

Interview with Charlie Ball, Executive Vice President, Holland America Group 2/11/2016 @ 1030

Attendees: Brice Banning (NTSB), Adam Tucker (NTSB), Karen Reich (Holland America Group)

Mr. Charlie Ball is an Executive Vice President for Holland America Group land operations and customer service. He also oversees supply chain for the four Holland America Group brands e.g.. HAL, Seaborn, Princess and P&O Cruises Australia. He stated that prior to the consolidation in Dec. 2014, which restructured senior management, he was responsible for all Alaska operations Transportation and Hospitality Division, which included 9 seasonal hotels, 20 railroad cars, and all ground transportation in the state. He currently also manages all four customer call centers, the customer care group and air transportation for crew, employee and passengers.

He stated that the Care Group Team offered compassionate care company wide, and on a routine basis dealt with heart attacks, local authorities, family members, and took on a human services role.

There are 20 rail cars that are owned by the company and are on the Alaska railroad which are operated and maintained by the company, but are pulled by engines from Alaska railroad..

Mr. Ball stated he is not responsible for shore excursion operations or oversight. This would be Mr. Paul Goodwin. Mr. Goodwin is also in charge of the port operations such as port agents and stevedore companies etc.

Mr. Ball stated that he was alerted of an out of normal occurrence on June 25, 2015 when a Ms. Erickson notified him of a delayed shore excursion. Shortly thereafter, he was asked by Mr. Keith Taylor to stand up the Emergency Response Center (ERC) and to serve as the initial incident commander. Normally Mr. Taylor would be incident commander, but he was in FL so Mr. Ball assumed that position. He stated that he began to organize his role as incident commander, gathering key resources (marine, technical, public relations, care team etc.) and establishing communication with the ship, the CEO and President. Ms. Laurel Dunphy was the coordinator.

They knew of a late aircraft, returning from a sightseeing flight and had an obligation to report it to corporate and the ship. He began to look at key resources that may be needed, e.g. vessel, hotels, airlines, and people preparing for different possible outcomes. He stated that he had an open line of communication with the captain of the Westerdam (key leadership position on site) and a lot of resources in Ketchikan, AK, that he could bring in if necessary.

Mr. Ball stated he informed the president of the company and CEO there was a late shore excursion aircraft and they didn't know where it was. He felt very supported by senior management during the response. Following that they waited for word on the missing aircraft.

He said that the next phase of the response began after they were notified that everyone on board the aircraft had perished. When the ERC took on a role of compassionate support, which included, providing human care and support to the next of kin, guests and employees who were affected by the tragedy. In addition, he stated that as the news began to break, HAL was flooded with calls from concerned family members who had loved ones on board the ship. The ERC had the ability to communicate with the team

in Ketchikan and with the Alaska State Troopers, Coast Guard, and NTSB. Knowing they could not release the names of the victims prior to the notification of the next of kin, a decision was made to keep the vessel in port, where communication was available, and to encourage guests to communicate to relatives at home informing them that they were safe. The Westerdam remained in port. Guests on board were updated of the situation.

The next morning briefings were provided as the ERC continued in a support role. Mr. Taylor returned to Seattle, and appointed Mr. Inman to take over the functions of Incident Commander. The CARE Team, who was most affected by the tragedy provided counselors to meet the ship at port upon return to Seattle. He stated that no CARE Team personnel were on board the ship during its voyage; the crew served those functions and held a memorial service onboard the day following the accident. The ship security staff secured the rooms of the victims that were involved in the accident and waited for authorities to arrive. The ERC knew the names of the victims who were involved in the accident and had their pictures. Any family/friends of the persons were offered the opportunity to disembark the vessel in Ketchikan.

The ship's next port of call was supposed to be Victoria, British Columbia Canada. This was to be the Westerdam's only foreign port of call before returning to the home port of Seattle, WA. The ship missed Victoria because of the delayed sailing from Ketchikan due to the response to the accident. They had to work with the Canadian government to expedite the ship's sailing into Seattle because of the Jones act law that required a foreign port visit prior to returning to the home port. The Westerdam departed to return to Seattle the evening of the accident. No care team members were put on board the ship.

Mr. Ball stated that they owned busses in Alaska and were responsible for operational safety. In addition, they owned 20 railroad cars and worked with HAL's legal and risk management department, along with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). He stated that FRA managed compliance and safety for the Alaska Railroad cars.

He was not aware of any previous incidents that involved Promech. He felt the response to the tragedy was handled well, though it was clear that guests were truly saddened by the experience.

Air tours are popular in Alaska. HAL provided transport from the vessel to the Promech base.

There is no structured feedback at the motor coach level. They ensure the schedule is kept on the 60 tours per day that are provided.

The Westerdam turned around in the homeport of Seattle on Saturday as scheduled.

Interview with Mary Sloan, Vice President of Global Risk Management, Carnival Corporation – Carnival Corporate Headquarters, Miami, FL 4/25/2016 @ 1500

Attendees: Brice Banning (NTSB), Adam Tucker (NTSB), Karen Reich (Holland America Group), Caryn Jorgensen (Legal Counsel for HAL)

Mrs. Sloan is the Vice President for Global Risk Management for Carnival Corporation. She explained that her role with the company was primarily insurance procurement, managing insurance brokers, underwriting, and submissions for all Carnival Global assets and properties. This includes the fleet of more than 100 ships, company offices, and properties (i.e. island destinations) for each of the Carnival Corp brands of which Holland America Line (HAL) is included. She has worked for Carnival since 1993 and explained how the scale of operations and consolidated bulk buying of insurance worked. During her tenure at Carnival there have been many acquisitions of cruise lines, but her job for the most part has remained the same. She stated that she does not have any employees working for her.

Mrs. Sloan explained how each company, which they refer to as brands, worked with respect to insurance. She works to procure insurance for all the operating brands of the company but any insurance claims/casualties are managed at the brand level for property, hull and P&I, worker's compensation and passenger/crew claims. The risk managers at the brand level handle claims – they know the product. She has historically only been involved with big claims such as the Costa Concordia (2012) and Carnival Triumph (2013) accidents.

Mrs. Sloan stated that she was informed of the Promech accident but had no involvement. All casualty response and claims were managed at the brand level (HAL).

When questioned about the decision to cease operations after the accident, she stated she was not a part of the decision and had no knowledge on the determination to resume tour operations with Promech after the accident. She stated that typically she would only be involved if the tour operator had a lapse of insurance coverage. This was not the case for Promech.

She stated that her involvement in the approval of tour operators is limited to the insurance policies that are submitted by each operator. The tour operator submits documentation to a web based Tour Operator Gateway (TOG). Each tour operator is required to submit insurance information through the TOG, and Carnival Corporation must be named on the policy. There are specific check boxes for each type of activity for the tour operator (i.e. land, sea and/or air tours), and each have insurance requirements and limits based on that type of tour. There are numerous tour operators in the TOG since this is a global (company-wide) management system. She cited examples of the uniqueness of shore excursions and insurance requirements based on operation, risk and geographical location.

Given the general uniqueness of tour operations, many tour operators (i.e. in the Caribbean) carry specific insurance that is customized and brokered to meet the Carnival Corporation requirements, but this is not typical for aviation insurance. She noted there are not a lot of accidents with shore excursions.

Each Certificate of Insurance (COI) is reviewed by one of two persons at Carnival Corporation. They do not work directly for Mrs. Sloan (they work for Global Treasury), but have been trained to evaluate the COI content to ensure compliance with company requirements (i.e. limits, financial strength and named entities). She explained that they meet weekly and seek her expertise if they have any questions or concerns regarding a particular policy. If a COI is found to have too low a limit, incorrect jurisdiction or if it is not compliant in other areas, the tour operator is notified by e-mail (automatically through the TOG), and the brand using that tour operator is also informed via the TOG. Normally it takes about one month for the COI to be reviewed by the company. Most COI's are valid for one year, therefore each policy is reviewed on an annual basis. Carnival is notified by the broker issuing the COI if a policy is cancelled or modified before expiration. There were no problems identified to her with the COI provided by Promech.

Insurance exceptions can be granted by the company on a case by case basis depending on the operation, risk and geographical location. Any insurance exceptions need to be signed off by a senior executive for the particular brand that is using the tour operator. Aviation insurance requirements are strict and no exceptions are granted.

When asked if the TOG archived past documentation and information, she stated she was not aware.

The COI for Promech for the accident date (certificate 8.1 issued on 02/11/2015) that was submitted to Carnival Corporation through the TOG was reviewed, and Mrs. Sloan explained there were no problems with that policy or its validity. She never saw the policy prior to the accident because it was reviewed and met Carnival Corporation's requirements. With the Promech accident, she had no contact with the underwriters – if there was contact, this would have been handled at the brand level (HAL).

When asked if there was any additional documentation provided with the COI, she stated there was not. It is the responsibility of the underwriters to verify validity and compliance of the operation that is to be underwritten. An aviation insurance company would not accept the risk without verifying operational compliance and risk.

When asked about her role with respect to risk management, Mrs. Sloan stated this was specifically with respect to insurance. There is another department called the Global Maritime Group that works on operational risk management.

After the Promech accident, there have been no changes to any of the company required insurance documentation that tour operators are to provide via the TOG.

When asked what happens if a safety issue is observed or identified with a particular tour operator, Mrs. Sloan stated this would be handled at the brand level. Should the company be notified of a problem, the Global Maritime group may get involved and handle that through the company Health Environmental Safety System (HESS) protocols.

Interview concluded at 1640.

Interview with Ms. Ingrid Huber, Shore Excursion Manager from Westerdam, Conference call – April 26, 2016 at 1600 GMT

Attendees: Brice Banning (NTSB), Adam Tucker (NTSB), Karen Reich (Holland America Group)

Ms. Huber was the Shore Excursion Manager on board the Westerdam at the time of the Promech accident that occurred on June 25, 2015. She has worked on cruise vessels for the past 14 years with 11 of those within the shore excursion department. Since 2010 she has worked as a Shore Excursion Manager on various ships with Holland America Line (HAL). She enjoys her job and considers it to be one of the best jobs on the ship; she enjoys working with people who are on vacation and typically in a good mood. She stated that she had worked the Alaska itineraries multiple times during her tenure with the shore excursion department, and is familiar with the tours offered and local procedures and processes.

Her job entails the setting up tours for the ship and itinerary she is working on. She works to eliminate any tour related issues, and to ensure guests have a good time on their shore excursions. She works closely with other departments on the ship, and has a good rapport with staff on the navigation bridge coordinating with them on arrival and departure times for each port of call. She meets with the captain to get updated arrival and departure times ensuring that the shore excursion process runs smoothly. She also works closely with tour escort expectations and the Hotel Manager to help resolve any issues related to shore excursions.

On the day of the accident, she and her staff met in the office about 0630 to update all the tour numbers, and opened the front desk about 0700 for any last minute bookings. There were about 10 to 12 tours so she had to prepare the numbers (of guests attending) for each tour. Between 0645 and 0700 the ships gangway was set, which was steep since the tide was high that morning. She also looked at the weather for the day, trying to anticipate any tour cancellations. She stated that weather cancellations varied and were hard to predict, sometimes it would be sunny and tours would cancel because of wind, and sometimes it would be cloudy and tours would still operate.

That morning they had about 2,000 guests on board the ship and a large number wanted to disembark, so it was busy. Between 0700 and 0830 she spent most of her time on the dock, in the area where each shore excursion operator would wait for their tour group. Much of that time was spent finalizing guest attendance numbers. She remembered having to wear waterproof clothing because of the weather that morning. The weather was not great, but that was not unusual for Ketchikan.

With her experience in Ketchikan, she ensures that guests are informed that any tour operator may cancel at any time regardless of weather conditions. She stated that the tour operators make the decision to cancel tours.

At about 0730, she met with two of the air tour operator's agents – Taquan and Promech. Both early morning and mid-morning flights were scheduled, with an all aboard time of 1230. The Taquan agent informed her that all of the tours for the day were cancelled due to weather. The Promech agent informed her that they were proceeding with their tours. She stated that she was a "bit surprised" because both tours were being operated in Misty Fjords, but noted that it was not uncommon for tours

to be cancelled after guests had arrived at the operator's base of operations. In addition, she noted that Misty Fjords encompasses a large geographic area.

She recalled seeing the 8 guests that perished in the accident boarding the bus to depart for the tour. They were all excited – one of her staff members spoke to them before departing and told them they were going to have a great time. She mentioned that this staff member was very distraught following the accident.

Between 0900 and 0930 the first flightseeing tour guests returned to the ship, and they all seemed to have a good time (she noted that was a different Promech tour – 60 minute Misty Fjord flight).

She and her staff were busy the remainder of the morning trying to accommodate the guests that had their air tours with Taquan cancelled. The guests were disappointed. Due to the ships limited time in port it was difficult to try to accommodate these guests on other tours and they were busy reassuring guests of refunds.

By the time the Cruise n' Fly tour departed (the accident tour) she stated the weather looked better, but noted that the weather in Ketchikan is very dynamic.

At about 1200, Ms. Huber went back onto the dock to start work on all the returning tours. When she is working to receive the tours, she communicates with the navigation bridge and security officer (working on the gangway) regarding tour arrival times back to the ship. In Ketchikan there is a big push to get everyone on board because they had to be in Victoria, BC by 1800 the following evening.

The day of the accident, Ms. Huber remembered that when she initially went to the dock to work with the returning tours, the dock representative from Promech was not present. She speculated that the agent may have been busy with other ships.

At 1220, she was informed that the aircraft was overdue by a representative from the tour bus company responsible for bringing the guests back to the ship. The representative phoned the bus driver at the Promech base and was informed the aircraft had not returned. At 1230, she was starting to get concerned. At 1240, she was informed that the company (Promech) had no contact with the aircraft.

Between 1310 and 1315, she recalled being informed that the emergency beacon had activated on the aircraft. She was not sure what that meant. She called the bridge where she spoke to the chief officer by phone, and informed him of the late returning tour. She was worried – really worried.

Shortly thereafter representatives from Promech arrived at the pier, and Ms. Huber was informed that helicopters and seaplanes were launched to search for the missing aircraft.

After learning of the missing airplane the ship delayed sailing. She went back on board and provided her team, the Hotel Manager and Guest Relations Manager with an update. In addition, she staffed the on board shore excursions desk. She knew there were mostly couples on board the aircraft, but was aware of one family where the father and daughter did the flight, and the mother rode the boat out and back. The Guest Relations Manager provided information and had direct contact with the mother. In

addition, the company sent care team members to assist. The mother disembarked the ship mid-afternoon. At that point, everyone was still hoping for good news.

It was between 1600 and 1700 when she was informed that the airplane had been located. She was told it was in a precarious position but was intact. She hoped for good news. She informed the bridge and remembered the captain made an announcement to the ship about the accident.

At about 2000, after receiving word from search and rescue personnel, the captain made an announcement that all occupants onboard the accident airplane had perished.

Tour operators normally arrive at the dock 30 to 40 minutes before the scheduled departure time of the tour. During this time, they gather final attendance numbers, prepare signage, tickets and if necessary gather body weights. The Cruise n' Fly tour involved a flight to Misty Fjords and then a cruise back by boat. The opposite would also take place where another group of guests would cruise out first and then fly back to Ketchikan. Ms. Huber stated they had no role in the selection of guests for the first group to fly and the first group to cruise. That was handled by the tour provider.

The only Cruise-n-Fly tour offered on the Westerdam was provided by Promech. The dock representative from Promech typically collects the guests from the Westerdam before proceeding to the next ship. Usually there are four ships in port with the Westerdam, and Promech has guests from other vessels on tours as well. Ms. Huber stated that she is not involved with shore excursion activities from other ships, except for the occasion when guest numbers are below the minimum count for the tour to operate. She may reach out to another ship to see if they can fill the seats.

A bus company is responsible for bringing guests to and from the ship. She recalled the 60-minute roundtrip Misty Fjord tour operated by Promech made it back in time for the Lumberjack show.

Ms. Huber has worked with Promech on a regular basis over the years. She flew with them on a familiarization tour with other shore excursion staff at the beginning of the season to become familiar with the product. She stated she was looking at the tour more from a guest satisfaction point of view, and it was important for her to know what guest mobility limitations could and could not be accommodated. No paperwork or report was generated after the familiarization tour was completed. She stated the flight was a beautiful/stunning trip and she was never uncomfortable or concerned. However, she did feel a little nervous when standing outside the airplane on the aircraft's float.

Ms. Huber said that the other air tour operator Taquan cancelled all tours for the day of the accident due to weather. She was surprised that Promech did not cancel but they are two different companies. Sometimes they will leave by bus and when they arrive at the operator's base of operations the determination will be made not to fly and the tour would be cancelled. When asked what detail of conversation Ms. Huber had with the Promech dock representative, she said it was not long and she was told that the tours were proceeding.

Ms. Huber said she is not a part of any company decision making process with respect to making a determination to cancel tours due to weather. It is up to each individual company and she relies on their

expertise and judgement. In her 10 years of experience in shore excursions, she has seen many tours cancelled due to weather.

Ms. Huber stated that typically if a tour operates, everyone wants to go. She had not witnessed guests who were concerned about the weather requesting cancellation of their tours. She stated that more often than not, guests will question why the tour was cancelled; particularly if the weather is good in port. Tours typically cancel due to reduced visibility and automatic refunds are provided. She stated that a flight seeing tour is not going to happen if no one can see anything.

She stated that after the accident, a number of guests choose to cancel their air tours and requested a refund which was provided.

Ms. Huber noted an example where some air tour operators cancel for weather and others do not. In Juneau, there may be 3 to 4 different air tours operated by different companies. Some tours may cancel while others operate due to variables such as the route of flight and type of aircraft.

When asked if she knew of any past safety issues with Promech, she stated she knew of none. The only comments she ever had was with regard to the headsets in the airplane and guests being unable to hear the commentary. She believed that the commentary is recorded but was not completely sure.

The Westerdam did the same itinerary every week, and there were no arrival or departure time changes. If a change occurs it is planned and communicated to the crew.

The cruise n' fly tour was about 3.5 hours in duration. The cruise portion of the tour is longer; as the mode of transportation is slower therefore the plane arrives at the floating dock in Rudyard Bay before the boat. The guests are transferred by bus from the ship to the tour operator's base of operations and back to the ship when the tour is completed. The day of the accident, she thought the tour left about 0830 with a scheduled return time of approximately 1230.

Ms. Huber stated that tours sold on HAL are from reputable companies. Guests are not informed and have no way of knowing what company is providing the tour. Some guests ask and the information, if available, is provided. Guests still have the option to book tours directly with the tour operator if they wish, but normally seats are not available until the morning when shipboard sales stop and final guest counts are confirmed.

Ms. Huber recalled that Promech has had late returning tours in the past, usually about 15 minutes or less. She stated that this can happen due to many variables e.g. port congestion, traffic, road work, etc., and is not unusual. She did not recall, nor had heard of any penalties levied against the company for being late.

After the accident, tour operations with Promech ceased. She remembered that it was about 5 weeks before tours were reinstated with Promech.

Interview completed at 1720.

Interview with Ms. Ellen Lynch, Senior Director Shore Excursions, Holland America 2/11/2016 @ 1300

Attendees: Brice Banning (NTSB), Adam Tucker (NTSB), Karen Reich (Holland America Line)

Ms. Lynch is the Senior Director of Shore Excursions for Holland America Group (HAL). She stated that her job is to oversee all aspects of the shore excursions program to include but not limited to product management, creating tour programs, marketing strategies, IT development, and the vetting of the tour programs. Her job has changed in the past year because of the reorganization between HAL, Princess and Seabourn Cruises into Holland America Group. In addition, she works closely with shipboard staff ensuring proper procedures are being followed, tracks customer comments and works closely with the Risk Management Department. The shipboard shore excursion staff report to shore based product managers.

She stated that a tour operator that wishes to provide a shore excursion for HAL can be selected in a number of different ways, to include, but not limited to: an in person sales pitch, email, or previous work with a sister organization, or trade show. The tour is reviewed to ensure it is a good fit with the HAL brand, and if the vendor works with a sister brand, they find out passenger reaction to the tour, how it sells and if they are a good vendor. They look at the other tours and decide if they need it and if there is interest and a ship is in the port, they can send someone from the ship to inspect the tour. Prior to it being entered into the online shore excursion program, the tour operator accepts the online Holland America Line agreement called the Tour Operator Procedures and Policies and the Miami office reviews the tour operator's insurance, to ensure it meets Carnival Corporation's requirements. HAL then offers the shore excursion for sale online and shipboard. The Tour Operator Policies and Procedures have the insurance requirements that are set by Carnival Corporation in them. She does not know if there is any review of the operator's certificate or history. This takes place in Miami.

If a HAL guest had a safety concern regarding a shore excursion it would typically be communicated to the shipboard staff, who would notify the Seattle office. If it was an imminent safety concern, risk management and legal would be notified, and the event logged in the safety binder and tracked until the issue was resolved. If the tour was suspended, it would not be reinstated until word was received from risk management and legal that it was OK to resume operations. If not an imminent safety concern, the tour operations would continue until they could look into the comment or complaint. In addition, HAL monitors the online rating system, with key words triggering notification to high-level managers. An outside company monitors these guest comments. Shipboard shore ex staff can inspect shore ex operators as required to make sure all is OK. The shore ex shoreside team look at operators from more of a quality control/customer service standpoint.

Ms. Ashe, the company manager during the Promech appointment renewal, was familiarizing herself with Princess Cruises Operations at the time of the accident. The shore side manager for Promech at the time of the accident was Jennifer Miller.

After the accident, HAL, Princess and Carnival stopped using Promech until further notice. . There were many weeks before operations with Promech resumed, and tours only resumed after they received

approval to do so in writing. There was no further vetting of Promech after the accident that she could recall.

She stated that tour operators are supplied with the ships departure times long before the beginning of the season and port hours are posted by the port agent.

The HAL guests that were on the accident flight had disembarked from the Westerdam. To the best of her knowledge, the ship was on schedule, leaving port with an early departure time to go foreign based on speed and distance to Victoria, BC. This was a Jones Act requirement.

She stated that the advantages to purchasing a shore excursion through HAL are listed on the company website, and include convenience, standards, insurance, worry free shopping, ability to hold the ship and local vendors. She also stated that the no safety assurances are expressed or implied when purchasing a shore excursion through HAL.

She stated that if a tour was late returning to the ship, the tour operator would notify the Shore Excursion Manager on board the ship, who would notify the bridge with specifics e.g. number of guests, expected delay, etc. She stated that every situation was different, but a decision would be made to hold the ship in port or to continue on. Typically, if a ship sailed without guests that were delayed due to a late arriving tour, it would be the tour operator's cost/responsibility to provide accommodations and travel arrangements for the HAL guests to the next port of call. She also stated that it was very rare for a tour to be late, causing HAL guests to miss the all aboard.

On the day of the accident, Ms. Lynch stated that she received a voicemail from Ms. Kari Erickson in Ketchikan, AK, stating that there was a late returning aircraft from a sightseeing flight operated by Promech Air, Inc. and expressed concern with the ship sailing late. She returned the call, but at the time, it was believed that the flight was simply delayed and that there was no cause for concern. Shortly thereafter, she received word that Mr. Ball was standing up the Emergency Response Center (ERC), and she was asked to report immediately. Upon her arrival, she noted that there were about 20 ERC members already present. She remembered speaking with Mr. Marcus Sessoms of Promech, who indicated that the flight was missing, and that he was personally going to search for the aircraft. At some point later, she received word from Mr. Sessoms that the airplane's wreckage had been located, the fuselage was largely intact, and they were hopeful that the accident was survivable. She immediately cancelled all tours operated by Promech by messaging ships, notifying call centers and suspending online sales, while she continued to wait for word on the accident airplane. She also requested letters be created by the guest services staff for any guest booked on a different flying tour advising them they could cancel if they wanted. She later received word, at about 7 PM that first responders had reached the airplane, and there were no survivors. The ship was still alongside in Ketchikan at that time. She stated that the ERC disbanded at about 11 or 12 pm that evening.

The next day, they met again in the ERC. Mostly, she continued to manage any cancellations. She recalled some support was being sent to the ship to support the onboard team for Saturday.

Ms. Lynch stated that the tour operated by Promech was called “Misty Fjords Cruise and Flight”. The tour consisted of two groups of passengers. One group departed Ketchikan onboard a marine vessel and the other group departed via airplane, with a predetermined rendezvous at a floating dock in Rudyerd Bay. Once at the floating dock, the two groups would switch transportation modes for the return trip to Ketchikan. The boat was owned by a different company called Alaska Cruises and Tours.

After the accident on 6/25/2015, Ms. Lynch stated that all tours operated by Promech that were purchased through one of the three major brands represented by Carnival Corporation were cancelled. Tours were not resumed until the Shore Excursion Department received word from Holland America Group Legal or Risks to resume operations with Promech.

She stated that HAL had been selling shore excursions/tours operated by Promech for more than 11 to 12 years and was in place as a tour provider before she got there. Promech had a high delivery standard and she recalled very few, if any, negative reviews by HAL guests. Their online rating system had Promech rated as a 4 to 5star vendor (5 stars best rating). They were a good vendor; one of the best to work with high levels of service to the guests. The main complaint from guests with the flight operator is tour cancellations due to weather. Crew members can be escorts on tours but this is more routine on longer tours. Tour escorts are managed by the on board shore ex team. The escorts are always required to report back their experience.

She recalled a previous accident involving a de Havilland Beaver airplane, operated by Promech that collided with terrain following a loss of engine power, but noted that no HAL guests were onboard at the time of the accident.

She stated that throughout the geographic locations that HAL operates, Alaska had the highest concentration of flight seeing tours and they were very popular with guests. She didn't think there were many air tours outside of Alaska and recalled only a handful in places like Mexico, Hawaii and Australia.

Telephone Interview with Ms. Jennifer Miller, Shore Based Excursion Manger, Holland America Line
2/11/2016 @ 1600

Attendees: Brice Banning (NTSB), Adam Tucker (NTSB), Karen Reich (Holland America Group)

Ms. Jennifer Miller is the Shore Based Excursion Manager for Holland America Group (HAL) based out of Juneau, AK; she had been with Princess for about 19 years and her present job since November 2014. She is responsible for all shored based excursions for HAL, Princess and Seaborn in Alaska, Hawaii and the French Polynesia. Her job entails reviewing tour proposals, tour inventory and general administration for the shore excursions program in her geographic area. In addition, she reviews and accepts tour proposals, tour pricing and tour descriptions through the Carnival Corporation's online tour gateway-bidding portal for both new and existing tour operators. She has only been involved in the new HAL, Princess, and Seabourn structure for the past year and had a training period with the previous land based shore excursion manager (Ms. Jessica Ashe).

Ms. Miller stated that she knows all the tour operators in Alaska, but rarely visits their locations. In addition, she stated that site visits are not required as part of the approval process.

Ms. Miller recalled the process (mostly) for tour operator approval was:

- Tour operator requests a user account for the Carnival Corporation web based Tour Operator Gateway – various steps – account created
- Tour operator accepts Tour Operator Policies and Procedures
- Tour operator submits insurance information and proposal
- Once approved, tour operator places bid on upcoming season
- Information review
- Pricing for tour determined
- Tour description created to sell to passengers

She stated that Promech had been an existing tour operator with HAL for a very long time. She was familiar with their products, and noted that they had a long-standing history with the company. She knew the people she worked with at Promech and had visited their location one time, in April of 2015 when she took a flight seeing familiarization tour, with other HAL employees. The purpose of the familiarization tour was to educate HAL staff on what Promech had to offer, so they could better market the tour. She made no notes or documentation for this familiarization flight. She did not recall any specific safety issues, or the duration of the tour.

She stated that she was not really involved with the Promech accident, and that it was primarily handled out of the Seattle office. She was notified of an overdue airplane, and the standing-up of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) via email. She did assist in the cancellation of Promech tours by notifying ships and assisted with rescheduling HAL guests on other tour providers. She stated that she did not go to Ketchikan, and that the care team was sent there. Her only communications with Promech were after the accident when operations were suspended. She was not involved in the decision to reinstate

Promech as a tour provider, but was simply notified that they were being reinstated. She believed operations resumed with Promech on cruises starting July 18, 2015, so a few days after that.

She stated that she had received no feedback on this particular tour. Feedback would normally come from a HAL guest to the onboard shore excursion manager, to the head office. If a safety issue was identified it would be inserted into the incident binder shoreside and would be reviewed for action. In addition, reviews from guests online were monitored. She was not aware of any centralized system for this type of monitoring for the corporation (Carnival Corp.).

She stated that she had no first-hand knowledge of any safety issues with regard to Promech, and was not familiar with the safety review process. She stated other cruise lines also use Promech, but she was not aware if they had observed any safety issues or had any concerns.

She stated that HAL staff conduct one familiarization tour in Juneau, Ketchikan and Skagway every year in Alaska prior to the season, with a mix of both shipboard and shoreside staff. She stated from the last familiarization tour, she did not recall any observations or concerns related to safety.

Interview with Ms. Jessica Ashe, Holland America 2/11/2016 @ 0900

Attendees: Brice Banning (NTSB), Adam Tucker (NTSB), Karen Reich (Holland America Group))

Ms. Jessica Ashe is the Product Manager, Shore Excursion Department for Holland America Group. (HAL), and had been in her present job for Holland America Line about 3 years. Her job entails the strategic planning to launch and help develop shore excursions, which includes making the product available online and shipboard. In addition, she reviews previous years shore excursions, to ensure they still fit and sold well, consistent with HAL product line.

Ms. Ashe stated that the shore excursions were divided into 6 geographic regions. Prior to the accident involving a Promech airplane on June 25, 2015, she had been reassigned from the Alaska, Hawaii and French Polynesia Region, to the Northern and Western Europe Region. This change was in relation to the reorganization/merger between Holland America/Seaborn and Princess Cruises.

Shore Excursions are tours offered by a third party, but sold by HAL either online, prior to a cruise or shipboard. Ms. Ashe stated that the benefits to purchasing through HAL rather than with an individual tour operator not affiliated with the company were listed on company website, but included delayed sailing of the ship or accommodations and travel to the next port of call for late arriving tours at no expense to the guest. Shore excursions can be booked as far out as 6 months on the HAL web site. Ms. Ashe, reports to Ms. Ellen Lynch. Ms. Lynch reports to a person named Bruce who in turn reports to Mr. Paul Goodwin.

The cancellation policy for shore excursions purchased through HAL at the time of the accident was:

1. If cancelled outside of 24 hours - a full refund.
2. If cancelled within 24 hours – a 90% refund.

In order for a tour operator or subcontractor to offer a tour that is sold through HAL as a shore excursion, the applicant must submit an application through an online system called the Bidding Portal. The application is initially reviewed by the Bidding and Contracting Manager. Ms. Ashe then reviews each application to ensure the tour is a good fit for the HAL brand. Following her approval, Carnival Corporation reviews the submitted application to ensure the tour provider meets the necessary insurance requirements. The tour operator is then contacted for space availability, prior to the tour being appointed, and offered for sale online and shipboard. This usually happens about 1.5 years out for new tour proposals since the ships itineraries are published 1.5 to 2 years in advance.

Ms. Ashe stated that she doesn't necessarily go visit the tour operators during the approval process and it would not be uncommon for a tour to be appointed as a shore excursion, and sold by HAL without ever visiting the tour operator or its place of business. This is the same for all brands operating under Carnival Corporation.

She stated that flight seeing tours are approved in the same manner as all other tours, but are regulated by the Federal Government. In addition, a tour operator must select "agree" to the online terms and conditions every year in order to be renewed.

Promech had been approved, renewed and appointed in the same manner year after year, and had been offering shore excursions on behalf of HAL for greater than 10 years. Each year she confirms available space from Promech and then put this on line for sale to HAL guests. She stated that Promech had an excellent reputation and was a stellar operator. She could not recall any negative feedback from Holland America guests and never heard of any issues during the 3 years she was in that role. She was aware that Promech was a tour provider for other cruise ship companies. Ms. Ashe, had set up Promech as a tour operator for the 2015 Alaska season prior to being assigned to her new region in northern Europe.

Ms. Ashe stated that she was in Stockholm, Sweden on June 25, 2015 and was notified of the accident of via email from Ms. Lynch, and that the email contained no specific instructions. She was on a Princess vessel and familiarizing herself with the region she had been assigned. Ms. Ashe was not the manager for the Alaska region at the time of the accident.

Ms. Ashe stated that they receive feedback on tours via end of cruise voyage reports which are completed by the onboard shore excursion managers and tour escorts. If a tour escort identifies a problem or safety issue with a tour operator that report would be forwarded through the Shore Excursion Manager to the Seattle office, and onto the Risk Management division. Any safety issues with tour operators would be documented in the safety binder.

She stated that the cruise ship itineraries are available about 1 ½ to 2 years in advance of sailing. These itineraries are provided to the tour operators to aid in scheduling shore excursions. A manifest is kept onboard the ship that contains the names of the HAL guests that are participating in a particular shore excursion.

When asked how a tour operator would notify the ship of a late arriving tour. Ms. Ashe stated that in Alaska the tour operator would contact the shipboard Shore Excursion Manager via cell phone. The Shore Excursion Manager would then notify the ship's captain and hotel manager, and the captain would determine if the departure can be delayed to wait for the late arriving tour. If the ship cannot wait, travel would be arranged for the late tour group to meet the ship at the next port of call at the tour operators cost. Each tour operator has each ships itinerary and departure time. They know they have to have guests back to the ship 30 minutes before departure.

Interview with Ms. Kathy Brister, Supervisor Family Assistance, Holland America Line 2/11/2016 @ 1330

Attendees: Brice Banning (NTSB), Adam Tucker (NTSB), Karen Reich (Holland America Group)

Ms. Kathy Brister is a supervisor in the Family Assistance Department for Holland America Line (HAL). She stated that the Family Assistance Department helps guests and their families in cases involving death on board, medical disembarks and sexual assaults. In addition, they train and deploy the CARE Team. She stated that the CARE Team is a group of about 175 HAL employees, who have volunteered and been trained, to provide assistance to guests and employees during some form of tragedy. She stated that Family Assistance is a part of the Emergency Response Center (ERC) and is responsible for making the decision to activate the CARE Team. A representative from Family Assistance always travels with the CARE Team when they are deployed. Family assistance is separate from the CARE team in that family assistance employees work in a full time capacity, while the CARE team are shore side employee volunteers.

She said that she was briefed on a situation in Ketchikan, AK, on Thursday the 25th of June, at about 1530 by the Director of Guest Programs. A decision was immediately made to deploy members of the CARE Team to Ketchikan, AK, with two arriving that night. The wife and mother of a father and daughter on the tour disembarked from the ship and a tour leader and two other passengers who were on a tour with a missing guest also disembarked to provide immediate support. Initially, they had little detail about the accident but had the manifest.

Following notification to the next of kin, the Family Assistance group worked through the night making travel arrangements, and securing accommodations for the victim's families in Ketchikan. The following day she and a specialist and another CARE Team member traveled to Ketchikan where they arrived about 1500 and they continued to provide support to the victim's families. Such support included arranging for private rooms, meals, lodging and transfers for family already there and those arriving. NTSB briefings began with Elias and Stephanie. She, with Ralph Samuels and representatives from Promech met with the NTSB agents and the families and learned the remains would be moved to Anchorage and families were asked what they wanted to do. She stated that on Saturday the 27th the decision was made to relocate to Anchorage, AK, where services were available to care for the deceased. Family members of the deceased were flown or diverted to Anchorage, and accommodated there by the family assistance group.

She stated that while on scene her duties included coordinating with the NTSB Transportation Disaster Assistance (TDA) to provide investigative updates to the next of kin, making travel arrangements, working with the Empathia team (HAL's contracted emergency support provider) coordinating with funeral homes, and providing as much support to the victims' families as possible. The family assistance group remained in Anchorage until the last of the family members departed.

When asked who paid for the expenses related to the accident she stated that HAL covered the expenses, but that Promech helped financially as well.

She noted the Westerdam had departed Ketchikan by the time she arrived there. The ship was scheduled to sail at 1300 on the day of the accident. The ship's next port of call was Victoria, BC Canada which was a foreign port call required for compliance with the Jones act. The Westerdam was Seattle based and was on a seven-day cruise.

A councilor was sent to the ship in Seattle to work with any guests and crew. Additionally, personal effects of the deceased were removed from the ship in Seattle to be sent back to family members and photos were secured. All were inventoried. Next of kin were offered to have the luggage shipped back to them or personally delivered by her. Most wanted the luggage delivered. She also attended funeral services for two families.