MR. SOMMERS: That would be a reason, yes.

19 DR. CRAWLEY: And would it be safe to say
20 that the interval between checks is based on rates of
21 wear?

22 MR. JAQUES: I'm sorry. You're asking him to
23 comment on what the interval is based on? Again, I
24 think you're getting into an engineering judgement.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay.

2 MR. JAQUES: If you want to ask him what it
3 means to him as a mechanic or his role as an employee
4 of Alaska Airlines, that's fine. It sounds to me like
5 you're trying to push him into making engineering
6 judgements he's not qualified to make.

7 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Let me ask you as a
8 mechanic. If -- if -- can you tell by looking at that
9 MIG 4 the rate of wear of that jack screw?

10 MR. SOMMERS: No.

11 DR. CRAWLEY: What would you need to
12 determine the rate of wear?

13 MR. SOMMERS: An engineer.

14 DR. CRAWLEY: To determine the rate of -- how
15 fast it was wearing out?

16 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

17 DR. CRAWLEY: How about if you had a -- a
18 measurement from two years before on a C-check? Would
19 that -- could you determine the rate --

20 MR. SOMMERS: No.

21 DR. CRAWLEY: -- of wear?

22 MR. SOMMERS: No.

23 DR. CRAWLEY: By comparing the --

24 MR. SOMMERS: No, it could very easily be
25 that something would have an accelerated rate of wear

1 in the beginning until that gear is broke into another
2 gear. At that time the rate of wear would -- would
3 come along at a different rate, so maybe a rate of wear
4 would be a -- a curve rather than --

5 DR. CRAWLEY: Could you --

6 MR. SOMMERS: -- angles. And you have no way
7 of knowing that.

8 DR. CRAWLEY: Could you tell the average
9 weight of wear -- rate of wear?

10 MR. SOMMERS: That's what I'm saying. You
11 don't know that the average would be the actual.

12 (Pause)

13 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, looking at what's happened
14 since that MIG 4 was initiated, since what happened on
15 January 31st, if you consider that in, do you think
16 that jack screw needed to be replaced?

17 MR. SOMMERS: You mean had I known there was
18 going to be a problem with this jack screw would I have
19 changed it?

20 DR. CRAWLEY: Yes.

21 MR. SOMMERS: Of course.

22 DR. CRAWLEY: So I go back to my original
23 question. What -- what can we do to prevent this exact
24 same accident from happening again?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Well, that -- that would
2 involve some kind of ability to see into the future
3 that we don't possess.

4 DR. CRAWLEY: This is kind of like an autopsy
5 here that we're doing. And --

6 MR. SOMMERS: Or some knowledge that I don't
7 have.

8 DR. CRAWLEY: And -- and the idea is to -- to
9 come up with a way to prevent it, and I just -- I
10 thought maybe -- you said you stayed awake late at
11 night thinking about how we might do that, and -- and
12 thinking about all these things, it seems like we ought
13 to be able to come up with some idea of what we could
14 do to prevent another one. But you don't have any
15 ideas on that?

16 MR. SOMMERS: I wish I did.

17 (Pause)

18 DR. CRAWLEY: I think that's all I have.

19 MR. LASLEY: Mike Lasley. Is there any --
20 has there been any specific training for those
21 performing end-play checks? Training regarding
22 specifically the technique of how one performs an end-
23 play check per the card?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Not that I'm aware of.

1 MR. LASLEY: Has -- has there been any --
2 anything put into place since the accident to verify
3 that it's being checked properly and that everybody who
4 might check it knows exactly how to do it?

5 MR. SOMMERS: I haven't heard of any problems
6 following the cards -- no formal training that I'm
7 aware of.

8 MR. LASLEY: Nothing to confirm that
9 everybody's understanding how to -- how to accomplish
10 the cards, correct?

11 MR. SOMMERS: That's right.

12 MR. LASLEY: No known technique problems with
13 anybody who's accomplished any check?

14 MR. SOMMERS: No.

15 MR. LASLEY: Thank you.

16 MR. MCGILL: Dick?

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah. Gerry, you commented
18 that the -- the -- your impression was the NASAPs had
19 gone fairly well at the Oakland base.

20 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is that base on any specific
22 out-briefing or management response or reports to you
23 regarding those inspections?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Yes, there's usually a report
25 that comes along after those.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What form does that take?

2 MR. SOMMERS: I don't recall specifically,
3 but it seems to me it's a -- it's a written report that
4 we get, you know, how we did. There's also a
5 debriefing that goes with that in -- before they leave
6 and they sort of tell you in general what they found --

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: The team specifically
8 debriefs you before they leave?

9 MR. SOMMERS: Yes. But not in '95. '95 I
10 was an acting supervisor and so --

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What about the one that was
12 just completed?

13 MR. SOMMERS: That would be one where they
14 would debrief me and I'd give a report on how we did.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You were debriefed by that
16 team?

17 MR. SOMMERS: It seems to me I was. I can't
18 recall specifically that happening at that time.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, this was in the April 3
20 to 19 time frame.

21 MR. SOMMERS: April 3rd of what -- this year?

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: To -- yeah. To the 19th.
23 That's the -- the total scope of the inspection. I
24 don't know when they were at Oakland but somewhere in
25 that time frame.

1 MR. SOMMERS: I can't recall specifically
2 that we sat down with them and went over -- although it
3 may have been so brief that I don't recall it.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you received a written
5 report from the company on that brief -- on that
6 inspection?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Not that I recall.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So with respect to the most
9 recent FAA -- we call 'em NASAPs, they've got all kinds
10 of names. But the latest inspection by the FAA, a team
11 inspection of the Alaska Airlines facility at Oakland -
12 -

13 MR. SOMMERS: Mm-hmm.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- you have neither
15 recollection of a out-briefing by the team nor do you
16 have a report in writing from the company about the
17 results? Is that correct?

18 MR. SOMMERS: No, that's not correct. I do -
19 - let's see.

20 (Pause)

21 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, there was an FAA group
22 down there that -- that did go over their findings, as
23 I recall now, looking mainly at paperwork. And as I
24 recall, the release of an aircraft at the time. And it
25 seems to me there was a written report but I -- I'm not

1 sure that I recall it specifically. But I do recall
2 the debriefing, yes, now at this time I do.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And the -- the specific
4 aircraft going through the C-check that they looked at
5 the paperwork for and that sort of thing --

6 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- do you recall the end-
8 number on that?

9 MR. SOMMERS: No, sir.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Let me ask another way. Was
11 that the aircraft that engendered all manner of threats
12 and accusations or what have you from the FAA with
13 respect to Alaska's major maintenance facilities just
14 June the 9th, 7th, somewhere in that time frame? Are
15 you familiar with that?

16 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, I'm just --

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did you know you almost lost
18 the base at Oakland? I mean the authority to operate
19 there?

20 MR. SOMMERS: Yes. Well aware of that, yes.
21 I'd say yes, that was the airplane, yes.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That was the same -- one and
23 the same?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, it seems to me it was,
25 yes.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And you think that's a good
2 report?

3 MR. SOMMERS: No, I thought we were referring
4 back to '95.

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Oh.

6 MR. SOMMERS: In that era.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: No, I specifically asked the
8 most recent NASAP that you -- did you think you --

9 MR. SOMMERS: Well, it took me a while to
10 catch on. That's why I didn't remember to begin with
11 and then all of a sudden April, you're talking about a
12 couple of months ago.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Right here in River City.

14 MR. SOMMERS: Right. Yeah. So I'm with you
15 now.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Was that a good report?

17 MR. SOMMERS: No.

18 (Pause)

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you remember any specifics
20 of that out-briefing now that we're on the same sheet
21 of music?

22 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

23 (Pause)

24 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I don't want to get into the
25 details of them, but did you find them surprising?

1 MR. SOMMERS: Some of it, yes.

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What I'm trying to -- to get
3 a feel for is how much of it was something you really
4 weren't aware of and how much of it is just a matter of
5 interpretation or that sort of thing? Do you
6 understand my question?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I -- I -- I think I do in
8 that --

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Was -- was theirs -- did they
10 have a different perspective of what you were already
11 doing and you thought it was okay? Or did -- were you
12 really doing things that weren't too good and you
13 needed to change?

14 MR. SOMMERS: Well, they felt that in general
15 we were doing things that -- that were -- were good but
16 that they weren't -- the procedures that we had weren't
17 -- weren't documented for someone else who wanted to do
18 what we were doing to follow along and -- with what we
19 were doing.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How much of the criticism, if
21 I could use that word, how much of the criticism of
22 your facility had anything to do with the -- with the
23 specific air-worthiness of the aircraft?

24 MR. SOMMERS: You mean the safety of the
25 aircraft --

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes.

2 MR. SOMMERS: -- itself? None, that I
3 recall.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you gotten a -- this
5 written report from the company with respect to that
6 inspection?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Say that again?

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you gotten the report,
9 the written report from the company regarding the most
10 recent NASAP inspection?

11 MR. SOMMERS: I believe that I've seen it but
12 I haven't actually gotten --

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You don't have a copy?

14 MR. SOMMERS: No.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: We talked about this MIG 4
16 card. Do you still have it in front of you?

17 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And in answer to Mr. McGill
19 you were saying that, and as I understand your process,
20 based on the first finding there and the corrective
21 action that was written, replace the jack screw or
22 whatever, I think you used the wrong nomenclature but
23 the thrust was replace the jack screw.

24 MR. SOMMERS: On the planned action?

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, sir.

2 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. And as I understand
4 it, that lead mechanic would then go to Parts and order
5 the part? Is that right?

6 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: This is a Friday the part
8 would start being ordered. Something would happen. Is
9 that correct?

10 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

11 MR. JAQUES: If it were on a Friday.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Who does that lead -- I think
14 he's a lead mechanic. Who does that lead mechanic work
15 for that ordered the part or that would order the part?

16 MR. SOMMERS: One of the A & P supervisors.

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That work for you?

18 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How many of them are there?

20 MR. SOMMERS: Eight, generally.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Eight.

22 MR. SOMMERS: Not A & P supervisors. There
23 would be three A & P supervisors, three sheet metal,
24 avionics.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But this would be -- this
2 would be under the A & P supervisor?

3 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Now, we have a -- a
5 correction or an adjustment to the reading and the
6 planned action on that card, right?

7 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Explain to me why that would
9 even take place. Where -- where in the organization is
10 the tripwire that would say hold it, redo this?

11 MR. SOMMERS: That would be the call that was
12 made by the person that changed this. In this case
13 it's a lead mechanic.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So are you telling me that
15 one lead mechanic can go pick up a completed work card
16 or MIG 4 and do it over again?

17 MR. SOMMERS: Well, not completed but at this
18 point he could. If it -- if he had the first
19 discrepancy written down, someone had written a planned
20 action, yes, a lead mechanic can change that planned
21 action.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Why is he even messing with
23 it?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Based on the -- I'm just
25 assuming, you know, that -- speculating that he's

1 looking at -- at the original measurement. I don't
2 know exactly why --

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I mean doesn't he have his
4 own business to take care of?

5 MR. SOMMERS: Well, this may become his
6 business. He may be the -- the lead on the -- the
7 following shift. The other guy may not have ordered
8 parts at all. He may have just handed this over to --
9 or put it back on the board is what actually happens
10 down there. We stick those on the board and the other
11 lead may have come along a shift or two later and --
12 and it's all speculation, but take this down and -- and
13 --

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But that card at that point -
15 - that card would have you believe it'd been there for
16 three days.

17 MR. SOMMERS: Possible.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That -- with -- with no
19 supervisory mechanic -- what do you call them? I'm
20 sorry. Losing the terminology. But the supervisors of
21 these A & P mechanics, without one of them saying go
22 redo this work, a lead mechanic would come in and redo
23 work that had already been done?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Yes --

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: For an aircraft that's
2 scheduled out of C-check?

3 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, that's possible.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is that still possible? The
5 procedures that you have in place?

6 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You slid off a question about
9 this -- I don't think it was clear about the stocking
10 of jack screws, and I'd like to come at it a different
11 way. Are you aware -- prior to the accident, are you
12 aware of Oakland base ever having a jack screw in
13 stock?

14 MR. SOMMERS: No.

15 (Pause)

16 MR. SOMMERS: But it could be there without
17 me being aware of it.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I understand. And I -- I'm
19 not sure what your answer was about the frequency of
20 one lead mechanic overruling another lead mechanic.

21 MR. SOMMERS: That's not usual but it does
22 happen. I couldn't give you a number, I mean how many
23 out of how many, but that happens on a -- a regular
24 enough basis that it wouldn't be extraordinary.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And there's no supervision
2 involved anywhere?

3 MR. SOMMERS: Well, down here in your
4 authorized you have -- it's -- that's a supervisor's
5 signature there.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is that where it says
9 "corrected by"?

10 MR. SOMMERS: No. See it where it says the
11 planned action and that part that was changed?

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah.

13 MR. SOMMERS: Down there in the lower right-
14 hand box of that section it says "RB" something or
15 other?

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. How would you know
17 whether that it authorizing the change or authorizing
18 the reevaluation?

19 MR. SOMMERS: You don't.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You don't?

21 MR. SOMMERS: Under that system, no, you
22 wouldn't.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: As a practical matter do you
24 know?

1 MR. SOMMERS: No.

2 (Pause)

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So nowhere in the quality
4 control, quality assurance were concerns of Alaska
5 Airlines maintenance at the Oakland base have you been
6 involved in the discussion about how all this
7 transpired? Is that what you're saying?

8 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And you're the director of
10 the maintenance base?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Manager.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Manager of the maintenance
13 base. Can I infer from that that's never taken place
14 then, since you weren't involved? That they've never
15 really gone back and rehashed or reexamined or
16 evaluated or discussed this in any way?

17 MR. SOMMERS: Right. With me.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I'm -- my question is
19 if they had, would they have bothered to talk to you
20 about it? Would you know about it if they had?

21 MR. SOMMERS: Depending on when you're
22 talking about. You mean back in '97 when this took
23 place?

24 MR. RODRIGUEZ: No.

1 MR. SOMMERS: Or --

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Either in '97 or now.

3 MR. SOMMERS: Or -- well, now I don't think I
4 would be made aware of that if someone had rehashed or
5 gone through it, no.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Why wouldn't you be aware of
7 it if it involved your people and your facility and
8 they were trying to figure out what all happened in
9 this -- what the background of this particular work
10 card was?

11 MR. SOMMERS: This -- this is the first time
12 I've been --

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I understand that.

14 MR. SOMMERS: -- called on to --

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, that's why I'm asking -
16 -

17 MR. SOMMERS: -- participate, and I haven't
18 been called on prior to this. Nor have I gotten with
19 these guys and gone over this.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay.

21 (Pause)

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you have ever have any
23 dealing with Engineering?

24 MR. SOMMERS: From time to time.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What would be the nature? A
2 damaged aircraft or something?

3 MR. SOMMERS: Right. They come out and -- we
4 have one engineer in Oakland who would come down and
5 maybe take a look at a repair and help us decide what
6 we're going to do with it.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Who's he assigned to or what
8 does he do?

9 MR. SOMMERS: Bob Menache.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What -- what does he do?

11 MR. SOMMERS: Well, --

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: When you don't call him what
13 does he do?

14 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I -- I don't know exactly
15 what he -- what he does when he's not doing something
16 for us. I imagine he's involved with engineering
17 orders and things of that nature.

18 (Pause)

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: As a function of this
20 reevaluation of the maintenance base at Oakland by the
21 FAA there was a -- there were certain agreements
22 reached between the company and -- and the FAA about
23 changes that should be made and specifically one that I
24 am aware of reportedly is the hiring of 130 mechanics.
25 Are you familiar with that? Are you aware of that?

1 MR. SOMMERS: I've -- I've read some of that
2 in the news readings.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Through the newspapers?

4 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So nobody's talked to you
6 about staffing or that sort of thing at the maintenance
7 base in Oakland?

8 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, we -- the director in
9 Oakland now has the -- the numbers that we're going to
10 be hiring and proceeding with that. And we have had
11 visits from Bill Air and -- and other officials from
12 Seattle.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But you've not been privy to
14 those conversations?

15 MR. SOMMERS: Well, yeah, they come down and
16 -- and talk to the employees. Told everybody what --

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What are they going to do?

18 MR. SOMMERS: -- in general what the plans
19 are.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What are they going to do
21 with respect to mechanics?

22 MR. SOMMERS: Going to hire more.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How many?

24 MR. SOMMERS: There's 12 mechanics I know of
25 in Oakland and seven supervisors at this point. There

1 may be more that I'm not aware of.

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But they haven't been hired
3 yet?

4 MR. SOMMERS: Several of the employees have
5 been upgraded to supervisors. We're coming down toward
6 the end of that. We have one or two at the most to
7 fill them out.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And the additional mechanics?

9 MR. SOMMERS: We have a number that we've
10 interviewed that are coming. I don't know what that
11 number is, but they're on the way and we're proceeding
12 with that.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know -- do you know
14 what kind of training is anticipated for those people?

15 MR. SOMMERS: I would assume, you know, the
16 same type of training we've had in the past,
17 familiarization of the equipment that we have and our
18 Training Department, you know, what -- what they
19 present for the new -- new employees.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: If you -- do you think that
21 the 12 additional mechanics and seven supervisors is --
22 would represent adequate staffing for the Oakland
23 maintenance base?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Yes.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you think that your
2 current staffing is adequate?

3 MR. SOMMERS: For what we do, yes.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So these are just surplus?

5 MR. SOMMERS: No, these would, I -- I think,
6 increase our capacity and ability.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I think somewhere along the
8 line I got the impression that, you didn't say it
9 directly, but you had no problems or you weren't
10 involved in the changeover of grease from Mobil 33 to -
11 - I'm sorry, Mobil 28 to Aeroshell 33?

12 MR. SOMMERS: That's true.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Who would have implemented
14 that claim? Or is there a plan for it? You just
15 change grease?

16 MR. SOMMERS: When something like that
17 happens it usually -- Engineering will generate that.
18 That'll go in to Planning. Planning distributes the
19 paperwork, and we do the work that comes out of
20 Planning.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Who would have done that
22 where the rubber meets the road? Down where -- where
23 you are in -- in Maintenance? You're the people who
24 are going to use it.

1 MR. SOMMERS: Yeah, that piece of paper at
2 our facility would show up in Production Control. It
3 would become part of the package that we talked about,
4 and that would be one of the things that's scheduled to
5 -- to be done to the aircraft. And when it came time
6 to do that and the piece of paper to be issued to the
7 mechanic, then he would be the one to carry out the
8 orders on it.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Prior to December of '97 did
10 you use Aeroshell 33?

11 MR. SOMMERS: I don't know.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So at your level you're
14 really not involved or care what kind of grease they're
15 using or anything?

16 MR. SOMMERS: Well, I hate to say I don't
17 care. It's -- I'm not involved with what's actually
18 being used.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: If they bought a large
20 quantity of the grease -- of a new grease would you be
21 aware of that?

22 MR. SOMMERS: No.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's all the questions I
24 have.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: I've got one more. Dave
2 Crawley, ALPA. Mr. Rodriguez asked you some questions
3 about how this other lead mechanic might have gotten
4 involved in repeating the end-play check. How long
5 does it take to set up for an end-play check from the
6 time the mechanic goes out there, puts the restraining
7 device on, puts the dial indicator on, and is ready to
8 have the inspector come out there and look at it with
9 him? How long does that whole set-up take?

10 MR. SOMMERS: I'm not sure. I never did the
11 job myself.

12 DR. CRAWLEY: But they -- you know that they
13 use a restraining device to -- I mean do you basically
14 know how the test works?

15 MR. SOMMERS: Some pieces of it. Not all of
16 it.

17 DR. CRAWLEY: It involves putting on this
18 restraining device?

19 MR. SOMMERS: I'm aware that there's a
20 restraining device that goes on it.

21 DR. CRAWLEY: And we've been told two to four
22 hours to get it set up. Is -- does that sound
23 reasonable?

24 MR. SOMMERS: Sounds reasonable, yeah.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: So this initial check was done
2 on Saturday the 27th and the repeat was done some three
3 days later on -- on Tuesday. Did -- did the
4 restraining device, do you know, would it have stayed
5 on there and the whole set-up and the dial indicator
6 stay right there in place for all that time?

7 MR. SOMMERS: No, I don't know.

8 DR. CRAWLEY: You don't know?

9 MR. SOMMERS: No.

10 DR. CRAWLEY: So you don't know whether he
11 had to go up and do the set-up again to do the recheck?

12 MR. SOMMERS: No.

13 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. That's all I have.

14 MR. MCGILL: I got one follow -- follow-up
15 question here, Gerald, when Mr. Rodriguez asked about
16 the -- the lube, that jack -- that particular
17 lubrication card was changed over from a task card on
18 January 1, 1998, where Mobil 28 was changed to
19 Aeroshell 33. And if I were one of your mechanics
20 going out to do that task I would have shown up to get
21 my tools and grease. Did ya'll segregate or do you
22 have both types of greases? Did you -- how is that
23 done in that -- in your --

24 MR. SOMMERS: I don't know.

1 MR. MCGILL: Did you go back through or --
2 you don't remember anything about the grease and you
3 come back and send some of it back to -- some back up
4 here or --

5 MR. SOMMERS: No, not --

6 MR. MCGILL: keep it there or --

7 MR. SOMMERS: Not a thing I'd know anything
8 about.

9 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Since the time that the
10 FAA has issued the letter stating to go back to Mobil
11 28 has there been any inventory or has anybody in the
12 Oakland base --

13 MR. SOMMERS: I don't -- I don't know.
14 That's -- that's handled through Stores.

15 MR. MCGILL: But you haven't personally got -
16 - so it would just -- whoever's in your Stores would
17 make whatever changes are necessary and you don't know
18 anything about it?

19 MR. SOMMERS: Right.

20 MR. MCGILL: Gerald, I think that's it.

21 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

22 (Pause)

23 INTERVIEW OF CHET YANCEY

24 MR. MCGILL: Just before I forget, Chet, you
25 did want Dane to be your representative?

1 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

2 MR. MCGILL: Okay. That's fine. I'd like to
3 start off by asking you to just give a brief sketch of
4 your background and experience and time with the Alaska
5 Airlines.

6 MR. YANCEY: Okay. The -- my aviation
7 background starts in 1962. I was in the Air Force for
8 four years, jet engine mechanic. December 1st, 1966, I
9 hired on with Alaska Airlines as a mechanic. In '69 I
10 acquired my MD license. Roughly 1972 I acquired the
11 inspection authorization or -- I-authority with Alaska.
12 And in October '78 I went into management as a foreman
13 here in Seattle. In the following year, spring, I took
14 a position in Fairbanks as the ground ops manager and
15 maintenance foreman. There four years and then moved
16 to Anchorage and managed the -- manager of contract
17 services, ground-managed -- airlines. Then that was
18 for two years. And then four years of my time in
19 Anchorage was the line maintenance manager for the
20 State of Alaska, the areas that we served, including
21 Anchorage.

22 January 1989 I moved back to Seattle as
23 manager of inspection. And then I believe in -- I
24 believe it was around '92 I was named the chief
25 inspector -- manager of inspection slash chief

1 inspector. And that's where I've been since.

2 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Thank you.

3 (Pause)

4 MR. MCGILL: As chief inspector listed on the
5 op specs, the A-6 portion, what are your duties?

6 MR. YANCEY: As chief inspector is to ensure
7 that the safety and reliability or -- of the aircraft
8 is maintained at the highest level; that we adhere to
9 all FARs, regulations, and our own manuals that we
10 abide by; and if recommendations are in order for
11 things that I may see as that person then I make
12 recommendations. I also as chief inspector control the
13 issuance of the RII inspector program we have and the
14 air-worthiness release program we have.

15 MR. MCGILL: Then it would be kind of a fair
16 assessment to say you're kind of the checks and
17 balances of the maintenance that is performed?

18 MR. YANCEY: Checks and balances of the
19 maintenance that's performed, especially when it comes
20 to the -- the portion where you're RII or your
21 inspectors are involved and the mechanics that have a
22 worthiness release, yes.

23 MR. MCGILL: You're also over the inspectors
24 that are in the overhaul facilities also?

1 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

2 MR. MCGILL: Is that right?

3 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

4 MR. MCGILL: How often do you get with those
5 -- the other supervisory inspectors?

6 MR. YANCEY: From -- you're talking about the
7 ones that are here in Seattle?

8 MR. MCGILL: And the ones in Oakland, the
9 ones wherever they're located at.

10 MR. YANCEY: Wherever they're located? On
11 the -- the ones in -- well, in Seattle my office is in
12 the same office as our inspection group. The ones in
13 Oakland it's -- I try to do that quarterly. Sometimes
14 it's more often, sometimes it's less often. The
15 Phoenix facility, you're talking about the vendor --

16 MR. MCGILL: Yes.

17 MR. YANCEY: -- people, yeah. Phoenix
18 facility, I believe I was down there once since we've
19 started up with 'em this past spring. Tramco once
20 since we started -- or not spring, but in January of
21 this past year. The -- and prior to that there were --
22 there were trips but I -- I couldn't give you a number,
23 recall a number. I know I've been several times but --

24 MR. MCGILL: When an aircraft is not done
25 with ya'll's own facilities and it's out-sourced

1 somewhere else, do you send Inspection?

2 MR. YANCEY: When I'm requested to, yes.

3 MR. MCGILL: If you send a -- do you normally
4 send a -- a rep or inspector with --

5 MR. YANCEY: I normally send -- in the past I
6 have sent an Inspection supervisor.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. MCGILL: What is your -- if issues of
9 safety come up with any of your inspectors how are they
10 addressed?

11 MR. YANCEY: If -- if an item comes up that's
12 a concern of an inspector, whether it be Oakland,
13 Seattle, or even throughout the system with the RII
14 people, normal process would be that they would talk to
15 the supervisor if one's available and if not they would
16 talk to me. And the -- if I -- if I took that item of
17 concern from a person I would have to look at it and --
18 and see how much involvement that they were in and see
19 where else I could go to -- to corroborate what -- what
20 I'm hearing. But I -- I would research it, let 'em
21 know that we'll have an answer, and if I couldn't get
22 an answer or wasn't satisfied with where I come up with
23 a conclusion I'm usually sharing this concern with my
24 boss also for help on what do we do.

1 MR. MCGILL: Is there a formal written
2 procedure? Is there a form that one would fill out or
3 anything like it other than just the verbal?

4 MR. YANCEY: Well, for safety issues you can
5 write 'em on any paper you want. I -- I'm not --

6 MR. MCGILL: I didn't know if -- if you might
7 have a formal way of -- if I were working on graveyard
8 or something and I sensed something of safety how would
9 I get that to you?

10 MR. YANCEY: Normally what I've received is a
11 type of typed thing of, Chet, here's something you
12 might want to look into.

13 MR. MCGILL: When you say you -- you might
14 pass this board to your boss, which would be Mr.
15 Trimberger, how do you differentiate between
16 disposition as director of safety and director of QC?

17 (Pause)

18 MR. YANCEY: I really don't understand the
19 question. How do I differentiate? I -- he's the same
20 person and he's like me, he wears multiple hats.

21 MR. MCGILL: Does he ever -- do you ever --
22 would you ever go to him and talk purely safety where
23 he would have his safety hat on and then maybe as
24 opposed to when he's wearing his quality control hat or
25 his director of training hat? Is there any change in

1 any of these or same person, same thing?

2 MR. YANCEY: To me, I've always considered
3 that if I went in with a -- a safety issue that he has
4 a safety hat on because we wouldn't be talking about
5 training or it wouldn't spar out. We would -- we would
6 talk about an issue.

7 MR. MCGILL: What would be the difference
8 between safety and quality control? Could you give us
9 an example --

10 MR. YANCEY: Proper --

11 MR. MCGILL: -- of one in one instance where
12 something might be safety and one might be quality
13 control?

14 MR. YANCEY: Well, proper quality control
15 ensures safety. To be honest with you, I can't
16 remember the last time I had an occasion to talk to Jim
17 that I could give you an example.

18 MR. MCGILL: Okay.

19 MR. YANCEY: Let me help you out a little
20 bit, too. I don't want to sound like I'm avoiding
21 anything here, but in the last -- since mid-March and
22 all of April I was out of touch with the company
23 because I was on jury duty for six weeks. So there's
24 been things that have happened in that period and
25 there's been things that have happened --

1 MR. MCGILL: No, I wasn't really --

2 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

3 MR. MCGILL: -- referring to any particular
4 time at all. I was just trying to -- it's a very
5 important position that you're holding -- holding this
6 certification of this airline right now. You're one of
7 five people that's listed on there as having that type
8 of knowledge and expertise.

9 MR. YANCEY: Right.

10 MR. MCGILL: A few years ago in 1995 a
11 position was created. It was made director of safety
12 because overall it was felt that it was -- it should be
13 there, it was an important position. This position is
14 now being, like your director -- chief inspector --
15 director of maintenance, somebody's, you know,
16 operations and so forth. One of those is director --
17 and I was just curious how your relationship is with
18 this person that is a director of safety and how that's
19 treated and how that would be separate from director of
20 QC. If -- if there were any, but I understand it's one
21 person and maybe that's not ever defined. I don't
22 know. I was just asking you if there were instances
23 that would segregate that in some way. If not I
24 understand.

1 MR. YANCEY: Yeah, I -- I've never had a
2 concern that there was a problem with -- with that, but
3 I've never really dissected it and -- and gone into
4 Jim's office and told him to put on his safety hat or
5 put on his QC hat or whatever. So it's always --

6 MR. MCGILL: I understand that. Back in '95,
7 1995, the FAA conducted a NASAP inspection. In 1998
8 the DOD. Then of course, recently there's been another
9 one but I'm not going to get into that because you
10 haven't been here -- about that, but let's just take
11 the two in '95 and '98. Did -- were you aware of any
12 concerns that came out of these inspections from the
13 FAA and the DOD?

14 MR. YANCEY: The ones that would pertain to
15 my area I would have been aware of, yes.

16 MR. MCGILL: Was there -- what -- what --
17 what parts in your area that -- that --

18 MR. YANCEY: The -- an inspection finding,
19 like an RII finding or a receive an inspection problem.

20 MR. MCGILL: So there were some of these and
21 they were addressed to you and --

22 MR. YANCEY: For me to provide --

23 MR. MCGILL: -- you took -- you took some
24 sort of action --

1 MR. YANCEY: -- yes.

2 MR. MCGILL: -- to get 'em corrected? On RII
3 items, can you just quickly explain that process, how
4 you make the selection of those individuals, how
5 they're used, how they're trained, recurrent, and so
6 forth?

7 MR. YANCEY: The RII program starts with a
8 supervisor at an outlying station or even Seattle. It
9 starts anywhere within our system we have mechanics.
10 Their supervisor would see the need to add an RII
11 person. They would do the suggestion or provide me
12 with the name, and I then would go into Training --
13 over Training building, into their training file,
14 review what training they've had. And there's a
15 inspection procedure we call QCIP, Quality Control
16 Inspection Procedure class that they would have had to
17 have gone through, passed.

18 And once that's in order along with their
19 proper certification as A & P license or -- with that
20 in -- in hand to where they've had the training on the
21 type aircraft, they've had our indoctrination training
22 that we do employee indoctrination training and
23 inclusive training they would have met the requirements
24 for the issuance of RII authority on the type aircraft
25 that they've been trained on.

1 MR. MCGILL: How long can they hold that
2 authority?

3 MR. YANCEY: That authority is -- depends on
4 the individual. They -- they have a one-year
5 recurrency that they have to keep maintained. So it --
6 it could live on year after year unless --

7 MR. MCGILL: Okay. You say the one year.
8 What does it take to --

9 MR. YANCEY: There's a recurrent -- annual
10 recurrent requirement that is a workbook produced by --
11 produced and controlled and issued by our Training
12 Department that is mailed out to these individuals when
13 their recurrency date is coming due. And it's up to
14 that individual and that individual's supervisor --
15 matter of fact, I believe they're mailed to the
16 individual's supervisor to where they ensure that
17 they're handed out and properly handled and mailed back
18 to Training for storing.

19 MR. MCGILL: Has there ever been any
20 instances where that recurrent training was not done on
21 time or something but yet the RII went ahead and signed
22 off on some -- some work that was performed?

23 MR. YANCEY: There may have been. I -- I've
24 had situations to where I -- I try to keep that tracked
25 and earmarked, the dates that they're coming due. And

1 there's -- there's been times that I'll get right up to
2 the day that it's expiring and try to contact the
3 supervisor of where is this. Well, it was sent to
4 Training. I says, well, the computer isn't updated
5 yet. And there's times that Training hasn't updated
6 that -- the computer part of it.

7 The -- the one thing, though, that we have in
8 place that draws a bigger flag, and that is when you
9 have RII authority and your annual day goes by with
10 whatever reason you haven't kept it up or computer work
11 hasn't been done, the ARTIC system that we have
12 recognizes that they -- recognizes they're an RII
13 person and they've exceeded the date. When you go and
14 enter paperwork into ARTIC it won't take that person's
15 number. I'm not sure what the screen looks like, but
16 they then know that we've got a problem, get another
17 person.

18 MR. MCGILL: -- remember your --

19 MR. YANCEY: The -- it's -- it's a good
20 safeguard because you're -- you have a screen telling
21 you you've got a problem and right away they know what
22 the problem is.

23 The other part of the RII program is the
24 individual's responsibility to ensure they stay
25 current. Of course, they have supervisors that help

1 that process along and then the prompting that they get
2 from Training by sending the letter and the booklet to
3 them.

4 MR. MCGILL: Approximately how many
5 maintenance technicians do you have that are RII
6 qualified?

7 MR. YANCEY: I used to be able to tell you to
8 the number. I'm -- approximately 250.

9 (Pause)

10 MR. MCGILL: I used to have one of these
11 cards too.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. YANCEY: I would say between 250 and 300.

14 (Pause)

15 MR. MCGILL: September of 1997 when 963 went
16 through the C-5 in Oakland we have looked at. It's
17 been sort of a contingent about that MIG 4 of the end-
18 play check. Have you reviewed that process with your
19 inspectors or looked at any of that or thought about it
20 or did anything like that?

21 MR. YANCEY: The -- you mean based on this --

22 MR. MCGILL: Yes, sir.

23 MR. YANCEY: -- right here?

24 MR. MCGILL: Yes, sir.

1 (Pause)

2 MR. MCGILL: Would that be something that
3 ya'll would have discussed or --

4 MR. YANCEY: Well, --

5 (Pause)

6 MR. YANCEY: The -- the records on this -- I
7 -- I saw this for the first time yesterday just briefly
8 because it could have been presented today like it was.
9 Prior to that I -- I didn't know it and it would have
10 been inappropriate to go asking, you know, what does --
11 what does this say? But what happened after September
12 or after January 31st was from my office -- I talked to
13 the people in Oakland, especially. They handled the MD
14 80's. But we were also in the middle of checking in
15 Seattle and sending inspectors elsewhere out of Seattle
16 to check -- was to ensure that the task card that calls
17 for this check, if you don't understand any part of it
18 call and get a clarification. This is important. You
19 know, we need these readings and they have to be
20 accurate so just pay careful attention to the
21 paperwork. But if there is a question, call.

22 MR. MCGILL: So there was some discussion
23 amongst your -- your group even involving that EO and
24 it's written on the task card itself?

1 MR. YANCEY: Yes, because I -- I have access
2 to blank task cards and I've seen task cards -- the
3 work card 24627000, I've seen other aircraft's task
4 cards and on a brief overview it seemed to be -- gives
5 you the guidance that you would need to do a check.
6 But as a precautionary, as just a point of interest
7 because we have huge focus on this, is make sure you
8 follow the paperwork to the letter. If you have a
9 question and if you haven't done it before and you have
10 a question especially, call for clarification.

11 MR. MCGILL: When -- this particular card,
12 let's look at the task itself. Was any review ever
13 done? Here we have a mechanic and then we have an
14 inspector that signed off on the initial measurements
15 of this particular plane.

16 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

17 MR. MCGILL: Then we have a lead that created
18 all of this. And then it comes back and now it's
19 reevaluated again, and there would have been -- there's
20 another card similar to this with another mechanic and
21 another inspector. Did you ever -- and did you ever
22 discuss with those two inspectors what transpired
23 between the two?

24 MR. YANCEY: No, because I -- I felt it was
25 inappropriate to -- let me interject this. I was on

1 the first airplane that left Seattle that afternoon,
2 and I attended Mr. Rodriguez's briefing. And
3 everything that pertained to anything about 963 you
4 didn't discuss, so the answer is no, I didn't discuss
5 because I didn't know whether it'd be -- you know, you
6 hear rumors but I didn't know what it read and I
7 wouldn't -- there was nothing to discuss. I -- that's
8 why I took the central point of, look guys, if there's
9 any questions about that work, ask.

10 MR. MCGILL: Following the accident did you
11 ever go back to just try to just for some safety guards
12 from other -- was this ever discussed or keep this kind
13 of hidden where we don't know at this point whether --
14 where it's at, but just to keep -- was this entire
15 procedure just discussed amongst your inspectors to --
16 at all after -- after the --

17 MR. YANCEY: After the accident, yes. Yes.
18 As a matter of fact, --

19 MR. MCGILL: So you'd -- you'd gone through
20 this with your people?

21 MR. YANCEY: My supervisors would have had --
22 have gone through, yeah.

23 MR. MCGILL: Let's just say that nothing ever
24 happened, there was no crash, and this was just a --
25 something that's in the C-check. I happen to dig it

1 out and I found it. Would it seem unusual that you
2 have one inspector watch and observe the mechanic
3 create a discrepancy and then another mechanic and
4 another inspector observe a different set. Would --
5 would you have considered -- would ya'll have talked
6 about that or discussed that in any manner? Or is
7 there -- is that unusual at all? I --

8 MR. YANCEY: It's -- the answer is no, it's
9 not unusual that something can be reevaluated or
10 retested, so I -- I believe my answer would be no, it's
11 not unusual.

12 MR. MCGILL: Okay. It's not unusual so if
13 Dr. Brenner, if he observed one check and then I
14 observe a check, you don't have anything in place where
15 if you would have talked to -- since we both work for
16 you you would have asked about, well, are you sure you
17 saw what you saw and did I see what I saw and do we
18 need to look at this process or system? Or is there
19 something here that's creating the difference here? I
20 mean potentially -- it didn't work out, but potentially
21 it could have meant replacement of a jack screw
22 assembly.

23 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

24 MR. MCGILL: Potentially it could have cost
25 money. Potentially it could have delayed an airplane

1 off an assembly line of a day or two or something, you
2 know. I was just curious as --

3 MR. YANCEY: Yeah, --

4 MR. MCGILL: -- you're leading the inspectors
5 --

6 MR. YANCEY: Mm-hmm.

7 MR. MCGILL: -- do ya'll ever get together
8 and discuss things like this and --

9 MR. YANCEY: Yes, we do. We discuss a lot of
10 -- a lot of things, especially when we have new EOs
11 coming up and they're involved in it. But on -- on
12 this one, the -- it wouldn't stand out because you're
13 within the limits on both times that the -- the thing
14 was recorded, at 40 thousandths and then again at 33
15 thousandths. So it wouldn't stand out.

16 It may stand out as to why my inspector wrote
17 it up to begin with when it's within limits. And you
18 know, eventually, well, you guys will get there first,
19 but that's a question that I would have to ask the
20 supervisors down there and the individual himself.

21 MR. MCGILL: What -- did anyone ever call
22 back on this particular airplane to you? Did you ever
23 talk to anyone about this -- this check?

24 MR. YANCEY: I -- I would have to say I don't
25 think so, but that was so far down the road that it

1 would -- would really be tough for me to recollect.
2 And I -- I think if they had have, the first thing I
3 would have asked them is what's the limit? And they
4 would have told me and I would have probably replied if
5 you want to go check it again that's fine, but you
6 know, that's -- that's -- I don't -- I wouldn't have
7 had an objection to that, but it's within limits and go
8 check it again if you want to.

9 But to answer your question, no, I don't
10 recall any --

11 MR. MCGILL: Why would your inspector not --
12 why did it take another lead mechanic to make that
13 request if your inspector observed when they --
14 wouldn't that --

15 MR. YANCEY: I -- I'm sorry. I -- I can't
16 answer for why the lead did what he did. I don't find
17 it unusual, though.

18 MR. MCGILL: Well, I meant here's the --

19 MR. YANCEY: That's mine?

20 MR. MCGILL: That's your inspector.

21 MR. YANCEY: Mm-hmm.

22 MR. MCGILL: Your inspector wrote what this
23 thing was and it's at 40 thousandths. So why would he
24 even write that in there?

1 MR. YANCEY: I would -- I would have to ask
2 him. It's within limits and I -- I --

3 MR. MCGILL: Well, that's what I'm asking.
4 Did ya'll ever talk about that? Why would he even put
5 that in there? And if he did, do you think he could
6 have thought that maybe 40 thousandths exceeded the
7 limit?

8 MR. YANCEY: You know, I -- I read 40
9 thousandths, I think, in the newspaper, but I -- I --
10 like I said, I stayed away from -- from doing what I
11 thought would be inappropriate by asking to see this,
12 which I wouldn't have got to see anyway, so.

13 MR. MCGILL: Well, since the fact, now that
14 we know everything, is it -- have you still addressed
15 your people to be more cognizant and pay attention to
16 these end-play checks? Have ya'll gone through any
17 kind of a systematic discussion of end-play checks or
18 anything that -- amongst the inspectors?

19 MR. YANCEY: We've -- we've discussed it with
20 them as -- when I say "we," I -- I work through my
21 supervisors here in Seattle, and there used to be five
22 in Oakland but there's four now. But yes, there have
23 been discussions. Now, I can't validate because I
24 wasn't there and I wasn't here all this time, but I --
25 you know, I don't -- I can say -- I'm wanting to say

1 yes, they've -- they all were in a discussion on
2 following the maintenance program and follow the
3 paperwork that gives us guidance to do this stuff.

4 This -- this is an issue of safety we have
5 here, that we feel that we have, and you know, if -- if
6 leads want to believe that the jack screw was the
7 culprit by -- through a failure -- premature failure
8 you might say. However, we don't know that.

9 MR. MCGILL: Yeah, you're right. We don't
10 know that. But we do know the fact that one of your
11 inspectors observed a 40 thousandth reading and another
12 one of your inspectors observed a 33 thousandths, and
13 it just poses a problem -- a question that, well, which
14 is right? And is there something wrong with the
15 process? Do we need to reevaluate something? Or do we
16 need to better look at this task card or something? I
17 don't know. I'm just --

18 MR. YANCEY: Yeah, I was involved in -- I'm
19 not -- I'm going to think that this task card has been
20 revised because I was involved when we were rechecking
21 or checking testing the jack screws in Seattle that we
22 had airplanes everywhere. And an inspector came in and
23 mentioned that following the maintenance manual on this
24 test, following the maintenance program on this test,
25 it gives you a chart value of 250 to 300 inch-pounds.

1 He tested it at 250 and he tested it at 300 inch-
2 pounds, which is, you know, within the program. And at
3 300 inch-pounds he had a greater reading than at 250.
4 So I went to Engineering with that and made them aware
5 of that. And they then took it where they took it.

6 I'm not going to assume, but I don't think
7 that they -- because during this same time period and
8 based on what you can believe in the newspapers but it
9 was almost consistent out there within the industry
10 that operate DC 9s and MD 80s, they don't have a
11 problem. And I felt that unusual. And I felt that for
12 everyone to get the same results you'd have to use the
13 same target value. Give us one target value because
14 you can vary. There's a variance there.

15 MR. MCGILL: That was -- okay. Go ahead.
16 I'm sorry.

17 MR. YANCEY: I'm through.

18 MR. MCGILL: You brought up a good point
19 there, of course. There's -- that's one variable. Was
20 any thought that maybe the -- the tooling itself, was
21 that ever thought about? I mean we know now from the
22 last few days maybe that it might be some tooling, but
23 at that point in time would -- would that not been
24 maybe another step to have looked at?

1 MR. YANCEY: Not being the mechanic that --
2 that has the -- that goes and gets the tool nor the
3 inspector that is looking at it, it's -- it's a fairly
4 -- I don't want to -- it's a -- in -- in appearance
5 it's a fairly simple tool. However, the proper tool is
6 important built by proper specs. Is the tool
7 important?

8 MR. MCGILL: Well, I mean right away would
9 you have thought maybe I ought to look at that caliber?
10 We should -- do I know that that dial indicator is
11 calibrated? Was there some sort of a logic that went
12 through? When you talked about the foot-pounds that
13 pre-load? Would you have thought about the tools?
14 Would you have thought about the calibration of the
15 tooling? Were any of these things ever kind of thought
16 about? Did someone start -- put together anything?

17 MR. YANCEY: The -- the tooling has the --
18 the calibration sticker on it, and you have to trust
19 that. If there's a question, of course, you could go
20 get another one. But the tooling I don't feel would
21 have come up as being -- well, let me put it this way.
22 I wasn't there. I don't know if they used the same
23 dial indicator or the same torque wrench, so if that
24 contributed to it I wouldn't know anything about it.

1 MR. MCGILL: At this stage right now do you
2 know how many dial indicators are in Oakland that would
3 -- could -- would be capable of --

4 MR. YANCEY: No, sir.

5 MR. MCGILL: -- doing this?

6 MR. YANCEY: I wouldn't know because the --
7 the mechanic is the one that goes and gets the tools.
8 I would say that the inspector could, but it's -- it's
9 normally the mechanic that would get it.

10 MR. MCGILL: Would that be then a role from
11 someone in the QC Department? Would you have brought
12 this up with someone and maybe they would have sent
13 someone down and looked and made sure that they were
14 calibrated and made sure that --

15 MR. YANCEY: Well, --

16 MR. MCGILL: I don't know.

17 MR. YANCEY: -- not really. The process goes
18 the -- the stock person issuing the tool, if it has --
19 if it has a calibration life on it, is supposed to
20 ensure that it's within life before they hand it over
21 the counter. The mechanic or whoever receives it is
22 supposed to check the -- the date to make sure it's
23 within calibration. And the inspector that then is up
24 on the tell-stand with them -- I'm not sure if there's
25 anything -- can I take a quick pause?

1 MR. MCGILL: Certainly.

2 (Pause)

3 MR. YANCEY: I was looking for a sign-off for
4 the inspector to ensure tools being used was --

5 MR. MCGILL: Yeah.

6 MR. YANCEY: -- but -- but he is expected to,
7 once the fellow gets up there or whomever gets up
8 there, ensure that the tools they brought with them,
9 that they're --

10 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Let's --

11 MR. YANCEY: -- calibration.

12 MR. MCGILL: -- talk about just those tools.

13 That your people and Inspection that would inspect the
14 tools at Oakland?

15 MR. YANCEY: That inspect as in for
16 calibration?

17 MR. MCGILL: Yeah. Who -- who inspects the
18 tools --

19 MR. YANCEY: Yeah, that -- that -- they're --
20 all tools that --

21 MR. MCGILL: Doesn't that fall under
22 Inspection?

23 MR. YANCEY: It falls under Inspection, but
24 --

1 MR. MCGILL: So you would have someone
2 designated in Oakland that would periodically inspect
3 the tools?

4 MR. YANCEY: No. The -- the tools that have
5 calibration dates are all sent to Seattle. They're all
6 handled in -- from a central point, and that -- that
7 includes anywhere in our system where we have tools.

8 MR. YANCEY: Okay. So you don't --
9 Inspection people don't necessarily inspect the tools -
10 - for -- if they're broke or working or not working or
11 there? Who -- who would check if -- if -- how often
12 does one -- you have a C-check on a MD 80, you would
13 have to go through all these task cards like that and
14 you would pull off and make sure you have all of these
15 tools, right? Is there a list somewhere where all of
16 these tools are listed and would someone in Inspection
17 verify that you had those -- all of these tools at
18 Oakland for you to perform the C-check? Who does that?

19 MR. YANCEY: Not -- not Inspection. The --
20 the Production part of our system, both cities, would
21 -- are responsible for that.

22 MR. MCGILL: So they would be the ones to
23 verify that you would have --

24 MR. YANCEY: They have 'em.

1 MR. MCGILL: -- the tools available? In
2 January of 1998 the lubrication grease was switched on
3 the lubrication task card from Mobil 28 to -- you don't
4 have it with you but --

5 MR. YANCEY: No, 'cause --

6 MR. MCGILL: -- but it would -- it would be
7 very similar to that -- but to Aeroshell 33. That
8 event occurred in January of 1998. I just happened to
9 know that, but --

10 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

11 (Pause)

12 MR. MCGILL: Do you know anything about --
13 could -- is there anything that was -- here a card has
14 been changed or did you get all of the current
15 revisions? The ME-01s or whatever? Are you aware of
16 when changes are made on task? Would your inspectors
17 be aware of -- of a change of lubrication like that?

18 MR. YANCEY: The inspectors --

19 (Pause)

20 MR. YANCEY: The only -- I'm not sure because
21 they -- they wouldn't have anything to do with going
22 and getting grease and greasing -- the grease card does
23 -- includes --

24 MR. MCGILL: So that -- that responsibility
25 would fall back on Maintenance --

1 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

2 MR. MCGILL: -- and the individual that's
3 performing the task to verify that he in fact got the
4 lubricant that it was on the task card?

5 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

6 MR. MCGILL: But you don't -- you don't have
7 any knowledge of how the transition occurred between 28
8 to 33? There was nothing put out or you didn't tell
9 your inspectors that we've got -- now I've got a change
10 on this task card or anything like that?

11 MR. YANCEY: No, because like I said, it
12 wasn't a task card that we're involved in. The -- the
13 process of the change, as -- in my position, I'm an
14 advisory for the Reliability Analysis Control Board. I
15 -- I sit in on meetings. This change of grease, I
16 don't recall discussion on it. Engineering usually is
17 the one that does the leg work and somebody prompts it,
18 but I don't recall myself being in on that
19 conversation. I may have, but it wasn't something that
20 perked my interest, I guess.

21 MR. MCGILL: Changing of grease.

22 MR. YANCEY: No, I -- I would have relied on
23 Engineering to take the step in the right direction.

24 MR. MCGILL: You're not part of the RAP
25 Control Board?

1 MR. YANCEY: There are times when I -- when
2 my boss is out of town and a board meeting comes up for
3 discussing and reviewing and signing, approving for --
4 I will sit in his place.

5 (Pause)

6 MR. MCGILL: Are you also in any of these
7 discussions -- daily discussions on the -- how an
8 aircraft is going through a particular check? I notice
9 how we've heard early every morning there's some sort
10 of a -- conference calls and so forth --

11 MR. YANCEY: -- yes --

12 MR. MCGILL: -- that --

13 MR. YANCEY: Yes, that --

14 MR. MCGILL: Do you participate in that?

15 MR. YANCEY: I do.

16 MR. MCGILL: Was -- do you recall any
17 discussions made on 963 about this request to change
18 out that jack screw --

19 MR. YANCEY: No.

20 MR. MCGILL: -- assembly?

21 MR. YANCEY: No.

22 MR. MCGILL: Just as a routine, listening to
23 this every day, do you -- can you get a sense of how
24 aircraft are -- how -- how they're coming along in --
25 in these checks, whether they're behind or on schedule

1 or whatever like that? Does it affect your inspectors
2 in any manner?

3 MR. YANCEY: I get a sense from -- from
4 listening in to -- like, the report from Oakland is
5 obviously by phone, but -- and then normally the base -
6 - Seattle base manager is right here off to my left so
7 I know where they are. If there's an inference or if
8 it's requested that I need more support from the
9 Inspection Department that usually comes before the
10 meeting because it -- we normally put two people on the
11 check for buy-backs because the activity has slowed
12 down to a pace. Once there's more MIGs being processed
13 their supervisor from base maintenance will come over
14 and request an additional inspector. So that's -- we
15 sit there and check and balance that by demand.

16 MR. MCGILL: So after you get through the
17 pre-inspection part, the -- the probably the most
18 manpower-wise --

19 MR. YANCEY: That's the most intensity that I
20 have, yes.

21 MR. MCGILL: Then after that, the buy-backs,
22 even though the rest of the mechanics may be put on
23 overtime or whatever they need to do to try to get
24 caught back up again, you have a -- you would have two
25 inspectors? You would have enough inspectors to

1 normally buy back on anything that they're doing?

2 MR. YANCEY: Yes, and you know, there's --
3 there's a lot of different reasons why we would have
4 more than two out there. And so I -- I don't want to
5 come across we -- we respect -- just the two just to --

6 MR. MCGILL: Oh, yeah.

7 MR. YANCEY: -- show it less than we would
8 need. Whatever we need out there then we supply. And
9 whether it came from a base supervisor or someone from
10 base saying we need more, there -- there are often
11 times I'll go out and walk through airplanes, walk
12 around airplanes, and there's normally a supervisor
13 that's doing the same thing. If -- if there's a hint
14 that we're not providing the oversight that's required
15 on this thing and -- and -- or that we're -- the
16 mechanics are overrunning us with the completed MIG 4s
17 we on our own will step in and say, okay, place however
18 many you feel that are -- would be adequate and go from
19 there.

20 MR. MCGILL: So if -- in the process of this
21 check if it's -- if the -- maybe the manager, I guess,
22 Gerald would -- I'm just talking about Oakland right
23 now. If he got behind he might request overtime or --
24 for mechanics, would you -- do you need to put -- does
25 -- does the inspectors get normally the same amount of

1 overtime as the Maintenance people or can you normally
2 get yours done without the overtime?

3 MR. YANCEY: The -- I can speak to this
4 because I -- I have a -- a report that comes in monthly
5 showing sick leave and -- and overtime by hours and in
6 percentages. And the answer to that is the part of it
7 do we get as much as Production, no, we don't need it
8 as much as Production. They're the worker bees that
9 are lubing and doing all this other stuff. So during a
10 primary inspection it's not unusual for us to stop
11 looking at our normal crew with overtime if -- if it
12 looks like, number one, we're going to fall behind, or
13 number two, say Planning puts more into the package
14 that was agreed upon up front. We -- we react based on
15 can we keep up and can we finish in our -- what we feel
16 is a reasonable time to do the primary.

17 MR. MCGILL: Does the FAA ever communicate to
18 you any?

19 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

20 MR. MCGILL: Here on -- just the area here in
21 general on Inspection or do -- do they go down and talk
22 to your inspectors at different locations? Do they
23 report back what the FAA said? What total involvement
24 -- how much of a total involvement do you have as chief
25 inspector?

1 MR. YANCEY: On Tuesdays -- Tuesday mornings
2 at 9:30 we normally have an FAA-Alaska Airlines
3 meeting. When Mr. Trimberger isn't there I conduct
4 those meetings. When he is there I sit in on the
5 meetings. So that -- that's one part of it.

6 Another part of it is I process most of the
7 LOIs and self-disclosures. I process by means of -- it
8 may or may not be the -- like, a self-disclosure,
9 whomever self-discloses it, then I get it and then I do
10 all the paperwork, the investigating, and --

11 MR. MCGILL: Do you physically write the
12 letter, the LOI?

13 MR. YANCEY: The -- the answer to an LOI? I
14 have in the past, yes. And the answer to self-
15 disclosures, yes. I've -- okay. That part of it. So
16 I -- I work with them there. When they come into the
17 hangar when I'm there and they have a question or
18 they're -- they're requesting information on a specific
19 flight, specific airplane, or a MIG number, then I
20 would do whatever it took to trace down. If they only
21 had a flight number I could find out what tail number
22 of what they -- I provide them with the information
23 that they request. If they have a concern over
24 something they may see in the hangar, I go with them
25 and see what --

1 MR. MCGILL: So your -- your overall dealings
2 with the FAA are good, then?

3 MR. YANCEY: My dealings with the FAA, I feel
4 -- I -- I -- and I strongly believe have always been,
5 regardless if it was the existing PMI here or -- or the
6 ones before, I've never -- I've always felt it was a
7 professional -- they're there for a purpose and I'm
8 there for a purpose relationship. The -- so when --
9 when you volunteered do I feel it was good, I don't
10 like to characterize it as -- as good because that
11 could be explained more. So what I did was answered
12 your question by I explained more and didn't say it was
13 good.

14 I -- I -- we're -- we communicate. We have
15 to communicate to both do our jobs, but I feel it's
16 always been the utmost professional relationship that
17 it could be. We both have ethics that we have to
18 maintain and we live by.

19 MR. MCGILL: Are you familiar with the ATOS
20 system?

21 MR. YANCEY: Yes. I'm vaguely familiar. I
22 -- I've read certain things about it and I've looked
23 at it in -- in its entirety. Not entirety, but I've --
24 I've -- I'm familiar with it.

1 MR. MCGILL: Well, your air carrier went
2 under this type of surveillance and oversight I believe
3 it was October of 1998. Can you -- do you see any
4 difference between the way it was up till then under
5 the old system versus the way it is since October of
6 '98? Just in your dealings with the FAA?

7 MR. YANCEY: Difference as in?

8 MR. MCGILL: Whatever difference, I don't
9 know. Were there surveillance, dialogue, more
10 inspectors, less inspectors?

11 MR. YANCEY: I -- I --

12 MR. MCGILL: Anything. Do you see any
13 difference at all?

14 MR. YANCEY: Other than talking about ATOS I
15 -- I can't say that I have seen any differences. But
16 you know, define differences. I --

17 MR. MCGILL: As from a practical point of
18 view, as chief inspector, it's about the same?

19 MR. YANCEY: The ATOS is certainly more in-
20 depth and -- and is more specific than before ATOS.
21 But as far as me doing my job or -- or our relationship
22 with the FAA, I -- I can't say that there's a
23 difference.

24 MR. MCGILL: Okay.

1 (Pause)

2 MR. MCGILL: Training for your inspectors,
3 how is that addressed, just generally? How often? How
4 much?

5 MR. YANCEY: When we introduce new equipment
6 for the basic class for the -- they -- they all have to
7 go through that before they can receive RII authority
8 for it. The recurrent or the RII authority itself is
9 the same as anyone else, so that's an annual
10 recurrency.

11 (Pause)

12 MR. YANCEY: We have in the past had
13 recurrent training on receiving inspection to where the
14 computer changes. Then there's different items to
15 input, so the supervisors would get with the inspectors
16 and provide training to -- to bring 'em up to speed on
17 that.

18 MR. MCGILL: What kind of receiving
19 instruction training do you get for Inspection?

20 MR. YANCEY: It's mostly OJT, and of course,
21 the ARTIC system that we use. That's a formal training
22 -- not -- yeah, I guess you could call it formal --

23 MR. MCGILL: When you do inspection of parts
24 coming in, like receiving right here, is that an
25 inspector that normally might go out and inspect

1 maintenance? Is that a -- is he in Stores or is he a
2 regular inspector that would do maintenance?

3 MR. YANCEY: Regular inspection -- inspector
4 that would do inspections on maintenance --

5 MR. MCGILL: Okay. So --

6 MR. YANCEY: No, no. I was talking to
7 myself. Because you had said a regular inspector that
8 would do maintenance as in inspection duties, but we
9 have a day shift inspector that that's all he does is
10 receiving inspection. Actually, we have two. We have
11 one up in Avionics. So that's all they do. They don't
12 inspect under normal duties of an inspector. They
13 cover swing shift and graveyard if there are parts
14 still on the shelf left over from days and we need
15 fill-in work we'll do that with the inspectors that
16 have had -- that would normally be doing other things.

17 MR. MCGILL: So that person works for you?
18 Right now has any discussion been talked about on the
19 receiving of -- of the Aeroshell 33 grease versus the
20 Mobil 28? Obviously, this stuff is sent to you
21 somewhere and somebody is inspecting this and putting
22 it on your shelf, right? Has any discussion been made
23 about any of this?

24 MR. YANCEY: Not that I recall over grease,
25 no.

1 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Were they -- go back to
2 that task card again. When that task was -- was --
3 task card was changed, a different grease was put on
4 it, was there any discussion to how you -- how you
5 stocked that -- what was sent to you? Or do you -- do
6 you get any of this information? I mean are you now
7 sitting with a lot of Mobil 28 and you -- not enough of
8 the other grease or one or the other? Or how is all
9 this balanced out?

10 MR. YANCEY: I -- I wouldn't be even involved
11 in what -- what they do because I -- that would be the
12 base maintenance people, but --

13 MR. MCGILL: So all you're doing is
14 inspecting it as it comes in. Stores kind of takes it
15 and puts it in inventory.

16 MR. YANCEY: Oh, during receiving?

17 MR. MCGILL: Yes.

18 MR. YANCEY: Yes. There's a -- there's -- I
19 don't recall any question about we -- we have a new
20 grease because they wouldn't know why it was ordered.
21 All they would know is here's the paperwork, that's got
22 a PO, it's what it says it is, there's no holes in it,
23 shipping damage. They identify it.

24 MR. MCGILL: Do you know if there's any
25 shelf-life limits on grease?

1 (Pause)

2 MR. YANCEY: I'm sure some grease have shelf-
3 life limits, but I -- I couldn't get specific with you.

4 MR. MCGILL: Would your inspectors have some
5 sort of -- specs or something that would keep 'em up to
6 speed on what the shelf-life is on each whatever it
7 might be? Any type of material that you --

8 MR. YANCEY: Yes. Upon receiving they go
9 into a program to -- by part number to check -- the
10 program, and I'm not -- I -- I haven't used it so I
11 wouldn't know. But a receiving inspector goes into a
12 program in ARTIC and if there's a shelf-life it'll tell
13 you. The step prior to that is when the receiving
14 Stores person does their part. Before it even gets to
15 us they're supposed to look at that screen also and
16 make out the MIG 130 tags with that shelf-life.

17 MR. MCGILL: So that would be here, and then
18 they ship you what you -- and they load the computer
19 with whatever information?

20 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

21 MR. MCGILL: On the shelf-life?

22 MR. YANCEY: For the receiving part of it, it
23 would -- it would come in, like I said, and the Stores
24 person would do their part of it and then we would.
25 Because the computer's already loaded with this

1 information and it's already -- it's telling you as a
2 tool it has a shelf-life, so I'm not sure if your last
3 comment was a question or you were confused as to --

4 MR. MCGILL: No, I was just wondering if I'm
5 working for you and I'm -- I'm down in Oakland right
6 now and I'm working as an inspector for you in the
7 receiving area and all this grease comes up to me, I
8 can -- I could hit the computer and it'd tell me about
9 this grease or whatever. And -- and then if I wanted,
10 this would be Aeroshell 33 and I could get it to give
11 me the shelf-life of Mobil 28 and I could verify that.

12 In other words, all this information was there and I'm
13 working for you and all I'm doing is verifying it, is
14 that correct?

15 MR. YANCEY: Right. Because the -- the --
16 the ARTIC system was put into place for that where you
17 could access it. You know, we -- we normally do most
18 of our receiving inspection in Seattle because it's a
19 central point. That's not to say that we can't receive
20 in Oakland, which we have in the past. So if that
21 inspector were in Oakland and received Aeroshell 33, he
22 -- he'd go onto the computer to -- to do your process.

23 And if the Stores person has the MIG 130s that you're
24 going to put your stamp on, matches -- the shelf-life
25 matches what you're looking at it's a proper

1 transaction. You put the tag on it, you push it off to
2 the side, and Stores then takes over and -- and
3 delivers it wherever it may be going.

4 MR. MCGILL: As the chief inspector, did you
5 have any knowledge of why you would want to change
6 greases?

7 MR. YANCEY: As chief inspector, there are
8 times the manufacturer would come out and give you a --
9 a grease that's better than what they have recommended
10 in the past. So --

11 MR. MCGILL: Yeah. So you think that's why
12 that change was -- took place?

13 MR. YANCEY: I -- I wasn't involved --

14 MR. MCGILL: Okay. So you're --

15 MR. YANCEY: -- so I can't comment, yeah.

16 MR. MCGILL: -- just like me, you'd just be
17 guessing --

18 MR. YANCEY: Don't know.

19 MR. MCGILL: -- what -- whatever the reason
20 would be. Okay.

21 (Pause)

22 MR. MCGILL: We had earlier talked about this
23 C-5 inspection that happened in September of '97 that
24 involved this end-play check.

1 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

2 MR. MCGILL: A little over two years later --

3 (Pause)

4 MR. MCGILL: -- the wrong airplane -- I've
5 already been caught by your -- so I've got to make sure
6 I'm on the right airplane before I state something
7 here.

8 (Pause)

9 MR. MCGILL: But I don't -- I can generalize
10 what I was going to say. The -- you had a -- a
11 following check, a C-6 check done on this aircraft at a
12 later date, a later time. But the end-play check is
13 performed, as you know, every C-2, so you wouldn't have
14 had an end-play check on the next C-check. Do ya'll
15 ever discuss or keep things in your mind and since this
16 occurred in '97 and there was a little discrepancy here
17 and they were up toward the upper end of this thing,
18 would you -- is there anything that -- someone that
19 would have thought, well, maybe at least we ought to
20 look at it or not look at it?

21 MR. YANCEY: If it was within the maintenance
22 program that we follow by the manufacturer and -- I --
23 I believe because I -- I wasn't aware of this one I
24 can't really talk about specifically jack screws.
25 There -- there are times when I see a pattern or see

1 something that I feel unusual throughout my acting --
2 my thought there that I will go to Engineering and --
3 and talk to them to see if it's a -- out of the
4 ordinary or sometimes were they aware of.

5 MR. MCGILL: And then they would have -- but
6 had you done that over here, maybe by the '99 check
7 maybe they would have inserted another one of these
8 cards just for precautionary -- another recheck, right?

9 MR. YANCEY: Well, --

10 MR. MCGILL: Does that ever occur on any
11 item?

12 MR. YANCEY: For them -- that answer is that
13 for that check it was within the parameters that we
14 were looking for so it -- it didn't draw a flag. And
15 has it happened to other items? I -- I want to say I'm
16 -- I'm sure other items have been talked about because
17 I've talked about 'em with Engineering just to run it
18 through the system. But --

19 MR. MCGILL: If an airplane came through your
20 Oakland facility or any of the facilities tomorrow and
21 somebody measured it at 39 thousandths, do you think
22 after the fact, you know, forget the --

23 MR. YANCEY: I don't --

24 MR. MCGILL: -- ADE in all of this, wouldn't
25 -- would you think that someone would throw a job

1 card in on the next C-check whether it needed it or not
2 and have it looked at?

3 MR. YANCEY: If -- if we didn't have an AD
4 that reduces it, if --

5 MR. MCGILL: Right.

6 MR. YANCEY: -- January 31st didn't happen, I
7 would be speculating if I said they would or wouldn't.

8 (Pause)

9 MR. MCGILL: I think I've just about run out
10 of questions.

11 (Pause)

12 MR. MCGILL: I'm going to switch over. I'm
13 going to let Dr. Brenner ask -- or do we need to take a
14 break here?

15 DR. BRENNER: I do --

16 MR. MCGILL: How is everybody doing? Let's
17 take a --

18 MR. YANCEY: I'm fine.

19 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Let's take a -- take a
20 short one here and --

21 (Brief recess)

22 DR. BRENNER: Dr. Brenner. How is it working
23 for Jim Trimberger?

24 MR. YANCEY: On a professional level I -- I
25 consider we have a good professional relationship.

1 DR. BRENNER: What's it like personally?

2 MR. YANCEY: I've never dealt with him
3 personally.

4 DR. BRENNER: Okay. And what would you say
5 are his strengths as a manager?

6 MR. YANCEY: His or mine?

7 DR. BRENNER: Well, I was talking about his,
8 actually, but you know.

9 MR. YANCEY: Well, let's stick with his.

10 (Laughter)

11 DR. BRENNER: Then that's a good question.

12 (Laughter)

13 MR. YANCEY: I'm sorry I didn't mean to make
14 light of that, but --

15 DR. BRENNER: -- Jim Trimberger.

16 MR. YANCEY: He seems to have a knack for
17 knowing what's going on, knowing the right questions to
18 ask when that would be the proper thing to do, if he
19 has a concern or something's not clear to him. He can
20 be personable as in -- in an office setting and he can
21 be stern. And his -- that kind of --

22 DR. BRENNER: Can you give me an example
23 where he was stern?

24 (Pause)

1 MR. YANCEY: It's infrequent type -- off the
2 top of my head, I -- I know when I investigate a letter
3 of investigation or some disclosure he -- if I haven't
4 covered all the bases and being well in tune with what
5 -- a lot of hours I've put into something I may leave a
6 pertinent part of something that would provide more
7 answer to something, he would give it back and usually
8 tell me that it needs more work and here's the area
9 that needs more work.

10 DR. BRENNER: Thank you. What's it like
11 working for John Fowler?

12 (Pause)

13 MR. YANCEY: Professionally speaking, I would
14 have to say the same thing. I've -- in -- in the years
15 that he's been here I've never felt that he wasn't
16 supporting what I'm there for nor have I ever been in a
17 confrontational-type discussion with him. I -- I feel
18 I've been doing my job to his satisfaction, therefore
19 I've never had to go in and explain my being at Alaska
20 Airlines. So that says a lot for what I do and
21 possibly how he has perceived how I do.

22 DR. BRENNER: Well, what are his strengths as
23 a manager?

24 MR. YANCEY: He's somewhat like Jim
25 Trimberger whereas he can be personable and he can be

1 stern, and that's my perception. Like I said, I've --
2 I've never -- I haven't encountered a stern -- the
3 stern side of him, but I -- I know based on his
4 position that he can be very stern.

5 DR. BRENNER: Can you give me an example
6 where he may have been very stern?

7 MR. YANCEY: Not really because I -- I
8 haven't been -- I've seen results of -- of -- of people
9 leaving the company. I never knew why but it -- I
10 would be speculating if I thought they didn't get along
11 or -- or -- or whatever. It's -- there -- everyone out
12 there is in an area of responsibility is expected to do
13 what they're there for and that's pretty much that.

14 DR. BRENNER: Who were some of the people
15 that -- that left the company?

16 MR. YANCEY: I -- I can give you names of
17 some people that have left the company and -- but I
18 don't want to tie it to as a result of John Fowler
19 doing something.

20 DR. BRENNER: Sure.

21 MR. YANCEY: But John Hanson that worked in
22 Maintenance Control recently retired. There was an
23 engineer named Ron Rice that left, I believe resigned.
24 And another engineer named Ray Nelson that retired.
25 But again, I don't want to tie that to a direct link of

1 -- of John Fowler being stern because I don't know what
2 -- beyond me.

3 DR. BRENNER: And what -- what time frame are
4 we talking about? For example, Ron Rice, when did that
5 happen?

6 MR. YANCEY: I -- probably five, six years
7 ago. John Hanson was just within the last six months.

8 DR. BRENNER: I had a question about the
9 tooling and the restraining fixtures. There's been
10 some talk about that. And would your department have a
11 responsibility for checking this tooling or -- or
12 maintaining it was compliant with the -- the operations
13 -- operation manual? I mean --

14 MR. YANCEY: If it came out of the tool crib
15 it would have already been a tool authorized that we
16 wouldn't know -- I guess the -- the answer to that is
17 if it's issued by the tool crib it's an approved tool
18 to use. But they would have no reason to look beyond
19 the history of it or anything like that. There would
20 be no reason for them to do that.

21 DR. BRENNER: Which group has responsibility
22 for the tool crib?

23 MR. YANCEY: That would be the base -- it
24 usually falls under base maintenance, but it could be
25 shared by the Stores Department because it's usually a

1 Stores clerk that issues tools.

2 DR. BRENNER: Okay.

3 MR. YANCEY: Sorry, I -- I -- I can't speak
4 of Oakland, but that's how it is in Seattle. I'm real
5 familiar with it because they're right down the hall
6 from my office.

7 DR. BRENNER: And there was a -- I believe
8 there was an AD in February about this tooling and at
9 that time I believe the AD was to recheck that -- that
10 -- that this tooling was in compliance. Would your
11 department have any role in implementing that at a
12 date? Or monitoring it?

13 MR. YANCEY: Because I -- I'm not familiar
14 with the -- the document that we -- would have been
15 turned into an EO from an AD -- I really can't answer
16 that because I don't know. I don't recall seeing this
17 document that we have or that we would have conducted
18 the -- the work on. Anything related to ADEs were
19 normally included, so that -- I would have to see the
20 document. But based on what I -- I recall of it --

21 DR. BRENNER: Okay. In the Oakland facility
22 around the 1997 period, could you characterize morale?

23 (Pause)

24 MR. YANCEY: I really can't because it's --

1 (Pause)

2 MR. YANCEY: During that time I -- I really
3 can't because I can't place it in time, and with a
4 visit that I would have gone down there and -- and
5 found that people were disgruntled, I -- I -- my trips
6 to Oakland, I've never really had anyone or anything
7 said to me that would say that the morale was "in the
8 tank"-type thing. I know that there were times that --
9 that they lost mechanics because United was hiring 'em
10 down the street and that put a -- a burden on the
11 mechanics. It didn't affect Inspection because I
12 didn't lose anybody. It put a burden on the mechanics
13 to then fill in and probably work overtime to make up
14 for that. But I -- I don't recall a "in the tank"
15 morale problem the times that I visited.

16 DR. BRENNER: How was work load during that
17 period?

18 MR. YANCEY: I don't know, really. I
19 wouldn't know.

20 DR. BRENNER: I guess what I'm asking, if I
21 understand, there were some changes that were starting
22 maybe in '96, a little bit before that, where the
23 Oakland facility went to a -- a seven-day-a-week
24 program, so we had a major increase. I think there was
25 some hiring. There was maybe some contracting out that

1 was starting. So basically, the company perhaps was --
2 was growing at that point. I'm just curious to your
3 observations and -- and maybe it would all just help
4 that how morale and work load may have changed during
5 that period.

6 MR. YANCEY: I -- I don't really --

7 DR. BRENNER: Do you have any thoughts --

8 MR. YANCEY: -- have a recollection of either
9 changing one way or the other. The -- there was
10 always, it seems like, an airplane in the hangar and so
11 there was always activity. I -- I -- I can't recall
12 ever visiting Oakland since we opened in '89 that there
13 wasn't an airplane being worked.

14 DR. BRENNER: Okay. All right. Thank you.

15 MR. YANCEY: Mm-hmm.

16 MR. MCGILL: Dean?

17 MR. HAMILTON: Earlier when we were talking
18 about the MIG 4 you made a comment that "we've spoken
19 with him." I think that you were talking about the
20 mechanic -- the inspector that made the write-up, and I
21 think we were talking about why it -- why the MIG 4 was
22 written up. Do you remember why he would have written
23 that up -- with inspection? Or did I misunderstand?

24 MR. YANCEY: Yeah, I -- I think you
25 misunderstood because when I said -- number one, I -- I

1 -- I have not discussed anything with this card with
2 the people that did it because I was wanting to hold
3 hands off. It's -- it's been investigated by others
4 and I wasn't part of that, but I -- I did mention that
5 you guys would have interviewed him, so I -- I think
6 you may have misunderstood a reply.

7 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. I think that's all I've
8 got right now.

9 MR. PAPE: Kevin Pape in Quality Assurance.
10 Chet, I just have one question. Just comment as far as
11 on -- on the rapport between the Inspection group and -
12 - and Production overall, not a specific time period
13 but just -- just in general?

14 MR. YANCEY: In general between Production
15 here and in Oakland?

16 MR. PAPE: Yeah.

17 MR. YANCEY: And our Inspection group? I
18 would characterize that as good. There are times the
19 perception may be that we're a pain, to characterize it
20 that way. And there's a lot of times that we're their
21 best friend because as an inspection group we oversee
22 the work that they're producing, and during the buy-
23 back process can't find mistakes that they had made or
24 may have made. So I believe they -- that there's a
25 respect -- a common respect between both groups. Their

1 mission is to produce airplanes. Our mission is to
2 make sure it's the safest airplane that we could
3 possibly produce. I feel there's a very good mutual
4 respect there.

5 MR. PAPE: So being the -- being a pain shows
6 -- is a good attribute from -- from a QC inspector? Is
7 -- is -- is what I would gather --

8 MR. YANCEY: The -- sometimes it can get into
9 a situation that someone from Production hears
10 something or sees something and jumps to the conclusion
11 that we're holding their feet to the -- to the -- to --
12 look at our viewpoint. And once they've looked at our
13 viewpoint and see from our perspective why we're saying
14 this needs to be reevaluated and redone or something
15 then they understand why.

16 MR. PAPE: Thanks, Chet. That's all I have.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Kristen Von Kleinsmid.
18 How well do you know the inspectors -- I know you've
19 been away for a while but -- that work for you? I mean
20 do you -- have you met every inspector or is your
21 relationship primarily with the supervisors?

22 MR. YANCEY: They've added two inspectors in
23 Seattle that I -- I haven't met yet. Oakland, I'm --
24 I'm not sure that there's been any turnover there. I
25 -- in -- in my travels -- well, for Seattle everyone

1 for sure because, like I said, there -- my office is as
2 a divider. That's where we all get our meetings, staff
3 meetings, gatherings, and discussions. In Oakland I
4 want to say that I've met every one of them, and when
5 some of 'em have come on board it may be because of the
6 shift, the day that I'm there their day off or -- or
7 I've been down there to where I overnight two or three
8 days or one night trying to see everyone.

9 On a professional basis as inspectors and me
10 being the manager, I -- I believe I've touched base
11 with all of 'em. To turn it over to a personal
12 relationship with any of them, very limited.

13 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. Have you met Leo
14 Batista?

15 MR. YANCEY: Batista? I'm -- I believe I
16 have. I believe he's a graveyard person, but I'm not
17 sure of that. But I -- I believe I have.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And following the
19 revelation of the MIG 4 card which probably wouldn't
20 have come to light until approximately February 4th or
21 5th, you had made a couple comments that go and -- go
22 and talk to the personnel, you know, getting the word
23 out about making sure they understand a work card and
24 what it takes to do the inspection. And -- and I think
25 you said, we need to make sure that the readings are

1 accurate. And I don't know if that's an exact quote,
2 but -- and then later on you went on to say that it had
3 come to your attention probably a while later that, you
4 know, the different torque -- torque pressure could
5 affect the reading. Any other ways that the reading
6 could have affected besides torque pressure?

7 MR. YANCEY: If there are I'm not aware of
8 any, but I -- I'm -- I would be speculating and
9 throwing things on the table here that I really would
10 have no firsthand knowledge of that I could speak to.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And I think we had talked
12 about the fact that the tooling may have affected it
13 slightly if -- if it wasn't -- slightly fabricated
14 different in the drawing. They call it -- what about
15 the person completing the inspection in terms of the
16 angle that they had the tool, if it was not in the
17 exact 90 degree angle, if it was slightly, you know,
18 less or more in terms of degree, how that would affect
19 the readings? Has anyone mentioned this to you? Any
20 of your inspectors brought this to your attention as to
21 the potential for that varying in the readings?

22 MR. YANCEY: Not that I recall.

23 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So when the statement
24 goes out or when you send the word down to the troops
25 about making sure that -- that we have accurate

1 readings, do you know did you say anything else
2 instruction-wise or did you just infer or tell them to
3 go and review the drawings and make sure that the
4 inspections complied with -- to what's written in black
5 and white?

6 MR. YANCEY: Not review the drawings. It was
7 just make sure that the -- they were comfortable with
8 the task card that had them -- there's no drawings to
9 do this job, so there would be to make sure that
10 they're comfortable with the constructions and -- and
11 process that they go through to do the measuring.

12 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. And do you
13 remember -- do you recall specifically speaking to any
14 particular supervisor in Oakland or in Seattle
15 regarding to send the word out to the inspectors on
16 making sure that they understand how to do -- how to
17 perform this inspection?

18 MR. YANCEY: During staff meetings -- I -- I
19 can't say that I personally talked to each supervisor,
20 so to give you names I'd be guessing. But I believe it
21 went out -- our -- our practice of when something comes
22 from me and there's people that aren't there that
23 should -- should hear it then it's passed on through
24 whatever -- like graveyard that comes in and talk to
25 the swing shift, so --

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So you would have sent
2 instructions, make sure this gets passed along?

3 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. And I think you
5 already said this but I just wanted to make sure. You
6 didn't personally go to Oakland or to Seattle to talk
7 to -- spread the word out about the inspections? It
8 was done through your -- your supervisors?

9 MR. YANCEY: I would have made a phone call
10 to Oakland because I'm -- I'm in Seattle.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Right. This time you may
12 have been at Fort Wymie. I'm not sure if you were
13 still out there, but did you --

14 MR. YANCEY: No, when we started checking the
15 end-play on these airplanes I was back.

16 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. And the question
17 came up about your interactions with Mr. Trimberger and
18 you talked about the different hats and stuff. How
19 many times do you recall -- and the safety is -- is
20 under quality to an extent, right?

21 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: How many times do you
23 think you talked to Mr. Trimberger regarding safety
24 issues? And you may have answered this question. I
25 just want to --

1 MR. YANCEY: To provide a number, that's
2 hard.

3 (Pause)

4 MR. YANCEY: That's -- that's a hard one to
5 answer. Time -- time frame or over the years?

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: In the last -- in the
7 last five years?

8 MR. YANCEY: That -- that's hard.

9 MS. VON KLEINSMID: More than 10?

10 (Pause)

11 MR. YANCEY: I want to say it would have been
12 more than 10, yes. You have to understand, when I am
13 dealing with self-disclosures or letters of
14 investigation there are times that there are safety
15 issues embedded in those and all of those we discuss.
16 The -- so it -- for sure more than 10.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. And going back to
18 the -- to the end-play check, specifically the 5-C
19 check that was performed in September of '97, you had
20 made a couple references about the MIG 4 technically
21 shouldn't have been written up because it was within
22 its allowable. Would that be a fair statement?

23 MR. YANCEY: No, I -- I don't think I said it
24 shouldn't have been written. I -- I said that it's --
25 it's -- it was written and -- and dealt with properly

1 but I -- I wouldn't say that I said that it was -- it
2 shouldn't have been written.

3 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Was there any discussion
4 at any point following the crash or at the time of the
5 crash as to maybe the reason why it might have been
6 written up even though it was technically within
7 tolerance?

8 MR. YANCEY: I haven't had discussions with
9 anyone because this -- this all came under the umbrella
10 of the NTSB rules and you don't discuss it. Therefore,
11 I -- I never searched out to try to figure out for
12 myself why is it in. You know, I read the newspaper
13 like everyone else and it seemed to -- not knowing if
14 they were accurate or what, but I -- I know that --

15 MS. VON KLEINSMID: You just made a comment
16 about 10 minutes ago that, you know, your goal would be
17 to have the safest airplane you could possibly produce.

18 And do you think -- so you had no discussion with any
19 supervisors and no one talked to Mr. Batista that
20 potentially that's what he was intending when he wrote
21 that up, is to -- 'cause he had a concern at the fact
22 that it was at its maximum allowable end-play within
23 five years of the life of the airplane?

24 MR. YANCEY: I don't recall anything -- I
25 don't recall and I don't believe I did, so the -- I

1 believe that the -- if the supervisors did, then again
2 -- I don't know. That's a hard -- maybe you rephrase
3 and I can help you.

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Well, I'm just trying to
5 -- I get the impression that and you yourself have said
6 that safety is of a concern -- of great concern to you.

7 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

8 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And we have interviewed
9 Mr. Batista and you're not privy to that, but
10 communication that went on that I -- it's my belief
11 that that was what his intention was and I'm just
12 trying to figure out from an inspection point of view
13 if there's been any communication regarding -- he was
14 trying to do the safe thing and not necessarily he
15 wrote up something that he shouldn't have because it
16 was technically within -- within allowable tolerances.
17 And the -- it hasn't reached back up to you, that
18 communication or -- has there been any discussion that
19 you're aware of amongst any of your inspectors, whether
20 they be supervisors or --

21 MR. YANCEY: I -- I -- I don't recall any.
22 If it had and -- and if I heard something out of that,
23 I -- I shrug it off as hearsay or the NTSB is the
24 official umbrella here and they're going to tell us
25 what it is. But I -- I don't recall a discussion or --

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: No discussion --

2 MR. YANCEY: -- but I -- I -- but I can't
3 speak for the other inspectors or supervisors down
4 there. I -- I just don't -- it doesn't ring a bell
5 with me.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: But you did not talk to
7 Mr. Trimberger about this? About potential safety
8 regarding this check or how the card may have been
9 written up?

10 (Pause)

11 MR. YANCEY: Talked to Mr. Trimberger because
12 of the -- the MIG 4 or the work card as it stands?

13 MS. VON KLEINSMID: The MIG 4.

14 MR. YANCEY: No. No, 'cause I -- he -- he
15 has his assignments and I get my assignments from him.
16 I was not included in -- in this. I was on the
17 response team that -- that reacted immediately, but I
18 don't recall any conversation with Jim on that MIG 4.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: What about on the work
20 card?

21 MR. YANCEY: The work card, I -- I can recall
22 conversations with the -- I believe Engineering was --
23 was going over it.

24 (Pause)

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Does Alaska Airlines --
2 have you heard of the FOQA Program?

3 MR. YANCEY: The what?

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: F-O-Q-A, FOQA? I think
5 that's how it's -- am I pronouncing it correctly? I
6 think it was Flight Operations Quality Assurance
7 Program.

8 MR. YANCEY: I may have but on -- in a
9 different either acronym or --

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So you have no -- if I
11 asked you about FOQA and Alaska Airlines, whether or
12 not they had a program --

13 MR. YANCEY: I --

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- you can't -- you're
15 not familiar with that?

16 MR. YANCEY: -- couldn't tell you, no.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And you mentioned a
18 Tuesday morning 9:30 meeting that you had with FAA?

19 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Was that conducted on
21 Alaska Airlines premises or FAA facilities?

22 MR. YANCEY: Normally on Alaska Airlines.

23 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And what's discussed in
24 the meeting?

1 MR. YANCEY: We -- we have a -- an agenda
2 that would have items that are carried over week from
3 week that we're trying to resolve with the FAA. One,
4 for instance, is the -- the maintenance program for the
5 737-900 was an early item where we -- we -- we put
6 items on there that -- for whatever significance they
7 may have that we don't want to base our memory on
8 coming back and doing things and that we -- there are
9 usually a time line on 'em that we need to meet in
10 resolving the items.

11 In addition to that, the normal agenda items,
12 and then after we've gone through and either leave open
13 because they're still not appropriate to close or at
14 times when we've met what objective we wanted we close
15 them and then we open the -- the table up to each
16 individual has an opportunity to bring on new business.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Would you discuss things
18 such as ME-01s or changes to work cards during this
19 meeting?

20 MR. YANCEY: ME-01s, yes, we -- we would
21 discuss because there are certain things that -- that
22 we want to do to change something in -- in our either
23 GMM or -- or -- that requires an ME-01, and that
24 normally -- once the ME-01 has been processed and
25 approved by the Board then we're given a -- a revision

1 date as to when we can expect it to hit the manual, and
2 that would close out that item. So ME-01s are talked
3 about.

4 Time limits, I don't recall a specific one.
5 But I -- I would say that it wouldn't be unusual to
6 have something like that on the agenda.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Are you on one of those
8 signature sign-up clocks on -- on an ME-01 approval
9 process?

10 MR. YANCEY: When an ME-01 is generated and
11 whether it be an inspector or one of my supervisors,
12 they would sign "generated by," I would sign "the
13 supervisor" because I've looked at it and, yes, it
14 makes sense to do this and pass it down to Jim
15 Trimberger for his -- his review.

16 And then he reviews it to look -- to -- to
17 see if it makes sense, it's a smart thing to do, and to
18 make sure that we have enough documentation to get our
19 point across because then it would go to the
20 Maintenance Review Board that he normally sits in on.
21 And if questions come up on the items that Inspection
22 would -- would submit he would be able to answer. And
23 then he would sign the approval, the actual approval on
24 that form. There are times that -- when Mr.
25 Trimberger's out of the office that he'll request me to

1 sit in on his behalf with the authority to sign for the
2 approval for Jim Trimberger.

3 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And to reiterate, you do
4 not remember in any of these Tuesday morning meetings
5 that were discussing an ME-01 to change the grease or
6 any change of work cards?

7 MR. YANCEY: No. The -- the 8:00 conference
8 call is usually the lay counsels and what can we do
9 better along with the base maintenance report. But I
10 -- I believe it would be unusual for someone to --
11 and very rare, not to say it would never happen -- for
12 someone to bring that up during this meeting for a
13 certain purpose that would be out of the purpose, that
14 that's the --

15 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Well, I think I was
16 talking about referring to the Tuesday 9:30 meeting
17 with the FAA.

18 MR. YANCEY: Oh, I'm sorry. With the FAA.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay.

20 MR. YANCEY: I don't recall discussion on
21 those.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay.

23 MR. YANCEY: I -- I just don't.

24 MS. VON KLEINSMID: All right. That's all I
25 have. Thank you.

1 MR. SEYER: Lance Seyer. I'm going to start
2 with some training issues. Chet, when a technician
3 upgrades, becomes a new inspector --

4 MR. YANCEY: Mm-hmm.

5 MR. SEYER: -- is there a probationary
6 period, a period where this new inspector follows a
7 experienced inspector around and shows him how to do
8 certain tasks or what his duties are?

9 MR. YANCEY: There's a contractual
10 probationary period of 480 hours that this person is --
11 is viewed or -- or watched and -- and helped along to
12 see how well they catch onto the procedures and
13 policies, practices that we go through. There isn't a
14 set time that we would put an experienced inspector
15 with them. It's not set in concrete. It's supply and
16 demand-type thing.

17 MR. SEYER: Okay. When a C-check is complete
18 usually there's a inspection supervisor who reviews the
19 paperwork before they send it forward to Records?

20 MR. YANCEY: Mm-hmm.

21 MR. SEYER: Is that correct? Is that same
22 inspection --

23 MR. YANCEY: Yes. Yes.

24 MR. SEYER: -- supervisor who reviews the
25 paperwork from a particular check, is he the same

1 supervisor who would sign off the logbook the check is
2 complete or could that be any supervisor?

3 MR. YANCEY: Could you ask me that one again?
4 Because I had an answer then --

5 MR. SEYER: All right.

6 MR. YANCEY: -- said something.

7 MR. SEYER: Normally, from my understanding,
8 --

9 MR. YANCEY: Mm-hmm.

10 MR. SEYER: -- and we were talking about C-
11 checks in Oakland, for instance. When the check is
12 complete, all the MIG 4s, all the paperwork's together,
13 and we have to sign off the check is complete --

14 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

15 MR. SEYER: -- they usually have a
16 maintenance supervisor and an inspection supervisor do
17 the paperwork. And when it's -- all the paperwork's
18 been reviewed and it's correct, then they sign off the
19 check is complete.

20 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

21 MR. SEYER: Is that correct?

22 MR. YANCEY: My recollection of how that
23 works is throughout the time that airplane is there
24 it's generating paperwork. An inspection supervisor --
25 and all this paperwork is on a tally sheet. Whether it

1 be a non-routine or routine card it's on a tally sheet.

2 The inspection supervisors review all those
3 documents and mark off that they've -- they've been
4 reviewed. So the person that signs off a check, the
5 inspection supervisor that signs off the check would
6 not have been able to review every piece of paper.
7 They don't review every piece of paper. The person
8 that signs it off reviews the tally sheets. If there's
9 gap that's a quick picture to find. You have a gap.
10 You can't do anything until you close the gap.

11 MR. SEYER: You're a mechanic so we're going
12 to talk about tools for a little bit. I know you like
13 those. When we get a new aircraft type -- we just
14 recently received the 737-700. When we first get our
15 new aircraft there is new tooling that comes along with
16 that aircraft purchase. Do you know how that new
17 tooling from a new aircraft type is received into the
18 company and how it's determined what pieces of
19 equipment need calibration?

20 MR. YANCEY: The -- the new tooling comes in
21 on a -- a purchase order. The ones -- I can only speak
22 to the ones I'm familiar with. But there were a lot of
23 tools ordered from Boeing that came in on the purchase
24 order that they're the manufacturer of. They -- they
25 have their -- their stamp on the paperwork.

1 So the receiving part would come in. Does it
2 match the PO? Is there shipping damage? And what
3 drives them into does it need calibration or not is
4 they would go to the GM -- here's the area that we talk
5 about calibration, here's a list of items that we would
6 use. They would use that as their guide as to how to
7 set that up and give them the time value that
8 calibration would be called for.

9 MR. SEYER: Okay. And that would be in each
10 handbook?

11 MR. YANCEY: Yes. Got it. Dial indicators,
12 torque wrenches, pressure gauges -- pressure gauges,
13 that's the term. And it's in the GMM and -- well, let
14 me put it this way. The last time I looked it was in
15 the GMM. There's been a -- a work-over of the GMM, but
16 the part I'm familiar with is you have a -- a tool. If
17 it has a calibration value to it, it tells you that
18 time value also.

19 MR. SEYER: And all these tools that have a
20 calibration time would have either a MIG 11 or a MIG
21 11-A placard on 'em stating the time, is that correct?

22 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

23 MR. SEYER: Currently in the Seattle tool
24 room we have a Stores clerk and all also an A & P
25 technician, is that correct?

1 MR. YANCEY: In the -- I know we have a
2 Stores clerk. In the past I know that we've had an A &
3 P technician. When I left I -- I'm not sure if there
4 was one there or not. I'm thinking Brad Reynolds was,
5 but I believe he spent most of his time up on the line.

6 MR. SEYER: He's on the line now? When a
7 tool gets sent in for calibration or repair, perhaps
8 the tool is broken, do you know if it was that tool
9 room mechanic's responsibility to repair that tool? Or
10 do you know if they sent it out to a manufacturer to be
11 repaired?

12 MR. YANCEY: Out of my realm of being in the
13 loop on telling 'em where to go or -- or -- I don't
14 know --

15 MR. SEYER: I just have one more question.
16 If there was a dispute between an inspector and
17 Production or a inspection supervisor, they would go up
18 the chain of command and eventually bring that dispute
19 to you. Has there been any times that you can remember
20 since you've been a chief inspector where you've had to
21 go to the vice president of maintenance to overturn a
22 inspector's decision?

23 MR. YANCEY: Never.

24 MR. SEYER: That's all I have.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: Dave Crawley with ALPA. Chet,
2 you mentioned that you'd read a lot of or followed a
3 lot of the reports in the newspaper with -- about the
4 accident, and certainly some of that at least came from
5 press releases from the -- that the NTSB has put out
6 and the press has gotten and published. So you know a
7 little bit about what we've been focusing on, anyway.
8 And even though a final conclusion hasn't been reached
9 yet, just from what you know now can -- can you think
10 of anything that -- that might help us or help Alaska
11 Airlines in preventing another accident just like this
12 one?

13 MR. YANCEY: Conclusion, the -- the final
14 report hasn't been issued, and I totally respect your
15 question, and -- and I wish I could come up and -- and
16 give a magic solution to this, but I don't know to this
17 day conclusively what happened. I -- I want to offer
18 this. The -- not being part of the investigation, but
19 I'm -- I'm -- I know through what I've read, seen on
20 TV, and the official releases that Mr. Rodriguez has
21 let go that it centers on that -- that failed take-off
22 out of Puerto Vallarta. Did -- did a pelican hit the
23 leading edge of that thing and start the -- is there
24 another outside process that can be looked at to come
25 up with a conclusion? Because I -- I -- I know we, you

1 know, have the jack screw and I've seen pictures of it
2 in the news, but did anything contribute to that
3 getting to the condition it was outside of what we've
4 already -- that I know of that we're looking at.

5 DR. CRAWLEY: In the job that you're in, it
6 must be frustrating for you not to know.

7 MR. YANCEY: It's terribly frustrating for me
8 because for anyone in the airline business you never
9 want to have to go through this. The last thing you
10 want to do is have to go through this. Not knowing now
11 what it was, yes, that's frustrating. Is there
12 something that will come out of this investigation that
13 will give us the means to make that type aircraft safer
14 and this never happens again? I hope so. But it's
15 frustrating, yes.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Let me kind of change my
17 question around a little bit and -- and say let's say
18 we -- the investigation was all done and we made our
19 final conclusion that the jack screw failed because it
20 was worn out.

21 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

22 DR. CRAWLEY: And -- and that was the final
23 conclusion. Is -- is there anything that, looking back
24 in retrospect, that could have been done differently
25 here that would have -- and knowing this -- this is my

1 Monday morning quarterback now. You've got an
2 opportunity to be a Monday morning quarterback. And
3 could you look back and say, oh, we should have done
4 this. And if we told you that right today, that --
5 that we were finished -- which we aren't.

6 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

7 DR. CRAWLEY: But if we told you that right
8 today that's what happened and you looked back and you
9 said, oh, we could have done this, what would we have
10 done -- what would Alaska Airlines have done?

11 MR. YANCEY: You know, in my position and as
12 a company that would be speculating, saying what we
13 would do differently. However, once the conclusion of
14 this and the report has been issued and it has to do
15 with anything that we could have done differently, you
16 can rest assured that that will be taken and handled
17 very expeditiously because, like I said before, nobody
18 wanted to be in this situation. So once the conclusion
19 is issued, if there's anything anyone in the industry,
20 and that includes the manufacturer, can be done to
21 prevent this from ever happening again, I -- I -- I'm
22 -- have confidence in the industry and the
23 manufacturer that it will be.

24 DR. CRAWLEY: I don't think I have any other.
25 Thank you.

1 MR. LASLEY: Mike Lasley. You solicited
2 comments or questions about the card from -- they're
3 using it -- inspectors that might have any questions
4 about it, how to use it. Have you received any
5 feedback from that?

6 MR. YANCEY: I haven't because -- and this --
7 I would be -- well, let me -- let me answer it this
8 way, start over again. No, I haven't.

9 MR. LASLEY: In your reviews of the cards, of
10 the procedures for checking -- for doing -- check, have
11 you found anything that you'd like to see changed or
12 something that's kind of a sticking point or a problem
13 expanded on or -- you know, anything at all?

14 MR. YANCEY: I haven't. It's a fairly
15 straightforward card. However, I -- I would certainly
16 look for the manufacturer to provide any suggestions or
17 -- or improvements to the card as it stands should they
18 have recommendations.

19 MR. LASLEY: Are you aware that there has
20 been a temporary -- you don't make up the cards, I
21 assume?

22 MR. YANCEY: No, sir.

23 MR. SEYER: -- Planning, Engineering, and et
24 cetera, there is a temporary revision -- those issues
25 -- manufacturer's maintenance manual that has changed

1 a couple things. That's not a complete redo of the
2 procedure that there are -- has that been --

3 MR. YANCEY: I -- I haven't --

4 MR. SEYER: -- gone to -- to the level of the
5 card and truck floor yet?

6 MR. YANCEY: I -- I don't know. I haven't
7 seen it. And like I said, I've been absent from that
8 day-to-day activity. So I'm not aware of it, put it
9 that way. I haven't seen it.

10 MR. LASLEY: Okay. Thank you. That's --

11 MR. YANCEY: Mm-hmm.

12 MR. MCGILL: Dick?

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, sir. Chet, I'm -- I
14 wanted to cover this area of self-disclosures. You
15 mentioned it several times. Does -- does that take up
16 a fair amount of your time?

17 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Why?

19 MR. YANCEY: The reason being is when you
20 self-disclose the advisory circular gives you very
21 defined guidelines and in putting the puzzle together
22 as to what was reported that happened, then you have to
23 boil it down to what really happened, what led up to
24 the events, was it indeed something that we violated?
25 If so, then your -- your next assignment to advisory

1 circular is you have to come up with, number one, an
2 immediate fix to where it doesn't repeat. The other
3 part of that is more lengthy, and that is a
4 comprehensive fix to ensure this happening doesn't
5 recur.

6 And the investigating part of it, if you want
7 to try to assure yourself that you're leaving no -- no
8 rocks overturned, if you want everything you can, when
9 it comes to the comprehensive fix, it normally affects
10 other departments that were root cause of the problem.

11 And so you spend time with them discussing and making
12 sure they understand the report in its entirety and the
13 ramifications and -- and the process we're in. It's
14 embarrassing to have to self-disclose things. But then
15 you have to make sure they understand the problem and
16 then what's their comprehensive fix going to be.

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you -- do you attack this
18 -- a problem -- how many times have you done this?

19 MR. YANCEY: Probably between 50 and 100
20 times.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you attack the problems
22 presented in these things routinely as an individual or
23 as a team of one of these, one of those, and one of --
24 somewhat like the Board approaches an accident. We get
25 a power plants guy and a systems guy and a structures

1 and an officer and what not. Do you get a mech and a
2 quality control something or how do you do it?

3 MR. YANCEY: No, that -- that's solely based
4 on me and what I see and suspect. Everything we do
5 leaves a trail and so it's real easy to get on that
6 trail. Sometimes there's gaps in the trail and I have
7 to spend more time uncovering those, but it's -- it's
8 an individual --

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So it's you?

10 MR. YANCEY: Me. That's got kind of a -- so
11 to speak.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: While you're doing this, who
13 runs the inspectors?

14 MR. YANCEY: That -- that would be the day
15 shift supervisor Don Gilbert if I'm out of town on
16 something like that. If -- if I'm not out of town then
17 I'm in the office taking phone calls and conducting my
18 business that I have.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And he's here in Seattle?

20 MR. YANCEY: Yes, yes.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So in that time frame he
22 would be responsible for Oakland as well?

23 MR. YANCEY: No, no. I -- I would still be
24 there. If -- I -- I guess I kind of led you astray
25 there. The day shift supervisor Don Gilbert, whether

1 it be Don Gilbert or Bob Cless -- there's two of 'em I
2 have -- are more involved in the -- the activity in the
3 Seattle hangar to where I -- unless it's serious I
4 don't have to get involved. So that's one less thing
5 that I have to deal with during this time that I'm
6 investigating and -- and doing my other --

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And -- and what does Oakland
8 do in this time frame?

9 MR. YANCEY: Because I'm -- I'm not stationed
10 in Oakland it's business as usual there. If they have
11 a question, like again I've said, I'm -- I'm available
12 there by phone and concerns or questions are always
13 directed to me. Or via e-mail. First-class mail, the
14 company mail. Electronic mail.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is there a way you could
16 characterize for me the -- the nature or the specific
17 areas where these self-disclosures typically occur?

18 MR. YANCEY: Typically, it would be line
19 maintenance.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Line maintenance.

21 (Pause)

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And what happens if you're
23 working on self-disclosure and the FAA catches you?

24 MR. YANCEY: Well, see, I'm working -- no,
25 that's -- self-disclosure to -- to use that provision,

1 so to speak, is first knowledge and if it's quite clear
2 that we violated upon first knowledge I would make the
3 phone call to self-disclose, give them a brief
4 description of what that self-disclosure would be and
5 the immediate fix if one were appropriate. So I -- I
6 would never -- I don't want to say never because that's
7 -- it wouldn't be appropriate for me to be working on a
8 self-disclosure before it was disclosed.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And you're on sick leave now?

10 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you have any knowledge in
12 any way whatsoever with respect to the -- the recent
13 controversy in the last week or so of the tool itself
14 and the restraining fixture and that sort of thing?

15 MR. YANCEY: There was a question as to -- a
16 question as to was the tool they used -- I don't know
17 where -- a tool that Alaska manufactured or one that we
18 would have bought from Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know when the company
20 first began to suspect or discover or tinker with this
21 particular issue?

22 MR. YANCEY: No. My -- my first knowledge of
23 it was the morning the news broke. I -- I was up at
24 4:30, turned on the TV, and almost fell out of my
25 chair.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. I -- again, I'm -- I'm
2 not sure yet. I didn't copy down exactly when your
3 absences occurred during the investigation. But I
4 wonder if you were present for duty in the period when
5 981, 982 were discovered to have excessive end-play and
6 they began checking several others in Reno. There was
7 a Reno plane that was -- had some switch problems and
8 -- with the longitudinal control. They ran an end-play
9 check on it. Do you recall those issues?

10 MR. YANCEY: The Reno one, yes, because we
11 sent an inspector over. 981, 82 I -- I believe I was
12 on duty.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. Who was the inspector
14 at Reno? Do you remember?

15 MR. YANCEY: I do, but I can give you a last
16 name only because --

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's okay.

18 MR. YANCEY: -- he's part of triplets and I
19 can't yet to this date tell 'em apart.

20 (Laughter)

21 MR. YANCEY: It was Inspector Bailey.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Bailey.

23 MR. YANCEY: And there's three of 'em in my
24 department. Triplets.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: They're not really blood
2 relations or they are really --

3 MR. YANCEY: They -- they're -- they're
4 minutes apart triplets.

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is that right?

6 MR. YANCEY: Absolutely.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So one of the Baileys went?

8 MR. YANCEY: Yes, sir.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you familiar or do you
10 recall then the -- there was an end-play check on that
11 aircraft that was done, I guess, independently at that
12 time. Do you recall that?

13 MR. YANCEY: While it was in Reno?

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Uh huh.

15 MR. YANCEY: That doesn't stand out. It
16 wouldn't surprise me that it was, though. But what
17 does stand out is the -- the parts. There was an NTSB
18 person, I believe, at the site.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: We went over for the -- the
20 switches by system --

21 MR. YANCEY: Yeah, because the -- the box of
22 parts that they removed I got to look at for about six
23 weeks. I was wondering what to do with them. Finally,
24 you guys wanted 'em and we gave 'em.

1 (Pause)

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do the Baileys all work the
3 same shift?

4 MR. YANCEY: Yes. Swell.

5 (Laughter)

6 MR. YANCEY: Graveyard.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, let me distill this
9 down to one question, though. Did this attention and
10 focus on the end-play checks, and I'll characterize it
11 as the scatter of the findings, give you any pause
12 about the accuracy or the validity of the end-play
13 check as a wear measurement?

14 MR. YANCEY: No. The -- what do you mean by
15 "scatter"?

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, --

17 MR. YANCEY: Different readings?

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- don't hold me to the exact
19 figures --

20 MR. YANCEY: Yeah.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: --but roughly one of your
22 airplanes had an 82 thousandths, 81 thousandths,
23 something like that reading.

24 MR. YANCEY: Oh.

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But then we took it someplace
2 else and we checked it and it was in the 50 thousandths
3 range, and we had that kind of scatter where here we've
4 got a 40 thousandths and it came up 33 thousandths by
5 two different mechanics.

6 MR. YANCEY: Yeah.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And so I'm just wondering if
8 -- if -- if that gives you any pause to suspect the
9 validity of the end-play check as a measure of wear on
10 the jack screw?

11 MR. YANCEY: Well, that one that was, I
12 believe, a lower value that went and jumped up to 80, I
13 was there for that, and yes, that gave me cause because
14 -- and there were so many then, but it seems like that
15 was the one we went from 250 to 300 inch-pounds. And
16 after that we did the same thing and there wasn't that
17 big of a jump. Now, my recollection may be not 100
18 percent on this, but I believe -- I know that we
19 removed that jack screw and the other measurement you
20 talk about as being 50, I never got that feedback. But
21 we sent it to an overhaul agency, I believe, and --

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: It went to trig?

23 MR. YANCEY: Trig. For them to come back --
24 and you said it was in the 50's?

1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah, I think it was 51.

2 MR. YANCEY: Then both occurrences would --
3 would give me cause to say, hey, wait a minute, you
4 have one that's way, way the heck out here. And so,
5 yes.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Now, in -- in respect to,
7 say, the questions that have been posed to you about
8 safety discussions or safety issues or speaking, say,
9 with Mr. Trimberger who's carried or did carry that
10 title of safety when you were working, did you have any
11 discussions at all about the end-play check and how the
12 company was doing their end-play checks, restricting
13 the number of mechanics, retraining the mechanics that
14 were doing it, anything of that nature other than this
15 memo that went out and said if anybody doesn't
16 understand it call us?

17 MR. YANCEY: I don't recall any specific
18 conversation I had with him on the safety issue because
19 what I saw, what I was aware of I felt was being
20 handled appropriately through the -- the channels that
21 were there to handle that.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And you said a couple times
23 because of the NTSB rules you weren't discussing things
24 or -- I'm not sure what your reference was, but it
25 would appear that based on our organizational meeting

1 in Oxnard -- yeah, Oxnard, that you've come away with
2 the impression that the company shouldn't be talking
3 internally about the accident investigation and taking
4 steps to improve safety or -- or dealing with any of
5 the aspects of the investigation. Is that your
6 understanding?

7 MR. YANCEY: No, not the company. I came
8 away -- because I remember looking you in the eyes.
9 You were way over there. That I -- I knew what my
10 marching orders were, and if the company wanted me
11 involved in part of this investigation, like Lance
12 Seyer is an employee and so is this gentleman here, I
13 would know the rules. But I came away -- I wasn't
14 requested to get into any of this, and your -- your
15 part of this was nothing leaves this room. I knew what
16 my part was. If I was invited, fine, to be on the NTSB
17 investigation part of it, fine. But what the company
18 has done I can't speak to because I don't know. I -- I
19 do know the -- because of the nature -- everybody knows
20 we have a focus on this jack screw. Let's look at it -
21 -

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, I -- I -- I wanted you
23 -- let me just set your mind clear. References to non-
24 disclosure, no discussion, or what have you, as far as
25 Alaska Airlines and personnel is concerned has to do

1 with those involved in the investigation talking to the
2 media outside of the investigative team. And
3 participation in the investigation directly is a
4 function of assignment to a group and then proceeding
5 along this -- the discipline of that particular group,
6 whatever it may be. In this case, maintenance records.

7 But there's -- there's nothing in our rules
8 and to the contrary, we -- I -- I usually make some
9 statement to the effect you gotta still run the airline
10 and we want people that have knowledge that are not
11 directly involved in the investigation looking toward
12 the aspects of safety and figuring a better way to run
13 a railroad if -- if such a way exists and to be
14 communicating internally. And to that extent, you
15 certainly should be giving input to anybody within the
16 company that you feel has an -- an ability to improve
17 things or to change things to make things safer.

18 And these folks, to the extent that they feel
19 it's important and significant, have a responsibility
20 to pass on the information that they get, even
21 internally within the investigative team, to
22 management, to their supervisors because that's the way
23 to get things done. And that's -- that's the gospel
24 according to Saint Rodriguez with respect to the Safety
25 Board method of operation.

1 And so I -- I personally want to encourage
2 you, if you have something to -- to say to us, say it.
3 If you have something to say to your management people,
4 say it to them. But don't pull a blanket over your
5 head and wait for a report to come out of the Safety
6 Board and think that we've prohibited or inhibited the
7 dialogue within your company when it comes to the
8 accident or the prevention of similar ones in the
9 future. You understand that?

10 MR. YANCEY: I understand that, and there may
11 have been a slight misunderstanding the way that came
12 across. But the -- I have an obligation, moral and
13 professionally, that if I feel I know something or --
14 or have a suspicion of something that can help this
15 investigation go forward, I -- I -- I would want you to
16 know it but for sure the company to know it. And in
17 that meeting, you'll have to understand, from 6:00 the
18 previous morning until when we had that meeting, around
19 two or whatever it was, perhaps I didn't hear as
20 clearly and thought processes didn't work as well.

21 But I -- I felt that that meeting, what we
22 heard there we keep it to ourselves. The people that
23 were selected on the different groups had a protocol
24 that -- and since I wasn't selected I'm sure there was
25 another briefing for that and -- and so, yes, I -- I do

1 feel it would be appropriate then that these
2 individuals, if they learn something from you that you
3 haven't released to the press yet, that would help us
4 that there would be a channel --

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: There is.

6 MR. YANCEY: -- so no, I -- I -- I don't want
7 to give anyone the impression that I would not pursue
8 something that I thought would help either Alaska
9 Airlines or this investigation.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yeah. Okay. I just -- I
11 wanted to make that clear 'cause I had -- I had 30
12 minutes less sleep than you at that point in time.

13 MR. YANCEY: That's --

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: 'Cause I got up at 5:30, so
15 --

16 (Pause)

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's all the questions I
18 have, Frank.

19 MR. MCGILL: Do you have any --

20 MR. HAMILTON: I have one quick follow-up.

21 MR. MCGILL: Go ahead.

22 MR. HAMILTON: I'm going to go back to the
23 morning meetings with the FAA on Tuesdays at 9:30.

24 MR. YANCEY: Okay.

1 MR. HAMILTON: You said that one of the items
2 that had been discussed was the 737-900 program?

3 MR. YANCEY: That's on --

4 MR. HAMILTON: Did you -- did you mean 700
5 program?

6 MR. YANCEY: The Boeing 737-900 maintenance
7 program that we -- you know, that's a year away from
8 being delivered but we put it on the agenda and I
9 believe it's still on the agenda.

10 MR. HAMILTON: Is it being discussed?

11 MR. YANCEY: Well -- well, it's -- it's
12 probably in the sense of the program -- we developed
13 through manufacturers the program, put it in our
14 paperwork, put it on our task cards. After we do that,
15 we give this huge bundle over to the FAA to review and
16 do their part of this. So it's on the agenda, and if
17 there is -- if we're falling behind we'll tell 'em.
18 Once we've given them this package weekly or we may
19 wait two, three weeks, we may ask them is there any
20 more we can do to help facilitate your review of this.
21 So it -- it's there as a -- kind of a prompt or
22 reminder if someone has a question about.

23 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. And the other -- the
24 only other question I have is also regarding the
25 meetings, is every ME-01 discussed in that meeting?

1 MR. YANCEY: In the FAA meeting?

2 MR. HAMILTON: On Tuesday mornings, correct.

3 MR. YANCEY: Very rarely will you discuss ME-
4 01s there.

5 MR. HAMILTON: So you had told Kristen that
6 ME-01s are discussed there, but it would be rare that
7 they are? A very small percentage maybe, or --

8 MR. YANCEY: Yes. A very small percentage of
9 ME-01s would come up in the FAA meeting.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Who's your replacement
11 while you're on leave?

12 MR. YANCEY: The day shift supervisor Don
13 Gilbert. And when he's not there, the second day shift
14 supervisor Bob Cless.

15 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Thank you.

16 MR. YANCEY: Yes.

17 MR. MCGILL: All right. We have to cut it
18 off.

19 (Whereupon, on August 9, 2000, the hearing
20 was adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., on August 10,
21 2000.)

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