

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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IN RE: :

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THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING TWO : NTSB Accident No.

UNION PACIFIC FREIGHT : DCA16FR005

TRAINS THAT OCCURRED NEAR :

GRANGER, WYOMING ON :

MARCH 14, 2016 :

 :

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INTERVIEW OF: TEL CARTER

Tuesday,

March 15, 2016

Little America Travel Center

Granger, Wyoming

BEFORE

TED TURPIN, NTSB

RICK NARVELL, NTSB

BRIAN FRANSEN, BLET

RAYMOND LINDSEY, Federal Railroad Administration

JOHN MAYSER, Federal Railroad Administration

STEVE LORD, Union Pacific

This transcript was produced from audio

provided by the National Transportation Safety Board.

1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 (Time not given)

3 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: All right. My name is
4 Ted Turpin. Today is March 15, 2016, and we're at the
5 Little America Travel Center interviewing the pilot
6 conductor in connection with an accident that occurred
7 near Granger, Wyoming, March 14, 2016.

8 The NTSB accident number is DCA16FR005. And
9 the purpose of the investigation is to increase the
10 safety not to assign fault or liability or blame. And
11 we cannot offer a guarantee of confidentiality because
12 these things are transcribed and then put into a public
13 docket.

14 MR. CARTER: Okay.

15 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: We also can't provide
16 immunity if somebody wanted to pull a certificate or
17 something, conductor ticket. We don't have anything to
18 do with that.

19 MR. CARTER: I understand.

20 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: And you have opted not
21 to have a representative here. And do you understand
22 that this is being recorded?

23 MR. CARTER: Yes.

24 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: All right. Thank you.
25 So if you would state your name and spell it.

1 MR. CARTER: Name is Tel Carter. First name
2 is T-E-L. Last name Carter, C-A-R-T-E-R.

3 MR. FRANSEN: Brian Fransen, BLET. B-R-I-A-
4 N, F-R-A-N-S-E-N.

5 MR. LORD: Steve Lord, L-O-R-D, Director of
6 Operating Practices, Union Pacific Railroad, Northern
7 Region.

8 MR. LINDSEY: Raymond Lindsey, L-I-N-D-S-E-
9 Y, Federal Railroad Administration, Operating
10 Practices.

11 MR. MAYSER: John Mayser, Federal Railroad
12 Administration, M-A-Y-S-E-R, OP Practices.

13 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Rick Narvell, N, like
14 in Nancy, A-R-V-E-L-L. I'm a Human Performance
15 Investigator with the NTSB.

16 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: And again, Ted Turpin,
17 T-U-R-P-I-N. Do you mind if I call you Tel?

18 MR. CARTER: Absolutely not, that's fine.

19 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: All right. Just tell
20 us what happened.

21 MR. CARTER: We were running in the signal
22 suspension there. I was at the CPG 002 helping Mr.
23 Bush because he just showed up on the scene. Dropped
24 in with him. Mr. Lundquist (phonetic), Jerry Lundquist
25 had been out there before and then told me that Mr.

1 Bush had just showed up and wanted me just to go help
2 him out when he showed up.

3 So I went over there, was just with him as
4 he talked the, I believe there was a west bound he
5 talked through first on signal indication leaving the
6 limits and then he talked the Chemra (phonetic) local
7 into the OSL main. After he got done with that I went
8 back over to CPG 847 to basically get back on my
9 territory where I was assigned after assisting with Mr.
10 Bush.

11 That's when the dispatcher told us we were
12 going to go run some trains because she was having to
13 hold the Chemra local in the long sighting. She didn't
14 have a route because the, I can't remember which train.
15 There was another train out there out west Baco
16 (phonetic) on Main 2.

17 So she had to have a route for them. So she
18 was going to hold them in the long sighting, the Chemra
19 local. And she wanted us to go Main 1 to Main 1 with
20 the 5718 and then we had an east bound coming. I
21 believe it was a 7712 that we were going to go Main 2
22 to Main 2 through the limits.

23 Talked the train through. The pilot of 844
24 talked the train into the limits and through the
25 limits. The night dispatcher came on, said I just had

1 an occupancy pop up Main 1 to the long sighting at 844.
2 He tried to contact the train, contacted us and that's
3 when the incident occurred and the train struck the
4 other train.

5 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. So that was the
6 missing part. There was, in this project right here
7 there was three conductor pilots then?

8 MR. CARTER: There was, they had Clark,
9 Litteral, Bush and then I was there. I was, Bush was
10 the Pocatello guy that I went out --

11 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: You were 847?

12 MR. CARTER: I was 847 and EIC was Litteral.
13 And they wanted us to have two guys at 847 if possible
14 just with the amount of switches at 847 we could have
15 an EIC coordinating and somebody at 847 lining switches
16 if need be.

17 We had to run everything straight track at
18 847. We had not lined any switches all night long at
19 847. I was going to go to Verne, excuse me west of
20 here to set up there if need to be to be as an
21 intermediate pilot between 847.

22 It was kind of, I was kind of floating just
23 because I had to cover G002 for a portion of the night
24 because they didn't have a pilot until Mr. Bush showed
25 up.

1 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Got you. At the time
2 of the accident then there were four pilots on the
3 scene?

4 MR. CARTER: That's correct. I was there
5 too.

6 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: And you were at 847?

7 MR. CARTER: I was at 847.

8 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: But since they weren't
9 moving a lot of switches you were also kind of wild
10 card in a sense?

11 MR. CARTER: Yes, yes.

12 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. All right. So
13 when you went down to help Bush let's get to the
14 detail. Mainly when he called, when he authorized the
15 local in what were your activities, what were you
16 doing?

17 MR. CARTER: I was just sitting there in my
18 truck next to Mr. Bush. And just instructing him on
19 verbiage, you know, ensuring the switches were lined
20 for him and, you know, making sure that he knew that --

21 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: So you went down and
22 checked the switches?

23 MR. CARTER: At G002. I actually did look
24 at the switch at G002 to ensure that it was lined for
25 the, because the west bound was signal. So we were

1 okay there. They were going on signal indication.

2 When the other one came in I verified the
3 switch. But that was, does that make sense?

4 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: No, because it's, the
5 signals are suspended. So I'm not sure I understand.
6 If it's suspended who is running on signals?

7 MR. CARTER: That was the first operating
8 signal, G002 was.

9 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay, for a west bound
10 move?

11 MR. CARTER: That is correct.

12 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: I got you.

13 MR. CARTER: The west bound got the light
14 out. The east bound was the local. We verify the
15 switches and Mr. Bush talked him into the limits.

16 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. Did the
17 dispatcher control the switches there?

18 MR. CARTER: Yes.

19 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: All right. Is it
20 normal for you to go down and check them even though
21 the dispatcher is controlling them?

22 MR. CARTER: On a remove like that I would
23 where it's entering the limits. Dispatcher says you're
24 lined and locked or sometimes does, they should. But
25 I'm a little paranoid, OCD. I like to check those

1 things.

2 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Do you think that's a
3 personal procedure not really a written one?

4 MR. CARTER: I don't know that it's written.
5 But it's something I like to do just cover my butt,
6 cover, I mean the train's butt to prevent something
7 obviously from happening.

8 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Right, okay. So where
9 were you physically when the accident happened?

10 MR. CARTER: I was back at G847.

11 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Down at 47?

12 MR. CARTER: Yes, I had just got back to
13 there.

14 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. Do you know
15 where the EIC was?

16 MR. CARTER: He was at 847.

17 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: You guys were together
18 there?

19 MR. CARTER: Yes, I had just barely got back
20 there and Mr., I can't remember his last name, Bernie
21 was there too, the EIC for the signal gate.

22 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. We've got
23 another character. You didn't throw anybody --

24 MR. CARTER: No, he was just there because
25 he was our coordinating guy that we were coordinating

1 with to make sure their guys weren't on the tracks.

2 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay.

3 MALE PARTICIPANT: Were you there when the
4 two earlier east bound went through?

5 MR. CARTER: I've got to --

6 MALE PARTICIPANT: We don't have engine
7 numbers.

8 MR. CARTER: And that's the hard part for
9 me.

10 MALE PARTICIPANT: There was an MH at 7:00.

11 MR. CARTER: Yes.

12 MALE PARTICIPANT: And then there was, 7:30
13 there was a ZW. They both basically did the same
14 thing. They were long sighting over to 2.

15 MR. CARTER: Excuse me. Yes, I don't, I
16 have engine numbers. But I believe I was at 002 for
17 those two trains, the HKMP and I'm pretty sure that ZWA
18 I was at 002 for those two trains.

19 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Well without IDs did
20 you bring two trains off of Pocatella?

21 MR. CARTER: Yes, I brought, yes, I did.

22 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: There you go. I think
23 that works. Do you recall when you authorized them did
24 you take them all the way to 2 or did you have to hand
25 them over to 844?

1 MR. CARTER: I was 2.

2 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Yes, right. But when
3 you authorize them through at 2 --

4 MR. CARTER: Yes.

5 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: -- you hand them to
6 844 or did you have, were you able to give them
7 instructions all the way through?

8 MR. CARTER: That would depend on if a train
9 was ahead still. Like the first train that came
10 through if I had verified with 847 that the switches
11 were lined and locked normal then I could send him all
12 the way to 844.

13 Then once he cleared, his rear end would
14 clear 847 then I could then send the next train to 847.

15 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: To 847.

16 MR. CARTER: And then he would send that
17 train to 844 when the train ahead cleared 844.

18 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. But you could
19 never authorize them beyond 844. You have to give them
20 to 844?

21 MR. CARTER: 844 and I could give them to
22 exit on signal indication because that was the first
23 operating signal.

24 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Those were live
25 leaving?

1 MR. CARTER: Yes. 844 east bound was your
2 first operating signal.

3 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Do you remember if
4 they lit up for the trains? Did they send the signals?

5 MR. CARTER: As far as I can remember they
6 did not have to flag any trains out that way. They
7 were getting signals to cross over there at 844.

8 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: So once you got them
9 through 02 they were able to leave by signal?

10 MR. CARTER: They could leave on signals
11 once they got past 847, yes, barring trains ahead,
12 exactly.

13 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. We're going to
14 know all this when we look at the dispatcher log as
15 well. You know, it's all time stamped. But it's
16 interesting from the field perspective what you saw and
17 heard out there as far as the train movements.

18 Do you remember hearing the conversation the
19 dispatcher had with the EIC of the pending moves,
20 specifically about the local move and the 1 to 1 move?

21 MR. CARTER: If I remember right the
22 original, they weren't, she wasn't sure which one she
23 was going to go with first. And then as the local came
24 up through the sighting that's when she said they
25 didn't have a route for that local to go anywhere.

1 That's when she, and Mr. Litteral then
2 talked, he actually came on the radio and told the
3 local, excuse me again, hey, did you guys hear that.
4 We're going to be holding you at 844. And it was in
5 that conversation with the dispatcher that she had said
6 Main 1 to 1 west, 2 to 2 east. I mean, if that makes
7 sense.

8 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: And the way you heard
9 that was that was a formal briefing of the moves to be
10 made?

11 MR. CARTER: That's the way we, yes, that's
12 the way I took it is that we were going to go with the
13 5718 Main 1 all the way through the limits.

14 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: And were you with the
15 EIC listening to the radio at the same time?

16 MR. CARTER: I was on my way over. That was
17 in, while I was coming over from 002 to 847. That was
18 on my radio in my vehicle that I heard that.

19 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. Did you talk to
20 the EIC once you got there and got the pending moves?

21 MR. CARTER: Yes.

22 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: What was that
23 conversation?

24 MR. CARTER: It was that we were going to,
25 he was, at that time when I got over there he was

1 talking to Bernie making sure that his guys were clear
2 of Main 1 and Main 2 so that we could run the trains.

3 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: We've got a west,
4 we've got an east.

5 MR. CARTER: We've got a west, we've got an
6 east, exactly.

7 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay.

8 MR. CARTER: Bernie checked with his guys.
9 Everybody is in the clear. Tells Mr. Litteral we can
10 run the trains. He then tells Mr. Clark that we can
11 run the trains. We've got authority from these guys to
12 run the trains, the west bound. The east bound had not
13 arrived in our limits yet.

14 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Were you there when
15 the EIC told 844 pilot 1 to 1? Was that the
16 instruction he gave him?

17 MR. CARTER: Yes, it was 1 to 1.

18 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: And specifically to,
19 you know, bring the west into 1?

20 MR. CARTER: Yes, we were going to run,
21 we're ready to run 1 to 1, yes.

22 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay, all right.
23 We're really kind of interested in this pre-discussion
24 that the dispatcher had with the EIC which we'll get,
25 it will be clearer when we talk to him obviously. But

1 you did overhear it.

2 And we've dug back so and talked about your
3 experiences too. You've been a conductor pilot a lot?

4 MR. CARTER: Three years.

5 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Three years. And you
6 worked it a lot during those three years?

7 MR. CARTER: Yes.

8 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. Have you
9 experienced two levels of briefings from a dispatcher,
10 one is I'm planning but I'm not sure yet and then all
11 of a sudden it becomes formal and this is what I want
12 done? Do you understand what I'm asking?

13 MR. CARTER: Yes, give me that one more
14 time. I'm sorry.

15 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. So a dispatcher
16 is having a discussion with you if you are an EIC.
17 Says well I think I'll run 1 to 1, 2 to 2. The east is
18 coming. And then later they call you up formally and
19 say this is the way the trains are going to run and it
20 may even be different from the previous discussion?

21 MR. CARTER: It will happen, yes.

22 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. How do you tell
23 the difference between what's an informal kind of
24 discussion and what's a formal this is the way we're
25 going to run it?

1 MR. CARTER: I guess it would just be if
2 it's, the dispatcher would basically say I'm not sure
3 what I'm going to do next. And then when they're ready
4 to go it's we're going to do this. I mean does that
5 make --

6 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Yes.

7 MR. CARTER: That's going to be hey, this is
8 your next move or we're going to do this. That's
9 generally how it will come across as more of a
10 definitive thing.

11 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. And that last
12 instruction in this accident, that sounded like a
13 definitive plan to you?

14 MR. CARTER: Exactly, that's how I took it
15 was that was a definitive plan to me.

16 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. And I guess
17 that would kind of piggyback off of the previous
18 discussion that I've got an east bound that's going to
19 foul the local. I can't take him out, therefore, and
20 that's what prompted the 1 to 1.

21 MR. CARTER: Yes, yes.

22 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Was the only way you
23 could run the train?

24 MR. CARTER: Yes, because there's, yes,
25 because it goes to directional traffic at 847. So 1 to

1 1 at 844, 1 to 1 at 847.

2 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Right, okay. That
3 makes sense. Brian.

4 MR. FRANSEN: Brian Fransen, BLET. Can you
5 tell if you, just for my clarity you, the dispatcher
6 comes on and has an informal conversation and tells you
7 guys what her plan is. But there is no, you have a
8 format on how like Pilot Clark told us, there is a
9 format how you talk the trains through.

10 It's almost like typing through a form,
11 right there's a certain speed. You give them the
12 speed. You give them the permission. That's a red
13 flag, that. But there is no format or anything for the
14 dispatcher to tell you the official plan that okay,
15 this is, so from the pre-conversation to what she's,
16 the locked down plan of she or he there is no formal
17 thing she has to do?

18 MR. CARTER: No specific verbiage. Is that
19 what you mean?

20 MR. FRANSEN: Yes.

21 MR. CARTER: No.

22 MR. FRANSEN: There's not a script basically
23 that she has to give that would, does that put it
24 clear? And I know I'm struggling for the right word.

25 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: No, we got the answer.

1 No, there is no procedure.

2 MR. FRANSEN: All right.

3 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: You didn't struggle.
4 You got it. And you answered.

5 MR. LORD: Steve Lord. Tel, I've got a
6 couple questions. So dispatcher controlled G002.

7 MR. CARTER: Yes.

8 MR. LORD: And 844?

9 MR. CARTER: Yes.

10 MR. LORD: But not 847?

11 MR. CARTER: That's correct.

12 MR. LORD: Were those switches off power?

13 MR. CARTER: They were.

14 MR. LORD: And you didn't line any of them
15 all day long?

16 MR. CARTER: No, sir.

17 MR. LORD: Were they clamped?

18 MR. CARTER: They were not clamped. They
19 were locked with the signalman lock.

20 MR. LORD: Because, you know, you describe
21 yourself as OCD a little bit I guess.

22 MR. CARTER: Yes.

23 MR. LORD: At 002 you've known the
24 dispatcher controlling you ensure that they're lined?

25 MR. CARTER: I did, yes, at G002.

1 MR. LORD: Why do you think the switch on
2 the (inaudible) was still lined?

3 MR. CARTER: Are you talking 844?

4 MR. LORD: Yes, at 844.

5 MR. CARTER: Why do I think it was still
6 lined? I have no idea. The dispatcher had control.
7 So as far as I'm concerned or I know the dispatcher had
8 it lined into there.

9 MR. LORD: So if you would have been worked
10 844 and you got an instruction from the EIC would you
11 still ensure that switch was lined?

12 MR. CARTER: Me personally, yes.

13 MR. LORD: There's nothing really that
14 requires you when the dispatcher is controlling?

15 MR. CARTER: Not to my knowledge.

16 MR. LORD: So do you think it's possible
17 listening to a radio conversation that the EIC assumes
18 the dispatcher is ready to run that west bound 1 to 1
19 when she really wasn't?

20 MR. CARTER: Do I think that --

21 MR. LORD: Think the EIC assumed she was
22 ready to run that west bound 1 to 1 when she really
23 wasn't?

24 MR. CARTER: No, I believe that she was
25 ready and instructing us, the EIC to run that train 1

1 to 1. That's my --

2 MR. LORD: (inaudible). I've been trying to
3 say it that well about, planning, planned moves, not
4 really being ready to do it. There was a chance that
5 she was still in the planning stage when the EIC
6 understood as she is rock solid on this plan we're
7 going to run 1 to 1.

8 MR. CARTER: Not the way it sounded to me.
9 I thought she was ready to go 1 to 1 west bound.

10 MR. LORD: Thank you. It turned out she
11 wasn't.

12 MR. CARTER: Yes, it turned out she wasn't.
13 But it was, she had forgot to maybe line the switch and
14 didn't realize it or --

15 MR. LORD: The EIC assumed she was ready
16 when she wasn't?

17 MR. CARTER: Either way, I guess. But I
18 told you that's not the way I saw it and not the way I
19 heard it.

20 MR. LORD: That's all I have.

21 MR. MAYSER: John Mayser, FRA. Have you had
22 any formal training ever in being a switch tender or a
23 flagman like this?

24 MR. CARTER: When I first started it was a
25 few years ago, I spent a few days following around

1 somebody who had been doing it for a few years getting
2 acquainted with it.

3 MR. MAYSER: Sort of like an OJT or is it
4 formal, you know, like classroom?

5 MR. CARTER: It was just like an OJT.

6 MR. MAYSER: Like an OJT?

7 MR. CARTER: Yes, I was just following him
8 around getting the verbiage correct, stuff like that,
9 you know. Mostly it's verbiage ensuring that you know
10 what you're doing, where your trains are, what's going
11 on type of deal.

12 MR. MAYSER: Had you worked any other
13 suspended blocks before like this?

14 MR. CARTER: Yes.

15 MR. MAYSER: Okay. So it's not your first
16 rodeo on this?

17 MR. CARTER: No, sir.

18 MR. MAYSER: When switches are on power is
19 it assumed that the dispatcher, besides having control
20 of the switch knows the indication of the switch?

21 MR. CARTER: They, the way I've took it is
22 they can tell if it's lined and locked.

23 MR. MAYSER: If they have power on the
24 switch?

25 MR. CARTER: If they have power. I'm not a

1 signalman. I don't know this cat. I don't know, you
2 know, that's above me. But that's my assumption and my
3 understanding.

4 MR. MAYSER: But it's just your extra sense
5 of being careful to verify switch positions?

6 MR. CARTER: Yes.

7 MR. MAYSER: Okay. And it's, you've never
8 been told you have to always, rather it's on power or
9 not, have to verify switch positions?

10 MR. CARTER: They, the job basically we had
11 here on Sunday that's what they wanted us.

12 MR. MAYSER: Who is they?

13 MR. CARTER: The signal department.

14 MR. MAYSER: The signal department wanted
15 you guys, made it clear that they wanted you guys to
16 check switch positions?

17 MR. CARTER: Just to check the switch
18 position on the --

19 MR. MAYSER: Only on the 847s?

20 MR. CARTER: No.

21 MR. MAYSER: Or on the, you know, the 844
22 and the 002 as well?

23 MR. CARTER: I've got to think about it just
24 to make sure. I just want to make sure. And I can't
25 remember specifically what switches exactly they wanted

1 us to check, if it was just the ones off power or the
2 ones on power. But they did ask us to check switch
3 points.

4 MR. MAYSER: Okay. They asked you to check
5 switch points.

6 MR. CARTER: But and I can't remember if it
7 was all. That's, I can't remember.

8 MR. MAYSER: But you take it upon yourself
9 to always check whether it's on power or not?

10 MR. CARTER: Yes.

11 MR. MAYSER: Okay, I got you. So you hear
12 the west bound train. He talks to 844. You hear that
13 over your radio, right?

14 MR. CARTER: Yes.

15 MR. MAYSER: Did, was the west bound train
16 cleared to you or is he cleared through the entire
17 limits?

18 MR. CARTER: If I remember correctly that
19 was, we had cleared him through the entire limits.

20 MR. MAYSER: Okay, so did you speak with the
21 --

22 MR. CARTER: No.

23 MR. MAYSER: You just heard he is cleared
24 through the entire limits?

25 MR. CARTER: Yes.

1 MR. MAYSER: Okay.

2 MR. CARTER: I didn't speak to either one of
3 the trains.

4 MR. MAYSER: Anybody, okay, I got you.

5 MR. CARTER: No, sir.

6 MR. MAYSER: So were you in a position to
7 see him take the sighting when he did?

8 MR. CARTER: No.

9 MR. MAYSER: Okay. When the impact occurred
10 or at any time before or after the impact, did you ever
11 hear over the radio a dispatcher come across and say
12 stop the train?

13 MR. CARTER: He came across and said stop
14 the train. But I believe it was after they had already
15 made contact. He had been trying to get a hold of them
16 because he, I don't know what he thought if he just
17 didn't know if it was a signal occupancy or what.

18 But he had tried to get a hold of them and I
19 did hear him say stop the train. And I believe the
20 crew came back on and said we've already made contact.

21 MR. MAYSER: Right.

22 MR. CARTER: It was kind of a hectic time
23 right there. But that's the way I remember it.

24 MR. MAYSER: Did you hear, did you get the
25 sense or was it official that one dispatcher was taking

1 over for another dispatcher or is it you just kind of
2 figured that out?

3 MR. CARTER: That was just, that was the
4 first we heard from the night dispatcher.

5 MR. MAYSER: Okay, that was the first time
6 you heard from the night dispatcher or from the male
7 dispatcher?

8 MR. CARTER: Yes, yes.

9 MR. MAYSER: Was stop the train?

10 MR. CARTER: Was he tried to contact the
11 train.

12 MR. MAYSER: After it had already struck?

13 MR. CARTER: After, I believe it was after
14 it had passed the signal because he caught that
15 occupancy there. It may have already struck at that
16 point. That I don't know.

17 But that was when he had first, I had first
18 heard him on the radio, yes, was in that time frame
19 shortly before they actually struck.

20 MR. MAYSER: Thank you. Got you, okay. I'm
21 good.

22 MALE PARTICIPANT: I don't have any
23 questions on the accident if you want me to.

24 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Did you need to leave
25 again? It's Rick's turn.

1 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: I have some
2 questions, standard type questions that I would ask but
3 are not related specific to the accident.

4 MR. CARTER: Okay.

5 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: If you don't know on
6 some of these you don't know. One is, and I've asked
7 the other fellows this too, I'm trying to get a sense
8 of your rest history, what time to bed what time to
9 awake three or four days before the accident. Can you
10 do that here or do you want to do it and e-mail it to
11 me down the road?

12 MR. CARTER: I can try to do it here if you
13 like and if I have a rough time then I can e-mail you
14 if that's okay with you.

15 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: That's fine with me,
16 yes.

17 MR. CARTER: Okay.

18 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: So we're going, I'm
19 interested in from Friday the 11th up to and including
20 yesterday. So Friday what time, do you remember what
21 time you got up?

22 MR. CARTER: Friday I got up at probably
23 around noon. I had worked a trip to Delco (phonetic).

24 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. And did you
25 work later that day?

1 MR. CARTER: Yes.

2 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: All right. So you
3 worked, you were up at noon and then you went back on
4 duty at what time?

5 MR. CARTER: I believe it was around, I've
6 got to remember what train I caught. I'm sorry.

7 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: And again, if you
8 want to, if this is kind of vague to you because I've
9 got three more days of this.

10 MR. CARTER: Why don't I e-mail it to you if
11 that's okay with you just so I can look at my work
12 history and make it a lot easier on me.

13 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: So if you want to
14 just put underneath your days worked and then your
15 awake and then bed times for the time period.

16 MR. CARTER: Let me write this down, I'm
17 sorry, just so I don't forget. Can I borrow a pen?
18 That will work even better, thank you. Okay, what did
19 you need again? I'm sorry.

20 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: So from Friday the
21 11th up until including when you went on duty, Monday,
22 yesterday the 14th. Your on duty and off duty times
23 for those days and then your in bed and awake times.
24 Okay.

25 MR. CARTER: Okay.

1 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: And just send them to
2 me in the next few days or so.

3 MR. CARTER: This one if you're here, okay.
4 I'll keep that card so I don't mess it up.

5 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: If it goes to me I
6 will get it to him. He has his own. We do know each
7 other.

8 MR. CARTER: All right. That works for me.

9 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: I share.

10 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: How about, just a
11 couple of questions about your health in general.
12 Good, bad, poor?

13 MR. CARTER: I would say good.

14 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. Taking any
15 medications?

16 MR. CARTER: I take a anti-anxiety,
17 Lexapro.

18 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. Why don't you
19 put that information on, and I'll get that from you in
20 terms of when it was first prescribed and dosage and
21 you can send that to me in that e-mail too please?

22 MR. CARTER: Yes, first.

23 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay, anything else
24 medication wise?

25 MR. CARTER: Ibuprofen, that's it.

1 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay, is that normal?

2 MR. CARTER: It is a prescription ibuprofen.

3 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Did you take it the
4 night of the accident, the day of the accident?

5 MR. CARTER: I don't believe so.

6 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay, and again put
7 that down, that information as well. Just put it
8 together.

9 MR. CARTER: Okay.

10 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: When was your last
11 physical?

12 MR. CARTER: Thank you.

13 MALE PARTICIPANT: Why don't you send him a
14 questionnaire? You send him the e-mail.

15 MR. CARTER: That probably would be easier.

16 MALE PARTICIPANT: There's only a few more.

17 MR. CARTER: No, I'm fine, I'm fine.

18 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: So put that on there
19 too I guess.

20 MR. CARTER: I got it.

21 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Any alcohol or drug
22 use before the accident?

23 MR. CARTER: No.

24 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. And then did
25 you go for post accident testing?

1 MR. CARTER: No.

2 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. All right.
3 How about your vision? Do you know what your vision
4 rating is?

5 MR. CARTER: I don't off the top of my head.

6 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Do you wear glasses
7 or contacts?

8 MR. CARTER: No.

9 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. Do you see
10 okay?

11 MR. CARTER: Yes.

12 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Hearing, same thing,
13 any problems?

14 MR. CARTER: Yes, no problems.

15 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Can you give us a
16 sense of the workload that night? Was it busy, normal
17 or low?

18 MR. CARTER: It was incredibly busy through
19 the first and then it had slowed down.

20 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: When you went on
21 duty?

22 MR. CARTER: Yes.

23 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay, then it slowed
24 down?

25 MR. CARTER: Yes.

1 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. And any
2 problems with any of your equipment that night, radios,
3 any issues?

4 MR. CARTER: No.

5 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Last one, cell phone,
6 do you have a cell phone?

7 MR. CARTER: Yes.

8 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Were you using it
9 when you went on duty at all?

10 MR. CARTER: I had it with me just to,
11 communication redundancy because of the pilots. The
12 one we can very faintly hear if at all so we can
13 communicate with him.

14 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Did you actually do
15 that or was it just a back up?

16 MR. CARTER: As a back up.

17 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: So you did not use
18 it?

19 MR. CARTER: I probably used it to call him.

20 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Prior to the
21 accident?

22 MR. CARTER: Yes.

23 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: But it's work
24 related?

25 MR. CARTER: Yes, everything work related.

1 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: What's UP's policy on
2 cell phones?

3 MR. CARTER: I believe it was okay on
4 communication redundancy. That was my understanding.

5 INVESTIGATOR NARVELL: Okay. All right.
6 That's all I have. Thank you.

7 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: A little overview,
8 where you hired out, what you've done, where you've
9 been?

10 MR. CARTER: I hired out, out of Ogden as a
11 switchman.

12 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: What year?

13 MR. CARTER: 2003. I worked in the yard for
14 pretty well the first eight, nine years of my career in
15 Ogden. I went out on the road a few years ago and I've
16 been working as a road conductor since.

17 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. So you're a
18 certified conductor?

19 MR. CARTER: Yes.

20 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Remote?

21 MR. CARTER: Yes.

22 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Engineer?

23 MR. CARTER: No.

24 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Are you going to take
25 the engineer?

1 MR. CARTER: Probably not.

2 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay, that's fair.

3 And just overall how often do you think you've probably
4 done pilot work?

5 MR. CARTER: I'd say two to three times a
6 year on average and just depending on the time range on
7 each one. I mean it's not excessive. The first year I
8 did, I did it for three months straight (inaudible)
9 project.

10 And then it just, it's kind of sporadic,
11 just whenever they need me.

12 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: Okay. Anything else
13 in the room?

14 MR. FRANSEN: Fransen of the BLET. Is it
15 the dispatcher that dispatches his territory, what is
16 it Green River to Ogden, one dispatcher or is it --

17 MR. CARTER: He goes, Dispatcher 6 goes
18 Green River to Salt Lake.

19

20 MR. FRANSEN: To Salt Lake?

21 MR. CARTER: Yes.

22 MR. FRANSEN: Is this the only signal
23 suspension going on right now in the territory that you
24 know of?

25 MR. CARTER: To my knowledge, yes.

1 MR. FRANSEN: Okay, good for me.

2 INVESTIGATOR TURPIN: We're all good.

3 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
4 off the record.)

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C E R T I F I C A T E

MATTER: Union Pacific Freight Train Accident
Granger, WY March 14, 2016
Accident No. DCA16FR005
Interview of Tel Carter

DATE: 03-15-16

I hereby certify that the attached transcription of page 1 to 33 inclusive are to the best of my professional ability a true, accurate, and complete record of the above referenced proceedings as contained on the provided audio recording; further that I am neither counsel for, nor related to, nor employed by any of the parties to this action in which this proceeding has taken place; and further that I am not financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.



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