

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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AIR METHODS CORPORATION
LIFENET HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
AUGUST 26, 2011
NEAR MOSBY, MISSOURI

Docket No.: CEN11FA599

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Interview of: ED STOCKHAUSEN

Air Methods Corporation
7301 South Peoria
Englewood, Colorado

Thursday,
December 8, 2011

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MALCOLM BRENNER, Ph.D.
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I N T E R V I E W

INTERVIEW OF ED STOCKHAUSEN

BY DR. BRENNER:

Q. What's your position? What's your name and position?

A. My name's Ed Stockhausen. I'm the director of safety.

Q. How long you been with the company?

A. A little over 6 years.

Q. And how long you been director of safety?

A. That entire time.

Q. Oh, you were hired in as that?

A. I was hired as director of safety, yeah.

Q. Just quickly, what's your background? What's your aviation background and background for the safety --

A. Oh, I've been flying for about 35 years, all helicopters. I have over 11,000 hours. I've been an EMS for most of that time other than about a 5 or 6 year stint where I was -- I had my own company for about 3 years, 3-1/2 years, single 206. And then when I was working for Omniflight, one of my jobs was as a general manager of any aviation service that we did other than EMS, so a lot of government contracts, OES, ENG, you know, those kind of things.

But most of my time's been in EMS. I have over 5,000 mission flights. I've held positions from being a PIC, IFR PIC, check airman, chief pilot, director of ops, company owner, and director of safety.

1 Q. Why did you accept the position with Air Methods?

2 A. I was with PHI. I was a general -- I was a ops manager
3 for them, regional ops manager. One of my programs had a fatal
4 accident in Jackson, Kentucky. That was an S-76. I've always
5 been involved in safety. I've, you know, been the company safety
6 rep or a base safety rep or those kind of things. And the
7 gentlemen that were in that aircraft, I had flown with both of
8 them. One of them still happened to live in the Cleveland area
9 and just went down to Lexington only 7 days to fly.

10 And I was tasked with going to his house and telling his
11 wife that he wasn't coming home. As you can imagine, that was not
12 a pleasant experience. It was kind of the catalyst for me to
13 determine that -- I certainly didn't want to do that again and I
14 didn't want anybody else to really have to do that again. So, I
15 thought that I could make a difference. This position with Air
16 Methods became available. At that time, quite a bit smaller
17 company. I think we had about 120 aircraft at the time.

18 But still, it was an opportunity to engage not only with
19 a company that I felt very good about, but also that would support
20 me in some national efforts that, you know, were going on at the
21 time and are still going on, where we could take up a leadership
22 position and try to move the industry forward.

23 Q. What special training do you need for your position?

24 A. Well, there's no 119 requirement for a director of
25 safety in 135, so, you know, as far as special training and

1 requirements from a regulatory standpoint, there are none. But,
2 you know, I went back to school and got my safety credentials.
3 I've attended Amarillo. I've also been to HAI and TSI and
4 different safety courses, so I'm kind of a life-long student.

5 Q. Who do you report to?

6 A. I report directly to the COO and the CEO. COO directly,
7 CEO is a dotted line.

8 Q. What's a dotted line?

9 A. I have direct access to his office at any time that I
10 feel I need to, but I'm not a direct report of his. I'm a direct
11 report of the COO.

12 Q. How far along is the SMS in looking at implementation?

13 A. We're pretty far along. We exited Level 2 in December
14 of last year, so we're in Level 3. We hope to exit Level 3 next
15 year sometime third quarter-ish. We are -- well, last I checked,
16 we were one of eight operating certificates in the country that
17 have exited Level 2. There's only two that have exited Level 3.

18 I don't know if you're familiar with the FAA levels, but
19 they're -- they actually started out with Level 0. I'm not sure
20 what a Level 0 is, but -- but you have 1 is planning; 2 is
21 reactive; 3 is proactive; and 4 is continuing improvement.

22 You never exit out of Level 4. You're always in the
23 continuing improvement phase of that. The only two that I know of
24 that are in the test program with us, 121 operators, are Delta and
25 US Air; have both exited Level 3 and are in continuing improvement

1 based on the current FAA criteria. You know, as you know, the FAA
2 is going to have, probably by mid-year next year, a 121 rule for
3 SMS should be out. What I've heard is probably 2014 for 135, but
4 we felt that it was important to go ahead and move forward with
5 the process for a couple of reasons.

6 Number one, it's the first time in my career that I
7 believe we've had an opportunity to be a part of rulemaking to the
8 extent that we were able to accomplish being involved in the pilot
9 project, you know, being able to influence the rule and instruct
10 and teach the FAA, really, as to what we do and how we do it. And
11 then, of course, just the fact that it's the right thing to do.
12 You know, being involved in the SMS process, we obviously see it
13 as, you know, the future, so we wanted to be a part of that and
14 help build that.

15 Q. What actions have you taken regarding the safety policy
16 component?

17 A. What action have we taken?

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. Oh, gosh. Well, obviously, we have statements from the
20 COO and the CEO for safety policy statements. We have a -- I
21 mean, all of our manuals, we developed a document department, or
22 document control department, which we felt was important. When we
23 looked at our documentation across the board, you know, there were
24 some formatting issues, some inconsistencies, and those kind of
25 things -- wanting to make sure that we were consistent across the

1 board with guidance so there was no inconsistency in one manual's
2 compared to another, no conflicting guidance or documentation.
3 So, we've developed a -- we brought on through the safety
4 department, a person that is our document control manager.

5 She since has left the safety department -- and that was
6 the goal all along, was for her to help us with our documentation
7 for the SMS process, but then move into a more of an umbrella
8 function. So, she now reports, you know, to the COO as well. So,
9 she's got a staff of three, counting herself now.

10 We have, I believe, it's 14 core documents to include
11 the GOM, GMM, you know, those kind of things, safety manual,
12 obviously, that's policy. We have a series of, you know, notices,
13 bulletins, memos, those kind of things. It's all controlled
14 through the life-cycle process and through the owners of the
15 manuals, through the document control process.

16 Q. I was going to ask how you determine the effectiveness
17 of the safety policy component?

18 A. That's an ongoing process. You know, we have reporting
19 systems. We have ASAP, MSAP. We have our internal, what we call
20 AIDMOR. It's employee reporting system. We have a SilentWhistle
21 system. You know, so it's -- that's always an ongoing process,
22 you know, as you get things in, whether through our reporting
23 systems, through our root cause analysis process. You know, often
24 we'll look at our documentation and our guidance and note any
25 changes to that guidance. You know, whether it may be additions,

1 might even be subtractions to that guidance, just really kind of
2 depending on, you know, what the root cause is and what we see
3 when we do our due diligence based on the reports we get in.

4 Q. What actions have been taken regarding safety promotion
5 component?

6 A. Well, yeah, that's a fourth pillar. We do a lot of
7 communication. We have a monthly newsletter -- we call it Safety
8 Connect -- that goes out on a monthly basis. It averages about 8
9 to 10 pages of information. We include pertinent information on
10 incidents that have occurred, information that's pertinent not
11 only to the pilots, but to the rest of our staff, mechanics,
12 clinicians. We try to get them to participate as much as
13 possible. And in that we have kind of a regular feature called,
14 Any Given Day, which is kind of I learned about flying from this
15 kind of thing.

16 Q. Yeah, I love those things, yeah.

17 A. We have what we call AIDMOR attaboys. So the regional
18 and area managers when they see a report -- what we want to do is
19 really reinforce those positive decisions and decision making, so
20 that's where the attaboys come in. So, when somebody has done
21 something and they fill out a report, as far as the good decision
22 making process, it's commented on by a manager. That goes to
23 their e-mail, but then I get a copy of it. I request a copy of
24 all those. So, what I do is I collate them and consolidate them
25 each month and pick probably about a dozen to a dozen and a half

1 and they go into it -- with the manager's comments and they go
2 into the Safety Connect every month so guys can see, hey, this is
3 the decisions we want you to make; this is how we want you to make
4 them; this is a good outcome kind of thing, just positive
5 reinforcement to that.

6 We have a quarterly CEO WebEx or web -- he's filmed and
7 he gets questions in. Now, they're not all safety, but it -- this
8 really instituted from the safety department, and he spends the
9 first 20 minutes or so on safety, talking about where we are with
10 the SMS, things that he's looking for, or what his expectations
11 are, those kind of things as well.

12 Q. Had you had any incidents involving fuel issues?

13 A. Incidents with fuel issues? Could you be a little
14 specific, or --

15 Q. Fuel exhaustion issues or low fuel? Anything like that
16 come through?

17 A. You know, on a rare occasion --

18 Q. How common is that, yeah?

19 A. On a rare occasion there will be a report that, you
20 know, there was an issue with fuel relative to change of
21 destination or change in weather and those kind of things and how
22 they were handled.

23 Q. How about difficult launch decisions, do you get these
24 kinds of --

25 A. A difficult launch decision? Again, I'm going to have

1 to ask you to --

2 Q. Well, you're describing -

3 A. -- define that a little bit better.

4 Q. -- different incidents that you're able to highlight or
5 that come across your desk. Is that a common thread?

6 A. Again, I wouldn't call it common. I wouldn't call it
7 common. I mean, we've got 440 aircraft that I'm not even sure how
8 many daily operations at this point. So, you know, there's going
9 to be, you know, issues that arise from time to time, I'm sure.

10 Q. Um-hum. Because here's a case where the pilot called
11 the flight following and said, I made a mistake and I don't have
12 enough fuel; I don't have as much fuel as I thought. Has that --
13 has anything like that happened before?

14 A. Not to my recollection.

15 Q. How do you determine the effectiveness of your
16 promotional material?

17 A. You know, again, it's through the entire process. You
18 know, when you look at the SMS, it's an SMS system. So, looking
19 at it through our reporting processes, the trending that we do,
20 you know, the anecdotal information that we bring in. You know,
21 we have a series of training that we do with our regional
22 managers, with our area managers, with our base folks, you know,
23 that's constantly ongoing, pretty much done on a quarterly basis.
24 We get feedback through that way, through conference calls. We
25 have monthly conference calls with our base safety reps. We have

1 monthly conference calls with all of our area regional managers.
2 So, it's just a series of things. It's not one thing that we look
3 at.

4 Q. Well, when we talked to the line pilots we interviewed
5 in this investigation, there seemed to be a lack of knowledge
6 about the safety department and about the safety --

7 A. Um-hum.

8 Q. -- outside of ASAP, I think they're familiar with, but
9 in general, they weren't. They didn't seem to be very familiar
10 with these outlets. How do we interpret this?

11 A. You know, it's a work in progress. You know, the SMS is
12 a new concept in aviation. I mean, obviously, it started in the
13 nuclear industry and chemical industry, and it's kind of worked
14 its way out. But we're a fairly large and geographically
15 dispersed company and it's a work in progress. So, you know, all
16 those things that I just mentioned are effective and we wind up,
17 you know, pushing the information down. But, you know, it's not
18 an immediate occurrence; it takes some time.

19 Q. Have any changes been made as a result of this accident?

20 A. Currently, I can't think of anything specifically. We
21 did mention the root cause analysis that we've done. That is in
22 draft form. We met on that a couple of weeks ago and are
23 finalizing our recommendations. And the process for that is, you
24 know, when we have an RCA -- we have an RCA review board. It
25 consists of, you know, most of the functional areas within the

1 company and we wanted to do that because we wanted to have that
2 input when they vet the report. So in other words, these are
3 people that are going to be responsible for instituting the
4 recommendations that come forth. We wanted them to have a say,
5 you know, in that, so, you know, if there was an alternative
6 method that they wanted to use based on their experience relative
7 to the recommendation, you know, we'd certainly take that into
8 consideration. So, that's an ongoing process that we use. So,
9 we're still vetting those out and once we get the final
10 determination, then we'll move forward.

11 Q. What hazards have been identified as a result of this
12 accident?

13 A. What hazards have been identified?

14 Q. Um-hum.

15 A. You know, I mean, obviously, we've looked at the
16 circumstances surrounding it, the issues, the training issues with
17 the aircraft, the reconfiguration issues with the aircraft.
18 Obviously, the communications with the communication center, those
19 are all things that we've looked at and recognized that we may
20 need to make some changes.

21 Q. How do you -- fuel status, for the pilot to determine
22 fuel status, how do you mitigate the risks involved with that?

23 A. Can you elaborate a little bit?

24 Q. What's the pilot do to determine the fuel status? How
25 do you -- how does the company address that?

1 A. Well, obviously, the pilot is the one that's responsible
2 for determining fuel. And as part of the pre-flight action, you
3 know, you should be looking at your fuel gauge and, you know, you
4 know your flight and your flight parameters and you make your
5 decisions appropriately.

6 Q. Are there written procedures for this?

7 A. You know, I'd have to defer on that. I don't know
8 offhand exactly what the GOM would state on that.

9 Q. The OCC -- in the advisory circular, the FAA talks about
10 the pilot should consult with an OCC specialist for flight
11 approval concurrence at any time that a predetermined threshold is
12 reached, for example, by risk assessment matrix. So, I think the
13 FAA advisory circular envisions cases where you can have joint
14 mission responsibility.

15 A. Um-hum.

16 Q. My understanding is the company does not do that with
17 its OCC. Could you discuss that company philosophy?

18 A. Yeah. You know, we do. The advisory circular, when it
19 came out, there were two different methods that you could use in
20 setting up your OCC and how you utilize your OCC. One was the
21 training method and one was the procedural method. The procedural
22 method, obviously, you try to list all of, or many of your static
23 and dynamic risks. You put a value to those risks. You add that
24 value up. If it reaches a certain triggering threshold, then, you
25 know, you would have different decisions and decision matrix based

1 on that procedural method.

2 Or you could use what the training method is. Now we --
3 that's the method that we chose to use. We felt that it was more
4 appropriate to our operation. We spend a lot of time and a lot of
5 effort in our basic indocs, utilizing the training method and
6 teaching the new pilots that come in, explaining what our
7 expectations are, how to use the matrix, and basically that's --
8 we decided that the pilot-in-command is the one that's ultimately
9 responsible. They're the one to have the most information, the
10 most experience in a particular area. We utilize the OCC as a
11 resource, as an informational resource, as a resource to bounce
12 options off of as -- you know, they are pilots down there as well
13 that have done the job. But too, we felt that if you reached a
14 point where you had a triggering threshold that you had to
15 communicate with a manager of the OCC, that, you know, at that
16 point, you know, the decision-making process gets a little
17 convoluted and we felt that it was best that we have the pilot,
18 you know, be that ultimate authority on those decisions.

19 Q. How often do the pilots confer with OCC on operational
20 issues?

21 A. You know, I can't give you an exact answer. I know that
22 they utilize them quite often. Obviously, with any change, there
23 was -- initially, there was not much use, but after 4 years now,
24 you can see that they're used quite often as a resource.

25 Q. How often do pilots confer with their supervisors,

1 supervisory management?

2 A. And, again, I don't have a good answer for you on that.
3 Obviously, they do. How much, I don't know.

4 Q. I appreciate your thinking on this. When I listen to
5 the tape, I give the pilot credit. He talked to Flight Service.
6 He said, I made a mistake.

7 A. Um-hum.

8 Q. There's a problem with fuel here. To me, the fact that
9 he's talking to them, he's looking for another opinion, in my
10 sense. And what would have helped him, would have been someone to
11 say, son, you take that mission and do this and this. Or, son,
12 you park that aircraft. We don't need this mission and you get
13 fuel, take -- whatever it was. It would have helped him. I
14 thought he was asking and could have benefited from -- how can --
15 what changes could we make to help him out?

16 A. Yeah. You know, again, I'll have to defer. I mean, we
17 are looking, you know, into some of those issues based on our root
18 cause analysis. What changes exactly we're going to make at this
19 point, I can't give any specifics.

20 Q. Has there been any literature to the pilots about this
21 accident?

22 A. You know, that's not normally our practice with an
23 accident that's under investigation unless there's something
24 specifically that we can point to, that we know for a fact;
25 otherwise, we have to wait.

1 Q. Has senior management gone through training on SMS?

2 A. Some have; some have not. I've got another training
3 tentatively scheduled. We use TSI, Transportation Safety
4 Institute, for most of our SMS training for just about all levels
5 of management. And they kind of had a beta test of a management
6 SMS class last year -- or this year, rather. And we plan on, like
7 I said, tentatively holding that again for the rest of the senior
8 management.

9 Q. Has the CEO undergone the training?

10 A. Not yet. No.

11 Q. What does he say in his statement of safety commitment?

12 A. You know, you can -- I'll get a copy for you if you'd
13 like. I mean, it's not proprietary. Other than Christmas, it's
14 normally hanging down in the area when you walk in, but a wreath
15 has taken that position right now, but -- you know, basically,
16 it's, you know, he -- the buck stops there, you know. I mean, he
17 is the senior risk manager of the company and basically lays out
18 what his expectations are for the employees and also lays out what
19 the employees can expect from the company and from him as senior
20 management, relative to safety and risk.

21 Q. Any other ways that he sets the tone for the safety
22 culture?

23 A. You know, other than what I've already explained, you
24 know, he's constantly talking about safety. He talks with the
25 customers about safety. You know, the primacy or recency, it's

1 always the first part of what he does when he speaks; he talks
2 about safety. He talks about risk management. You know, we're
3 moving -- corporately, we're moving away from talking safety so
4 much as we are talking risk management. I think people understand
5 risk a lot better than they do the safety.

6 Q. At staff and board meetings, is a discussion of safety
7 matters set as a first priority?

8 A. It is. We have a series of meetings, what we call
9 Search, SART (ph.), and SORT (ph.). They contain different levels
10 of managers. And the one specific meeting for the CEO is his
11 meeting; it's the safety oversight roundtable. We meet on a
12 monthly basis.

13 Q. How would you characterize pay? How is the pay?

14 A. I think I'll defer on that one. You know, it's -- it is
15 what it is.

16 Q. Um-hum. How would you characterize morale?

17 A. You know I would -- morale I would say is pretty good
18 most of the time. You know, I look at it as a 10/80/10. You
19 know, you've got 10 percent of the employees who are going to be
20 company men no matter what. Then you got the other 10 percent on
21 the bottom that no matter what you do, you're not going to make
22 happy. And then you've got the 80 percent in the middle where if
23 you communicate with them, you show, you know, that you understand
24 and that you're reasonable then, you know, you've got a pretty
25 motivated workforce.

1 Q. How would you characterize the size of the workforce,
2 the pilot workforce compared to the work that has to be done?

3 A. You know, again, it kind of is what it is and we roughly
4 have and exactly, I mean, I couldn't tell you, but it's about 1300
5 or so pilots, you know, based on the one-for-one schedule. And
6 then we have, you know, a number of back-up pilots within each
7 region and area.

8 Q. How is the quality of new hires?

9 A. You know, and again, we meet our requirements: 2500
10 hours, I think, for IFR; 2,000 for VFR pilots. You'd have to
11 probably ask the training guys that question.

12 Q. What's special about this company?

13 A. You know, it's a good company. I looked, I looked hard,
14 you know, several years ago. When I took this position, I
15 reported to the C suite. I still report to the C suite. That was
16 a requirement for me.

17 Q. What is a C suite?

18 A. The CEO, the chief executive suite. So, COO, CEO, those
19 guys. You know, I am an independent department more or less. It
20 goes right up, you know, to the -- so there's no conflict of
21 interest, you know, with me. The company's very sound
22 financially. The company is very motivated to do the right thing.
23 They are motivated to manage risk to a level as low as reasonably
24 practical. They're motivated and they understand their position
25 as being a leader in the industry.

1 I am involved in AGI safety committee. I am the
2 chairman of the AMOA, Air Medical Operators Association, safety
3 committee. We are involved in Flight Safety Foundation. We are
4 involved in -- I don't know if you're familiar with IHST,
5 International Helicopter Safety Team, and the JSAT, JSIT
6 processes. So, the analysis and implementation part of that. We
7 are -- we have been pushing very hard for our competitors to enter
8 into the safety management program. We currently -- you know,
9 there's six voluntary safety programs within the FAA voluntary
10 safety office.

11 We, with the advent of a flight data monitor, we will be
12 participating in five of those six. And the one we haven't
13 participated in or won't -- it kind of depends -- is AQP, Advance
14 Qualification Program. It was certainly geared for the 121, so
15 we're not sure exactly how we could make that fit for our
16 operation. We've looked at a bunch of different areas relative to
17 safety and risk outside of aviation, or outside of our particular
18 operation, looking at the 121. Try to determine how does the 121,
19 how do they do what they do; what makes them so successful and how
20 can we make it work for our operation?

21 We think outside the box when it comes to those type
22 activities. We work with the LOSA collaborative. You guys
23 familiar with LOSA? Line Operation Safety Audit, James Klinect,
24 down at the University of Texas. We work with them. I approached
25 them about 4 years ago. Said, how do we do a LOSA in our

1 operation? And he says, well, I'm not sure; let's talk about it.
2 So, we worked with them for quite a time, came up with a single
3 pilot threat and error registry for our operation and we are
4 currently undergoing our second LOSA. We have ASAP and MSAP
5 programs, IEP. I think we have a very sophisticated operation and
6 we're always looking to improve.

7 Q. What changes in the operation have resulted from the SMS
8 program?

9 A. You know, specific changes -- you know, again, it's all
10 part of the system. So, we've made changes to training. We've
11 made changes to operational procedures. We've made changes to
12 structure. You know, it's just -- it's kind of an ongoing -- you
13 know, I'm not sure I could say there's any silver bullet thing
14 that we've done. It's just a series of small, steady continuing
15 improvement.

16 Q. How would you characterize the competitive environment
17 in this industry?

18 A. You know, again, that's not my, that's not my area of
19 expertise. You know, I'm not on the business end. I'm on the
20 safety end and risk end, so I don't feel as though I could give
21 you a good answer on that.

22 Q. How does the CEO set the tone for the safety culture?
23 You mentioned he has a statement. Any other ways?

24 A. I thought I had already answered that for you.

25 Q. Oh, I'm sorry. Okay. Yeah, all right.

1 MR. SILLIMAN: Talked about that round table and all
2 that other stuff that goes on, right?

3 MR. STOCKHAUSEN: Yeah.

4 DR. BRENNER: Yeah, you're right. Thank you. This is
5 my back-up when -- all right, disregard. Please.

6 BY MR. SILLIMAN:

7 Q. In the training, from what I understand, the pilots come
8 in and get their initial training. Is there -- and that's when
9 they'll do autorotations. Is there another training opportunity
10 that the company provides other than initial training?

11 A. There's a -- yes. I mean, there's a, to my knowledge --
12 and Dennis could probably answer this for you better, or may have.
13 But there is an interim training that takes place between check
14 rides. Now we've gotten quite a few flight training devices now
15 to help with that, but I'd have to refresh myself with the
16 training manual as to exactly what that covers.

17 Q. Okay. And then, of course, there's the 12-month check
18 ride that's required.

19 A. Right.

20 Q. So you do training on that?

21 A. Right.

22 Q. Are you involved with the simulator discussions and
23 training?

24 A. I am. I mean, to a certain extent. I'm not intimately
25 involved in it, but it was certainly one of our -- one of the

1 things that we push and, you know, and personally, I feel very
2 strongly about.

3 MR. SILLIMAN: I don't have any questions. Maryam?

4 MS. ALLAHYAR: Actually, I do.

5 BY MS. ALLAHYAR:

6 Q. I think it came up that if a pilot wants to do overtime,
7 there is a certain amount of overtime they can do. I was
8 wondering the company's policy as far as the safety office is
9 concerned. How is that, you know, how does the safety office
10 oversee it and evaluate it as far as risk management is concerned
11 with the extra time --

12 A. Um-hum.

13 Q. -- that they pick up?

14 A. You know, again, we defer a lot to the, as it should be,
15 to the regional and area managers. And it's their job to go ahead
16 and manage overtime relative to their particular area. I mean,
17 they certainly know their area a lot better than I ever could.
18 You know, if it becomes an issue, it may rise up through the
19 system, but, you know, normally, you know, these guys keep a good
20 handle on it. You know, there's never been any question in my
21 experience if there was -- if we didn't have anybody to man the
22 base, you shut the base down. If a pilot is fatigued, he needs to
23 let us know that he's fatigued and, you know, we will shut the
24 base down. You know, if -- I mean, obviously, the number of
25 consecutive days is managed, again, through the regional and area

1 management side of the house.

2 BY DR. BRENNER:

3 Q. I had the impression that the OCC was fairly unique in
4 this industry; is that correct?

5 A. You know, unique how? Most of the other operators,
6 based on the FAA Notice 297, I think it was, that talked about the
7 OCC, you know, they all have an OCC of one kind or another. But,
8 you know, we feel that ours is unique in that the level of
9 automation that goes into it, the business rules that are written
10 into it, the ability of the system to manage the flights and alert
11 the OCC, is probably unique within the industry.

12 Q. Anything else we haven't discussed that might help us in
13 the investigation?

14 A. No, sir, I can't think of anything offhand.

15 Q. I sure appreciate your helping us.

16 A. Sure.

17 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: AIR METHODS CORPORATION
 LIFENET HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
 AUGUST 26, 2011
 NEAR MOSBY, MISSOURI
 Interview of Ed Stockhausen

DOCKET NUMBER: CEN11FA599

PLACE: Englewood, Colorado

DATE: December 8, 2011

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to
the recording.

Vanita Tildon
Transcriber