

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

**INVESTIGATION INTO THE CRASH OF  
ALASKA AIRLINES FLIGHT 263**

Thursday, August 10, 2000  
9:00 a.m.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

9:30 a.m.

INTERVIEW OF JAMES TRIMBERGER

MR. MCGILL: Good morning, Jim. Would you start off please by giving us a short sketch of your background in aviation in your -- since you've gone with Alaska Airlines, please?

MR. TRIMBERGER: My aviation background started in 1961. I spent four years in the U.S. Air Force. Aircraft mechanic on B-52s and KC-135s. Discharged in 1965, honorable discharge.

Went back to school for a brief period of time. In 1966 I went to work for Brannock International Airways in Dallas, Texas as a aircraft mechanic. Stayed with them for the next 16 years to 1982.

Brannock filed bankruptcy at that time, and so I went to work for a company by the name of Brian Aviation in Wichita, Kansas. I stayed with them 1983 through 1988. At -- at such time they lost their contract with their customers, and I started work the following day with AAR in Oklahoma City, a third-party repair station facility. And stayed with them to about 1990.

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1           And did a little consulting work and  
2 certified a repair station, third-party repair station,  
3 again under 145 out in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Stayed  
4 out there, had it running.

5           In 1992 I came to work for Alaska Airlines where I  
6 currently am. Went to work for Alaska Airlines as the  
7 director of quality control and maintenance training  
8 and was responsible for the -- the Inspection  
9 Departments in Seattle and Oakland and the Quality  
10 Assurance Auditing Department and Maintenance Training  
11 Departments. And approximately 1995 I was made  
12 director of safety and along with my other job  
13 responsibilities and reported to the chief executive  
14 officer of the company.

15           MR. MCGILL: Today, Jim, can you -- let's go  
16 through an explanation of your duties of your current  
17 positions.

18           MR. TRIMBERGER: My current position is  
19 director of quality control and maintenance training.  
20 My responsibilities include the Inspection Departments  
21 in Seattle and in Oakland, Maintenance Training  
22 Department, and FAA liaison.

23           MR. MCGILL: Okay. And then what about your

1 position as director of safety?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: The company hired a vice  
3 president of safety and I assumed the responsibility  
4 for the director of safety position.

5 MR. MCGILL: Okay. Let's talk about prior to  
6 the accident, though.

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: Uh huh.

8 MR. MCGILL: There was not a vice president  
9 of safety? You were the director of safety?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

11 MR. MCGILL: So let's just take that time  
12 frame rather than what it is today. Explain your  
13 position as director of safety. Your duties and  
14 responsibilities.

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: Okay. As the director of  
16 safety I was chairman of the Internal Evaluation Board.  
17 And the Internal Evaluation Board was responsible to  
18 the chairman of the company for the safety and  
19 compliance of -- of the complete company.

20 MR. MCGILL: That's kind of a general  
21 explanation. Could you define that even better of --  
22 of how ya'll interacted, how frequently, what areas  
23 that you did in this area?

1           MR. TRIMBERGER: The -- the Internal  
2 Evaluation Board was comprised of representatives from  
3 the Maintenance and Engineering Division, from the  
4 Flight Operations Division, and the Customer Service  
5 Division. The Internal Evaluation Board met on a  
6 monthly basis, on a ad hoc basis if it was necessary to  
7 -- to call a meeting. Minutes were prepared, agendas  
8 were prepared. And then on a quarterly basis we met  
9 with the chairman of the company. And on an annual  
10 basis we met with the officer group, including the  
11 chairman of the company.

12           MR. MCGILL: Specifically, is -- in that  
13 position as director in title, who -- who is the next  
14 step up that you would report to? Was it the chairman  
15 or --

16           MR. TRIMBERGER: I was reporting to the  
17 chairman of the company when -- back in the '95, '96  
18 time frame.

19           MR. MCGILL: And that carried forth -- let's  
20 talk about at the time of the accident.

21           MR. TRIMBERGER: At the time of the aircraft  
22 -- at the time of the accident, the position reported  
23 to senior vice president of the Technical Operations



1 System Control.

2 MR. MCGILL: So at that point you were  
3 reporting to Mr. Fowler?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

5 MR. MCGILL: And then as director of quality  
6 control, who -- who did you report to?

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: I reported to the vice  
8 president of maintenance and engineering.

9 MR. MCGILL: Which is?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: Bill Weaver.

11 MR. MCGILL: Mr. Weaver. As director of  
12 safety, was there an avenue or a procedure written or  
13 any kind of forms? Could other employees in the  
14 company -- do they have -- be able to reach you to  
15 voice any kind of concerns about safety issues that  
16 they thought were important?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: The safety organization, the  
18 Internal Evaluation Board policies, procedures,  
19 organizational charts were outlined in our safety and  
20 environmental manual which our employees had copies of.  
21 We've let -- we later took that and we put it in each  
22 one of the division operating manuals: Maintenance and  
23 Engineering, General Maintenance Manual, and Flight

1 Operations Manual, and Customer Service Manuals.

2 MR. MCGILL: Just to be able to separate your  
3 position as director of quality control and director of  
4 -- of safety, we've asked other people that worked  
5 under you could they see some sort of a -- a difference  
6 between the two titles if they dealt with you  
7 differently in these capacities. Can -- can you  
8 reflect if -- were you acting that as -- as one person  
9 or did you in fact change your hat and would treat  
10 different areas differently as director of safety  
11 versus director of QC or director of training?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, safety is our number  
13 one priority. And whatever the situation was, whether  
14 I dealt with it as the director of safety or the  
15 director of quality, if there was a safety issue we  
16 dealt with the safety issues. And whatever we needed  
17 to do to make that a safe practice or change procedures  
18 to get it into compliance if it was a compliance issue.

19 MR. MCGILL: We've noticed that in 1998 the  
20 FAA changed their oversight to this ATOS system. You  
21 were there previous to the old system. Could you kind  
22 of explain how this transition was worked and how it's  
23 -- how you see it -- the role that Alaska Airlines had

1 in the change?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, my first exposure was  
3 roughly the summer of '98 when the FAA assembled all of  
4 the major carriers and gave them a briefing on how the  
5 program was going to work. And I believe they  
6 implemented it in October. And I believe the way it's  
7 -- it was implemented and the way it's currently  
8 working is somewhat different than the way it was  
9 explained on how it was going to work, or at least the  
10 way I understood it.

11 And therefore, I -- I believe that the  
12 current system that we're working under, the ATOS  
13 system needs some changes made to it so we can provide  
14 the information to our principals that have the  
15 oversight for us. I don't believe they have the  
16 oversight that they had prior to the ATOS system being  
17 implemented.

18 MR. MCGILL: What was -- what is the  
19 frequency that you used to deal with the FAA prior to  
20 October of '98? How often did they come and talk to  
21 you about things and issues? How much did you see  
22 them? I mean just tell about the relationship. Was it  
23 a good relationship? Was it a bad relationship?

1           MR. TRIMBERGER: It was -- it was a good  
2 relationship. It was a business relationship, and  
3 anything that we had or wanted to do needed to be  
4 supported by whatever documentation we had.

5           A typical day for me, I was probably on the  
6 phone with my principal inspector about 6:45 in the  
7 morning and spent 20 or 30 minutes talking to him about  
8 what went on in the operation the day before, any  
9 issues that we needed to talk about, any items that we  
10 were working on that needed follow-up either by myself  
11 or by him. And -- and a lot of times we didn't talk  
12 for the rest of the day and then maybe follow up, you  
13 know, the following day on whatever.

14          If we needed to talk, we talked. He was a phone  
15 call away, I was a phone call away. It was 24 hours a  
16 day, seven days a week. He had my contact numbers, I  
17 had his contact numbers, and we had open lines of  
18 communication.

19          MR. MCGILL: Is that prior to '98, to when  
20 they took over to the ATOS system? Did that change  
21 after they moved into this type of --

22          MR. TRIMBERGER: It didn't change as far as I  
23 was concerned. We did the same thing.

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1           MR. MCGILL:  So as long as you're dealing  
2 with -- you dealt with the principal.  Did you deal  
3 with any other FAA people that was part of the  
4 certificate management team?

5           MR. TRIMBERGER:  I started getting calls from  
6 the ATOS inspectors assigned to our certificate up and  
7 down -- throughout the system.  I found that they were  
8 calling me rather than keeping their principal office  
9 where the certificate is held abreast of any issues or  
10 anything.

11           I in turn would communicate the same issues  
12 to my principal so that he was in the loop, but it  
13 wasn't the way the system was designed to work as far  
14 as I understood it.

15           MR. MCGILL:  Did you feel that you got any  
16 benefit as a carrier from guidance that was issued to  
17 the -- from the FAA?  Could you see a benefit that  
18 they're helping you with their oversight or whatever  
19 issues that they feel are current or pertinent?

20           MR. TRIMBERGER:  Not sure I understand the  
21 question.  I -- I'm not sure they helped me or not.  We  
22 -- we worked through a lot of issues, Frank.  If I had  
23 questions they would give me answers.  If they had

1 questions I would give them answers.

2 MR. MCGILL: So you -- you're still going  
3 back to the same principals, PMIs and PAIs?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: Mm-hmm.

5 MR. MCGILL: I'm wondering about the other 20  
6 or 25 or whatever FAA -- did you have communication  
7 with them? Did they -- did they address problems with  
8 you? Did they work out things with you? Did they help  
9 you see different areas or concerns from a -- a larger  
10 perspective that the FAA is looking at?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, for the most part they  
12 didn't. If they called me it was, well, you had an  
13 airplane that had an air turn-back, you know, what was  
14 it. And so I'd get them the information. But the same  
15 information was being provided to our certificate of  
16 management office. And again, how I understood the  
17 program to work, they were supposed to interface  
18 through that office to get the information that they  
19 needed. Regardless of how it was, they -- I saw to it  
20 that they got the information that they needed to the  
21 questions.

22 MR. MCGILL: Okay.

23 (Pause)

1           MR. MCGILL: Let's go back to the C-5 in  
2 1997. It was September. On 963. We have asked  
3 several questions about the jack screw end-play check  
4 and that particular MIG 4 card. Can you tell me  
5 anything that you know about that card? Were you ever  
6 informed about anything involving that particular work  
7 card?

8           MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I wasn't.

9           MR. MCGILL: So until we found -- looked at  
10 it after the accident, in 1997 you had no -- no  
11 knowledge whatsoever about that?

12          MR. TRIMBERGER: I had -- no, I didn't.

13          MR. MCGILL: That task card. Were you  
14 familiar with -- since your inspectors were also in  
15 Oakland, can you give me a -- just a brief oversight  
16 from your perspective as director of QC of the -- that  
17 you obviously received from your inspectors of the  
18 Oakland facility in the 1997 time frame?

19          MR. TRIMBERGER: I -- I had a daily meeting  
20 with my managers of Quality Assurance and Inspection  
21 Department who had daily interface with supervisors  
22 both here in Seattle and in Oakland. And through them  
23 that's how I kept abreast of what was going on in both

1 facilities. And then maybe two or three times a year,  
2 depending, I would visit the facility myself or visit  
3 the hangar floor here in Seattle.

4 MR. MCGILL: You're part of the Reliability  
5 -- RAP Program --

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: Control board?

7 MR. MCGILL: -- control board that makes  
8 decisions about changes to the program? What is --  
9 just general -- I -- tell me what you do in that  
10 capacity.

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm one of the board members  
12 that when they make changes to the program it's brought  
13 to the Reliability Panel -- and review, justify, either  
14 approve within our areas of approval or send to the FAA  
15 for --

16 MR. MCGILL: When -- when changes are made  
17 like -- for instance, a C-check package was increased  
18 from 13 to 15 months, not only the interval would --  
19 but did you fully understand the utilization of the  
20 aircraft other than just the two months, the flying  
21 hours? Was all of that evaluated?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: Utilization was taken into  
23 consideration with the -- with the escalation.



1           MR. MCGILL:  And then the job cards that were  
2 attached to the C-check, were they also gone through?  
3 For instance, the -- what we're interested in, the end-  
4 play check?  Because it works off of a 2-C check and  
5 there is a -- there was a substantial increase in time  
6 when -- before it would be rechecked again.  Was all of  
7 that evaluated, that kind of thing?

8           MR. TRIMBERGER:  There was a RAP Control  
9 Board document that supports the escalation.  It was  
10 developed at the time, and that was presented to the  
11 board.

12           MR. MCGILL:  Is that also presented to the  
13 FAA?

14           MR. TRIMBERGER:  Yes.

15           MR. MCGILL:  Is the FAA part of that board?

16           MR. TRIMBERGER:  They're not part of the  
17 voting members on the board.  I believe they get  
18 invited to the -- to the board meetings.  But an  
19 escalation is an operation specification item and needs  
20 to have FAA approval.

21           MR. MCGILL:  So then you would send this  
22 entire package for justification to the FAA for their  
23 approval?

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

2 MR. MCGILL: What about the -- the  
3 lubrication areas where -- at one time lubrication, I  
4 have noticed, were -- were performed on different types  
5 of checks. Later they switched 'em to A-checks and so  
6 forth, and then progressed. And then at a period you  
7 switched it over to a stand-alone card -- eight months.  
8 Was data given to the FAA on how -- for justification  
9 was done with the lubrication?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't answer off the top  
11 of my head without looking at whatever it was.

12 MR. MCGILL: The -- the lubrication was --  
13 prior to that was done on a 8-A segmented check. And  
14 of course, the A-checks had been escalated, first from  
15 125 hours to 150 hours to 200 hours. And in that -- by  
16 '94 we had -- we were up to an A-check of 200 hours, 8-  
17 A check, which would have been a total of 1600 hours  
18 for lubrication. At that point you moved it to a  
19 stand-alone card. Did -- was somebody looking at the  
20 total time? Because that now worked out to about 2550  
21 hours, so you moved it technically from 1600 to 2550  
22 hours. Was that evaluated in ya'll's decision-making?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Without looking, I -- I

1 can't answer that. But we haven't made any changes to  
2 our maintenance program without requiring a  
3 documentation and evaluation of the system and the  
4 reliability program.

5 MR. MCGILL: On January the 1st of 1998, the  
6 lubrication grease was changed on this particular task  
7 card to another grease. Were you part of that  
8 evaluation -- that made that change?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: I was not.

10 MR. MCGILL: Is that a -- the same type of  
11 process that you would have done from an escalation of  
12 -- of a check interval? Would you have gone through  
13 the same process to make a change of a material on a  
14 task card? Had you gone through this RAP procedure?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: It would have gone through  
16 an approval process. I don't know if it would drive a  
17 RAP Control Board document.

18 MR. MCGILL: Who -- who would know that? How  
19 -- how is that -- how does that work? How can a change  
20 be done and you wouldn't know anything about it?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, there's a procedure in  
22 the General Maintenance Manual for making changes to  
23 work cards and task cards, and that's the procedure

1 that would have been followed.

2 MR. MCGILL: So they could go from a ME-01 to  
3 straight into a change without really going through the  
4 board itself?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: Probably -- it probably goes  
6 to the Maintenance Review Board, but that's part of the  
7 ME-01 process.

8 MR. MCGILL: Okay. So the Maintenance Review  
9 Board, are you a member of that?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes, I am.

11 MR. MCGILL: Do you remember that change?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

13 MR. MCGILL: Do you know why a request was  
14 made to change the type of grease?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know.

16 MR. MCGILL: What area would -- would know,  
17 if we were to ask someone? Who -- who would know that  
18 best? Usually is this in Engineering? Is -- what --  
19 what area would be able to get that information?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: From whoever interfaces with  
21 the manufacturer on items such as that.

22 MR. MCGILL: And who is that?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Typically, the Engineering

1 Department.

2 MR. MCGILL: Engineering.

3 (Pause)

4 MR. MCGILL: We've had some discussions here  
5 just recently about the -- the -- the tools that are  
6 used to perform these end-play checks. Can you tell me  
7 what the -- your area -- since you're over Inspection,  
8 who actually has an oversight of what tooling Alaska  
9 Airline uses in these checks? Who does this? How does  
10 this work? Just generally tell us.

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, tools are identified  
12 in the illustrated tool catalog, which usually comes  
13 from the manufacturer. And so I mean that's the  
14 document that's used and the work cards -- the  
15 Maintenance Manual call off specific tools to use. And  
16 whoever's responsibility it is to acquire those tools  
17 would acquire the appropriate tools --

18 MR. MCGILL: Who has that responsibility?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: -- to handle all the tasks.

20 I'd be speculating, but I think it's the Maintenance  
21 Department. I can't speak for the Inspection  
22 Department because if there's MDT tools or barscopes or  
23 standards that need to be bought I'll review the work

1 that's to be done and order the appropriate tools and  
2 equipment to accomplish that task.

3 MR. MCGILL: Right now ya'll are putting some  
4 work -- a program together to work, for instance, a  
5 730-7900, is that correct?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: We are, yes.

7 MR. MCGILL: You would probably -- instead of  
8 me putting words in, but you would probably go through  
9 these -- all these task cards, identify these tools  
10 that are noted on these task cards and then someone  
11 would go out and purchase those tools for you to be  
12 able to do this work, is that correct?

13 MR. TRIMBERGER: That -- that's exactly what  
14 we do. When -- when we get a -- when we're bringing on  
15 a new airplane or whatever the situation is, we have a  
16 group that typically gets together. Inspection  
17 Department's part of that group. The task cards are  
18 reviewed for content, understanding of the -- of the  
19 work instructions, and any tools or equipment that are  
20 identified are then requisitioned and purchased.

21 MR. MCGILL: Okay. But you -- you started  
22 with these task cards that have already identified a  
23 tool that will have a serial number or part number --

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: Part number.

2 MR. MCGILL: What is the process if you now  
3 manufacture your own in-house tools?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I -- I don't  
5 manufacture any in-house tools. If I need a standard  
6 or something, the non-destructive manual that comes  
7 from the manufacturer identifies the standard of the  
8 tools that I need. And I go to a vendor that can  
9 document that tool and make it per that part number  
10 drawing and we'll purchase it. So that's what I do  
11 when we need tools and equipment.

12 MR. MCGILL: Has any internal audit from your  
13 quality assurance area ever gone back through and  
14 reevaluated or rechecked or did some internal procedure  
15 to verify the tools that you have been operating with  
16 for a long time are in fact the tools that are  
17 specified?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't recall the auditing  
19 group ever identifying any of those areas, no.

20 MR. MCGILL: It just seems like that right  
21 now we're -- there's a little conflict. I don't know  
22 which way it goes, but there could be some area of  
23 dispute of whether or not certain tools are in fact the

1 ones that's designated by the manufacturer, and I was  
2 just wondering since you're in quality control if there  
3 was some sort of procedure or something that -- that  
4 would have been able to resolve that or check that or  
5 previously had checked that or whatever. I don't know.

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: I -- I can't speak to that.

7 We have a procedure for test equipment, and it's  
8 outlined in the General Maintenance Manual. And I  
9 would expect that to be followed if we were going to do  
10 anything with tooling.

11 MR. MCGILL: Were you ever in any of the  
12 phone conferences that are -- that are made between the  
13 outlying bases, for instance Oakland? Are you part of  
14 that number of people that are in these morning  
15 conferences?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: We have a morning conference  
17 call with all the line stations and the base -- base  
18 stations, yes.

19 MR. MCGILL: Do you remember ever having any  
20 discussion from 1997 about Aircraft 963?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

22 MR. MCGILL: Anything specifically about the  
23 jack screw of 963?



1 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

2 (Pause)

3 MR. MCGILL: The calibration of tools in  
4 themselves, just the calibration of it, does that fall  
5 under your inspection area?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, we have a department  
7 that's responsible for calibrating tools.

8 MR. MCGILL: What about the receiving of  
9 materials into parts inventory?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: The inspectors do the  
11 receiving on parts and equipment that come through  
12 receiving inspection.

13 MR. MCGILL: Do you recall anything specific  
14 of lubricants right now of switching from Mobil 28 to  
15 Aeroshell 33?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

17 MR. MCGILL: Could we talk about -- since you  
18 are the director of training also, can you talk a  
19 little about the technical training of the maintenance  
20 technicians?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: The Training Department is  
22 basically set up to conduct the formal training classes  
23 that we hold for our technicians. They also do our

1 vendor training when it comes to fueling. Third-party  
2 contractors get training on our policies and procedures  
3 in our manuals. And the Training Department meets  
4 annually with the maintenance directors and managers to  
5 see what they need for the upcoming year as far as  
6 training requirements. The training catalog is  
7 developed and issued approximately the end of the year  
8 for the upcoming year. And that's pretty much for the  
9 formal side of the training.

10 The OJT side of the training is handled from  
11 the Production group and it's on-the-job training, just  
12 --

13 MR. MCGILL: Are all of these -- the  
14 different means of training, are they captured at some  
15 point to identify -- if I were to ask any of the  
16 training of Lance here, you could tell me all the  
17 training he's had?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: We'd give you Lance's  
19 training records and to coincide with the items listed  
20 on the training records would be a class syllabus that  
21 outlines the training that he received. If it was  
22 training he received prior to Alaska Airlines we would  
23 have documented that based on some certification that

1 he received from attending that class.

2 MR. MCGILL: You document the OJT also?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: We receive quite a few OJT  
4 forms from the maintenance groups.

5 MR. MCGILL: What about recurrent training?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: Recurrent training, there's  
7 a few courses that are identified as required recurrent  
8 training. RII training is one. Running taxis is one.

9 Category Two, Category Three training is a recurrent  
10 training program. Hazardous material is a recurrent  
11 training program.

12 MR. MCGILL: We've noticed that we've sent  
13 some public information out that Alaska is hiring or  
14 will be hiring soon a large number of mechanics. What  
15 is the process if I hired on today or next week? What  
16 -- what would be my -- what would I have to undertake  
17 before I could be put on the line to -- to work  
18 aircraft for Alaska?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I -- I can't speak to  
20 the hiring side of that. I know what we require for  
21 them to go out on the line is to have their air-  
22 worthiness release authorization. They need their A &  
23 P license.

1           MR. MCGILL:  But -- but I'm saying after I  
2 got hired.  I'm hired.  I now report to you.  Could I  
3 go straight to the line to work or do I have to go  
4 through indoctrinations?  Do I go through any kind of  
5 training programs?  Do I -- how --

6           MR. TRIMBERGER:  There's --

7           MR. MCGILL:  -- how would that work?

8           MR. TRIMBERGER:  Yeah, there is -- there's an  
9 indoctrination program.  It may or may not be received  
10 prior to going to work out on the line.

11          MR. MCGILL:  What -- what is covered in the  
12 indoctrination?

13          MR. TRIMBERGER:  Much of our paperwork, our  
14 procedures, our GMM, the use of the maintenance  
15 manuals, illustrated parts catalogs, our computer --  
16 computerized system of entering data, company policies  
17 and procedures.

18          MR. MCGILL:  If I had been working Lockheed  
19 Aircraft for the last five years, when would I get  
20 training on Douglas or Boeing aircraft?

21          MR. TRIMBERGER:  Usually the training is --  
22 the maintenance personnel are scheduled in through  
23 their -- through their maintenance department into a

1 class.

2 MR. MCGILL: Is that done by you or is that  
3 done by the direct areas or departments that a mechanic  
4 is put into?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: It's done by the department  
6 the mechanic is assigned to.

7 MR. MCGILL: How many instructors do you have  
8 in Training?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think mainly we have six,  
10 and I think we've just added an additional at least  
11 four, I think, recently.

12 MR. MCGILL: At outlying stations do the  
13 mechanics come here to be trained or would -- do you go  
14 there?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: We have -- we have formal  
16 classrooms here in Seattle, one up in Anchorage, and  
17 one in Oakland. And for the most part we try to have  
18 the instructors do the traveling rather than all the  
19 maintenance personnel do the traveling. There are  
20 times where people at the other locations may have to  
21 travel to Seattle or, say, San Francisco to Oakland or  
22 something like that.

23 MR. MCGILL: Ya'll train maintenance

1 controllers?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: We do train maintenance  
3 controllers.

4 MR. MCGILL: How often?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: Depending on the maintenance  
6 controllers and their -- their training records.

7 MR. MCGILL: So somebody that's looking at  
8 training records and if you go for a period of time or  
9 not have any, they're scheduled in some manner?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, there's department  
11 managers and directors that determine that.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. MCGILL: How often do you get direct  
14 contact with your inspectors at an outlying station?  
15 And I'll just use Oakland as an example.

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: I personally would have  
17 probably traveled to Oakland maybe three or four times  
18 in the course of the year. Again, most of my interface  
19 with them was through my managers and supervisors of  
20 the Inspection Department.

21 MR. MCGILL: How's your relationship with Mr.  
22 Diatsi?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: I have a good relationship.

1           MR. MCGILL:  How many years have ya'll worked  
2 together?

3           MR. TRIMBERGER:  I've been here going on nine  
4 years and he's been the manager of Inspection the  
5 complete time.

6           (Pause)

7           MR. MCGILL:  That's all I have right now.  
8 Does anyone need to take a quick break before we -- we  
9 start with Malcolm?

10          MR. TRIMBERGER:  I wouldn't mind.

11          MR. MCGILL:  What's that?

12          MR. TRIMBERGER:  I wouldn't mind.

13          MR. MCGILL:  Okay.  That's a very, very quick  
14 one and then -- and then we'll start again.

15          (Brief recess)

16          MR. MCGILL:  Malcolm, you want to start the -  
17 -

18          DR. BRENNER:  Okay.  Malcolm Brenner from the  
19 Safety Board.  I'd like a little bit of history; can  
20 you help me?  From 1995 to let's say the time of the  
21 accident or the time you took over as director of  
22 safety until the accident, what were some of the major  
23 areas of -- of safety attention, let's say, on the

1 maintenance side that the Internal Evaluation Board  
2 addressed or that maybe you had to deal with?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I probably have to go  
4 back and take a look at our minutes and agendas,  
5 Malcolm, but I remember items on there that the audit  
6 teams had identified as far as aircraft accidents on  
7 the ramp that the Internal Evaluation Board was  
8 involved in.

9 Actually, the Internal Evaluation Board put  
10 together a audit team and went to the station that was  
11 identified and did a complete audit of the Flight Ops,  
12 Customer Service, and Maintenance and Engineering areas  
13 and -- and applied some areas that needed -- could be  
14 approved -- improved and met with the station manager.

15 And the station manager ended up coming to Seattle and  
16 meeting with the board, and he implemented a number of  
17 corrective actions that would prevent it.

18 DR. BRENNER: Good. And at the time of the -  
19 -

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's an example.

21 DR. BRENNER: Uh huh. Good. And what time  
22 frame was that?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Again, I'd be guessing but



1 I'd say '97.

2 DR. BRENNER: And before -- at the time of  
3 the accident, say the period before the accident, were  
4 there any special safety concerns that you were  
5 addressing on the maintenance side? Six months before  
6 --

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't recall any, no.

8 DR. BRENNER: Okay. And -- and from '95 to  
9 '99 also, what were the areas of FAA attention that you  
10 were dealing with in the area of safety?

11 (Pause)

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I think it was pretty  
13 much typical business as usual. Again, I spoke with  
14 our principal almost every morning. We dealt with, you  
15 know, whether it was a letter of investigation or a  
16 self-disclosure. Our rates were pretty consistent with  
17 the previous years. I don't recall anything of -- of a  
18 real safety issue that we were dealing with.

19 DR. BRENNER: When you say "principal," was  
20 that John Hubbard that you were dealing with?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah, typically it was John  
22 Hubbard. It was -- on the Avionics side it would have  
23 been Christina Dawson. And very seldom I would deal

1 with the principal ops inspector.

2 DR. BRENNER: Tell me about John Hubbard.

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: I worked with John Hubbard.

4 I came and worked with the airline in '92 and I think  
5 he retired in October of '99, roughly. John and I had  
6 a -- a working relationship. I think we understood  
7 that the jobs had to be done, they had to be done  
8 right, had to be done in accordance with the  
9 maintenance procedures, and that's pretty much how we  
10 went about our business. It was -- it was by the book.

11 If our manual said do it this way, that's the way it  
12 needed to be done. If there was something that came up  
13 that didn't get done that way, then we addressed it and  
14 -- and provided acceptable corrective actions to -- to  
15 remedy the situation, whether that was training or --  
16 or disciplinary action.

17 DR. BRENNER: You mentioned there were cases  
18 where some of the ATOS -- some of the inspectors under  
19 ATOS might contact you and then you would be a conduit  
20 to John. Can you give me any examples of that?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: You know, possibly a air  
22 turn-back at one of our stations. The inspector's  
23 calling me to find out what was going on. Didn't

1 necessarily have a problem with doing that. I always  
2 provided 'em the information they needed. But it was -  
3 - it kind of left the principal out of the loop and so  
4 I just took it upon myself to try to keep our principal  
5 in the loop. But had that gone on -- I not said  
6 anything and kept him in the loop, then I -- I don't  
7 think he would have the information to be able to  
8 function like he should be.

9           Again, that's one of the things that, you  
10 know, John and I would discuss. We spent 20, 30  
11 minutes on the phone almost every day early in the  
12 morning.

13           DR. BRENNER: Were there areas of particular  
14 attention that he had during this time?

15           MR. TRIMBERGER: Not off the top of my head,  
16 Malcolm. I -- I don't know of any. I mean we had --  
17 our -- our -- our relationship with the FAA, other than  
18 my morning conference call -- if you will, a conference  
19 call; it was John and myself.

20           We held a Tuesday meeting. Tuesday meeting  
21 went from 30 minutes to two hours depending on what the  
22 agenda was. We met Tuesdays every week, unless for  
23 some reason we couldn't meet, and we typically

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1 conducted most of our business during those meetings.  
2 Again, we kept minutes and we kept agendas and action  
3 items during the week, and then we'd meet the following  
4 Tuesday.

5 DR. BRENNER: And did you work with Phil Hoy?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: Didn't work directly with  
7 Phil I don't believe on anything. Phil was the office  
8 supervisor.

9 DR. BRENNER: Tell me about John Fowler.  
10 What's he like personally and --

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: John Fowler hired me in  
12 1992. He was my direct supervisor till roughly 1998,  
13 maybe. John and I had a -- a good working  
14 relationship. John was -- any issues that I ever had  
15 about safety or compliance that I would take to John's  
16 attention we acted on immediately. John's number one  
17 priority was the safety and -- and the operation. And  
18 we had a good working relationship. If we needed to  
19 ground airplanes we grounded airplanes. Whatever it  
20 took.

21 DR. BRENNER: What are his strengths as a  
22 manager, would you say?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm sorry?

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1 DR. BRENNER: As a manager what would you say  
2 his -- his strengths are?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: His strengths?

4 DR. BRENNER: Yeah.

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: He's a very smart  
6 individual. I think John has a number of strengths. I  
7 think he's a good manager. He holds people  
8 responsible. He works very hard. I think he expects a  
9 lot from everybody else. We always got our -- along.  
10 I managed to be able to do that by working 12 hours a  
11 day, I guess.

12 (Laughter)

13 DR. BRENNER: Now, I understood that maybe,  
14 oh, some people had difficulty working with his style,  
15 may have resigned or left positions. I think the name  
16 Ron Rice came up as one. Are you familiar with that?  
17 Do you address that?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: I -- I don't know about it.

19 DR. BRENNER: Okay.

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: I mean I know Ron Rice, I  
21 just don't know anything about his relationship with  
22 John.

23 DR. BRENNER: And I understand from the FAA

1 that there was an issue about whether to have a single  
2 director of safety or -- or have, I guess, the Internal  
3 Evaluation Board director of safety. Who was the point  
4 person on the company side dealing with that issue?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: John Fowler was at the time,  
6 I believe.

7 DR. BRENNER: And were you involved in those  
8 discussions?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: I was involved in the  
10 discussions. We talked about the way the Internal  
11 Evaluation Board was set up at the time -- and -- and  
12 the benefits of having it that way versus the benefits  
13 of having it single-point contact. We believe that the  
14 way the Internal Evaluation Board was -- was set up and  
15 outlined, the responsibilities brought more to Alaska  
16 Airlines and the safety of the airline than had we had  
17 one individual responsible for the safety of the  
18 airline. In essence, we had six or eight people  
19 responsible for the safety of the company chaired by  
20 the director of safety.

21 DR. BRENNER: Thank you. The Oakland  
22 facility, I'm interested in the period about '97 and  
23 perhaps comparing it over time. How -- how would you

1 characterize the workload at that time?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think the work load was  
3 consistent with previous years. They typically had one  
4 airplane in the base maintenance facility at a time.

5 DR. BRENNER: I think there was one period  
6 where they -- they changed from a five-day-a-week  
7 operation to a seven-day-a-week operation. I'm  
8 wondering how -- how that affected work load.

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, again, I think they  
10 had one airplane. I think -- and they did go from five  
11 days to a seven-day operation. They -- they hired  
12 personnel to -- to take up the difference of the  
13 additional shifts. That's about all I know about it.  
14 We -- from the Inspection Department we added  
15 additional inspectors when we went from five days to  
16 seven days. And with the staffing that we have we were  
17 able to keep up with the Production group.

18 DR. BRENNER: How -- how would you  
19 characterize morale at Oakland at that time?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: From what I know about the  
21 Oakland facility I -- I never thought there was a  
22 morale issue down there. You know, it's quite a  
23 diverse operation down there and I think -- I've always

1 thought the morale down there was good. For at least  
2 my visits down there. I mean they always greeted me  
3 and treated me and talked to me, and they were all, you  
4 know, it was a pleasure to -- to visit down there.

5 DR. BRENNER: How was their on-time  
6 performance in terms of completing the C-checks?

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: '97, '98 time frame?

8 DR. BRENNER: Yeah.

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah. It wasn't what it was  
10 in the '92, '93, '94, '95 because for whatever reasons  
11 they had a good on-time performance at that facility.  
12 Their performance for one reason or another got worse.

13 DR. BRENNER: But when did the change happen?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't actually tell you  
15 exactly when it happened. I just know the airplanes  
16 weren't coming out like they were previously.

17 DR. BRENNER: Thank you.

18 MR. HAMILTON: I don't think I have any --

19 MR. PAPE: I'm going to -- same. I don't  
20 have anything right now either.

21 MS. VON KLEINSMID: I do. You had talked  
22 about quarterly meetings regarding -- I'm talking  
23 safety right now. Quarterly meetings with the chairman



1 and then you had annual meetings, I think, with your  
2 board members. Were those meetings -- were notes taken  
3 during those meetings?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: We put together quarterly  
5 reports and annual reports, and that's what was  
6 discussed at the meetings.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And is this the same  
8 report that when you talked about -- I think Mr. McGill  
9 had asked you in terms of information flowing to  
10 employees regarding the safety, were these reports that  
11 you had put together that was distributed to the  
12 employees or made available to the employees?

13 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, these reports weren't  
14 made available to the employees although in the  
15 Maintenance and Engineering Division we have monthly  
16 safety meetings of which our hourly employees are  
17 members of that particular board.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. So besides the  
19 monthly safety meetings where the hourly employees are  
20 part of the board and the information that's flowed --  
21 was flowed to the employees or made available through  
22 company publications, what other access did individual  
23 employees have to either get to your office or your

1 support regarding safety?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: They -- they called me on  
3 the phone if they had any issues. I think everybody  
4 down there knows me and knows who -- who to talk to.  
5 When we -- when I held my employee meetings on the  
6 floor I always let 'em know what my areas of  
7 responsibility were, talked to 'em about having the  
8 Internal Evaluation Board, about the -- how the  
9 Internal Evaluation Board functions and what their  
10 responsibilities are, and the fact that they can bring  
11 any safety issues to my attention as well as their  
12 supervisor's attention, and if need be they can take it  
13 to the attention of the chairman.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So information that they  
15 wanted to be brought forth to this Internal Evaluation  
16 Board would be flowed up either to you or to someone  
17 else they knew was a member of the board or to the  
18 chairman?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Were they given feedback?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Feedback through their --  
22 through their managers and supervisors back to the  
23 individuals.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Was there any type of  
2 safety hotline established?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: There wasn't at the time,  
4 Kristen. We developed two co-mail addresses to the  
5 Safety Department and -- one to the Safety Department  
6 and one to the Internal Evaluation Board. And both of  
7 those were my co-mail addresses. And also set up a e-  
8 mail address to the Internal Evaluation Board, which  
9 comes to me.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And when approximately  
11 were these e-mail or co-mail addresses established?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm going to say about a  
13 year ago.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So approximately early  
15 '99 time frame --

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: To the best of my  
17 recollection.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: What does Alaska Airlines  
19 do in terms of participation in safety issues or  
20 concerns or discussions with other airliners -- airline  
21 carriers?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I can speak for the --  
23 the Maintenance and Engineering Division. I've

1 participated in some of the meetings, the FAA meetings  
2 in -- in Washington regarding safety and the different  
3 changes the FAA is going through. Also participated in  
4 some of the ATA functions regarding safety personally  
5 and through the Southern California Safety Institute  
6 accident investigation classes along with safety  
7 classes for managers, typically a one-week or two-week  
8 class. Attendance on the -- classes on aviation  
9 cultures seminars back in Washington. Some examples.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. What about FOQA?  
11 You guys a -- a participant in -- in that program?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: Our Flight Operations  
13 Department Division is.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Do you know to what  
15 extent?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't speak to it  
17 directly. I know they're pretty involved with the --  
18 the FAA.

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: But that hasn't crossed  
20 over in -- in your areas -- but as -- as you held the  
21 title of director of safety, do you involve yourself  
22 with -- with anything FOQA-related to Flight  
23 Operations?

1           MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah. No, I don't think  
2 anything that FOQA may -- have identified. I know we  
3 had a MD 80 flight control problem. That was probably  
4 the one that I recall. It's been a couple years ago  
5 now. Slow to respond or something. The manufacturer  
6 was involved in working with us on that.

7           MS. VON KLEINSMID: Was there downloading  
8 information from flight data recorders and using it and  
9 analyzing that information?

10          MR. TRIMBERGER: We have FOQA recorders, yes.  
11 A second flight recorder installed on some of our  
12 airplanes.

13          MS. VON KLEINSMID: Do you know approximately  
14 how many aircraft?

15          MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't. I guess it would  
16 be eight, but I'm not sure about that.

17          MS. VON KLEINSMID: And have you established  
18 a hotline recently regarding safety and safety  
19 problems?

20          MR. TRIMBERGER: Since the director of safety  
21 -- vice president of safety retired, yes.

22          MS. VON KLEINSMID: That's been up and  
23 running and in use?

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1                   MR. TRIMBERGER: For the past three months or  
2 four.

3                   MS. VON KLEINSMID: I'm -- I'm sure you've  
4 had a chance to review the Internal Safety Assessment.  
5 Well, maybe you haven't had a chance to review it.  
6 Have you -- did you get a copy of this from your  
7 internal audit that was done, I believe, -- I guess  
8 April 10th to May 18th?

9                   MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not sure I have the  
10 complete audit.

11                   MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. There's quite a  
12 few items here brought up regarding safety, and one of  
13 the items was the hotline and development and the vice  
14 president of safety. Another item mentioned was Alaska  
15 Airlines benefitted from a greater participation in  
16 industry-wide safety -- where I talked about. But one  
17 of the comments that was stated in here and I'd like  
18 you to talk about was cynicism in recent years has  
19 developed in the perception that the company has failed  
20 to act on sincerely made suggestions and  
21 recommendations. And what -- what do you think about  
22 that? Or if you haven't read it, just me saying it  
23 right now, what's your impression? It says a couple

1 different times in here about the failure of company to  
2 -- to act sincerely. You talk about safety but not  
3 really take action on it.

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: Not sure what -- what  
5 they're talking about.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So you -- you don't think  
7 that's a problem?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: It's not a problem the way I  
9 dealt with safety issues.

10 MS. VON KLEINSMID: You don't think that  
11 there's been a hindrance from people to feel free to  
12 discuss safety concerns and that they haven't felt --  
13 I'm talking basically your -- employees, mechanics,  
14 inspectors, that they haven't been intimidated or felt  
15 pressure or worry about getting repercussions for  
16 bringing safety issues brought forward?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can only speak for myself,  
18 and that's not the way I deal with any problems  
19 regarding safety or anything else brought to my  
20 attention. And if they're brought to my attention in  
21 confidentiality, that's exactly the way they're kept.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And so you haven't heard  
23 any complaints about people feeling intimidated --

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: I --

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- after they've brought  
3 safety concerns forward?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

5 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Have you heard any  
6 complaints about people being upset that they haven't  
7 gotten any feedback after they've brought forward  
8 safety concerns?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: Nobody's mentioned anything  
10 to me.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Following the accident  
12 you -- you had quite a role in terms of collecting  
13 documents, I know, for this team. I'm sure you've been  
14 part of meetings of that nature. A question was asked  
15 to you whether or not you had any knowledge of the work  
16 card, and we're talking about the MIG 4 non-routine  
17 work card on the end-play check that was conducted in  
18 September of '97. The question was whether or not you  
19 had any knowledge of that work card in '97, and I think  
20 your response was no?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And have you since found  
23 out any information subsequent to our investigation



1 regarding any other personnel at Alaska Airlines that  
2 may have had knowledge of the issues going on in  
3 September of '97 regarding that end-play check and the  
4 jack screw?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: No. I mean that was a long  
6 question, but I know there's been a lot of conversation  
7 about that particular non-routine, but --

8 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So you're not aware of  
9 any management -- person under you, any inspector under  
10 your leadership, or any maintenance person, any manager  
11 at all in Alaska Airlines that had any -- any awareness  
12 of the -- in September 27, '97, to September 30, '97,  
13 about that jack screw and it being at its maximum  
14 allowable limit and the possibility of taking it out  
15 and removing it?

16 MR. JAQUES: You mean other than what's  
17 already been disclosed to the NTSB in letters and  
18 documents?

19 MS. VON KLEINSMID: I guess this is -- was  
20 disclosure about people having information on that, so  
21 if there has been then --

22 MR. JAQUES: If I understand your question  
23 correctly, a lot of information has been turned over

1 concerning that MIG 4 and the people who were involved  
2 in it, if that's what your question --

3 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Well, I -- I'm not  
4 talking about turnover logs. I'm not talking about --  
5 I'm talking about management, whether it be through any  
6 kind of conference call or -- are you aware of any  
7 managers at your level or below that had information  
8 September '97 about that MIG 4 work card and the  
9 possible removal of a jack screw?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not aware of any.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Not since -- nothing's  
12 come to your attention since the accident  
13 investigation?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not exactly sure what  
15 the question is.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Let me -- let me ask --

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: That --

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- let me ask a couple  
19 questions here. Do you have any personal knowledge in  
20 the September 27th to 30 time frame regarding the  
21 possible removal of a jack screw from 963?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You have no personal

1 knowledge at that time?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Subsequently, in review of  
4 accident material or any of the discussions, do you  
5 have personal knowledge about activities surrounding  
6 that -- the completion of that C-check on 963?

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: As the director of quality  
9 control and technical training and safety in that  
10 interim period you had no discussions with any  
11 management people concerning the examination of a jack  
12 screw, the end-play check and the subsequent -- non-  
13 removal of the jack screw?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah. I did not have any.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And you don't now?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Have you had any meetings  
18 with any of your inspectors following the accident?  
19 Was any information -- out to any of your inspectors  
20 about what's -- end-play check? Were you then involved  
21 in any communication?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: I have not directly.

23 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Any analysis of the MIG 4

1 work card, since I'm -- I'm -- I'm assuming that you  
2 have seen the non-routine work card?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Have you talked to anyone  
5 amongst your inspectors in terms of proper -- the way  
6 it was written, things to do -- differently, what  
7 should be or shouldn't be written in a situation -- say  
8 this same situation came up next month where you have a  
9 jack screw at the maximum allowable 40, point 040. Any  
10 discussion?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

12 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Any discussion -- you  
13 said that -- I think your quote was safety is your  
14 number one priority -- that -- that there might have  
15 been a possibility that that inspector writing up the  
16 MIG 4 card because that's what his concern was, safety?

17 In terms that there was a jack screw out there that  
18 was at maximum allowable limits and that he was  
19 concerned about that and that that was the right thing  
20 to do or the wrong thing to do?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't speak for why the  
22 inspector wrote it up.

23 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And you haven't had any

1 discussion or haven't talked about it amongst your --  
2 your inspectors --

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

4 MS. VON KLEINSMID: -- about doing that?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

6 MS. VON KLEINSMID: What's your opinion on  
7 your -- your training budget? Have you had adequate  
8 training budget in the past?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: We've had an adequate  
10 training budget to support the training that the  
11 department's been requested to do.

12 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And would you say that  
13 your training budget currently is adequate?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: We're making a number of  
15 changes to the Training Department which will  
16 ultimately affect the budget, so I think it will be,  
17 yes.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: But was there a time  
19 where it may not have been adequate?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

21 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. So have you  
22 received any complaints from any of your instructors  
23 about the fact that they can't get any supplies for the

1 training classes?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

3 MS. VON KLEINSMID: That they had to buy  
4 pencils out of their own pockets to distribute to the  
5 -- the trainees?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: You haven't heard that?  
8 No complaints have been lodged to you regarding --  
9 okay.

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Do you feel you've --  
12 your staffing levels have been adequate in -- in  
13 training?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

15 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And safety awareness  
16 programs?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

18 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And in QC?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: That's all I have.

21 MR. MCGILL: Lance?

22 MR. SEYER: We'll start with safety. Do you  
23 know who Holly Fegger is?

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1 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

2 MR. SEYER: Could you tell the other members  
3 of the panel here who she is? What's her title?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think she's manager of  
5 employee safety, do work injuries, I think.

6 MR. SEYER: Systems safety manager for all  
7 departments. How often do you talk to her or have  
8 correspondence with her regarding safety issues?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't recall the last time  
10 I talked to her.

11 MR. SEYER: This Internal Evaluation Board  
12 that you were describing, it involved Flight Ops,  
13 Maintenance and Engineering Departments, and also  
14 Customer Service Departments. Do you know if Holly  
15 Fegger is part of that board or process?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: She's not.

17 MR. SEYER: She is not. Does the Board  
18 forward her any information?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: Not that I'm aware of.

20 MR. SEYER: It would seem to me that if she  
21 was the head of safety for the whole airline that the  
22 maintenance -- Maintenance and Engineering Department  
23 would want to forward information out to her just like

1 perhaps the Flight Ops people or the Customer Service  
2 people would.

3 MR. JAQUES: Is that a question?

4 MR. SEYER: I'm asking him. Yes. Do you  
5 think that they should? The Engineering Department  
6 should forward information on to the corporate systems  
7 safety manager?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know.

9 (Pause)

10 MR. SEYER: In the GMM under the chapter of  
11 safety, section 8-6-0, it's -- lists under the policy a  
12 general description and it says here, it says, "The  
13 overall accountability for safety shall be the  
14 responsibility of the director of quality control."  
15 Why wouldn't this -- the overall accountability for  
16 safety be the responsibility of the director of safety  
17 not the director of quality control?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think that was written to  
19 -- to identify who is the director of safety. And in  
20 this case the director of safety and the Maintenance  
21 and Engineering Division is the director of quality  
22 control.

23 MR. SEYER: Okay. Currently we have a new



1 director of safety. So accountability for safety  
2 should still be directed to the director of quality  
3 control or shouldn't that be something we should look  
4 at and change?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: It's probably due a  
6 revision.

7 MR. SEYER: You mentioned monthly safety  
8 committee meetings in the Maintenance and Engineering  
9 Department. Could you tell us which departments or who  
10 would attend these monthly safety meetings?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: A representative from Line  
12 Maintenance, Base Maintenance, and the Inspection  
13 Department.

14 MR. SEYER: And do you know if all of these  
15 departments attended these monthly meetings?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: For the most part they did.  
17 The minutes probably reflect that.

18 MR. SEYER: And are these monthly minutes  
19 forwarded to you? The safety committee meeting  
20 minutes, are they -- a copy forwarded to you?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Are you talking about the  
22 IAM safety committee meetings?

23 MR. SEYER: No, the safety committee meeting

1 that's held once a month on the first Wednesday of  
2 every month.

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: I get a copy of safety  
4 minutes. I'm not sure where they come from.

5 (Pause)

6 MR. SEYER: Talk about training for a minute  
7 here. You talked about recurrent training as far as  
8 base training, RII recertification every year. Do you  
9 know if there's any recurrent training for systems  
10 classes?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's left up to the  
12 department managers and directors to send their  
13 personnel to classes.

14 MR. SEYER: I understand there's initial  
15 schools, but I'm talking about the recurrent training  
16 class.

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: There's nothing that would  
18 prevent 'em from sending 'em back through another  
19 class.

20 MR. SEYER: During a time when -- and we'll  
21 talk about the time frame from, let's say, '97 to the  
22 present, we acquired more aircraft, the -- we utilized  
23 aircraft longer hours, and during this process more and

1 more staffing in all departments were hired. As far as  
2 the Training Department, was there any growth in the  
3 Training Department during this time of increased  
4 organization and growth within the company?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, not to the general  
6 familiarization classes, again, dictated on the  
7 schedule that Maintenance asks for and staffing --

8 MR. SEYER: As far as maintenance control is  
9 concerned, usually these are more experienced members  
10 of the maintenance team who have a lot of experience  
11 and knowledge and they're chosen to go into the  
12 maintenance control. Is there recurrent or additional  
13 training for maintenance control personnel once they go  
14 into this position and are there for several years?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, again, the classes are  
16 open to anybody. It's up to the managers of the  
17 department to send their personnel to class.

18 MR. SEYER: Are you normally on the  
19 conference calls in the morning, the -- conference  
20 calls?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Normally, yes.

22 MR. SEYER: During these conference calls, if  
23 they have problems -- problem areas with any -- or

1 delays in -- in C-check schedules, would that normally  
2 be discussed during that conference call?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: Aircraft out of service is -  
4 - is discussed, yes.

5 MR. SEYER: But you don't have any knowledge  
6 or any remembrance of Aircraft 963 or any mention of a  
7 jack screw?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

9 (Pause)

10 MR. SEYER: Does Alaska Airlines have a  
11 grease purge work card that you know of?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: A grease what?

13 MR. SEYER: Purge work card.

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: A grease purge?

15 MR. SEYER: Yes.

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know.

17 MR. SEYER: And why I bring this is up is  
18 there was a change from Mobil 28 to Aeroshell 33  
19 grease. And would it be normal or customary to purge  
20 the existing grease prior to putting -- changing that?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't answer that.

22 MR. SEYER: Do you know if all the  
23 lubrication work cards were followed and complete and

1 correct?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: As far as I know.

3 MR. SEYER: And do you know who has the final  
4 authority to accept or reject the extension of lube  
5 intervals or what data they use to do that?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: Do I know who can accept or  
7 reject?

8 MR. SEYER: Right. Extension of lube  
9 intervals.

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, that's governed by the  
11 Maintenance Review Board, and any one individual that  
12 signs on that can decline to sign and it wouldn't go  
13 through.

14 MR. SEYER: On the ME-01, there's several --  
15 several blocks for signatures on a ME-01. Can you tell  
16 us what departments would need to sign off on that,  
17 those blocks?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I think the ME-01  
19 process is outlined in the GM manual as far as who  
20 needs to sign for it.

21 MR. SEYER: Is it Maintenance, Engineering,  
22 Stores, Quality Control?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Some of 'em require

1 everybody on the ME-01 to sign for it and some of 'em  
2 don't require all the signatures.

3 MR. SEYER: Can you give us an example of  
4 maybe a ME-01 that would require all signatures before  
5 it's forwarded? Can you give an example of anything --

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, not really all  
7 signatures.

8 MR. SEYER: And you stated that you do not  
9 remember this -- change from Mobil 28 to Aeroshell 33?  
10 You did not sign the ME-01? You have no knowledge of  
11 it?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

13 MR. SEYER: That's all I have.

14 DR. CRAWLEY: Jim, you mentioned, I believe,  
15 you're chairman of the Internal Evaluation Board, and  
16 you said it's responsible for safety and compliance for  
17 the entire company. Is that statement basically  
18 correct?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

20 DR. CRAWLEY: You also said that there were  
21 members on that board from -- either a member or  
22 members from Flight Operations. Who -- who would that  
23 be?

1           MR. TRIMBERGER: Ed Drechsnowski was on it.  
2 Jim Michaelman is currently on it. Terry Clark was on  
3 it. Currently, who just replaced Terry? I can't  
4 recall his name to tell you.

5           DR. CRAWLEY: And when you met, were all  
6 those people there or just one representative? Or  
7 would they -- they all -- all be there?

8           MR. TRIMBERGER: It varied. There were times  
9 when they all weren't there.

10          DR. CRAWLEY: What -- as direct -- when you  
11 were director of safety, what was your relationship of  
12 -- of -- with the director of safety for flight  
13 operations Terry Clark and Ed Drechsnowski? My  
14 question, really, is were they independent departments  
15 or did -- or if you worked together how did you work  
16 together?

17          MR. TRIMBERGER: Ed and Terry were not on the  
18 board at the same time so I dealt with one of 'em when  
19 I did. And if I had anything that Ed needed to know  
20 about or anything that Ed thought that I needed to know  
21 about, then he would either call me or I would call him  
22 or whatever. We would get together and talk about it.

23          DR. CRAWLEY: When Terry was director of

1 flight safety, would he report to you?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: It wasn't a reporting  
3 organization as like being his superior or anything.  
4 It was -- I was chairman of the board and it consisted  
5 of these individuals, and it was mainly I chaired it to  
6 make sure that the action items were acted upon, that  
7 safety issues brought to the attention of the board  
8 members were being acted upon and taken care of, so it  
9 was more of a working-together relationship for safety  
10 and compliance.

11 DR. CRAWLEY: The flight operations safety  
12 reporting system for pilots is the only thing that I'm  
13 particularly familiar with, and that is through our O-  
14 53 form. Would that come all the way up to you or  
15 would that be pretty much left to Terry to handle those  
16 kinds of matters?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: I got every one of 'em.

18 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. And you -- and you  
19 reviewed those?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: While I was eating my  
21 sandwich.

22 DR. CRAWLEY: What kind of -- of follow-up is  
23 done on those?



1           MR. TRIMBERGER: A number of 'em were flight  
2 operations-related or medical oxygen needed on board or  
3 things like that, so personally, I didn't deal with  
4 those. The ones that piqued my attention was maybe one  
5 of the flight crew members mentioning something about  
6 the push-back that involved customer service or maybe a  
7 station where we had a contractor, and I would send  
8 those back to Flight Operations for some kind of  
9 follow-up or send 'em to Customer Service for some kind  
10 of follow-up. And if they affected us then I took it  
11 upon myself to get with the responsible manager and --  
12 and let him know about it so that they could follow up  
13 on it.

14           DR. CRAWLEY: What kind of a tracking system  
15 for the follow-up did you have set up so that you knew  
16 that -- that action was completed?

17           MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, there -- there wasn't  
18 an awful lot of 'em that weren't being followed up that  
19 I had to send something out on, so for the most part,  
20 it was maybe at the Internal Evaluation Board meeting,  
21 did you get the O-53 I sent over, are you following up  
22 on it, and things like that. So that's how I  
23 personally followed up on it.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: So was -- there's not a real  
2 tracking system that you're aware of that --

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: No. I know there's a  
4 tracking system over in Flight Operations 'cause I  
5 think those all get input in their database or  
6 something.

7 DR. CRAWLEY: Now, if you were to go back and  
8 review wherever these are filed, would you see the  
9 action attached -- the follow-up action attached to the  
10 originals in the file?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I don't know if I'd  
12 find that or not.

13 DR. CRAWLEY: I was just wondering if there  
14 would be a follow-up to every O-53 or whether there  
15 would be some without follow-ups.

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't answer that.

17 DR. CRAWLEY: And what about information back  
18 to the originator? Would that be provided in all  
19 cases?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't answer that either.

21 DR. CRAWLEY: I had some questions about  
22 Aircraft 973 which was the aircraft which returned to  
23 Reno with failure of both the primary and alternate

1 trim, which occurred on February 5th, 2000, the same  
2 week that the -- we had the crash. Did you get  
3 involved in what was going on down there as far as the  
4 evaluation of that airplane?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: Only if -- I was aware of  
6 what was going on. I was aware of the air turn-back.  
7 I was aware that several representatives, NTSB, the  
8 Government, we had a number of employees there working  
9 the problem. I think the parts were quarantined and  
10 then dealt with.

11 DR. CRAWLEY: Were you aware that the jack  
12 screw itself was not inspected or an end-play check on  
13 it at Reno?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think I was aware of that.  
15 I know there was some relays changed, I think.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Was there any concern about  
17 looking at the jack screw? I know the information from  
18 the crash at that time was pretty preliminary and we  
19 didn't have a whole lot of information in that regard,  
20 but I just wondered if anybody said, hey, we better get  
21 out there and look at that jack screw and maybe do an  
22 end-play check on it 'cause we don't know what's going  
23 on here yet. Did that come up at all?

1           MR. TRIMBERGER: Not that I'm aware of. I  
2 think they found hard failures of the components.

3           DR. CRAWLEY: It looks like the last sign-off  
4 in Reno on that was the -- on February 7th, which two  
5 days after it turned back. And then it resumed flying.

6           And then on February 10th in Seattle the jack screw  
7 and actuator assembly were inspected. Do you recall  
8 that or were you contacted or involved in that in any  
9 way?

10          MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

11          DR. CRAWLEY: It was noted that no  
12 discrepancies were found. But then two days later, on  
13 February 12th, it was inspected, according to this  
14 emergency ADE that came out, which it must have come  
15 out -- I don't know the exact date of it, but it must  
16 have been between the 10th and the 12th. And at that  
17 time they found shavings and flakes around the jack  
18 screw. And that flew for four more days and then the  
19 jack screw was replaced in Oakland. Can you explain  
20 any of this to us and why it was replaced? And end-  
21 plays and so forth?

22          MR. TRIMBERGER: Not without looking at the  
23 records.

1 DR. CRAWLEY: We've got, you know, what's in  
2 the logbook but it doesn't give end-play checks or --  
3 or what the findings were. I'm -- and -- and you don't  
4 recall or remember anything about that? Did -- did you  
5 get involved in it at the time and you've just  
6 forgotten?

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: No. I mean the ADE was  
8 issued. We were complying with the ADE. I know prior  
9 to the ADE coming out we did a volunteering check of  
10 the -- the jack screws. I know there was a lot  
11 transpiring in that time frame about shavings and  
12 what's a shaving, what's not a shaving. I think  
13 there's a -- meets compliance to the ADE. So I was  
14 just letting 'em work the ADE and -- and --

15 DR. CRAWLEY: So -- so you can't fill --

16 MR. JAQUES: Let him finish.

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm just letting 'em work  
18 the ADE, make sure we were in compliance with  
19 everything.

20 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. So you can't fill in any  
21 of the gaps here as far as how it resulted in that  
22 change of the jack screw? That's all the questions I  
23 have on that particular subject.

1           Frank McGill was asking you about the switch-  
2 over from the grease from Mobil 28 to Aeroshell 33.  
3 And you said you weren't a part of that change. But  
4 then you said you're a member of the Maintenance Review  
5 Board and this change would have gone through that  
6 board. But -- but you're -- you still can't recall  
7 anything about that switch-over to the grease, is that  
8 correct?

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

10          DR. CRAWLEY: Now, we have interviewed the  
11 inspection supervisor at Oakland. That's Johnny Baker.  
12 We've interviewed the base manager of the Oakland  
13 facility Gerald Sommers. And we've interviewed your  
14 manager of inspection Chet Yancey. We've also  
15 interviewed various members of the FAA Certificate  
16 Management Team of the FAA. And no one can tell us  
17 anything about this switch-over of the grease. Who do  
18 we need to talk to that does know something about this  
19 switch-over?

20          MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I understand there's  
21 an ME-01 that made the change.

22          DR. CRAWLEY: And we could track down who was  
23 involved in this through that?

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's all I know about it.

2 DR. CRAWLEY: Are you familiar with this no-  
3 technical-objection letter from Boeing? Do you recall  
4 ever seeing that?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: I have.

6 DR. CRAWLEY: About the switch-over from  
7 Mobil 28 to Aeroshell 33?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: I have seen that.

9 DR. CRAWLEY: So you do recall that, at least  
10 that part about the switch-over?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: I've seen the message, yes.

12 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. Okay.

13 MR. JAQUES: I would clarify the time frame  
14 that you saw it. I think you're on different tracks  
15 here.

16 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. When -- when was the  
17 time frame that you saw it?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't remember exactly off  
19 the top of my head. Maybe two months ago.

20 DR. CRAWLEY: Oh. So that -- when you're  
21 saying you didn't know about is from prior to the  
22 crash, and that was what I was asking.

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Oh, no, I --

1 DR. CRAWLEY: Yeah, that was what I was  
2 asking.

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

4 DR. CRAWLEY: Okay. We just have a lot of --  
5 a lot of questions about that and we haven't been able  
6 to get any of them answered. I think that's all I  
7 have.

8 MR. LASLEY: Is there any training specific  
9 to how to accomplish or inspect the end-play check and  
10 its results?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: Back when -- prior to the  
12 accident we had no formal training set up to do  
13 training for the end-play check. Does that answer your  
14 question?

15 MR. LASLEY: Yes. Anything planned now?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, there's been a lot of  
17 talk about the end-play checks now and we've -- we do  
18 it at a pretty frequent interval. Nobody has asked  
19 that any special training be accomplished on it.

20 MR. LASLEY: Has any attempt been made to  
21 make sure that everybody who's performing it and  
22 inspecting it, that they understand what they're doing  
23 and are correctly accomplishing it?

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1           MR. TRIMBERGER: My observation is that they  
2 know what they're doing and -- and that they're  
3 accomplishing it correctly.

4           MR. LASLEY: Great. Thank you.

5           MR. MCGILL: Let's take a --

6           (Brief recess)

7           MR. RODRIGUEZ: When was the vice president  
8 of safety hired?

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: By means of title?

10          MR. RODRIGUEZ: When was the vice president  
11 of safety hired?

12          MR. TRIMBERGER: A couple months ago.

13          MR. RODRIGUEZ: June?

14          MR. TRIMBERGER: Roughly. It may have been  
15 May.

16          MR. RODRIGUEZ: And to whom does he report?

17          MR. TRIMBERGER: Chief executive officer.  
18 Mr. Kelly.

19          MR. RODRIGUEZ: Mr. Kelly? And you were  
20 reporting to?

21          MR. TRIMBERGER: John Fowler.

22          MR. RODRIGUEZ: When you were functioning as  
23 safety?

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Which is one step below Mr.  
3 Kelly?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, actually, I've  
5 reported to John Kelly as CEO. I've reported to Bill  
6 Air as president. And then I've reported to John  
7 Fowler as senior vice president in the director of  
8 safety capacity.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: In what capacity did you  
10 report to Mr. Kelly?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: When I was the director of  
12 safety. It -- it had changed three times.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I'd say at least.

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: When -- when -- yeah. When  
15 -- when the board -- Internal Evaluation Board was set  
16 up which I initially reported to Mr. Kelly. And then  
17 when Mr. Air became president interim evaluation  
18 reported to him for a short period of time. And then  
19 shortly after that they changed that to John Fowler at  
20 --

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Why was the change made? Do  
22 you know?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't answer that.

1           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Can you comment for me on the  
2 effectiveness of that function as it was downgraded  
3 from various levels in the company?

4           MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah. For -- for me it  
5 didn't change anything because I could still go to Mr.  
6 Kelly if that's what I needed to do.

7           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did you?

8           MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

9           MR. RODRIGUEZ: You made reference to the  
10 various -- in the -- in the ATOS program now, you made  
11 reference to the inspectors, ATOS inspectors calling  
12 you on turn-backs and that sort of thing. Do you know  
13 whether they were instructed to do that or not?

14          MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I can't answer that they  
15 were instructed to or not. I just -- I got them  
16 answers to their questions and I let the Certificate  
17 Management Office know so that they were aware of what  
18 was going on.

19          MR. RODRIGUEZ: When you spoke -- and this  
20 would be through the PMI?

21          MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

22          MR. RODRIGUEZ: And that would have been Mr.  
23 Hubbard?

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And subsequently Mr. Bennett?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, --

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: For a short period of time?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: For a short period of time,  
6 and now our principal maintenance inspector is Bill  
7 Whitaker.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: When you would advise Mr.  
9 Hubbard or Mr. Bennett that the -- some inspector from  
10 someplace had called you on this -- on an issue, were  
11 they surprised?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: Didn't seem to be surprised  
13 but wasn't aware of it, and --

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Aren't aware of them calling  
15 you or they weren't aware of the incident?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: They weren't aware of the  
17 incident. And they weren't aware of them calling me  
18 because what they were telling me that they would  
19 follow up with the individual wherever they were.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is it reasonable to infer  
21 from that then that they weren't instructed by the PMI  
22 to call you --

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's what I would say.

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1           MR. RODRIGUEZ: So correct me if I'm wrong,  
2 but I get the sense that although ATOS is in place with  
3 your carrier you are really functioning dually?  
4 Complying with the ATOS program, that is, responding to  
5 inspectors or whatever were ATOS-assigned, but in  
6 actuality you're really functioning under the old  
7 system of working with the principal maintenance  
8 inspector?

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: Kind of doing both, yes.

10          MR. RODRIGUEZ: And have you made the  
11 Certificate Management Office aware of that?

12          MR. TRIMBERGER: I have.

13          MR. RODRIGUEZ: At other than the PMI level?

14          MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

15          MR. RODRIGUEZ: Only through the PMI?

16          MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

17          MR. RODRIGUEZ: And the comments or reactions  
18 were?

19          MR. TRIMBERGER: They don't work for me.

20                 (Pause)

21          MR. RODRIGUEZ: How does this leave your  
22 working relationship, of course the people have  
23 changed, but with the office? How does this leave your

1 working relationship?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: It doesn't affect our  
3 working relationship. The work goes on, the  
4 relationship goes on, and we still have business to  
5 take care of.

6 (Pause)

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Frank, Mr. Trimberger made  
8 reference to an evaluation of the -- what you call the  
9 -- the extension of intervals in the maintenance  
10 program. Do we have that on record?

11 MR. MCGILL: Yes, we do.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do we have a copy of the  
13 package that was provided to the FAA?

14 MR. MCGILL: Not -- I don't know what was  
15 given to the entire package. I have what was supplied  
16 to me -- that did the justification -- I have requested  
17 through the FAA the last package on the lubrication. I  
18 haven't received it.

19 (Pause)

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I believe you've indicated  
21 that you were not part of the changeover from the one  
22 grease to the other?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

1           MR. RODRIGUEZ: In your role as director of  
2 quality control is that surprising to you?

3           MR. TRIMBERGER: It is.

4           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you taken any steps to  
5 change that?

6           MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I haven't.

7           (Pause)

8           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is there a reason why?

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: We have a process in place  
10 and -- I mean I don't know anything about the changing  
11 of the grease, but there's a process in place to make  
12 changes to our maintenance program. And it's described  
13 within our General Maintenance Manual.

14           MR. RODRIGUEZ: I haven't read the  
15 Maintenance Manual. Can you tell me what the process  
16 generally would be?

17           MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah, it talks about --

18           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is somebody doing something  
19 in the company about the grease?

20           MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes, it's being  
21 investigated. But there's an ME-01 process for changes  
22 to our maintenance program that requires a number of  
23 signatures and relies on those signatures to review the

1 data and sign the ME-01 and make the change to the  
2 maintenance program.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Would your signature be one  
4 of them required?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: It is.

6 (Pause)

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know if there's an ME-  
8 01 in process now to change back?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not aware of that.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you aware the company has  
11 been instructed by the FAA to stop using Aeroshell 33?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: I believe it's been changed  
13 back.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is that -- do you know if  
15 that went through an ME-01 process or did they just  
16 stop doing it?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't tell you.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you familiar with the  
19 horizontal stabilizer fixture tool that is used in the  
20 end-play check?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is that a tool that you would  
23 classify as one of yours or is that one that you would



1 classify as belonging to maintenance?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: It -- it's a maintenance  
3 tool.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: It's a maintenance tool.

5 (Pause)

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you familiar with the  
7 end-play check?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: I've seen the end-play check  
9 accomplished.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Who does the end-play check  
11 physically?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: The task card requires for a  
13 mechanic and inspector to accomplish the check.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: A mechanic and an inspector?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. That's a fairly  
17 confined space. So who's doing the work?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: The one I observed was the  
19 mechanic was installing the fixture, parking the  
20 restraining fixture. The inspector was up there  
21 observing and took the reading of the required -- so it  
22 -- it was a dual effort.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: The readings are made by the

1 inspectors?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But still you would classify  
4 that as a maintenance tool, not an inspector's tool?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

6 (Pause)

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you -- you're still  
8 involved as the -- a title of quality control --

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's --

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- director of -- I don't  
11 mean to --

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- the titles.

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you satisfied with the  
16 staffing of the Quality Control Department?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you satisfied with the  
19 experience of the inspectors?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And their qualifications?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you have plans for

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1 expansion in the near future?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: Personnel-wise?

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes, sir.

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah.

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How many?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think the request I  
7 submitted asked for two additional supervisors, Seattle  
8 and Oakland, and three additional inspectors, Seattle  
9 and Oakland.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And the concept would be to  
11 add them over what time frame?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'd like to see 'em added  
13 within the next several months, but I don't have a time  
14 frame for that. The personnel requisitions are still  
15 in the approval process.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So it -- it has not yet been  
17 approved?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: The organizational chart I  
19 was told was approved, and now the personnel  
20 requisitions are being processed.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So your recommendation or  
22 suggestion or request has been looked on favorably by  
23 management?

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And you fully expect within  
3 the constraints of the hiring process to have two  
4 supervisors and three inspectors in the next several  
5 months --

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: -- there?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Has your staffing remained  
10 fairly stable in the last eight to 10 years? Do you  
11 have much turnover?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: I haven't been here 10  
13 years, but in eight-plus years that I have been here  
14 I've -- I've found my department stable. And I think  
15 the only individuals that I've lost were due to  
16 retirement.

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. And they were  
18 replaced?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: They were.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: With like-qualified people?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Qualified people. The  
22 individuals -- the individuals that leave the company  
23 have, like, 40, 45 years --

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1 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I see.

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: -- and we're bringing in  
3 people with 20, so I mean --

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. I understand. I was  
5 wondering if the stable -- if the work force is  
6 relatively stable what other comments you might offer  
7 with respect to the -- what you perceived and described  
8 as a change in the effectiveness of the C-check process  
9 between '92 - '96 time frame and the more recent '97,  
10 '98?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: From -- from the Inspection  
12 Department perspective, I don't really see much of a  
13 change there the way the -- the primary inspections  
14 were accomplished. And once the primary is completed,  
15 the Inspection Department basically is working with  
16 Maintenance as they clear the non-routines that are  
17 generated. And I believe that's the process that is  
18 probably taking a little bit longer than it did. But  
19 in other words, the Inspection Department is there to  
20 support maintenance.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So Maintenance is taking  
22 longer to get the work done?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think it's the whole

1 process, but I mean there's adequate inspection there  
2 to -- to support the production.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, the process hasn't  
4 changed in that time frame, has it?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So the people doing the  
7 process must have changed?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's possible.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Can you think of other  
10 reasons why the process would have slowed?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I haven't evaluated it.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: I'm asking you now can you  
13 think of other reasons that might affect the process in  
14 terms of time to complete?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

16 (Pause)

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you had discussions with  
18 any of your personnel with respect to this, I don't  
19 know if "problem" is the word, but this phenomenon?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: What phenomenon is this?

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, this slowing or the  
22 missing of a deadline for turning out an aircraft in C-  
23 check?

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I --

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Does the company care how  
3 long it takes to get it out of C-check?

4 MR. TRIMBERGER: The company cares, and the  
5 people responsible are working those issues, I'm sure.  
6 When I evaluate a check package and what's being done,  
7 I evaluate it for the departments that I'm responsible  
8 for to make sure that we're functioning in an efficient  
9 manner.

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So when management would  
11 evaluate this degradation, again performance of the C-  
12 checks, is that a fair description of it? I don't want  
13 to put words in your mouth. Is that a fair -- it's  
14 degraded slightly in terms of meeting on-time?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, the check's not. It  
16 appears that they're not coming out on the schedule  
17 that's set out by Planning.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you had any or been  
19 privy to any discussions by management concerning  
20 recent delays in the completion of C-checks?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Recently, no.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What is your definition of  
23 recently? When were you last involved in a discussion?

1           MR. TRIMBERGER: Involving the length of time  
2 it takes to do a C-check?

3           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes.

4           MR. TRIMBERGER: Maybe last year.

5           MR. RODRIGUEZ: What --

6           MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know.

7           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Summer, fall, winter, spring?  
8 '98?

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: Again, for the department  
10 that I'm responsible for I evaluate them daily on their  
11 performance, and they have the tools, the equipment,  
12 the training, and the personnel, and everything to do  
13 their job. And the result of that evaluation is that  
14 the Inspection Department is accomplishing the check  
15 the way it needs to be accomplished. It's being  
16 accomplished in the time frame that's set out for them,  
17 and the remainder of it is based on what Maintenance  
18 does and their ability to buy back those non-routines.

19 They have enough people and tooling and equipment to  
20 support what Maintenance is doing in an effort to buy  
21 back those non-routines.

22           MR. RODRIGUEZ: So I infer from what you're  
23 saying it's -- at no time is there a consideration that



1 inspectors may have been too tough on the process or  
2 that production planning is scheduled too tightly so  
3 that you don't have time to get your inspections done  
4 or anything of that nature?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: The inspections are getting  
6 done and nobody has said they're not being done or  
7 they're being too tough. We just extended the  
8 maintenance check span time to accommodate for the  
9 length of time it's taking to do the checks, so we've -  
10 - we've extended those to allow them more time in the  
11 hangar to complete the checks.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: From what to what?

13 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't have the exact time.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: But you know they have  
15 expanded it?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And how do you know that?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: I was told that.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: By?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: Planning Department. My  
21 inspection supervisors and managers. I meet with them  
22 daily. They tell me what's going on down in the  
23 hangar. They tell me if the span time for the check

1 has changed. They tell me if their span time to do the  
2 primary has changed.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Who in the company is --  
4 oversees this Production Control? Is that Maintenance?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: The vice president of  
6 maintenance and engineering.

7 (Pause)

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Let's talk a little bit about  
9 the -- the safety now. As I understand it, we've  
10 established the -- Alaska has established a hotline, is  
11 that correct?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: When was that?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: With the hiring of the VP of  
15 safety.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So it's very recent?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: Fairly new.

18 (Pause)

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you receive any -- do you  
20 participate in NASAP inspections? Do they speak to you  
21 when they come in and do NASAP inspections?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you receive any feedback

1 on those inspections?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: We do.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you received any  
4 feedback on the recent one that was completed this --  
5 this spring?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not aware of them doing  
7 any NASAP inspections in over a year because it's been  
8 on hold.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, --

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: You're -- you're referring  
11 to our safety inspection that they did, special  
12 inspection.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Special inspection of Alaska  
14 Airlines. Are you familiar with that?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: I am, yes.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Did you participate in an in-  
17 briefing or that kind of thing?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

19 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And what about an out-  
20 briefing?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: I wasn't in Seattle for the  
22 out-briefing.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you been provided a copy

1 of the report of that team?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you had time to look at  
4 it?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: I have looked at it.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What is your overall reaction  
7 to the report?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, the company responded  
9 in writing back to the FAA on the report. It indicates  
10 in that that there was a response to each one of the  
11 findings they had.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: One of the findings is that  
13 the director of safety is also director of quality  
14 control and training. This position -- I'm quoting.  
15 "This position also does not report directly to the  
16 highest level of management." I'm kind of disconcerted  
17 on that. Do you have a comment to -- to that  
18 particular finding by the outside agency?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: I know that particular  
20 position was approved via the out-specs by the FAA.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, let me ask you, do you  
22 think that the director of safety should have been  
23 separated from your position?

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1           MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not sure. We had -- we  
2 have an Internal Evaluation Board chaired by the  
3 director of --

4           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, my question is very  
5 simple. If I made you chief of the Certificate  
6 Management Office, would you require the separation of  
7 the director of safety from the director of quality  
8 control-training?

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know as if I can  
10 comment to that. I'm -- I -- I'm not part of the  
11 Certificate Management Office.

12                   (Pause)

13           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Now let's talk about your  
14 director of technical training -- or is it all  
15 training?

16           MR. TRIMBERGER: Manager of technical  
17 training.

18           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Manager of technical  
19 training.

20           MR. TRIMBERGER: Okay.

21           MR. RODRIGUEZ: One of the comments by the  
22 inspection team was that "Alaska's manual does not  
23 specify maintenance training curriculums or on-the-job

1 training procedures or objectives." Are you aware of  
2 that comment?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: I am aware of that comment.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What is your reaction to  
5 that? Do you agree or concur --

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: The OJT program is described  
7 in our manual. It's an informal program that relies on  
8 the Maintenance Department to accomplish their OJT. It  
9 relies on the Inspection Department to accomplish any  
10 OJT that might be necessary. We have documentation  
11 forms to be filled out and sent to Maintenance Training  
12 when this on-the-job training is accomplished, and it's  
13 recorded in the maintenance training personnel records.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, might the difference  
15 here be that they're looking for a more formal or  
16 structured or detailed description of what the training  
17 program might be and yours is described more as an  
18 informal than it is --

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think -- I think they're  
20 looking for a formal OJT program, which we're in the  
21 process of developing.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you think that's  
23 necessary?

1           MR. TRIMBERGER: I think it's a good move. I  
2 -- necessary, we've previously relied on Maintenance to  
3 -- to accomplish the OJT that was necessary.

4           MR. RODRIGUEZ: With respect to quality  
5 control, the GMM does -- this is another quote, "The  
6 GMM does not include how-to procedures regarding heavy-  
7 check planning and/or production control." What does  
8 that mean?

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, the -- I'm not sure  
10 exactly what it means. It was their write-up. We have  
11 a Production Control and Planning Department that does  
12 a number of things prior to an airplane coming in,  
13 while an airplane is in check, and after the airplane  
14 leaves check. And if I read what they're writing there  
15 is that our manual does not describe each and every one  
16 of those aspects of the Maintenance, Planning, and  
17 Production Control Department in our General  
18 Maintenance Manual.

19           MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is that section being  
20 rewritten then?

21           MR. TRIMBERGER: I believe -- I don't know  
22 for sure, but I think there's a department manual being  
23 developed to outline procedures.

1           MR. RODRIGUEZ: As a practical matter, do you  
2 have any exchange of information or discuss your job  
3 with like positions in other carriers? Do you know  
4 what I'm asking?

5           MR. TRIMBERGER: I am. I -- I do. I  
6 interface with some of the directors at other airlines.

7           MR. RODRIGUEZ: For instance, on the OJT  
8 description and that sort of thing, are you familiar  
9 with what might be in other carriers' manuals?

10          MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not aware of anything  
11 different from what we do as far as OJT.

12          MR. RODRIGUEZ: Well, let me ask it the other  
13 way. Are you aware that other carriers have either  
14 very similar or if not identical descriptions of their  
15 OJT procedures and that sort of thing?

16          MR. TRIMBERGER: That's my understanding.

17          MR. RODRIGUEZ: What about the performance of  
18 heavy-check planning and production control?

19          MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't speak to that.

20          MR. RODRIGUEZ: You haven't -- you haven't  
21 explored that?

22          MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

23          MR. RODRIGUEZ: As quality control, my



1 understanding you have some responsibility with respect  
2 to shelf-life.

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: We have a -- we have a  
4 shelf-life program outlined in the General Maintenance  
5 Manual.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you know if greases are  
7 included in that?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I don't know.

9 (Pause)

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You haven't looked to see?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: I haven't looked, no.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How long a list would this  
13 be?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't tell you exactly how  
15 long the list is. I know it contains items such as  
16 sealants and everything and --

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is it several pages or is it  
18 a one -- one sheet or --

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know for sure. I  
20 think it's listed in our computer program.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Oh.

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: I wouldn't think it's over  
23 two pages.

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1                   MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. I gather it's not  
2 changed very often?

3                   MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not sure. I don't -- I  
4 don't think it is.

5                   MR. RODRIGUEZ: We talked about outside  
6 vendors such as -- I mean I'm thinking primarily  
7 Phoenix. I mean I'm sure you have a lot, but I'm  
8 thinking about Phoenix. One of the comments or  
9 findings of the inspection team was required audits of  
10 outside vendors are not complete. Some of the audit  
11 forms have not been completed. But that says to me  
12 that -- that the audit of, like, Phoenix has not been  
13 completed. Is that true? I mean --

14                   MR. TRIMBERGER: No, if -- well, --

15                   MR. RODRIGUEZ: Am I misreading something?

16                   MR. TRIMBERGER: No. I'm not sure exactly  
17 which one you're referring to. I think it's the D-91  
18 op specs which approves our substantial maintenance  
19 contractors, of which AMS is one of those. And in this  
20 case the AMS facility had been audited on a regular  
21 basis.

22                   MR. RODRIGUEZ: By Alaska --

23                   MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct, yes. What I

1 believe, without looking at that, is referring to is  
2 some of the vendors that are listed on our substantial  
3 maintenance contract or operations specification page  
4 weren't looked at on a regular basis because they were  
5 not utilizing the services of that facility. That's --  
6 that's what that is.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay.

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: The vendors we were using,  
9 we have been audited on a regular basis. And the other  
10 ones that we haven't, if we decided to use them we  
11 would have accomplished the audit prior to doing so.

12 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Are you familiar with the  
13 remedies of this particular finding?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think what -- what we're  
15 going to do on that is take off of the operations  
16 specifications the contractors that we're not using  
17 because if we were going to conduct an audit if we were  
18 to start using them again anyway and just basically  
19 start all over.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What time frame is that going  
21 to be accomplished?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't answer that  
23 question. I'm no longer responsible for the Auditing

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1 Department under the reorganization. We have a  
2 director of quality assurance. The auditors would fall  
3 in under that. So I -- I can't speak to that.

4 (Pause)

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you have dealings with the  
6 Engineering Department?

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Could you characterize the  
9 frequency --

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: They're on the same floor  
11 that my office is on. If I have a question I typically  
12 go ask the engineer, if I need some information from  
13 them. So it's a fairly open relationship.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is there anything between  
15 Quality Control or Safety that would impact the  
16 Engineering Department?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: We -- we review the data  
18 that comes out of that department, engineering orders,  
19 different things such as that. So we review 'em to  
20 make sure that they comply with the air worthiness  
21 directives or the service bulletins or whatever's  
22 called out in the job requirements.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: With respect to the -- the --

1 the evaluation of a major or minor repair, would  
2 Quality Control be involved in that at all?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: Probably not. We have a  
4 troubleshooting tree, if you will, to determine major  
5 and minor repairs.

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: So you wouldn't necessarily  
7 be involved in that?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: No. I mean we would look at  
9 the -- say it's an Engineering order, and we'd look at  
10 it to see if it fell into the category --

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's after the evaluation  
12 and that sort of thing?

13 MR. TRIMBERGER: After the engineers wrote  
14 it, prior to it being issued we review it.

15 (Pause)

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And this may have been  
17 covered and I was not paying attention or something,  
18 but do you have anything to do with continuing analysis  
19 of --

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes. With our auditing  
21 process.

22 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Your --

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Whether I have anything to

1 do with it or not, prior to the recent changes between  
2 the director of quality control and director of quality  
3 assurance, the -- the Auditing Department was  
4 responsible to me. And the Auditing Department is our  
5 arm that keeps us in compliance with the CASP  
6 requirements.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Is -- do you know -- well,  
8 while it was still with you did that ever get up and  
9 running?

10 MR. TRIMBERGER: The CASP Program?

11 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Yes.

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: The Auditing Department?  
13 Yes.

14 (Pause)

15 MR. RODRIGUEZ: There's a reference to that  
16 area being understaffed in this inspection by the FAA.

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: Mm-hmm.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Would you agree with that?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

20 (Pause)

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: As a practical matter, are  
22 they going to increase staffing or do you know?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: We are, but then we've also

1 added a great number of additional audits to be  
2 accomplished prior to what was being accomplished  
3 earlier.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: In the -- or if you'd  
5 understand, I'm a dumb pilot. That's why I ask all of  
6 these questions. In the -- in the orderly flow of  
7 coordination and what have you within the company, is  
8 the quality control aspect at all concerned about MELs  
9 and deferrals and things of that nature? Do you ever  
10 -- is that something that you need to monitor?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: We monitor MELs and  
12 deferrals.

13 (Pause)

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: There seems to be a comment  
15 about that as far as numbers of MELs, et cetera. Do  
16 you have any comment on that?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't. I don't know what  
18 the average industry standard is. I think our MELs are  
19 far less than one per airplane.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Can you -- is that something  
21 you would discuss, say routinely, at any -- intervals  
22 with like positions?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Probably not routinely.

1 When there's an increase in MELs there's -- there's an  
2 effort to get them reduced to something reasonable.

3 (Pause)

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: On -- as a -- making your  
5 conclusions here, the assessment of Alaska's processes  
6 -- excuse me, be mulling it over, but -- okay. If --  
7 the next question would be "quality control and quality  
8 assurance programs are convected. This is evident  
9 through things such as C-check packages that are  
10 missing signatures, open work cards, partial work  
11 completed forms, incomplete, et cetera." Did I read it  
12 too fast?

13 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I -- I got it.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Go ahead. Apparently she's  
15 not coming back in. Go ahead. Respond if you like.

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, we did a -- end-up  
17 evaluation into 70-some aircraft last C-check packages.  
18 And the -- the percentage of errors of all the  
19 paperwork -- I think there was 60,000-some pieces of  
20 paper that we looked at. The error rate was .06, and  
21 the compliance rate was 99.94. So although they did  
22 find some errors, they had to look at some of the  
23 airplanes to ensure all the work had been completed,



1 and in no case did they find that the work was not  
2 completed. They did find some items on the paperwork.

3 It was a small percentage and all the work had been  
4 completed.

5 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Would the -- would the  
6 reference to open work cards, is that -- is that a  
7 reference to paperwork also?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: It just hasn't been signed  
10 off? The work -- you said the work had been all  
11 completed?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: That's correct.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: There were no examples of  
14 work not being completed?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, there wasn't.

16 (Pause)

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: We've had some discussion  
18 with other interviews about the -- the size of Alaska  
19 Airlines as it relates to growth, no growth, or what  
20 have you. How would you characterize Alaska Airlines  
21 since '97 to the present?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: Without looking at the  
23 listing layer I'd have to say, well, currently we're

1 probably operating, you know, 92, 93 airplanes  
2 probably. Back in that time frame we were probably  
3 operating 80 to 82. So our -- our aircraft -- our  
4 fleet has grown.

5 (Pause)

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: With the fleet growth  
7 there's obviously more to do.

8 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. Could you characterize  
9 that in terms of quantity of growth or the rate of  
10 growth or whatever? Any terms of reference that you  
11 would care to offer?

12 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I don't know for sure.  
13 They keep those growth rates in corporate. I -- I  
14 think it's been moderate over the years. Maybe four  
15 percent.

16 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And how about staffing levels  
17 to go along with this growth rate?

18 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, when we went from  
19 five-day-a-week to seven-day-a-week operation, the  
20 Inspection Departments took a look at their staffing  
21 and increased staffing. I think the other departments  
22 did the same thing.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You're saying the inspection

1 staff increased?

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

3 MR. RODRIGUEZ: You probably gave it already.  
4 Would you give it to me again? How much?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: Oh, I can't tell you off the  
6 top of my head how much it was.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: This to five- to seven-day  
8 increase, was -- was that other than at Oakland?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: I think somewhere in my  
10 tenure here we went from five to seven here in Seattle  
11 as well, and we gave it the same considerations as we  
12 did at Oakland.

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Were they about the same time  
14 frame?

15 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know for sure. I  
16 don't recall.

17 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Or separated by several  
18 years?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know about several.  
20 I think there was a -- several months, anyway.

21 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay.

22 (Pause)

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Do you have any specific

1 knowledge of -- of additions of the 737s, the new ones?

2 For instance, do they have all the 700s now?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Or they've still got more to  
5 go?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: We're still taking delivery.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Give me a thumbnail sketch of  
8 that, if you would.

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, --

10 MR. RODRIGUEZ: If you know.

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know for sure off  
12 the top of my head. We had a number of options, and  
13 I'm not sure what options have been taken. I think we  
14 currently have seven or eight 700s in our -- in our  
15 fleet, and I -- I think the figure is in the teens.  
16 But again, there's options. I'm not sure what they  
17 are.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Mm-hmm. And the 900s?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: The -- I'm not sure how many  
20 900s we have on order. Again, we have options on some  
21 of those. And I think we take delivery of the first  
22 900 in roughly another year or so.

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Would the buy be single

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1 digits or forties or --

2 MR. TRIMBERGER: Oh, no. I don't -- I don't  
3 think we're into forties. I don't have --

4 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Don't know.

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: -- an exact count 'cause --

6 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Okay. Well, -- well, --

7 MR. TRIMBERGER: -- 'cause again -- 'cause of  
8 the options.

9 MR. RODRIGUEZ: We've got some people coming  
10 that'll probably have a good feel.

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: Yeah.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Have you had any discussions,  
14 specifically with the CMS, soon to be CMO, with respect  
15 to the capacity or capability of Alaska to absorb more  
16 aircraft?

17 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

18 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Not at all? Would you?  
19 Would you be involved in that with the inspectors and  
20 that sort of thing? Or does that -- is that handled at  
21 a higher level?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I mean when -- when we  
23 talk about the additional airplanes and everything they

1 know our -- they're familiar with our delivery  
2 schedule. They know the airplanes that are taking --  
3 we're taking delivery of. They're working with us on  
4 approving the maintenance program for those, and the --  
5 the staffing goes along accordingly. So that -- that  
6 would be the extent of our conversation, probably.

7 MR. RODRIGUEZ: Were you involved in the  
8 introduction of the 700s?

9 MR. TRIMBERGER: Not closely involved. On  
10 the parameters. When we put the maintenance program  
11 together I was involved in the approval of the program.  
12 We're still currently working with them with approval  
13 for the C-check and -- and the structural inspection.

14 MR. RODRIGUEZ: How early in the process did  
15 that -- did the dialogue between FAA and Alaska begin?

16 MR. TRIMBERGER: Quite early, if I recall.  
17 Maybe shortly after it was announced. I'm not sure,  
18 but I know we talked about it for a long time, talked  
19 --

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: This is a year or six months  
21 or --

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I don't know the exact  
23 time. I -- I'd say roughly a year, yeah.

1 (Pause)

2 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And in general terms, has  
3 this been a smooth introduction? How would you  
4 characterize the --

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: We worked through  
6 everything. We -- one of the things we experienced,  
7 again, was taking a delivery of a brand-new airplane  
8 out of Boeing and then manufacturing it to the FAA's  
9 specifications in compliance with all regulations there  
10 were in this directive, life limit, components, and  
11 everything. When we took delivery of our first 700  
12 they made us go back and take a look at all of -- all  
13 of the ADEs that had been accomplished -- that they  
14 accomplished and certified on the airplane prior to us  
15 operating it and basically do a conformity on that  
16 airplane.

17 So whether that work was -- to me, that's  
18 kind of over and above what's really required to take  
19 delivery of a -- a brand-new airplane.

20 MR. RODRIGUEZ: And has this had any impact  
21 on the other -- the existing fleets?

22 MR. TRIMBERGER: What kind of impact?

23 MR. RODRIGUEZ: What effect, if any, has it

1 had? I mean you've got manpower tied up introducing a  
2 new airplane. What -- who -- who's tending the store?

3 MR. TRIMBERGER: Most -- most of it was  
4 paperwork. It wasn't that it required a large staffing  
5 to go actually look at the airplane through everything.

6 But it -- it basically wasn't that we could take the  
7 word of Boeing that they had accomplished it and this  
8 was their means of compliance and everything. We had  
9 to go back and it was a paperwork research more than  
10 actual hands on the aircraft. Management personnel  
11 resources were absorbed.

12 (Pause)

13 MR. RODRIGUEZ: That's all the questions I  
14 have. Thank you very much.

15 MR. HAMILTON: I think I have one, yeah. Or  
16 a couple of questions. When did -- you had said you  
17 didn't know anything about the jack screw on 963 until  
18 after the accident. When did you become aware of the  
19 MIG 4 that was written up?

20 MR. TRIMBERGER: After the accident.

21 MR. HAMILTON: Time frame? A couple days  
22 later or was it a couple days ago when you started to  
23 talk with the lawyer?



1           MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I think it was a couple  
2 weeks later when we were working the records group and  
3 found it.

4           MR. HAMILTON: Okay. Do you know of any  
5 conversation -- well, let me back up. Our  
6 understanding is that that MIG 4 was written up by an  
7 inspector which would -- through a couple of people  
8 would fall under your jurisdiction.

9           MR. TRIMBERGER: Mm-hmm.

10          MR. HAMILTON: Do you know of any  
11 conversations with the inspector who wrote that up?

12          MR. TRIMBERGER: I'm not aware of any.

13          MR. HAMILTON: Alaska's position is that that  
14 is a -- essentially shouldn't have been written up,  
15 that it's within limits. Why wouldn't you talk to him  
16 and ask him why he wrote it up or counsel him not to  
17 make those kinds of write-ups again or whatever the  
18 case may be?

19          MR. TRIMBERGER: The General Maintenance  
20 Manual allows for them to generate a MIG 4 non-routine  
21 if they think it's necessary.

22          MR. HAMILTON: So you wouldn't go back and  
23 ask him why he thought that was necessary?

1 MR. TRIMBERGER: I didn't go back and ask  
2 him.

3 MR. HAMILTON: Do you know of anybody else  
4 who did?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: No.

6 MR. HAMILTON: Okay. That's all I have.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Yeah, sorry. Are you  
8 aware of -- we had briefly talked about the ME-01 on  
9 the grease change and you said it was -- your signature  
10 wasn't on that, you weren't aware of that change. Are  
11 you aware of any other ME-01s that have bypassed  
12 signatures?

13 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I'm not.

14 MS. VON KLEINSMID: You've not done any audit  
15 of ME-01s to check compliance?

16 (No response)

17 MS. VON KLEINSMID: In the question of  
18 staffing you stated that you felt your staffing levels  
19 were adequate and then we -- I guess you're hiring two  
20 supervisors and three inspectors in quality?

21 MR. TRIMBERGER: Mm-hmm.

22 MS. VON KLEINSMID: If staffing levels are  
23 adequate, what are these hires going to be needed for?

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1           MR. TRIMBERGER: We -- we were -- we were  
2 able to get by with blanking some shifts with  
3 supervision. In other words, they didn't have a  
4 supervisor assigned to that shift or -- or when there  
5 was vacation and training classes and things like that  
6 there was no supervisor on that shift. And we've --  
7 we've told 'em we wanted to staff all shifts to -- to  
8 support seven-day operation.

9           MS. VON KLEINSMID: So in terms of the  
10 statement "we were able to get by," was that through  
11 overtime or was that just no coverage but it was okay?

12          MR. TRIMBERGER: We just didn't have the  
13 coverage, yes.

14          MS. VON KLEINSMID: And you've stated a  
15 number of times that you have frequent communication  
16 with the PMI. Are you still in your morning -- are you  
17 still talking to that individual every morning?

18          MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I end up leaving a  
19 message a lot.

20          MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. Thank you. So we  
21 understand. But you have been -- is that a recent --  
22 in recent months?

23          MR. TRIMBERGER: Yes.

1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. Has there been any  
2 communication to you regarding any changes on the FAA's  
3 part in how they're handling their ATOS Program and  
4 their instructors?

5 MR. TRIMBERGER: Hasn't been any conversation  
6 with me, no.

7 MS. VON KLEINSMID: So you're not aware of  
8 any variations that they're having regarding getting --  
9 getting additional geographic inspectors to inspect  
10 Alaska Airlines?

11 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I think they've  
12 mentioned there may be some additional inspectors but  
13 I'm not sure what that means. No numbers or locations  
14 or anything like that.

15 MS. VON KLEINSMID: No detailed conversation  
16 with you. Would there be any communication with anyone  
17 else regarding this issue at Alaska Airlines? Are you  
18 the right person that they would have talked to?

19 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, I would have thought,  
20 yeah, that they'd at least talk to me.

21 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And you made a statement  
22 when the issue regarding the filling of a dedicated  
23 person for the director of safety position, you stated

1 that's the responsibility of the Certificate Management  
2 Office, their decision, they have approval over that.  
3 Was there communication with you about this issue,  
4 about the not having a single dedicated Alaska Airlines  
5 employee as the director of safety?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: There was. They -- they did  
7 ask us about it and asked us how do you support the  
8 fact that you don't have a single person. And we  
9 explained how the Internal Evaluation Board is  
10 constructed and how it works and that we felt that by  
11 having representatives from each one of the operating  
12 divisions the company would be aware of any safety or  
13 compliance issues much earlier than if we were to leave  
14 that up to auditing concept to identify these areas.  
15 They -- they took that to Washington and Washington  
16 came back and said that you needed a dedicated person  
17 filling that position, that's what the regulation  
18 states. And that's when we opened the position up and  
19 started interviewing.

20 MS. VON KLEINSMID: What was the initial  
21 communication with the FAA regarding this non-dedicated  
22 position?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: I don't know exactly. I

1 want to say the middle of '99.

2 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And approximately, can  
3 you give me how many times you communicated with either  
4 the PMI or someone else from the FAA regarding this  
5 topic?

6 MR. TRIMBERGER: Well, they asked us to  
7 submit something in writing, which we did, and -- and  
8 that's what they evaluated whether we met the -- the  
9 intent of our program and came back to say you needed a  
10 dedicated person.

11 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Okay. In your opinion,  
12 it was a -- was it a significant concern to them about  
13 this or what level would you --

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: No, I don't think it was  
15 significant.

16 MS. VON KLEINSMID: And just to clarify,  
17 'cause I wrote it down and maybe I wrote it down wrong,  
18 but when the question regarding the, I think, auditing  
19 of Phoenix outside vendor, you said that you're no  
20 longer responsible for the Auditing Department, and I  
21 have it written down that that's under the director of  
22 quality control, and I thought that was your position?

23 MR. TRIMBERGER: Quality assurance.

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1 MS. VON KLEINSMID: Quality assurance, and I  
2 just wrote it down wrong. That's all I have.

3 DR. BRENNER: How common is it to have, on  
4 the end-play check, to have two teams, a mechanic and  
5 inspector, get discrepant values of the sort that we're  
6 looking at here? Did that draw attention, 40  
7 thousandths versus 33 thousandths?

8 MR. TRIMBERGER: I can't answer that,  
9 Malcolm. If your question was how --

10 DR. BRENNER: No, I -- I guess from an  
11 inspection point of view, would that draw attention?  
12 Was it the terms of the reliability of the test or --  
13 or other factors?

14 MR. TRIMBERGER: I -- I can't answer that.

15 DR. BRENNER: At -- at -- I think that's all.

16 MR. MCGILL: Is that all the questions?

17 (No response)

18 (Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., on August 10,  
19 2000, the hearing was adjourned.)

20

21

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23