NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Washington, D.C.

Attachment V REFERENCE 33

33. IR 357: NTSB verbal request of 2/26/2012 regarding significant crack length. Page 1

07-26-10 Marshall, MI DCA10-MP-007

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MP 608 – Marshall, Michigan Incident NTSB/PHMSA Information Request No. 340

340	Reference: Preamble:	NTSB verbal request of February 6, 2012 by Ravi Chhatre				
	Request:	With regards to section 6 of the 2003 Field Assessment Procedua) Was the failed feature considered "significant" per the d in 6.1?b) Does Enbridge grind remove all SCC as required in Tab section 6.4?				
	Response:	a) Understand the field an Canadian p necessarily this definit following t critical crac 50% deep o	nderstanding that (1) SCC dimensions are only determined in e field and not from ILI, (2) section 6.1 only applied to anadian pipelines, (3) the term "Significant SCC" does not cessarily relate to SCC severity, (4) and that CEPA removed is definition from their updated Recommended Practice, the llowing table provides the length pertaining to 75% of the itical crack length for 30"OD x 0.25" wt pipe determined for 0% deep cracks exposed to internal pressure of 110%SMYS.			
		CVN	YS (ksi)	UTS (ksi)	75% of Critical	

CVN	YS (ksi)	UTS (ksi)	75% of Critical
(ft-lb)			Length (in)
20	52	66	0.98
	56	71	1.75
	60	75	2.47

b) All SCC confirmed by field NDE technician is mitigated through surface grinding, installation of a pressure containing sleeve, or through cutout. Table 1 of section 6.4 is intended to relate limits to grinding and the maximum operating pressure during these mitigation activities, and not the necessary repair itself. There are field conditions, such as local geometry, that prevents UT examination for other potential flaws, and that prevent grind removal of all shallow SCC. In these cases, a pressure containment sleeve is also a mitigation option allowed by our O&MP.