



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA *

STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. *

JANUARY 12, 2015 *

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Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004

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Interview of: RICHARD ZEGOWITZ

Washington, D.C.

Thursday,
January 29, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: RICHARD DOWNS, JR.
Survival Factors Investigator

APPEARANCES:

RICHARD DOWNS, JR., Survival Factors Investigator
Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group
National Transportation Safety Board

ROBERT JOE GORDON, Investigator-in-Charge
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JOSEPH TEBO, Program Manager
State Safety Oversight
Tri-State Oversight Committee
Maryland Department of Transportation

DENTON ROURKE, Operations Manager
Office of Emergency Management
WMATA

DERRON HAWKINS, Deputy Fire Chief
D.C. Fire and EMS
Homeland Security & Special Operations Division

JAMES GORDON, Secretary
International Fire Fighters Association Local 36
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Zegowitz)

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I N T E R V I E W

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2 MR. DOWNS: -- 2015. And the following is an interview
3 being conducted in reference to the NTSB investigation number
4 DCA-15-FR-004, which relates to an accident involving a heavy
5 smoke release and train evacuations that occurred in or near the
6 L'Enfant Plaza Station of the WMATA Metrorail system here in
7 Washington, D.C. on the afternoon of January 12, 2015.

8 This interview is being conducted with a member of the
9 District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
10 Department, as conducted by the NTSB Survival Factors Technical
11 Working Group of the investigation.

12 My name is Richard Downs, Jr. and I'm a survival factors
13 investigator with the NTSB, in which I also serve in the role as
14 the Survival Factors Technical Working Group chairperson.

15 I will preside over this interview, which is being
16 recorded for the record, in which a transcript may also be
17 compiled of the recording as a permanent docketed record of the
18 interview.

19 I'll now ask that our witness please identify
20 themselves, their employment affiliation and job position title
21 for the record?

22 MR. ZEGOWITZ: My name is Richard Zegowitz. I'm a
23 captain with D.C. Fire Department. On that day, I was a safety
24 officer.

25 MR. DOWNS: Thank you for joining us today. Are you

1 accompanied by any individual in this this interview?

2 MR. ZEGOWITZ: Yes.

3 MR. DOWNS: I'd like to ask that person to please
4 identify themselves?

5 MR. GORDON: My name is James Gordon. I'm a secretary
6 of Local 36. I'll be their union rep for the day.

7 MR. DOWNS: Thank you, sir.

8 I'll now ask the participants of this interview, who
9 will also have an opportunity to present questions to the witness,
10 to please individually identify themselves, their employment
11 affiliation and job position title for the record?

12 MR. ROURKE: Good morning. My name is Denton Rourke. I
13 work for WMATA. I am the operations manager in the Office of
14 Emergency Management.

15 MS. BURTCH: Good morning. I'm Kimberly Burtch. I work
16 for the Federal Transit Administration's Office of Transit Safety
17 and Oversight in the Safety Assurance and (indiscernible) Group.

18 MR. HAWKINS: Good morning. Derron Hawkins, Deputy Fire
19 Chief, D.C. Fire and EMS, Homeland Security Division.

20 MR. BLACKISTONE: Hi. Steve Blackistone, National
21 Transportation Safety Board, Office of Communications.

22 MR. TEBO: Joseph Tebo, Maryland Department of
23 Transportation. I'm the Maryland representative for the Tri-State
24 Oversight Committee. Good morning.

25 MR. GORDON: Joe Gordon, National Transportation Safety

1 Board, the Investigator-in-Charge for the L'Enfant incident.

2 And before we get started, I'd like to let you know the
3 purpose of the NTSB investigation is to enhance safety, looking
4 for process and improvements. We're not here to assign any blame
5 or fault. Mr. Downs mentioned the transcript that will go into
6 the public docket. NTSB cannot offer or guarantee an
7 confidentiality or immunity from any legal action, any certificate
8 action, anything of that nature.

9 With that, we can get started with the interviews,
10 Mr. Downs.

11 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

12 INTERVIEW OF RICHARD ZEGOWITZ

13 BY MR. DOWNS:

14 Q. And Captain, thank you for joining us, and could you
15 please describe for us, in your own words, what occurred on the
16 day of the event relative to your actions and enrollment at the
17 L'Enfant Plaza Station, starting with the time you got the first
18 initial call?

19 A. First we were -- I guess, once they realized that there
20 was a ongoing incident -- normally the safety officer is dispatch
21 during the initial call. As soon as it's confirmed that there's a
22 working incident, usually the safety officer will come and that's
23 when I will get dispatched.

24 Q. And that's prompted by a certain elevation of the
25 incident command process?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Very good. Please continue.

3 A. Once I was dispatched, once I got there, there was, like
4 I say, already units on the scene. I got dressed, entered the
5 station at the control point, which I think was 7th and 8th, went
6 down the escalator, headed to station. When I entered the station,
7 there was a large amount of smoke in the station. When I got down
8 there, I saw the floor chief, Henry Welsh. We met together. The
9 companies, the official -- the recon companies, Engine 18, the
10 truck company, Truck 3, and I'm not sure who the other engine
11 company was, they had already entered the tunnel and they were in
12 the tunnel.

13 Me and the chief, we tried to make a transmission as we
14 were going into the tunnel.

15 Q. On your radio?

16 A. Yes, sir. And we were having issues getting out. So I
17 tried to go back a little ways on the platform to see if I could
18 make a transmission for him and it didn't work.

19 At that point in time I noticed there was passengers
20 exiting the train on the opposite side.

21 Q. Opposite side?

22 A. Of the platform.

23 Q. Oh, yeah -- still on the platform?

24 A. They were on the platform.

25 Q. And that's the train that stopped in the station?

1 A. No, sir. That was the one that was in the tunnel. That
2 was the one that actually had, I guess, the trapped victims.

3 Q. I see. So they were coming, working their way up the
4 tunnel onto the platform?

5 A. They had already been, I guess, released from the train.
6 And when I first go there, I wasn't aware that there was a train
7 disabled in the tunnel.

8 Q. You hadn't heard any broadcasts on your radio coming in?

9 A. We hadn't gotten any information.

10 Q. I see.

11 A. I guess as soon as the companies got to the train, I
12 could hear them say that we have passengers coming down the
13 tunnel. So at that point there was already a disabled train in
14 the station.

15 Q. Stopped in the station --

16 A. That was sitting at the platform. Nobody was in it. It
17 was just, you know, abandoned train. The other train was, like I
18 said, down the tunnel.

19 Q. Could you see the back end of that train down the
20 tunnel?

21 A. No, sir. The smoke was so thick that where the train
22 was located, I guess later on, you could see it was in the little
23 pocket track. But when we first got down there, I was not aware
24 that there was actually a train down there.

25 Q. I see.

1 A. The companies were ahead and they were going down there
2 because they were advised that's where the fire was and the recon
3 group was on their way down the tunnel. So when I started to see
4 people coming out on the other side, I worked my way around to the
5 other side of the platform. I used the aerial across --

6 Q. You went upstairs to the mezzanine, then came back down
7 the other side?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And the escalator was coming up, so I hit the emergency
11 stop to get down the other side. I got down the other side, going
12 down the platform. Like said, victims were coming out and they
13 were going out the entrance on the opposite side from the control
14 point. When I got to where the train was, Firefighter Carmody and
15 Firefighter Williams from Squad 1 --

16 Q. Rescue Squad 1.

17 A. -- they were bringing a victim that --

18 Q. Carrying a victim?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. -- ended up being [REDACTED].

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Okay. He had her -- Firefighter Carmody had her over
24 his shoulder and Williams was helping him. They were, like,
25 Captain, I need your help. So at that point in time Firefighter

1 Carmody handed her to me, and me and Firefighter Williams carried
2 her from the platform to the escalator, and then Firefighter
3 Carmody put her back up on his shoulder. We rode up the
4 escalator. We took her out to the sidewalk area and performed
5 CPR.

6 Q. And you stayed with that patient and Carmody went back
7 down, or --

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. I was with the patient the whole time until she was
11 loaded into the ambulance. One of the Metro police officers ended
12 up -- there was a couple people, a couple firefighters, and then a
13 Metro police officer did compressions on her. So --

14 Q. So between the two or three of you up topside with the
15 patient, you stayed with the patient, you continued CPR, attempts
16 to revive her until an ambulance arrived?

17 A. That's correct. We intubated her with an airway. I was
18 doing the ventilations. They were doing the chest compressions.
19 An ambulance arrived. We had hooked up the AED, but we never --
20 by that time it -- I guess we ran out of time before we could
21 actually attempt to try to --

22 Q. Unfortunately, unsuccessful?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. But you did your best, it sounds?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. Very good. When you were topside with the patient, did
2 you have to radio for an ambulance? Because we had testimony to
3 the effect that there was no ambulance when you brought that
4 patient up.

5 A. That's correct. When we got there, like I said, we were
6 on the opposite side of where the control point was. I think
7 there's three entrances. Like I say, I had to cross the platform
8 to get to the other side, so we were on the complete opposite side
9 form where we went in at. So we had to call to let them know
10 that, hey, we're on the opposite side, you know, and we had to
11 wait for the ambulance.

12 Q. We had testimony yesterday to the effect that two
13 medical stations were set up topside. It sounds like it was just
14 a case were you came up at the third exit to the station where the
15 medical station hadn't been set up?

16 A. Well, I think when we came up that side, that was --
17 that wasn't where the medical station was, and then they realized
18 that's where all the victims were coming.

19 Q. I see.

20 A. And that's where -- eventually that's where the medical
21 station was set up.

22 Q. Got relocated. I see. Okay. Thank you. That's good.
23 Please continue.

24 A. Once the patient was loaded into the ambulance, I went
25 back. Like is said, we had multiple victims. I really didn't

1 get, I guess, the -- I kind of got, like, thrown into the fire,
2 per se, and I guess I didn't get to do what a safety officer is
3 supposed to be doing.

4 Q. Your safety officer duties because you were too --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- diverted to other activities that --

7 A. Yeah. That's kind of what --

8 Q. -- had far more priority?

9 A. Yeah. I was kind of like called in to -- you know, it's
10 like I couldn't have said, hey, I'm the safety officer, I can't
11 help you. You know, so I pretty much had -- at that point I was
12 kind of like in the mix, you know, the bug that went to the light
13 and, you know, I was assisting other people up, you know, up the
14 escalator.

15 There was a lot of people, I guess, that had asthma or,
16 you know, breathing problems that, you know, that just initiated a
17 little bit more. But, you know, for anybody that, I guess, didn't
18 have training, you know, in a smoke-filled area, whatever, I know
19 that it was very, you know, nerve-racking for them, you know.

20 Q. When you went down below the first time did you bring a
21 SCBA?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Did you use the SCBA?

24 A. No. I never, I guess, got that deep into the tunnel to
25 where, you know, like the pictures that were on the media, it was

1 a heavy smoke. I had never seen that much smoke in a tunnel. I'd
2 been on two or three incidents, but I'd never seen that much
3 anything. So when I was coming down, it's like I knew I had, you
4 know, we had something going on. And like I say, even, like, the
5 train, we didn't know that there was a train in there because the
6 smoke was so thick that you couldn't see down the tunnel.

7 Q. Right. And there were no broadcasts, as you stated, on
8 your radio, your fire radio, that there was a train?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. And you suddenly realized it when you actually saw folks
11 coming out of the tunnel and you obviously concluded we got a
12 train there?

13 A. Yes. I think the initial dispatch, I think one of the
14 companies went to another station for trash in the Metro station
15 and then I guess they changed it to the L'Enfant Plaza Station.

16 Q. So there might have been a prevailing thought that it
17 was just a relatively minor trash fire?

18 A. Well, I think soon as you went down the steps and you
19 entered the station, you knew it wasn't just a minor trash fire.

20 Q. It was obviously, it was far beyond a simple routine
21 trash fire?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Very good. Okay. So you were assisting for a period of
24 time the various patients coming up from the underground,
25 assisting in various ways. These folks were in respiratory

1 distress. Please speak to the record, please, rather than just
2 nod?

3 A. Yes. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 A. Like I say, there was a lot of people that needed
6 assistance. We had a few people we had to get stair chairs, put
7 them in chairs, take them up the escalator that way. Like I say,
8 there were a lot of people who were shaken. You know, the Metro
9 policemen were in the tunnel with flashlights guiding them through
10 the walkway. So it was, like, a handful effort where, you know,
11 everybody was working together to assist those people getting out
12 of the station.

13 Q. Very good. So you continue to assist until the last
14 passenger came out of the train; is that basically what --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- your role at that point was?

17 A. Yes. Like I say, I assisted and then at the end, when
18 the situation was ended, then I went back down. I could see where
19 the train was. I could see, you know, once the smoke cleared you
20 could basically see what was actually in front of you, what the
21 situation was.

22 Q. Did you make a sweep of the train to make sure there
23 were no passengers left?

24 A. I actually never made it down to the train.

25 Q. Oh.

1 A. I was on the platform. I stayed at the platform. At
2 that point in time I guess the investigators and Metro people were
3 down there.

4 Q. So you were comfortable that there were other trained
5 professionals working the train process, in terms of evacuating
6 the passengers and assuring we had a clean sweep of the train and
7 that sort of process?

8 A. Yes, sir. At that point in time most of the
9 firefighters were out of the track bed and it was more
10 investigative. They were checking a couple of ancillary rooms to
11 make sure that the fire wasn't in those. But I don't know --
12 while I was there, I don't know if they ever determined exactly
13 where the fire was. I don't know if the fire finally just went
14 out or burned out from shutting the power down, that it lost its
15 source, but I actually never got to see exactly where the fire
16 was.

17 Q. I see. So once the last passenger was evacuated from
18 the station, what did you do then?

19 A. Like I say, I was at the station, at the platform, along
20 with all the other members until they released us.

21 Q. Until they released you an hour later or something,
22 or --

23 A. It was probably somewhere close.

24 Q. Very good. Captain, what is the role of safety officer
25 on this particular type of assignment? The normal role, not

1 considering you got diverted to other exigent activities?

2 A. Normally I would go down and I would work with the truck
3 company on the third rail. When I arrived at the station, the
4 recon group -- normally I meet up with the recon group and
5 normally they're at the platform. But they had already entered
6 inside the tunnel. There was so much smoke -- you know, I
7 could've probably went down there but, you know, I would've had to
8 find them in the smoke. And it's like I -- you know, it's like I
9 didn't get to start out with them.

10 Q. I see.

11 A. So I wouldn't -- but as a safety officer, you're
12 responsible to make sure nobody gets hurt and make sure the third
13 rail is down, because nobody's supposed to enter the track bed
14 until we've got confirmation that the third rail is down.

15 Q. So would it be suffice to say that you simply are an
16 independent set of eyes to monitor everybody's actions just to
17 make sure they don't inadvertently run into trouble?

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Very good. Thank you.

20 MR. DOWNS: That concludes my questions for now. I'll
21 pass on to the next questioner.

22 BY MR. ROURKE:

23 Q. So Denton Rourke again from Metro. Captain, I'm just
24 going to ask you some general questions about Metro training in
25 general. This is all just from your perspective.

1 A. Okay.

2 Q. And then maybe a couple questions about L'Enfant.

3 So can you describe for me, just in general terms, the
4 DCFD's Metro training program?

5 A. We kind of go on our own. I know years ago they would
6 close the stations and we would have, like, a 1:00 or 2:00 --
7 drills. And I had, I've only been in the safety office now for
8 maybe a couple months. I filled in for that. But I was actually
9 the captain of Engine 18, which is over near the Eastern Market
10 Station. And I would say probably within the last 6 months, we've
11 been over there. We went down the emergency shaft exit, took them
12 to escalator pit, guys were working on escalator pit, so you've
13 got the guys down in to the escalator pit, looked underneath, and
14 just a general knowledge of the station.

15 Q. And that's something you did as a company officer?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. Okay. And you mentioned an exercise. Do you remember
18 when the last time you went to any kind of full-scale exercise?

19 A. A full-scale? We've been out Pennsy Drive a couple
20 times. But actual in the station, I want to say it's probably
21 been, like, 8 or 10 years or more where they've actually done one,
22 say, in the evening time. Now, there's four shifts, so I don't
23 know if they did one, you know, on a shift where we weren't
24 working. But it seems like it's been a little bit of a time lapse
25 since we we've actually done a actual full-scale drill out on the

1 -- but like I say, we've been to Pennsy Drive a couple times and
2 talked about the safety and --

3 Q. All right. Thanks. Are you -- you're a captain, right?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Do you fill in as battalion chief?

6 A. No, sir.

7 Q. No. Okay. What time did you dispatch; do you remember?

8 A. I'm not sure. I think it was sometime between, like,
9 3:30, quarter to 4, somewhere in that general area. I'd have to
10 look at my --

11 Q. And were you monitoring the fire band channel by any
12 chance or the tactical channel before that?

13 A. I think everything happened so fast that as soon as, I
14 guess, the initial companies, they called out that -- you know, I
15 was still -- when I arrived, there was still, like, some of the
16 companies were still, like, getting there. I guess the health
17 companies.

18 Q. Okay. And where do you -- where is your office or where
19 did you come from?

20 A. I'm at 2531 Sherman Avenue in Company Engine 4. That's
21 in Northwest.

22 Q. Okay. So not a terribly long run, but a fairly -- they
23 don't run that on the first alarm box siren?

24 A. No, sir.

25 Q. And I think you said you didn't hear anything over the

1 radio about a train in the tunnel?

2 A. No, sir, not the initial dispatch. I don't think I was
3 aware that there was anybody in the tunnel until I was actually
4 down into the station.

5 Q. Thanks. That's all I got right now.

6 MR. DOWNS: Next question?

7 BY MS. BURTCH:

8 Q. Kimberly Burtch. Captain, you said that you called EMS
9 to report the location of the victim when you went out, I guess,
10 out of the exit of the building. Did you have any issues with
11 that transmission?

12 A. No, not when we were outside.

13 Q. Okay, so clear? So as an SO, you're responsible for
14 ensuring the safety of passengers and ensuring that the third rail
15 is down?

16 A. I'm more responsible for the safety of the firefighters.

17 Q. Oh, safety of the firefighters. Sorry. Thank you for
18 the clarification. Are you required to request the third rail
19 power shutdown or is that what you do or --

20 A. I'm not the person that requests the third rail.
21 Usually it's the battalion chief or whoever's in charge, the
22 incident commander.

23 Q. Okay. So, okay, as your role as safety officer, you
24 remained on the platform, and generally is that what the safety
25 officer's location would be during an event?

1 A. Well, normally everybody would meet up and enter the
2 track bed all at one time. Now, the companies, I guess since they
3 realized that there was a working incident, they all went in
4 before even the battalion chief. Because there's one battalion
5 chief that's upstairs or outside the station and he's the incident
6 commander, and then we also have a forward command, which actually
7 goes down into the tunnel.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Normally I would work with them and we all go together.
10 And I'm responsible with the truck company. The truck company's
11 responsible for putting down the WSADs, making sure the power's
12 shut off, and monitoring the power to make sure it doesn't get
13 kicked back on. Like I say, the recon companies had already left
14 the station. They were already down in the tunnel. So rather
15 than trying to find them in the low visibility smoke, and then
16 when I realized that people were coming out, that's when I went
17 ahead and took the mezzanine level, got over to the other side and
18 started assisting -- well, my plan wasn't to carry a victim out
19 and do CPR, but I was kind of, like, thrown into that situation
20 then, when I realized --

21 Q. Okay. That's all I have.

22 MR. DOWNS: Chief, any questions?

23 MR. HAWKINS: Yes.

24 BY MR. HAWKINS:

25 Q. Derron Hawkins, D.C. Fire and EMS. Captain Zegowitz,

1 can you explain to me what is the levels of accountability in D.C.
2 Fire and EMS?

3 A. Well, for a Metro station, it is Level 3 accountability.
4 And everybody has an identification card, PAT tag, and as you
5 enter the station, everybody enters the same station and you're to
6 give your PAT tag out and you enter and exit at the same station.

7 Q. Okay. Is there any any other levels of accountability
8 that we use?

9 A. Well, the first accountability is, you know, just
10 putting your PAT tag onto the UDC.

11 Q. Okay. So the level -- the first level is putting your
12 PAT tag on a UDC at a company. Is there another level?

13 A. Well, they do the accountability, which every 20 minutes
14 they do an accountability.

15 Q. At the Metro incident, was Level 3 accountability
16 established when you arrived?

17 A. Yes, sir. I think it was -- I'm not sure which company.
18 I want to say it was Engine 23 was at the top of the escalator and
19 was collecting the PAT tags as you entered to the station.

20 Q. Engine 23? Okay. At any time did you link up,
21 communicate with any person from Engine Squad 1 down on the
22 platform level?

23 A. Yes, sir. That's when I saw fire Carmody and Williams.
24 They were bringing the victim out through the -- coming down the
25 platform. And I basically worked with them taking the victim

1 upstairs and CPR.

2 Q. Okay. In terms of communications, the way you
3 communicated, what are the -- when we have problem with
4 communications, there are procedures that we do in terms if we
5 can't communicate below grade or in a high-rise or something. Can
6 you expand on that, communications, bad communications?

7 A. Well, normally we try to set up a relay, and at first
8 that's what I was trying to do. I was trying to reposition myself
9 on the platform to see if I could transmit out. And I walked a
10 little bit of a ways and it didn't get any better, so I would've
11 probably almost had to go out of the station in order to make a
12 transmission. So rather than taking myself out of the equation
13 altogether, I went ahead and, like I said, I saw people coming out
14 on the other side. So I tried to go over there and see if I could
15 be of some assistance in that area.

16 Q. Do you remember what radio frequency, channel -- were
17 there a number of radio channels or were there radio channels
18 specifically that you monitored while you down as safety officer
19 on the platform level?

20 A. I think the initial response was A-3 and then we went to
21 the ABO channel. And so, like I said, neither one of them worked.
22 And it's like I could hear transmissions from the guys inside the
23 tunnel, but I couldn't hear, like, anything outside.

24 Q. So could you hear the incident commander?

25 A. Every once in a while I could hear the incident

1 commander.

2 Q. And one last question. Regarding training, Metro
3 inspections, and the AFAX report (ph.) we do on Metro incidents,
4 do you feel you have the knowledge and skill set to effectively
5 respond to a Metro incident?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. That's all I have.

8 MR. BLACKISTONE: Thank you.

9 BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

10 Q. Steve Blackistone with NTSB. Just a couple questions.
11 And by the way, if this interview runs long, I'm going to be
12 leaving at 9:30, just so you're aware.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. It's nothing to do with you. So in your role as safety
15 officer, whether it be at a construction fire or Metro or anyplace
16 else, are you responsible for making judgment about, where there's
17 an IDLH that requires you to take up breathing air?

18 A. Yeah, you know, everybody pretty much is on your own.
19 You know, that's your decision. But yes, I go around and make
20 sure that everybody does have their SCBA on and they're supposed
21 to be wearing it.

22 Q. So if somebody makes a decision that I don't need it and
23 you feel they should use it, do you have the ability --

24 A. I have the power, yes.

25 Q. You have the power to say do it?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. But in this case, you didn't feel it was necessary?

3 A. Where I was, I didn't feel that it was necessary for me
4 to. But like I say, I never entered the tunnel. But the smoke
5 was pretty thick. In the platform area, it was a lot more wide
6 open space. So, you know, the conditions down in the tunnel I
7 know were a lot worse than the conditions that I was in.

8 Q. Yeah. But you weren't there, so you couldn't --

9 A. Right.

10 Q. Which raises another question, I hadn't thought about.
11 Did you have any sense of whether there was air movement? Was the
12 ventilation system pushing the air --

13 A. It didn't seem like it. It was just lingering. It
14 didn't seem like it was going anywhere. You know, it wasn't,
15 like, moving one way or the other. It was just -- it looked like
16 it was just stalled.

17 Q. Okay. Because my understanding is that one of the
18 elements of Metro's smoke removal system is ventilation fan
19 shafts, but apparently it wasn't doing it.

20 A. Yeah, it didn't seem like there was, like, any relief.

21 Q. Okay. And then I wanted to focus in for a second on
22 your all's handling of the patient who was in cardiac arrest. You
23 all, the three of you, I guess, took her to the top of the
24 escalator and right on that patio area there?

25 A. We took her up out the escalator and actually took her

1 to the street side.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. And we actually worked on her right at the curb area.

4 Q. Okay. So then you made a decision there to send Carmody
5 and Williams back inside, rather than leave them there to take
6 care of the patient --

7 A. Well, there was so many people --

8 Q. -- and go back inside yourself?

9 A. We didn't -- that was more a decision that they had
10 made. When we got down there, we had -- I think it was Engine 10
11 was there. We got all the first aid stuff, the oxygen and the
12 bag, the intubation tube, the King airway.

13 Q. So there were other people there to help you
14 administer --

15 A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

16 Q. But it was right away not EMS?

17 A. No. No, we had to call a couple times because -- I
18 don't know if they were confused a little of our location. Like I
19 said, we were on the opposite side, so I don't know -- but I think
20 it was Medic 27 finally arrived.

21 Q. Okay. All right. And then the other question is, I
22 know in emergency instances like this, it's often very difficult
23 to judge time, when I guess long seems short and short long. But
24 did -- first of all, when you got down to the platform, was it
25 just the first of the passengers that were coming out or had a

1 significant number --

2 A. I want to say -- it wasn't -- like, when I first got
3 down there, they weren't initially coming out.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I'd say within, like, the first, like, maybe 10 or 15
6 minutes that I was down there --

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. -- that we started to see, you know, more come

9 Q. Do you have any sense of how long it was until the last
10 passenger was out?

11 A. No, I don't. So it might've been like a half hour, 45
12 minutes that -- it had been a -- it was a pretty long time,
13 because --

14 Q. Been a while.

15 A. -- like I said, we had, I had worked on the patient up
16 at the street level, came back down and assisted a few people --

17 Q. And they were still coming?

18 A. -- and there were still people coming out. But I
19 actually got back down to the platform and there was still people
20 coming out then.

21 Q. Yeah. Was it, at that point was it a few stragglers or
22 was it still --

23 A. No, it was a pretty -- I think that train was pretty
24 full of passengers, so there was a lot of people.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I don't know the exact number of how many people went,
2 but you know, that might've only been an eighth of how many people
3 were actually -- you know, it's a busy time; there was probably a
4 lot of people getting off work, so that train was probably pretty
5 busy, pretty packed. But a lot of people just walked away, yes,
6 sir.

7 Q. Okay. That's all the question I have for now.

8 BY MR. TEBO:

9 Q. Good morning. Joseph Tebo, Tri-State Oversight
10 Committee. Good morning, Captain.

11 A. Good morning.

12 Q. Thanks for your time. Captain, your agency utilizes a
13 Air Cascade, Air Flex, or some type of emergency response vehicle
14 that supports the refill of SCBAs on the scene?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Sir, to your knowledge, was that unit on the scene?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Do you know if it was placed in service? Was it
19 actively refilling bottles?

20 A. It was -- I don't know if he was refilling bottles, but
21 it was on the scene. I was parked, I want to say, like on 7th
22 Street underneath where the little bridge is, and the air unit was
23 actually behind my vehicle. I don't know if he was refilling
24 bottles on the scene. I'm not sure exactly how many bottles he
25 has. I think he might have, like, 80 or so extra bottles. So I

1 don't know if -- I know it was a fill-in driver, but like I say, I
2 don't know if he was actually filling bottles.

3 Q. So they have the capacity to supply air bottles from
4 their stock, their inventory on board the vehicle, as well as if
5 that runs low, they can refill as needed?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. But you did not actually see any refilling going on?

8 A. No. Like I said, he was maybe a half a block or more
9 away from me. So I never went in the opposite direction down
10 there to where he was located at.

11 Q. Thank you. Captain, you indicated that when you first
12 got there, at one point in time you made your way back up and over
13 to the opposite side of the platform?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. At that time, or during that time, do you know if that
16 opposite side track third rail had been de-energized?

17 A. I'm not sure. Like I say, there was -- people were down
18 in the tunnel. I assume that all the tracks were de-energized.
19 You know, that was another part of the confusion, you know, not
20 knowing whether or not the -- you know, we were trying to make
21 sure -- Chief Welsh, you know, he was very concerned that there
22 was companies down in there and they were -- you know, they
23 weren't sure whether or not -- you know, I guess they didn't have
24 a true confirmation right at first whether the third rail had been
25 shut down.

1 Q. So during your presence there initially, did you see or
2 did you observe any trains coming into the station from the
3 opposite direction?

4 A. No, sir, but I did observe -- or hear trains down below,
5 because --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- on the tracks below --

8 Q. On the lower level of the station?

9 A. Yes, sir. They were still running. And I probably
10 might've -- my time on the platform, I might've heard like three
11 or four trains. Now, I don't know -- I don't think they were
12 stopping because I never saw any passengers coming up. They were
13 bypassing the station, but they were running through the tracks.

14 Q. Did that cause you some concern in terms of having
15 firefighters down there, perhaps?

16 A. You know, initially when I first got there, they had
17 checked down the lower level to see, you know. Because it wasn't
18 until, like, the Metro -- I guess the Metro police officers said,
19 hey, they're working down there. That was the only reason I knew
20 that the recon group had already left. Because he advised me, he
21 said other firefighters have gone down the tunnel. So, but yeah,
22 you know, if that one's running, like I say, you're never sure
23 whether or not they shut the other ones off.

24 Q. Captain, from your position when you first arrived, and
25 I understand things happened very quickly and you suddenly found

1 yourself in a life support situation with the one victim. So your
2 crews that were in the tunnel, did you observe your crews in the
3 tunnel or as they were exiting the tunnel or entering the tunnel,
4 were they wearing their face pieces or their SCBAs?

5 A. I'm not sure if they, you know, they were or not. I
6 would assume they would or they would have because of the
7 conditions. The other guys that you're going to speak to later,
8 they were actually inside the tunnel so they would be able to
9 answer that question.

10 Q. But you did see firefighters having their SCBA equipment
11 on and --

12 A. Everybody had their SCBA on their backs. Whether or not
13 they used it -- and there was a lot of people exchanging bottles,
14 so definitely there was people using their SCBAs. Like I say, the
15 closer you got to, I guess, to the disabled train, you know, the
16 worse the conditions, that you would have to wear it.

17 Q. Thank you. Captain, besides -- you had indicated you
18 had seen the MTPD, the police on the scene down there. Besides
19 the police officers who were there, did you observe or interact
20 with any Metro employees on the scene?

21 A. I didn't see, I don't think I saw any -- like the kiosk
22 manager, I didn't see anybody like that. I didn't really see any
23 of the Metro employees. It was mostly the transit police. I did
24 see a lot of officers, you know. And like I said, they were a big
25 help in helping the people out with flashlights and going down the

1 walkway.

2 MR. TEBO: Okay. That concludes my questions. Thank
3 you, sir.

4 BY MR. JOE GORDON:

5 Q. Joe Gordon, NTSB. After you arrived on the scene, when
6 did you first get notification that the third rail power was down?

7 A. I guess when the guy -- when they got down there, they
8 were already into the tunnel, I guess it might've been 4 or 5
9 minutes, before they said, hey, third rail is down.

10 Q. Okay. And who -- do you remember who told you that?
11 Was that another firefighter that gave you that or --

12 A. I think that was, I think that was a transmission that
13 did come over the radio.

14 Q. Okay. And we've heard in previous testimony that mass
15 casualty event, nine or more is the trigger for that. And, you
16 know, understanding in this even there were more than 80 people
17 that -- you know, victims that you guys were dealing with, you
18 kind of got thrust into a all-hands role and, you know, just
19 trying to do the best you could, and it sounds like you fell into
20 that role. When you took the victim, the unconscious victim up
21 the escalator, when you got to the top of the escalator, did you
22 go right to exit to street level or left?

23 A. Right.

24 Q. Right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. Okay, and --

2 A. When you get to the top of the escalator, you go to the
3 right, as -- I guess there's, like, some little shops, and then
4 you walk around and then you go down like a level --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- of steps to the --

7 Q. So when you come out, there's like a big area with
8 tables and chairs and then you go to street level?

9 A. Yeah, just like a little shops. I don't know if they
10 have a restaurant to something --

11 Q. Right.

12 A. -- like right in there. And you bear off to the right
13 and then you go down and then you get out to the outside part.
14 And then you go down like a little level of steps.

15 Q. A flight of stairs and down to the street level? Okay.
16 And then you got all the way down to street level before CPR?

17 A. We were, like, right next to the curb area where the air
18 vents are.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And we had put her on, like, a plastic type billboard
21 sign. And that's what we used to -- as a board type to use. And
22 then like I say, Engine 10 was positioned right at that location
23 and we got all the medical supplies that -- oxygen, the bag valve
24 mask, the airway, their AED. We used all the medical supplies
25 right off Engine 10. And then, like I say, we also used their

1 manpower. They had the wagon driver and another firefighter was
2 there that assisted us.

3 Q. Okay. Okay. And you stated that after your arrival, it
4 was about 10 to 15 minutes before passengers, before you saw
5 passengers coming out of the tunnel portal. Were those passengers
6 being assisted? Any indication that some of those may have self-
7 evacuated or, when you saw people coming out, were they being
8 assisted by the firefighter and PD?

9 A. It was like a joint effort between the Metro Transit. I
10 guess they had positioned themselves, and I think once there was,
11 you know, the realization that the people are coming out that way,
12 that they needed assistance because, like I say, the visibility
13 was really poor.

14 Q. Right.

15 A. And, you know, they used their flashlights to kind of,
16 like, guide them along. Like I say, the firefighters were
17 assisting the people all up along the way too.

18 Q. Okay. At any time did you hear any plan to possibly
19 back the train that was in the tunnel back to the platform to
20 evacuate? Or by the time you got there, third rail power's down?

21 A. I never heard them say that they were going to try and
22 back the train. But, you know, once you shut the power down and
23 it's disabled, then you know they're not going to be able to move
24 it. But I -- you know, when we got down there, at least for me, I
25 didn't even know that there was a train in there.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. And I had -- you know, and I start to listen to the
3 report as soon as I get, you know, get the call. I'm on the -- I
4 go right to the tac channel and I'm listening to everything that's
5 unfolding so I know what I'm stepping into when I actually arrive
6 on the scene.

7 Q. Okay. So you don't feel like there was any delay to
8 bringing down the third rail power to facilitate --

9 A. No, because the --

10 Q. -- moving the train back?

11 A. -- the recon companies, they got down there pretty
12 quick. You know, they -- you know, normally we all meet up at the
13 platform and they had already -- they didn't wait. They just,
14 they started their way on down.

15 Q. Okay. Okay, thank you. I have nothing further.

16 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

17 BY MR. DOWNS:

18 Q. Captain, let's touch briefly your personal work history:
19 when did you start, what role did you start, and that kind of
20 thing? Just summarize the points over the years, if you would,
21 please?

22 A. I'm a firefighter. I started in March of 1987. I'll
23 have 28 years in March. I started out in Engine 4, where I'm at
24 now. I was the wagon driver, the technician for 8t or 9 years. I
25 got promoted to sergeant when I had about 11 years on. I was over

1 in Southeast as a sergeant. I made lieutenant, went back to 4
2 Engine. Went Upper Northwest, Connecticut Avenue, 28 Engine for a
3 little bit. Been downtown, down to the 16 Engine as a lieutenant,
4 went back there as a captain. I was a captain at Engine 25. I've
5 probably been a captain now for I want to say 7 years.

6 Being downtown at 16 Engine, we've run Metro a lot,
7 between sick people or just, you know, minor incidents. Nothing
8 as large scale as the one that we, you know, just ran. But like I
9 say, so I'm pretty familiar with the Metro setup and, you know --

10 Q. Very good. Thank you. Have you had incident command
11 training as part of your education process in the fire department?

12 A. Yes, sir. I also do, like, special events where I am
13 actually the incident commander. I've worked the National
14 Ballpark many times, marathons, that type of stuff.

15 Q. That would be a fire department presence rather than a
16 response to an actual emergency?

17 A. Well, actually, as an incident commander, we're
18 responsible for all the first aid and everything that goes on
19 within the park.

20 Q. I see.

21 A. So basically, I'm the one that dispatches everybody and
22 usually they man the first aid stations. If somebody's hurt in
23 the ballpark, the ushers -- I sit actually in the command post. I
24 have ushers, the stadium employees, security, everybody, we all
25 sit together. If they get an emergency call for first aid, I

1 dispatch them and I'm -- basically coordinate with the
2 transportation and --

3 Q. Very good. Thank you. As part of the incident command
4 process, a command post would be established, in this case,
5 topside --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- at some given location, and it as a fairly large
8 geographical area that you had to deal with; is that correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Three station access points spread out over several city
11 blocks. Normally in an incident command process, would a forward
12 command post be established, particularly with a large geographic
13 area to deal with?

14 A. That's what we established. Chief Welsh, who is the 4th
15 Battalion chief --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- when I entered the station, he kind of arrived at the
18 same time I did.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. So he was the forward command and we were actually
21 together --

22 Q. And where was he located at the time when he established
23 this forward command?

24 A. Like I say, we were both going into the tunnel and he
25 was making sure there was confirmation. Because, like I say, you

1 always treat is as being hot until, you know, you get the
2 confirmation --

3 Q. Confirmation of the third rail being down?

4 A. Third rail being shut off.

5 Q. Okay. So in your mind, you were, it was your
6 understanding that he was running the forward command operation?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. And in communication with the incident commander
9 topside?

10 A. Correct. And that's why I tried to reposition, because
11 he was having issues trying to relay a message.

12 Q. He had radio troubles as well?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Very good. Let me ask you this, Captain. Does fire
15 department have an SOP that might have provisions for providing a
16 backup safety officer if, for some reason, the regular safety
17 officer responds to the site becomes unavailable?

18 A. We don't have position -- I guess, set-up stuff. When,
19 I guess, a large scale incident, they'll designate a safety
20 company and they'll assist me. But we only have one safety
21 officer that works each day, so it's not like I have a second
22 safety officer. But on a large scale incident, they may dispatch
23 a second company.

24 Q. In this case, did you feel that that wasn't a necessity
25 here, to have an additional safety officer support available

1 because you were taken off to other exigent circumstances?

2 A. I don't know if, you know, you could've -- with the
3 incident, you probably could've had extra help, but you know, the
4 thing is too, it's like the radios weren't -- so it's like even if
5 I needed to, you know, call -- because it's like when I was
6 assisting the squad, I couldn't tell them, say hey, I'm assisting
7 the squad to bring somebody out because our radios weren't
8 working.

9 Q. So was it the case that the scene was somewhat quiet and
10 there were no obvious safety issues so that that kind of
11 alleviated your immediate concern that there wasn't any real
12 safety issues that have to be focused upon at that time? Would
13 that be a fair characterization?

14 A. Yeah. I think it was more a rescue, to assist
15 evacuation. Because even like the fire itself, I don't think --
16 I'm not sure if we ever informed anyone, because I don't -- you
17 know, I think once they shut the power down, I think the fire
18 finally went out.

19 Q. And that's, for an event like this, that would be your
20 primary safety concern is having the hot third rail?

21 A. Yes, sir. That's your main concern.

22 Q. Very good. So I'm taking it that there were no real
23 safety issues identified in the event?

24 A. No. Not that I was aware of.

25 Q. How about the firefighter who was reported to have

1 sustained an injury? Are you familiar with what occurred in that
2 manner?

3 A. Only -- nobody every reported it to me. I had
4 secondhand knowledge of it, that they had taken her up to one of
5 the evacuation --

6 Q. And that was after the fact?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. And what was the general nature? Was that a respiratory
9 distress situation?

10 A. I think so.

11 Q. You think so? Okay. We can follow up on that. Very
12 good.

13 Let's see. Did you take any notes or compile a report
14 of the event?

15 A. No, sir.

16 Q. Very good. Okay.

17 MR. DOWNS: I'll pass it on to the next person for
18 questions, continued questions.

19 BY MR. ROURKE:

20 Q. Captain, did you ever -- we had a little conversation
21 about mass casualty incidents. When the incident commander does
22 that, is that declared? Does he say anything on the radio or does
23 he just ask for a dispatch or how does that work?

24 A. Yeah, he'll declare the -- and he'll ask for -- usually
25 we have, like, the mass casualty buses that they use to transport

1 patients, and I guess in this instance, they used the Metro bus.

2 Q. And did you hear that on your radio at any time?

3 A. There was so much stuff going on, it's like I, you know,
4 it's like I would hear stuff coming across, but it's like I
5 wasn't, like, sitting there and, you know, listening because, like
6 I said, I was busy.

7 Q. And how long, if you can characterize, how long do you
8 think you were up top with the cardiac arrest until Engine 10 got
9 there?

10 A. Well, Engine 10 was already there when -- they were
11 already sitting there at that position. I don't know if they were
12 supplying one of the standpipes, but they were already in position
13 when we were there. But the ambulance might've took 5, 10
14 minutes. I'm not sure. You know, it always seems longer when
15 you're, you know, you're working --

16 Q. When you're doing CPR, yeah.

17 A. -- somebody or you're looking for help.

18 Q. Is there a paramedic on the engine? Is that a paramedic
19 engine?

20 A. Yes, it was a paramedic engine. I don't know where the
21 officer -- I don't know if the officer and the paramedic were
22 somewhere else. It was a young firefighter. I'm not sure who he
23 was or -- but, you know, he was helping with the chest
24 compressions for a bit.

25 Q. So you don't think he was a -- that was the paramedic

1 was with you?

2 A. I don't think he was the paramedic, no.

3 Q. Okay. There was a report that, from a week earlier,
4 that they had run a call at L'Enfant Plaza and there was some
5 radio issues. Before this incident on the 12th, were you aware of
6 radio issues at L'Enfant Plaza? Had you seen a memo or directive
7 or anything?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. And can you just describe for us, when it works
10 perfectly, what is the SOP for taking down power? How does that
11 work?

12 A. Well, normally you go, you know, you go through the
13 Metro OCC and you have them -- you notify them that you need the
14 third rail down and they -- or they normally notify you if they've
15 already shut the power down.

16 Q. Okay. And then what? You take their word for it?

17 A. Well, you get confirmation. And then once you get
18 confirmation, then you use your WSAD and you check it with the
19 volt probe to make sure what they told you is correct.

20 Q. Okay. Good. And since you just came from a company --
21 you said, a couple months ago?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. What's your understanding of the emergency doors on
24 Metro trains? How would you, as a company officer, how do you
25 access a Metro train in an emergency?

1 A. The Metro train, above the door there's a little thing
2 that has two screws and drop down --

3 BY MR. DOWNS:

4 Q. That's on the interior of the car.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. If you were on the exterior of the car, how would you
7 access the emergency doors?

8 A. You have your Metro keys on the corners that --

9 Q. Which specific doors would you be accessing?

10 A. The ones on the end. It's the end doors.

11 Q. The very end of the railcar, the bulkhead?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Are there any --

14 A. We'd use a key.

15 Q. With the key?

16 A. Yes, sir.

17 Q. The barrel key. How about if you weren't able to get to
18 the end doors, meaning you've got a middle car of a train, how
19 would you access the emergency doors? How do you open the
20 emergency doors?

21 A. From the inside or --

22 Q. From the outside.

23 A. -- the outside?

24 Q. From the outside.

25 A. With the barrel key that --

1 Q. Same barrel key arrangement? There's a lock on the side
2 of the car, you're saying?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Which particular doors are the emergency doors on the
5 rail car?

6 A. The emergency doors are on the inside.

7 Q. Sorry?

8 A. In the middle.

9 Q. The middle doors? You have three doors on the outside
10 of the railcar on each side, right?

11 A. Yeah. Well, you have your collector shoes on both ends,
12 so you don't want to evacuate them on the --

13 Q. In other words, avoid the end doors and you're saying go
14 to the middle door of the three doors?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Very good. And you would you use your barrel key?

17 A. Well, you use your barrel key for the end doors.

18 Q. Well, no, for that middle door, to open the middle door?

19 A. The middle door, you have to use the -- there's a map
20 and then there's the dropdown of --

21 Q. But that's on the inside. How about the outside? How
22 would you open the door from the outside? Are you not familiar
23 with that?

24 MR. DOWNS: Excuse me. Excuse me. No, if you want to
25 go off the record, we can go off the record, but -- your

1 testimony.

2 MR. ZEGOWITZ: I'm not sure.

3 MR. DOWNS: You're not sure? Okay, very good.

4 Thank you. That answers my question.

5 Go ahead.

6 BY MR. ROURKE:

7 Q. Now, we talked about radios. And so I just want to
8 clarify that for your radio, it worked well at street level when
9 you first arrived and then as soon as you got into the station, it
10 started honking?

11 A. You know, I could hear transmissions. I couldn't
12 transmit anything out.

13 Q. So was it -- would you clarify it as being ineffective?

14 A. Ineffective, yes, sir.

15 Q. All right. Thank you.

16 MR. ROURKE: That's all I got. Thanks.

17 MR. DOWNS: Next questions?

18 MS. BURTCH: Yeah, I have a follow-up regarding the
19 emergency doors.

20 BY MS. BURTCH:

21 Q. So, is there an SOP for evacuation of trains, of the
22 passengers from the train?

23 A. I don't think there's, like, a specific SOP for --

24 Q. So you go in through the bulkhead door and then
25 passengers egress through the bulkhead door only, or are you

1 saying the side doors are opened once you're inside the train to
2 evacuate? I'm just trying to get clear.

3 A. Normally we try to evacuate everybody out the middle
4 doors because the collector shoes are on the end doors.

5 Q. So you enter through the bulkhead door and you get into
6 the train and you open the middle doors --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- to get passengers out of the vehicle --

9 A. Yes, ma'am.

10 Q. -- out of the train? Okay. Thank you.

11 MR. DOWNS: Chief, any questions?

12 MR. HAWKINS: Yes.

13 BY MR. HAWKINS:

14 Q. Derron Hawkins from D.C. Fire and EMS. Captain,
15 normally as Metro, you work with the truck companies in system
16 safety. Regarding the catwalks, what was the status of the
17 catwalks? Were they dark, were they well-lit or, you know, what
18 was going on with the catwalks?

19 A. Everything was dark. There wasn't, like, any lighting
20 on the catwalks. I'd say, the only lighting was the Metro
21 officers with their flashlights guiding people down.

22 Q. So no truck companies put any lights in the catwalks?

23 A. No. You know, the recon company went ahead and, you
24 know, as I -- the only other -- I saw Truck 4 down there, but I
25 didn't see them with any lighting, no.

1 Q. Okay. I have no further questions.

2 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Tebo? Questions?

3 BY MR. TEBO:

4 Q. Joseph Tebo, Tri-State Oversight. Captain, do you know
5 or did you observe any of the Metro E-tech carts were being
6 utilized by any firefighters?

7 A. Yes, sir.

8 Q. Do you know what -- or do you know the term or are you
9 familiar with what an ETS is, or an emergency trip station?

10 A. Emergency trip station. Yeah.

11 Q. Yes, sir. Okay, thank you.

12 In your opinion, as a very seasoned fire officer, would
13 you agree that having no radio communications on an event like
14 this or any event is a serious safety concern?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you. No further questions, sir.

17 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have nothing further.

18 BY MR. DOWNS:

19 Q. All right, Captain, let's go back for a moment to
20 portable lights and lighting. Do the engine companies and truck
21 companies and the like, do they carry portable lights in an event
22 that they need to get underground with some lighting to illuminate
23 an area to work?

24 A. The truck companies carry the lights.

25 Q. Truck companies?

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Are they extension cord lights or are they battery
3 powered?

4 A. They have portable generators and then they also have
5 lights that you could actually plug in.

6 Q. A generator light, self-contained generator light which
7 you could carry down and fire up the generator and it would
8 illuminate an area?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. As well as a plug-in, variety of lights that can plug
11 into the local electric service? And were any of those lights in
12 use in this event, do you know? Did you see any down there?

13 A. I didn't see any until, like I say, the incident was
14 pretty much over. But I don't know if they were fire department
15 lights and I don't know if --

16 Q. There was some form of lights you saw later on?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. I see. And you're not sure if they're Metro lights or
19 fire department lights?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Very good. Thank you.

22 We're getting close to the end of the questioning and I
23 like to give my witnesses the opportunity to express what we call
24 retrospective thoughts. Now that the event is over and that
25 you've had an opportunity to kind of mull over in your mind

1 various points of the response, given what you know now, not that
2 anything was done wrong, would you have done anything differently,
3 in hindsight, that you could be able to offer and share with the
4 professional emergency response community in terms of that might
5 be a more efficient in a large scale event like this? Any
6 thoughts you can offer on that?

7 A. No. You know, I think what-- my actions were the best
8 I, you know, could've done that day. Like I say, we had, you
9 know, a lot of technical issues, you know.

10 Q. With the radios, for example?

11 A. With the radios. Like I say, the fans and, you know,
12 and there was an issue with the smoke.

13 Q. Meaning manage the ventilation in a more efficient
14 manner so that the smoke would've been evacuated, exhausted
15 quicker?

16 A. Yeah. You know, that could alleviate -- you know, like
17 I say, that could've maybe alleviated some of the issues and the,
18 that we --

19 Q. I see. Fire companies typically do carry portable fans;
20 is that correct?

21 A. Yeah, but the area that we were in, our fans wouldn't
22 have --

23 Q. It wouldn't have done any good because you have such a
24 large tunnel bore; is that what you're suggesting?

25 A. Yeah. There was -- you know, it's such a big area and

1 with our fans, it probably wouldn't have even done anything.

2 Q. The portable fans that you carry are small, residential
3 or small business type fans? Or --

4 A. Yeah, but they're only rated to move a certain amount of
5 air. And the space that, you know, especially the station itself,
6 the fan --

7 Q. Wouldn't had any effect?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. Very good. Thank you.

10 So there's no other retrospective thoughts that you
11 might be able to share with us?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Very good. That completes my questions.

14 MR. DOWNS: Anybody, questions over here? Final
15 questions?

16 MR. HAWKINS: Not for me.

17 MR. DOWNS: No more questions?

18 MR. TEBO: No, sir.

19 MR. DOWNS: Captain, thank you for joining us.

20 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
 STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
 JANUARY 12, 2015
 Interview of Richard Zegowitz

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: January 29, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Karen Stockhausen
Transcriber

No Discrepancies Found.


A thick black horizontal bar redacts the signature.

Captain Richard Zegowitz