



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
**Investigative Hearing**

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

<b>GROUP</b>	<b>G</b>
<b>EXHIBIT</b>	
35	

Agency / Organization

District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical  
Services

Title

**Interview Transcript of Kenneth Moore**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA  
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
JANUARY 12, 2015

\*  
\* Docket No.: D.C.A-15-FR-004  
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Interview of: KENNETH MOORE

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday,  
January 28, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: RICHARD DOWNS, JR.  
Survival Factors Investigator

## APPEARANCES:

RICHARD DOWNS, JR., Survival Factors Investigator  
Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group  
National Transportation Safety Board

ROBERT JOE GORDON, Investigator-in-Charge  
National Transportation Safety Board

STEVE BLACKISTONE, J.D.  
Office of Communications  
National Transportation and Safety Board

KIMBERLY BURTCH, Senior Program Analyst  
Office of Transit Safety and Oversight  
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

SHARMILA SAMARASINGHE, Vice Chair  
Tri-State Oversight Committee

DENTON ROURKE, Operations Manager  
Office of Emergency Management  
WMATA

DERRON HAWKINS, Deputy Fire Chief  
D.C. Fire and EMS  
Homeland Security & Special Operations Division

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I N T E R V I E W

1  
2 MR. DOWNS: Okay. Today's date is January 28, 2015 and  
3 the following is an interview being conducted in reference to NTSB  
4 investigation number DCA-15-FR-004, which relates to an accident  
5 involving a heavy smoke release and train evacuations that  
6 occurred in and near the L'Enfant Plaza station of the WMATA  
7 Metrorail system here in Washington DC on the afternoon of January  
8 12, 2015.

9 This interview is being conducted with a member of the  
10 District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services  
11 Department as conducted by the NTSB Survival Factors Technical  
12 Working Group of the investigation. My name is Richard Downs, Jr.  
13 and I'm a Survival Factors Investigator with the NTSB in which  
14 I'll also serve in the role -- which I also serve in the role as  
15 the Survival Factors Technical Working Group Chairperson.

16 I will preside over this interview, which is being  
17 recorded for the record, in which a transcript may also be  
18 compiled of the recording as a permanent docketed record of the  
19 interview. I'll now ask that our witness please identify  
20 themselves, their employment affiliation and job position title  
21 for the record.

22 MR. MOORE: Hi. My name is Kenneth R. Moore, Jr. I'm a  
23 deputy fire chief of operations on Platoon number 2 for the D.C.  
24 Fire and EMS Department.

25 MR. DOWNS: Thank you for joining us today, Chief. And

1 if you -- you're not accompanied by anyone today?

2 MR. MOORE: No, I'm not.

3 MR. DOWNS: Thank you. I'll now ask the participants of  
4 this interview who will have the opportunity to present questions  
5 to the witness to please individually identify themselves, their  
6 employment affiliation, and job position title for the record.

7 MR. ROURKE: Hi. Good morning. I'm Denton Rourke. I'm  
8 with WMATA. I am the Operations Manager of the Office of  
9 Emergency Management.

10 MR. MOORE: Hi.

11 MS. BURTCHE: Good morning. I'm Kimberly Burtch with the  
12 Federal Transit Administration's Office of Transit Safety and  
13 Oversight.

14 MR. HAWKINS: Good morning. Derron T. Hawkins, Deputy  
15 Fire Chief, Homeland Security Division, D.C. Fire and EMS.

16 MR. BLACKISTONE: Steve Blackistone, Office of  
17 Communications, National Transportation Safety Board.

18 MR. MOORE: Good morning.

19 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Good morning, Chief Moore. I'm  
20 Sharmila Samarasinghe. I'm with the Tri-State Oversight  
21 Committee.

22 MR. MOORE: Good morning.

23 MR. GORDON: Good morning. Joe Gordon, National  
24 Transportation Safety Board, Investigator-in-Charge for the  
25 incident. And a couple of things before we start in with the

1 questions. In addition to the remarks by Mr. Downs, the purpose  
2 of the NTSB investigation is to enhance safety. You know, we're  
3 looking for process improvements, not trying to assign any fault  
4 or blame to anyone.

5 NTSB cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or  
6 immunity from any legal action. And Mr. Downs already spoke about  
7 the transcript that will come from the recording and go into the  
8 public docket. So with that, Mr. Downs, if you'd like to start  
9 with the questions.

10 MR. DOWNS: Thanks, Mr. Gordon. And, Mr. Gordon, in  
11 role, you're the investigator in charge?

12 MR. GORDON: Yes.

13 INTERVIEW OF KENNETH MOORE

14 BY MR. DOWNS:

15 Q. Very good. Thank you, Chief, again, for joining us. My  
16 first question to you, sir, would be, would you please briefly  
17 describe for us your role or involvement in the event?

18 A. When I arrived on the scene to assist the incident  
19 commander and what I ended up doing was actually communicating  
20 with the Metro liaison officer, which was Battalion 1, Chief  
21 Leonard, who was at the OCC. And he was having radio issues with  
22 communicating with us so we established a communication through  
23 cell phones. So throughout the event I was in contact with him.  
24 And I also was in contact with the EMS branch.

25 Q. So you were basically a communications liaison between

1 the different command?

2 A. Well, and I assisted because I assisted him with -- we  
3 ended up having what was equivalent to a second alarm respond to  
4 the event. And to keep up with his resources, I was assisting him  
5 with actually tracking all of his resources.

6 Q. I see. Thank you, Chief. And could you please -- would  
7 you please describe for us in your own words what occurred on the  
8 day of the event relative to your specific actions and involvement  
9 at L'Enfant Station response?

10 A. Well, my response was I heard a call go out for a Metro  
11 Station box with smoke in the tunnel so we responded down. He had  
12 already established a command post. I got in the buggy and I  
13 kinda got an update of what he had going on and he advised me that  
14 the report was that they had smoke in the tunnel. They had a  
15 disabled train that was in the tunnel. Well, smoke actually in  
16 the station -- let me go back.

17 There was smoke in the station and then they later  
18 discovered that they had a disabled train that was in the tunnel.  
19 And the report that was that they had a possible fire in one of  
20 the ancillary rooms in the station. So, I mean, during the  
21 incident we were trying to location the room to actually find the  
22 source of the fire so we could extinguish the fire to mitigate the  
23 emergency.

24 Q. So it's your understanding that you were more focused on  
25 responding to a fire situation in one of the rooms underground



1 rather than identifying if there was any trains involved?

2 A. Exactly.

3 Q. Were you informed early on that there was a train  
4 involved in the tunnel that needed evacuation?

5 A. No.

6 Q. You didn't hear --

7 A. Not --

8 Q. -- you didn't hear about that until later on was it?

9 A. Yeah. Well, like I said, the initial -- the initial  
10 report that was got was smoke in the station and then somewhere  
11 later on in the situation, in -- I don't know exactly when but  
12 later on into the situation, we did get that they had a possible  
13 train that was disabled in the tunnel.

14 Q. I see.

15 A. And then later as we went on it was that there was smoke  
16 in the train. Then, I mean, we started to get more and more  
17 details as to what was going on. But the initial report that we  
18 got and when I responded and got on the scene, my interpretation  
19 of the incident was that it was smoke in the station and that we  
20 had a fire in one of the rooms that was in the tunnel.

21 Q. I see. Thank you. We'll now move on to our next round  
22 of questioning. Mr. Rourke?

23 BY MR. ROURKE:

24 Q. Denton Rourke from Metro. Good morning again, Chief.

25 A. How are you doing?

1 Q. I'm just going to ask -- I'm good, sir. I'm just going  
2 to ask you some general questions about training and then we'll  
3 talk some general questions about the incident itself.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. All right. Can you describe for me the DCFD Metro  
6 Training Program?

7 A. The training program?

8 Q. Um-hum.

9 A. Well, we have a -- like I said, we got a working  
10 relationship with Metro where we send companies out to Pennsy  
11 Drive. You know, occasionally to drain -- to train on different  
12 rail car orientation. We've trained on simulated derailments. We  
13 have a bunch of different training simulations that we have with  
14 WMATA itself. Are you talking about just with WMATA or our  
15 training in general or?

16 Q. Either. Both.

17 A. Well, I mean, because we got our own Metro manual that  
18 we train on.

19 Q. You do a lot on your own, right?

20 A. Exactly. And if we go down to the -- into the tunnels  
21 and we do, --

22 Q. Yeah.

23 A. -- you know, radio tests and station familiarization  
24 drills all the time. But, I mean, that's -- we're pretty familiar  
25 with what's going on in Metro.

1 Q. What training -- Metro training is provided in recruit  
2 school?

3 A. In recruit school?

4 Q. Um-hum.

5 A. I'm not assigned to recruit school. I'm not 100 percent  
6 sure exactly what they get, but I know they get the basics. I'm  
7 sure they get, you know, the review of the actual different  
8 responses that we go on in Metro. They have access down there to  
9 our Metro manual and our Metro service -- Emergency Services  
10 Manual.

11 So I'm sure they get -- I'm not -- I'm not going to say  
12 that I know exactly what they get, but I know it's a part of their  
13 probation that when they do come out there's some Metro items that  
14 are in their probationary studies for them to have to complete.

15 Q. All right. Thanks. And you talked a little bit about  
16 my next question, which is what do you all do at the  
17 station/battalion level? Do you want to -- anything else you want  
18 to add to that?

19 A. At the battalion level?

20 Q. The station or battalion level. You talked about -- you  
21 talked about station familiarization, radio testing, drilling on  
22 the SOP book, that sort of thing.

23 A. And that's pretty much all we do. We come in usually  
24 and make contact with the kiosk operator, let him know that we  
25 want to do a walk through through the station and we walk through.

1 We go down and familiarize ourselves with where the E-tech carts  
2 are and where all the different equipment, all the different  
3 equipment rooms and all that kind of stuff. And each particular  
4 station, it may be in, you know, whatever the company's first due  
5 (indiscernible).

6 Q. And what Metro training have you participated in?

7 A. Just about all of it. Well, I mean, I've been on the  
8 job 24 years and I've had just about all the Metro training they  
9 have to offer.

10 Q. And how about exercises? What Metro exercises have you  
11 participated in? Training drills? Drills, yes.

12 A. Well, to be honest, I haven't actually done a tabletop  
13 or an actual drill, Metro live drill, but I've had different  
14 instances where we've run different calls in the Metro.

15 Q. Um-hum.

16 A. You know, I used to be assigned to a rescue squad and  
17 we've had different, you know, people on the tracks. We've had  
18 trains that have actually derailed for whatever reason. So I've  
19 had experience with drilling with different types of Metro  
20 emergencies.

21 Q. And have you attended Metro training at Carmen Turner  
22 out in Landover?

23 A. Yes. Yes.

24 Q. Do you recall what that was?

25 A. The last time I went out, it was actually the radio

1 training was the last thing I did, when we set up the mobile  
2 station for us to respond out there. That was the last part of  
3 the training we went out to.

4 Q. Okay. Um-hum. All right. For Metro training and  
5 revolving incident management, what incident management training  
6 is provided to acting battalion chiefs?

7 A. To acting battalion chiefs?

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. I don't know exactly what's offered. I know we do have  
10 a acting battalion fire chief's training course.

11 Q. Um-hum.

12 A. I'm not -- I don't participate in the actual  
13 administration of that so I don't know if there's a Metro portion  
14 in that at all. I don't know.

15 Q. Okay. Thanks. And what Metro incident management  
16 training have you received or participated in?

17 A. Just, like I said, just the ongoing Metro training that  
18 we've had with WMATA and the D.C. Fire Department, our partnership  
19 over the years, just different training.

20 Q. Um-hum. Did you attend the joint supervisor training  
21 last year where police, fire, rail, and bus all trained together  
22 on incident management either at Carmen Turner or at Jackson  
23 Graham?

24 A. No, I didn't.

25 Q. Does the district have a Metro-specific command and

1 control worksheet?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thanks. Now we want to talk a little bit about L'Enfant  
4 itself, just some general overview questions and then there will  
5 probably be more specific questions as well. What's the DCFD  
6 procedure for managing a Metro incident?

7 A. As far as -- what do you mean?

8 Q. How -- what's -- you know, the command -- what's the  
9 command structure by SOP supposed to be, that sort of thing.

10 A. What -- how many units we got to respond or --

11 Q. Well, I'm more interested in the -- in managing it, like  
12 from your level or the battalion chief's level.

13 A. Well, the battalion chiefs really just -- well, I think  
14 we got five engines and we got -- and we got five engines, two  
15 trucks, a rescue squad, three battalion chiefs that respond, an  
16 EMS supervisor, an ALS unit, a BLS unit.

17 Q. Um-hum.

18 A. And he's pretty much responsible for just the managing -  
19 - everybody has a specific SO -- well, a specific job laid out in  
20 the SOGs.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. And the incident commander is pretty much responsible  
23 for making sure that everybody performs their specific duties.  
24 And we have a Metro worksheet that's specific to all the job -- it  
25 -- it's lined out as to what everybody should be doing and he --

1 it's pretty much a checklist.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. He can go right down the checklist and just say, hey,  
4 you know, just to make sure that everybody's doing exactly what  
5 they need to be doing on the scene.

6 Q. What's the role of the Metro Transit police supervisor  
7 at the command post during a Metro incident?

8 A. Usually communication.

9 Q. And between?

10 A. Between fire department employees and WMATA employees.

11 Q. Okay. Thanks. Was there a solid, unified command  
12 established on this incident between the fire department, Metro  
13 police department and Metrorail?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Can you expand on that a little bit?

16 A. Well, we had representatives from all those different  
17 agencies were at the command post.

18 Q. And how was the police representative utilized at the  
19 command post?

20 A. Well, to be honest, inside the command -- well, in the  
21 buggy --

22 Q. Um-hum.

23 A. I was in the buggy with the incident commander. We had  
24 our operations chief, Chief Mills, was on the outside doing a lot  
25 of the communication with the other agency heads. We didn't have

1 an actual -- usually we'll have our command bus or whatever that  
2 comes and then we can all be in the same room and communicate.

3 Q. Um-hum.

4 A. But in that instance, we didn't. And we just operated  
5 off of the buggy. So a lot of the communication that was going on  
6 outside of the buggy was between, you know, our operations chief,  
7 the WMATA police, the -- it was MPD officials on the scene and all  
8 the other officials that were there.

9 Q. And your SOG for incident management is to stay in the  
10 buggy?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. From your perspective would you classify that the  
13 Transit police official was an active participant in the incident  
14 management?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And how were communications in coordination with Metro  
17 at the command post?

18 A. Through their radios.

19 Q. You know how?

20 A. How?

21 Q. How did it work?

22 A. It worked -- well, I mean, because we were also in  
23 communication -- I was directly in communication with one of our  
24 guys that was at Metro OCC.

25 Q. Um-hum.



1           A.    So I was on the phone with him getting information just  
2 as well as we were getting information from the, you know, Transit  
3 police officers and everybody that was right there at the command  
4 post.

5           Q.    Okay. Was the information the same? Was there -- let  
6 me rephrase that. Was there any conflicting information where you  
7 heard one thing over the radio and one thing from the police?

8           A.    Not that I recall.

9           Q.    What is -- what is -- what were the challenges or the  
10 obstacles that you were facing in managing this particular  
11 incident?

12          A.    Communications and I don't -- I mean, I know we had  
13 issues with our radios. But, like I said, I was in contact with  
14 our liaison and went to OCC. He said he had problems  
15 communicating over the radio but once he established  
16 communications with me via cell phone, that eliminated that issue.  
17 We had issues communicating with the battalion chief that was  
18 actually down on the scene.

19                    We had another deputy chief that went down and actually  
20 was calling back again on the cell phone and that kinda eliminated  
21 that communications issue. But we did have a few communications  
22 issues.

23          Q.    Did anyone at the incident command post talk to the ROCC  
24 assistant superintendent directly? Anybody in OCC directly?

25          A.    We had -- we had somebody at OCC.

1 Q. Yeah, you had -- but did anybody talk directly to the  
2 superintendent?

3 A. No. Not that I know of.

4 Q. No? All done through the liaison?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Um-hum.

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. How about the command conference line? Was that  
9 utilized?

10 A. No.

11 Q. How well does -- how well do your radios work? On a day  
12 to day basis in Metro stations and tunnels?

13 A. Well, this -- we have new -- we have a process now, we  
14 got new radios and we were going out testing each Metro station to  
15 assess the radio to see if it worked or if it didn't work. And, I  
16 mean, for the most part, most stations we did have good radio  
17 communications.

18 Q. Do you know if L'Enfant had been done or not?

19 A. I'm trying to -- I'm not sure. I'm not sure.

20 Q. Um-hum.

21 A. I'm going to say (indiscernible).

22 Q. Um-hum. Okay. And what procedures do you have in place  
23 if your radios don't work in a Metro incident?

24 A. Well, we got a talk through. We can go to a channel and  
25 we can set up a relay where we -- it takes, you know, just from

1 point of contact, one point to the next point, next point to get  
2 all the way out to -- and then, like I said on that incident we  
3 just reverted to using cell phones and the cell phones worked.

4 Q. And they worked well?

5 A. They worked well.

6 Q. That's where there's media reports that there was a call  
7 at L'Enfant, like, a week before where there was some radio issues  
8 identified. Do you know about that?

9 A. I did.

10 Q. Did any -- at any time did a -- the police  
11 representative at the command post offer to try to assist with  
12 communications by pairing up a police officer with the fire  
13 department personnel?

14 A. That may have happened but I -- not directly with me.

15 Q. So I want to talk a little bit about the train in the  
16 tunnel. So the initial report was for smoke in the station. Is  
17 that correct?

18 A. Right.

19 Q. All right. So at what point were you notified about the  
20 train being stuck in the tunnel with passengers aboard? When's  
21 the first time you knew about it yourself?

22 A. I don't -- I want to say maybe 10 minutes in. Well, 10  
23 minutes, I'm not going to say into the incident. Maybe it was 10  
24 minutes after I arrived and I didn't -- I was dispatched on the  
25 initial alarm. So I don't know exactly how long that would be

1 able to -- maybe it took me 5 minutes to arrive, so 15 minutes  
2 maybe.

3 Q. And when you -- you're the deputy chief on duty, right?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. So when you met up with Acting Chief Chapman, --

6 A. Um-hum.

7 Q. -- what was the report he gave you, if any?

8 A. He -- well, when I -- when I met up with him, he gave me  
9 the report that it was smoke in the station and that it was a  
10 report that there was a fire in one of the ancillary rooms. That  
11 was the initial report I got when I arrived on the scene.

12 Q. Nothing about a train in the tunnel?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. So who -- who'd you hear that from? Do you  
15 remember?

16 A. I heard that -- I want to say that it came from -- my  
17 first recollection may have been from my guy at OCC.

18 Q. And you get a reported location of the train?

19 A. The -- like a marker number or whatever?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. I don't think he had that initially.

22 Q. Did the chief or did you have a emergency response map?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And, if so, did you use it?

25 A. We had one but I didn't use it initially. I can say

1 that when Chief Baker arrived on the scene, he did utilize the  
2 maps.

3 Q. Chief Baker?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And then so at the point that you did get the message  
6 about the train being stuck on the -- well, let's back up a  
7 minute. So you didn't assume command. Correct?

8 A. I didn't.

9 Q. You were mentoring/assisting?

10 A. Pretty much. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Okay. So what actions were taken either by you or by  
12 Chief Chapman after you were told about the train in the tunnel?

13 A. We notified everybody that was -- report that there was  
14 a train in the tunnel that was stuck or stalled with people  
15 aboard.

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. And then we contacted the recon group to let them know  
18 of that report.

19 Q. And do you -- what did the incident commander tell them  
20 to do? Do you recall?

21 A. To try to locate the train to confirm -- or to try to  
22 confirm there was a train.

23 Q. Try to confirm the report?

24 A. Yeah. Because up until that point, like I said, our  
25 initial thoughts were that we just had a fire. There was no train

1 actually in the tunnel but there as a fire in one of the ancillary  
2 rooms down there.

3 Q. Okay. And the ancillary room report, do you know --  
4 remember where that came from?

5 A. I'm not sure if that came with the initial box. Like I  
6 said, when I arrived on the scene, that was what I -- that was the  
7 update that I got.

8 Q. And you came, before the second alarm, you came on your  
9 own?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q Thank you. Let's talk a little bit about ventilation.  
12 What is the DCFD SOP regarding ventilation in underground Metro  
13 stations and tunnels?

14 A. We usually contact OCC and have them operate the fans in  
15 whatever direction we need them to. It's a coordinated effort  
16 usually. It's nothing that we just get down and --

17 Q. Did -- when you arrived, did Chief Chapman say anything  
18 about ventilation or what we were -- what Metro was doing with  
19 ventilation?

20 A. No. And like I said initially, again, we were still --  
21 we were in the process of just trying to locate the fire. I mean,  
22 we didn't know how to ventilate. We didn't know where anything  
23 was going on. We didn't know where the fire was located, so  
24 (indiscernible) know how to try to go about trying to ventilate.

25 Q. Okay. How -- did Metro give you any information about

1 anything they had done with fans?

2 A. At that point, no.

3 Q. Did you ever get that from anybody?

4 A. I know at one time we, like I said, I talked -- Chief  
5 Baker arrived on the scene and we discussed and that's when we got  
6 to talking about, you know, what we want to do with the fans. We  
7 wanted to get some feedback from Metro on what directions we  
8 wanted the fans to go in.

9 Q. And did we ever -- did you -- did the incident commander  
10 ever change or make any changes?

11 A. To be honest with you, I really don't know. That was  
12 something that I relayed to him, some information to find out  
13 exactly what mode the fans may have been in. I didn't have that  
14 (indiscernible).

15 Q. Now what is the -- what's the District of Columbia Fire  
16 Department Mass Casualty SOP?

17 A. As far as if we got nine or more patients.

18 Q. Nine or more patients?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. Um-hum. And what -- when was the -- when did the  
21 incident commander recognize that they might have that situation?

22 A. Once they located the train and noted that they have  
23 victims on the train is when we requested the mass casualty units.

24 Q. And how was that managed?

25 A. As far as?

1 Q. The mass casualty portion of the incident?

2 A. That -- we had a EMS branch that managed that.

3 Q. So how did he -- how was the units organized on the  
4 platform at the tactical level?

5 A. How were they?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Well, our initial units, they go in and they form a  
8 recon group.

9 Q. Um-hum.

10 A. And they go down into the tunnel. We got a chief that's  
11 linked up with those initial companies to go down and investigate  
12 to find out exactly what they have in the station.

13 Q. Now how well did that work on this incident?

14 A. That worked well.

15 Q. And what companies were those? Do you recall?

16 A. 18. I know Battalion 4 was the chief. I should have  
17 brought my notes with me. I don't know right off the top of my  
18 head --

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. -- exactly what companies. But they had -- they had two  
21 trucks, I mean, two engines, a truck, and a battalion chief who  
22 was the recon group.

23 Q. And where did the rescue squad -- where did they come  
24 into the picture?

25 A. Actually I want to say the rescue squad was the first



1 arriving unit.

2 Q. How was your communications between command and those  
3 tactical units?

4 A. It was, like I said, once the recon group got down into  
5 the actual tunnel, it was intermittent.

6 Q. So you were getting some things and not getting others?

7 A. Right. It was -- the communications was, like I said,  
8 it was an issue.

9 Q. How about -- let's talk a little bit about third rail  
10 power. What's the SOP on third rail power?

11 A. As far as we concerned, when we get down there, usually  
12 we verify with communications. I mean, OCC, --

13 Q. Um-hum.

14 A. -- that third rail power has been shut down. And then  
15 we hit the ETS stations. We use our -- now that we don't have a  
16 volt probe anymore, we use the hot sticks to verify that it was  
17 down and then we put WSADs in place.

18 Q. And what information were you getting on the status of  
19 third rail power either from Chief Chapman or from Metro or --

20 A. Well, we were getting information that the third rail  
21 power was shut down and then we were getting information from our  
22 guys that they still had train movement.

23 Q. And what was that report? Do you remember?

24 A. What was that report?

25 Q. The train movement report. Do you know what that was?

1           A.    Yeah, that they had train movement.  I mean, there  
2 wasn't no specific, what track or -- they still had train  
3 movement.

4           Q.    Um-hum.

5           A.    And so we were telling, you know, OCC we need to get  
6 everything shut down because we still didn't know exactly -- even  
7 though we had a report that there was a fire in the tunnel or a  
8 fire -- we had smoke in the station.  We didn't know where the  
9 fire was located.  Then we had a train that was disabled.  So we  
10 didn't know exactly where all of these things were going on, so --

11          Q     Um-hum.

12          A.    -- we felt that it wasn't safe to have any trains moving  
13 at all.

14          Q.    Okay.  Did you -- did you -- did you all take that to  
15 mean that trains were moving on that Green Line or downstairs or?

16          A.    We took it to mean that trains were moving in the  
17 station, period.

18          Q.    Okay.

19          A.    And like I said, with all that -- with the information  
20 that was being, you know, put out, we didn't know -- me, you know,  
21 I was sitting in the buggy.  I really don't -- I don't get a  
22 visual, so just knowing that there's trains moving and even though  
23 you say, well, okay, it's a train stuck in Tunnel 1 and we operate  
24 in Tunnel 2 but then we don't know where the fire is.  And the  
25 fire could have been in Tunnel 1 where the trains are moving, so.

1 Q: Um-hum. Right. Okay. About that, talked about that.  
2 Did any discussions with the on scene -- with the Metro police  
3 officials there at the command post about power?

4 A. No.

5 Q. And did you have any direct or do you know if Chief  
6 Chapman had any direct conversation with OCC about power?

7 A. I did.

8 Q. You did? With OCC directly or with your liaison?

9 A. With my liaison.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Not OCC directly, no.

12 Q. Okay. Thanks. How do -- how do -- how do you keep  
13 accountability of fire department personnel? How does the D.C.  
14 Fire Department do accountability?

15 A. In Level 3 accountability. We assign a accountability  
16 officer that keeps track what everybody's personal accountability  
17 tags that enters the entry control point.

18 Q. And that, so that's only at -- L'Enfant has three  
19 entrances. So you identify one entrance and everybody is supposed  
20 to go in there?

21 A. Exactly.

22 Q. And which one was that?

23 A. We were right there on 4th Street, D Street -- the D  
24 Street side.

25 Q. Right where the command post was?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. (Indiscernible) questions. Well, does Metro do  
3 anything about accountability of Metro employees? I'm sorry, does  
4 DC do anything about accountability of Metro employees?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Who's responsible for that? Do you know?

7 A. Metro.

8 Q. Any discussions with the Metro official at the command  
9 post about accountability of Metro employees?

10 A. I know before we -- before we actually -- I want to say  
11 there was discussion about Metro employees being in the track bed.  
12 I know we -- when we made sure that we had all of all our guys out  
13 of the track bed, we wanted to identify if there was still any  
14 Metro employees in the track bed.

15 Q. And what point was this, Chief?

16 A. This was as we were winding down. That's the only  
17 accountability, like I say, that -- where Metro employees were  
18 concerned on our part.

19 Q. Okay. Thanks. The EMS branch --

20 A. Um-hum.

21 Q. -- how well -- how did that function?

22 A. That functioned well. I mean, we had a battalion --  
23 well, we actually ended up with two battalion chiefs that were  
24 assisting the EMS supervisor to run -- well, we had two. We had  
25 EMS 8 and we had EMS 6. And we had battalion chief special

1 operations in Battalion 3. So I think it went well.

2 Q. Do you -- does captain get reports back from them, like,  
3 or does he just kinda have that -- it's off to the side being  
4 managed --

5 A. That was --

6 Q. -- and they call them if they need them?

7 A. They were -- really, I was communicating with them for  
8 him.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Yeah. So I managed the EMS branch and, like I said, the  
11 communications with the Metro liaison.

12 Q. You did say that. When the -- when the companies got to  
13 the train -- and I know we talked about communications were  
14 intermittent. What kind of reports were you getting back from  
15 conditions that they found?

16 A. They said that they found people -- the train was  
17 disabled and that they found people on the train that needed  
18 assistance with getting off of it. But like I said, Squad 1 had  
19 already arrived at the train and started to assist the patrons off  
20 the train.

21 Q. Um-hum. Was it -- did we -- did you all do any  
22 searching or checking of adjacent tunnels? And if so, was there  
23 any results from that?

24 A. I'm sure they did, yeah. But I don't think they found  
25 any -- they checked every tunnel while they were down there.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. But there was no report of anything found in any other  
3 tunnel but that one train.

4 Q. All righty. And did anybody ever locate the fire or the  
5 source of the smoke?

6 A. No. I want to say once it was all said and done, they  
7 said it was a short on the track. I think something had burned  
8 the third rail. Some water or something from outside had caused  
9 some type of fire or explosion or something that burned itself  
10 out.

11 Q. Okay. Before the Metro L'Enfant alarm, you had a --  
12 there was an alarm over at -- on Main Avenue --

13 A. Um-hum.

14 Q. -- for smoke coming from the fan shaft. Are you aware --  
15 - you're aware of that, I'm sure.

16 A. I did. Yeah.

17 Q. Right.

18 A. I did hear that.

19 Q. What was the result of that? Do you know?

20 A. They had -- they ended up staying there and helping with  
21 people who self-evacuated to come out of that emergency exit.

22 Q. And did they say -- did they have smoke when they got  
23 there, coming out or anything?

24 A. Yes, they did.

25 Q. And would -- did you all get that word back at -- did

1 Chapman get that word or did you -- did you get that word back at  
2 your command post?

3 A. I didn't get that until later into the incident because,  
4 like I said, I didn't -- I didn't know, when they initially put  
5 that run out, I didn't hear that, the first run for the smoke  
6 coming from the exit shaft. And I didn't hear that until later  
7 on. But I do know they were on the scene. Once I arrived on the  
8 scene, they were already there and they assisted with evacuation  
9 of some of the (indiscernible).

10 Q. So they came over onto your channels at that point? Do  
11 you know?

12 A. Exactly.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Exactly.

15 Q. Thank you. That's all I've got right now. Thanks.

16 MR. DOWNS: Thank you. Ms. Burtch?

17 BY MS. BURTCH:

18 Q. Good morning.

19 A. Good morning.

20 Q. Kimberly Burtch.

21 A. Hello.

22 Q. So you did say that there was a representative from D.C.  
23 Fire and Emergency Services at the OCC -- at WMATA's OCC?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. Okay. How is that person assigned to that position?

1 Are they there all the time in the event of something or are they

2 --

3 A. It was -- it was assigned on a dispatch.

4 Q. Okay. So when the dispatch goes out, everybody --

5 A. Exactly.

6 Q. -- moves --

7 A. Everybody gets their assignments and they know what to  
8 do.

9 Q. Okay. Great. And do they have procedures that they are  
10 to follow while in the OCC?

11 A. Establish communications.

12 Q. Right. So they just are on standby or they are  
13 communicating -- who are they to communicate with between --

14 A. They -- to communicate with OCC while they're there and  
15 relay that information back to the incident commander.

16 Q. Is there a person that they're supposed to be partnered  
17 with or communicating with in the OCC specifically?

18 A. No. They have a -- we have a station --

19 Q. Right.

20 A. -- that's there --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- that we report to.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And that's supposed to be our, you know, our  
25 communications pod where we can sit and get the information from



1 everybody that's there. I don't -- I don't think we limit it to  
2 one person that's in the OCC.

3 Q. That's what I was wondering, --

4 A. Right.

5 Q. -- who that might be.

6 A. Yeah, I don't think we -- well, I know we're not. We're  
7 not limited to just one person --

8 Q. You're not.

9 A. -- in the OCC. Yeah. We can get information and then  
10 relay it back --

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. -- to the incident commander.

13 Q. Your communications -- you were in communication with  
14 the recon groups -- units that went down into the elevator?

15 A. Well, the incident commander was.

16 Q. So he -- but you -- do you take communication for him?  
17 Are you facilitating that communication or --

18 A. No. He was --

19 Q. -- it was direct with the incident commander --

20 A. Right

21 Q. -- from the recon groups?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. Okay. Thank you.

24 A. All right.

25 Q. That's all.

1 MR. DOWNS: Chief Hawkins, do you have any questions?

2 BY MR. HAWKINS:

3 Q. Yes. Derron Hawkins, D.C. Fire and EMS. Chief Moore, I  
4 have three questions for you. The first one regarding  
5 accountability. In terms of our accountability system, what are  
6 the accountability system we use for incidents -- to manage  
7 incidents in terms of --

8 A. For the Metro --

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. For the Metro incident?

11 Q. Yeah. This one and in general. We had a Level 3 for  
12 the Metro but are there other forms of accountability that we use  
13 to manage incidents?

14 A. Well, yes. Level 1 accountability is when guys assume  
15 duty and put their PAT tags and everything on a piece on the  
16 apparatus. That's Level 1 accountability. Then we have --

17 Q. Okay. You say PAT tag. Can you explain the PAT tag?

18 A. It's a personal accountability tag. It's -- everybody  
19 has one of these. It had their face, name, rank. And we carry  
20 them on all our apparatus. So everybody has -- everybody that's  
21 working has one of these with them to be able to track where they  
22 are and what they're doing for the course of the (indiscernible).

23 Q. And that's Level -- that was Level 1. And Level 2 is?

24 A. Well, like I said, Level 1 is when you put your PAT tag  
25 on a piece. Level 2 is when we have a designated area for

1 everybody to report. And then Level 3 we actually assign  
2 accountability officer and we have an entry control point. And  
3 that's what we had on the Metro incident.

4 Q. Okay. Okay, so in terms of accountability as it relates  
5 to timelines, how does -- how does that -- what's the connection  
6 between timelines and the way we look at accountability? The time  
7 the incident started and the first units, so forth.

8 A. I'm not following.

9 Q. Okay. All right. When you arrived on the scene --

10 A. Um-hum.

11 Q. -- there was units already down inside the tunnel.

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. And we established Level 3 accountability.

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Okay. At some point was there accountability checks or  
16 what was the level of accountability that we used -- benchmarks we  
17 used to track our accountability?

18 A. Oh, yeah. Well, we do -- every so often, we do do  
19 accountability checks for to gather where all our -- to keep up  
20 with all the companies, to make sure that they're -- or to find  
21 out where they are and what they're doing, to make sure they have  
22 all their people. And to be honest, I'm not sure how many  
23 accountability checks we did. But we did do a few. I don't know  
24 what -- at what time we did them and -- but we did do a couple of  
25 accountability checks during the incident.

1 Q. Okay. Okay. And one more question, actually two more.  
2 Regarding unified command structure. Was the command post  
3 identified at the -- during initial incident commander reported on  
4 scene? Did you know where the command post was or the location of  
5 it?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Yeah, he did -- he did an announcement on the tac  
9 channel where he was located.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And then, like I said, all the other officials that we  
12 had, they came up to the -- they were asking, you know, is this  
13 the command post. So I'm sure once they found out it was the  
14 command post, they announced that to whoever they needed to  
15 announce it to as well concerning their agency.

16 Q. Okay. At the command post -- you was at the command  
17 post. Was there Metro representative there, a Metro police  
18 officer at the command post?

19 A. There was a Metro representative there. I want to say  
20 there was definitely a Metro police officer there as well. Yes,  
21 sir.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. I think we had an MPD official. It was -- it was a few  
24 different agencies that were there.

25 Q. Okay. So in your own words, would you feel that we

1 established unified command with those officials being there? A  
2 command post?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And my last question is in regarding communications. We  
7 have procedures in place in terms of our communications. There is  
8 primary things we do, secondary and, you know, tertiary. Can you  
9 explain our communication processes? If we lose radio contact on  
10 a -- on a incident, whether it was a Metro station or some other  
11 incidents, what are the procedures?

12 A. And, like I say, usually we'll go either to a talk  
13 around channel, which is a local channel where we can communicate  
14 just within line of sight or we can set up a relay where you're  
15 going to have -- we'll use a company or, you know, people that  
16 were at certain points so they can relay the message.

17 And, like I said, on this -- I've been on other calls where  
18 we've used cell phones and, you know, just whatever issue that we  
19 had with communications and we used cell phones and this was one  
20 of the incidents where we used cell phones and the cell phones  
21 worked as well.

22 Q. That's it. I have no further questions.

23 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Blackistone?

24 BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

25 Q. Steve Blackistone, NTSB. Just a couple questions to

1 clarify for the record some of the terms you used. First, could  
2 you describe what a E-tech cart is and what it's used for?

3 A. It's an emergency cart. It's stored in the Metro system  
4 and it's usually used for patients that can't walk out of the  
5 station and we use it, put it on the tracks and we usually put  
6 them, if they're stretcher-bound, we put them in stretchers and  
7 put them on the E-tech cart and take them out.

8 Q. Okay. And then second, could you describe a WSAD?

9 A. It's a warning, strobe and alarm device. It's a device  
10 that we use to put on a third rail to let us know if third rail  
11 power for some reason has been restored.

12 Q. Restored?

13 A. Right. It will give us a warning to know that, hey, the  
14 power's back on.

15 Q. Okay. And you mentioned Rescue Squad 1 was -- you -- at  
16 least you thought it was first arriving on scene --

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. Where are they stationed? Engine 2?

19 A. Engine 2, correct.

20 Q. And up on -- is that up on F Street or?

21 A. Right. That's 5 and F.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. 600 E. It's where that is. Yeah.

24 Q. Okay. And then could you describe in general terms what  
25 is the deputy chief's job when you -- when you -- what is your day

1 like? What are the things you deal with? And then secondly, what  
2 incidents do you respond on and --

3 A. Well, my overall duty is to oversee the operations of --  
4 daily operations. When I assume duties, like, today, I'm on  
5 Platoon 2 and my overall duty is just to oversee the overall  
6 operations of the fire department.

7 Q. There's one for the entire city on duty at any time?

8 A. Correct. Correct. And normally I respond to incidents.  
9 I'm not going to say every small fire. Any incident that I feel  
10 has the -- that may escalate into more than just a normal incident  
11 is what I respond to.

12 Q. So a routine house fire, you -- the battalion chiefs  
13 would handle but if it was something --

14 A. It depends. And even routine house fires, you know, I  
15 listen to the radio, you know, depending on if I'm in a meeting or  
16 if I'm out I do whatever. Like now I got my radio off for you  
17 guys. I didn't want to get in trouble. I got my aid though.  
18 He'll call me if --

19 Q. Um-hum.

20 A. -- something's going on I need to come out. But for the  
21 most part, yeah, battalion chiefs can handle the smaller incidents  
22 but anything that I listen to or even if they call and say, hey,  
23 you know, Chief, we need you to come out for this or come out, you  
24 know, and that's what usually what I respond to. Anything that  
25 has potential to escalate or anything that's a (indiscernible).

1 Q. So you pretty much self-dispatch?

2 A. Pretty much.

3 Q. Based on your own judgment?

4 A. Well, like, working five dispatches, now they've put me  
5 back on -- it's an automatic dispatch for me on working fire  
6 dispatch.

7 Q. (Indiscernible).

8 A. But it's not an all -- it's not -- in some incidents  
9 they will automatically dispatch me but it's no set parameter on -  
10 -

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. And then finally could you talk about how frequent are  
14 smoke events in Metro?

15 A. How frequent?

16 Q. Yeah. I mean, not specific numbers, is it the kind of  
17 thing that you run calls for smoke events every day, once a month,  
18 this is the first time ever?

19 A. Well, to be honest, we work -- with our work schedule I  
20 would 8 days a month.

21 Q. Yeah.

22 A. And I say -- because I mean it could be where you may  
23 have a Metro incident, you know, 3 days out of the week but I only  
24 worked that one day.

25 Q. Yeah.



1           A.    So I would say, it's not too often that we run smoke in,  
2 you know, in the Metro. I would say, --

3           Q.    Yeah.

4           A.    -- you know, on my shift we don't run a whole bunch of  
5 Metro smoke incidents.

6           (PHONE RINGING.)

7           MR. DOWNS: Okay. We're going to go off the record for  
8 a moment.

9           (OFF THE RECORD.)

10          (ON THE RECORD.)

11          MR. DOWNS: Back on the record.

12          BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

13          Q.    Okay. Steve Blackistone again. Has the frequency of  
14 smoke events increased, decreased over the years, stayed the same?  
15 Has -- in your -- just in your experience?

16          A.    I'm -- yeah. In my experience, I don't -- I can't  
17 recall running a bunch of smoke. Like I said, most of the  
18 incidents that I've run in Metro have been probably -- outside of  
19 just a medical level where somebody hurt themselves --

20          Q.    Yeah.

21          A.    -- would be somebody on the tracks. That's more than  
22 anything I think I've run more than smoke. Yeah, issues with  
23 people on the track or under the train. But smoke, no. I don't --  
24 -- we don't have nothing like that.

25          Q.    Okay. So do you ever have, like, smoldering insulators

1 and things like that?

2 A. We -- I've had that but not -- I wouldn't say a lot.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. You know, I mean, for something that operates as much as  
5 it does, I wouldn't say, you know, that we run it all the time.

6 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you. That's all my questions.

7 A. All right.

8 BY MS. SAMARADINGHE:

9 Q. Sharmila Samarasinghe, Tri-State Oversight Committee.  
10 Chief Moore, I have a few questions. You mentioned that -- as you  
11 were explaining the communications, you mentioned that because you  
12 were encountering problems with your radio, you switched over to  
13 using your cell phones.

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Was there any -- anything done to compensate for the  
16 fact that when you are now communicating with individuals on your  
17 cell phone, the listening in feature that others might have if you  
18 were on the radio was not available anymore. Is that correct? So  
19 there is nothing done in terms of expanding the availability of  
20 information that you and whoever else was on the other end of the  
21 line was talking about?

22 A. No. My main communication for me on cell phone was to  
23 OCC.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. And that the Metro --

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. -- liaison. And any information that I had with him --

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. -- that needed to be relayed to the incident commander,

5 --

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. -- I relayed and he got it to the units. Now he may not

8 have got it to the unit direct, --

9 Q. Sure.

10 A. -- but he could call, you know, another unit that was

11 close to them and tell them, hey, look, this is what we got a

12 report of.

13 Q. Okay. All right.

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Thank you. You talked about as you were describing

16 training drills and familiarization --

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. -- you mentioned a Metro manual.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can you describe what that manual or handbook is?

21 A. Well, we actually have two.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. We have one that's our Metro Standard Operating

24 Procedures book.

25 Q. Okay.

1           A.    And that just pretty much defines what we do on  
2 different type of calls involved in the Metro system.

3           Q.    Okay.

4           A.    And then we have what's called a Metro Emergency  
5 Services Manual.

6           Q.    Okay.

7           A.    And then that goes more in detail as to what's contained  
8 in the stations, what's contained on the different rail cars, the  
9 -- it's pretty much more the mechanics of Metro --

10          Q.    Okay.

11          A.    -- as opposed to what we do.  So we got two separate  
12 manuals --

13          Q.    Okay.  And --

14          A.    -- that we use.

15          Q.    -- those two manuals, are they updated at any frequency?

16          A.    Yes.

17          Q.    They are.  How often?  Or reviewed I mean.

18          A.    Well, they -- they're always in use.  I mean, I won't  
19 say -- I don't know.  Any time there's a change.

20          Q.    Um-hum.

21          A.    We have a working relationship with Metro.

22          Q.    Okay.

23          A.    So usually any type of change that they have to the  
24 system, they would notify us.

25          Q.    Okay.

1 A. And then we then would update our books --

2 Q. All right.

3 A. -- to say, hey, this is changed and now we putting this  
4 in and so we, like I said, we got a working relationship with them  
5 and they usually inform us on anything that's new that's going on  
6 in the system, anything that's changed, any new rail cars,  
7 anything like that and then we update our manuals accordingly.

8 Q. And your primary point of contact with Washington Metro  
9 would be through the Office of Emergency Management or some other  
10 department?

11 A. No. We got an actual liaison. One of our battalion  
12 chiefs is a Metro liaison so he has an ongoing relationship with  
13 Metro.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So he interacts with them, you know, frequently to set  
16 up drills, to get information and he will disseminate that  
17 throughout the department.

18 Q. Okay. Thank you. You were also talking about the radio  
19 tests.

20 A. Um-hum.

21 Q. And are the radio tests conducted primarily inside the  
22 tunnels to get radio functionality or to get a sense of radio  
23 functionality or are radio tests conducted in the vicinity of  
24 Metrorail stations at the, like, near the kiosks, the station  
25 manager's kiosk area, like --

1 A. Yes. It's all over the station.

2 Q. It's all over the station.

3 A. Yeah. The platform level, --

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. -- kiosks, tunnels, yes.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. It's all over. The track.

8 Q. And are they conducted by D.C. Fire Department radio  
9 communications technicians or are they also conducted using the  
10 radios that the actual personnel use?

11 A. Yeah. The actual personnel. Usually what happens is  
12 the companies that are closest in proximity to those stations --

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. -- go out --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- and they use their actual radios that they use to do  
17 the radio test.

18 Q. All right. Do you happen to know how often those are  
19 done?

20 A. No. I can't say --

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. -- how frequently they are done.

23 Q. All right. And then --

24 A. But I do know we just had a new -- we just changed over  
25 to a new radio system, so it had been, you know, we had been doing

1 it recently --

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. -- in all the stations just because of the new radios  
4 that we're using.

5 Q. Okay. All right. And you don't have full access to the  
6 stations for drills. You were describing that you would go up to  
7 the station manager to say, just identify yourselves?

8 A. That's pretty much, you communicate with the kiosk  
9 attendant and say, hey, you know, we're the fire department.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. We're here to do a radio test or if we wanted to go and,  
12 you know, look at the E-tech carts or --

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. -- whatever. As long as, you know, we usually check in  
15 with that manager --

16 Q. Yeah.

17 A. -- and let them know that what we doing and, yeah, we  
18 usually don't have any issues.

19 Q. Okay. Going passed the end gates on the platforms, are  
20 you all still authorized to do that or do you need to get in touch  
21 with somebody at the ROCC or how do you do that?

22 A. Yeah, well, now we need to -- now we need to actually  
23 have a Metro employee escort us passed the platform level to go  
24 into the tunnel.

25 Q. Okay.

1           A.    It used to be -- I'm going to say I know in past I don't  
2 think we ever had it in writing with Metro --

3           Q.    Yeah.

4           A.    -- that we had to actually have an employee --

5           Q.    Okay.

6           A.    -- to take us through --

7           Q.    Okay.

8           A.    -- you know, into the tunnel.

9           Q.    Yeah.

10          A.    If we made contact with the kiosk manager and said, hey,  
11 we here to do this, because like I said, some of the rooms --

12          Q.    Yeah.

13          A.    -- where the equipment is located --

14          Q.    Yes.

15          A.    -- is passed --

16          Q.    The end gate.

17          A.    -- the platform.

18          Q.    Yeah.

19          A.    But now we do have it where we're supposed to have a  
20 Metro employee escort us.

21          Q.    How well does that work out for you all?  And when you  
22 all do need to go passed the platform end gates, either to conduct  
23 a radio test or maybe as part of a drill, how efficiently does  
24 that work when you all realize you need to get track side?

25          A.    For a drill?



1 Q. How forthcoming is Metro in terms of arranging for you  
2 all to get escorts?

3 A. To be honest, me personally, I haven't even encountered  
4 it. I don't -- I don't know.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. So I haven't had -- gotten any feedback on, I mean, if  
7 it's good or bad but --

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. -- I haven't had -- I haven't encountered that where  
10 I've had to go and actually have a Metro employee escort me passed  
11 --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- the platform level --

14 Q. All right.

15 A. -- so I couldn't comment on it.

16 Q. Thank you. And you described for us your protocol for  
17 accessing the tunnels.

18 A. Um-hum.

19 Q. And how you all confirm power down.

20 A. Um-hum.

21 Q. On the day of the incident, as personnel were accessing  
22 the tunnel area, did they go through those steps in that sequence  
23 where they call ROCC, they get confirmation back, --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- hit the ETS button, put the WSAD. Did they do all of

1 that?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But still you all got radio communication or you heard  
4 radio communication that there was power still on the tracks?

5 A. Exactly. But the thing is, like I said, it's -- that's  
6 a multitrack station.

7 Q. Um-hum.

8 A. So the track that they were actually operating in, they  
9 went through all the steps to make sure that power was removed.

10 Q. Okay. Okay.

11 A. And -- but my worry was that we still had a report that  
12 there was fire. And we didn't know where the fire was, on what  
13 track the fire was.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. So until we actually found that out --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- I felt like it needed to -- you know, we needed to  
18 shut the power down other places.

19 Q. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much.

20 A. You're welcome.

21 MR. DOWNS: Next question.

22 BY JOE GORDON:

23 Q. Joe Gordon, NTSB.

24 A. Hi.

25 Q. You mentioned the unknowns when you arrived on the

1 scene. You know, the origin of the smoke was an unknown. The --  
2 whether or not there was a train involved in the incident was  
3 unknown.

4 A. Um-hum.

5 Q. There was a Metro point of contact at the incident  
6 command.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was he asked those questions to your knowledge? You  
9 know, was he asked about the location of the smoke, the -- or if  
10 there was train involvement? And if so, did those -- you know,  
11 was that information forthcoming?

12 A. Yeah, I think that he was -- well, I know he was asked  
13 what, you know, what the incident was and the information that he  
14 gave us, I felt like he gave us all the information he had at that  
15 point.

16 Q. Okay.

17 MR. DOWNS: That there was a train in the tunnel?

18 MR. MOORE: No. He didn't give us that initially. Like  
19 I said, when I got there, initially the report that -- the report  
20 was that there was smoke in the station and that there was a fire  
21 in one of the rooms?

22 MR. DOWNS: That was your initial pursuit?

23 MR. MOORE: Exactly. Exactly.

24 BY JOE GORDON:

25 Q. Okay. Okay. And so the first knowledge that you had of

1 a train in the tunnel came from OCC through the liaison there?

2 A. That's what I got, yes.

3 Q. Okay. Okay.

4 A. And to be honest, I'm not going to say that the Captain,  
5 that Chapman didn't get it earlier from -- because I'm sitting  
6 behind him. He's, you know, operating and I know he was in  
7 communication with guys at the window of the buggy, giving him  
8 information as well as I was on the phone getting information too.  
9 So, I didn't say, hey, well, you know -- when I got my information  
10 I'm letting him know, hey, look, this is -- there's a report that  
11 there's a train disabled in the tunnel. So he may have already  
12 gotten that information, --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. -- you know, from one of the Metro officials as well or  
15 at, you know, at pretty much the same time. I don't know.

16 Q. Okay. But you feel like the information flow there at  
17 the incident command was -- I mean, that was going well?

18 A. Yes, sir. I felt like it was. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay. I have no further questions.

20 BY MR. DOWNS:

21 Q. Thank you. Downs, NTSB again. Chief, can you give us a  
22 little bit of background of your personal work history, how long  
23 you've been with D.C. Fire and so on?

24 A. I've been with D.C. Fire for 24 years.

25 Q. And when you started out, can you go through your --

1 briefly summarize your roles over the years as to what ranks and  
2 such you held? I'm not looking to split hairs dates. Just give  
3 us a general description.

4 A. Well, I mean, you know, our rank process. What? When I  
5 became a sergeant, a lieutenant or?

6 Q. You started out as a DC firefighter and worked your way  
7 up. Is that how it worked?

8 A. Correct. Yes.

9 Q. Can you go through that progression for us briefly?

10 A. I was hired in 1991 as a firefighter. I got promoted to  
11 sergeant in 2002. I got promoted to lieutenant in 2003. You want  
12 to know, like, my assignments and --

13 Q. Just generalize what different companies you worked with  
14 and so on.

15 A. Well, as a firefighter, I was assigned to engine  
16 company, a rescue squad and a truck company as, you know, during  
17 my firefighting career. And then when I got promoted to sergeant  
18 in '02, I was assigned to a truck company. I got promoted to  
19 lieutenant in '03 and I was assigned to the Hazmat Unit. I got  
20 promoted to captain in '05.

21 I went to -- was assigned to a truck company and then I as  
22 assigned to a rescue squad. I got promoted to chief in '09 and I  
23 was initially assigned to the 5th Battalion and then I was  
24 transferred to special operations. And I actually sat on the COG  
25 committee for heavy rail.

1 Q. Very good. And that's where you're currently assigned  
2 special operations?

3 A. No. Now I'm a deputy fire chief.

4 Q. Deputy fire chief.

5 A. I got promoted for deputy in June of '13.

6 Q. Very good.

7 A. And that's where I sit right now.

8 Q. Very good, chief. And as part of your training program  
9 over the years, you attended various incident training activities  
10 and programs?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. What levels have you accomplished in your training?

13 A. As far as?

14 Q. There's a level 100, 200, 400, and 700 and so on.

15 A. Oh, well, I've gotten -- I got 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, and 8.

16 Q. 100, 2, 3, 400, 700, and 800?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Very good. Do you have any professional academic  
19 training? College degree or anything like that?

20 A. No, I don't have a -- I do have some college but not a  
21 college degree.

22 Q. Some college. And what training programs were your  
23 college credits in?

24 A. I do have some Fire Science programs from UDC.

25 Q. From Fire Science from UDC?

1 A. Yes. Um-hum.

2 Q. Very good. Okay. Thank you. Next question, Chief.  
3 Individuals on board the train were reporting in the media that  
4 they waited, they characterized it as somewhat of a long time  
5 before the fire department personnel actually arrived at the train  
6 to initiate the evacuation process.

7 A. Um-hum.

8 Q. We got testimony from yourself today and your colleague,  
9 Captain Chapman to the effect that your initial arrival at the  
10 site was to pursue the fire location. That was your original  
11 information. And it was in, perhaps, one of the ancillary rooms.  
12 Is that correct?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. And that was essentially unfounded.

15 A. Well, it turned out to be, yes, unfounded.

16 Q. That -- that's what you ultimately determined. There  
17 was no fire, per se. It was just a general smoke condition in the  
18 station?

19 A. Well, I don't -- I'm not going to say that. I don't --  
20 I don't know if there was actually fire. We didn't -- we didn't  
21 find a fire.

22 Q. You never found a fire. That's my question.

23 A. Exactly. No. No.

24 Q. Okay. And that in essence you needed to power down the  
25 track before you proceeded down the track bed and you had to go

1 through a certain process for that.

2 A. Exactly.

3 Q. So that would help account for why there was a period of  
4 time --

5 A. Right. Correct.

6 Q. -- between when you initially arrived on scene and when  
7 you actually got a fire crew to the rail cars themselves.

8 A. Exactly.

9 Q. Would that be a good characterization?

10 A. That would be a great characterization.

11 Q. Very good, Chief. Thank you. That concludes my  
12 question.

13 BY MR. ROURKE:

14 Q. Denton Rourke from Metro Office of Emergency Management.  
15 Chief, can you just -- you touched on this a little bit but how do  
16 you -- is there an SOP for when you would assume command of an  
17 incident or guidelines that you go by for when you would  
18 personally assume command of an incident?

19 A. For me as the deputy?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. No. It's totally up to me.

22 Q. So can you run us through your thinking on this  
23 particular incident?

24 A. I thought that he needed assistance in other areas that  
25 I didn't need to actually assume command because there was enough



1 going on that -- he had already established a good command and he  
2 needed help with the, like I said, communications with the liaison  
3 officer and actually with communications with the EMS group.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 A. Because if I could have came in and I guess took over  
6 the incident command and then had to give him that but it was --  
7 it didn't -- at that point, to me, during an incident, if a  
8 incident commander is far enough along into an incident and the  
9 incident is actually running smoothly, I've found that it's  
10 actually easier to allow them to continue to run the incident as  
11 opposed for me to come in there and have to be briefed and then  
12 start over and then me have to re-establish communication and all  
13 of that.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A So that was my thinking on that.

16 Q. Thank you. That's all I have right now.

17 MR. DOWNS: Ms. Burtch?

18 BY MS. BURTCH:

19 Q. Kim Burtch. For clarification, the representative at  
20 the OCC, is that the liaison?

21 A. Well, that's his -- that's his title.

22 Q. That's his title. Okay.

23 A. Right.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Additionally, when you were speaking of the  
2 communication issues, using the cell phone as necessary --

3 A. Um-hum.

4 Q. -- is there any type of requirement for recording these  
5 communications if they're between cell phone to cell phone or are  
6 you not calling cell phone to cell phone? How is this  
7 communication captured?

8 A. How is it recorded?

9 Q. Is it recorded?

10 MR. DOWNS: In other words, is it recorded ultimately  
11 private cell phone communications because you resorted to cell  
12 phones rather than the radio?

13 MR. MOORE: I have no idea. I don't know if it's  
14 recorded. I don't -- I don't know how it would be recorded.

15 MR. DOWNS: These are -- these are agency issued cell  
16 phones?

17 MR. MOORE: Yes.

18 MR. DOWNS: Okay. So my question is, does the agency  
19 record these calls in any manner are you -- that you're aware of?

20 MR. MOORE: Not that I know of. I don't know.

21 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

22 MR. BURTCHE: Thank you. And the last, so the use of  
23 cell phones, is this allowed under your SOGs?

24 MR. MOORE: I'm not going to say it's written in the  
25 SOGs, no. But, like I said, I mean, it -- over my career, I've

1 had instances -- other instances where if we couldn't communicate,  
2 we used, you know, whatever we could, you know, (indiscernible).

3 MR. DOWNS: That's your standard backup to a radio,  
4 you're saying?

5 MR. MOORE: The standard backup?

6 MR. DOWNS: That you would fall back to your cell phone  
7 process rather than if -- than your radios if your radios didn't  
8 work?

9 MR. MOORE: I'm not going to say that's standard. I  
10 said, that's something that I've done in the past.

11 MR. DOWNS: Your personal practice?

12 MR. MOORE: Exactly.

13 MS. BURTCHE: That's all I have. Thank you.

14 MR. DOWNS: All right. Chief?

15 BY MR. HAWKINS:

16 Q. Yes, Derron Hawkins. Chief, more of a question  
17 regarding the command structure. Would -- did you -- were you  
18 aware of the command structure that was put in place from incident  
19 commander Captain -- Acting Chief Chapman in terms of a medical  
20 branch -- EMS branch, recon? Were you aware of the various  
21 command structure (indiscernible) he had in place and can you  
22 explain them?

23 A. Like I said, initially on a -- on a Metro incident in  
24 our SOGs it's already written that the first due -- first two  
25 engine companies and the truck establishes the recon group. They

1 were already established. And then the responding battalion  
2 chief, which is actually the third responding chief is the recon  
3 group and he attaches himself with them. And that's what they  
4 did.

5           And once they established that they had a train in the  
6 station that had people on it was when we established the EMS  
7 group. That's when we went to -- we declared we had a mass  
8 casualty event and we requested the mass casualty units, the south  
9 and the north unit. And then we established the EMS group. And  
10 that's when we put, you know, the units in place.

11           Q.    Okay. So, that's all I have. I have no further  
12 questions.

13           MR. DOWNS: Mr. Blackistone?

14           BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

15           Q.    Yep. Steve Blackistone, NTSB. Just one question or two  
16 about the OCC liaison. Is there a battalion chief who's  
17 designated to be the person always who goes? Is it the battalion  
18 chief who's geographically closest to the scene?

19           A.    Well, that's the way it's written but he's not always  
20 available. So, you know, based on dispatch --

21           Q.    Um-hum.

22           A.    -- and when the call is dispatched, they dispatch three  
23 different chiefs.

24           Q.    Yeah.

25           A.    And the first chief is the incident commander. The

1 second chief is the chief that's to report to OCC. And then  
2 usually the third chief would be the special operations battalion  
3 chief and he's usually the recon chief. But he's -- you know,  
4 it's interchangeable because during the course of the day, anybody  
5 can be on any type of run.

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. But we send three different chiefs on a Metro incident.  
8 And like I said, the first one was the incident commander. The  
9 second one goes to OCC. And then the third one is the recon.

10 Q. Now in your days when you were battalion chief, did you  
11 ever respond out to OCC?

12 A. No, I don't think I've ever had an incident where I  
13 responded but we -- I went through training --

14 Q. Yeah.

15 A. -- where we knew to go out there and what -- where to go  
16 and where our station is set up and all. And I went through that  
17 training.

18 Q. Sometimes training and the actual incident can be --

19 A. Totally different.

20 Q. -- different.

21 A. Definitely. Yeah. But, I mean, to be honest, lucky me.  
22 I never was in a situation where I had to respond out there and be  
23 --

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. -- Metro liaison.

1 Q. Okay. And the last question, what were -- what engines  
2 and trucks were you assigned to and rescue squadron?

3 A. I was assigned to -- I was hired then I was assigned to  
4 Engine 3. I left Engine 3 and went to Truck 13. I left Truck 13  
5 and went to Engine 15. I left Engine 15 and went to Rescue Squad  
6 3. That was a firefighter.

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. As a sergeant I was assigned to Truck 6. As a  
9 lieutenant I said I was assigned to the Hazmat Unit. As a  
10 captain, I was assigned to Truck 13 again and then I went back to  
11 Squad 3 as a captain. And then as a battalion chief I went to  
12 Battalion 5, Battalion 4, Special Operations and then I got hired  
13 as a deputy. I got promoted to deputy.

14 Q. Yeah. So you -- a good bit of your career was at  
15 stations that we very close to Metro --

16 A. Busy. Busy.

17 Q. -- stations?

18 A. Yeah. Yeah.

19 Q. Okay. So you had a good bit of experience with --

20 A. With Metro.

21 Q. -- with --

22 A. And then like I said, but for the most part, I mean,  
23 over my career I could say, overwhelmingly, I think outside of  
24 just medical locals, just injuries, the most I've run into Metro  
25 has been people run over by a train more so than any type of smoke

1 or smoke event.

2 Q. Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

3 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

4 Q. Sharmila Samarasinghe, Tri-State Oversight Committee.  
5 Chief Moore, on the day of the incident at the incident command  
6 post, were you able to identify or did anybody introduce  
7 themselves as a rail transportation supervisor or a rail  
8 transportation liaison from Metro?

9 A. A rail transportation --

10 Q. Yeah, like --

11 A. I don't -- I don't know the title. I know we did have a  
12 Metro official --

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. -- there. I don't know the exact title.

15 Q. Aside from MTPD officials who might have been at the  
16 command post, was there anybody, civilian from --

17 A. Now are you saying from --

18 Q. Metro Rail.

19 A. -- Metro Police?

20 Q. No.

21 A. Outside of Metro Police?

22 Q. Outside of Metro Police.

23 A. No. I'm saying that I know we had a Metro employee  
24 there outside of Metro Police.

25 Q. Okay. Were they able to provide you any additional

1 information on what was going on down at the incident location or  
2 add to the information that you were getting from other sources?

3 A. Again, like I said, Captain Chapman was in direct  
4 communication with those people.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And, like I said, I was in communication with our Metro  
7 liaison.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. So I couldn't do both. And I couldn't listen to what  
10 their conversation and also --

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. -- so I know we did have a Metro official there.

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Officially established communication with him at the  
15 buggy.

16 Q. All right.

17 A. I don't know what the title was though.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. You're welcome.

20 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Gordon?

21 BY MR. GORDON:

22 Q. Joe Gordon, NTSB. Did you ever hear of a plan by Metro  
23 to move the train that was in the tunnel back to the platform for  
24 unloading? When you were onsite, did you --

25 A. I didn't. I didn't hear that.



1 Q. You never heard any plan for that?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. So there -- in your mind there was no delay to  
4 shutting down the third rail power and going into the tunnel to  
5 the train once you -- once you were aware that the train was  
6 stopped in the tunnel? There was -- there was no delay to taking  
7 local control, --

8 A. No delay.

9 Q. -- knocking down third rail power, and going in?

10 A. As far as I know, once we knew that the train was there,  
11 we did -- we took all our precautions and procedures to go and  
12 actually assist with getting people off the train.

13 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you. I have no further  
14 questions.

15 BY MR. DOWNS:

16 Q. Down, NTSB again. Chief, I always like to give our  
17 witnesses a final opportunity to express what we call  
18 retrospective thoughts. In other words, knowing what you know  
19 now, your experience with the event, is there anything that you  
20 would have done differently for a future event to help alleviate  
21 some of the challenges that you encountered? Anything you would  
22 like to share with the professional firefighting community?

23 A. Well, I think I do -- I know one of the issues we did  
24 have was resources for the number of patients. And I mean in  
25 hindsight, we didn't have enough resources I think on the scene to

1 actually treat the number of patients we had. Well, I'm not going  
2 to say we didn't. We could have had more resources there to treat  
3 them more effectively. That was one of the main things.

4 Q. Okay. Anything else?

5 A. That's an overwhelming event to have that many people  
6 need to be assisted and that's one of the main things.

7 Q. Anything else you can think of?

8 A. No. That would -- that would be the main --

9 Q. Yep. Yeah, but think about it, how about we covered  
10 briefly training drills that have been conducted by the fire  
11 department over the years --

12 A. Um-hum.

13 Q. -- and we've received testimony to the effect that it's  
14 been several years since the D.C. Fire had conducted training  
15 activities with Metro. Is --

16 A. Years?

17 Q. Years.

18 A. As far as what type of --

19 Q. Live action. Live exercise drill.

20 A. Well, I, to be honest, I know it's been a while since I  
21 have. I don't know.

22 Q. Well, that's my question. It's been a while since  
23 you've participated in any live action drills with Metro?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So do you think maybe more live action drills might have

3 --

4 A. Definitely.

5 Q. -- helped?

6 A. Definitely.

7 Q. Very good.

8 A. I think that the training should be amped up. Yeah.

9 The training overall should be amped up with Metro.

10 Q. Amped up? Okay.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Great. Okay. That concludes my question. Do we have  
13 any other questions down the line here?

14 BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

15 Q. Just one quick thing to clarify. Steve Blackistone,  
16 NTSB. Am I right that during the acute phase of an incident, once  
17 the power shuts down -- is down, you don't bring it back  
18 (indiscernible). Is that part of the protocol?

19 A. Once it's down for a -- I'm not --

20 Q. During the acute phase of an incident --

21 A. Um-hum.

22 Q. -- once you shut the power down, then you wouldn't bring  
23 it back up until the acute phase is over with?

24 A. Yeah. We don't -- we don't bring it back up at all.

25 You mean OCC?

1 Q. Yeah. Well, yeah, OCC.

2 A. Yeah, I mean --

3 Q. You're not going to -- you're not going to let OCC do it  
4 until --

5 A. No.

6 Q. -- until --

7 A. We not going to advise them to bring it back up until  
8 we're totally done in the track bed.

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Okay. So once the power's down, you can't go back and  
12 change your strategy and say, let's turn the power on and move the  
13 train?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Yeah. Okay.

16 A. No. Once we've decided to put that down, we would --

17 Q. It's down.

18 A. Yeah. It's down.

19 Q. Okay.

20 BY MS. BURTCH:

21 Q. I do have one more. Kim Burtch. You spoke about the  
22 equipment within the station area.

23 A. Um-hum.

24 Q. Do you have your own equipment or is your own equipment  
25 brought into the emergency situation or do you utilize WMATA's

1 emergency equipment?

2 A. Well, we do use their E-tech carts.

3 Q. The -- right. You talked about the E-tech cart.

4 A. Yeah, but for the most part we bring our own equipment  
5 in.

6 Q. Okay. Are respirators or -- for yourselves and/or  
7 potential victims also provided or do you bring those as well to  
8 provide oxygen or something to -- or are you just --

9 A. Well, we -- if we -- for a medical call we would bring  
10 oxygen.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. No. We don't bring in respirators per --

13 Q. As a --

14 A. No, we bring in our own SCBA. We wear our own SCBAs and  
15 then all we provide is oxygen, medical oxygen.

16 Q. Okay. Okay.

17 A. Medical grade oxygen.

18 MR. DOWNS: And that oxygen is not provided until they  
19 get top side?

20 MR. MOORE: Pretty much. Well, I mean, we can provide -  
21 - we have provided it to -- on the -- I mean, to patients on the  
22 platform level or, you know, the kiosk.

23 MR. DOWNS: As needed?

24 MR. MOORE: As needed, yes.

25 MR. DOWNS: Very good.

1 MS. BURTCH: Okay. Thank you.

2 MR. DOWNS: Questions over here?

3 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

4 Q. One question. Sharmila Samarasinghe, Tri-State  
5 Oversight Committee. Deputy Chief Moore, at what point do you  
6 have -- do you happen to know whether any personnel donned their  
7 SCBA as they were entering the platform area?

8 A. I'm sure they did with the smoke. I don't know exactly  
9 when.

10 Q. Okay. But they did?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. From the reports that I got, I'm sure, yes, they did.

14 Q. All right. Thank you.

15 A. You're welcome.

16 MR. GORDON: No further questions.

17 MR. DOWNS: Chief, it just came to minor thought. You  
18 actually never did get down to the platform level or to the train  
19 level? You were always top side working incident command?

20 MR. MOORE: I was top side. Correct.

21 MR. DOWNS: Very good. Any further questions for the  
22 group? Okay. Thank you, Chief. With no further questions, that  
23 concludes our interview.

24 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA  
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
JANUARY 12, 2015  
Interview of Kenneth Moore

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: January 28, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,  
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed  
to the best of my skill and ability.

---

Heidi E. Gardner  
Transcriber