



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA *

STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. *

JANUARY 12, 2015 *

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Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004

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Interview of: MARCEL MALLOY

Washington, D.C.

Thursday,
January 15, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: DAVID BUCHER
Railroad Accident Investigator

APPEARANCES:

DAVID BUCHER, Railroad Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

RICHARD DOWNS, JR., Survival Factors Investigator
Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group
National Transportation Safety Board

SHARMILA SAMARASINGHE, Vice Chair
Tri-State Oversight Committee

DORSEY ADAMS, Manager of Rail Safety
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)

HERCULES BALLARD, Managing Director Rail Transportation
WMATA

MARLENE FLEMINGS-McCANN, Assistant Business Agent
for Rail Operations
Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) Local 689

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I N T E R V I E W

(3:00 p.m.)

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3 MR. BUCHER: This is Dave Bucher, Rail Accident
4 Investigator for the NTSB. This is the interview of Marcel
5 Malloy, Assistant Superintendent for the ROCC for WMATA, and the
6 interview is related to the L'Enfant Plaza incident, January 12,
7 2015, NTSB accident number DCA-15-FR-004.

8 To my right I have --

9 MS. SAMARASINGHE: I'm Sharmila Samarasinghe with the
10 Tri-State Oversight Committee. I'm the full-time member from the
11 team.

12 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: Marlene Flemmings-McCann,
13 Assistant Business Agent for Rail Operations, Local 689.

14 MR. BALLARD: Hercules Ballard, Managing Director, Rail
15 Transportation.

16 MR. ADAMS: Dorsey Adams, WMATA, Manager of Rail Safety.

17 MR. DOWNS: Rick Downs, Survival Factors Investigator
18 and Survival Factors Group Chairperson, NTSB.

19 MR. BUCHER: Okay. Marcel, like I said, if you could
20 just go back to the day of the incident and describe what was
21 happening in your eyes and words, pretty much, what has happened
22 in the ROCC during the L'Enfant Plaza incident.

23 MR. MALLOY: First of all I would like to say good
24 afternoon to everyone and my heart does go out and my condolence
25 to those who lost a life and those who suffered throughout that

1 tragic incident.

2 That incident happened very quick. It was multiple
3 things that took place on different lines. I recall at the time
4 one of my Controllers on the Red Line said they had a small fire
5 between Gallery Place and Metro Center. And then I heard the
6 Controller over on the Yellow and Green Line holler as well; we
7 got a report of a small fire between Mt. Vernon and Gallery Place,
8 report of smoke in the interlocking at L'Enfant Plaza. And we
9 have an AC track circuit down at Anacostia and an AC track circuit
10 down in Mt. Vernon all at the same time.

11 And immediately what I do is I go take a look in and see
12 what the controller is doing to respond to it. And my personnel
13 on the Red Line told me that I had an operator, the supervisor at
14 the time, attempting to extinguish the fire at Gallery Place. The
15 Ops 3 controller told me that she had instructed an operator to do
16 a track inspection between Mt. Vernon and Gallery Place and
17 L'Enfant Plaza.

18 At this time, I attempted to notify my senior management
19 of everything that was taking place at the time. And also advised
20 the maintenance department that works alongside me to send an
21 emergency response team to help with this. And I recall
22 overhearing the operator from the 302 saying, Central, I am -- I
23 have zero visibility, I need to reverse ends. And I yelled out, I
24 recall yelling across the room to the Ops 3, we got the report of
25 smoke in the interlocking and a fire between Mt. Vernon and

1 Gallery Place. So at this time I'm expecting all our rules and
2 procedures to go in effect as far as dealing with smoke and fire
3 on the roadway and the operator reversing ends being moved back to
4 the next near station.

5 However, I looked up and we had a train on the platform
6 at L'Enfant Plaza and the controller was, I see I had a newer
7 controller on the radio so I brought a senior controller over, I
8 did have a senior controller as my button controller. And we were
9 trying to make contact with the train at L'Enfant Plaza, Track
10 Number 2, to no avail.

11 We called for all the supervisors to respond and I
12 recall one supervisor did respond. We asked him to keep the train
13 up in the opposite direction so we can move it out the station so
14 we can have this train, 302, report back to L'Enfant Plaza.
15 However, the train never moved and the operator, I just can recall
16 the operator, repeatedly saying, Central, I need to get back to
17 the platform.

18 With the train being stuck there, 510, I mean, it was a
19 loss in communication at that time because with the information
20 that we had was only that the problem existed ahead of Train 302
21 and there was no problem behind him. As it turned out, that
22 L'Enfant Plaza had smoke coming in it as well and that's why the
23 510 train was stuck there because the personnel on the field there
24 was evacuating everyone.

25 I made sure that the fire department was updated and

1 responded. My director came on the floor; I gave him an update of
2 what was going on. At the time we constantly still, we were
3 trying to make contact with somebody for 510. A supervisor did
4 respond but told us that he had to, he was instructed to, leave
5 the station and he cannot move the train.

6 Then I looked up and saw the power has come down on the
7 train, well, I do recall the operator saying that it was a problem
8 with the train, it had BIE'd on him and he couldn't get a brake
9 solve and we initiated troubleshooting procedures. Then
10 immediately after that I saw the power come down and we overheard
11 that customers, the operator reported that customers was,
12 attempting to evacuate the train at that time. And we immediately
13 de-energized power throughout the entire area for the safety of
14 the customers. And at that time I think we lost it. We had no
15 more control of the railroad.

16 INTERVIEW OF MARCEL MALLOY

17 BY MR. BUCHER:

18 Q. Okay. And we've heard from the control operators
19 already about this loss of communication, this is Dave Bucher
20 again, can you kind of give us as little time sequence in your
21 mind when this loss occurred. Before we've heard about 501 and
22 his last or her last communication with the Control Center that,
23 you know, I'm stopped at the station and it sounds like that was
24 kind of it after that. There was no other communication with the
25 car operator --

1 MS. SAMARASINGHE: 510.

2 BY MR. BUCHER:

3 Q. 510, I'm sorry. Was there other communication with any
4 of the other station managers at that time even brief or --

5 A. Station managers?

6 Q. Anybody, I guess.

7 A. I can't recall any communication with the station
8 manager at all. At that time we were unaware that anything, there
9 was a problem at the station. Well, based on the information we
10 had the problem was in front of 302 --

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. And there was no problem behind. And other than that
13 there was no other communication --

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. -- until 510 got on the platform and I called the
16 controller, was telling the operator, do not service the station,
17 continue on through, but the train was stopped.

18 Q. And your intent was to do what with 510? Did you have a
19 plan in mind?

20 A. Well 510 -- well, it was to get 302 --

21 Q. Back.

22 A. -- back.

23 Q. Right. I understand that.

24 A. Right.

25 Q. Was there a plan to get 510 somewhere out of the way?

1 A. Yes, 510 -- yes, like I said, the problem existed on the
2 bridge heading towards Pentagon in front of 302. I didn't think
3 there was a problem heading towards the Waterfront; the turnout
4 that would have went straight through for the train, 510, to
5 continue towards Branch Avenue, which would have been away from
6 the problem.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. So he could have -- that train could have gotten out the
9 way and 302 could have moved into the platform.

10 MR. DOWNS: Had you still had the operator available to
11 move the train, in other words?

12 MR. MALLOY: Exactly. Yes, sir.

13 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

14 MR. ADAMS: Well, at that time you had the operator
15 available --

16 MR. BUCHER: You have to --

17 MR. ADAMS: Sorry. Dorsey Adams. At that time you had
18 the operator available when you told them continue through and not
19 make a stop.

20 MR. MALLOY: Right.

21 MR. ADAMS: Is that correct?

22 MR. MALLOY: That's correct. But the train stopped and
23 the operator never responded.

24 MR. BUCHER: Okay. I'm going to pass it off to
25 Mr. Downs.

1 MR. DOWNS: Thank you. Downs, NTSB.

2 BY MR. DOWNS:

3 Q. Mr. Malloy, thanks for joining us today, we appreciate
4 it. I want to divert a little bit, get your mind off of the event
5 itself. Tell us about your background. You've been assistant
6 superintendent there at the OCC for how long?

7 A. April 14th was my permanent date for the utility
8 assistant superintendent for Rail OCC starting in August of 2013.

9 Q. So in April, this past April, you were promoted to the
10 assistant superintendent?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. And before that, sorry, what were you?

13 A. Rail operation control supervisor.

14 Q. Supervisor, rail operations, okay.

15 A. So I did work the control desk.

16 Q. And how long were you in that position roughly,
17 approximately?

18 A. Two and a half to three years.

19 Q. Okay. And before that what did you do at Metro,
20 anything?

21 A. I was a rail supervisor.

22 Q. Rail --

23 A. Rail operations supervisor.

24 Q. Rail operations supervisor, okay. How long did you work
25 in that role; do you remember?

1 A. Roughly three and a half years.

2 Q. Three and a half, okay. Previous to that?

3 A. I was bus operations supervisor.

4 Q. Bus ops supervisor, okay. How long there, roughly?

5 A. Four years.

6 Q. Four years. And before that?

7 A. A bus operator.

8 Q. Bus operator yourself. So you've been in the
9 (indiscernible) as they say, out in the field a lot. How long all
10 together have you been with WMATA?

11 A. March of this year will be 18 years.

12 Q. Eighteen years, okay great. And you had that initial
13 work as bus operations and you went into the rail side?

14 A. That's correct, yes sir.

15 Q. And been there ever since, okay. And professional
16 training, college degree or things like that?

17 A. Well, I have -- no, I don't have a college degree.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I'm working on that now.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Most of my profession has been in transportation.

22 Q. Transportation. What is your degree going to be in?

23 A. Transportation.

24 Q. Transportation?

25 A. Communication.

1 Q. Excellent, thank you. Okay, let's see, going back to
2 the event itself we had some good testimony this morning from the
3 operator and the radio controller and so on. So we have a good
4 idea as to the scenario that have gone step-by-step and it sounds
5 like a lot of frustrated people were involved, okay. In terms of
6 the events, I want you to correct me if I misspeak here, as I go
7 through the scenario, okay? And I'll describe what our
8 understanding is so far.

9 You had the 302 train coming into the L'Enfant Station,
10 service the platform routinely, proceeded out of the station
11 heading south, encountered some smoke, reported back to OCC, I've
12 got smoke, I cannot go any further. I requested to reverse and to
13 work their way back into the station, but by that time the 510
14 train had come in behind it, okay, and stopped in this station.
15 For whatever reason at that point, the operator of the 510 train
16 had been told to exit the station, evacuate the station, by some
17 entity. We're hearing that the Transit Police or some authority
18 had requested that. So you had no train operator for that train.
19 So that train is basically locked down at the platform, okay.

20 So the operator of the 302 train is at that time at the
21 opposite end of the train trying to get authority to proceed back,
22 okay? Is that a pretty good assessment so far that we got?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. There are certain -- there's obvious rules you have to
25 follow when you operate the railroad and there are certain

1 prohibitions you can't follow, meaning you can never move a train
2 unless you got permission, correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Right. So this operator of 302 was awaiting permission
5 that never came because they didn't know, the operations folks,
6 didn't know if it was okay to move that train forward. Would that
7 be a fair assessment?

8 A. They didn't know if it was okay to move --

9 Q. To move that train going in the reverse direction
10 because they're running contrary to the flow of traffic at that
11 point.

12 MS. SAMARASINGHE: 302.

13 MR. DOWNS: 302, excuse me.

14 MR. MALLOY: Well, because of the 510 sitting there they
15 were unable to establish traffic for the 302.

16 BY MR. DOWNS:

17 Q. Right. And there were numerous attempts to communicate
18 with the operator, the 510 train and could not connect for
19 whatever reason, okay, so there's a level of frustration there, I
20 believe.

21 A. That's correct.

22 Q. And physically a train operator would need to get out of
23 his train and clamp a switch or a series of switches in order to
24 go through the switch if they had been given authorization in
25 order to assure that the switch didn't inadvertently become

1 unlocked for whatever reason; is that correct?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. And only a train operator can do that. In other words,
4 your station personnel couldn't do that; is that correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Okay. You have cameras that are available for review by
7 the OCC personnel; is that correct, showing various stations but
8 not all stations; is that correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. And what's not clear is the utilization of those camera
11 views. In other words, hearing or monitoring on your control
12 panel that the 510 train had pulled into L'Enfant Plaza and
13 stopped, we found out later when we conducted our investigation it
14 had actually stopped, not in the eight-car position but stopped in
15 the six-car position, meaning there was plenty of room on the
16 platform, which apparently sounds like based upon testimony this
17 morning the OCC folks didn't understand because that detail is not
18 shown on their console. Is that a fair assessment?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Okay. But that if you had the capability to examine
21 actually through the station camera system, to be able to look up
22 and say, oh, you know, that train is way down the track. There's
23 plenty of room, potentially, to bring the back end of that train,
24 which is now reversed, okay, back in the station then there would
25 be no collision, okay?

1 The question, I guess, here is, were the cameras
2 utilized in order to make any kind of decision path in that? What
3 was your thinking at the time? Help us out to understand the
4 process here.

5 A. Well, at the time I was just really oblivious as to why
6 there was no communication even with anybody in the station with
7 ROCC. Also, I was talking to the emergency management personnel
8 that were there once we found out that our Transit Police
9 Department was on site to at least help us get this train out of
10 the station.

11 And he was trying to communicate with them. He was
12 actually -- he did tell us, well, they're saying you can move the
13 train but our personnel in the field was we did have a supervisor
14 come down and he responded to us and said they told him he can't.

15 Q. Who is they?

16 A. Transit.

17 Q. Transit Police?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Okay. So specifically the authority demanding move no
20 trains was the Transit Police?

21 A. Yes. That's the information that we had.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. That the train could not be moved and for everyone to
24 evacuate the station. And my director did put the screen up and
25 all you could see was smoke. So we couldn't see exactly where the

1 train had stopped and if it was safe for us to go against the
2 procedure and even if the operator could even go down there and
3 see where he could safely clamp that switch. There's a couple of
4 dangerous areas with that.

5 If he can't see, you will have to bring the power down
6 for him to go down there and try to attempt to clamp that switch.
7 He can't see because you don't want him touching any third rail
8 and if you bring the power down now you have the train sitting on
9 dead rail as well. And without visibility, no telling how long he
10 would have been down there. So now we have lost the operator and
11 we still -- no communication on the platform.

12 So I pretty much really depended on those that were
13 there to try to give us some type of solution, to help us out with
14 the communication.

15 Q. Okay. So the strategy at that point, correct me if I'm
16 wrong, would be simply to rely upon the emergency services of the
17 fire department, whatever, to send their forces in, their
18 resources in, and evacuate the train? Would that be fair?

19 A. The strategy at that time was for the Transit Police
20 Department and my supervisor that was there to move the 510 out
21 the way so we can bring the 302 in.

22 Q. Oh, that was your thinking at the time?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. And there was a supervisor at L'Enfant at the
25 time --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- who could move that 510 train?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. And the idea was to align the switches outbound,
5 southbound from L'Enfant to switch it over towards the Green Line,
6 just to get out of harms way, so to speak, and send it up to the
7 Waterfront or wherever just to get it out of the way. Would that
8 be correct?

9 A. Yes. That and actually we told the supervisor -- the
10 operator of 510 we instructed to continue on towards Waterfront.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. The supervisor we told, once we didn't get any answer to
13 go towards Waterfront, we told the supervisor to key up on the
14 Green by then and pull it back out the station.

15 Q. That was his alternate strategy, in other words?

16 A. Yes. We were trying to get it moved from either end.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Let's get the train off the platform so we can bring 302
19 in.

20 Q. And you found out later that you couldn't even allow
21 that because the Transit PD was prohibiting anybody?

22 A. Yeah, according to the supervisor, yes sir.

23 Q. So, okay, let's move on to other questions here.

24 MR. ADAMS: Okay. Dorsey Adams, WMATA Safety.

25 BY MR. ADAMS:

1 Q. Malloy, did anyone ever explain to you why the operator
2 and the supervisor were evacuated? Was it a life safety concern
3 from the police? Were you given any explanation?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. Did you ask?

6 A. Well, I specifically just was telling the emergency
7 management beside me that we need to get the train off. And he
8 was telling me that they had permission.

9 Q. Excuse me, repeat that.

10 A. The emergency management personnel that was in the
11 office at the time was telling me that the supervisor had
12 permission to move the train. But his personnel, the supervisor
13 is telling us something totally different that the Transit officer
14 on the scene is not allowing him to move the train. So I'm
15 talking to emergency management saying we're getting this
16 conflicted information and we need to get the train moving.

17 So based on information that he is giving me, I'm trying
18 to follow that we do have permission but what we're getting out in
19 the field, I don't know why they never let the train, let the
20 supervisor, key the train up and move out.

21 Q. Okay. So in the OCC at the time of this incident, you
22 had an emergency management person there, right, and you had a
23 representative from MTPD there, right?

24 A. No, at the time just emergency management.

25 Q. Just emergency management at that time.

1 A. Yes, sir.

2 Q. Did you have a representative from the fire department
3 at that time?

4 A. No, sir.

5 Q. So this is early in the event?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Was there ever a liaison for OCC, is that normally a
8 police officer or an officer of emergency management that the
9 liaison with the on-the-scene incident commander?

10 A. Emergency management.

11 Q. Is that throughout the process of an event when you have
12 one?

13 A. They come in every day during our peak hours at
14 approximately 3:30 to, approximately 3 to, excuse me, 7:30
15 throughout the peak hours. And he's the liaison for personnel,
16 emergency personnel, in the field as far as Transit and emergency
17 management personnel.

18 Q. Okay. All right. I have no further questions.

19 MR. BALLARD: Hercules Ballard, Washington Metro.

20 BY MR. BALLARD:

21 Q. Mr. Malloy, as the assistant superintendent of the ROCC,
22 your rank and responsibilities is it only isolated to the Yellow,
23 Green Line console or do you have other duties that you're
24 responsible for in the Control Center?

25 A. Yes. I have responsibility to oversee the Red Line,

1 which is Ops 1 as well as our Blue, Orange and Silver Line, which
2 is Ops 2 along with Ops 3, which is our Green and Yellow Line.

3 Q. As the assistant superintendent, are you able once you
4 become aware that there is an incident occurring like on the
5 Yellow or Green Line, are you able to remain at that incident
6 console or are you still required to manage other incidents and
7 make other notifications and other duties while these events are
8 occurring?

9 A. No. I have the overall responsibility for each
10 emergency throughout the system on any Ops as well as work with
11 other departments that is in the office at the time.

12 Q. So during this incident on Monday, were there other
13 activities that also drew you away from these Yellow and Green
14 Line console, which did not allow you to maintain a constant
15 oversight throughout the entire incident?

16 A. Yes, sir. Initially, the Red Line and it initially
17 happened at the same time. It drew me to the Red Line because I
18 had inexperienced which, newer controllers on the console, and I
19 had an experienced controller and a newer controller working
20 together on the Yellow and Green Line and I depended on my
21 experienced controller to make the best decision.

22 So I went to make sure that my Red Line controller was
23 okay. I resolved that as well as update the emergency management
24 and the MOC as well as the customer operations.

25 Q. So when you need to communicate with MOC and MOC's

1 assistant superintendent, was that assistant superintendent
2 located at the Yellow, Green Line console or did you have to move
3 away from the console and go back to the MOC assistant
4 superintendent's console to communicate with him?

5 A. I had to walk back to his desk, turn my back to speak
6 with him. He was behind the -- he was not at the Yellow and Green
7 console.

8 Q. Okay. And why did you make the decision to move
9 Ms. White away from the console and place Sam Harveston (ph.) to
10 work the radio? Give me a sense of that.

11 A. It was quite a few incidents taking place at one time
12 and I preferred an experienced controller to be sitting at the
13 console that I could depend on to make good judgments on how to
14 resolve all the incidents at the same time.

15 Q. Okay. Thank you, sir, no more questions.

16 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: Mr. Malloy, Marlene Flemmings-
17 McCann for Local 689. And I have a couple of questions.

18 BY MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN:

19 Q. One, I have spoke with the controllers who brought down
20 the third-rail power and they couldn't give me an answer. Could
21 you give me an answer of who brought it down?

22 A. No, ma'am, not initially.

23 Q. The second thing I asked was, I think, Ms. Smith said
24 that, and you all can correct me if I'm wrong, that 510 was told
25 to stop her train, which she did. But after that point, Ms. White

1 said that no one really knew the position of where her train
2 stopped. And I'm finding down there the six-car marker so I kind
3 of find them as we go along. The problem I had was the lack of
4 communication between Central and Transit.

5 To me, I just think that it's unacceptable because if an
6 operator cannot reach Central Control they're supposed to stop the
7 train. If Central Control cannot reach an operator, they're
8 either going to keep calling or they're going to try to get
9 someone to locate the operator; 302 was in an emergency situation.
10 Obviously, no one told Central, unless you can, you know, tell me
11 something different, that there was a Transit or Transit officers
12 there taking over the scene and actually taking over what I
13 thought Central had full control over main line.

14 But it sounds like you all lost control over main line.
15 And both of your controllers said that they felt that they had
16 lost control, no communication with 510. I asked did anyone pull
17 the cameras that you all have access to and I know Passenger Ops
18 can't pull and you answered and said, yeah, but you couldn't see
19 because there was so much smoke at L'Enfant.

20 My other question was, did anyone make a blanket
21 announcement to any WMATA personnel to contact Central? You had
22 plenty of -- you had station managers, you had, I'm sure,
23 custodians, you had all kinds of people at L'Enfant but I couldn't
24 get their answer.

25 So can you tell me if Passenger Ops, because you're not

1 Passenger Ops you don't make that announcement, but was anyone
2 instructed or did they attempt to make an announcement to anyone
3 to find out, to contact ROCC to find out why that train wasn't
4 moving? Because at that point you had no knowledge of the
5 operator where they were and for all anybody knew they could have
6 been laying there unconscious. No one knew anything because you
7 got no contact or no information from anyone.

8 So can you tell me what steps was followed, besides
9 radio handset, to get someone to call you all to let you all know
10 what was going on at L'Enfant?

11 A. Yes. The controller continuously made blanket
12 announcements speaking with emergency management beside me and the
13 video feed. And prior to what Customer Ops did with the
14 communication I am unaware.

15 Q. Okay. So you don't know if Passenger Ops made the
16 announcement?

17 A. Yes, I'm not sure. I know nothing about that.

18 Q. Okay. I guess that's what I've been trying to get
19 someone to tell me. Now Central sits, Rail sits to the left and
20 Passenger Ops sits to the right, not quite on the same side but
21 like this, you got a space. So when or would you expect a
22 Passenger Ops supervisor to come towards you to tell you or one of
23 your supervisors go tell them something to get visual or to make a
24 blanket announcement. Do you know if anybody gave those
25 instructions or did anyone take the initiative to do that?

1 A. Well --

2 Q. I know you were dealing with what you was dealing, but I
3 just need to know did anyone do that?

4 A. I'm unaware. However, I do know that normally they do,
5 if they know we are really engaged in something, they would make a
6 blanket announcement for us without us even asking. They normally
7 do get involved.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. So I'm not sure if they did or they didn't during this
10 incident.

11 Q. Okay, 302 kept trying to get some assistance to get to
12 that platform, but by then, I guess, it sounds like Transit
13 already cleared out the station. The supervisor you sent over was
14 also removed from the station; is that correct?

15 A. According to him, yes ma'am.

16 Q. Did the supervisor tell you as he was getting, or he or
17 she, was getting escorted or told to leave? Did they give you
18 radio communication saying, hey, they're putting us out, we gotta
19 leave, I can't move the train?

20 A. Yeah. Actually, he responded to us. He was the only
21 one that responded to us over the radio. He said, Central, I'm
22 attempting to -- we told him to key up on his Greenbelt and he
23 responded, I can't recall was it via phone or over the radio that
24 he said they told him to get out of the station. I honestly
25 cannot recall.

1 Q. Do you know about what time they said that?

2 A. No, ma'am.

3 Q. Okay. So at that time when you all get that
4 transmission, you realized you got a train sitting and nowhere for
5 302 to go?

6 A. Yes, ma'am.

7 Q. Thank you, sir. No more questions.

8 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Sharmila Samarasinghe with the Tri-
9 State Oversight Committee. A couple of questions, Mr. Malloy.

10 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

11 Q. The first question I have is, when an incident takes
12 place, any unusual occurrence where your emergency operations
13 procedures go into practice, do the controllers for that
14 particular line where the incident is going on, have control of
15 the CCTV cameras for that particular station or do they have to
16 rely on the OEM MTPD desk?

17 A. Yes. We have to rely on the MTPD desk.

18 Q. Is that by procedure or is that by just the way that
19 things are configured? If the controller wanted to, if it was so
20 urgent, would the controller still be able to access the CCTV for
21 that station and put it up on the board, on the screen?

22 A. No, ma'am.

23 Q. No?

24 A. No, ma'am. It's not configured that way.

25 Q. All right. The second question I have is, could you

1 explain what the Passenger Operations desk is in charge of in
2 general?

3 A. Mainly making notifications to senior and executive
4 management, communicating with our customers via through the PA so
5 I think I heard them say something about Twitter, I'm not sure.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And they filter a lot of information throughout the
8 system --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- and the public that comes through Metro.

11 Q. Okay. So they essentially take the information that's
12 produced raw through the Control Center and essentially packaged
13 then send it out to the public and management; is that --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Okay. Going back to the interaction between the OEM
16 desk and the controllers, per procedure what's the expectation
17 that you as the control staff have that the MTPD desk will provide
18 to you in terms of information for an incident that's going on
19 similar to the incident that took place at L'Enfant?

20 A. Normally, they're pretty good with providing us with
21 information and whatever is happening in the field. They're
22 personnel there, they are our eyes. We would have normally been
23 updated with the condition in the station and their action.
24 That's normally the case. They are actually our eyes out there
25 with emergencies and incidents as such and they would communicate

1 it with us.

2 Q. Okay. So on January 12th when the incident started
3 taking shape, you started communicating with the person at the OEM
4 desk asking for updates on what was going on at the scene as far
5 as law enforcement and emergency response. Was that correct?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Okay. And so they were able to have constant
8 communication, as far as you know, do you know where the MTPD OEM
9 desk person who was there, the liaison who was there at the
10 Control Center, whether he or she had continuous communication
11 with the on-scene law enforcement personnel, MTPD personnel or
12 even the fire department so that they can get the information back
13 to you?

14 A. I don't know --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- what type of communication he had with the personnel
17 at all, that was in the field. Other than what -- the only
18 knowledge I had was what he was telling me.

19 Q. Okay. Okay. And then the last question I have is, when
20 you all realized that there was an incident going on that you
21 would benefit from getting a better visual from the CCTV cameras
22 in the station, you all asked them to pull it up on the screen; is
23 that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. On that date?

1 A. Yes. My director did, yes.

2 Q. Okay. All right. Thank you.

3 A. You're welcome.

4 MR. BUCHER: Okay, Dave Bucher.

5 BY MR. BUCHER:

6 Q. And I just want to build on the last question and mostly
7 to be clear and I believe I wrote this down as you said it before.
8 The emergency management person was the only contact you had with
9 Transit Police through the whole incident?

10 A. That's correct.

11 Q. So there was no Transit Police liaison or person in the
12 ROCC at the time of the incident?

13 A. No, sir.

14 Q. Okay. All right.

15 A. Initially.

16 Q. Initially?

17 A. Yes. Thereafter --

18 Q. After the incident they probably --

19 A. The whole world came.

20 Q. Yes. Okay.

21 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Dave, Sharmila Samarasinghe, follow-
22 up question.

23 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

24 Q. How much after or how much far into the incident did
25 MTPD personnel start showing up at the Control Center?

1 A. I can't recall.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Just initially, just the one personnel and I can't
4 recall how far in before when everybody showed up.

5 Q. Okay, thank you.

6 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: One follow-up question. Marlene
7 Flemmings-McCann.

8 BY MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN:

9 Q. Who was the director, I'm not sure, you say he was
10 director, for the camera; who are we talking about?

11 A. Mr. Charlie Ziditch (ph.).

12 Q. Mr. Ziditch, okay thank you.

13 MR. DOWNS: Downs, NTSB, again.

14 BY MR. DOWNS:

15 Q. Mr. Malloy, dive in a little bit, tell us about the
16 training that you undergo. Do you have annual refresher training?
17 You probably have original training. Tell us about the training,
18 particularly safety training, safety procedures training.

19 A. Well, initially, each year we have to recertify, make
20 sure that we are up-to-date with all the new memos and all the --
21 all our SOP's, our RWP procedures. So each year we do a
22 refresher.

23 Q. And is there a test involved where you get --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- the certification? How long is this training, a day,

1 two days, roughly?

2 A. A day.

3 Q. A day, okay. Is there a training program that you go
4 through to get to your particular position?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And tell us about that.

7 A. Oh, well you actually based on your experience on the
8 console, you, your superintendent or your assistant superintendent
9 or your director, based on their observation and what they think
10 of you, they allow you that opportunity so you worked alongside
11 those that are in a position permanently and they monitor your
12 growth. Are you able to adapt to the way things work back there
13 and if they decide to keep you, they let you move forward, they
14 don't think that you're making the cut, back to the desk.

15 Q. You don't hear about it again, okay. But there's no
16 training program, in other words, let's say you're required by
17 your supervisor at the time, would be interested in promoting you
18 to this new position but there is a training program to take that
19 new position. Is there such a training like that or no?

20 A. It's more of a hands on.

21 Q. Hands on.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. On-the-job training?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Okay, great. Back to the site itself, we have the 302

1 train stopped in the tunnel. About 1,100 feet ahead we had the
2 problem smoldering cables we discovered now, okay, the source of
3 the smoke. There's an exhaust shaft right at that location with
4 large exhaust fans, okay. There's controls, I guess, for those
5 fans at the OCC; is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Tell us about those, how they work, when do you use
8 them, that kind of thing.

9 A. Yeah, normally whenever we get smoke or we're advised of
10 smoke or odor we turn the fans on to try to push the, you know, to
11 help the ventilation in that area.

12 Q. Okay. So that's just basically a standard procedure,
13 somebody reports smoke in the area, you automatically go to the on
14 button and exhaust to the outside?

15 A. Well, mainly personnel in the field will request the
16 fans. We don't just automatically turn the --

17 Q. In other words, you get a train operator saying I have
18 smoke in this area --

19 A. Or station.

20 Q. -- or station, that would be a request?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Okay. And your response would be typically, go to the
23 exhaust feature --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- hit the on button and that would normally exhaust the

1 smoke; is that a fair appraisal?

2 A. Supposed to.

3 Q. Supposed to, okay. Smoke detectors, are there smoke
4 detectors in the tunnel?

5 A. I'm not sure.

6 Q. You're not sure. Not aware of it or --

7 A. I'm not aware of smoke detectors.

8 Q. Okay. The fans are bi-directional, in other words, you
9 can exhaust or supply?

10 A. Let me say this, let me take that back. We do have what
11 we consider fire alarms.

12 Q. Fire alarms, okay. Tell us about the fire alarms.

13 A. Well, I would get an alarm, we would get alarms on our
14 screens giving us an indication only that maybe there's some smoke
15 or some fire in a particular area.

16 Q. Okay. In this particular circumstance, in prior
17 testimony, that the report of the smoke came in so you activated,
18 you OCC, activated the exhaust fans. Is that correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And that there are not only that exhaust shaft, it's
21 also an emergency exit shaft, but those fans are activated down
22 the track, but also the exhaust fans back at L'Enfant Plaza,
23 there's exhaust fans there, yes?

24 A. Sure.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Should be.

2 Q. So the process was engaged to where the exhaust on both
3 sets of fans are activated. Is that correct, to your best
4 knowledge, recollection?

5 A. Yes, that the controller activated the exhaust fans.

6 Q. Let me ask you kind of given your knowledge of the
7 system on a theoretical basis, would it have helped if you had
8 smoke detectors down the track, near the problem cables, okay, to
9 where if those smoke detectors engaged indicating there was smoke,
10 would that have been helpful information in terms of deciding what
11 fans to turn on?

12 In other words, rather than turn on both fans for
13 exhaust because what you're doing now is you're drawing,
14 potentially drawing, the smoke into the station rather than having
15 the fans in the station supply air. You have the other fan at the
16 fan shaft exhaust, remember it's a flow away from the train.
17 Would that have been helpful in retrospect? Again, I'm not trying
18 to point fingers here now that you -- new technology and
19 everything. But what do you think?

20 A. Well, I think any information that would have given us
21 any indication would have been very helpful to us.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Any information, alarms.

24 Q. Okay, great. On that same note, in hindsight and
25 retrospect we're all Monday morning quarterback, okay, given what

1 you know now, is there anything else during the process you might
2 have engaged or whatever that you think might have helped the
3 situation?

4 A. With more information?

5 Q. In other words, let's brain storm a little bit. In
6 hindsight, what would have helped here? What would you have done
7 differently and all that sort of thing, knowing what you know now?

8 A. With the information I had?

9 Q. At the time.

10 A. With the information that I had there was nothing else I
11 could do.

12 Q. Nothing else at the time. Knowing what you know now, is
13 there anything you would do differently?

14 A. No.

15 Q. New technology or something like that, that could be
16 employed other than maybe smoke detectors?

17 A. Yes. If we had some indication to let me know there's
18 smoke right here, do not allow this train to come this direction,
19 yes I would have made sure that, made every attempt that the train
20 didn't go that direction.

21 Q. Okay. How about technology, for example, that could
22 remotely plant these switches? In other words, rather than have
23 the requirement for the operator to get out of a train and hand
24 clamp the switches so that they could go back, would something
25 like that have been helpful?

1 A. Very helpful. That would have solved a lot --

2 Q. That would have solved the problem maybe.

3 A. A lot of times for a lot of incidents, yes.

4 Q. Okay. Because we discovered here when we did our
5 inspection, there were actually length on the platform available
6 for up to two cars maybe, okay, in front of the 510 train. So if
7 we could have maybe somehow gotten that train through those
8 switches without the possibility, and there's a real possibility I
9 understand if you don't clamp a switch you might derail or
10 something; is that correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. That simply reverse that train slowly and walk back into
13 the station at least one door opening would have helped the
14 situation. Would you tend to agree?

15 A. Absolutely.

16 Q. Excellent. Okay. That concludes my round of
17 questioning.

18 MR. ADAMS: This is Dorsey Adams, WMATA. Just a few
19 more questions.

20 BY MR. ADAMS:

21 Q. The way I'm looking at this, and you can tell me if I'm
22 wrong, was there room if you had power working, if the operator
23 had not been evacuated, you could have just moved this train out,
24 correct?

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. And you wouldn't have to worry about how much room that
2 you had because the train would have been gone?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. So whoever took down that power really kind of tied your
5 hands?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Could you have set to move the train out, back the train
8 into the station and not worry about any kind of collision, right?

9 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

10 Q. Of course, clamping the switches if you could. All
11 right. You said that when you immediately notified your managers
12 of this incident, who showed up?

13 A. My director showed up.

14 Q. Who else?

15 A. A little later everybody showed up. I saw the fire
16 department, Transit, who else, there was quite a few --

17 Q. Any other assistant superintendents available during the
18 start of the event to give you some assistance?

19 A. The maintenance assistant superintendent.

20 Q. So he was there when the incident started?

21 A. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Did he offer assistance?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. Okay. So there was more than just you in ROCC that
25 could work with the different consoles to address --

1 A. No, sir. The only assistance he could offer was to
2 dispatch the emergency response team, the maintenance personnel.
3 He could not walk up to the console and give them any direct
4 instructions.

5 Q. What are you talking about, MOC?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Okay. I just want to clear this up from earlier; you
8 mentioned that you heard someone say that they heard smoke or saw
9 smoke with no visibility, right, did you know immediately what
10 train that was?

11 A. No, sir.

12 Q. You didn't?

13 A. No, sir.

14 Q. You just heard it?

15 A. I just heard it.

16 Q. So you didn't know immediately what console that was
17 coming from?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. Okay. How much later in the process did you find out
20 where that came from?

21 A. My controller on Ops 3, she called me said, Malloy, I
22 have the operator reporting that zero visibility, he need to
23 reverse ends.

24 Q. Okay. So at first you heard it through the periphery
25 and then somebody pointed out exactly what train it was?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Okay. Thanks. No more questions.

3 MR. BALLARD: Hercules Ballard, Washington Metro.

4 BY MR. BALLARD:

5 Q. Just to clarify something, Mr. Malloy, as the assistant
6 superintendent you have the ability to bring up the CCTV's in the
7 OCC?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Okay. On Monday, I know I thought you said your
10 director, Charlie Ziditch was there, he came down from his office
11 after he became aware of the incident --

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. -- to assist you. Was the superintendent there also?

14 A. No, sir.

15 Q. The superintendent was not there?

16 A. No, sir.

17 Q. Okay. No other questions.

18 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: Marlene Flemmings-McCann, Local
19 689. One last question, Mr. Malloy.

20 BY MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN:

21 Q. As assistant superintendent of rail, your job is to
22 basically run the railroad. You have people that run it and you
23 oversee it. How did it feel as assistant superintendent to feel
24 helpless when you heard an operator needing assistance to get to a
25 platform and I'm sure when he was talking to you, you could hear

1 the commotion in the background.

2 How did it feel as assistant superintendent of WMATA to
3 be helpless and not be able to help an operator when people are
4 yelling in the background that they need to get off that train?

5 A. (No audible response.)

6 Q. No more questions, sir.

7 MR. BUCHER: Anything else?

8 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Does he need to take a break? I do
9 have a question.

10 MR. BUCHER: Do you want to take a break?

11 MR. MALLOY: No, I'm fine.

12 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

13 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

14 Q. Mr. Malloy, three quick questions. One is, have you had
15 any opportunity to understand what the OEM MTPD desk is required
16 to do in emergencies? I mean, I know they work with you but have
17 you had an opportunity to kind of have training, cross-training,
18 with them so that you understand what their responsibility for all
19 this is, what your responsibility for all of it, what the
20 information floor should be to you so that you can make the
21 decisions you need to make? Have you had that opportunity or is
22 the majority of your time just on-the-job training where depending
23 on the availability the information comes to you or not?

24 A. Yes. No, ma'am, I never had the opportunity to cross-
25 train with them.

1 Q. Okay. And just to understand what Mr. Ballard brought
2 up, so even though the controllers might not be able to bring up
3 the CCTV views for a given station location, you still are able to
4 bring those things up if the need is there, right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. If there's a request?

7 A. Yes, ma'am.

8 Q. Okay. All right, thank you.

9 MR. BUCHER: I just have one more question.

10 BY MR. BUCHER:

11 Q. Has WMATA Transit Police, since Monday, made any changes
12 in their relationship with your office?

13 A. I'm not sure.

14 MR. DOWNS: Not sure?

15 MR. MALLOY: No. Because I haven't been there.

16 MR. DOWNS: You haven't been in the office since Monday?

17 MR. MALLOY: Yes.

18 MR. DOWNS: I see.

19 MR. BUCHER: Okay. Thank you.

20 MR. MALLOY: Oh, I'm sorry. I went in Tuesday and I
21 left early Tuesday. I did show up the following day and I left
22 early Tuesday.

23 MR. BUCHER: Okay.

24 MR. DOWNS: Downs, NTSB.

25 BY MR. DOWNS:

1 Q. Mr. Malloy, you're back on the job or are you still
2 having troubles?

3 A. Am I still having troubles?

4 Q. Troubles on the job. Are you back on the job; you
5 haven't been in the office, you said, since Tuesday briefly?

6 A. I haven't been back yet.

7 Q. You're having trouble still getting back to the office,
8 you need some time, in other words, to adjust or how are you
9 making out?

10 A. I'm making out pretty well. I thank the office for
11 allowing me a day or two to --

12 Q. Decompress?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Very good. The cameras, you mentioned before, and make
15 sure I got it straight, you did make use of the security camera in
16 L'Enfant Plaza to see where that train was and see what was
17 happening with the 510 train, but you had basically a blank
18 screen, in other words, too much smoke to see the train; is that
19 correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Okay. That completes my questions, thank you.

22 MR. ADAMS: I just have one follow-up for Mr. Malloy.
23 Dorsey Adams, Safety.

24 BY MR. ADAMS:

25 Q. What activates the fire alarm in OCC?

1 A. Smoke.

2 Q. So there has to be a sensor somewhere that activates the
3 fire alarm or something?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. A door opening or something that activates the fire
6 alarm?

7 A. Yes. I believe there's sensors all over the system.

8 Q. Oh, so there are sensors throughout the system?

9 A. Yes. There are sensors throughout the system that
10 activate those alarms.

11 Q. But they may or may not be in the tunnel that you know
12 of?

13 A. That I know of, no, that I knew of that they may or may
14 not be in the tunnel, yes.

15 Q. That's all. Thank you.

16 MR. DOWNS: I don't have anything.

17 MS. FLEMINGS-McCANN: I don't have anything.

18 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Nothing, thank you.

19 MR. BUCHER: I have nothing else. Dave Bucher. All
20 right, well that concludes the interview of Mr. Malloy.

21 MR. MALLOY: I do have a correction. Mr. Ballard, the
22 superintendent he did come in.

23 MR. BALLARD: But he came in later?

24 MR. MALLOY: Yes, he did come in. He wasn't there
25 initially, but he did come in.

1 MR. BALLARD: Okay, thanks a lot. I appreciate it.

2 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Who is the superintendent? This is
3 Sharmila Samarasinghe.

4 MR. MALLOY: Ma'am?

5 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Who is the superintendent for the
6 ROCC?

7 MR. MALLOY: Mr. Deltrin Harris.

8 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Thank you.

9 MR. BUCHER: Okay. That concludes the interview of
10 Mr. Malloy. Thank you.

11 MR. MALLOY: You're welcome.

12 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
 STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
 JANUARY 12, 2015
 Interview of Marcel Malloy

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: January 15, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Michelle Smiroldo
Transcriber