



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

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| GROUP | |
| EXHIBIT | |
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Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015

* Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004

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Interview of: JEFFREY HULL

D.C. Fire and EMS - Fire Operations
Center
500 F Street, N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington, D.C.

Monday,
February 2, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: RICHARD DOWNS, JR.
Survival Factors Investigator

APPEARANCES:

RICHARD DOWNS, JR., Survival Factors Investigator
Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group
National Transportation Safety Board

RUBEN PAYAN, Railroad Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

KIMBERLY BURTCH, Senior Program Analyst
Office of Transit Safety and Oversight
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)

DENTON ROURKE, Operations Manager
Office of Emergency Management
WMATA

DERRON HAWKINS, Deputy Fire Chief
D.C. Fire and EMS
Homeland Security & Special Operations Division

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I N T E R V I E W

1
2 MR. DOWNS: Okay. Today's date is February 2, 2015 and
3 the following is an interview being conducted in reference to NTSB
4 investigation number DCA-15-FR-004, which relates to an accident
5 involving a heavy smoke release and train evacuations that
6 occurred in and near the L'Enfant Plaza Station of the WMATA
7 Metrorail System in the District of Columbia on the afternoon of
8 January 12, 2015.

9 This interview is being conducted by a member --
10 conducted with a member of the District of Columbia Fire and
11 Emergency Medical Services Department as conducted by the NTSB
12 Survival Factors Technical Working Group of the investigation. My
13 name is Richard Downs, Jr. and I'm a Survival Factors Investigator
14 with the NTSB, in which I -- in which I also serve in the role as
15 Survival Factors Technical Working Group chairperson.

16 I will preside over this interview, which is being
17 recorded for the record, in which a transcript may also be
18 compiled of the recording as a permanent docketed record of the
19 interview. Additionally I'd like to mention that the purpose of
20 the investigation is to increase safety and not to assign fault,
21 blame or liability, and that the NTSB cannot guarantee -- cannot
22 offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity from legal or
23 certificate actions.

24 Further, pursuant to the criteria under 49-CFR-831.7,
25 the interviewee may have one representative of the interviewee's

1 choice accompany him or her at this interview in which the
2 representative may not testify for the interviewee. It's also
3 requested that comments of the interviewee's representative be --
4 should be limited and objections expressed by the interviewee's
5 representative are not grounds for the NTBS to refrain from asking
6 questions.

7 I'll now ask that our interviewee, our witness, to
8 please identify themselves, their employment affiliation and job
9 position title for the record.

10 MR. HULL: Jeffrey Hull. I'm a battalion fire chief
11 with the 6th Battalion with Washington, D.C. Fire and EMS
12 Department.

13 MR. DOWNS: Thank you for joining us today, Chief. And
14 are you accompanied by anyone today?

15 MR. HULL: I am not.

16 MR. DOWNS: Thank you. I'll now ask the participants of
17 this interview who will have an opportunity to present questions
18 to the witness to please identify themselves individually, their
19 employment affiliation, and job position title for the record.

20 MR. ROURKE: Good morning, Chief. I'm Denton Rourke. I
21 work for WMATA. I am the Operations Manager in the Office of
22 Emergency Management.

23 MR. PAYAN: I'm Ruben Payan, P-A-Y-A-N, and I'm one of
24 the investigators with the NTSB, Washington, D.C.

25 MS. BURTCH: Kimberly Burtch with the Federal Transit

1 Administration's Office of Transit Safety and Oversight.

2 MR. HAWKINS: Derron Hawkins, Deputy Fire Chief, D.C.
3 Fire and EMS, Homeland Security Division.

4 INTERVIEW OF JEFFREY HULL

5 BY MR. DOWNS:

6 Q. Thank you. And as my first question for the witness,
7 would you please briefly describe for us your role and
8 involvement -- or involvement in this event?

9 A. We -- the 6th Battalion chief was dispatched with three
10 engines.

11 Q. Let me clarify. Your role in the event.

12 A. My role in the event.

13 Q. You responded to the --

14 A. I responded to a fan vent shaft.

15 Q. Vent shaft. That's what we're looking for. Thank you,
16 Chief.

17 A. Okay.

18 Q. And with that, could you please describe for us, in your
19 own words and to your best recollection, what occurred on the day
20 of the event relative to your actions and involvement at the
21 L'Enfant Plaza Station or other sites, commencing at the time that
22 you were alerted to respond?

23 A. Okay. We did not go to the L'Enfant Plaza. We went to
24 fan vent shaft FL-1, which was at 9th and Main, or 9th and Water
25 Streets, N.W. We went with three engines and a truck, were

1 dispatched there for smoke coming from a shaft.

2 When we got there we didn't see any -- or I didn't see
3 any smoke coming from the shaft. We did not -- the companies
4 there reported back to me that they did not see anything, you
5 know, coming from or in the shaft. I did not authorize anyone to
6 go down the shaft at that time since nothing was visible. We just
7 staged up top for a number of minutes -- I couldn't say how many
8 anymore, 5, 10 minutes, perhaps -- when they put out a Metro box
9 alarm for the L'Enfant square.

10 Q. Okay. So make sure that I'm following you here, Chief.
11 The initial call that you got was simply respond to a vent shaft
12 for smoke coming out of the shaft?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. And it would be your standard protocol when you arrive
15 there, if there was smoke coming out, you would do something
16 specific?

17 A. We would call in and we would not send anyone down, you
18 know, that shaft. You know, if you saw someone there, yes, you
19 would go down to rescue, but if you just had smoke, no, you would
20 not go down there.

21 Q. And in this particular case there was no smoke at your
22 arrival, and you arrived about the same time as the three engines
23 and the truck company?

24 A. Yes. Yes. They may have arrived, you know, 30 seconds
25 before, you know.

1 Q. Pretty close to the same time?

2 A. Correct. Correct.

3 Q. Very good. And upon your arrival, Chief, tell me, is
4 that particular area involved in a construction zone at this time?

5 A. It is. They are working on the wharf construction area
6 there. There used to be some restaurants, et cetera, there, which
7 have been torn down and they're working on a large, you know,
8 construction project there.

9 Q. Did you have trouble at all with any of the construction
10 vehicles blocking that particular vent shaft location or were you
11 able to pull right up and have good access?

12 A. We were able to pull right up and have access.

13 Q. Good.

14 A. There were some barriers up and that but that did not
15 interfere with us.

16 Q. As far as you were concerned, you were able to get right
17 in there and do what you needed to do straightaway?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. Very good. Okay. So you arrived on scene and shortly
20 thereafter -- you saw no one. Shortly thereafter, you got an
21 alarm box for the Metro box you were describing?

22 A. We heard that being put out and so then we monitored
23 that radio channel as well as our own, kind of figuring that the
24 two were one and the same. Although since they were dispatched
25 differently and we were on different channels, you know, we had

1 our incident to handle. Some minutes into the event, it was
2 figured out that it was one in the same and then we were put onto
3 their channel.

4 Sometime thereabouts, I can't remember if it was before
5 or after, it was reported by one of the companies, Engine 13, that
6 they saw people at the bottom of the shaft. At that point I told
7 them to open up the shaft and enter the shaft and assist those,
8 you know, those persons, however many --

9 Q. That was your instructions to your three engines and
10 truck company?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Okay. Did you go down with them?

13 A. I did not.

14 Q. You stayed at the command up topside?

15 A. Correct. Correct.

16 Q. And that's your normal protocol for an event like that?

17 A. Correct. Yes, yes.

18 Q. Okay, very good.

19 A. At that point in time we instituted or I instituted
20 Level 3 accountability. I had Engine 7 as the accountability
21 company. They stayed up top, collected the PAT tags of those that
22 went down. Initially I sent Engine 13 down, which was the officer
23 and one person, to assist anyone at the bottom. After a few
24 minutes when those guys came up -- it happened to be a naval
25 officer and a Secret Service employee came up.

1 Q. And these were passengers on the train?

2 A. Correct. Correct. They came up. We did -- or, you
3 know, companies or members did, you know, check them out. They
4 had no medical problems. They were not complaining of anything.

5 Q. No respiratory distress to speak of?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Very good.

8 A. They didn't have anything. They were fine.

9 Q. Do we -- are we able to get a timestamp for any of these
10 steps of the process; do you know? Did you keep notes or anything
11 like that?

12 A. I did not keep timestamps, no.

13 Q. There would be radio communications, so we could go
14 maybe from that in terms of identifying the milestones as we're
15 working through?

16 A. That could be possible, yes.

17 Q. Perfect. Okay, thank you. So then what happened? The
18 two train passengers came up out of the shaft --

19 A. Right.

20 Q. -- and you checked them out. They seemed to be okay.

21 A. Right.

22 Q. What happened next?

23 A. They said that there could be others coming as well,
24 that they had told other members of the train to follow them. So
25 at that point in time I told Truck 10 to take their personnel, all

1 the oxygen bottles, the SCBA bottles that they could carry, and go
2 down.

3 Q. Now let me interrupt you for a moment. When your
4 companies first responded down the shaft, did they have SCBA with
5 them going down?

6 A. Yes, they were in full PPE.

7 Q. Did they -- were they actually on air --

8 A. No.

9 Q. -- or they just carried it with them?

10 A. No. They --

11 Q. So they -- in the fire service we call it dangling
12 masks. You didn't actually engage them but they were instantly
13 available?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Very good.

16 A. They were on their backs. They were ready to go. They
17 were turned on but they did not have the face piece in place --

18 Q. Okay. So --

19 A. -- because they had no reason to.

20 Q. Right. So you're anticipating my question in that
21 because there had been no smoke visible at that time, you -- it
22 wasn't necessarily warranted but it was a precautionary measure.
23 Would that be correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. Very good.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So your crew -- your fire crews go down in the tunnel,
3 find the two passengers, send them up topside.

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Your next command was to get additional manpower --

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. -- and bring all the bottles that they could and proceed
8 down the shaft and do what?

9 A. Just go along the tunnel to see if they could find
10 anyone else that might need assistance.

11 Q. How did they know which direction to move?

12 A. That, I don't know. They had --

13 Q. Would it be a standard practice to go in both directions
14 in terms that could be -- train could be located anywhere?

15 A. It could be they probably talked with the guys that came
16 up and got some directions from them as to, you know, which
17 direction to go. That part I don't know.

18 Q. So that was not communicated to you?

19 A. That was not communicated.

20 Q. Would it be fair to say had it been communicated to you,
21 would you have passed that on to command, incident command?

22 A. I certainly would have.

23 Q. Very good. Okay, please continue.

24 A. I also questioned the two members, the two train
25 passengers that came up. I asked if they saw any signs, any mile

1 markers, anything that might help us to identify where, you know,
2 the train was or -- they said that they did not see any, you know,
3 chain markers or anything of that sort.

4 At that point there were five Metro police officers
5 there. They took charge of those two passengers then, and after
6 they were given the, you know, a clear bill of health, so to
7 speak, they were taken wherever, you know --

8 Q. Taken off somewhere?

9 A. Right.

10 Q. Okay, very good.

11 A. Right.

12 Q. Okay. So what did you do next in terms of your process?

13 A. About some point in time there, three members of Tower 3
14 came up through there. One member was having medical problems.
15 I'm not exactly sure what it was, you know, trouble breathing, out
16 of breath, something of that nature.

17 Q. It was respiratory related?

18 A. Yes. It was something to that effect, yes.

19 Q. Was this --

20 A. Now, whether it was from the smoke or whether it was
21 from --

22 Q. Something else.

23 A. -- exertion or so, you know, I don't know. I just
24 assigned a medic from -- was it Engine 3 or Engine 7's medic to --

25 Q. A medic.

1 A. Right. To take care of that person. Eventually called
2 an ambulance. Medic 30-B, I believe it was, showed up and
3 transported that firefighter to Providence.

4 Q. And was this firefighter -- did this firefighter have
5 air with him?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Do you recall?

8 A. Yes, they had full PPE, SCBA.

9 Q. So as far as you were concerned, they were properly
10 outfitted for being --

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. -- down in the tunnel --

13 A. Correct, had --

14 Q. -- as opposed to having no air?

15 A. Correct. Definitely.

16 Q. Very good.

17 A. Definitely.

18 Q. Okay, please continue.

19 A. So then I radioed that back to, you know, the incident
20 commander to tell him that three members came up, so that if he
21 did an accountability that, you know, those members were counted
22 for.

23 Q. For tracking purposes.

24 A. Right. Since they did not exit where they had entered.
25 After that we pretty much, you know, just remained up -- you know,

1 I remained topside with Engine 7. Like I said, they were the, you
2 know, the accountability company. The other companies were down
3 below. After a period of time it was, you know, declared that
4 they were no longer needed down there so they came up. We did an
5 accountability, which I reported that we were even, all members
6 were topside and, you know, that one member of Tower 3 was
7 transported to the hospital. After that we were placed in service
8 and that was about it.

9 Q. As far as you know there was only that one firefighter
10 that had medical difficulties?

11 A. At my end, yes.

12 Q. Your end. Okay.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Very good. Okay, next step of the process, were things
15 winding down at that point?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. So you were pretty much winding down in preparation of
18 packing up and going back to your fire station or going over to
19 incident command?

20 A. No, back to the fire station. We were returned to
21 service.

22 Q. Okay, very good. That completes my questioning. We'll
23 pass it on to the next line of questions.

24 BY MR. ROURKE:

25 Q. Yeah, Chief. Denton Rourke from Metro. I'm going to

1 ask you just some general questions about Metro training and Metro
2 incident management and then maybe a few questions about this one
3 in particular.

4 A. Okay.

5 Q. Can you describe for me just from your point of view the
6 Metro training program for the fire department? This can be stuff
7 that you do with Metro or that you do at the battalion or that
8 your companies do at the station level.

9 A. We do go -- I do send companies out for Metro inspection
10 periodically. You know, they go down and do the station, the
11 platform inspections. I just had CB-EMIS training Friday.
12 They're, you know, redoing the CB-EMIS program. You know, check
13 out the equipment each morning when assuming duty, you know, the
14 Metro bag, et cetera.

15 Q. Um-hum.

16 A. That's kind it, you know, other than any responses
17 that we would have.

18 Q. Right. Is the station level drills managed at the
19 station level or does the battalion chief manage that?

20 A. It's generally at the station level. I might tell a
21 company that today, you know, Engine 16, you'll be the one, you
22 know, doing Metro inspections or -- so, just due to other training
23 and other things that are going on, that we don't have everyone
24 out at one time doing training, you know, of some sort or, you
25 know, whatever they might be doing.

1 Q. And how about Metro training that you participated in?
2 I know you've been with them a long time, so -- but just whatever
3 you can recall?

4 A. Yeah. Well, just, you know, various Metro inspections.
5 You know, the CB-EMIS training, you know -- I just can't remember
6 all the trainings that I've had over, you know, the course of 30
7 years.

8 Q. How about, have you ever participated or when the last
9 time you participated in a full-scale Metro exercise? This could
10 have been something that happened at after hours, 2 in the morning
11 or early on a Saturday or Sunday morning.

12 A. Wow. I can't remember, you know, of any time that I did
13 or when it might have been.

14 Q. Okay. So what's the -- just briefly, what is the DCFD
15 SOG for commanding a Metro incident, managing a Metro incident?

16 A. You would send -- initially you would send the recon,
17 you know, supervisor -- or group down to recon. It would be two
18 engines and a truck. Of course, Level 3 accountability is always
19 in when we do a Metro.

20 Q. And what is -- briefly, what is that? That's --

21 A. We have a company at the top of the escalators that will
22 take everyone's PAT tag and account for everyone that's going down
23 into the Metro and then when they come back out, you do a physical
24 accountability, hand the person's tag back to them, you know, so
25 that you're sure that all the tags of the people that went down

1 came back out. We also do it by radio as well, you know, make
2 sure that everyone is --

3 Q. And how do you make sure that they get all the tags?

4 A. They just -- you hand them to them.

5 Q. Well, like, at L'Enfant, there's three entrances.

6 A. Well, you go in and come out of one entrance.

7 Q. They designate one entrance?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Yeah. One, yeah -- sorry.

11 Q. No problem.

12 A. Yeah, one entrance is designated as the entry control
13 point.

14 MR. DOWNS: If I may interject?

15 MR. ROURKE: Um-hum.

16 MR. DOWNS: In this particular case, this is a major
17 station of Metro. It has three entrances. We have testimony
18 where the passengers were evacuating through all three exits.
19 Your standard protocol, correct me if I'm wrong, please, is that
20 you have a maximum of two control stations, accountability
21 stations. Having a third exit point of the Metro, would that
22 complicate things in terms of the accountability process? Is this
23 something that the fire department might want to think about in
24 terms of future events?

25 MR. HULL: It definitely would complicate, yes. We do

1 have a primary entrance where the entrance control is, and then do
2 have a secondary, you know, at times as well. So, yeah, a third
3 would definitely complicate the situation.

4 MR. DOWNS: Very good.

5 BY MR. ROURKE:

6 Q. All right. Thank you. So what is the role of, what
7 is -- is there a role for a Metro police official or a rail
8 supervisor in the command structure?

9 A. I know when I get on the scene, generally, you know, I
10 look for or one of the members, now I'm not always sure who or
11 what it is, gets in the back seat of the buggy and, yes, I do
12 communicate with that member. It is helpful at times because our
13 radios are, what would I say, less than good in the Metro. It
14 seems that the Metro, you know, police or Metro officials do have
15 better radios, so there are times that, you know, we do kind of
16 use that. And also with them going back and forth to OCC, that is
17 a help.

18 Q. And would you consider that to be like a unified -- do
19 you think -- let me say that. Is Metro a good place for a unified
20 command?

21 A. What do you mean; in my buggy? Is that a --

22 Q. Well, wherever you want to have it, but having a Metro
23 official there and hand-in-hand with you?

24 A. Yeah, I think it's handy.

25 Q. All right. So going back to the fan shaft that you got

1 dispatched to.

2 A. Okay.

3 Q. You said that when you arrived on scene there was
4 nothing evident --

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. - no smoke, fire coming out?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Was there any -- do you know of any communications
9 between OUC and Metro related to that shaft?

10 A. I do not know of any, no.

11 Q. All right. And was there any Metro -- anybody from
12 Metro there when you first got there?

13 A. That I don't remember. I do remember that shortly
14 afterwards there were upwards of five, I want to say Metro police,
15 but --

16 MR. DOWNS: Transit police officers?

17 MR. HULL: Something -- yes. Yes, I know several of
18 them, you know, had badges and didn't have side arms.

19 BY MR. ROURKE:

20 Q. Um-hum. Okay.

21 A. Whether they all did or not, that, you know, I --

22 Q. Right. And then so describe for me when it transitioned
23 from being your run at the fan shaft to being a part of the
24 overall L'Enfant incident?

25 A. Okay. When my aide and I, we were in the buggy -- and,

1 you know, the battalion chiefs have an aide who drives and assists
2 as needed. When we heard that there was, you know, a Metro box
3 being put out, then we monitored both channels. I want to say
4 that we at the vent shaft were on A3 and the Metro box was on A7.
5 We monitored both channels.

6 At that point we did -- or I did call the command post
7 on my cell phone and, you know, asked if they wanted to, you know,
8 merge the two events. At that time it was said, yes, that they
9 did want to. And so, therefore, then we switched to A7, although
10 we did have a radio on A3 just in case any of my members that were
11 there, you know, didn't get the message, you know, so that we
12 would still have communication with them.

13 Q. Right. Did they -- when you called them on -- did they
14 know you were there and what you were doing there?

15 A. I'm not sure if they did immediately. You're talking
16 about the command post at L'Enfant?

17 Q. Right. To your knowledge, did they know that there
18 was --

19 A. A separate incident?

20 Q. -- an alarm for smoke coming from a vent shaft as well?

21 A. That I don't know. I don't remember if -- but in a
22 minute or so, you know, I briefed them and --

23 BY MR. DOWNS:

24 Q. And that was a radio conversation that you briefed them
25 on or telephone?

1 A. No. I went through cell phone.

2 Q. Cell phone. Okay.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Yeah. We're experiencing, Chief, the problem that most
5 cell phone communications, unfortunately, aren't recorded. So
6 we're trying to get timestamps for these key --

7 A. Right.

8 Q. -- communication points. Did you compile notes, by
9 chance, of the various principal activity bullets during --

10 A. I did have a worksheet, yes.

11 Q. Okay. And would that be captured on there, by chance?

12 A. I can look and see.

13 Q. Okay. Well, I don't want to burden that right now. We
14 can defer that for the moment.

15 A. No. I don't have that on my sheet.

16 Q. Don't have that on there. Are we able to offer a best
17 guess recollection of that, when that occurred?

18 A. No, sir.

19 Q. Everything jumbles together at that point?

20 A. Right. It was, I want to say, 15 minutes after we
21 arrived, and that is purely a "pulled out of thin air" guess.

22 Q. Okay. That's fine.

23 MR. DOWNS: Go ahead. Sorry.

24 MR. ROURKE: As a note, before I forget, I don't know if
25 we -- if you all requested the tapes of that particular alarm to

1 match up with the whole overarching thing.

2 MR. DOWNS: We did request all the communication tapes.

3 MR. ROURKE: Did they get that run to the vent shaft; do
4 you know? It may be helpful to figure out the timeline.

5 MR. HAWKINS: Okay. So we can get the recordings from
6 this incident as it transitioned into L'Enfant Plaza.

7 MR. ROURKE: Right. Then we could match them up. It
8 might help a little bit with the timeline.

9 MR. HAWKINS: We can get that.

10 MR. DOWNS: Yeah. Yeah, that will be helpful, yes.

11 MR. HAWKINS: We got some subsequent interviews coming
12 up with OUC so we can get all of that.

13 MR. ROURKE: Okay. Okay, that's good. Yeah.

14 BY MR. ROURKE:

15 Q. All right, so you said Truck 10, you sent them down to
16 check?

17 A. Correct. Along with a medic from -- either Engine 3 or
18 Engine 7's medic. I'm not sure which one it was.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. So there were six -- first of all, two guys went down.
21 Then I sent down Truck 10, which was five guys, and then along
22 with the medic, which would have made six. And then I sent down
23 two additional -- I sent down the officer from Engine 3 along with
24 one of his members to stay just at the bottom of the vent shaft
25 to -- for communication purposes.

1 MR. DOWNS: Kind of like a forward command for you?

2 MR. HULL: Correct. Well, or to relay messages that I
3 might not have been getting.

4 BY MR. ROURKE:

5 Q. Right. And so, do you -- what did -- so when they went
6 down, did they -- we'll assume they, assume -- we'll, we shouldn't
7 assume. But do you know what'd they do? That's my question.

8 A. Engine 13's members when they went down -- and you'll be
9 interviewing Lieutenant Johnson here in a minute, he was Engine
10 13's officer. Him and one member went down. I'm not exactly sure
11 to -- you know, I can't testify exactly to what they did.

12 Q. Um-hum.

13 A. You know, I told them just to assist any other
14 passengers that might be coming out that way, you know, in any way
15 that they could. When we did have those two come out, you know,
16 then I decided to send down Truck 10, like I said, with an extra
17 medic just in case there were members that, you know, needed some
18 kind of medical -- you know, higher medical than what the EMTs
19 could provide.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. And, again, you'll be talking with
22 Lieutenant Kalinowski, who was Truck 10's officer.

23 Q. So you don't know if they stayed at the bottom of the
24 shaft or if they went one way or the other?

25 A. They did not stay at the bottom of the shaft.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. They did not. Those members did not. Engine 3's
3 members, which was DJ, which I don't believe you're going to be
4 interviewing him. Him and his member did stay at the bottom of
5 the shaft as, you know, a communication relay.

6 Q. Um-hum. But you're unclear of where the other eight
7 personnel went?

8 A. Correct. I do know they went down the tunnel and I do
9 believe they wound up at the train eventually, but I -- they can
10 testify to that better than I can.

11 Q. Okay. I think the only thing I have -- that struck me
12 was that the three from the Truck 3 that came upstairs --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- and transported one.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Did the other two go back down or did they go home?

17 A. No. They stayed up with us and then were transported
18 back. One of the engine companies, and I can't remember which
19 one, either Engine 3, Engine -- took them back to, you know, to
20 meet up with the tower then and they came back to the station.

21 Q. And did -- was the Truck 3 officer aware of where they
22 were?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. That's all I've got right now. Thanks.

25 MR. PAYAN: I'll go last if that's okay.

1 MS. BURTCH: I'm gonna pass right now.

2 MR. DOWNS: So, you're going to pass?

3 MS. BURTCH: Pass.

4 MR. DOWNS: Chief, any questions?

5 BY MR. HAWKINS:

6 Q. Yes. Derron Hawkins, D.C. Fire and EMS. So,
7 Chief Hull, regarding Metro training, you stated that you
8 participated in a -- had companies participate in inspections and
9 you had had various training over the course of your years of
10 service. So, currently, do you feel that D.C. Fire and EMS is
11 ready to respond or capable to respond to Metro incidents based on
12 your training and experience?

13 A. I think so. You know, training's always a good thing,
14 but, you know, I think that -- you know, it is part of probation,
15 so obviously you get it coming on. And then with being downtown,
16 you know, with so many stations there, you know, we do do
17 training, you know, whether it's individual, company level or
18 whether it is larger. You know, so, yes, I think that our
19 training is, you know, is good.

20 Q. Okay. Also regarding communications, you've spent a lot
21 of time in the 6th Battalion. Can you explain what is
22 communication procedures when we start to experience problems with
23 communications inside a Metro station?

24 A. Well, there's several things we can do. You can switch
25 to a talk-around channel, which is, you know, channel 15 or 16.

1 It's more like a walkie-talkie line of sight communication. If
2 that doesn't work from in the station to the -- I'll say to the
3 buggy, then we may have, you know, put like runners, you know,
4 where they're spaced so far apart and then you just, you know, go
5 with your radios that distance.

6 Q. Um-hum.

7 A. Cell phones are, you know, are another option. There's
8 been several occasions when, you know, I've gotten a cell phone
9 call from someone that's down relaying information. I know that's
10 not a timestamped official way, but, you know, as firemen we kind
11 of make things work sometimes, you know, to get the job done.

12 Q. Sure.

13 A. And then as a last resort you could just have a physical
14 runner. You know, but I say that that's last resort due to time,
15 you know, that that would take for a person to actually, you know,
16 do the running.

17 Q. I have one more question for you. So once you
18 transition from your fan shaft and you became a part of the
19 L'Enfant Plaza box, what was your tactical assignment?

20 A. I was then the FL-1 fan vent shaft supervisor.

21 Q. Okay. So you was the --

22 A. So I was kind of put into my own little group, I guess
23 you'd say.

24 Q. And that was a -- okay.

25 A. Yeah. It was my --

1 Q. Fan shaft supervisor?

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. FL-1 fan shaft supervisor.

4 A. Yeah. So I was kind of my own little thing, my own
5 little area. And then I did report back, you know, with the
6 accountability and, you know, what we had to operations.

7 I'm not sure of my, you know, exact designation but it
8 was something, you know, that was -- you know, FL-1 or fan shaft
9 supervisor, something to that effect.

10 Q. Okay. Okay, and you mentioned that Level 3
11 accountability was established at the fan shaft. What about the
12 whole overall incident, Level 3 accountability, was it
13 established? Were you aware of it established, the L'Enfant Plaza
14 box assignment?

15 A. That I can't say. I do know that I heard them doing
16 accountabilities and then that's when I chimed in. You know, when
17 I was called for my members, I chimed in. So I hate to use the
18 word assume, but, you know, just from the radio traffic that I
19 heard and then when they called me for my accountability, I just
20 guessed that, you know, they had been doing Level 3 there as well.

21 Q. Okay. So under your command structure, what was the
22 companies you had again?

23 A. I had Engine 13, Engine 7, Engine 3 and Truck 10.

24 Q. Okay. And Truck 10. Okay.

25 A. And then like I say, when we transported the

1 firefighter, Medic 30-B was also, you know, assigned there then as
2 well, but that was later after we called.

3 Q. Medic 30 was called.

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. Okay. Okay, that's all I have right now.

6 BY MR. DOWNS:

7 Q. Thank you. Downs, NTSB again. Chief, when you arrived
8 at the vent shaft, did you establish your own incident command at
9 your particular site?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And did -- was it elevated at all to a unified command
12 or it -- you didn't need to elevate it at that point because the
13 event had not escalated to the degree of necessity of a unified
14 command, or no?

15 A. That is correct, I did not escalate it. I just stayed
16 in my own little, you know, command there.

17 Q. I see. And when you became aware of the box alarm, you
18 then deferred your command to the main incident command, the
19 unified command process back at L'Enfant? Would that be an
20 accurate characterization?

21 A. Yes. And then I was like the supervisor of my area of
22 the vent shaft.

23 Q. Your particular branch?

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. Would that be a good way of saying it?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. The vent shaft branch --

3 A. Branch.

4 Q. -- for lack of a better description.

5 A. That'll work.

6 Q. Very good. Okay. Let's divert a little bit on your
7 personal work history and experience. You say you're a 30-year
8 veteran of the fire department?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you give us the highlights, the bullets of 30-year
11 career? I'm not looking for detailed dates or anything. Just
12 give us a rundown of your experience.

13 A. Okay. I was appointed to Engine 19 as a firefighter,
14 was a pumper driver there.

15 Q. This is '85?

16 A. That was 1985, yes.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. You know, after completing training school.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Then I was a sergeant at Truck 17. Then they put the
21 4th Platoon in service or in however. So I went to Engine 23 as a
22 sergeant but I was a platoon commander because they did not have
23 enough lieutenants at that time.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Took the lieutenant's exam, was promoted to lieutenant,

1 went to Engine 33. Was there for, you know, 3½, 4 years. Was
2 promoted to captain. Went to Truck 5, was there but a minute so
3 to speak. Went to Engine 8, was there for 2, 2½ years at Engine
4 8. From Engine 8, I went to Truck 11. From -- let's see, from
5 there, I was involved in a collision, was off for about 9 months.

6 Q. A collision?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Accident or you mean your --

9 A. Yes. Engine 24 --

10 Q. -- apparatus collision?

11 A. Yes. Yeah.

12 Q. And you recovered from that?

13 A. Yes. After knee surgery and et cetera, et cetera. I
14 then wound up doing 2 years of day work as a regulations officer,
15 working in the basement of Grimke, basically under the fire chief.
16 From there I went to Engine 5 and then I went to the safety
17 office, was in the safety office for about 5 years. Then I was
18 promoted to battalion chief in 2011. Then I was assigned to the
19 2nd Battalion for about 2 years and then assigned to the 6th
20 Battalion.

21 Q. Very good. Thank you for that summary. I see you
22 brought some notes of the event. This is your worksheet?

23 A. Yes. This was --

24 Q. And this would be available to the investigation through
25 Chief Hawkins here. Is this something that's normally collected

1 as part of the process?

2 A. It's not normally collected, but it's just something
3 that I just --

4 Q. Well, we try to capture it because it's the
5 investigation.

6 A. I just thought it might be helpful or to jog my memory
7 depending what, you know, kind of questions were asked and so on.

8 Q. That's perfectly appropriate. Thank you.

9 A. You know, I'm not sure there's much on there that will
10 help, but --

11 Q. We're looking for all we can because, like I mentioned
12 before, we're not able to -- we're discovering we're not able to
13 really capture the timestamps of the various communications that
14 were by the various agency-issued cell phones, for example,
15 because that's just not recorded. Okay. Let's go over to the
16 topic of radios. First of all, radios in this event and then
17 generally the new digital radios that were issued maybe a year ago
18 or so.

19 A. Okay.

20 Q. In this event, did you have -- any challenges with the
21 use of your ordinary radios that you were using?

22 A. Yes. There was some communications we could not get
23 from inside the tunnel out.

24 Q. So you're at the topside and you had your crew down at
25 the bottom of the shaft, which is like 80 feet down or whatever.

1 And from my inspection of the site, you have just a series of
2 grates and you've got basically an open shot, top to bottom --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- where you could actually yell down. And you're
5 saying to me you had radio challenges down to the bottom of the
6 shaft?

7 A. No. To the bottom of the shaft, we were okay.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. But the members that were up the tunnel, we had
10 problems. That's --

11 Q. So as soon as they left from the bottom of the shaft, as
12 soon as they started going down a tunnel to some degree, you'd
13 lose them?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. That's why I sent the company to the bottom of the shaft
17 to do the relay.

18 Q. Relay at the bottom, and that solved the problem for the
19 most part?

20 A. Yes. I had them go to channel A6, which was not used in
21 the incident, although it's --

22 Q. Available.

23 A. -- part of the group. Basically 3, 4, 5, and 6 would be
24 like one group; 7, 8, 9, 10 would be another. So I had them go to
25 A6 and that way then they could communicate, you know, back and

1 forth.

2 Q. I see. Did you have to resort to runners, physical
3 runners at all --

4 A. No, I didn't.

5 Q. -- or just the relay? Radio relay worked?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Very good.

8 A. No runners.

9 Q. Generally your experience the last year or so with
10 radios, particularly in the Metro tunnels or out in the open air.
11 You have some challenges there you can tell us about?

12 A. Yes, we do.

13 Q. Fill us in.

14 A. Just in the open air, they're pretty -- you know,
15 they're fine. In the Metro, no, we have -- again, it might be a
16 hit and miss. Some are fine; some are not.

17 Q. Dead spots?

18 A. Yes. And --

19 Q. Is that principally the problem is dead spots?

20 A. Yes, yes. You know, some stations may be fine and then
21 some may not. Just general radios overall, some buildings same
22 way. You go into a building, you know, you get honked out,
23 there's nothing.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Other buildings are fine.

1 Q. Okay. Has the agency been researching the challenges,
2 the difficulties, upon receiving reports over the past year or so?
3 Do you know?

4 A. Yes, they are.

5 Q. Successful? Yes or no?

6 A. That I'm not sure of. I do know that they are working
7 on that and --

8 Q. And there's ongoing issues as far as you know?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Very good. That concludes the radio part.
11 Relationships with Transit Police Department, generally and in
12 this particular event. Can you offer anything?

13 A. I generally have no problems with them. They seem to be
14 very helpful. In this event, yes, they were very helpful. You
15 know, they were there, you know, willing to help in any capacity
16 that they could. And, you know, I'm always, you know, welcome for
17 their help, you know. So, I mean --

18 Q. How about relationships with WMATA OCC? Are there
19 challenges there sometimes, generally?

20 A. They're generally helpful. I do know that sometimes
21 calling in, you know, to establish whether the third rail's down
22 and that, get put on hold --

23 Q. And this is something that you've really not welcomed in
24 terms of needing to know straightaway?

25 A. Yeah, you know, they're very -- they're not mean or ugly

1 or anything of that nature. It's just that, you know, they --

2 Q. Sounds like they might be busy.

3 A. That could be or they're just not exactly sure, you
4 know, what to do or how to help or, you know, something of that
5 nature and you get put on hold. Of course, you know, that -- once
6 you're on hold, you're -- you may as well be hung up then. You
7 know, it's --

8 Q. And it sounds like it's very frustrating for --

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. It is. And --

12 Q. Okay. And you've been --

13 A. -- sometimes the incident commander's calling, you know,
14 is the third rail down and, well, I'm on hold, you know.

15 Q. And you've been incident commander so far as other WMATA
16 Metro events and have had the same issues with OCC during those
17 events?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Very good. Okay, digress a little bit. In your command
20 at Battalion 6, that serves several Metro stations, I believe?

21 A. Several, yes.

22 Q. And it's obvious that you yourself and your crews need
23 to know about Metro cars. I'm going to ask you about emergency
24 access doors. Spot quiz. Emergency access doors on Metro cars,
25 what's your understanding of how they work? We're asking all of

1 our interviewees, so don't feel like we're pointing it out to you.

2 A. I'm not really sure.

3 Q. Fair enough. If that's what your -- it's been a while,
4 it sounds like, since training?

5 A. It has been, you know, to that level, yes.

6 Q. Okay, that's fair enough. We can move on.

7 MR. DOWNS: That concludes my questions for the moment.
8 We have our next round of questioning starts.

9 BY MR. ROURKE:

10 Q. Yeah, Denton Rourke again from Metro, Chief. There was
11 a report from an incident maybe a week before the one on January
12 12th, that there were radio issues at L'Enfant Plaza. Were you --
13 before this incident this morning, were you aware that there were
14 reported issues at L'Enfant Plaza radio?

15 A. Yes. I believe that one of my companies had gone and
16 tested the radios, you know, had done the Metro inspection and,
17 you know, the radios were weak, at which time I got the reports
18 and forwarded them up, you know, up the chain.

19 Q. And does that get reported then throughout the battalion
20 or throughout the city?

21 A. It does to, you know, to my battalion, my shift, you
22 know, through me. Now, when I send it up, you know, up the chain
23 of command, I'm not exactly sure where it goes or what happens at
24 that point.

25 Q. All right. So but you notified your companies on your

1 shift?

2 A. Yes, my -- yes, yes.

3 Q. And you pass that, I assume -- well, I don't want to
4 lead you. Do you pass that along to the next shift?

5 A. Yes. Yes. Now whether, you know, he passes it on to
6 his company is --

7 Q. Right.

8 A. Once again, the generally the technicians and the
9 officers, you know, of the offgoing will pass along information to
10 the oncoming shifts as well. So, you know, sometimes that gets
11 passed along, but sometimes if you have a detail officer, he might
12 not think that that's important.

13 MR. DOWNS: Let me intercede with a question --

14 MR. ROURKE: Yeah, go ahead.

15 MR. DOWNS: -- if I may. When you make a report of
16 radio issues, does the department send around radio technicians to
17 investigate the issues that you report?

18 MR. HULL: That I don't know.

19 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

20 BY MR. ROURKE:

21 Q. Chief, when did you become aware, if you did -- well, I
22 know you did at least one point -- that there was a train stuck in
23 that tunnel?

24 A. It was -- again, I can't put a definite time on it, but
25 somewhere in the incident after we started -- after we were pulled

1 in or reassigned to the main Metro incident and we were on A7, it
2 did come across that there was a train and that they had multiple
3 casualties that they were evacuating.

4 BY MR. DOWNS:

5 Q. And this was before you saw the two train evacuees that
6 came up through the vent shaft?

7 A. It -- see, again, I can't remember exactly. It was --

8 Q. Which happened first? In other words, do you remember?

9 A. I want to say that the two members, the two train
10 evacuees came up first and said that there were possibly other,
11 you know, patients or persons there.

12 Q. So that was your first --

13 A. So then it starts --

14 Q. -- information that you had in terms of there was a
15 train down there?

16 A. That there could be a possible train, yes.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. And then by then we had already switched over to, you
19 know, to the main --

20 Q. So it was shortly thereafter that command communicated
21 with you that there was a train in the tunnel?

22 A. Perhaps not directly to me but just through
23 communications you --

24 Q. There was communications --

25 A. -- you ascertained --

1 Q. -- on the radio that you became aware of?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Correct.

5 MR. ROURKE: And how about, did you ever tell him --

6 MR. DOWNS: Him who?

7 BY MR. ROURKE:

8 Q. Did you ever tell the IC that you -- about the
9 passengers that came out of the shaft?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. All right.

12 A. Yes. And I informed him that we were sending other --
13 that I was sending other members down to, you know, check for any
14 additional passengers that may have followed those two. You know,
15 because I didn't know if there were, you know, maybe people passed
16 out along the right-away, you know, the rail line. So that was my
17 thought to go and assist, you know, in any way that we could.

18 Q. And is that -- right. Okay, good. And is that one
19 telephone or radio?

20 A. That was over the radio. I think the only time that I
21 used the phone was to contact before we were integrated into the
22 main Metro -- you know, to contact him to tell him that we were at
23 the vent shaft and that it was the same incident and if he wanted
24 us to, you know, come over.

25 Q. Okay. So let me ask you as a -- when did you get

1 promoted to battalion chief?

2 A. 2011.

3 Q. '11. So you've been a chief for 4 or 5 years now?

4 A. Yes. Yeah.

5 Q. With 30 years on the job. I know the IC was an acting
6 captain. He's got a lot of time on but he was acting.

7 A. He was a captain, acting battalion chief.

8 Q. Acting battalion chief, right.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did you get a feel for, when you switched over or when
11 you were listening to the radio, how his command control structure
12 was functioning?

13 A. I thought he was doing pretty well.

14 Q. That's all I got now. Thanks.

15 MR. PAYAN: All right. You doing okay? You need a
16 break or --

17 MR. HULL: Yeah. No, I'm --

18 MR. PAYAN: No? All right.

19 MR. HULL: -- I'm fine.

20 MR. PAYAN: All right. All right.

21 MR. DOWNS: Identify.

22 MR. PAYAN: This is Ruben from NTSB. You beat me to it.

23 BY MR. PAYAN:

24 Q. I know that some of these are getting repetitive but we
25 kind of -- we weren't there, so it kind of helps us a lot.

1 A. Right. I understand.

2 Q. So please bear with us. You mentioned two passengers
3 that were in the shaft.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did your firefighters let them out or did they open the
6 vents?

7 A. No, the -- we had -- the gate was -- the vents were
8 already open. So we --

9 MR. DOWNS: That's the topside door?

10 MR. HULL: Correct. Correct. The grates or whatever
11 you would officially call them. It did have a padlock on, but I
12 believe that the Metro keys that we had, had a key to that. I do
13 not think that they cut the lock.

14 BY MR. PAYAN:

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. But, again, you may have to refer --

17 Q. Sure.

18 A. -- to the -- you know, to Lieutenant Johnson or
19 Lieutenant Kalinowski for that.

20 Q. But it was your people that opened it?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Did you by any chance physically get up on the shaft?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Did you? Do you recall any kind of draft either coming
2 in or out or the direction of it?

3 A. I want -- there was not an air blowing out, you know,
4 that made you hold onto your hat, so to speak.

5 Q. Sure. Sure.

6 A. And there was not a draft pulling you down that if you
7 let go of a piece of paper that it sucked it fast.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. So, but I don't remember if there was, you know, like a
10 light air, you know, going one way or the other.

11 Q. Okay. And once you got your firefighters down the
12 shaft, did they report the status of the fans, whether they were
13 operating or shut down?

14 A. No, they did not.

15 Q. They did not. Okay. Do you recall hearing anything?

16 A. I do not.

17 Q. Do not. Okay. Once you assumed -- you were merged into
18 the bigger incident, the L'Enfant Plaza, were you reporting the
19 status of the fans, by any chance, or were you asked for the
20 status by anyone?

21 A. I don't remember.

22 Q. Okay. And then once your firefighters went down into
23 the tunnel, did they report seeing any kind of arcing or fire when
24 they were there?

25 A. No. They did not report seeing any arcing or any fire.

1 Q. Okay. I think that's all I got. Thank you.

2 MS. BURTCHE: I have no further questions.

3 MR. DOWNS: Chief?

4 MR. HAWKINS: I have no further questions. I'm good.

5 BY MR. DOWNS:

6 Q. Thank you. We're kind of wrapping up our questions
7 here, Chief, and I always like to give our witnesses the
8 opportunity to express or recall retrospective thoughts, meaning,
9 knowing what you know now, kind of in hindsight, as a learning
10 experience, thoughts that you might want to share with the
11 professional firefighting community or Metrorail? Things you
12 might do differently or have done differently in the future should
13 get an event of this sort? We're not suggesting that you did
14 anything wrong. Things that prior to events you just didn't see
15 because this is a first experience. Anything you can share with
16 us?

17 A. That's kind of tough. Nothing really jumps out at me.
18 No, I don't think that there was anything that I really would have
19 done differently. Maybe now just, you know, with the questions
20 and that, maybe, you know, maybe writing down some times. You
21 know, when --

22 Q. A little better documentation maybe?

23 A. Yeah. Yeah. You know --

24 Q. You had an aide, right?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Would it be fair to say that in the future you might
2 think, ah, let me make sure the aide is jotting down notes or
3 something like that?

4 A. Well, the aide was researching in the Metro maps to find
5 out exactly what map we were on so that we could get an official
6 designation of, you know, of where we were, you know, what the
7 shaft was actually called where we were. So he was engaged in
8 that as well as, you know, monitoring the different channels that
9 we were monitoring. So, you know -- you know, with that question
10 sitting here, maybe writing down a few times.

11 Q. Just a little more documentation for your
12 retrospective --

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. -- report writing?

15 A. You know, had I known that it was going to go, you know,
16 to this extent, maybe sending, you know, more personnel down
17 immediately, not waiting for, you know, for passengers to come
18 there. But again, that could, you know, get into -- get you into
19 some trouble too. You send guys down, not exactly knowing, you
20 know, what the situation is at the other end, so --

21 Q. So in other words, more recon initially to --

22 A. Perhaps, you know, knowing now what -- you know, had I
23 known now what I know, you know, back then, I probably would have
24 sent more guys sooner. But, you know, thinking of the safety of
25 my members as well, you know, I didn't want to send guys into the

1 unknown.

2 Q. And you had plenty SCBA and all that --

3 A. Yes, we did.

4 Q. -- so you wouldn't necessarily have an initial -- or
5 have a concern over air for a while.

6 A. No. Correct.

7 Q. You could always get more air if needed?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Okay. Anything else comes to mind?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Okay. Very good. Go ahead.

14 MR. ROURKE: Do you all use the 30 or 45 minute bottles?

15 MR. HULL: We have 60 minute, although you might get 45.

16 MR. ROURKE: You don't get that -- right. Okay, 60-
17 minute bottles. All right. Thanks.

18 MR. HULL: Yeah.

19 MR. ROURKE: That was was Denton Rourke from Metro.

20 MR. HULL: Yeah.

21 BY MR. DOWNS:

22 Q. No further retrospective thoughts then?

23 MR. ROURKE: Sorry about that.

24 Q. Okay. Other than more recon initially maybe knowing
25 what you know now --

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. -- and better documentation, should the event escalate
3 to a --

4 A. Timestamps, yeah.

5 Q. Very good.

6 A. Time documentation.

7 Q. Communications about reversing the fan directions, were
8 you aware of any communications that came along your way, by
9 chance?

10 A. I did not hear anything.

11 Q. Didn't hear anything? We had other testimony, various
12 individuals where there was a request to reverse fanning
13 operations, and I was curious if you had heard anything about
14 that?

15 A. I had not heard anything.

16 Q. Okay. That kind of winds up my questions.

17 MR. DOWNS: Do we have any final questions from anyone?

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

19 MR. DOWNS: All right. That concludes the interview.

20 Thank you very much.

21 MR. HULL: Thank you.

22 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

23

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015
Interview of Jeffrey Hull

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, DC

DATE: February 2, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Heidi E. Gardner
Transcriber

Page 6 line 24 should read "Maine Ave. SW"

Page 6 line 25 should read "SW"

JH
 *2/21/15*
JH

[signed: Jeffrey Hull]