



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of:

*

*

WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015

*

* Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004

*

*

* * * * *

Interview of: CRAIG BAKER

D.C. Fire and EMS - Fire Operations
Center
500 F Street, N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington, D.C.

Monday,
February 2, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: RICHARD DOWNS, JR.
Survival Factors Investigator

APPEARANCES:

RICHARD DOWNS, JR., Survival Factors Investigator
Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group
National Transportation Safety Board

RUBEN PAYAN, Railroad Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

KIMBERLY BURTCH, Senior Program Analyst
Office of Transit Safety and Oversight
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

DENTON ROURKE, Operations Manager
Office of Emergency Management
WMATA

DERRON HAWKINS, Deputy Fire Chief
D.C. Fire and EMS
Homeland Security & Special Operations Division

I N D E X

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Interview of Craig Baker:	
By Mr. Downs	6
By Mr. Rourke	22
By Mr. Hawkins	28
By Mr. Downs	30
By Mr. Rourke	37
By Ms. Burtch	38
By Mr. Payan	41
By Mr. Downs	44

I N T E R V I E W

1
2 MR. DOWNS: Today's date is February 2, 2015, and the
3 following is an interview being conducted in reference to NTSB
4 investigation number DCA-15-FR-004, which relates to an accident
5 involving a heavy smoke release and train evacuations that
6 occurred in and near L'Enfant Plaza Station of the WMATA Metrorail
7 System in the District of Columbia on the afternoon of January 12,
8 2015.

9 This interview is being conducted with a member of the
10 District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
11 Department, as conducted by the NTSB Survival Factors Technical
12 Working Group of the investigation.

13 My name is Richard Downs, Jr., and I'm a Survival
14 Factors Investigator with the NTSB, in which I also serve in the
15 role as the Survival Factors Technical Working Group chairperson.
16 I will preside over this interview, which is being recorded for
17 the record in which a transcript may also be compiled of the
18 recording as a permanent docketed record of the interview.

19 Additionally, I'd like to mention that the purpose of
20 the investigation is to increase safety and not to assign fault,
21 blame or liability, and that the NTSB cannot offer any guarantee
22 of confidentiality or immunity from legal or certificate actions.

23 Further, pursuant to the criteria under 49 C.F.R. 831.7,
24 the interviewee may have one representative of the interviewee's
25 choice accompany him or her at this interview in which the

1 representative may not testify for the interviewee. It's also
2 requested that comments of the interviewee's representative should
3 be limited, and objections expressed by the interviewee's
4 representative are not grounds for the NTSB to refrain from asking
5 questions.

6 I'll now ask that our interviewee witness please
7 identify themselves, their employment affiliation, and job
8 position title for the record.

9 MR. BAKER: Okay. My name is Craig Baker. I'm the
10 Deputy Chief responsible for the Special Operations Division for
11 the District of Columbia Fire and EMS department.

12 MR. DOWNS: Very good. Thank you.

13 I'll now ask the participants of this interview, who
14 will also have the opportunity to present questions to the
15 witness, to please individually identify themselves, their
16 employment affiliation, and job position title for the record.

17 MR. ROURKE: Good morning. My name is Denton Rourke. I
18 work for WMATA. I am the Operations Manager in the Office of
19 Emergency Management.

20 MR. PAYAN: My name is Ruben Payan. I'm an investigator
21 with the NTSB out of Washington, D.C. here.

22 MS. BURTCH: Kimberly Burtch with the FTA, Federal
23 Transit Administration's Office of Transit Safety and Oversight.

24 MR. HAWKINS: Good morning. Derron Hawkins, Deputy Fire
25 Chief, D.C. Fire and EMS, Homeland Security Division.

1 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

2 INTERVIEW OF CRAIG BAKER

3 BY MR. DOWNS:

4 Q. And as my first question for the witness, would you
5 please briefly describe for us your role or involvement in the
6 event?

7 A. Okay. I responded from my office --

8 Q. What was your role in the event?

9 A. My role? I'm sorry. My role was, initially, I reported
10 to the command post and I participated in the initial command
11 organization. And then from the command post, I was directed to
12 the platform to assist Chief Welsh, who was at that time still
13 being referred to as the recon group, I think.

14 Q. Very good. Thank you. And could you please describe
15 for us in your own words, Chief, and to your best recollection,
16 what occurred on the day of the event relative to your actions and
17 involvement at L'Enfant Station commencing at the time that you
18 were alerted to respond to the site?

19 A. So as I was starting before, is that kind of what
20 you're --

21 Q. That's fine.

22 A. So I responded to the call shortly after the second one
23 was dispatched. En route, I checked with the deputy chief that's
24 responsible for coming here to the Fire Operations Center to see
25 if they wanted me to report here or at the scene. After speaking

1 with him, Pete Douglas, it was determined that I would continue
2 responding to the scene.

3 When I arrived on the scene, I reported -- well, when I
4 arrived on the scene, I put all my protective clothing on about a
5 block away and walked to the command post. I reported at the
6 command post and engaged in kind of an update of what was going on
7 and what had been done so far. We had a discussion about the
8 current command organization. We had a discussion about the
9 establishment of EMS command organization and EMS resources that
10 were on the scene. And then after about -- it may have been 10 or
11 15 minutes, maybe -- probably about that time frame that I spent
12 at the command post after arriving, it was determined that I would
13 report to the platform and assist Chief Welsh with the recon.

14 Q. Very good. And what did you do once you got down to the
15 platform and collaborated with Chief Welsh? What was the essence
16 of that activity?

17 A. Essentially, we -- when I was at the command post, Tom
18 Jones, Metro's fire marshal, was at the command post as well. And
19 he -- at the time when it was determined that I was going to
20 report to the platform, he decided that he would like to go with
21 me at that point. So that's what he did. We walked into the
22 station.

23 Q. Which station entrance did you use; do you remember?
24 Was it the Maryland Avenue entrance or was it the L'Enfant Plaza
25 7th Street entrance?

1 A. The Maryland Avenue.

2 Q. Maryland?

3 A. Right.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah. Okay.

6 Q. Just trying to help jog your memory as we proceed along
7 here.

8 A. Yeah. Are you interested in the details leading --

9 Q. Well, step by step of your command process is what we're
10 looking to sort out.

11 A. Okay. I'm not so sure that there was -- the command
12 process -- when I left the command post, the -- I think the plan
13 was is that they were going to determine exactly what role I would
14 fill as I was proceeding from the command post to the platform.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. As we were walking into the station with Tom Jones, we
17 were having conversations about train movement --

18 Q. There were trains moving still at that time when you
19 went down into the platform area?

20 A. Yeah. Well, when we went into the station, when we got
21 to the bottom of the escalator, the first thing that I was
22 thinking about was actually the PROTECT system and how it was --
23 whether it was working.

24 Q. PROTECT system?

25 A. The chemical detection system in the Metro.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. We walked by --

3 Q. And for the benefit of our readers on the transcript,
4 maybe give us a quick thumbnail of what the PROTECT -- it's
5 sensors in the system that sense any chemical or biological
6 disturbance, and it fires up an alert? Is that the essence of it?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. Yes, monitored by Metro. So as we were walking by, I
10 asked Tom if these kind of -- almost kind of joking, are these
11 things working today? And he said yes. And I checked with OCC,
12 and there's no issues, nothing to be concerned about.

13 Q. So you did check, and you discounted that as being a
14 possible source of the event? Is that what you -- the essence of
15 your check?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay, perfect. Thank you. Please continue.

18 A. So the next thing that we -- we heard train movement on
19 the lower tracks, and actually, Tom had mentioned that. That was
20 his follow-up to my question about the PROTECT system. He says,
21 I'm hearing train movement. And I said, yeah, I'm hearing it,
22 too. It's pretty evident. I said, but at this point -- this was
23 probably, in reality, pretty late into the incident. As we were
24 entering into the tunnel, units were -- had been calling saying
25 that smoke conditions were lightening up and things were kind of,

1 you could tell, kind of settling down a bit.

2 Q. Let me interject a question here, Chief. Were you aware
3 at that point that there was a train stranded in the tunnel yet?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So when --

6 A. Yes, I was. Yes.

7 Q. Did you learn of that topside at incident command, or
8 when did you learn that?

9 A. I'm not sure. I think I picked up on that on the radio
10 on the way down.

11 Q. The way down, okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Very good.

14 A. It certainly wasn't evident early on. In fact, early on
15 in the incident, we were listening in the office, and it didn't
16 seem like it was going to be anything more at that time early on
17 than a routine smoke investigation.

18 Q. So it generally, correct me if I'm wrong, it generally
19 was not anything when everybody initially responded, or at least
20 when you responded, your thinking was it was going to be
21 relatively routine, minor smoke event?

22 A. No.

23 Q. No?

24 A. No. By the time I responded, it was evident that it was
25 more than a routine smoke event.

1 Q. I see. Okay.

2 A. I'm saying leading up to the --

3 Q. Leading up to that point?

4 A. When we were monitoring the call in the office.

5 Q. That was your thinking at the time?

6 A. There was nothing to indicate early on that it was going
7 to be anything more than something more than a normal
8 investigation for smoke --

9 Q. Relatively --

10 A. -- in the Metro, that it was not going to expand. In
11 fact --

12 Q. Relatively minor event that you've --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- had many times before at various Metro stations?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. I see. Okay.

17 A. And in fact, when they requested a second alarm, it kind
18 of surprised me, because it sounded like the incident was not
19 expanding.

20 Q. So that was a key flag for yourself and perhaps other
21 command officers to elevate the event, in that it was not a
22 routine event at that point?

23 A. Yes. At that point, then, it was clear that something
24 else was going on.

25 Q. I see. Go ahead. Please continue.

1 A. All right. So we're back at the station, and we're
2 talking about train movement. And so the reason I started talking
3 about the fact that things were winding down is because in
4 response to Tom at that point about train movement, I said, well,
5 at this point, I guess everybody is pretty clear on where those
6 trains are operating, and it's probably not as big a deal as it
7 may have been earlier in the incident, so we'll figure out what's
8 going on when we get down here.

9 At that point Tom asked, he said, have you heard
10 anything about fan control, ventilation fan? I said no, I haven't
11 heard discussing fans. Are you making a recommendation concerning
12 fan control? He says, I believe it was FL-1, that he might
13 consider putting that in supply.

14 Q. So Tom knew the different designations of the fans and
15 knew basically how to operate the fans in terms of a correct
16 response strategy to draw smoke away from the station?

17 A. Well --

18 Q. Would that be a fair characterization?

19 A. Well, maybe so. So we weren't sure about that. I
20 certainly wasn't absolutely positive about that.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. But we were looking at a smoke condition at the station
23 where the only smoke remaining at this point was really in the
24 ceiling level. The train evacuation was well underway, probably
25 nearing an end at this point.

1 Q. So when you're approaching the upper level platform, the
2 train evacuation was approaching its end, you're saying?

3 A. Um-hum.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I would say that. Well, I can tell you -- I can give
6 you a better time frame probably for you, not so much for me.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. I'm not sure what time it was --

9 Q. Yeah, we're trying to get a handle on the time frames of
10 each activity as best we can.

11 A. Right. So at that point when we're having this
12 conversation, we can see that we're on the opposite platform, and
13 we can see the situation on the other side of the platform. So at
14 that point I called Chief Mills by phone, and I gave him basically
15 an update on the three things that I just discussed with you: I
16 told him about the fact that Tom Jones had checked on the status
17 of the PROTECT system, that there was still train movement that we
18 could hear and where that was, and the fact that Tom was
19 recommending that possibly that command consider placing FL-1 in
20 supply. But I certainly didn't -- and I conveyed this message
21 very deliberately. And I said I certainly don't have access to a
22 map, I don't know where FL-1 is and I'm not sure where you have
23 personnel operating, so you're going to have --

24 Q. So it was question in your mind exactly that we get the
25 correct fan operable here rather than have an incorrect airflow?

1 Would that be a fair way of describing it?

2 A. Well, to be completely honest, I really didn't think at
3 this point, given the smoke condition, that it was all that
4 critical. In other words, we weren't going to create a serious
5 hazard either way. But it was more of a prompt to command to make
6 sure that they were checking on the fan status in general.

7 Q. To make sure we had fan operation in some manner?

8 A. In some manner that was working to efficiently remove
9 whatever remaining smoke that was --

10 Q. I see. Okay. So --

11 A. So we had that conversation, and the fact that that was
12 a recommendation and it needed to be verified that that was the
13 appropriate thing to do.

14 Q. And who took the next action in terms of contacting
15 incident command, was it, or the OCC to --

16 A. I don't know at that point. I wouldn't know --

17 Q. So your discussion with Tom was to the effect we need to
18 get some fans operable here and make sure they are the right ones
19 because you weren't quite sure which, the FL-1 --

20 A. No. I think what I just said was is that it was Tom's
21 concern, and correctly, that he hadn't heard command have a
22 discussion about fan status and whether or not they were exactly
23 operating the way they may have wanted them to.

24 Q. I see. Okay.

25 A. And the conversation that I had was by phone with

1 Chief Mills relaying that recommendation and the fact that they
2 should be looking at exactly what --

3 Q. By phone, you say, from the platform or --

4 A. From the platform, yes, by phone.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Cell phone.

7 Q. And you had that conversation with Chief Mills?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And the resolution of the conversation was what?

10 A. That from that point forward that command would have
11 acted on that from the command post.

12 Q. So you just alerted them to your concerns, and then your
13 expectation was for them to proceed with the action?

14 A. Yes, the appropriate action given the information that I
15 had provided.

16 Q. I see. Thank you. Okay, and tell us next what happened
17 in the progression of activities.

18 A. So we crossed the tracks from the catwalk, actually, to
19 the other side of the platform, and met with -- I'm not exactly
20 sure who we spoke to. We spoke to a transit police official on
21 the other side of the platform and confirmed that Chief Welsh was
22 not on the platform, and he was, in fact, at the train.

23 Q. Down into the tunnel at the train?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. So at that point we left the platform and moved into the
2 tunnel. Of course, the train evacuation was well underway at that
3 point.

4 Q. And you indicated you put on your safety gear topside in
5 preparation of going down into a smoky environment, SCBA equipment
6 and everything. Did you actually go on air or you just had it
7 mounted on your body ready for use?

8 A. So I did not have SCBA with me at all.

9 Q. I see.

10 A. I had turnout pants, coat, helmet. There was not a
11 smoke condition at all, I would say, at my level. At any time did
12 I encounter any smoke, and I really didn't anticipate based on the
13 reports that I was hearing at the command post that there was
14 still going to be a smoke condition that required a breathing
15 apparatus.

16 Q. I see.

17 A. I didn't have any breathing apparatus.

18 Q. And it wasn't needed?

19 A. And it was not convenient for me to get any at that
20 point, so we proceeded, Tom and I together, into the platform.
21 I'm sorry. When we reached the platform and we moved into the
22 tunnel, that was certainly the case, there was no -- I would say
23 that there was no smoke condition at head level or below. It was
24 certainly all up at the top of the tunnel, if there was any left
25 at all to speak of.

1 Q. Okay. Do we need to pause the record here?

2 A. Just one second. I want to make sure --

3 MR. DOWNS: We'll pause the record.

4 (Off the record.)

5 (On the record.)

6 MR. DOWNS: Resume the record.

7 BY MR. DOWNS:

8 Q. Okay, chief. So at that point, what was the next step
9 of the process?

10 A. So at that point, we went on the -- we proceeded down
11 the tracks. I'm not sure of where we were, but we were on the
12 opposite track for a moment, and I think it was Engine 4 that was
13 trying to take an E-tech cart from the opposite track across into
14 the -- I guess the L2 track.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. So they were going from L1 to L2.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And they were requesting, as we were about halfway down,
19 they were requesting a hot stick so that they could verify that
20 the third-rail power was down so that they could move the E-tech
21 cart across. Tom and I located them a hot stick pretty quickly
22 and were able to give that to them. We continued down the tracks.
23 At the time that we were going down the tracks, an E-tech cart was
24 coming back towards our direction with a patient on board.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. From conversation -- now, we didn't stop to check at the
2 time. From conversation that I've had with others, I believe that
3 that was a seizure patient.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. But I'm not sure.

6 Q. All right.

7 A. That was passing us. I do know that the E-tech cart,
8 when they got to the -- towards near the platform, the E-tech cart
9 the dead person was on did fall off the tracks.

10 Q. Fell off the track?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay. What fire company was maneuvering that cart?

13 A. I have --

14 Q. Was that Engine 4, by chance? You're not sure?

15 A. No. I believe it was Engine 4 on the other side.

16 Q. On the other side. Okay.

17 A. They had just about made it to the platform, and -- so
18 that was enough of a commotion concerning that event that we took
19 notice as we were walking in the other direction.

20 Q. Okay. Do you have any idea, was the patient injured in
21 any way, do you know, as a result of that E-tech cart falling off?

22 A. No. It wasn't that significant of an event, it just
23 was -- came off the tracks enough that they could not continue to
24 push it along.

25 Q. I see.

1 A. So they carried the patient from that point forward.

2 Q. So the cart was moving relatively slow?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And that it falling to the track would not necessarily
5 be a critical action that might harm a patient, given that there
6 would be firefighters right there with them?

7 A. Given what I saw --

8 Q. Would that be a fair characterization?

9 A. -- I would say not at all.

10 Q. Very good. Okay, thank you. And the firefighters were
11 able to carry the patient at that point from where the cart fell
12 off the track to the platform?

13 A. And they were just about to the platform at that time,
14 so yes.

15 Q. I see. Okay, so they got the patient to the platform
16 and took the patient off and did whatever activity. Okay, very
17 good. And the next step of the process for you?

18 A. I think at that point we arrived at the train where I
19 had Chief Welsh, got a brief update from him. I believe there was
20 very few passengers left on the train. Very few, meaning, I'm
21 guessing from what I could see real quick, maybe 10 or 15. They
22 were coming off as I was at the tail-end of the line that was
23 walking out. The remaining patient -- or the remaining person,
24 occupant in the train, was a gentleman on an electric wheelchair,
25 and he was the last one to be removed. And that was occurring

1 just about shortly there -- I guess shortly after I arrived at the
2 train.

3 Q. Okay, very good. And what happened then?

4 A. Basically, the -- you know, Chief Welsh kind of smiled
5 at me, says, well, you know, thanks for showing up. It's -- you
6 know, he was pretty much to the end of what they were doing. And
7 I said, well, how can I help you now? And so we discussed the
8 plan to do a secondary search on the train.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. And during that time, I asked Lieutenant Kuhn on Rescue
11 Squad 1 to give me the train car numbers when they were done. We
12 also discussed a plan in coordination with Metro Police to walk
13 the tunnel from the station to the portal to do a search of the
14 tunnel, and the -- then -- and emergency exit shafts.

15 Q. And that was you and somebody else?

16 A. That was myself and Chief Welsh, and Tom Jones was there
17 as well.

18 Q. So the three of you?

19 A. Yes, discussed how we would kind of close this out, make
20 sure that we were doing --

21 Q. Get a final sweep of the tunnel?

22 A. Correct. At that point I called command at least one or
23 two more times. I think just about as soon as got to the train I
24 called command on the phone again, Chief Mills, and advised him
25 that the evacuation of the train was complete with the exception

1 of one person in the motorized wheelchair. I confirmed the
2 location of the train by chain marker. There was a chain marker
3 right by the end of the train. And I think that was it for that
4 phone call. When Lieutenant Kuhn came back and advised that the
5 secondary search of the train was complete and that he had the
6 rail car numbers for me, I called command again on the phone,
7 advised them that the secondary search of the train was complete,
8 and gave them the car numbers of the train.

9 I think at some point we walked back to the platform. I
10 guess at this point, we walked back to the platform, and I
11 consulted with command as to who they might assign to assist Metro
12 Police with the search from the station to the -- and I'm not
13 exactly sure if I recall who we assigned to that, but I'm pretty
14 sure that it may have been Truck 13 and maybe -- I'm not sure of
15 the engine company. But that was coordinated with command, and
16 they were assigned to do a search.

17 Q. So at this point, chief, you're back at the platform.
18 And then what happened? Were things wrapping up for you at that
19 point?

20 A. Things were wrapping up really almost as soon as I
21 arrived.

22 Q. So there really was no further activities in terms of
23 passenger evacuations beyond that point?

24 A. No, there wasn't. That was over.

25 Q. I see. Okay. Well, that sounds like we've covered

1 quite a bit of your activities. Was there anything else germane
2 to the event other than your wrap-up of the site?

3 A. I don't think so.

4 Q. Okay, very good.

5 MR. DOWNS: Let's pass the questioning on to our next
6 questioner.

7 BY MR. ROURKE:

8 Q. Denton Rourke from Metro. Chief, I'm just going to ask
9 you some basic questions about Metro training and stuff that we're
10 asking everybody.

11 A. Okay.

12 Q. If we have some more questions about L'Enfant itself,
13 we'll ask them. Can you describe for us the District of Columbia
14 Fire Department Metro training program?

15 A. So in the past, I can speak to, we had in-service
16 training with Metro. As far as frequency of training over the
17 past several years, I have no real direct knowledge of that or
18 what the program has been in place. I returned to Special
19 Operations in August, and I can tell you that we had conversations
20 with Metro, had conversations with you, at least by September
21 restoring in-service training to a more routine pace. And I
22 believe that we start routine in-service training this Wednesday
23 and every Wednesday until further notice as a matter of routine
24 for in-service training at Pennsy Drive.

25 There's been other training initiatives in the past

1 couple months. The CB-EMIS computer exchange and training has
2 just started, and there's some other training initiatives that are
3 being undertaken by the -- our Metrorail officer, Chief Mulligan
4 (ph.), in coordination with Metro.

5 Q. And how about stuff that you all do -- I know you're not
6 in the station or battalion anymore, but what kind of stuff do you
7 all do internally at the station or battalion level?

8 A. There would be company drills. I can't speak to the
9 schedule or frequency. There would be -- certainly, if there's
10 probationary members in the company, there's definitely basic
11 training on Metro operations, use of WSADs, hot sticks, safety
12 procedures, emergency exits and things like that that's required
13 at a probationer's training. Outside of that, I'm not sure what I
14 would tell you.

15 Q. All right. Thank you. Have you ever participated in a
16 full-scale Metro drill? This might be after hours, early -- 2:00
17 in the morning or early on a weekend morning?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. When was the last time that happened?

20 A. The last time that I would have participated would have
21 been the last time that I was assigned to Special Operations, and
22 that was during the time period from 2007 to 2010, which I
23 participated in a number of exercises.

24 Q. Do you recall where they were?

25 A. We participated in at least two exercises of the Yellow

1 Line, evacuation of the bridge.

2 MR. DOWNS: Is that the Potomac River Bridge?

3 MR. BAKER: Yes. We did a MERV car exercise right as I
4 was leaving, I guess, the later part of 2010, and I am absolutely
5 sure there were some other exercises during those 4 years, but I
6 cannot drag --

7 BY MR. ROURKE:

8 Q. Sure, I understand.

9 A. -- in my mind.

10 Q. All right. Thank you. So you said that you -- when you
11 arrived, you went to the command post?

12 A. Um-hum.

13 Q. And was observing -- I don't remember your exact words,
14 but how things were going. Can you describe for me what you
15 observed when you got there at L'Enfant Plaza?

16 A. When I got there, there was -- which you might expect --
17 there was Battalion 2's buggy and Battalion 2 and his aide were in
18 the driver's seat in the front seat, Deputy Chief of Operations
19 Moore was in the backseat, and Chief Mills was outside of the
20 buggy on on Captain Chapman's side of the vehicle. And of course,
21 there was numerous people around the command post, different
22 officials, Metro and Transit officials, and others.

23 When I arrived at the command post -- I may have already
24 said that when I saw Chief Mills, I confirmed again whether or not
25 he wanted me to stay on the scene or come back here to Fire

1 Operations Center. And he advised that he wanted me to stay at
2 the scene. When -- there was a number of people on that side of
3 the vehicle, so I tried to move around to the other side of the
4 vehicle, tried to get closer to the people inside of the vehicle
5 so I could communicate better with them and Chief Mills.

6 And when I went around to the opposite side, I asked
7 them if -- what their -- if they had an EMS branch established and
8 if -- what their EMS resources were on the scene. We had some
9 discussion about that, and we determined that we would assign a
10 battalion chief in staging, which was Chief Dean -- he was
11 Battalion 3 -- to be the medical branch. And about that time,
12 Chief Sollers, who's the Special Operations battalion chief who
13 had been responding from another call, came up to the command post
14 on my side of the vehicle. And I advised him that he would be
15 assisting Chief Dean with the medical branch. And I asked him to
16 call Communications by phone due to the radio traffic and confirm
17 the EMS resources that were on the scene. And then I called
18 Chief Dean on Channel A10 and asked him to report to the command
19 post and advised him that he'd be taking over the medical branch.

20 We had a little more discussion about a couple different
21 aspects, which I can't specifically remember what we were --
22 exactly what the conversation was in the command organization.
23 And then at that point there was discussion about whether I would
24 stay at the command post or whether I would go assist Chief Welsh
25 at the platform. And at that time it was determined that I would

1 go assist Chief Welsh at the platform and try to provide some
2 additional information as to the status of the evacuation process
3 and other issues concerning the incident.

4 Q. Right. And at the command post, you said you saw a lot
5 of people standing around. Could you identify that there was a
6 Metro on-scene commander there?

7 A. You know, I saw Tom, and I focused on Tom when I got
8 there. I'm not exactly sure. There was certainly people there in
9 uniform, but I can't tell you --

10 MR. DOWNS: And you'd worked with Tom in the past, so
11 you knew him at sight?

12 MR. BAKER: I've known Tom for 30 years, yeah.

13 MR. DOWNS: Very well. Thank you.

14 BY MR. ROURKE:

15 Q. When you were responding or listening on the radio
16 before you responded, did you have any feel for the structure of
17 the command and how it was functioning?

18 A. I really didn't because, you know, like I do so many
19 times during the day, I listened initially and I was focused on it
20 for a second, and I was listening for the initial reports, and the
21 initial reports didn't lead me to believe that I needed to focus
22 as much. The radio traffic was pretty light. It seemed to be
23 pretty orderly. There was nothing there that was really raising a
24 red flag for me. And like I said, the second alarm transmission
25 kind of took me by surprise. You know, normally, as you know, you

1 kind of -- most of the time you see it coming or feel it coming or
2 know that you can anticipate additional resources being requested,
3 and that wasn't particularly the case for that incident for
4 whatever reason. Can't put my finger on it.

5 Q. Um-hum. And when you were listening on the radio for
6 that period of time, did you ever hear anybody say anything about
7 a train being stuck in the tunnel?

8 A. I don't recall when I heard that. I know that while I
9 was responding -- I'm pretty sure that while I was responding,
10 anyway, that I was aware that there was a train in the tunnel, but
11 I'm not exactly sure when I -- when that actually -- when I became
12 aware of that.

13 Q. And in that short period you listened at the station,
14 did you have any feel for how the radios were working? Were you
15 listening to the tactical channel or the --

16 A. Yeah, I was listening to the tactical channel. When you
17 say how they were working, to be clear, I'm not sure whether I was
18 aware that there was a problem with the radios or whether it was
19 just a lot of radiotraffic, and I'm still not exactly clear. I
20 know that it was easier for me -- I did try to use my radio. You
21 know, I said I was on the phone, but I did attempt to use my radio
22 a couple of times and I could not get through for one reason or
23 another. So I resorted -- fell back to the phone.

24 Q. And that's after you got to the platform?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. Thanks. There were some media reports that --
2 from a call a week earlier at L'Enfant Plaza where they discovered
3 that there were some radio issues there. Were you aware before
4 this incident that there were radio issues at L'Enfant Plaza?

5 A. I was not specifically aware of the radio issues at
6 L'Enfant Plaza. I was aware that we were doing radio testing
7 throughout the system and that we had been coming up with issues
8 in certain places.

9 Q. That's all I have right now. Thank you.

10 MR. DOWNS: Very good.

11 Mr. Payan?

12 MR. PAYAN: Can I go last? Let your -- go first?

13 MR. DOWNS: Very good. Ms. Burtch?

14 MS. BURTCHE: I'm going to pass right now.

15 MR. DOWNS: Pass?

16 Chief, any questions?

17 MR. HAWKINS: Yes.

18 BY MR. HAWKINS:

19 Q. Derron Hawkins, D.C. Fire and EMS. Chief Baker,
20 regarding Metro training, you mentioned that there's -- we're
21 starting to restore in-service training and there has been basic
22 probationary training coming out of recruit school. Regarding
23 training, do you feel that as an agency, we are capable to respond
24 to Metro incidents with our training, whether it's participating
25 in full-scale exercise to recruit training and some of the in-

1 service training?

2 A. Yeah. In general, I feel that we're ready to respond to
3 Metro. I think a lot of that has to do with strong standard
4 operating guidelines. As far as training goes, and I said -- what
5 is the word you just said I used?

6 Q. Restoring --

7 A. Restore. So I'd say restore or refocus, and to be
8 clear, I'm not exactly clear on what the extent of training was or
9 was not prior to my return in August.

10 Q. Okay. Okay, next question for you. Regarding
11 communications, there are things within the agency that we do when
12 we have communication problems; there's things we do. If you have
13 a problem, you set up relay, so forth. Can you elaborate on what
14 are some of the procedures that we do when we start experiencing
15 communication problems, whether it's a high-rise or a Metro
16 incident?

17 A. So, yeah, the options certainly exists, and I know it's
18 been discussed, about whether or not we set up a radio relay using
19 analog channels or line-of-sight communications. I don't think
20 that there was any indication that we attempted to do that at this
21 incident, but there were certainly options that -- other options
22 that we could have used.

23 We probably could have expanded on the use of the
24 conference mike, and maybe one of the other options would have
25 been to use Metro Transit Police to relay communications at the

1 command post.

2 Q. Okay. And lastly, regarding accountability, there are
3 certain phases of accountability we have within D.C. Fire and EMS.
4 Can you elaborate on accountability at the incident, and what do
5 we use?

6 A. So, yeah, we use Level 3 accountability. We used our
7 accountability tags. The accountability company did, in fact --
8 from my recollection, collected accountability tags and maintained
9 Level 3 accountability throughout the incident. Of course, the
10 true accountability at the end of the day is the incident
11 commander and the incident commander's worksheet. And you know,
12 the tag system counts bodies. The accountability system, for
13 where the companies are working at and who their supervisors are
14 and where they're assigned, is the responsibility of the incident
15 commander. And the indications are the incident commander did
16 have accountability for his personnel.

17 Q. Okay. I have no further questions.

18 MR. DOWNS: Very good, Chief. Thank you.

19 BY MR. DOWNS:

20 Q. Chief, let's digress a little bit. Your personal work
21 history. How long you been with D.C. Fire and EMS, and maybe give
22 us the highlights over the years?

23 A. So I've been --

24 Q. Not looking to fuss over dates so much as just the
25 general progression of promotions and such.

1 A. Yeah. Okay. I'll have 30 years of service in June. I
2 came on the job in 1985. I was promoted through the ranks --

3 Q. You came out as a line firefighter?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. You want every promotion that I --

7 Q. Just give me the highlights.

8 A. So I guess relative promotions to previous experience to
9 this incident may be relevant. I was promoted to captain in
10 2000 -- I'm sorry -- in 1995. And that was -- well, actually, as
11 a firefighter, I've been associated with Special Operations and
12 was assigned to a unit that worked with the hazmat unit. And in
13 1995, I was promoted to captain and went to the Special Operations
14 Division as the captain of Rescue Squad 2.

15 Q. Rescue Squad 2?

16 A. Rescue Squad 2, yeah.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. I spent about 7 years there. I was promoted to
19 battalion chief in 2005 and spent a year and a half as assistant
20 training director at the training academy. And then from there, a
21 few months as an operations battalion chief in the third battalion
22 in Southeast. And then in January of 2007, I was promoted to
23 deputy chief of the Special Operations Division and stayed there
24 until the end of that administration in 2010.

25 In 2010, I worked here for a couple months as the

1 operations deputy. From there, I went to the Risk Management
2 Division. I was detailed with the Fleet Maintenance Division and
3 then spent some time in the Professional Standards Office. And
4 then this August, I returned to the Special Operations Division.

5 Q. Special Operations?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Very good. Thank you. Radios.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. We've had a lot of discussion, various witnesses over
10 the last several days, we're getting comments to the effect there
11 were some radio challenges down below ground. Can you offer any
12 additional thoughts beyond what you've already offered? You've
13 mentioned, for example, setting up runner relays in the event that
14 the radios didn't work and things of that sort. So maybe a little
15 discussion here on the radios?

16 A. There's some options that could have been used, I guess,
17 early on. By the time I arrived, it was -- there was probably no
18 point in doing that. But you know, there's a lot of discussions
19 about radios and I'm not so sure that that's really the focus. I
20 mean, there's clearly some radio issues and there are going to be
21 radio challenges that should be expected in the Metro system. But
22 I think the communications that we were having difficulty with was
23 really probably between the incident commander and Metro OCC, and
24 others on the scene.

25 Q. Can you expound a little bit on the challenges between

1 incident command and OCC?

2 A. I guess I can. My comments would only be observations
3 because I haven't dug too deeply.

4 Q. That's what we're looking for.

5 A. And so you kept asking me questions about when I knew
6 there was a train in the tunnel with people on it. And it just
7 seems to me, just that it was an extremely long time -- maybe
8 extremely isn't a word I should add, but it was a long time before
9 we understood that there was a train in the tunnel with people on
10 it, I think. I'm not exactly sure about that, but it wasn't
11 evident to me in the office. Because if it had been evident to me
12 in the office, I think I would have got up and walked out the door
13 right away. And so that never came across to me. Maybe I missed
14 it, you know, the radio -- Chief Hawkins and I have an office, two
15 trailers stuck together in an old firehouse, and we've got radios
16 throughout. It's in the other room but it's not like I can't hear
17 it. I mean, I can clearly hear. Obviously, I was doing some
18 other things. I was on the computer. I may have been on the
19 phone for a second or two. But I don't recall hearing anything
20 that would -- because that would have made me get up and walk out
21 and start heading --

22 Q. So had there been an emphasis early on that there was a
23 train stuck in the tunnel, that might have elevated the awareness
24 of all the command officers?

25 A. It would certainly heighten --

1 Q. At least in your --

2 A. -- my awareness.

3 Q. At least in your experience?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Very good. Okay, so you feel that that might have been
6 a shortcoming on the part of the overall incident command process,
7 at least from your familiarization?

8 A. I'm not sure where the shortcoming would be, but I can
9 tell you that I didn't understand that to be the case until later.
10 And I can't recall exactly when that I knew, but --

11 Q. But you were down below ground at that time when you --

12 A. No, no.

13 Q. When you learned of the train in the tunnel, you were
14 above ground in incident command?

15 A. I would say I was responding, even before that, I knew
16 before that. But I don't know what the timeline that you have
17 from the time that they arrived on the scene until the time that
18 he called for the second alarm, but it had to be, what -- can you
19 guys tell me? It was closer to 15 minutes --

20 Q. Well, we're still establishing the timeline. That's
21 what we're trying to sort out.

22 A. So -- but it was a while, you know? And there was
23 nothing that indicated to me listening that something like that
24 was going on because it would have made me question command's
25 activities, that they weren't reacting in a different sort of way.

1 Q. As to why, perhaps why they weren't providing more of a
2 tactical response down the tunnel sooner?

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Okay, very good. Chief, let's digress a little bit
5 further. Emergency access doors on Metro cars --

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. -- what's your understanding of how they work?

8 A. So it appears that there is some misunderstanding, but
9 so the center doors on a Metro car are the emergency exit doors
10 for passengers.

11 Q. The center side doors, you're saying?

12 A. Yes, center side doors. And so there's clearly some
13 misunderstanding about that from some statements that I saw in the
14 media. Also, there's access that our personnel have utilizing
15 keys or --

16 Q. Barrel keys? The small, round key that --

17 A. Yes, barrel keys or -- I believe there's been some
18 handles retrofitted by Metro as well.

19 Q. Emergency door release handles?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Very good. And they're located, you said, on the side
22 center door?

23 A. The emergency door release handle?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. On the side center door, yes. I'd say that's probably

1 just about right.

2 Q. Probably just about right? You don't -- you're not
3 quite positive?

4 A. Well, I was making sure that we were differentiating
5 between the door handles that were installed and the barrel keys.

6 Q. I see. Access door training, have you had that recently
7 or you're going by recollection or you're going by the SOP or --

8 A. I'm going by recollection. Have I had any training
9 recently? No.

10 Q. No? Okay, very good. How about notes of the event?
11 Did you keep any notes, by chance, in your response operations?

12 A. Not really.

13 Q. No? Okay.

14 A. I scribbled down the car numbers.

15 Q. And that's about it?

16 A. I scribbled down -- and it was really, literally
17 scribbled on a piece of paper because I was -- I noted early on
18 that -- where the passengers were exiting, where they were
19 reporting patients, and it was basically three locations. Other
20 than that, I wrote the car numbers down, the chain marker, and
21 where patients were evacuating.

22 Q. Very good. Thank you. And let's see. How about the
23 relationship with the Transit Police Department officers? Have
24 you had dealings with them at various WMATA and Metrorail events
25 over the years that you can express any kind of observations there

1 in terms of relationships?

2 A. My relationships and experiences and interactions with
3 the Metro Police have always been positive and --

4 Q. Positive?

5 A. Positive and cooperative.

6 Q. Positive and cooperative? Very good. Thank you. Let's
7 see. We got that. We got that.

8 MR. DOWNS: I'm going to defer, and let's go to the next
9 question, line of questions.

10 BY MR. ROURKE:

11 Q. Denton Rourke, Metro. When you got down to either the
12 platform or when you went into the roadway, did you notice any air
13 movement at all, like, for instance, a fan moving air in any
14 direction?

15 A. So I don't want to make a statement that sounds like I
16 came to a conclusion, but I think -- or that just listening to
17 other people leads me to a conclusion. But I think that I recall
18 thinking to myself that there wasn't a whole lot of air movement,
19 that I was surprised that there wasn't --

20 MR. DOWNS: Was not?

21 MR. BAKER: There was not a lot of air movement at the
22 time.

23 BY MR. ROURKE:

24 Q. Now you -- a short conversation about the command and
25 control chart, your all's Metro-specific command and control

1 charts or worksheets, as I think you all call them.

2 A. Um-hum.

3 Q. Did you have a chance to look at Chief Chapman's?

4 A. I wasn't -- I was looking through the rear window of the
5 car from the side, like, so there was a lot of people around and I
6 didn't see his command worksheet.

7 Q. Oh, so you never looked at it afterwards or anything?

8 A. I'm sorry?

9 Q. You never saw it afterwards or anything?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. Thank you. That's all I got. Thanks.

12 MR. DOWNS: Ruben?

13 MR. PAYAN: Want to finish with your group and then
14 I'll --

15 MR. DOWNS: Ms. Burtch?

16 MS. BURTCH: I just --

17 BY MS. BURTCH:

18 Q. Kim Burtch. Question about your contact with Mr. Jones.

19 A. Um-hum.

20 Q. Is that -- are you partnered with the fire chief
21 routinely or is this -- how did this -- how did your coming
22 together and moving toward the station platform happen?

23 MR. ROURKE: Well, if I might --

24 MS. BURTCH: Oh, sorry, is that --

25 MR. ROURKE: No, no, I just want to clarify. They're

1 both named Jones, but there's a D.C. fire chief named Jones, and
2 there's a Tom Jones who he's talking about.

3 MS. BURTCH: Tom Jones.

4 MR. ROURKE: Right, who's not the D.C. fire chief. He's
5 a Metro employee.

6 MS. BURTCH: Right.

7 MR. ROURKE: Okay, cool.

8 MS. BURTCH: That's who I was referring to.

9 MR. ROURKE: Okay, excellent, okay.

10 MS. BURTCH: I didn't know how that partnership
11 happened.

12 MR. DOWNS: Okay. So for the record, clarification,
13 you're talking about Tom Jones?

14 MS. BURTCH: I'm talking about Tom Jones.

15 MR. ROURKE: The Metro fire marshal?

16 MR. BAKER: Fire marshal.

17 MS. BURTCH: Fire marshal. Thank you.

18 MR. BAKER: So at the point where I was having the
19 conversation with Chief Mills about whether I would stand at the
20 command post, or stay at the command post or go to the platform
21 and assist Chief Welsh, Tom Jones was standing there during that
22 conversation. And at that point, he asked if he could accompany
23 me as well. And so we all agreed that that's what would happen,
24 and that's how he ended up entering the station with me.

25 BY MS. BURTCH:

1 Q. Okay. Was there -- so based on your going down there
2 together, were there any -- discussing the protection system with
3 him and asking him various questions, I guess, about what
4 equipment was functioning?

5 A. Um-hum.

6 Q. Was there any other information that -- and the fans as
7 well -- was there any other information that he provided while you
8 were down in -- down on the platform?

9 A. No. We got down on the platform pretty quickly. I
10 mean, we were talking the whole time. We were kind of just
11 bouncing things off of each other as we were walking. That's what
12 was really going on. We were just -- he was kind of -- I was
13 asking him and he was asking me, hey, what about this, what about
14 that. We were kind of going down a checklist in our mind, and
15 when we got to the platform, then that's where that stopped.
16 So --

17 Q. Okay. So that's a good point, the checklist. Would
18 there normally be items that would be addressed by the fire
19 marshal and someone from D.C. EMS during this type of an incident?

20 A. Maybe not in the manner in which we were doing it, no.

21 Q. So -- okay. Thank you.

22 MR. DOWNS: Chief?

23 MR. HAWKINS: I have no further questions.

24 MR. DOWNS: Questions, okay.

25 Ruben?

1 MR. PAYAN: Yeah, okay. Is it my turn?

2 BY MR. PAYAN:

3 Q. This is Ruben with NTSB. My group is looking more into
4 the operation of the fans and everything else, so I'll kind of
5 limit my questions to that. You mentioned that you're -- you were
6 discussing FL-1?

7 A. Um-hum.

8 Q. I'd like to backtrack a little bit. When you were in
9 the office or while you were en route, or when you arrived, were
10 you ever briefed on the condition of the different fans at
11 L'Enfant?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Okay. And when you arrived on scene, you mentioned
14 there was very little air movement or --

15 A. You know, I don't know. I think I expected something
16 more than what was happening.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And so maybe that's just, you know, maybe that's just an
19 unreasonable expectation. But I don't -- I didn't really draw any
20 firm conclusions about it at that point. And really, by the time
21 we got there, it wasn't that big of an issue for us anymore. I
22 saw pictures from some of the social media that showed the
23 conditions prior to our arrival, and it was nothing like that when
24 we arrived. I mean, the smoke had basically cleared by the time
25 we had hit the platform.

1 Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned that some of the smoke was
2 clinging to the ceiling? I mean --

3 A. There was still a haze of smoke maybe at the ceiling
4 level or at the top of the tunnel, but --

5 Q. Did you by any chance happen to see any movement? I
6 mean, if you were asked where it --

7 A. Didn't look like there was a whole --

8 Q. -- was moving to --

9 A. Didn't look like there was a whole lot of air movement
10 at that point.

11 Q. Okay. And walking down the tunnel, you couldn't feel
12 any movement?

13 A. I could feel some air movement, but I think -- like, I
14 think maybe I expected something more than there was, but again,
15 I'm not really sure.

16 Q. Okay. And now, do you know if FL-1 was ever put in
17 supply like you were discussing?

18 A. I do not know that.

19 Q. Okay. All right. Now, switching channels to -- or not
20 channels -- switching to the radios, how many channels does the
21 fire department have on their radios available to them?

22 A. A lot.

23 Q. A lot?

24 A. That's the best I can do for you.

25 Q. Okay. No, that's fine, that's fine.

1 A. We have a fleet map for radio channels that -- I'd say
2 well over 100.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. And that would include all regional channels. And we
5 have a number of channels that we have access to.

6 Q. Okay. And then when you're responding to an incident,
7 who determines what channel you're going to operate on?

8 A. Initially, the radio channel's assigned by the Office of
9 Unified Communications.

10 Q. Okay. And can these be changed when after -- have you
11 ever seen where they were changed?

12 A. Sure. Yeah, they can be. Not routinely, and it's not
13 regularly done. Usually we stick with the assigned tac channel.

14 Q. Okay. And then how do you communicate with Metro
15 officials? Either by radio or personal telephone, or what's the
16 procedure there?

17 A. So usually we communicate with Metro officials by phone
18 or by radio with a -- with one of our battalion chiefs as a Metro
19 liaison or by conference line.

20 Q. I see. Okay. And have you ever done any training on
21 using communications system there at the stations, their
22 telephone?

23 A. Have I ever had any training?

24 Q. Yes. Or do you know of any training?

25 A. Yes, I've had training. Been a long time ago, but I've

1 had training.

2 Q. So is that an option for somebody on the platform from
3 the --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- fire department?

6 A. Um-hum.

7 MR. PAYAN: I think that's all I have.

8 MR. DOWNS: Okay. Very good. Thank you.

9 BY MR. DOWNS:

10 Q. Downs, NTSB again. You mentioned a little bit ago,
11 Chief, you have a response checklist that you use as --

12 A. No, we were -- we have a command worksheet for --

13 Q. Command worksheet?

14 A. But that's not what I was really referring to.

15 Q. What were you referring to?

16 A. More of an informal mental process.

17 Q. Informal mental process?

18 A. It was Tom and I having a conversation while we were
19 walking trying to figure out what needed to be addressed and what
20 had been missed.

21 Q. I see. And what determines what goes on your informal
22 mental process list? Just experience?

23 A. At that point in time, yes.

24 Q. At that point in time, okay, very good. Okay, Chief, it
25 looks like we're probably going to be wrapping up our questions.

1 MR. DOWNS: If there are any further questions --

2 BY MR. DOWNS:

3 Q. I always like to give my witnesses the opportunity to
4 express what we call retrospective thoughts. Kind of in hindsight
5 we're all an expert, of course. Given what you know now, given
6 your experience with the fire department, EMS over the years, are
7 there any thoughts or things that you would have done differently
8 knowing what you know now, that you might want to share with the
9 professional firefighting community and/or WMATA, Metrorail that
10 might have helped the situation given some of the criticism that's
11 been occurring in the media and such?

12 A. No. There's nothing that -- I don't want to say that
13 there's things I couldn't personally improve, but I think that I
14 would have pretty much gone through the same process that I did
15 given the type of assignment that I was given, which was really to
16 kind of collect and verify information and help command bring some
17 organization to the structure and verify that certain activities
18 were or were not happening. As far as the other activities of the
19 fire department, that's a much bigger issue, and over the long-
20 term, we're going to work to do after-action reports and after-
21 action activities that will address those things.

22 Q. Some of those things, do they come to mind right now in
23 terms of -- that jump out at you that you'd like to see
24 implemented for future events if that should occur?

25 A. No, I don't think so. I think it would be premature

1 to -- with the information that I have to make any assumptions
2 that -- you know, obviously, we're going to look at command and
3 control activities, communications activities with Metro. We're
4 going to look at the activities of our first units on the scene
5 and their training and things of that nature.

6 Q. Okay. Very good. Anything else you'd like to add
7 before we close?

8 A. No, sir.

9 Q. Thank you very much, Chief.

10 MR. DOWNS: That concludes our interview.

11 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015
Interview of Craig Baker

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: February 2, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Danielle S. VanRiper
Transcriber

List of discrepancies found in NTSB interview transcript:

Page 6

Line 22 – change the word “one” to “alarm”

Line 24 – to clarify – when I was referring to “coming here”, I was referring to the Fire Operations which is where the NTSB interview was being conducted.

Page 7

Line 1 – Change the word “Pete” to “Chief”

Page 8

Line 1 – I entered the station from “D” Street.

Page 18


Line 9 – I did not refer to a “dead” person

Page 19

Line 19 – I believe this line should read as follows – just **not** a lot of radio traffic.....

Page 29

Line 24 – change the word “mike” to “line”


Craig S. Baker
Deputy Fire Chief
Special Operations Division