

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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AIR METHODS CORPORATION
-IFENET HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
AUGUST 26, 2011
NEAR MOSBY, MISSOURI

Docket No.: CEN11FA599

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Interview of: CHRIS BASSETT

Air Methods Corporation
7301 South Peoria
Englewood, Colorado

Thursday,
December 8, 2011

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: MALCOLM BRENNER, Ph.D.
Senior Human Performance Investigator

APPEARANCES:

JIM SILLIMAN, Investigator-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board
31 West 775 North Avenue
West Chicago, IL 60185

MALCOLM BRENNER, Ph.D.
Senior Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW
Washington, D.C. 20594
(202) 314-6000

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I N T E R V I E W

INTERVIEW OF CHRIS BASSETT

BY DR. BRENNER:

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4 Q. Mr. Bassett, could you -- when did you start with the
5 company?

6 A. 2002.

7 Q. And just a brief summary of your aviation career?

8 A. I'm currently director of operations. I have been since
9 early part of this year. Prior to that, for nearly 5 years, I was
10 a chief pilot. Prior to that, I was flying a contract that Air
11 Methods had in Miami, Florida. I was a training captain and check
12 airman, as well as a line pilot in Sikorsky and Bell Helicopters.
13 Prior to that, I had my own company. I had a helicopter
14 construction company, long line, using old Sikorskys. Prior to
15 that, I worked for a number of different operators in Florida and
16 in Dallas, construction work, Part 135 charter work, offshore news
17 gathering, firefighting, utility, quite a lot of different
18 civilian applications. I'm also fixed wing rated at the ATP
19 level. I'm also an A&P mechanic.

20 Q. All right. How did you learn to fly?

21 A. Like everyone else, in an aircraft with an instructor.

22 Q. About how many hours do you have?

23 A. About 7,000.

24 Q. And how many rotor in that?

25 A. Most of that's rotor.

1 Q. And how many EMS rotor?

2 A. About 1,000.

3 Q. Um-hum. Great. What are your responsibilities,
4 briefly?

5 A. My primary responsibility is to ensure that our
6 operations are safe and compliant with all -- various regulations
7 and notices, orders, so on, so forth, op specs. I'm ultimately
8 responsible for the operations within this company, the aviation
9 operations.

10 Q. How do you promote a safety culture encouraging pilots
11 to accept only the flights that they can do safely, prudently, and
12 legally, and turn down those they cannot?

13 A. You're quoting me. Those are my words.

14 Q. You talked to the NTSB several years ago and I thought
15 it was well said. How do you achieve that?

16 A. We achieve that in a number of ways. First of all, it's
17 ongoing. It's not something that we can set forth and then walk
18 away from it. So, to promote it in a continuing fashion, all of
19 the aviation operations' personnel must subscribe to what you just
20 stated. So that starts with me. I teach it to every new hire
21 pilot that comes through this company and we continue to teach it
22 on a recurring basis. This is what we're after.

23 Q. How long is the initial training --

24 A. A pilot who hires on with Air Methods will go through
25 approximately 8 days of basic indoctrination training. The class

1 size dictates whether it's 7 days, 8, or 9. And from there, the
2 pilots will go into an aviation aircraft ground school and those
3 vary in length depending on complexity of the aircraft that
4 they're going to fly. Then they go into the flight training
5 program and the number of flight hours is -- varies based on
6 whether it's VFR, whether it's IFR. Then there's an NVG portion
7 of it. Subsequent to that, check ride successful. Passing of the
8 check ride, the pilot will then go through local area orientation.
9 So, the entire training process for a new hire without any delays
10 would take approximately 3 weeks. But we work against weather,
11 unscheduled maintenance, so sometimes that gets extended out to 4
12 or 5 weeks.

13 Q. How much of that training focuses on safety culture?

14 A. Quite a lot of it. Everything we do is intertwined with
15 safety and safety culture.

16 Q. And how do you monitor safety culture, safety compliance
17 with the pilots?

18 A. A number of different ways that are encompassed within
19 our safety management system: programs such as internal
20 evaluation program, IEP; LOSA, line operation safety audit. FOQA,
21 flight operations quality assurance, is a program that is not
22 fully matured. We're in the early stages of it, but that will be
23 an excellent tool for us to monitor safety culture. We meet in
24 person and monitor safety culture. But all of these various
25 programs inside of an SMS are designed to help us monitor safety

1 culture to ensure that our operations are in compliance with what
2 you initially stated.

3 Q. Do you have problems with fuel exhaustion or fuel issues
4 in the operations?

5 A. We had an incident of exactly what you've stated, a fuel
6 exhaustion problem.

7 Q. Tell us about it, please.

8 A. Well, first, I was not party to that accident
9 investigation, so I don't know much more outside of what the
10 general public knows, what's been released in a probable -- I'm
11 sorry, in a initial report. I have read those and the accident
12 appears to be related to fuel exhaustion.

13 Q. The Mosby accident, is that what we're talking about?

14 A. That's what we're talking about.

15 Q. Okay. Have you had any other accidents? Or any other
16 reports --

17 A. None that I'm aware of. We have -- I do recall an
18 incident where a pilot landed and had to call a mechanic to bring
19 him some fuel at the hospital in order to make it back to base due
20 to head winds that were not forecasted, but no other problems
21 other than those, that I'm aware of.

22 Q. What changes have been made since this, since Mosby, as
23 a result of the Mosby accident?

24 A. Well, we've made some changes to our training program,
25 specifically to the methods of teaching engine failures within the

1 AS-350 series helicopter. There have been other -- I'm trying to
2 recall now -- primary one is the changes to the technique in
3 managing engine failure. We're also looking into being able to
4 simulate full down autorotations using full motion simulator. And
5 I'm excited about being able to get into simulator training for a
6 number of reasons, not just for the touchdown autorotation, but
7 for many reasons.

8 Q. If a pilot has a difficult launch decision, who do they
9 consult with?

10 A. Pilots have resources. They have peers; they have
11 colleagues; they have managers; they have a chain of command that
12 is always available for them to consult with, but ultimately,
13 pilot-in-command is the decision maker.

14 Q. What about the OCC? Is that part of the resources?

15 A. OCC, OCC's function is a resource. They're not a
16 dispatch center. They're not a go/no-go center. They're
17 resources.

18 If a pilot is away from base and has limited capability
19 to evaluate weather situations, then they have that resource, to
20 be able to use OCC to get additional information; or en route,
21 flying an aircraft without onboard radar, which is very common in
22 VFR helicopters in all aviation sectors. They do, in essence,
23 have instant radar by being able to just call OCC and have it -- a
24 radar map textually described to them.

25 Q. There's evidence that the pilot did not sign the daily

1 flight log. Is that common or uncommon, or --

2 A. I don't know if he signed it or not. I haven't seen the
3 document. And to answer your question, is it common? No, it is
4 not.

5 Q. Okay. In the hypothetical that he did not, what does
6 that mean?

7 A. If he did not sign the document, it's -- it would be
8 speculation. You could say that he simply forgot to sign the
9 document, that he -- what he is signing on the document is
10 attesting to the airworthiness of the aircraft. If he did
11 determine the aircraft to be airworthy, then he would sign the
12 document. If he did determine it to be airworthy and forgot to
13 sign the document, it's just that.

14 Q. Who monitors that? Is that monitored?

15 A. Yes, it is.

16 Q. By who?

17 A. By the base lead pilot. Those documents are retained
18 for 30 days and they are electronically transmitted to us.
19 They're scanned and sent to us and they're monitored by pilot
20 records as well. So, there are at least two sets of eyes that
21 look at those documents.

22 Q. How often are they monitored?

23 A. Daily.

24 Q. What are the procedures for the pilot to check the fuel
25 state of the aircraft?

1 A. Fuel status is determined during the airworthiness
2 inspection and prior to flight. It's a preflight item.

3 Q. All right. What about during flight?

4 A. During flight, pilots monitor fuel as a normal course of
5 pilotage. We monitor all systems, including fuel system.

6 Q. In this case, the pilot landed with a passenger and he
7 called up Flight Service and said, look, I made a mistake; I've
8 less fuel than I expected. So he did, he did acknowledge it. If
9 he had stopped the flight at that point, what would have been the
10 company's reaction?

11 A. I don't know that that occurred, but if it did, the
12 company's reaction to it would be, good job; that's exactly what
13 we want you to do. We don't want any of our pilots to push any of
14 the rules. I tell the pilots that we hire, don't come to work and
15 plan to follow 99 percent of the rules and bend one. We're not
16 going to do that. We come to work to follow all the rules.

17 Q. What if the pilot had elected to transport the passenger
18 -- oh, what he did elect: Suppose he transported the passenger,
19 fueled up on the way, and then delivered the passenger, what would
20 the company's reaction have been?

21 A. That's perfectly acceptable. We have allowance for that
22 in our operations manual. I've done that myself.

23 Q. Suppose he had landed at the hospital, delivered the
24 passenger, and then called for a fuel truck, what would have been
25 the company's reaction?

1 A. That too would have been acceptable because the outcome
2 is never in doubt. If you're concerned about your fuel status and
3 you're on the ground and you call for a fuel truck or a mechanic
4 to bring two jerry jugs, or whatever it may be, as I mentioned
5 happened in the past, that is a desirable outcome. The other one
6 is not. And in the past when that happened with that pilot, he
7 was not admonished; he was not reprimanded. His planning was
8 looked at to ensure that he did do proper planning. But while
9 that might be -- well, it's an acceptable practice. Anything that
10 leads to a safe outcome, this is what we're after.

11 Q. Suppose he had autorotated successfully with the
12 patient, but was out of fuel, what would have been the company
13 response?

14 A. When we have things that happen like this -- that's
15 never happened to us before, so I can't just say, well in the
16 past, we've done this, that, or the other. But when we have
17 things that happen out of the ordinary, there's no one individual
18 that says we're going to do this or that. We discuss it as a
19 group. Well, we would discuss it: the chief pilot, myself,
20 probably a training manager, an HR representative. We're going to
21 think about what's happened here and how do we move forward from
22 this point.

23 Q. A possible recommendation that could be considered would
24 be that the company looks at either some sort of procedure or
25 enhances procedures to have the launch decision shared or have

1 someone else available. If a pilot calls in and says, I'm not
2 sure what to do here, that somehow either OCC or OCC connects him
3 to someone, someone like you, or some other thing, would that be a
4 fair recommendation?

5 A. That would impede upon the pilots-in-command, the pilot-
6 in-command's authority and responsibility to have somebody
7 removed, sitting 2,000 miles away to make that decision. Because
8 it works two ways. It could be that's an acceptable condition, go
9 ahead and fly, and that pilot might feel, I don't know that I
10 would really make that decision. We don't operate in an airline
11 world. We operate in a Part 135 on-demand system, wherein the
12 pilot-in-command, it's critical for him or her to maintain the
13 ultimate responsibility for the decision making. During the
14 course of the flight, they have the up-to-date information, which
15 I would not have, which someone in the OC would not have.

16 Q. How would you characterize pilot pay in the company?

17 A. Well, pilot pay currently, I know about, but there is a
18 contract that's out to the pilots currently for ratification and I
19 don't know the details of that contract. I was not involved in
20 the negotiations of it, but I worked under the other contract, the
21 current one that we're honoring. I worked under that contract as
22 a pilot and I was very satisfied with the pay.

23 Q. How would you characterize pilot morale?

24 A. I would characterize pilot morale as very good, very
25 high. Pilots enjoy this type of work and they take away from

1 this, from the day's work, more than just a paycheck. We perform
2 a service that, honestly, makes you feel good, more so than when I
3 used to fly giant air conditioners up on top of tall buildings.
4 The flight that I take today is going to have -- I worked at a
5 children's hospital -- it's going to have a profound effect on
6 that child and that child's family and it's -- it does, it really
7 does boost morale, makes you feel good to go to work.

8 All of the Omniflight pilots -- company that we acquired
9 in August of this year -- have -- I've met every one of them,
10 except for about 30 when I was unable to attend that class because
11 I was in the hospital, but otherwise I'd have been there -- are
12 very happy becoming Air Methods. They're seeing improvements and
13 changes from the way that they're currently operating under the
14 Omniflight company and that boosts morale. And I think the
15 contract that's out for ratification, I think that's going to help
16 with morale as well.

17 Q. What's special about this company?

18 A. Where do I start? I bleed blue. This company has a
19 very high ethical standard. They treat people very well, very
20 fairly. The positions that Aaron Todd, our CEO, has with regard
21 to things like pay, he will tell you, I want the pay in the
22 different homogenous groups to be at or near the top, which is a
23 nice standard for a CEO to take.

24 The safety initiatives that this company has voluntarily
25 taken, they cost money. I have a bullet in my presentation where

1 -- what is priority one? And I ask the group, what's the next
2 bullet? Everybody's going to know what it is. Safety, right?
3 But then I challenge that group to challenge me. Why do you think
4 that? Why do you believe it? And again, it's because this
5 company has taken the initiative to explore everything that we can
6 think of and determine whether or not it would improve the safety
7 and lower the accident rate.

8 And then we compete with our safety and we don't compete
9 with our safety. We take things that we have done here that have
10 been successful and share them with the industry. I sit on
11 various groups, director of ops committees, and we share ideas and
12 Air Methods is very willing to share these ideas to, again, to
13 promote safety within this industry. And I think that sets us
14 apart from others, that we're not so engrossed in running an
15 operation and not thinking about all of the industry to improve
16 the safety.

17 Q. For the record, what are some of the safety initiatives?

18 A. Well, we'll take a brand new aircraft, like a Bell 407
19 -- we ordered 15 of them this year -- and we'll bring them to
20 Denver and we'll spend about \$2 million on safety equipment.
21 Well, that's \$2 million including the medical interior, but a lot
22 of that expense is safety equipment. And then we'll put that
23 aircraft out into the field where we're competing against other
24 companies running 30-year-old 206s with hand-held GPSs. That's
25 one of them.

1 And then that equipment we're talking about: night
2 vision goggles, HTAWS, wire strike prevention systems, satellite
3 tracking, satellite telephone, satellite weather, night vision
4 goggles.

5 And then we've matured our SMS. We meet -- initially we
6 met every week for a year to exit Level 2, and we're meeting now
7 -- the frequency is appropriate at once a month there's a big
8 group, and once a month is breakout groups, and we're making a lot
9 of progress to become proactive and predictive to exit Level 3
10 into a fully-matured SMS, along with only two other airlines. And
11 I think that's a significant achievement and it doesn't come
12 cheaply.

13 The safety department, when I came on board in this
14 company, was one individual. Today it is a real department. We
15 have people that man up and chair certain programs within our
16 company, such as ASAP, MSAP, IEP. Those are some of the
17 initiatives that we've undertaken in order to continue to enhance
18 the safety.

19 Q. When you say two other airlines with SMS. Is that
20 within this industry or overall?

21 A. Every airline in the United States, there are only two
22 that have exited Level 3, that I'm aware of. And that's as
23 current as of maybe 3 months ago. In this industry, we're the
24 only ones that have exited Level 2. Many haven't even begun the
25 program. You can't get in the program any longer. There are too

1 many waiting in line and Washington can't fund it, but we still
2 share the ideas with others.

3 Other initiatives, the -- I lost my thought.

4 BY MR. SILLIMAN:

5 Q. Can you tell us about the FOQA program you're
6 developing?

7 A. Yes. We have signed an agreement with the Flight Safety
8 Foundation and our pilots union to establish a FOQA program. Our
9 safety department has funding for a full-time employee to develop
10 the program for 2012 to, you know, to get it started. Somebody's
11 got to grab it and get going with it. We have approximately 30
12 aircraft that have recording devices installed currently. We have
13 evaluated the equipment. I chair a group called Technology Review
14 Group and this is a group of engineers and pilots that come
15 together and we look at the latest state-of-the-art equipment.
16 And we've done that with different recording devices and made
17 recommendation on what we should install into our airframes.

18 And I'm hopeful that next year, we've got the 30 devices
19 feeding us data that we can react to in a -- or rather, be
20 predictive with. We can see trends. We have, you know, a culture
21 within our company where they fly lower than everyone else. So,
22 we can intervene and find out what's going on and why that is.

23 Partnering with the Flight Safety Foundation, they have
24 an endowment they want to use to develop a helicopter FOQA program
25 and they've partnered with us to do this. So, it's exciting. I

1 think it's -- if you were to rate or build a wish list of what I
2 wanted when I was chief pilot, now director of operations, we'd
3 put night vision goggles at the top. We would put HTAWS probably
4 underneath that, along with some other things. But where we are
5 now, is FOQA, recording devices. I want to become preventive and
6 predictive. They go hand in hand and we have to have data to do
7 that.

8 So, we have all these different reporting mechanisms.
9 Some are appropriate to be reported with this venue, which is
10 SilentWhistle, and this one may with ASAP and this one may be with
11 MSAP, but now we're going to gather all that data through a data
12 management system and it's going to give us what we need, I think,
13 to be able to get there. And the data we collect out of the FOQA
14 program, same thing. It's going to go into that data management
15 system and we're going to be able to look at that and have
16 meaningful data, which we have, but use it in a preventive and
17 proactive stance, so that we can get out there and stop stuff from
18 happening if we have somebody that isn't following the creed:
19 safe, legal and prudent.

20 Q. What recording devices are you using?

21 A. The one -- the 30 that we have now are the Apario (ph.)
22 devices.

23 Q. And can you explain that, what's special about those?

24 A. Well, I don't know that they're -- well, the special
25 thing about the Apario device is it's very light. It's very easy

1 to install. It's self-contained. It has its own accelerometers
2 and GPS and a small media card that can capture -- I can't tell
3 you how much data at this point. I don't recall. But the special
4 thing about it is it's easy. It's easy to install. It doesn't
5 take up a lot of space. It doesn't take up -- it doesn't weigh a
6 lot, so it doesn't have those impacts that we would if we went
7 with a full-up cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder.
8 They just, they wouldn't fit in our little helicopters. So,
9 that's what's special about it.

10 Apario kind of pioneered these little devices, but a lot
11 of other companies now have seen the value and they're hoping that
12 the NPRM calls for the, at some point, the requirement for this
13 device. They're hopeful for that. So a lot of companies are
14 making them. Companies that are providing a certain service, such
15 as satellite tracking, have expanded the capability to include
16 some recording capability and even uploading so you can get live
17 stream. They're exciting, what's out there on the market today.

18 So, I don't know that we'll stay with the Aparios for
19 the balance of our fleet. We're looking to capture more than what
20 the Aparios are. But they were what was available just as
21 recently as about 3 or 4 years ago. And in the last 3 or 4 years,
22 these other companies have really, you know, progressed
23 tremendously with the capability of those recording devices.

24 Q. Is the union pushing back on the video recording
25 capability of Apario?

1 A. I don't know, to be honest. I know they signed the FOQA
2 document and they're very -- the union leadership that I've met
3 with over these devices are very on board with it. I believe it's
4 a significant piece of safety equipment, but specifically speaking
5 of the video, I don't know.

6 MR. SILLIMAN: I'm done with that.

7 BY DR. BRENNER:

8 Q. How are relations with the union?

9 A. I have, I have good working relations currently with the
10 union leadership. I had nothing to do with the negotiations over
11 the contract, so I couldn't speak to that. But as far as when
12 they meet us out here and we talk about things like FOQA, we talk
13 about things like professional standards and so forth, the level
14 of cooperation is very good. We met most recently over the
15 integration of the Omni pilots, for example, and we were seeing 99
16 percent of that together.

17 Q. How's the quality of new hires for pilots?

18 A. The quality of the new hires? Excellent quality, just
19 not enough of them.

20 Q. How many more would you like?

21 A. Well, I'd like to see -- we're starting to see an uptick
22 in retirement. You know, for years, people have said, oh, the
23 Vietnam pilots aren't going to retire. But I think we're -- I
24 know it's a performance measure that I look at and we're seeing
25 more retirements. So, I'd like to see our pilots come home from

1 Afghanistan and Iraq, come back to work. We've got quite a few of
2 them out doing that, so I'd like to see them come back.

3 Q. How would you characterize the competitive environment
4 of this industry? How competitive is it?

5 A. I don't know that I could characterize it. I have a
6 very dark line in operations with a dotted line over to business.
7 We interact and speak and communicate, but I don't go out and
8 pound on the doors and look for more work. I've never done that.
9 I -- they take pizzas to 911 centers, but I don't know, I couldn't
10 tell you how -- I couldn't characterize that.

11 Q. Mr. Todd, what are his greatest strengths as a CEO?

12 A. He's a superb leader. He is a brilliant individual. He
13 challenges all of his reports and his executive staff and holds us
14 to performance measures so that when we make recommendations and
15 decisions, they're the right decisions. Those are some of his
16 strengths. He is a very visionary individual and, in a self-
17 effacing way, he'll say he's a bean counter, but the man is
18 brilliant. If I bring him something that's aviation-related, it's
19 uncanny how quickly he catches on or the questions that he'll ask
20 that are very meaningful.

21 Q. How does the company communicate safety to the pilots?

22 A. I'm sorry?

23 Q. How does the company, the safety office especially, how
24 do they communicate safety to the pilots?

25 A. Oh, we have a number of different ways that we do it.

1 We have safety alerts, safety notices, and safety bulletins. We
2 have different ways to disseminate information. One of the best
3 ways that we disseminate to the pilot-tasked -- pilot group and to
4 the maintenance group is through our 411 system, which is a --
5 well, it's an application that was developed initially to track
6 pilot currency and qualifications, but it has been expanding and
7 growing into different areas. But that's a way that we know we're
8 going to hit every pilot and every mechanic because they access
9 that application every day when they come to work.

10 We do safety connect newsletters on a monthly basis,
11 disseminated to all employees. That's a great tool for putting
12 out new information. We do attaboys. We do "There I was"
13 sometimes. Next year --

14 Q. What was a recent "There I was"?

15 A. A recent one that comes to my mind: A pilot who took
16 off without a flight release, and why that happened, the
17 distractions thereof. Another one was a pilot who inadvertently
18 hit a highway marker, highway -- it's actually a snowplow marker
19 on the side of the road on a scene landing with the tail rotor.
20 And he wrote a "There I was" for us on how he managed to do that
21 as experienced as he is, a 10-, 11,000-hour pilot.

22 Q. (Indiscernible) stuff. How are relations with the FAA?

23 A. We had some -- we had a team of 27 dedicated people in
24 our Certificate Management Team, our CMT, and they had some
25 turnover and some people moving up and moving down for a bit,

1 which can be sometimes difficult to get things done. But we now
2 have three principal inspectors for operations, maintenance, and
3 avionics that are excellent that we have an excellent relationship
4 with. They are always there for us. They, like myself, work
5 holidays, work nights, and work weekends, and we're working, I
6 think, very well together. We meet on a monthly basis and it's
7 rare a day goes by I don't talk to somebody on our FAA team. So,
8 we have a good relationship. They keep me well informed. They're
9 out in the field beating the bushes.

10 Last year, we had 8,000 inspections across the board
11 over all of our certificates and when they find things, they let
12 us know. We get letters of investigation or it may just be
13 something that's corrected on the spot. We get a phone call:
14 your airworthiness certificate was -- the sun had bleached out the
15 signature, so we provided a signature. It could be something
16 minor; it could be something bigger, but they do keep us informed
17 of their findings.

18 Q. All right.

19 DR. BRENNER: Jim?

20 BY MR. SILLIMAN:

21 Q. Early on in the conversation here, we -- you said that
22 you didn't know very much about this particular investigation.
23 Can you kind of expand on your role in this process? It sounds
24 like you've been able to divorce yourself of the particulars.
25 Could you explain that?

1 A. Well, I wouldn't use that word, divorce myself from it.
2 I've got to be kept informed, obviously, but when we get into
3 specifics -- well, let me back up a little bit. We had a fatal
4 accident. I know exactly where I am when I get that phone call.
5 It never leaves my head. And I got that phone call on a Friday
6 afternoon: we have an overdue aircraft. When that phone rings
7 and it's a 402 exchange, because their telephone trunking system
8 comes out of Omaha, I get a pit in my stomach.

9 And when I hear -- like the other night when they called
10 me, we had a tail rotor hit a mound of dirt on a scene call.
11 They're on the ground safe, a little tear rotor damage, you get a
12 sudden relief. That's all it was. Okay. But when it's an
13 overdue aircraft, it's a horrible, horrible feeling. When it was
14 confirmed, the fire departments found the aircraft, there are
15 fatal injuries, we launch -- and it's not only a fatal accident --
16 we have an accident response plan and we trigger it. So we get
17 into the manual and I run my responsibilities as director of
18 operations; Dennis runs his as chief pilot; Chris Meinhardt runs
19 his as the director of maintenance, and others. Michael Benton,
20 who's our compliance coordinator, he has a bag packed all the time
21 and he goes. He's on a plane right now, along with Chris
22 Meinhardt, along with a member of safety department. They're on
23 their way.

24 Our local managers are our first on the scene. They
25 have their responsibilities as well. Well, Michael Benton goes

1 and signs in as party to the investigation and he has a
2 requirement for confidentiality. So, there are certain things
3 that he cannot talk about as discussed with -- it could be you or
4 one of your colleagues. But I do -- I am made aware, as the
5 senior team is, of things that need to be addressed immediately.
6 I can't wait for your report 2 years from now. I can't do it.
7 I've got to know right now if I have something that's -- that
8 needs to be fixed or stopped right now. Those are the kinds of
9 things that I would get notified of.

10 I would participate in the root cause -- well, not in
11 the root cause analysis itself, but in the board's review of the
12 findings and recommendations. I have that level of participation.
13 But unless I sign on to an investigation, the particulars, not
14 necessarily until those confidential points are made public.

15 Q. You mentioned root cause analysis. I think I was
16 talking with Mike Koenes back in Fort Worth and he was mentioning
17 that as part of the SMS process, they were looking at root cause
18 analysis. And I asked if it would be possible to get that
19 information and he seemed to think it was. Now, he may have been
20 speaking a bit out of turn there, but if it's possible I would
21 like to have discussions or, you know, information about that and
22 some of the stuff that, as result of the SMS process, what changes
23 have been looked at and that kind of thing. So, you know, that's
24 kind of something that we'll just kind of throw up as a balloon
25 here and then just see if there's the possibility of -- you know,

1 if it's not possible, then I just want to know about it, but --

2 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Well -- and we'll talk to you
3 about that. Okay?

4 MR. SILLIMAN: Yeah.

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'll talk to Crystal about it. I
6 understand your request.

7 MR. SILLIMAN: Yeah.

8 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: See what we can work there.

9 MR. SILLIMAN: Okay.

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Because there's other
11 implications that really don't involve you guys, but --

12 MR. SILLIMAN: Right. I understand.

13 BY MR. SILLIMAN:

14 Q. What about your OCC? You have AirCom in Nebraska, OCC
15 here. In this circumstance, the OCC basically didn't know about
16 the aircraft because, from what I understand, is that the
17 dispatcher had created a new flight plan and so OCC was
18 essentially unaware until they got the call from AirCom that they
19 had a missing aircraft. Should -- from what I understand, OCC
20 probably would have picked that up had they not entered that
21 second flight plan; is that correct?

22 A. I don't know. I don't think so. From what I understand
23 about where he initially intended to go and the second revised
24 flight plan to the airport, were almost on the same track --

25 Q. Right.

1 A. -- just a shorter distance. So he would not have swayed
2 4 miles off center, off course line, to trigger an alert. But let
3 -- if -- even if it had been in a perpendicular direction and 4
4 miles out they received an alert, the alert is he's off course.
5 The call would be, why are you off course? The answer would be,
6 deviating to get fuel. And the conversation would stop.

7 Q. With OCC?

8 A. Um-hum.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes? You said um-hum. Just for
10 the purpose of the tape --

11 MR. BASSETT: Yes.

12 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- you said yes.

13 BY MR. SILLIMAN:

14 Q. In this situation, the pilot called AirCom and said that
15 he had a problem with his fuel and AirCom did not contact OCC with
16 that information. Is that something that the company is looking
17 at as far as changing operations on that, or changing procedures?

18 A. Oh, correction. LifeCom has a requirement now to make
19 that call when the aircraft is in flight. There's no requirement
20 to make that call when the aircraft's on the ground. We did
21 discuss whether or not we were going to change that language in
22 the manual, but without going back to my notes, I can't recall if
23 we were going to do it or not.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. It's not uncommon for a flight plan to change. We're a

1 very, very diverse operation. This is totally unlike the
2 airlines. Tomorrow morning at 10:04, I expect to push back on
3 United Airlines for Newark and everybody knows about this. And
4 they've known about it. The captain will -- he bid that flight
5 line a month ago, and he knows exactly where he's going. He could
6 probably, with the weather report, predict what runway he's going
7 to land on. He's probably going to predict about when he should
8 start getting vectors for the ILS. It's just all completely
9 planned. So for them to change -- I fly 100,000 miles this year
10 and we diverted once to Pueblo. So, it's very uncommon for those
11 things to happen. But in our world, it's common. Something
12 changes: the weather, the destination, cancel that inner facility
13 transport request and hang a left turn because we have a scene
14 call we need to respond to.

15 So, now that pilot in command has a lot of decisions to
16 make. Well, he has a lot of things to evaluate to make a
17 decision. The request just came in, I want to go -- okay, what
18 are the coordinates? What's my minimum -- or, I'm sorry, what's
19 my en route highest obstruction? What's the weather doing there?
20 Do I have the fuel to get there? Will I have the fuel to get back
21 from there to where they want to go? All these kinds of things
22 that a pilot-in-command is evaluating and then going to respond
23 back to the person that made the request. Most often it's the
24 communication specialist at LifeCom or at one of our hospital
25 communication centers. So, it's with him right there. It's

1 unpredictable in a lot of cases.

2 Q. The AirCom people, they're basically focused on EMS
3 coordination; is that correct?

4 A. Yes. They're call-takers and they find the most
5 suitable aircraft to respond to the call request that came in and
6 then they reach out to that pilot and offer it up. If the answer
7 is yes, now their responsibility includes the flight following
8 requirements.

9 Q. In this situation, the pilot called the dispatcher at
10 AirCom and said I've got a fuel problem, and then they tried to
11 resolve the fuel problem. In this situation, is that a question,
12 when it comes to, you know, piloting the aircraft and fueling and
13 those questions, would that be one where -- that AirCom and that
14 EMS dispatcher there would say, that's more of a pilot question
15 and maybe Leah up at OCC, since she's a pilot, could, you know,
16 provide better assistance than I can?

17 A. I don't know what conversation took place between those
18 two individuals, but if I were either one of them, if I were the
19 pilot and I'm discussing what's happening with my fuel situation
20 and what decisions I'm going to make about it, I don't need any
21 input from Leah. If I know what my fuel status is, I have my
22 flight, my charts; these are the kinds of things that I would do
23 as the pilot. If I was the communications specialist, I would
24 listen to what the pilot's telling me, but I really don't have any
25 input. He's telling me I can't get to the hospital; I got to

1 deviate for fuel. That I need to know and that's something I'm
2 going to have to enter in, but I don't see where that's going to
3 raise the ire of a non-aviator when being told in a confident
4 manner, I have to assume, that we're going to do this because of
5 fuel. Be the same on, you know, on a commercial flight. People
6 in the back are not involved in any decision making because
7 they're non-aviators.

8 MR. SILLIMAN: I'm thinking about -- if there's other
9 questions. I don't know, do you have anything?

10 MR. ALLAYHAR: I'm okay.

11 MR. SILLIMAN: You're okay?

12 DR. BRENNER: Anything else that we haven't discussed
13 that might help us in the investigation?

14 MR. BASSETT: Not that comes to mind. You know, we
15 participate fully, cooperate fully because we want to get to the
16 right answers, learn, so I -- nothing's coming to my mind that I
17 could add to this to help.

18 MR. SILLIMAN: And we appreciate that. You guys have
19 been very cooperative and we appreciate it. I don't have anything
20 else.

21 DR. BRENNER: All right. Okay. I guess --

22 MR. BASSETT: Thank you.

23 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: AIR METHODS CORPORATION
 LIFENET HELICOPTER ACCIDENT
 AUGUST 26, 2011
 NEAR MOSBY, MISSOURI
 Interview of Chris Bassett

DOCKET NUMBER: CEN11FA599

PLACE: Omaha, Nebraska

DATE: December 8, 2011

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been compared to
the recording.

Vanita Tildon
Transcriber