



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015

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* Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004
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Interview of: VALE'RE WHITE

Washington, D.C.

Thursday,
January 15, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: DAVID BUCHER
Railroad Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

DAVID BUCHER, Railroad Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

ROBERT JOE GORDON, Investigator-in-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

RICHARD DOWNS, JR., Survival Factors Investigator
Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group
National Transportation Safety Board

JOEY RHINE, Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

THOMAS LITTLETON, FTA Investigator In-Charge
Associate Administrator for Transit Safety and Oversight
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

SHARMILA SAMARASINGHE, Vice Chair
Tri-State Oversight Committee

JOSEPH TEBO, Program Manager
State Safety Oversight
Tri-State Oversight Committee

DORSEY ADAMS, Manager of Rail Safety
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)

HERCULES BALLARD, Managing Director Rail Transportation
WMATA

BRIAN VAUGHN, Special Agent
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

MARLENE FLEMINGS-McCANN, Assistant Business Agent
for Rail Operations
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) Local 689

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I N T E R V I E W

(12:45 p.m.)

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2
3 MR. BUCHER: This is Dave Bucher, Rail Accident
4 Investigator for NTSB. And this is the interview of Vale're --

5 MS. WHITE: Vale're White.

6 MR. BUCHER: Vale're White, radio controller for the
7 ROCC at WMATA's Control Center. And the interview is related to
8 the WMATA accident at L'Enfant Plaza on January 12, 2015. The
9 accident number is DCA-15-FR-004.

10 To my right, I have:

11 MR. LITTLETON: Thomas Littleton. I am the Associate
12 Administrator for Transit Safety and Oversight with the Federal
13 Transit Administration.

14 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: Marlene Flemmings-McCann,
15 Assistant Business Agent for Rail Operations, 689.

16 Mr. BALLARD: Hercules Ballard, Managing Director, Rail
17 Transportation.

18 MR. ADAMS: Dorsey Adams, Manager of Rail Safety.

19 MR. DOWNS: Rick Downs. I'm the Survival Factors Group
20 Chairperson, which looks at the emergency response.

21 MR. GORDON: Joe Gordon. I'm the Investigator-In-Charge
22 for the NTSB.

23 MR. BUCHER: Okay. I have one observer. And that is:

24 MR. RHINE: Joey Rhine, NTSB.

25 INTERVIEW OF VALE'RE WHITE

1 BY MR. BUCHER:

2 Q. Okay. Ms. White. Like I said, if you could just go
3 back to the day of the incident on the 12th, and just give us, in
4 your own words, what happened in the Control Center that you
5 remember.

6 A. I was sitting on Ops Number 3 at the Radio Position with
7 my partner, Ms. Smith. And a call came in from 508, Operator
8 contacted Central Control. Train 508, departing L'Enfant,
9 track 1, reporting smoke in the interlocking. He -- the way he
10 said track 2 it sounded kind of sketchy, so I, okay, roger,
11 reporting smoke, track 2 on the interlocking.

12 Q. Train 50 --

13 A. 508 was --

14 Q. -- 8.

15 A. -- the first train to report it. He was departing
16 L'Enfant. He contacted Central saying, Train 508 departing
17 L'Enfant, track 1. Report smoke in the interlocking, track 2. I
18 repeated it back to him. And 302, which was the incident train,
19 was departing Mount Vernon track 2.

20 And as he's -- well, let's go back. L'Enfant has two
21 interlockings. It has the turn-out, which is after you leave the
22 platform on track 2 side, and the diamond, leaving track 1 side.
23 So I zoomed in on the diamond, because he said he was departing,
24 so I zoomed in on the diamond.

25 I went to 302. He was departing Mount Vernon. 302 come in

1 to Central. I think I called him twice. I don't remember
2 exactly, but as I was calling him, he responded, Central, I was
3 trying to contact you. I was just trying to contact you. I just
4 passed a small fire wayside at train marker E2-014 plus double 0.

5 508 contacted me at 1506. 302 contacted me about a minute
6 later, because all I did was wrote down his ID and his time and
7 the train marker. 510 which -- I asked him if he was able to give
8 me a track inspection. He said I already passed the fire. He was
9 now berthed on the platform at Gallery Place track 2.

10 510 was coming in from Shaw-Howard onto the platform at Mount
11 Vernon. And I went to 510. Train 510, upon departing Mount
12 Vernon, I need you to give me a good track inspection.
13 Specifically looking for reports of a small fire at train marker
14 E2-014 plus double 0. She repeated it back. Roger that. I'll
15 give you a good track inspection. Let you know if I find anything
16 unusual.

17 At the same time I'm talking to 510, Anacostia went out. So
18 now my head's spinning. I go to Anacostia. Still remembering
19 that I have to go back to 302 to get him and do his track
20 inspection. But I had time, because I had -- he still had one
21 more station to get to. He was at Gallery.

22 So I go to 509 track 1 Anacostia. Train 509, make
23 announcement in to your customers. Give me a radio check. You
24 have permission to go wayside. Verify the switches 183 are
25 leaning to normal for a straight through move. You have

1 permission to clamp the switches, verify switch 1 is took. Return
2 to your cabin. He rogered, got the information, repeated it back.

3 I went to 503 on track 2. Track -- I made two attempts to
4 get her attention. I gave her the message. She didn't copy
5 clearly. It was taking up time. So I -- kind of rushing her to
6 get back to me so I can go back to 302, because I know I needed
7 him to do a track inspection. She got back, repeated the message,
8 roger that. She was going wayside. So I got Anacostia taken care
9 of.

10 In the process of me talking to her, Mount Vernon 5A switch
11 went out.

12 Q. Went out. What do you by went out?

13 MR. BALLARD: Out of correspondence?

14 MS. WHITE: Yeah, out of corres --

15 BY MR. BUCHER:

16 Q. Out of correspondence.

17 A. Yes, sir. And 510 came back. No fire found. Good
18 track inspection.

19 302 was about to leave Archives. Train 302, I need a good
20 track inspection from your location entering L'Enfant Plaza,
21 because the smoke was reported in the diamond interlocking. So I
22 need you to give me a track inspection from Archives entering
23 L'Enfant Plaza. Let me know if you find anything unusual. He
24 copied, roger that. He got into the platform.

25 I'm still waiting on him to come back to me, so I'm turning

1 my attention back to 5 -- instead of me going to 5 -- 508 now,
2 that's at Mount Vernon, I went back to 509, because I didn't hear
3 anything back from them. So I don't know if they're wayside now
4 or what's going on. I'm trying to contact the 503 Operator. 509
5 I need an update, I need an update.

6 By that time, couldn't get them, so I go back to 302. 302,
7 as I'm calling him for him to give me an update, he cuts me off
8 and calls me. Central, I can't go any further. There's heavy
9 smoke ahead. I have no visibility. I need a block back to the
10 platform. He sounds like he's running. I said negative, 302,
11 negative.

12 Because he -- in my head, he's going to get in the cab and
13 start to move, but I have 510 in approach to the platform. So
14 when he said that, I said negative. I go to 510. 510, stop your
15 train. I said it to her twice. She came back. I heard her, but
16 I didn't hear her. So I, 510, stop your train, stop your train.
17 She said it again. It confirmed good enough for me. She stopped.
18 I saw her stop outside the interlocking.

19 So with that, now we can figure out what's going on, because
20 we don't know what's going on. He didn't report smoke where I --
21 it was supposed to be. He reported it somewhere else. So I'm
22 calling. I'd already told my supervisor, Mr. Malloy, I have smoke
23 here. I have fire here. This is out. This is out. And I'm
24 trying to prioritize and handle all four at the same time.

25 Now, by the time he gets back. By the time I get back to

1 him, how 510 got from 8 signal to the platform, that is literally
2 blank. I don't -- I can't tell you how she got to the platform.
3 But when she did get on the platform, they ended up setting a
4 route for her to go to Waterfront, so we can get her out the way.

5 As they're setting a route for her to get out the way, they
6 were switching us out, because I just turned in. They said it was
7 too much and it was -- it was overwhelming. So they got a Senior
8 Controller to come over, but it was a pass down that needed to
9 happen between him and I. And I couldn't do it right then and
10 there, so he waited for a second.

11 510, we couldn't get her to move. She said transit wouldn't
12 let her leave the platform. They wouldn't let her leave the
13 platform. And the customers on board were arguing. I told her to
14 keep her doors closed. The customers were arguing with Transit as
15 far as trying to get off the train.

16 302 came back. It was like, Central, there's smoke coming in
17 the train. There's smoke coming in the train. I'd made an
18 announcement earlier for all operators to turn their EV's off.
19 And I told him again, turn your EV off. We're trying to get you
20 back to the platform. Stand by. Stand by.

21 But at that point, it just felt like -- we were -- it just
22 felt like there was nothing else we could -- we were just -- we
23 were lost. We couldn't get -- we couldn't move them in with one
24 train on the -- it just -- it just felt lost. It just felt like
25 we were stuck almost. And we couldn't -- after a while, we lost

1 communication with 510. We couldn't talk to her.

2 We got in touch with a supervisor from another line to have
3 him come down and assist us with moving the train off the
4 platform. But then he got thrown out and we couldn't contact --
5 we couldn't -- we didn't have anybody to assist us as far as, we
6 didn't know how many cars were on the platform. We didn't know if
7 we had room to bring another train back in the opposite way, you
8 know, inbound -- facing another train -- we didn't have any eyes
9 out there. We didn't have any communication with anyone.

10 And even after I got up and out, because I had to -- well, we
11 did pass down. I sat beside him taking notes and, you know,
12 telling him to go back here, trying to remind him and be his extra
13 eyes while he was talking. We just didn't have any communications
14 with anybody. And the one person we didn't have communication
15 that needed our help was 302. We couldn't help him.

16 There was nothing we could have done other than what was
17 illegal, because it wasn't in the book. And in order for us to
18 illegally -- to do that move illegally and get him back to the
19 platform, we needed to know where that train on the platform
20 actually was. And there was nobody on the platform to tell us
21 that. So our hands were tied.

22 Was I talking too fast.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

24 BY MR. BUCHER:

25 Q. Not a problem. It was very clear. Dave Bucher, it was

1 very clear. Okay.

2 Were you involved -- this is Dave Bucher again. Were you
3 involved with any of the emergency response? Did they talk to the
4 Center through you at all?

5 A. What do you mean?

6 Q. Contact wise, did they give you any information what was
7 going on in the station?

8 A. Oh, no. Everything we got was from the 41, unit 41. I
9 think that was Supervisor Adams. He was -- he contacted -- he
10 was, Central, they're evacuating the station. They told me to
11 leave the train and get out the station. They evacuate the
12 station. They will not let me go to the train, wouldn't talk to
13 any Transit, no ERT on the scene at the time. The only person we
14 spoke to is 41 and 302. We lost -- when we lost communication
15 with the 510 Operator, that was it for us.

16 So that train was stuck. It was empty. As far as we knew,
17 from the last transmission between her and us, they all got
18 evacuated. So we had an empty train sitting on the platform. Our
19 only supervisor that we were able to get a hold of to come over to
20 be able to move the train that was certified to move the train was
21 kicked out, forcefully.

22 Q. Kicked out?

23 A. Out of the station. They were all told to leave the
24 station. And he actually said they told him, leave the train and
25 get out the station. Like I'm ordering you to get out the

1 station. And this was -- I know his unit was 41. And I think it
2 was Supervisor Adams. I'm not -- don't -- I'm not specific on
3 him, but I think it was Adams, because he came from another line.
4 He wasn't assigned to our line originally. But he was kicked out
5 the station. And our only other person that we were able to talk
6 to was 302. And we couldn't do anything for him. It was -- we
7 just couldn't do anything for him.

8 Q. Okay. We're going to go to the left, and then just do a
9 loop around or two for --

10 A. Questions.

11 Q. -- questions. Thank you.

12 BY MR. GORDON:

13 Q. This is Joe Gordon, NTSB. You referred to the EV's?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Is that exterior ventilation? Is that what that stands
16 for?

17 A. Yes, sir. The environmental --

18 Q. Environmental.

19 A. So they can shut their breakers off so nothing -- the
20 smoke will -- it'll lessen. It'll try to stop the smoke from
21 coming in the train.

22 Q. Okay. So it's the ventilation, pulling air from the
23 outside into --

24 A. Into the train.

25 Q. -- the train. Okay.

1 A. Well, their AC, their HVAC system that provides them
2 with air condition and heat in the train.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. We didn't want anything -- trying to lessen whatever
5 they -- contact they were having with the smoke.

6 Q. Okay. Approximately how much time passed from the time
7 that 302 reported that he had stopped the train, encountered smoke
8 and stopped the train, until you informed him -- until you feel
9 like he got the message from you to turn off those EV's?

10 A. I got notes all over the place. 302 called me about --
11 train unable to move to Pentagon. He called me at 17
12 after -- 1517. And my transmission for 1517, he reported smoke.
13 He's demanding a -- MTPD demanded him to return -- request a block
14 back to the platform. I instructed him to inoperate his entering
15 and exit, to turn off their EV's. So it was in the same time
16 frame. It was in the -- the same --

17 Q. Same communication.

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. Okay.

20 MR. DOWNS: So that was 3:17?

21 MS. WHITE: Yes, sir.

22 MR. GORDON: Okay. I have nothing further.

23 BY MR. DOWNS:

24 Q. Ms. White, thank you for joining us and the good step-
25 by-step description. That was appreciated.

1 A. I've been thinking about it --

2 Q. A pretty good --

3 A. -- since it happened.

4 Q. We have a pretty good idea as to your process here.
5 Sounds like you had a level of frustration to try to deal with
6 what was going on. It sounds like there was a combination of
7 events involving a small trackside fire that had to be examined,
8 determined and investigated, which turned out to be nothing. That
9 caused a -- what could have been a smoke condition or that could
10 have been attributable to the later smoke, you were thinking. Am
11 I correct in that?

12 A. (No audible response.)

13 Q. Okay. Which is actually further back to -- towards like
14 Archives, Judiciary, or --

15 A. Well, that -- when he initially report -- when the first
16 train reported smoke, there was no way for me to verify it,
17 because he was leaving. And on top of that, he wasn't sure. He
18 gave me information, but it wasn't sure.

19 Q. Right.

20 A. So I couldn't assume -- I didn't want to assume. So in
21 order for me to verify anything, I needed a train -- now why I did
22 this is because we get reports of smoke every day. Sometimes it's
23 fog. Sometimes it's some guys. Nothing to do with our tracks.
24 So --

25 Q. It's a routine thing, daily, almost.

1 A. You kind of treat every situation as an emergen -- as
2 important. I don't want to say emergency, because you never know
3 it's an emergency until you're already in the emergency. So my
4 next train, in order to verify that smoke at L'Enfant Plaza,
5 was 302. He reported fire. I had a train closer to investigate
6 that fire than I did for trains investigate the smoke.

7 So let's prioritize this. 1, 2, 3. Is -- there's an order
8 now. I'm going to investigate my fire. By the time you get down
9 to where you can investigate the smoke, you'll be able to do that
10 then. So investigate the fire. Take your mind to lock in.
11 Investigate the smoke. Take your mind to lock in. It was just a
12 step that was -- I was forming it in my head in order to not miss
13 anyone, not overlook anyone, and to not -- because all of them
14 were important.

15 One didn't seem more important than the other at that
16 particular time, because it didn't -- none stood out as an
17 emergency. That fire was important, because I had a train right
18 there, and it could have been something that -- it could have been
19 anything. So being that that fire -- it was an actual fire. They
20 said fire. Smoke, fire. It could have been fog. I didn't want
21 to assume.

22 So let's get this taken care of. I have two trains right
23 here. One leaving, one coming. They're so close. Investigate
24 that. You still have two stations to go before you get to the
25 smoke. 508 on track 1 couldn't offer me any help other than, hey,

1 this is over here. You might want to get it looked at.

2 Q. As I recall, in that section of tunnel, there's separate
3 tunnel tubes, meaning that track 1 folks, crewmembers wouldn't
4 necessarily be able to see what's going on on track 2.

5 A. I can't even concur or deny -- I --

6 Q. Not familiar with it.

7 A. No, sir, I'm not. Okay. On the -- in the -- lost my
8 train of thought there. The 302 train came -- it stopped inside
9 the tunnel. We later measured it. The back end of that train was
10 about three hundred and --

11 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Eighty-six.

12 BY MR. DOWNS:

13 Q. -- eighty-six feet --

14 A. From the --

15 Q. -- from the platform.

16 A. -- platform?

17 Q. You could almost see, from the back of the train, could
18 almost see the platform. We had testimony from the Train Operator
19 that, because the smoke was so heavy, he could not see the
20 platform. It's really thick. We had testimony earlier that
21 the 510 train had stopped on the L'Enfant Plaza track 2 platform.

22 When the NTSB did our inspection of the platform that night,
23 we found that train had stopped two car lengths from the 8 car
24 position. Meaning there were 2 car length spaces on the
25 platform -- to the end of the platform. Okay?

1 A. So there was room on the platform --

2 Q. So there was --

3 A. -- for 6 other cars.

4 Q. -- room on the platform. And we heard earlier
5 testimony, to kind of fill you in as to what -- the story's
6 unfolding here. The 510 was sitting right there on the platform.
7 There was no crew, no supervisor available to move the train per
8 Com Center ROCC direction, because that was the ultimate plan is
9 to get that train out of the way. Correct me --

10 A. So we can --

11 Q. -- if I'm wrong. So you'd have room to bring in. We
12 had testimony this morning from the Supervisor to the effect that
13 ideally it would have been to bring back that train. Reverse
14 direction; bring back that train into the station. She indicated
15 to the effect that that was not permitted except when authorized
16 by the Superintendent.

17 A. Yes, so that was something that we would have to get
18 permission. He would have to call and get permission in order to
19 tell us to do it.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. Because we'd have to cancel the interlocking -- cancel
22 the signal. And in order for a train to go over a switch --

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. -- it has to be clamped. If it's not a normal --

25 Q. Um-hum.

1 A. Mr. Ballard, help me out with the word in here, because
2 I'm still --

3 MR. BALLARD: (Indiscernible) we can't establish a
4 route --

5 MR. DOWNS: Yeah.

6 MR. BALLARD: -- except to move the route
7 (indiscernible). Then we'd have to verify that the -- to be sure
8 that the switches won't move as the trains go across it. So it's
9 locked --

10 MR. DOWNS: Lock the switch.

11 MR. BALLARD: You have to lock the switch with the
12 clamp.

13 MS. WHITE: Because it wasn't a normal flow of traffic.
14 He was going against traffic.

15 MR. DOWNS: And you have to go through extraordinary
16 measures, safety measures --

17 MS. WHITE: He'd have to go --

18 MR. DOWNS: -- here in order --

19 MS. WHITE: -- wayside and clamp it. He can't --

20 MR. DOWNS: To make sure we don't have a derailment --

21 MR. BALLARD: (Indiscernible).

22 MS. WHITE: Exactly.

23 MR. DOWNS: -- or some other problem?

24 MS. WHITE: So that was the only --

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible).

1 MS. WHITE: -- option that I was mentioning earlier that
2 was --

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible). You went back
4 (indiscernible).

5 MS. WHITE: -- illegal for us to do. It's not in our
6 SOP'S. I'm sorry. So that was the only other outside the box
7 thinking that --

8 MR. DOWNS: Um-hum.

9 MS. WHITE: -- we could have done. To cancel the --
10 manually, we can manually throw the switch into reverse in order
11 for him to go over it. But then we're taking another chance with
12 him not being able to see if that switch was in fact really in
13 reverse in order for him to -- that's aligning him to the
14 platform. So with --

15 BY MR. DOWNS:

16 Q. So OCC has no way to remotely assure that that switch is
17 correctly aligned. You have to physically get out and lock that
18 switch?

19 A. Well, we can manually command the switch to go into
20 either direction. But --

21 Q. There's no way to assure that it's locked?

22 A. Machine and man. I don't want to say yes or no. Again,
23 I'm -- I'm learning as I go along. So to say yes we can assure
24 that it's locked, I think they --

25 Q. But there is a risk, in other words, if you --

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. -- run contrary to normal direction, you might have a
3 problem, derailment or whatever.

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Okay. The -- I'm going to let the questioning move on.
6 We'll get back to my continued questions.

7 A. Okay.

8 BY MR. ADAMS:

9 Q. Dorsey Adams. WMATA Safety. Ms. Smith, right? Yeah,
10 Ms. White.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. Ms. White, at what point was power deenergized?

13 A. Power was first brought down on the platform without --
14 I assumed it was from the ETS box, because we didn't bring it
15 down. Power was first brought down at 1540 under 510, which was
16 on the platform. So even if we had a chance to bring that train
17 back, they just took it from us. And then power again was brought
18 down under 302. He called he said, Central, the customers have
19 started self-evacuation at 1549. And immediately, power was
20 brought down on the 302. So you had to -- track 1 and 2, L'Enfant
21 came down. And then 9 minutes later, 302 -- we had to bring power
22 down on the aerial line (ph.) bridge into Waterfront, because
23 customers started going out the emergency doors.

24 Q. Before power went down, was there any thought of
25 having 302 proceed?

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Forward, you mean?

2 By MR. ADAMS:

3 Q. Forward?

4 A. The whole goal was to get him back to the platform. How
5 was the question. There was no -- where he was at -- he was at
6 the turnout. There's no room for him to cross over to go to
7 track 1. His only options was to go back on track 2. That switch
8 was -- we had a luna set for, an alignment set for 510 to go to
9 Waterfront. So it was thrown in the normal -- where he
10 couldn't -- we'd have to throw the switch in order for him to go
11 back to L'Enfant Plaza.

12 Q. No, go forward.

13 A. You mean --

14 Q. Towards the --

15 A. I asked him. When he reported, I asked him if -- is it
16 safe for you to continue on? And he said no. So I asked him.
17 I --

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. -- specifically asked him. He said no. At that point,
20 he's seeing something I can't see.

21 Q. Okay. Was it ever discussed with you or did you ever
22 hear or anybody take responsibility for hitting, bringing down the
23 power by hitting the ETS button?

24 A. No, sir.

25 Q. That's all I have for her.

1 BY MR. BALLARD:

2 Q. Hercules Ballard with Washington Metro. Ms. White,
3 because you were not able to communicate with the Operator of 510
4 at the platform at L'Enfant Plaza, even if you became aware that
5 there was space available to bring 302 back onto the platform,
6 capability in a safe fashion, would you have felt comfortable
7 moving that train towards a train that was already on the platform
8 without first communicating to the Operator on 510, that a train
9 is approaching the platform and not to move 510?

10 A. Mr. Ballard, I've been playing this in my head since I
11 got up. Honestly, coming from my background in dealing with what
12 I have dealt with airplanes and not being able to see and not
13 being able to get accurate detail and confirmation, I'm not
14 playing with people's lives like that. I'm just not doing it.

15 Q. Right. And the reason I was asking that question and
16 wanted to understand with our procedure, even though there was
17 space available on the platform, unless we can confirm with the
18 Operator who is aboard 510 train to make sure he understood what
19 OCC's plans were, that our folks are trained that they cannot take
20 another action until the first train understand what the second
21 train's going to do. So I just wanted to make sure that everyone
22 understood that. Okay.

23 A. And again, we only spoke to Unit 41 -- the Operator
24 didn't -- the last transmission from 510 Operator was the
25 customers on board were fighting with Transit. She didn't tell us

1 she was being evacuated. She didn't tell us she was leaving the
2 train. She didn't tell us anything.

3 Q. Would that be normal procedure for the Operator to
4 tell --

5 A. They cannot leave the cab unless they tell us. They
6 don't have permission to do anything other than operate that
7 train, unless they tell us. We give them permission to leave the
8 cab. We give them permission to -- we're controlling the
9 railroad. They're operating; we're controlling. That's just my
10 training, my idea, and my understanding of what goes on when it
11 comes to me sitting in that seat and being on that radio or
12 buttons.

13 41 was the only one that told us that they were being
14 evacuated, the train is being evacuated. The Operator could have
15 been left on the train. I didn't -- lives on the train and -- I
16 didn't feel safe.

17 Q. But with the radio system that we have, because multiple
18 conversations can be occurring at the same time --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is it possible, because you had, according to what you
21 said earlier, you had interlocking out at --

22 A. Anacostia.

23 Q. -- Anacostia. You had interlocking out --

24 A. Mount Vernon.

25 Q. -- at Mount Vernon. You had fire reported between Mount

1 Vernon --

2 A. And Gallery.

3 Q. -- and Gallery. So there was a lot of radio
4 communications going on around --

5 A. And I talk fast.

6 Q. -- the same time.

7 A. So I was trying to get out as much as I can.

8 Q. So is it possible that, while all of this radio
9 transmission was occurring, is it possible that the Operator
10 of 510 tried to communicate with you and you did not hear the
11 conversation from him? Is that possible?

12 A. There is a possibility, but while I was sitting there
13 that day and -- I know for a fact she reported good track
14 inspection. I know for a fact when I yelled at her twice, stop
15 your train, stop your train. She answered. And I yelled at her
16 again. Stop your train, 510. She answered again. And she said,
17 Central, I'm stopped. Us communicating, she had -- she had good
18 communications that day. I think she just got snatched off the
19 train and wasn't able to let us know. Now, I know we switched
20 over to digital radios.

21 Q. Um-hum. Yes.

22 A. Yeah, we switched over to digital, so a lot of their
23 handsets -- it's kind of funny. It's -- so her train unit may
24 have been working fine, and her handset may not have been why she
25 didn't contact to let us know she was off the train. I don't know

1 what happened. I'm speculating at this point.

2 Q. Right.

3 A. But we were good until she got on the platform.

4 Reported the confrontation between authority and customers. And
5 then it just -- it was -- now if Mr. Sam was able to speak to her,
6 I can't say yes or no. I know my conversation with her stopped at
7 the confrontation between Transit and the customers.

8 Q. Okay. And listening to you earlier, when you got the
9 report from 508, track 1 headed northbound that there was smoke in
10 the interlocking, track 2, L'Enfant Plaza, shortly after that, you
11 said that you told all operators to turn their EV off. So was it
12 after 508 said it about the smoke at L'Enfant Plaza and 302
13 reported smoke leaving Mount Vernon? Or was it after the Operator
14 on 302 reported that there was smoke in the tunnel?

15 A. It was after 302 reported that he couldn't go any
16 further.

17 Q. Okay. So that's --

18 A. It was after.

19 Q. Okay. That's all the questions I have.

20 BY MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN:

21 Q. Marlene Flemmings-McCann. Local 689. Ms. White, it
22 seems as though you and Ms. Smith have the same frustration in
23 your voice when you talk to us about what happened. It's like the
24 communication got lost somewhere. And without eyes, you really
25 don't know what's going on and background of noise and everybody's

1 trying to scramble.

2 My question was, to her, and I'll ask you also, I understand
3 that Transit has authority, being law enforcement officers. I
4 also understand that Central Controls has authority over the
5 railroad. But the lack of communication kind of put you all with
6 your hands tied, because you had no eyes out there.

7 A. It took our control from us.

8 Q. Huh?

9 A. It took our control -- it took everything out --

10 Q. Right.

11 A. -- of our hands.

12 Q. Right. And we heard that from Ms. Smith also. The
13 problem I have is there's no one at Central Control in the law
14 enforcement capacity that could have made radio contact with the
15 Transit officer or any Transit officer that was in the vicinity of
16 L'Enfant Plaza at that time to get some -- some kind of contact,
17 you know, to you all, because you're eyes weren't there. And with
18 the new radio system, I also hear that it sounds like
19 communication is either fuzzy or -- is it too many people at one
20 time or is it just not getting a relay information?

21 A. The first part of your question, other options to reach
22 person in the field. We have internal control two options. We
23 either have I think that's the liaison that sits behind the
24 Superintendent, this is the Superintendent.

25 Q. Um-hum.

1 A. And then we have the phone number, 2121, to reach out to
2 them. Now, each position has different roles. Sometimes we
3 intertwine and we do each other's role depending on the nature of
4 the emergency, but if I'm on the radio, I inform her of what's
5 going on. I either speak loudly or I get her attention, but I
6 inform her. And she notifies everyone.

7 If I can't -- if I can't -- now, we were so busy trying to --
8 I was so busy trying to get a hold of the Train Operator
9 continuously, even Mr. Harveson (ph.), when he sat down, trying to
10 get a hold of 510 Operator, that I don't think it came to mind to
11 tell her, call 2121. And I don't know what she was thinking, if
12 she did call them, if she didn't.

13 But I knew we had someone in the back. I don't know if he
14 was trying to reach out and he couldn't get a hold of, or he
15 didn't know who was out there, or -- I don't know what was going
16 on.

17 But we did have two options. And Mr. Harveson even went out
18 to tell the 302 Operator, tell your -- tell the MTPD on your
19 train, they need to contact MTPD on the platform, because they're
20 preventing us from moving you back to the platform. He
21 specifically said that to him.

22 Q. Um-hum.

23 A. We can't move you back to the platform. They've shut us
24 down. So even though we didn't -- we may or may not have utilized
25 our resources inside, because -- I don't know, because I wasn't --

1 that's not -- my focus is talking and getting and situating that.
2 Her focus is notifications and -- Ms. White this is what we're
3 going to do. Strate -- I hate that word -- strategizing. That
4 word.

5 Q. (Indiscernible) the hard one but not the easy ones.

6 A. So it's more or less to where our next option was to --
7 he did what the next option was, hey, tell them out there to call
8 them out there. You guys are out there. Talk to each other. So
9 we can get this moving. That didn't work either.

10 Q. Was -- and I guess I didn't ask -- I should have asked
11 earlier. Passenger Ops has the capacity to do a break in
12 announcement through the system. Did anyone contact Passenger Ops
13 and say, make a break in announcement in L'Enfant Plaza, any WMATA
14 personnel, contact -- I mean, you got an emergency going on? So
15 can you tell me if anyone relayed to Passenger Ops, which I'm
16 sure -- I want to say I'm sure it's known that there's an
17 emergency going on with you all? And all station managers have a
18 handheld radio. It's a lot of radios out there, was a blanket
19 announcement made to get someone to respond to Central Control?

20 A. I can't answer that and be truthful, because I do not
21 know, and I hate the term I do not know, because I know for a fact
22 Mr. -- I think his name is Wilson -- came over back and forth.
23 Mr. Malloy was back and forth between Customer Ops and us.

24 Q. Um-hum.

25 A. And again, notifications are specific to the buttons.

1 Q. Um-hum.

2 A. So it's just certain people, it's mandatory. There is
3 no and, if or buts. You call the Superintend -- the Assistant
4 Superintendent. You call Customer Ops. You -- if you need MOC,
5 you call MOC. If you need Safety, you call Safety. Depending on
6 the nature of the emergency, there are certain people that you
7 have to call. So in her -- with the interlocking going out and --
8 she had a number of people to call and report a number of things.

9 So it -- I'm not sure. I can't say yes or no they did or --
10 but I know they were going back and forth. Out of my peripheral,
11 you saw Mr. Malloy running back and forth. You saw Mr. -- I think
12 his name is Wilson -- coming back and forth. Mr. Bay (ph.) even
13 came down and started making notifications. So I'm not sure. And
14 with them -- with something that huge --

15 Q. Um-hum.

16 A. -- they normally don't wait for us to call. They --

17 Q. Exactly.

18 A. -- just -- they're proactive. They --

19 Q. Right.

20 A. -- start making announcements.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. So everyone was literally in a frenzy while still trying
23 to have the rest of the railroad continue running.

24 Q. Right.

25 A. So I believe they did it.

1 Q. Okay. I'm fine. Thank you. Appreciate that.

2 BY MR. LITTLETON:

3 Q. Tom Littleton from the FTA. You had mentioned that, at
4 some point as this unfolded, I guess it was Mr. Harveson came over
5 took your spot.

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. And you sat down to -- moved over to help him.

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Do you know -- and I'm only asking because you have some
10 wonderful notes, and maybe it's a time we can pick -- do you know
11 when that happened?

12 A. When what happened?

13 Q. What time he --

14 A. He came and took over?

15 Q. -- he came and took over?

16 A. Mr. Harveson took over -- I remember the event, and I
17 remember what I wrote down. I remember the event, and I remember
18 wrote down.

19 Q. Take your time, and it's okay if you can't peg a number
20 to it.

21 A. I have them everywhere. Around 1516. Wait. Hold on.
22 No, it's not 15 -- I told that train continue on -- okay. So
23 at 1524, I told that train to not service the station. Wait,
24 wait, wait, wait -- hold on. It was around 1524.

25 Q. Great. Thank you. I have no other questions.

1 A. It was around 1524, because he reported he couldn't get
2 a brakes off. Harveson was talking to him at that time.

3 BY MR. BUCHER:

4 Q. Okay. Dave Bucher. I'd like to follow up on
5 Mr. Littleton's question. And I'm trying to clarify it for
6 myself. The incident occurred. It's really busy. You're trying
7 to answer 15 people. Did Mr. Harveson come to assist you or
8 relieve you? Because I guess what I'm worried or want to make
9 clear, is now you have to instruct him what you're doing. Are you
10 trying to get a transfer to him also? Or is he just kind of sit
11 down to help assist with the communication?

12 A. Well, we have three Senior Controllers on our shift.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. And he is the most Senior Controller, one of the most
15 Senior Controllers in the Center --

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. -- altogether. So what Mr. Harveson, he actually came.
18 He stood behind me for a second. And as he's standing behind me,
19 I like to point at -- I use my hands. So I'm pointing and I'm
20 talking and I'm pointing. And he's actually paying attention, so
21 when we do do the change over, it's not a pass down. It's not a
22 me stopping to take time and say this is this, this is that. I'm
23 not doing that. He's -- he knows what's going on, because he's
24 standing behind me. He sits in the next chair. And we do this.

25 Q. So you're both working.

1 A. And he starts talking, and I start writing.

2 Q. Okay. I just wanted to be clear that you weren't
3 transferring duties in the middle of --

4 A. In the middle. No, it wasn't -- when I said pass down,
5 it was more like a -- I guess that would be the general term for
6 it, because he's taking over from me. I'm no longer in control.
7 He is. But it wasn't a -- hey, Sam, this is what's going on. It
8 wasn't a general pass down like we usually do.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. He was -- he kind of was over observing for a couple --
11 like what's going on. Malloy's standing right there. And I'm
12 pointing, three -- 5-0 -- 510, 510 -- trying to get him and -- I
13 need to get this interlocking clamped. 509, come in to Central.
14 Train 503 did you -- were able to clamp the switches.

15 So he's listening to me. By the time he sat down and
16 actually moved over, he didn't need me to tell him anything,
17 because he -- with experience like that --

18 Q. Right.

19 A. I'm the newbie, so me watching him, I learned more from
20 watching him than -- it was just, that seat. That seat is hot.
21 That seat is hot. I sat beside him. I was telling him what to
22 do. He looked at me like, oh, you want to do -- it's just
23 different when you're not sitting there. It's so different. It's
24 so different.

25 Q. A little follow up to that question, when was your

1 promotion to Control Oper -- when were you hired by WMATA? And
2 when were you promoted to the --

3 A. I was --

4 Q. -- Control Operators group?

5 A. -- hired in August 2013 on the 3rd -- maybe the 5th. It
6 was a Monday. I think it's the 3rd or the 5th. And I went
7 through training. I was certified in June of last year.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. June 2014. I don't remember the exact date.

10 Q. Certified as a Radio Operator?

11 A. No, as a Controller.

12 Q. A Controller.

13 A. Because we work both positions. We're able to work
14 either position. It's just, I'm assigned on the radio, because
15 it's better for us, because the Senior Controllers are on the
16 buttons. It's -- the strategy part is the -- in a situation,
17 strategy takes -- you have to know exactly what's going on, be
18 able to see the big picture, think outside the box.

19 We're still developing. We're like -- we're still eggs.
20 They're full hatched. So it's easier for them to tell us what to
21 do and we take instruction and still be -- as long as we know how
22 to get it out, they can tell us what to do. So that's why we're
23 radio. All the -- most of the junior people are radio, and
24 they're buttons.

25 Q. Okay.

1 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: When were you hired in?

2 MS. WHITE: I beg your pardon, ma'am.

3 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: You were hired in?

4 MS. WHITE: August -- I think it's the 3rd or
5 the 5th, 2013.

6 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: Thank you.

7 BY MR. BUCHER:

8 Q. Okay. And how long -- Dave Bucher again -- how long was
9 the qualification? Just for -- how long was your qualification
10 period?

11 A. That I went through OCC training, because I had to go
12 through Train Operator training first. I think mine was kind of
13 different than most. Because I was hired as a lone trainee, and
14 they wanted two or more people to go through at a time. It --
15 resource and learning was different if you had more than one
16 person. So time frame-wise, I started OCC training in January.
17 And I got certified in June. So that's what, 6 months?

18 Q. Um-hum.

19 A. But prior to that, I was actually in and out of the
20 Control Center observing. It's not (indiscernible). It's
21 observing where I actually get to listen, ask questions. Every
22 once in a while, you know, interact more. But so, I guess I had
23 more training than most.

24 Q. Okay. All right. I just wanted ballpark. That's
25 great. Thank you. Let's see here. There was one other question

1 I had. And I wanted to confirm about the smoke detection. Now,
2 we heard from Ms. Smith that there really aren't any smoke
3 detectors per se; it's the train crews that relay to the control
4 operators whenever they see something in the tunnels. And
5 that's -- I just want to confirm that with you. That's true?
6 There's nothing on the boards that gives them --

7 A. They're our eyes.

8 Q. -- an indication --

9 A. If there's a deer running across the track or a yellow
10 cone on the track or -- they're our eyes. They tell us what they
11 see.

12 Q. Okay. Great. That's all I have right now.

13 MR. GORDON: Joe Gordon, NTSB. I have no questions
14 right now.

15 BY MR. DOWNS:

16 Q. Ms. White, going back to my questions a little bit
17 earlier, station cameras. I understand the OCC does have station
18 cameras, but they're not readily observable to you at your work
19 station; is that correct?

20 A. No, they once were when I first got there. Now, they're
21 not any more.

22 Q. Oh, tell us about the station cameras. In other words,
23 you don't have any eyes actually on a platform from where you work
24 other than you see a train in the block controls move from one
25 block into the next block.

1 A. On our computer screen.

2 Q. On your computer screen, exactly. In L'Enfant Plaza,
3 you have the station platform, which is one block. So you don't
4 know where the train is exactly within that station confine; is
5 that correct?

6 A. If you pull up the -- still -- the playback, it looks
7 like he was -- she was on the platform.

8 Q. Occupying the whole platform.

9 A. It looked like she was dead on the platform.

10 Q. Okay. But in reality, we determined later that night --

11 A. There was only two cars --

12 Q. -- when we went down, that that train actually had
13 stopped at the lead end of the station, not in the A car position.

14 A. It doesn't -- it doesn't depict that on our --

15 Q. In other words --

16 A. -- screen.

17 Q. -- that's my question. It doesn't depict that. So you
18 had no way of knowing --

19 A. None.

20 Q. -- that. And you don't have cameras to actually look
21 and say, nope, nope, he's got plenty of space on that platform
22 that, if you had to or had a capability of backing that train
23 up --

24 A. We could have given a block.

25 Q. -- which now we know that we don't readily, possibility

1 would have been there to back the train up, at least one car
2 length onto the platform.

3 A. If we had cameras, then it probably would have given us
4 an opportunity to say, okay, we have room, we have space. Let's
5 do it. But we -- no, didn't have that help either.

6 Q. You don't have that capability now. Did you have
7 cameras before?

8 A. I know we had cameras in some of the stations when I
9 first got there. Now, what stations they were, I've never
10 actually sat there and played with it. Because it's just -- it
11 wasn't something --

12 Q. All the stations now --

13 A. -- that we did.

14 Q. -- do have security cameras. I'm curious as to what --
15 who has tied those cameras into what location? Is that strictly
16 security cameras? Or is that operational cameras?

17 A. I wish I can answer that for you, but I cannot.

18 Q. So let me lay out the event scenario. And I want you to
19 correct me as we go along.

20 A. Okay.

21 Q. Okay? And after that, I want to do a little
22 brainstorming here. What if? (Indiscernible) meaning knowing
23 what we know now type of thing. Okay? So the way the event is
24 unfolding as I see it. And I'd like to have everybody chime in if
25 they've got a question or a thought point, factually.

1 We have the 602 train comes into L'Enfant Plaza, leaves
2 L'Enfant Plaza heading south. Routine day.

3 MR. BALLARD: 602?

4 MR. DOWNS: Excuse me. Excuse me. 302.

5 MS. WHITE: Okay.

6 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

7 MS. WHITE: I was waiting until you said it.

8 BY MR. DOWNS:

9 Q. 302. Exits the station. Proceeds down the track a
10 certain distance. Encounters heavy smoke. Reports back to the
11 OCC, I'm no longer able to proceed. Can't see. Which is
12 according to your standard operating procedure. Correct?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Okay. The permission is given to reverse direction of
15 the train, meaning the Operator goes from the lead end of the
16 train with the intent, ultimately, going to the back end of the
17 train, and making that the control car for purposes of working the
18 train reverse direction back to, for the evacuation.

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Okay? You're telling me now, according to -- I think we
21 had testimony earlier, you can't really do that, because you're
22 running contrary to the flow of normal direction on the track,
23 without locking the track in some manner at the scene itself,
24 right?

25 A. Well, our SOP's our Bible. It governs everything we do.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. Everything we can do is in there.

3 Q. Um-hum.

4 A. Some things we can do is not in there. So if it's not
5 in there, it's illegal -- in our eyes.

6 Q. That's my question, okay.

7 A. Now, we could have sent him back to the platform. But
8 it would have been dangerous, for one, and illegal, for two.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And if it did work, then hooray on the Control Center.
11 But if it didn't work, multiple heads are going to roll because
12 it's illegal --

13 Q. Yep.

14 A. -- and it's dangerous.

15 Q. Yep. Understood. And that's a very good argument why
16 you want to be very cautious when you proceed in that regard,
17 correct? Okay. And you were hampered by not physically being
18 able to see, number one, you did have space on the platform,
19 physical space. And correct me if I'm wrong, that it would have
20 been better to have somebody at the site who is capable and
21 knowledgeable to hand lock the switch gear, so that when you did
22 go in reverse direction, you didn't inadvertently derail or
23 something?

24 A. Now, to answer that question, there's two parts to that.
25 If I still -- if one of us still had communications with the 510

1 Operator --

2 Q. Um-hum.

3 A. -- we could have asked her, how many cars do you have on
4 the platform?

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. That's one. Her answer determines what we can tell 302.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Now, we can tell him to pass. We can drop the signal.
9 I think that's 4642 signal, Mr. Ballard, going out of L'Enfant
10 Plaza?

11 MR. BALLARD: Going out of --

12 MS. WHITE: On track 2?

13 MR. BALLARD: Which direction? Going outbound?

14 MS. WHITE: Going outbound towards -- going to Pentagon.
15 Is that 42 signal that he would see? Or maybe it's 32.

16 MR. BALLARD: (Indiscernible).

17 BY MR. DOWNS:

18 Q. The kind of signal doesn't matter.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. Drop a signal in some manner.

21 A. That signal was lumid (ph.).

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. We can cancel that.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. We set them. We cancel them.

1 Q. You could override that signal.

2 A. Well, not even override. We set them.

3 Q. You set them.

4 A. We cancel them.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. So we can cancel that signal.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Once that signal is cancelled --

9 Q. Right.

10 A. -- the track is already aligned to go one way.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. So we can manually go in and click that track circuit --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. -- and set it back to the reverse.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. Reverse is going to send it back to L'Enfant Plaza.

17 Q. L'Enfant -- okay.

18 A. Now, that traffic is already locked going to Pentagon.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. So with that traffic being locked, I can't set a route

21 from his end back to L'Enfant. But what I can do is align the

22 tracks --

23 Q. Um-hum.

24 A. -- so the track is running straight.

25 Q. Um-hum.

1 A. Tell him -- give him permission to pass a red signal --

2 Q. Ah.

3 A. -- verifying that the track is laying in a reverse
4 position for him to go straight.

5 Q. Right.

6 A. He can't see.

7 Q. He can't see.

8 A. He can't verify. If it's not, he's going to derail.

9 Q. But if you gave him verbal authorization to proceed --

10 A. I'd have to get that from behind me.

11 Q. -- and you got that from your supervision, your
12 Superintendent --

13 A. Um-hum.

14 Q. -- could you have instructed him to proceed at a very
15 slow pace, and that we're not sure that the track is locked, et
16 cetera, et cetera? Would that have been a viable alternative?

17 A. Again going back to knowing where the train on the
18 platform was.

19 Q. Um-hum. In other words, you had given them the word --

20 A. Now, this is all speculation.

21 Q. We're brainstorming.

22 A. Hypothetically.

23 Q. We're brainstorming for future thinking. Okay? To help
24 eliminate a future issue. The idea is that -- let's see the what
25 if scenarios to help prevent it from occurring again, in the

1 future.

2 A. Can we move a train over an interlocking that's not
3 clamped and hope it doesn't move?

4 Q. Right.

5 A. Your asking a machine to do what it's supposed to do
6 when you tell it to do what it's supposed to do.

7 Q. Right.

8 A. I can't answer that.

9 Q. Can't answer that. Okay. Well, we'll answer that with
10 somebody else. But the idea is that, if that -- let's say for
11 arbitrary discussion purposes, arbitrary discussion purpose, that
12 switch was locked or we had somebody at the scene capable of hand
13 locking the switch.

14 A. Um-hum.

15 Q. Okay? Walk that train back, very slowly, with verbal
16 authorization to pass a red signal, back to the station, so you
17 had at least say one car --

18 A. At least --

19 Q. -- on the platform.

20 A. -- one door. Not even a car.

21 Q. At least one door. Great. That maybe would have been
22 enough --

23 A. That would have been more than enough.

24 Q. -- to preempt what ultimately occurred.

25 A. Or if he could even see. If he can see that the switch

1 was actually laying --

2 Q. Um-hum.

3 A. -- the way it should be for him to go over it. As
4 illegal as it was, once he got authorization, it's not illegal any
5 more. It may not be written down, but it's no longer illegal.

6 Q. Right. But that question wasn't asked of the
7 Superintendent in terms of getting him authorized --

8 A. We couldn't because that first part of the answer I gave
9 you wasn't verified. We had an Operator that we couldn't reach
10 and a train on the platform.

11 Q. And that's firm and fast rule that you have, you got to
12 make a determination from that Operator as to where they are and
13 get their approval.

14 A. It'd be crazy for me to send a train into another train.

15 Q. Right.

16 A. It's just -- the air traffic --

17 Q. So the downfall here --

18 A. -- controller in me can't see it.

19 Q. -- it sounds like that once that Train Operator of 510
20 left the train.

21 A. Once we couldn't communicate with her, because we --

22 Q. Couldn't communicate.

23 A. -- don't know if she left or not.

24 Q. And that started the problem.

25 A. That started the issue.

1 Q. Great. Okay. So does that Train Operator normally
2 carry a handheld radio?

3 A. They -- all Operators should have a handheld --

4 Q. And you --

5 A. -- radio.

6 Q. -- tried to connect with the 510 Operator?

7 A. Oh, we tried numerous times --

8 Q. Numerous times, and that Operator didn't respond.

9 A. Couldn't reach her.

10 Q. Now, do these radios operate outside of the tunnels,
11 outside of the stations?

12 A. I would assume so.

13 Q. In other words, if the Transit police --

14 A. Had to evacuate.

15 Q. -- instructed the crew member and the station crew
16 people, the station manager people, exit the station now, you are
17 ordered, their radios still should have worked outside the
18 station, yes?

19 A. It should. I don't know.

20 Q. As far as you know.

21 A. I'm not familiar with -- I talk to them on the train, on
22 the tracks. I'm not familiar with --

23 Q. Because you have trains --

24 A. -- anything outside.

25 Q. -- outside all the time, the radios work fine. So that

1 you don't -- it doesn't seem to make sense as to why they --

2 A. They wouldn't work --

3 Q. -- weren't responding.

4 A. -- out the station. Now again --

5 Q. It's important --

6 A. -- those radios are -- they -- we just switched over to
7 a new system and I've been getting numerous complaints from
8 numerous Operators on several different lines that the radios,
9 they're having problems with them. Whether it's the proper
10 station, not being familiar yet, not knowing. So we actually have
11 sheets that tell them what channels to be on in order to talk to
12 us. So maybe it's -- I don't know. I don't know why she couldn't
13 hear us, why she couldn't contact us. I don't know.

14 Q. Tell me about these radio problems, Ms. White.

15 A. Oh, God.

16 Q. You just got new radios, you're saying, new digital
17 radios. How long ago was this, roughly? A year, six months?

18 A. No, not that long. We just switched over, was it
19 January?

20 MR. BALLARD: January 1.

21 MS. WHITE: (Indiscernible).

22 MR. BALLARD: January 1.

23 MR. BALLARD: Yes.

24 BY MR. DOWNS:

25 Q. Is there somebody in the organization that is kind of

1 monitoring these new radios in terms of problems or anything, do
2 you know?

3 A. Well, when we have problems downstairs with them, we
4 call our Coms department. They come down. They check it out.
5 But it seems like it's like when you go to the dentist. You have
6 a toothache, and when you get there, it doesn't hurt any more.
7 The radio's broken, when they get there, it doesn't -- it's not
8 broken any more.

9 Q. Your Com department handles radio problems, issuing new
10 radios, that --

11 A. Well, no, they handle as far as what we -- the feedback
12 we get -- the feedback -- the fact that sometimes we have bleed
13 overs from other Ops or the Operators not being able to hear us in
14 large areas, in like a large -- not being able to communicate with
15 them.

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. So they'll come down and they'll play with their
18 monitor. And sometimes we have the wrong thing selected because
19 the mouse is so sensitive.

20 Q. Um-hum.

21 A. So they'll come down and say well, make sure this isn't
22 selected or make sure -- but generally I think -- I don't think
23 it's the equipment itself. I think it's the source --

24 Q. Maybe not as user --

25 A. -- which the communication --

1 Q. -- friendly as it could be?

2 A. No, I don't think that's it either. I think it's --
3 because they just went to new radios. They went to a new system.
4 So if the old one wasn't working and you say, well let me upgrade
5 to a new one. And the new one still isn't working. Well, what's
6 the main source between the old one and the new one? It's how --

7 Q. They talk to each other.

8 A. It's the lines that are set up for it to -- your lines
9 of communication. It's not the actual equipment. It's what
10 you're using. What do you guys call them? Those cables and wires
11 and all that stuff? It's --

12 Q. The hardware.

13 A. There you go.

14 Q. So you got --

15 A. Words are eluding me right now.

16 Q. You're saying that to your experience that Metro Rail
17 has radio issues, principally attributable to the new radio, new
18 digital radios?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Okay. We can look into that a separate line item
21 discussion. Very good.

22 Job history. You mentioned you started with WMATA when?

23 A. August of 2013.

24 Q. And what'd you do before August 2013?

25 A. I was an Air Traffic Controller in the Navy.

1 Q. ATC in Navy?

2 A. Yes, sir.

3 Q. How long were you in the Navy there at Air Traffic?

4 A. Thirteen years, and I'm still in.

5 Q. Thirteen -- oh, you're Reserve.

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Great. Okay. What'd you do before that?

8 A. Before the Navy?

9 Q. Um-hum.

10 A. I was in college, and I was in high school. Doing both.

11 Q. College. You have a degree?

12 A. Yes, sir. I'm not completely finished, but I'm --

13 Q. Close.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What discipline?

16 A. Criminal justice and psychology.

17 Q. Criminal justice. Excellent. Okay. Again, we kind of
18 brainstormed on a little bit further. I'm going to give you an
19 opportunity in retrospect. Anything else you'd like to add in
20 terms of things that you'd do differently now had you had the
21 opportunity -- knowing what you know now?

22 A. If I could go back, 508 would have to give me some more
23 information. How thick is the smoke? Is it -- are you going into
24 it? Are you going away from it? Is it lessening as you're going
25 away?

1 302, I would probably -- I don't think there was anything
2 different I could do with 302, because where the smoke -- well, if
3 I had asked 508 more questions, it would probably determine
4 whether or not 302 would see smoke in the interlocking or in
5 approach to L'Enfant Plaza. It probably would help. I'm not
6 sure.

7 I think maybe I just needed to get more information from 508.
8 And once 510 stopped the train, all signals would have had to have
9 been cancelled at that time, in order for her not to be on the
10 platform. All signals would have had to have been cancelled at
11 that time.

12 And being that 302 stated that he couldn't go any further, it
13 wouldn't have been a hold up as far as getting him back to the
14 platform. It would have been Mr. Malloy, can we? 302, can you
15 see the tracks? Will you be able to verify the switches? No?
16 Okay, Mr. Malloy, got to move him.

17 Q. It's your call.

18 A. We got to move him. And I think at that point,
19 Mr. Ballard would have gotten a phone call. Mr. -- everybody
20 would have gotten a phone call. But that again, speculation.

21 Q. Right.

22 A. Because hindsight is --

23 Q. Well, again, we're trying to help identify thoughts,
24 ideas as to future --

25 A. I think I would have --

1 Q. -- possible solutions.

2 A. -- asked more questions. But again, the -- my
3 experience in this particular area is -- I'm growing, I'm
4 learning. So I think those questions would have been developed
5 over a time from having -- dealing with situations like this and
6 knowing. It won't happen to me again. It won't happen to me
7 again.

8 Q. Thank you so much. That concludes my questioning.

9 BY MR. ADAMS:

10 Q. Thank you. Dorsey Adams, WMATA Safety. Ms. White, was
11 the system Superintendent close by --

12 A. Oh, yes.

13 Q. -- during all of this?

14 A. Um-hum.

15 Q. He acts as your liaison with --

16 A. With everyone.

17 Q. -- with everyone? Including the police?

18 A. He -- that's his job back there. He talks to all the --
19 he notifies all the -- Buttons and Mr. Malloy, they notify
20 everyone else. He tells -- see, he had multiple jobs. Because
21 he's assisting me and making sure that I'm doing the right thing.
22 He's assisting the Buttons, making sure she's doing the right
23 thing. And then he's still trying to contact up the chain of
24 command, and trying to get everybody else that's in the room or
25 that's supposed to be in the room in the room.

1 So he's moving. He's all over the place. He's -- he has a
2 lot of responsibility. So he has to be able to ensure that we
3 know what we're doing so he doesn't have to tell us what to do.
4 But more or less ensure we're doing it and if we're not
5 prioritizing correctly that -- hey, go back to this person.
6 What's going on? Get an update. Get an update. Like his job
7 is -- man, he -- he has a big job.

8 Q. So just want to be clear. At some point, was there a
9 discussion about getting somebody back on the train?

10 A. That's why --

11 Q. Anybody.

12 A. -- we got 41. That's why we got unit 41. He doesn't
13 belong to our line. He belongs to Ops 2. We called Ops 2, which
14 is the Orange and Blue line, and had him come over --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- to assist us in pulling the train off the platform.
17 He got kicked out of the station. So now we're double whammied.

18 Q. Could you have asked the Assistant Superintendent to
19 have the police bring him back? I mean, was it any thought to
20 that? Or you couldn't reach anybody?

21 A. The officer that was in the building, I guess he was
22 doing the best he could, but it wasn't helping me none. We had no
23 communications with anyone on the platform. None. Our only
24 communication was taken out of the station. We had none.

25 Q. Thanks so much. No more questions.

1 BY MR. BALLARD:

2 Q. Ms. White.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Hercules Ballard, Washington Metro. Think about Control
5 Center again. On the large screen display. Normally on the lower
6 level of the --

7 A. Screen.

8 Q. Yeah, you got the (indiscernible) overview. And
9 sometime they flip the upper and the lower, right?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. And when they do that, normally the station view station
12 cameras are on top. So we do have the ability to view some
13 station cameras from --

14 A. We do.

15 Q. -- large screen monitor --

16 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Some station cameras. Not all.

17 MR. BALLARD: Not all. Not all station cameras.

18 MS. WHITE: But you'd have to know what station -- you
19 can't see what station it is. Like a station is a station. And
20 you'd have to -- they have the ability to enlarge one particular
21 feed or screen. But you'd have to know it's -- it's that station.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There's not a label on a view
23 that says L'Enfant Plaza, track number 1 --

24 MS. WHITE: There is, but it's --

25 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- or something?

1 MS. WHITE: Because it's so far back and so high,
2 you'd --

3 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's hard to see?

4 MS. WHITE: Yeah. And with -- besides, I'm looking at
5 my screen. That screen up there, at that point, my screen has the
6 same thing, but it's specific to my line. That screen, you know,
7 I don't look up as often. So I wouldn't be -- I wouldn't think to
8 look up and say, hey, Malloy, put L'Enfant up there. It -- some
9 things just didn't come to me when they should have.

10 BY MR. BALLARD:

11 Q. When you tell train 302 to do a track inspection going
12 into L'Enfant Plaza, and you did not get a response back, when the
13 train arrived on the platform that there was a problem or an
14 excessive amount of smoke on the platform there at L'Enfant Plaza,
15 would that have led you to think that there was not a major
16 problem on the platform?

17 A. When I contacted him again, I thought he was going to
18 come back and say, Central, good track inspection. I thought he
19 was going to come back and say that.

20 Q. Because you had multiple incidents occurring at the same
21 time, do you think that made it more difficult for you to be able
22 to manage the L'Enfant Plaza incident prior to -- or communicate
23 more with 302 prior to 302 leaving L'Enfant Plaza or better
24 monitoring 302 as it entered the platform?

25 A. As it entered the platform?

1 Q. At L'Enfant Plaza.

2 A. Honestly, I don't want to say -- no, because in my
3 head -- I had it set up in my head. It was fixed in my head. The
4 fire, the smoke. Go to the interlocking. You still have to go to
5 that interlocking. Get a response about the smoke. Get a
6 response about the smoke. You still have to go to that
7 interlocking, Ms. White. 302, no answer. 509, 509, 503. Still
8 clamping.

9 302 -- like I knew I had to go back to him. So I don't think
10 anything took away time from. He still -- because he didn't -- I
11 know there's a process when they go into the platform. They make
12 announcements. They service the station. They make announcement.
13 They close. They go. So even when I'm calling him -- if I'm
14 calling and he's making announcement, he can't hear me. He won't
15 hear me. A lot of times they come back in to Central, were you
16 trying to contact me?

17 So I know the process was, he's going to give me a track
18 inspection. He's entering. He's making announcements. He opens
19 his doors. He closes his doors. He's making announcements. 302,
20 I have to give them some time. So he didn't respond back
21 immediately with Central I can't go any further, I see smoke in
22 the interlocking. Okay. He may be good. Let me give him some
23 more time so he can get -- do his routine stuff.

24 He came back shortly after leaving the platform saying, I
25 can't go any further. So it wasn't in that vicinity. Maybe I

1 should have extended it out further. But I took what I had and I
2 gave it to him expecting him to come back and say, yea, nay. And
3 he came back and he didn't say anything. His next transmission to
4 me was -- my apologies. He came back. And his transmission was,
5 can't go any further.

6 He didn't report, not -- he didn't report good track
7 inspection or bad track inspection. He said I can't go any
8 further, in a location that I didn't give him. So I don't think
9 that my multiple situations took any time away from him. He still
10 needed time to do his job. So I think it -- that part, there was
11 nothing I could have changed about that part if I had to.

12 Q. Right. Okay. I have one more. After the 302 reversed
13 ends, the north end of the train, and you realized that you were
14 not able to communicate with the Operator in 510, if it was
15 decided upon that you were going to move that train back to the
16 platform against the normal direction of traffic, right, who would
17 you have used to clamp the interlocking?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Clamp the --

19 BY MR. BALLARD:

20 Q. Clamp the switch, switch point. Who would you have used
21 to clamp the switch?

22 A. Well, normally, you would have to use the Operator.

23 Q. Well, once you could not communicated with the Operator
24 of 510, which -- what means would you have available to you to --

25 A. We wouldn't have anyone.

1 Q. -- prevent that interlocking or switch point --

2 A. That's why they said, even with permission from you, it
3 would still be illegal, because train movement would -- especially
4 with customer on board, over a switch that's not clamped. It's
5 not in the SOP for a reason. And maybe it's -- I guess it's in
6 there saying that we have to do it in this way. It's not in there
7 saying you can do it, because it's in there saying you have to do
8 it this way. So us -- we wouldn't have anybody to clamp it if the
9 Operator couldn't see it. If he can't see it, nobody else could
10 see it. And we didn't have anybody else to go out there.

11 Q. Would you feel comfortable having the Operator of 302 to
12 leave the customers aboard the train and walk from wherever the
13 train was down to the interlocking?

14 A. If it meant saving the Operator -- the Operator's lives
15 and the customers' lives and getting them out of harm.

16 Q. If you had done that, then who would be in communication
17 with the customers aboard the train, if the Operator was at the
18 interlocking?

19 A. That's another thing. I didn't think about that either.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Because he was actually keeping them -- he was actually
22 talking to them and he was -- he probably did a lot -- he caused a
23 lot more damage control than -- who knows what could have happened
24 if he wasn't doing his job.

25 Q. How were you notified that the train, 302, that the

1 customers had self-evacuated from the --

2 A. The Operator contacted me.

3 Q. Operator contacted you. Okay. After the Operator
4 reversed ends on 302, was the Operator initially able to move that
5 train?

6 A. Well, he said he couldn't get her brakes off. Yes. He
7 said he couldn't get her brakes off. Unable to get her brakes
8 off. He's still requesting a block back to the platform. At this
9 time Mr. Harveson is talking to him. Mr. Harveson gave him an
10 absolute block within 10 feet of the signal.

11 Q. Oh, did he?

12 A. He gave him a block within 10 feet of the signal. For
13 some reason he BIE'ed them. He couldn't get her brakes off, and
14 then he BIE'ed them.

15 Q. So Harveson was attempting to move the train back
16 towards L'Enfant Plaza?

17 A. He was attempting to get him --

18 Q. Cross over.

19 A. No, he was attempting to get him close to the signal --

20 Q. Right.

21 A. -- in the event we were able to contact 510 and move
22 that train, then, he's right there. We could just put him back on
23 the platform. So it's kind of like, we're setting him up to get
24 him out the way -- or to get him in -- on the platform. But he
25 BIE. And then he sent -- he told him well, you going to have to

1 go back and look for lights and Operator to go back and look for
2 lights.

3 Like, are you crazy. I'm in an emergency. You going to have
4 to go back and look for lights. I can't move the train, if you
5 can't find lights. A train BIE is like a car with no gas. It has
6 no air. It can't move. He went back, and he found lights. He
7 went to -- it was 3031 or 3130 -- 3031, two roars (ph.), two six
8 thousands. He went back and found lights. He cut trucks. On his
9 way back he found a customer. Went back to the lead car.

10 It was never confirmed that he was able to recharge the train
11 or not. But -- he only found one set of lights, and he said he
12 cut those trucks. And he went back to the lead car. But I don't
13 recall him saying he was able to get a charge. So we still don't
14 know if that train would have been able to move or not. He BIE'ed
15 at what time -- 1538, found lights at 42. Found a customer at 46.
16 They started self-evacuating at 49.

17 Q. No other questions.

18 BY MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN:

19 Q. Marlene Flemmings-McCann, Local 689. I do have a
20 question. I was down Central, I want to say maybe a month or two
21 ago just to kind of look around again. And like Mr. Ballard said,
22 the first thing I noticed, which was kind of funny, was the
23 station cameras, you could see different stations and -- all over
24 the place.

25 And I know what you're saying, what you're doing. You're on

1 the radio doing what you do. But you have a room full of
2 Controllers. You have Passenger Ops that will, at any time, can
3 pull cameras at stations. And my -- I guess my question was, did
4 anyone communicate with Passenger Ops and say, hey, pull up
5 L'Enfant Plaza, look at this train. Where's this train? Why
6 can't we get a communication? We're not getting anything.

7 Because once you don't -- as Operator, if I can't reach
8 Central Control and I have -- I stop the train, right? If Central
9 can't reach the Operator, somebody should be trying to look for
10 that train. So you can't see in the tunnel, and that's fine. I
11 understand that.

12 But you can see the station platform, because they do it all
13 the time. They look at station managers all day long. They look
14 at crowd control. They look at -- if you call in and say I got a
15 crowded station. They flip the cameras. They can see. They can
16 tell you what you got on if you went down to the platform.

17 I'm so confused as to -- did anyone in Passenger Ops or Rail
18 say, pull up L'Enfant Plaza and let's see where that train is or
19 where are the people or where's the supervisor? Where's anybody?
20 I'm not hearing it from you. And it's not you I'm blaming. I'm
21 just not hearing anyone say that that was done or someone
22 suggested it to you.

23 Not for you to do, because you can't. But you got Assistant
24 Superintendent on Passenger Ops and on Rail. And I just don't
25 understand with all the big, beautiful cameras I saw down Central,

1 did anyone do that?

2 A. I don't recall. I can't say they did or did not.

3 Q. Could it have been -- could it -- I'm so confused now.
4 Could it --

5 A. I think --

6 Q. -- have been done?

7 A. Knowing how inquisitive those guys are, I think somebody
8 probably did or -- I don't know. I don't know.

9 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: But there is a capability,
10 though, of accessing the camera --

11 MS. WHITE: Now, I know they can -- when I got there,
12 all the stations didn't have cameras that were operable. They
13 all -- there were cameras in the station, but they weren't all
14 working. So I don't know if that's -- I don't know if they were
15 able to pull up cameras in that station. I don't know. I never
16 checked when I went back to work on Tuesday if they were -- if
17 they're not for that particular station.

18 So if someone were to have said something, Ms. Smith should
19 have called or Mr. Malloy, being that he was going back and forth
20 so much. That would have been something that he would have said
21 or Mr. Wilson, who was on duty --

22 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: Right.

23 MS. WHITE: --probably would have went ahead and just
24 did it on his own to see. Because you're right, they do it all
25 the time just to see what's going on. So I don't know if he did

1 or didn't do it. My focus wasn't -- I couldn't even think about
2 what's going on over there at that time. I was attached to what
3 was going on in front of me.

4 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: Thank you.

5 MR. LITTLETON: Tom Littleton, FTA. No questions.

6 MR. BUCHER: Dave Bucher. No questions.

7 BY MR. GORDON:

8 Q. Joe Gordon, NTSB. Your duties on the day, the Ops desk
9 -- your Ops desk consists of the communications and the buttons.
10 You were communications. On the desk that you were on, is there a
11 number assigned to that desk as far as what your responsibilities,
12 what your line, what trains you're controlling?

13 A. Well, Ops 3 controls the Yellow and Green lines and the
14 Rush+ trains and the Blue line, like the outskirts of the Blue
15 line from Franconia to Arlington Cemetery.

16 Q. Okay. So you were on Ops 3 desk?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. And did -- I'm not sure and if you've already answered
19 this just let me know, but what time did you come on duty? Did we
20 ask --

21 A. At 1300.

22 Q. -- that question?

23 A. 1300.

24 Q. 1300. Okay. And Ops desk 3 which primarily controls
25 Green, Yellow and --

1 A. And Blue.

2 Q. -- part of Blue.

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Okay. No further questions.

5 BY MR. DOWNS:

6 Q. Downs, NTSB, again. Several more question have prompted
7 here. The OCC supervisor was here before, gave us testimony
8 describing some of these exhaust fans at the stations and such.
9 Do you control exhaust fans or not?

10 A. She does when she's on the buttons.

11 Q. She does?

12 A. The buttons is anything that needs to be turned on or
13 off. The only thing I do on the radio is talk. I look at my
14 monitor and I talk to trains. I hold trains. I talk. I talk. I
15 talk. I talk.

16 Q. So you're strictly --

17 A. Five days as week --

18 Q. -- communications.

19 A. I talk. I talk. That's it. I talk. That's it.

20 Q. Great.

21 A. She does all the phone calls. She does all the
22 clickings. She sets the route central. I have no lunar. Toni
23 (ph.), send him a route. Toni, he has no readouts. I talk,
24 standby. Toni, send them this. I don't do anything else but
25 talk.

1 Q. Got it. Okay. Thank you. This may be outside of
2 your --

3 A. I'm sorry.

4 Q. That's --

5 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'd like to have that job.

6 MS. WHITE: Wear braces. Uh-uh.

7 BY MR. DOWNS:

8 Q. This may be outside of your area of expertise, so just
9 let us know. The clamping of the switch, are you familiar with
10 that process?

11 A. I've seen it done, and I've done it a time or two in my
12 training.

13 Q. Okay. And obviously the Train Operators need to know
14 how to perform clamping a switch.

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Is there a tool involved or anything to do this?

17 A. The clamp.

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. The clamps are -- they're located wayside in certain red
20 boxes.

21 Q. Um-hum.

22 A. Sometimes they're there. Sometimes they may not be.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And if -- I think they're still located on the train in
25 the red -- they're in certain cars. They're located on the train

1 in bags. So they'd have to go and pull up the seat well and take
2 it out and --

3 Q. So they'd have to get a tool from someplace, either
4 lineside or in a car itself.

5 A. Well, normally, they don't go to the seat well
6 initially. They go wayside, because they're supposed to be
7 wayside. And if they go wayside, that takes time. And they don't
8 find any, then they have to go back on the train. Go to the seat
9 well. If it's in -- they're in the right car.

10 Q. Right.

11 A. I can't remember if they're in both cars or in one. I
12 can't remember -- they may be in both cars. I don't remember
13 exactly. But I know they're in the cars. So they have to open
14 the seat well.

15 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: I think it's in one. I --

16 MS. WHITE: It's only in -- I think it's only in one,
17 too. I think it's in the B car.

18 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: B car.

19 MS. WHITE: So if they're operating from the A car, they
20 got to go through all these customers to the B car, pull it out,
21 close it back. Go back outside to the track, after transiting
22 through all these customers again. And hopefully they can
23 actually clamp the switch.

24 BY MR. DOWNS:

25 Q. Okay. Is it typically a 2 minute process, 10 minutes?

1 What are we talking time frame, roughly.

2 A. Depends on where the train stops to where the
3 interlocking is. And you can't just clamp one switch. If you
4 clamp 1B, you got to clamp 3B. And there's a rule that if you
5 don't have -- oh, God. I'm still learning all my rules. If
6 you -- you have to clamp the entire interlocking. The entire
7 interlocking has to be clamped.

8 Q. Both switches on the interlock.

9 A. All four.

10 Q. All four.

11 A. It is four.

12 Q. Okay. So we're talking 5 minutes, 10 minutes typically,
13 any idea?.

14 A. It depends on the size of the interlocking, how long it
15 is, how -- the distance between the switches.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And again, I'm not -- I'm still learning.

18 Q. We can ask other qualified folks.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. I just wanted to get a little idea of what this --

21 A. Please don't quote me.

22 Q. Are station managers qualified to clamp switches.

23 A. No.

24 Q. No. It's strictly be a train crew person -- Train
25 Operator.

1 A. ATC --

2 Q. Or a Supervisor, train --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- Supervisor. I see. Okay. That concludes my
5 questions.

6 MR. ADAMS: No questions.

7 MR. BALLARD: Hercules Ballard. No questions.

8 MS. FLEMMINGS-MCCANN: No questions, Mr. Ballard. No
9 questions.

10 MR. LITTLETON: No questions.

11 MR. BUCHER: Dave Bucher. No questions.

12 BY MR. GORDON:

13 Q. I've just got one question. I know -- this is Joe
14 Gordon, NTSB. Emergency situations in your time here doing this
15 job. Any emergency situations that you've been involved in prior
16 to this incident?

17 A. In this particular job?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. This is my first one and --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. -- unfortunately, I'm the one that's in it.

22 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible). Didn't want to
23 steal the show.

24 MR. GORDON: I have no further questions.

25 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

1 MR. DOWNS: I'm good.

2 MR. BUCHER: This'll conclude the interview of Ms.
3 White.

4 (Whereupon the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015
Interview of Vale're White

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: WMATA Headquarters
Washington, D.C.

DATE: January 15, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Laura Shanley
Transcriber