

JOHN MAGNUS , Staff Chief Engineer, Crew 102, Safety 016, he is the assistant for the chief engineer. Safety is the on-scene leader. Cabin Olympic 1085.

He was in his cabin, awake, watching TV and relaxing at the time of the event. He felt shaking in the ship. He knew that something was wrong so he went down to the Biscayne Deck. He saw darkness and smoke. Then he went to the control room.

He heard a Code Bravo on his walkie-talkie but he did not know where it was. This was seconds after the explosion. He heard Bravo while he was on the Biscayne Deck running to the control room.

He saw that damage was in the boiler room. He went into the control room, he looked into the aft boiler room. The smell was bad. He helped someone, Mr. Rosal, out of the aft boiler room. He and another person took this person out. He called the bridge to shut the water tight doors. He asked for the general alarm of the bridge.

He requested from the bridge a stretcher team to help Mr. Rosal. A general alarm went out throughout the ship. He asked for the fire teams to be sent to the mid ships, Biscayne Deck, port side.

He was now the on-scene commander, located himself outside the engine office. The first fire team responded, but he does not remember the team number. The firefighters were dressed up so it was hard to see who the people were. He sent two fire teams to the engine room from both sides. The fire teams reported to him that they were there, reporting to him and who they were. Things were happening very fast. He was not able to document things. He had the fire plan in front of him, which was the only paper he had.

When the fire team reported to him they would say how many men and which team they were, he would report it to the bridge, the team number and the number of people, and they would write that down. He does not recall the number of teams that reported to him that morning.

He asked for a general alarm on the radio and gave the bridge a meeting place. He does not remember how long it took for the first team to report to him. It is not possible to come up with an accurate time estimation based on the conditions at the time.

He saw smoke through the passageway, sprinklers had gone off, water on the flooring, plastic plates on the floor, people were running, it was a big mess.

His emergency duties title is On Scene Commander, the safety director was there to assist him. He would help Magnus collect information if the radios went out.

The MIA FD was there to assist them, to help them. They came aboard when their own fire teams were already down in the engine room. He brief the MIA firefighters what happened, and sent one of his firefighters to escort MIA FD down. He was controlling the scene, MIA was there to help.

Fire teams were on one channel he was on another. He gave the fire teams specific places to go.

He was the staff chief engineer since January 2003. This is his second contact as staff chief. He started on the Norway in 1997. On first trip in the Norway he was a watchstander. He stayed on this ship throughout. Officers report to the first engineer and the first engineer reports to him. He reports to the chief engineer.

AT the time of the accident there were three or four engineers per watch. He was called out about 0230. They called him because there was a problem with one of the steam turbines to get it up to idling speed. He went down, helped them, then returned to his cabin. He would guess that he was back in the cabin about 0245. He was in the engine control room at the time.

He went back down about 0300 for the arrival, with the chief engineer, one second engineer, chief electricians. The same number of people is in the engine control room during arrival as with other phases, except for the chief engineer and chief electrician.

He did not know what the shaking was, it could have been another ship. Mr. Benjaminson, the 2nd engineer was with him. He came down the forward end of the ship, all the way down to Biscayne Deck. He was right behind him. Plenty of smoke was coming out of the funnel. In the engine room you could see right into the smoke. It was very hot so he did not go into the room. Mr. Rosal was walking out and Mr. Binjamenson and he helped him out.

The firefighters went into the space, they had to go to search for people.

His firefighter air bottles are high pressure. He does not recall if firefighters were wearing them or not. The bottles are 200 bars.

First code Bravo he was on his way out of the cabin.

First time he got firefighter training was in Norway, in Maritime School in school part of general education in maritime studies. Got a certificate for the school and for the course. He also took an upgrading course last year. Took the course in a different school, but also a maritime academy. You used equipment and training in actual firefighting. The first course was in 88, two week course, just in firefighting, theoretical and practice. The upgrade course was one week, theoretical and practice. Got his certificate in 88-89.

He was in the Norwegian Navy, got firefighting training the Navy. Was in the Navy from 89 093. Was in school on year, to become a second engineer. In the rest of the year had shore side occupations. 1996 joined NCL then in 97 came to the Norway.

In the Navy was 3rd engineer on steamship, frigates and corvettes. Experienced a grounding in 92 a frigate. The chief firefighter selects the training and the people to attend training.

The response went well, really well. The fire teams worked good, they got information back to him to send to the bridge. He would not make any changes to the response, it went well.

Typically his work hours are 0800 to 2000, but they are always available 24 hours, they have to do that.

On the way to him the fire teams would report to the his assistant if they encountered any difficulties, obstacles on the way to him. The night before he went to bed around 2130 and woke up around 0230.

Channel 5 is freq to the bridge, channel 6 is freq to communicate with team. They have stations around the ship where the equipment is located. Radios are there as well for recharging. They don't encourage them to use their walkie talkies because the batteries could be dead. This way they are charged all the time.

The MIA firefighters that came on board had air bottles, masks, etc. He did not have equipment on, went into the smoky area despite not having bottles. He has to be outside the fire zone. He has not received training in explosions, you never know what they will look like. The teams had hoses with them, and there were hoses and stations in the engine room. He does not know if the hoses were charged, but normally they would be.

Channel 5 is OK, channel 6 was OK. He is the on-scene leader anywhere on the ship for any fire. He knew that there was no fire because he did not get any report of fire from the teams that entered the engine room.

There is no fire suppression system in the funnel. There is a halon system onboard, but it did not release. There is no automatic release of the halon. They have to go through some procedures to release the halon, they have to be 100% certain that no one is inside the engine room, and the doors are shut to release the halon. They would only do this if the fire was getting pretty bad. The decision can only be made by the chief engineer. The halon was available, the sprinkler was available, both to fight the fire. Halon stored in the aft engine. Even if the pipes to the halon bottles were broken from an explosion halon would still be able to be discharged into the engine room.