



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Investigative Hearing

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Metrorail train 302 that encountered heavy smoke in the tunnel between the L'Enfant Plaza Station and the Potomac River Bridge on January 12, 2015

GROUP	
EXHIBIT	

Agency / Organization

Title

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA *

STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C. *

JANUARY 12, 2015 *

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Docket No.: DCA-15-FR-004

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Interview of: THOMAS DEAN

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday,
January 28, 2015

The above-captioned matter convened, pursuant to notice.

BEFORE: RICHARD DOWNS, JR.
Survival Factors Investigator

APPEARANCES:

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Chairman, Survival Factors Technical Working Group
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I N T E R V I E W

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2 MR. DOWNS: Today's date is January 28, 2015 and the
3 following is an interview being conducted in reference to NTSB
4 Investigation Number DCA-15-FR-004 which relates to an accident
5 involving a heavy smoke release and train evacuations that
6 occurred in and near the L'Enfant Plant Station of the WMATA Metro
7 Rail System here in Washington, D.C. on the afternoon of
8 January 12, 2015.

9 This interview is being conducted with a member of the
10 District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
11 Department as conducted by the NTSB Survival Factors Technical
12 Working Group of the investigation.

13 My name is Richard Downs, Jr. I am a -- and I am a
14 Survival Factors Investigator with the NTSB in which I also serve
15 in the role as a Survival Factors Technical Working Group
16 Chairperson. I will preside over this interview which is being
17 recorded for the record in which a transcript may also be compiled
18 of the recording as a permanent docketed record of the interview.

19 I now ask that our witness please identify themselves,
20 their employment affiliation and job position title for the
21 record.

22 MR. DEAN: My name is Thomas Paul Dean. I'm a Battalion
23 Fire Chief with the D.C. Fire and EMS.

24 MR. DOWNS: Thank you for joining us, Chief. And you're
25 not accompanied by anyone?

1 MR. DEAN: No, sir.

2 MR. DOWNS: Very good. Thank you. And now I'll ask
3 that the participants of this interview who will also have an
4 opportunity to present questions to the witness to please identify
5 themselves individually and their employment affiliation and job
6 position title for the record.

7 MR. ROURKE: Good morning. I'm Denton Rourke. I'm with
8 WMATA's Office of Emergency Management. I am the Operations
9 Manager.

10 MS. BURTCHE: Good morning. I'm Kimberly Burtch with the
11 Federal Transit Administration's Office of Transit Safety and
12 Oversight.

13 MR. HAWKINS: Good morning. Derron T. Hawkins, Deputy
14 Fire Chief, D.C. Fire and EMS, Homeland Security Division.

15 MR. BLACKISTONE: Steve Blackistone, National
16 Transportation Safety Board Office of Communications.

17 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Good morning, Chief Dean. I'm
18 Sharmila Samarasinghe. I'm with the Tri-State Oversight
19 Committee.

20 MR. DEAN: Good morning.

21 MR. GORDON: Joe Gordon with the National Transportation
22 Safety Board, Investigator-In-Charge on the WMATA incident.

23 To add just a few things to what Mr. Downs has already
24 said, the purpose of the NTSB investigation is to enhance safety
25 and we're looking for process improvements, not here to assign any

1 fault or blame. And to the transcript that Mr. Downs spoke of
2 that will go into the public docket, NTSB cannot offer any
3 guarantee of confidentiality or immunity from any legal action or
4 anything of that nature.

5 With that, I'll turn it over to Mr. Downs to start with
6 the interview there.

7 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

8 INTERVIEW OF THOMAS DEAN

9 BY MR. DOWNS:

10 Q. And as my first question for our witness, would you
11 please describe for us, Chief, your role or involvement in this
12 particular event?

13 A. On this incident, I responded on the second alarm as a
14 Battalion Chief. I was initially placed in staging and then was
15 ordered to command post. And once at command post, I went to the
16 incident commander and was given Medical Branch.

17 Q. So your responsibility was the Medical Branch Director
18 position?

19 A. Yes, sir. Myself and Chief John Silers (ph.) were both
20 assigned to Medical Branch.

21 Q. And you worked that jointly?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. Did either of you have a specific role or assignment to
24 address? In other words, we understand there were two medical
25 vehicles that responded to the scene. Did you each work one of

1 the vehicles or how did that -- how would that work?

2 A. What we did was, once we were assigned to Medical
3 Branch, we went to the back of the chief's buggy and got the
4 command board out to try to wrap our heads around what was going
5 on. I think at the time, the Medical Branch was not in place and
6 this was later on into the incident. So we tried to gather what
7 units we already had on the scene, where our victims were at and
8 because of the inclement weather, we slid of over to Assistant
9 Chief Mills' buggy, which is a Tahoe.

10 And myself and him sat in the buggy and tried to wrap
11 our heads around what was going; potential number of victims and
12 units we had there and trying to make heads or tails of everything
13 and try to get something going so we could get these people to the
14 hospital.

15 Q. Very good, Chief. Thank you. And could you please
16 describe for us in your own words what occurred on the day of the
17 event relative to your actions and involvement at the L'Enfant
18 Plaza Station response? In other words, you've set it up as to
19 what your role was. Maybe just start with your arrival at the
20 scene.

21 A. Okay. I arrived on scene. Like I said, I arrived in
22 staging. I responded on the second alarm. Then not to benefit
23 myself, but when the incident initially was dispatched, I was
24 already engaged in something else, so I did not listen to the
25 incident until I was dispatched on the second alarm. So I really

1 had no idea what was going on, what the situation was.

2 I arrived in staging, initially took over the staging
3 officer responsibilities of the second alarm units that were there
4 and was keeping the incident commander apprised of what we had
5 there and if he needed anymore units. And then, like I said, I
6 was ordered to the command post and once there, myself and Chief
7 John Silers were given the Medical Branch. So we got all our
8 tools together and initially went to the back of the chief's
9 buggy, but because of the inclement weather, we switched our
10 operations over into the inside of Chief Mills' buggy because our
11 command post was out of service and it was out of state somewhere,
12 so we really didn't have a command vehicle there.

13 So we ran our operations from there. We decided to
14 switch everybody over that was assigned to the Medical Branch to a
15 different radio channel, A5. We went to A5. Once we got
16 everybody on A5, we were making contact with the units that we had
17 there to find out about, approximate, how many number of victims
18 we had and where we were going to set our treatment and triage
19 area up.

20 So what we decided to do, we set 9th and D and 7th and D
21 both were treatment and triage areas, requested mass casualty
22 units north and the south. We had the north mass casualty go to
23 7th and D, the south mass casualty go to 9th and D to start
24 assisting those victims there. We put Chief Spriggs in charge of
25 transport. He was running back and forth from both areas.

1 And an incident of this magnitude, it was -- I hate to
2 say it, but it was like a night of the living dead. People were
3 coming up out of the ground all over the place. We were getting
4 reports of people coming up from 7th and Maryland, 825 Water,
5 L'Enfant Plaza, over by 9th and D. So we were trying to wrap our
6 heads around the whole situation to figure out how we could get
7 these people to these areas to get them transported.

8 So with the radio communications, I got a gist of what
9 we did and who we put where, so with the units at 9th and D and
10 7th and D, we were being apprised by Chief Spriggs on how many
11 people that we needed to transport. We were getting the units in
12 place, i.e., the metro buses that we had there, the mass casualty
13 buses and the ALS and the BLS units to transport these victims.

14 So once we had that coordinated and once we had
15 everybody in place, everything seemed to go pretty smooth and in
16 total, we ended up transporting 83 people to area hospitals via
17 the buses or ground transport units, ALS and BLS units. And we
18 were there -- I think by the time we set up the Medical Branch, it
19 was a little after 4:00, because I was keeping an eye on the clock
20 that was in the chief's buggy. And in about 45 minutes, we got
21 everything together and we transported those 83 people to the
22 hospital.

23 And like I said, I was a little surprised that this was
24 not set up prior to our arrival because me and Chief Silers both
25 responded on the second alarm. At this time of the day, with the

1 crush load that's on Metro and the magnitude of it, this should
2 have transpired long before we got there and people should have
3 been prioritized and triaged and ready for transport.

4 But regardless of that, I'm not Monday night
5 quarterbacking anything because I said, I didn't listen to it. I
6 don't know how the incident went, but we did the best we could,
7 what we had at the time to get everybody in place, the key players
8 and get these victims to the hospital.

9 Q. Would it be a normal response protocol for a Metro event
10 where you have an initial report of smoke in the tunnel,
11 particularly during the onset of say a rush hour, evening rush
12 our, crush load environment, would the normal protocol be to
13 establish at the onset of the response to establish a Medical
14 Branch with the likelihood of folks coming up out of the subway
15 system there under smoke environment that you likely would have
16 medical issues at the very --

17 A. Absolutely.

18 Q. -- beginning?

19 A. Yeah. We have standard operating procedures or
20 guidelines, if you with and once you arrive on the scene, with the
21 incident command system, you start breaking everything down and
22 the Medical Branch is part of it. And --

23 Q. And --

24 A. -- that should have already been established.

25 Q. And that had not been established prior to your being

1 assigned?

2 A. Not that I know of.

3 Q. Not that you know of.

4 A. I mean, we didn't assume it from anybody. We were given
5 it to us when we arrived.

6 Q. So you initiated the process?

7 A. Yes, sir, myself and Chief Silers did.

8 Q. And you say that was about at 4:00 p.m.?

9 A. It was 4:00, a little after 4:00. I'm not --

10 Q. Around 4:00 --

11 A. -- exact on the --

12 Q. Around 4:00 p.m.

13 A. -- time frame.

14 Q. We're not trying to split hairs on the --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- time, but it was around 4:00 p.m.?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So the initial -- make sure I've got the timeline
19 correct in my mind. The initial D.C. Fire EMS arrival was
20 somewhere around 3:20 and it was about 40 minutes before -- that
21 you actually received the assignment and actually got set up to
22 where you could actually perform?

23 A. Yeah. I would say, give or take, because I know it was
24 20 to 25 minutes afterwards, roughly, before they hit the second
25 alarm. Our response time in rush hour traffic from Southeast to

1 7th and D, Southwest, and I sat in staging for approximately 5 to
2 10 minutes and then I had to make my way up to the command post
3 and then get our assignment. I'm guesstimating around 40 minutes
4 or so.

5 Q. Very good. That concludes my questions for the moment.
6 We'll move on to the next questioner.

7 MR. DOWNS: He talks fast. I've got to write fast.

8 BY MR. ROURKE:

9 Q. Chief -- Denton Rourke from Metro.

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. I'm going to ask you a few general questions about Metro
12 training and then we'll talk more specifically about L'Enfant
13 Plaza. Can you describe for me, the DCFD Metro Training Program?

14 A. I don't really think there is a training program in
15 place. We do train on Metro. We've been doing Metro Station
16 inspections and that's basically the familiarization for our
17 people to now where the standpipe systems are at, to know where
18 the outlets are at, where the E-tech cards are at, the different
19 rooms that are down there, the kiosk and so on and so forth.

20 And also, we have a lot of responses to Metro for
21 medical locals down on the platform. So -- and I know when my
22 companies go down there, they go down there and do a
23 familiarization with their selves and especially if they have
24 probationers. That's part of their probation as far as Metro.
25 They train with the hot sticks. They test the WSADs and so on and

1 so forth. So when they run medical locals down there, my
2 companies take the extra time to take a walk and take a look
3 around the Metro Station to get familiar just in case of an
4 incident of this magnitude happens and they'll know where
5 everything's at.

6 Q. All right. Kind of dovetail on that, you may not have
7 answered this. What about in a recruit school? Do you know what
8 kind of training they get these days in recruit school?

9 A. I don't believe they receive much of anything in a
10 recruit school in reference to Metro, but it's changed over the
11 years and I haven't been down there, so I cannot confirm that.

12 Q. Okay. How about -- and you talked a little about this
13 at the station level or the battalion level, you guys do training
14 on your own.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So what kind of -- besides the things you talk about, is
17 there any other stuff you all do?

18 A. Well, we used to go out to Pennsy Drive when that
19 facility opened up out there and drill with Metro on a regular
20 basis and different scenarios, using different tools that Metro
21 has that is accessible to us and what we have so we can get
22 familiar with a scenario like this and working with the train
23 cars, working on the third rail, but that kind of went by the
24 wayside 3½, 4 years ago.

25 Q. And what Metro training have you personally participated

1 in?

2 A. I've been Pennsy Drive several times and as a
3 Firefighter, a Sergeant, up through the ranks. I haven't been out
4 there as a Battalion Chief yet. The last I went out there, I was
5 a Captain and I got promoted to Captain in '09. So it was
6 probably about '10 was the last time I went out to Pennsy Drive
7 and participated in any type of training.

8 Q. And then you do stuff at the station level?

9 A. Yes. Yes.

10 Q. All right.

11 A. I accompany some of the -- when the companies go out to
12 do Metro Station inspection, I accompany them and we go around to
13 do our rounds every day to the firehouses, so we have drills on
14 the Metro. It's not actual hands on. It's kind of like a
15 knowledge saying I'll quiz them on what they know about Metro and
16 their procedures and if they're first, second, third or fourth two
17 engine company, what's their responsibilities to do; first
18 (indiscernible) truck, secondary truck, what their responsibility
19 is on the different aspects of the Metro Station, Metro tunnel and
20 so on and so forth.

21 Q. All right. Thank you. How about full scale exercises?

22 A. I've never been a part of one.

23 MR. DOWNS: Sorry, what was that?

24 MR. DEAN: I've never been a part of a full scale
25 exercise. Incident, yes.

1 MR. DOWNS: You have personally not participated in a
2 full scale?

3 MR. DEAN: Full scale exercise?

4 MR. DOWNS: Yes.

5 MR. DEAN: No.

6 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

7 Q. And you said you've done a CTF, so we got that. How
8 about incident management training for acting battalion chiefs?
9 You may not know anything about that because you are a Battalion
10 Chief, but --

11 A. Well, I mean they require us to do the online training
12 and take the classes, the 100, 200s, 300, the ISS, you know, 400
13 and so on, so forth. But other than that, classroom work, they'll
14 have you go down to the Training Academy and you get your Fire
15 Officer I, Fire Officer II, the Fire Ops classes, they have you
16 complete down there at the Training Academy.

17 Q. All right. And how about Metro specific incident
18 management training?

19 A. No.

20 Q. And did you attend joint supervisor training last year
21 (indiscernible) that would have been whether it was police, fire,
22 rail and bus folks altogether training on incident management?

23 A. I did not.

24 Q. And do you all have a specific command and control chart
25 worksheet?

1 A. Yes, sir. But we did find on this particular incident,
2 our worksheets are not compatible to an incident of this magnitude
3 and myself and John Silers afterwards, we're going to get together
4 and we're going to make up our own worksheet that would reflect
5 what we need to do on an incident like this.

6 Our mass casualty worksheets are not made for this for a
7 command position. It's good for the treatment and triage areas so
8 they can track the patients, but relative to what we were trying
9 to do -- and that's why I have it all written down on a piece of
10 paper, because I was using yellow notepads, writing everything
11 down. So I had to rewrite it again and then type it up. So
12 basically, we both understood who we had where and who transported
13 who where and so on and so forth, but --

14 Q. All right. And you're talking specifically about mass
15 casualty worksheets?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. Good. Well, thank you.

18 A. And our mass casualty worksheets work good for if we
19 have nine. What we declare as mass casualty is nine people, nine
20 to maybe a little bit more of that, but something to this
21 magnitude, our worksheets are not compatible to that.

22 MR. DOWNS: And this rework of the worksheet, if I may,
23 Chief, you're going to share that with your command structure and
24 ultimately, this will be like an after action result --

25 MR. DEAN: It will be --

1 MR. DOWNS: -- a peer review process?

2 MR. DEAN: Yes. Yes. We're going to work up a
3 worksheet. We'll present it to them as hey, this would work good
4 for an incident of this magnitude. This is -- because we lived it
5 and we'll present it to them for approval. And then it'll be on
6 the LAN for the other chief officers to be able to print out and
7 use --

8 MR. DOWNS: And --

9 MR. DEAN: -- as well.

10 MR. DOWNS: And allow the command structure to critique
11 and vet it and so forth --

12 MR. DEAN: Absolutely.

13 MR. DOWNS: -- that way, ultimately be approved for
14 official process during your responses?

15 MR. DEAN: That's our ultimate goal. Yes.

16 MR. DOWNS: Your ultimate goal. Very good.

17 Q. Let me find my mass casualty stuff here since that's
18 really what you talked about. So do you guys -- does the district
19 have a specific mass casualty incident above -- SOP above and
20 beyond what's in the Metro SOG -- SOP?

21 A. We have mass casualty worksheets and like I said, our
22 basic number is nine. Anything more than nine victims, we're
23 supposed to declare a mass casualty and we have a worksheet for
24 that, but that worksheet does not work for --

25 Q. Well, and you said (indiscernible) --

1 A. -- when you have X number of victims.

2 Q. How about in the actual Metro SOP? Is there anything in
3 there about mass casualty incidents?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can you describe that for us?

6 A. Well, in the Metro SOGs, in reference to an incident
7 such as this, they'll give us a breakdown of where we should have
8 treatment areas to triage patients, transporting people to the
9 hospital, notifying the hospitals of how many victims we had and
10 how many they can take. And where you do the ambulance loading
11 zone at, they have the ambulances come in.

12 They don't specifically say using alternate vehicles,
13 but you can use the Metro buses. We had the mass casualty buses
14 north and south that we can use and we can also line up -- line
15 them up in line where approach is to come in and pick up the
16 people and take to the hospital as well. But, yeah, our Metro SOG
17 touches on that.

18 Q. All right. Thank you. How many -- I know you said you
19 transported 84?

20 A. Eighty-three.

21 Q. Eighty-three. How many people did you actually touch?
22 Do you know how many they evaluated?

23 A. I believe all 83 people.

24 Q. Well, I mean there was more than that on the train.
25 Like the folks that you looked at that didn't go, do you know?

1 Was it --

2 A. I don't --

3 Q. -- more?

4 A. -- know that. As I said, we had people -- it was crush
5 load. I don't know what the amount of people were on the train.
6 I don't know how many people got tired of waiting and left. These
7 were the only people that we treated and transported that I'm
8 aware of.

9 Q. So it's an inclusive number. Okay.

10 A. And we get -- we have 83, somebody else has 84. The
11 84th person was a seizure patient at 6th and D that was not even
12 affiliated with the Metro incident. So they just kind of
13 categorized that one in with us, but we found out shortly after
14 that that had no bearing on the Metro incident at all.

15 MR. DOWNS: So there appears to be one additional
16 patient that was processed here that was not directly affiliated
17 with the event; is that what you're saying?

18 MR. DEAN: That's what I'm saying. Towards the latter
19 part of it, we had all the people transported to the hospital and
20 we went over to make sure that what they had at the incident
21 command post and what we had and what the transport officer had
22 were all the same. The incident commander had 84 and the 84th one
23 was as the incident was winding down. I believe it was at 6th and
24 D that Medic 17 -- don't quote me on that one -- transported a
25 seizure patient, but that seizure patient was not directly related

1 to the Metro incident itself.

2 Q. Okay. Did you have anybody from Metro at your --
3 helping you in EMS Branch?

4 A. No, sir. Besides the Metro bus driver.

5 Q. Right. And how did you get the Metro bus?

6 A. I'm not sure how it showed up. The transport officer
7 advised us that he had two Metro buses there at the treatment and
8 triage area and that he was going to utilize them to transport
9 some of the victims to the hospital. Then in fact, we had two
10 buses there, but we only utilized one bus which was Bus #2122 to
11 take 45 people to the hospital. The other one, we used to
12 transport 12 or 13 victims from 9th and D to 7th and D where that
13 bus was waiting at.

14 Q. And so you said you guys ended up with two casualty
15 collection points, for lack of a better term, at both of those --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- D Street --

18 A. Yes, sir.

19 Q. -- entrances? Okay. And I just want to ask you a
20 couple general questions and I'll pass it along to Val. I know
21 you weren't in the actual incident command structure of this
22 particular incident.

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. But what is -- from your point of view, what is the DCFD
25 procedure for managing a Metro incident?

1 A. For managing an incident?

2 Q. Yeah. Because this was one that's in your battalion.

3 A. Well, I mean, as the incident commander, once you arrive
4 on the scene, you have to find out what you have, you have to be
5 in contact with Metro and see how big the incident is. And then
6 we break it down into the recon branch, accountability, water
7 supply, safety. And to me, this incident should have been
8 upgraded to a tunnel box assignment, which gives you more
9 companies and more units rather than just a Metro Station
10 assignment. You only got one company out the alternate entrance.
11 Whereas, it was upgraded to a tunnel incident, you'd have more
12 companies there.

13 And then break it down and it's information. And a lot
14 of times, we're not getting that information from whether it be
15 Metro or the units down in the ground. Shortly after this, we ran
16 an incident at Takoma Park Metro, called Metro OCC and said hey,
17 we're responding to this incident, what do you have; we don't need
18 you. It's like, what do you mean, you don't need us? We were
19 called.

20 So a lot of times, the information is not getting
21 relayed from Metro OCC to us on the scene and/or we're delayed in
22 responding to a Metro incident because it seems like a lot of
23 times that Metro tries to take care of the situation before they
24 call us and then sometimes, we don't get the call later on in the
25 incident and it puts us behind the eight ball right from the

1 beginning.

2 Q. Okay. You talked about arrive on scene, find out what
3 you have, make contact with Metro. How is that done normally?
4 What's the --

5 A. Well, we have third DO (ph.) chief that runs this and
6 he's classified as a Metro liaison. So he's supposed to get on
7 the phone with OCC and report to Pennsy Drive and gather all the
8 information that he can from Metro OCC in reference to what the
9 situation is, the status of the third rail. And also, our first
10 DO engine and second DO engine and first DO truck are recon, which
11 is supposed to be headed up by the special operation chief to see
12 if he's available as a recon branch.

13 They are supposed to make contact with the kiosk
14 commander once they go down the escalators and find out what type
15 of incident they have there. And then they're going to relay the
16 information to the incident commander so he can make a judgment on
17 what resources he needs to call and how he's going to put
18 everybody in place.

19 Q. All right. And what do you expect from Metro at a
20 command post?

21 A. I would like to have a liaison at Metro so they can give
22 us as much information as possible to what the incident is, how
23 many victims they have, the status of the third rail, the status
24 of the fans, whether it be on the platform or in the tunnels. I
25 mean, basically, I'd like to know as much information as possible.

1 Q. Who is that normally during these incidents? Is there
2 somebody that's --

3 A. During these incidents?

4 Q. Yeah. From Metro, do you know, is there somebody that's
5 supposed to do that?

6 A. I don't know. I've never -- this is the first Metro
7 incident of any magnitude that I've been involved with. I wasn't
8 directly involved with the operations.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. I was separate, over here. I'm not sure whether Metro
11 has a liaison that reports to the scene or -- we basically get our
12 information from our third DO chief that goes out to Pennsy Drive
13 and sits there with OCC. That's how we get most of our
14 information and transit police, they're on the scene. They're
15 always a wealth of information because they're always there and
16 they know what's going on.

17 And a lot of times, we'll run into these Metro
18 incidents, whether there anything or not, OCC doesn't know
19 anything about it and the kiosk commander doesn't know anything
20 about it. So we're kind of in the dark when we go down there a
21 lot of times to really find out what's going on.

22 Q. Okay. Thanks.

23 MR. ROURKE: That's all I have for now. Ms. Burtch?

24 MS. BURTCH: Not at this time.

25 MR. DOWNS: Chief, do you have any questions now or do

1 you want to defer?

2 MR. HAWKINS: I want to defer right now.

3 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Blackistone?

4 BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

5 Q. Yeah. Steve Blackistone, NTSB. Really, just two
6 questions about your experience with the Medical Branch. When you
7 set up the Medical Branch, you made reference to the fact that
8 people were coming up out of the ground everywhere. Were there
9 already a lot of victims that were out of the ground when you
10 first took over or did they just start coming after you?

11 A. Yes. We were getting reports of people coming out of
12 the ground and I actually visually saw some of them when I was
13 staging at 7th and Maryland coming out of that station. And then
14 you could hear on the radio, people were coming out of 9th and D,
15 825. I think they only had two people come out of 825 Water
16 Street and then 7th and D and then the ones coming out the main
17 L'Enfant Plaza Station.

18 Q. So people were coming out some period -- for some period
19 of time before the --

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. -- Medical Branch was set up --

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. -- which goes back to your comment about, it should have
24 been done earlier.

25 A. Yes, sir.

1 Q. So the other question is a little bit on the other end
2 of the system. Are you aware of when -- I know that when a mass
3 casualty incident is declared, we've heard earlier, the hospitals
4 are put on alert. Without getting into details of where various
5 people were transported to, are you aware of whether there were
6 any particular delays in transferring care to the hospitals once
7 the ambulances or bus, in one case, I guess, arrived at the
8 various hospitals?

9 A. Not that I'm aware of. I didn't hear anybody say that.
10 They were giving us information on where they were transported to,
11 how many were transported and basically, what color they are when
12 they were triaged and that's basically all the information we had.
13 Once they got to the hospital, we didn't hear from anybody else.
14 Other than if it was a mass casualty bus, they were dropping
15 people off and then they were coming back to the scene to pick up
16 more people.

17 Q. Yeah.

18 A. But --

19 Q. So you just mentioned something prompted another
20 question. Triage, how did that work? Did it seem to go smoothly?

21 A. From my standpoint, it seemed to go smoothly. I wasn't
22 in either one of the treatment areas. I think Chief Spriggs would
23 probably be able to answer that question a little better on how
24 the triage went, but it doesn't seem like there was a big delay
25 between when the people got to the treatment area, they were

1 triaged and then put on a unit to get transported to the hospital.

2 MR. DOWNS: Did triage, Chief, occur down at the station
3 platform as well as topside?

4 MR. DEAN: I don't think so, sir. I can't confirm that.
5 The only thing I know is we weren't aware of that when we arrived
6 on the scene and we took over the Medical Branch. When we set up
7 the two treatment areas, that's where we tried to get everybody
8 circumvented to so we could triage them and figure out who really
9 needed to go now and who could wait to get transported. So I
10 don't know about the operations downstairs and I wasn't aware of
11 anybody that was triaged downstairs.

12 MR. DOWNS: Thank you. Go ahead.

13 Q. Just one follow-up question on that. Were -- do you
14 know how many people were so-called walking or ambulatory and how
15 many were brought off the station, carried out on some sort of a
16 stretcher?

17 A. No. I mean I can give you the breakdown of how many
18 people we took to the hospital and what basically, priority or
19 color they were, but as they were coming out of the station and
20 being carried --

21 Q. I assume some --

22 A. I did hear the one female was carried out --

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. -- by Firefighter Carmody, the unconscious one.

25 Q. Yeah.

1 A. I know there was a wheelchair bound -- sorry -- patient
2 on the Metro car that had to get carried out and those are the
3 only two that I know of. And that's just from hearing other
4 people talk. That's not what information I found out on the
5 scene.

6 Q. Okay. We'll be able to get more of that, I think, from
7 the people who were down on the platform.

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. Thank you. That's all.

10 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

11 Q. Sharmila Samarasinghe of Tri-State Oversight Committee.
12 Chief Dean, just a couple of questions. Going back to the
13 training that you all -- training and familiarization that you all
14 receive or you all avail yourselves with, you said that on an
15 occasional basis or a frequent basis, that you take your personnel
16 into various Metro stations to familiarize themselves with the
17 various features within a station and so forth. How often do you
18 think that you are able to do that?

19 A. It's hard to say on the companies that run the medical
20 locals to the various stations. We run a lot of medical locals
21 to -- in my area, the only ones I have are Anacostia and Congress
22 Heights and they seem like -- be a hub for medical locals. So the
23 companies go down there and they familiar their selves with what's
24 going down on there basically on every response that they go to
25 unless it's late in the evening or early in the morning. Then

1 they want to --

2 Q. I see.

3 A. -- get back to the firehouse.

4 But the Metro Station inspections, we've been doing that
5 for 3 or 4 months now and I've had my companies, because I only
6 have the two stations, all five of my companies in my battalion
7 have been to each station at least twice to inspect those
8 stations.

9 Q. So this is somewhat of a new practice that you have
10 started about 4 months ago?

11 A. Yes. Yes. Give or take a month or two, but Chief
12 Mulligan (ph.) kind of spearheaded that in special ops and he
13 sends it out; hey, these Metro Stations need to be inspected and
14 when you've completed this -- the inspections, send me the 170.5
15 and the 170.7, which is the Metro Station inspection sheet and the
16 radio --

17 Q. I see.

18 A. -- check worksheet and that basically tells us any
19 deficiencies that are in the station and/or whether radio
20 communication works when you're down on the platform.

21 Q. You were talking about the various calls that you get
22 and sometimes you are told by ROCC that no, they don't need
23 support. And you might not be able to answer this, but when you
24 do get calls, do you happen to know who at Metro initiates the
25 call to your radio dispatch center?

1 A. I don't know who from Metro calls our 911 center.

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. No. I don't know that answer. I mean it could be a
4 person down there on the train --

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. -- calling 911 --

7 Q. Yeah.

8 A. -- that circumvents Metro --

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. -- and/or the kiosk manager there. And a lot of times,
11 we'll call OCC and they have no clue what we're talking about.
12 We're not aware of any event that's going on there and they'll say
13 the kiosk commander, he has no -- he's not aware of anything going
14 down in there. So we basically have to go in there and
15 investigate ourselves to try to find out what's going on. Then we
16 try to coordinate with Metro if there's something on the tracks to
17 get third rail shut down and so on and so forth.

18 Q. Understood. Okay.

19 A. But yeah, I mean the one relating to OCC, this was a
20 week after the Metro incident down at L'Enfant Plaza. We ran to
21 Takoma Park for a train, supposed, with the brakes overheated
22 coming into the station. Called them up. I just happened to be
23 the Third DO Chief on that call at OCC.

24 It's like hey, we're responding to Takoma Park; oh, we
25 don't need you. What do you mean you don't need us? We just got

1 called there for a train coming in the station with overheated
2 brakes. Well, they bypassed the station and they're en route to
3 Greenbelt now. We don't need you, but you can go in there and
4 check it out if you want to anyway. That's the kind of answer you
5 get. I don't know.

6 MR. DOWNS: If I might interject, Chief, Downs here, how
7 often has this been going on, this disconnect in communications
8 when -- with OCC?

9 MR. DEAN: I'm not sure how long because I've only had
10 the opportunity to have to call OCC as the Third DO Chief two or
11 three times and of those three times, it's -- the person on the
12 other end, really, it's either we don't need you or we have no
13 reason to know why you're even calling us. So we have to apprise
14 them of the situation or what we were dispatched to and where and
15 why we're responding there.

16 MR. DOWNS: And do you have, if nothing else, anecdotal
17 comments from other command officers at the fire department that
18 this has been going on with them as well?

19 MR. DEAN: No. I haven't really spoken to anybody else.

20 MR. DOWNS: This is just your personal experience?

21 MR. DEAN: Yes, sir.

22 MR. DOWNS: Thank you.

23 Q. On the day of the incident, you said you dispatched
24 yourself following the second alarm.

25 A. I was dispatched on the second alarm.

1 Q. Okay. What information did you have going to the
2 incident location and what other information were you provided as
3 the incident unfolded?

4 A. Basically, the only information I had was the units that
5 I had responding on the second alarm and where to stage at
6 because, of course, our SOGs, when we're dispatched on a second
7 alarm, we're given an alternate radio channel. So this was A10
8 that we were going to stage in. So everybody that's responding on
9 a second alarm, they have to be on the staging channel. And if
10 they want to monitor the incident, they have to switch their
11 portables or if they have their portables on the staging, could
12 switch their mobile to the fireground channel so they can listen
13 to what's going on there.

14 Yes, we're supposed to monitor both of them, but the
15 information I had was the only information provided me was in our,
16 what we call tablets now. We used to have the iMables, but now
17 we have the tablets and I could look in there and see the notes of
18 the event as it was happening. And it's updated by
19 communications.

20 So -- and basically, that -- I had nobody talking to me
21 or telling me what was going on. I was reading the notes and then
22 once I arrived in staging, I let the incident commander know that
23 we were in staging and these units we had in staging if he needed
24 other resources. And then I said shortly thereafter, I was called
25 to the command post.

1 Q. All right. Thank you.

2 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Gordon?

3 MR. GORDON: I have no questions at this time.

4 BY MR. DOWNS:

5 Q. Chief Dean, you were aboveground all the time? You
6 didn't actually make your way down to the platform?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. You were --

9 A. Going from my buggy to the command post, from the
10 command post over to Chief Mills' buggy and that's where me and
11 Chief Siler sat for the entire (indiscernible) --

12 Q. And that would be the normal activity, you'd stay
13 aboveground to administer your Medical Branch activities?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Radios. Did you experience any radio challenges
16 aboveground?

17 A. The only challenges we had was to get everybody switched
18 over from -- and I take that back because we were on A3, not the
19 A7 (indiscernible), was to get everybody switched over that we had
20 in the Medical Branch from A3 to A5, which in turn, relieved up a
21 lot of communications on his end. And once we got everybody on
22 A5, the Medical Branch channel, things went pretty smooth.

23 Q. So it was a logistical maneuver to get everybody to A5
24 and then once that occurred, there were no problems with
25 transmission drops or anything like that?

1 A. No, sir. And the reason for that is we were all
2 aboveground and we were within probably 2 or 3 blocks of each
3 other.

4 Q. Very good. Chief, I see you've brought some notes with
5 you. Would you be able to make those notes available to your
6 command in order to share with the investigation?

7 A. Yes, sir. And actually, I gave a copy to Chief Silers.
8 I mean, I can give a copy to you guys now --

9 Q. Yeah --

10 A. -- because I've got to (indiscernible) --

11 Q. -- well, we'll pursue that. I'm just saying that's
12 your --

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. That's your notes that you've compiled for the event in
15 terms of --

16 A. On basically --

17 Q. -- jogging your --

18 A. -- what we did, the treatment areas we set up, what
19 units we had there and then, all the victims that got transported
20 with a total number of how many greens, yellows, and reds that we
21 transported (indiscernible).

22 Q. Various points you wanted to jog your memory in terms of
23 making sure you covered everything?

24 A. Yeah, basically.

25 Q. Thank you.

1 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Rourke?

2 BY MR. ROURKE:

3 Q. Denton Rourke, Metro. Chief, just a couple more
4 questions. The staging area that -- is that assigned to you on
5 dispatch?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. Who decides that?

8 A. Communications.

9 Q. The communications picks the spot?

10 A. Well, it's supposed to be the incident commander when he
11 calls for a second alarm, will give an area for the units to stage
12 at, but we were given that over Channel 1 dispatch, respond and
13 operate on the radio channel and stage at such-and-such location.

14 Q. And what was the location again?

15 A. 7th and Maryland is basically where we staged at.

16 Q. Is that by the entrance right there?

17 A. It's about a block up on 7th Street.

18 Q. And then going back to the code patient, was she out
19 before you set up -- do you know, before you set up the branch or
20 not?

21 A. She was out and I think she was -- I'm not sure whether
22 she was on the platform or whether she was up because John Keller
23 works for you guys, the safety guy, when I walked up to the
24 command post, and I know him from outside of the fire department,
25 and he goes Tommy, we need a medical unit over here on the

1 platform. We've got a lady we're doing CPR on. Okay, we got it.
2 So that's when we made a radio transmission to get a medic unit
3 over there and -- because they were already doing CPR on her for
4 transport.

5 Q. And --

6 A. That's when I was made aware of the CPR victim.

7 Q. And that was up -- that was at 9th and D, do you know?

8 A. I was at the command post in front of the L'Enfant
9 entrance, standing at the command post when John came up to me and
10 told me that they had a CPR victim.

11 Q. And where did he say it was?

12 A. I don't recall where he said it was. It might have been
13 at 9th and D.

14 Q. And how about the -- there was a seizure patient at one
15 point that they may have treated on the platform. Do you know
16 anything about that person?

17 A. I wasn't aware of that one.

18 Q. And finally, the wheelchair patient, did that person get
19 transported?

20 A. Excuse me. I'm sorry. I'm not sure about the
21 wheelchair patient. We were never told that there was a
22 wheelchair bound patient that was transported. I know there was a
23 wheelchair bound victim on the car and that had to be carried out
24 and I think if I remember, it was Squad 1. We didn't get into
25 particulars about that, whether it was wheelchair bound or what

1 medical conditions they were having. We were just told that we
2 had a green or a red going to hospital such-and-such.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 MR. DOWNS: Ms. Burtch?

5 BY MS. BURTCH:

6 Q. It's Kim Burtch from FTA. You spoke about the
7 familiarization trips that the stations will conduct at their --
8 at a local or the nearest Metro Station to them?

9 A. Ones that they would respond to.

10 Q. Okay. So ones that they respond to. I guess my
11 question is, are there any variances in where the safety
12 equipment's located in these stations from -- if they're say
13 deployed to a station, say outside of their normal geographic
14 area, will they --

15 A. what type of safety equipment are you talking about?

16 Q. So where they have the E --

17 MS. SAMARASINGHE: E-tech.

18 MR. DEAN: E-tech cards?

19 Q. -- E-tech cards.

20 A. Not that I'm aware of. What I'm being told and what I
21 understood is they're all supposed to be uniformed, they're all in
22 the same place so as not to confuse anybody when they go there.

23 Q. Right.

24 A. I mean, if you walk into one Metro Station, they all
25 should be set up the same way and that's what I'm being told and I

1 haven't found any variances.

2 Q. Thank you. Is the equipment tested at that point? Do
3 they open up lockers or open -- try and access --

4 A. We only have access to so many rooms when we go down in
5 there and they're to the platform level only. We're not supposed
6 to go past the platform and go down the catwalk or anything, of
7 course, for safety reasons. Sometimes, we try to get a Metro
8 official with us so we can enter these rooms and see what's in
9 them.

10 Q. Okay. Thank you.

11 MR. DOWNS: Chief Hawkins?

12 BY MR. HAWKINS:

13 Q. Yes. Derron Hawkins. Chief Dean, I have a question and
14 I'm going to put it in kind of three categories. You mentioned
15 about the training you experienced with the Metro training and
16 then you also mentioned about the number of inspections that
17 you're doing and then you talked about some of the experience you
18 had with Metro incidents. So in essence, maybe after action
19 review. So in terms of the training, where do you think you are
20 in terms of training on the Metro system in terms of your
21 knowledge base?

22 A. I think knowledge in reference to what our books say and
23 how the stations and everything are laid out, but actually
24 hands-on training because 99.9 percent of our calls we run to
25 Metro, if you will, are really nothing; trash on the tracks, a

1 medical local, a person struck by a train. But an incident of
2 this magnitude where you actually would go down and you would work
3 with the WSADs, you'd work with the hot sticks, you'd work with
4 the E-tech cards, you'd work with the cars, opening the doors up
5 from the outside, knowing where the fire extinguisher's at on a
6 car.

7 I mean actual hands-on training, we're lacking in that.
8 And the only way -- I mean we have that great facility at Pennsy
9 Drive that we can go out there where they have real live Metro
10 cars that we can train on. That's one thing we should be getting
11 back into.

12 Q. So when you say lacking, I know you mentioned earlier
13 that there was a lapse in training. So you're saying in terms of
14 we start the process again, we can pick up where we left off at?

15 A. I would like to think we could pick up where we left off
16 at. I know years ago, we used to have a Metro liaison officer
17 because of the information from Metro is not filtering down to the
18 battalion chiefs, which in turn, is not filtered down to the
19 companies, of any deficiencies or something that's going on at a
20 station or in a tunnel or whether it be the repeater systems are
21 down, they're doing construction work in there, the fans were out
22 of service, the emergency exits are blocked or something of that.

23 We're not getting that information and that information
24 would plan an important role if say, I knew Anacostia Station,
25 there was a deficiency with it, I could pass that on to my members

1 while we're en route or once we arrived on the scene and say look,
2 this is going on in the station. The repeaters are down, okay, so
3 we're not going to have any communications. Call me on a cell
4 phone or use runners to relay the information.

5 I've been on Metro incidents before. I know you expect
6 the unexpected, but we just had one not too long ago over at Union
7 Station. I mean we killed one guy -- well, we didn't kill one
8 guy, but one guy died and when we went down there, there was a ton
9 of construction work going on. The repeaters were out. All the
10 wiring harnesses were hanging out of the ceiling. They were doing
11 some type of tunnel work and it had been going on for quite
12 awhile.

13 So one person died and we sent three of us to the
14 hospital. The fire department wasn't aware of this until we got
15 down there. So communications was a problem, status of the third
16 rail was a problem, OCC was a problem. We couldn't get any
17 information from them because, basically, they didn't pass on to
18 us that the construction work was going on and this was like 1:00
19 in the morning that this was going on.

20 MR. DOWNS: So if I may interject, Chief, in your
21 opinion, would having a fire department liaison at OCC when a
22 major event occurs like this, would that have helped perhaps in
23 this --

24 MR. DEAN: Well, we do have a Metro liaison. The third
25 DO chief, his responsibility is to contact OCC immediately and

1 respond to Pennsy Drive to sit down with Metro OCC --

2 MR. DOWNS: Right.

3 MR. DEAN: -- and gather all the information he can so
4 he can relay it to the incident commander. But I think we need a
5 Metro liaison, a specialist or his job title to coordinate with
6 Metro and to find out the everyday goings on of the entire system
7 that is directly related to us in case we have an emergency so we
8 know exactly what's going on.

9 I know the day before -- and I don't know whether this
10 is coincidence or not. The day before, Captain Kasler (ph.) from
11 Truck 10 was down in the L'Enfant Plaza, did a special report, did
12 a 170.7. I believe it said that there are no radio communications
13 whatsoever here. Did that information ever get relayed to
14 anybody? I don't know.

15 MR. DOWNS: So we have a --

16 MR. DEAN: I didn't --

17 MR. DOWNS: We have a disconnect in this regard on the
18 daily activities of Metro that might be relative to a fire
19 department response?

20 MR. DEAN: I think it is because they're all safety
21 issues. If we don't have any communications down below, it's a
22 safety issue for us and if we got construction work going on down
23 there, that's a safety issue for us because we're walking --
24 basically, you're walking into the unknown anyway when you go down
25 into a tunnel, but even to be confronted with something like this,

1 that doubles it.

2 So I mean, we would just -- I think we should be kept
3 abreast of what's going on, especially now with the infrastructure
4 that Metro has. You know, and with this incident, you know
5 there's going to be a lot of work going on in these tunnels and
6 these stations on the platforms and wherever that's going to
7 affect day-to-day operations. And I just think we should be more
8 aware of what's going on so we can be prepared when we arrive on
9 the scene.

10 MR. DOWNS: Thank you. Go ahead, Chief.

11 Q. Yeah. Okay. So in terms, you addressed the question I
12 had regarding training (indiscernible) we need to pick that back
13 up, but in terms of inspection, so we are increasing inspections
14 now?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. So is that making a difference? You mentioned the
17 captain for 13 Engine. So how do you feel about the inspections
18 then that we thought that -- and increase the level inspection at
19 the Metro Station?

20 A. I believe they're very beneficial, but the only problem
21 I have is like, we're limited to the number of stations that we
22 can visit because of our jurisdiction, our area that we're
23 confined to and we got the Anacostia, we've got the Congress
24 Heights and I'll send 19 Engine over to Potomac Avenue, which is
25 across the water, but we're kind of limited to the Metro Stations

1 that we can inspect.

2 And we're not allowed to go down in the tunnels, of
3 course. I mean it would be beneficial for us to go down in the
4 tunnel and drill and see what kind of radio communications we
5 really have to make these people familiar with what's in the
6 tunnel, to know that the standpipes are broken up in different
7 segments, to know where the fans are at, to know where the
8 controls are at and how to operate them, but we don't have access
9 to that. We can't get down there and drill with that.

10 And yes, Pennsy Drive is a good thing, but to actual get
11 down to see where the trains run and move on a daily basis to see
12 what's down there, you know, the blue light stations, the ETS
13 switches, where the phones are at and I mean, that would be a big
14 part if they could actually visually see it rather than read it in
15 a book. I mean it's integral if something were to happen.

16 MR. DOWNS: Anything further, Chief?

17 Q. Yeah. I've got one more question. You mentioned that
18 when you arrived on the scene, you noticed the clock in Chief
19 Mills' buggy and you said about approximately 1600 hours. And
20 also, you mentioned it was about 45 minutes until I think the last
21 person was removed?

22 A. I don't -- when we arrived on the scene, I'm not sure of
23 the exact time frame. I'm saying around quarter after 4:00, so
24 1615 hours. And I recall looking at the clock in his buggy and
25 he's not military time on his clock. So it was about a little

1 after 5:00, a little bit after 1700 hours when I think we declared
2 that everybody was transported to the hospital. 5:05, 5:07 is
3 about the time frame that I recall that we had everybody
4 transported to the hospital.

5 You know, in the real world I think that 83 people in 45
6 minutes was pretty good, especially, we were behind the eight ball
7 when we arrived there with what -- the situation we had. And, you
8 know, I was talking to the (indiscernible) and the Medical Branch,
9 a lot of people take that lightly, but I don't think that our EMS
10 supervisors that we have in the city are capable of handling a
11 incident of this magnitude as the Medical Branch Director. We had
12 two battalion fire chiefs in the Medical Branch. Basically, Chief
13 Silers was talking on the radio and I was dictating, writing
14 everything down so we had all the information.

15 Yes, we have aides, but they're sergeants. Not to take
16 anything away from them, but they may miss something that a
17 battalion chief might be able to pick up on. At that particular
18 incident, I had my aide standing right outside the window. God
19 help him, he was standing out there in the rain, but I had him
20 managing the staging area as well to let us know what units he
21 still had in staging, if we needed to deploy other units to our
22 particular locations and he did a heck of a job with that.

23 And we had ultimately depleted the staging area as well
24 with units so we could have the manpower to treat these victims at
25 7th and D and 9th and D.

1 MR. DOWNS: Anything further, Chief?

2 MR. HAWKINS: I have no further questions.

3 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Blackistone?

4 BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

5 Q. Three sort of different types of questions. Steve
6 Blackistone, NTSB. First, just for clarity, could you tell us
7 what an ETS station is?

8 A. In the tunnels --

9 Q. Yeah.

10 A. -- every 600 feet --

11 Q. You made mention a moment ago (indiscernible) --

12 A. The blue light stations?

13 Q. Yeah.

14 A. Yeah. They're every 800 feet in the tunnel or on the
15 tracks.

16 Q. Right. And that's --

17 A. And the blue light stations, you have the emergency trip
18 switch that you can hit to shut the third rail power down.

19 Q. I mean, and this is something every firefighter would be
20 familiar with.

21 A. They should be. Yes, sir.

22 Q. Yeah. Well --

23 A. And actually, they're in a box and you open the box up.
24 It'll tell you on the door what sections of the third rail that
25 this button controls.

1 Q. Yeah. So second question. The EMS officers that you
2 mentioned, what is their background? What rank are they? What --

3 A. They are paramedics whom take a test, a promotional exam
4 and they're promoted to a captain. And when they're promoted to
5 captain, they're assigned an EMS supervisor position because our
6 EMS supervisors are captains. And so they take promotional exam
7 for that, but they're also qualified as a paramedic. They all
8 have to be paramedics.

9 Q. Right. When you say captain, they're not the same rank
10 captain as the captain that was running fire station. I mean --

11 A. No, because this is their only responsibility --

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. -- is to be an EMS supervisor. They're not dual roled
14 or cross trained.

15 Q. Yeah.

16 A. They cannot ride in an engine, a ladder truck.

17 Q. So you couldn't lateral -- if you take a lateral
18 transfer familiar to being a captain at the station?

19 A. No. And actually, if they laterally transfer, some of
20 them --

21 Q. They (indiscernible) --

22 A. When they take a test, the fire department test,
23 promotional exam is different than the captain's exam for a
24 paramedic for EMS supervisor. So if you get promoted to EMS
25 captain and you took the firefighter exam and you're up to be like

1 promoted to sergeant, you have to get bumped back from this
2 captain position to take this sergeant. So no, they can't --

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. -- roll back over as a captain on the fire side.

5 Q. Exactly. And then my last question is I -- my
6 understanding is that typically, late afternoon is the time when
7 the ambulance -- there are often ambulance shortages in the
8 district. I'm not sure how to put that gracefully, but --

9 A. Oh no, that's what it is.

10 Q. Yeah. So was that an issue in this case? Did you have
11 trouble getting ambulances or -- and --

12 A. Yes. Yes and no. When we arrived on the scene and we
13 got in the buggy and we kind of got situated, I called the
14 (indiscernible) liaison officer. He's pretty much sitting up in
15 communications and I know him personally. I said hey, Rick. I
16 said I'm going to need more units here. I ain't got nobody. I
17 said what do you mean you ain't got nobody. I said time of day,
18 I've got no units available.

19 MR. DOWNS: Do you have mutual aid --

20 MR. DEAN: That's exactly what I tell him, I said --

21 MR. DOWNS: -- availability?

22 MR. DEAN: Yes. I told him. I said get mutual aid
23 units here, whether it's PG, Arlington, Fairfax or Alexandria. I
24 don't care who you get, just get them here. Somebody asks you a
25 question, you tell them I gave you authority to do it. Because

1 there was a time guys working up there under the old
2 administration, they called in for mutual aid units because we're
3 so low and they (indiscernible) calling charges for it. But
4 that's the old administration. That's not the new administration.

5 But -- so everybody's a little gun shy when it comes to
6 that and they don't want to make that call. They want that to
7 come from a higher level. So I just told them, I said if anybody
8 asks you, tell them I authorized you to do it. We need units.

9 Q. So did you wind up with any units outside of D.C.?

10 A. We did in the city, but not on this particular incident.

11 Q. They (indiscernible) --

12 A. They were staged in various locations to back fill and
13 cover the spots because we had so many units committed on this
14 incident right here.

15 Q. So you were able to handle it with the ambulance
16 resources you had?

17 A. Ambulance and the mass casualty buses --

18 Q. Yeah.

19 A. -- and the Metro bus. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Okay. I think that (indiscernible).

21 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: May I?

22 MS. SAMARASINGHE: Go ahead.

23 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: How many EMS units did you have
24 there, basic --

25 MR. DEAN: I can tally them up for you if you want to.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Not the buses --

2 MR. DOWNS: We can get that response data from the Chief
3 later on --

4 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That's fine.

5 MR. DOWNS: -- the details.

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, that's fine.

7 BY MS. SAMARASINGHE:

8 Q. Chief Dean --

9 A. Yes, ma'am.

10 Q. Sharmila Samarasinghe, Tri-State Oversight Committee.
11 Just one clarification first and one new question. To follow up
12 on Ms. Burtch's question on your familiarization inspections that
13 you conduct, for the E-techs themselves, you have the ability to
14 open the cabinets, take them out, unfold them upright and look at
15 them. Are you allowed to do that?

16 A. Not down in the tunnel, no.

17 Q. Not in the tunnel. At the platform end.

18 A. yeah. You can pull them out. They're secured with a
19 lock.

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. We have Metro keys that are supposed to go to that lock.
22 Everybody's supposed to have them.

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. So yes, you can pull down and then extend it up and take
25 a peek at it.

1 Q. All right.

2 A. And -- but to actually get on the tracks and use it, no.

3 Q. All right. You were talking about the Metro liaison
4 officer, somebody not just for incidents, but for an ongoing basis
5 to have that relationship back and forth between WMATA and D.C.
6 Fire. Right now, when there are changes made to station
7 facilities, station features, changes made to railcars, how is
8 that communicated to your level?

9 A. For the past 3 plus years, we basically haven't been
10 getting that information and I think maybe Bobby Mulligan's doing
11 it and maybe because Chief Hawkins is in place, we've been getting
12 some fire safety lines from Metro which kind of keeps us apprised
13 of what's going on at different times in different situations.
14 We've just started receiving that information again.

15 Q. When you say fire safety lines, what do you mean there?

16 A. That's a bulletin or something that Metro pushes out to
17 the fire department and then the fire department filters it down
18 to the branch.

19 Q. Do you recall about the most recent one of one that you
20 might have seen in the recent past?

21 A. We just got one not too long ago. I'm trying to think
22 of what it was about now. I can't recall what the specifics on it
23 are.

24 Q. All right. That's all. Thank you.

25 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Gordon?

1 BY MR. GORDON:

2 Q. Joe Gordon, NTSB. You mentioned the flow of information
3 between WMATA and the D.C. Fire and EMS. And my question, dealing
4 with the ventilation fans, would you feel comfortable if it was
5 covered in a standard operating procedure? You know, being a
6 trained Firefighter, you understand ventilation as far as exhaust
7 and supply and how best to move smoke away from people.

8 Would you feel comfortable if there was an agreement
9 between WMATA and the fire department to take local control of
10 those fans and manipulate those and configure them in order to
11 best mitigate the smoke? Would you feel comfortable with that if
12 that was a process that was put in place going forward or do you
13 have the ability to do that now? Is that an option that's --

14 A. Well actually, I mean if you read in our books and
15 say -- mind you, I haven't really had to experience because of no
16 incident, but our books tell us that Metro will have operations of
17 the fan prior to our arrival. And unless the smoke conditions,
18 whichever way it's moving, is detrimental to the passengers, we're
19 really not to do anything with it. And we get people at the
20 controls. We can switch it if we feel the need to, but basically
21 what our book says is unless it's life threatening or detrimental,
22 to not change what Metro's already set up with reference to the
23 exhaust or supply mode.

24 Q. No further questions.

25 BY MR. DOWNS:

1 Q. Downs, NTSB. Chief, I like to always give our witnesses
2 the final opportunity to offer what we call retrospective
3 thoughts. Knowing what you know now and the experience you gained
4 in this particular event which has a magnitude that you've not
5 previously experienced, are there any thoughts that you'd like to
6 share with the professional firefighting community or WMATA in
7 terms of things that you would have done differently knowing what
8 you know now in hindsight?

9 A. Well, like I said, in reference to the big picture of
10 the operations of the evacuation and what was going on down below,
11 I wasn't aware of that because I was engaged in something else. I
12 wasn't listening to the channel. But once we arrived on the scene
13 and just -- I won't say Monday night quarterbacking, but the
14 incident should have been upgraded to a tunnel box, so it would
15 have brought some more people there.

16 The Medical Branch should have been set up a long time
17 before I even arrived on the scene and the Medical Branch can't be
18 run by an EMS supervisor. It has to be either one or two
19 battalion chiefs. You're going to have to use your resources for
20 that and put your people in place. And, you know, the transport
21 officer is going to have to be a battalion chief. We had
22 Battalion Chief Spriggs. I'm not doubting the capabilities of our
23 EMS supervisors, but I don't know how much incident command
24 training they've had. So I would put an incident commander -- I'm
25 sorry -- a battalion chief in that spot as well to coordinate the

1 transport of all the people that you have.

2 That's basically it. I mean, that's the area that I
3 dealt with. Now if I was on the other side of it, I'd probably
4 have more information for you, but I don't know what happened over
5 there. What I have is hearsay, rumors. I haven't talked directly
6 to the horse's mouth yet to find out what went on and how it
7 transpired.

8 Q. Okay. Chief, anything else you can think of on that --
9 on those points? Pretty much covered it?

10 A. I think so.

11 Q. Very good. Chief, you mentioned you were with the fire
12 department how long now?

13 A. Twenty-four years today.

14 Q. Twenty-four years. And you've had incident command
15 training as part of your progressive and professional training
16 over the years?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. That's the 1, 200 Series, 400 Series, all of them or --

19 A. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and then we also have training at the
20 Training Academy that we go through in reference to the -- to
21 become a Fire Officer I and II and III. And part of that is
22 incorporated in that as well. I've also volunteered and had some
23 training in incident command out there as well, but I haven't
24 volunteered in (indiscernible).

25 Q. As well as Medical Branch specialty training?

1 A. Negative. Negative.

2 Q. So even --

3 A. Other than having to deal with the incident command
4 system, part of the Medical Branch -- I mean it's part of the
5 incident command system, but this was my first as being the
6 Medical Branch and being -- John was sitting in the buggy. We
7 were kind of joking around. I said probably my only major
8 incident in Metro in my entire career and I had to be Medical
9 Branch. But we understand that's a very important aspect of it
10 and we were just making light of the situation at the time.

11 Q. So do you think there were any -- I don't want to
12 criticize you, but do you think there were any shortcomings that
13 you might have been able to pick up had you had the Medical Branch
14 training or you felt pretty much capable that you had the basic
15 Medical Branch as part of the incident command process that you
16 could handle the job?

17 A. I think that I can handle the job knowing the incident
18 command system and knowing basically the mass casualty, how it
19 works and what's supposed to transpire and to have things set up.
20 And my most important thing is you put the right people in the
21 right places, good things are going to happen. And it just so
22 happened that day that who we had coming to 7th and D and who we
23 had at 9th and D, you know who the players are. And you put the
24 key players in the proper position and it worked out really well.

25 Now if you go into uncharted territory or unfamiliar

1 territory, then that might be a different story, but I knew my key
2 role players, where they were and I had the utmost confidence in
3 them and it went -- as far as I was concerned, it went pretty
4 smooth.

5 MR. DOWNS: Very good. Thank you, Chief.

6 Anybody else have any further questions while we're
7 here?

8 MR. BLACKISTONE: Yeah. I've got two other questions
9 that you reminded me about. One is --

10 MR. DOWNS: Mr. Blackistone.

11 BY MR. BLACKISTONE:

12 Q. Steve Blackistone, NTSB. I'm sorry. In your
13 experience, how often do you see smoke or fire events in Metro?
14 You mentioned rubbish fires and things like that. If something
15 happens --

16 A. Couple times a year.

17 Q. A couple times a year?

18 A. Yeah. It's not very often. And now, being the incident
19 commander or run as a Battalion Chief, the only time
20 (indiscernible) was in charge of the recon. And normally, our
21 special ops chief, according to our SOGs, our special ops dispatch
22 says the recon branch director, so he's the one that goes
23 downstairs. As a --

24 Q. I wasn't thinking so much being involved as awareness.
25 How often does that happen?

1 A. Yeah. I mean, we run a lot of Metro incident -- I won't
2 say a lot, but quite a few Metro incidents, but they either turn
3 out to be trash on the tracks or --

4 Q. Yeah.

5 A. -- nothings or some small electrical problem that is,
6 most the time, mitigated by the time we arrive on the scene. So
7 we basically go down there, investigate and then pack up and go
8 back home.

9 Q. Okay. And then the last question I have is about your
10 background. Could you tell us a little bit about your career in
11 the fire service and where you've been --

12 A. Sure.

13 Q. -- stationed and --

14 A. From my volunteer time or just D.C. time?

15 Q. Sure.

16 A. All right. Well --

17 Q. Sure.

18 A. -- I joined the volunteer fire service --

19 Q. (Indiscernible).

20 A. -- when I was 16. My 16th birthday, I joined the
21 volunteer fire service. When I was 21, I got hired by the Federal
22 Government and worked at Boeing Air Force Base/NRL Navy Yards,
23 NEW. I was there for 5½ years, fireman and then a technician and
24 took the test for D.C.. Got hired by D.C. January 28th, 1991 and
25 got appointed to Engine 25 over in southeast.

1 Transferred from there a year later, went to Engine 11
2 here on 14th Street. Remained there. In '95, I got a technician
3 spot as the wagon driver. '99, I got promoted to sergeant. 2002,
4 I got promoted to -- or correction. 2003, I got promoted to
5 Lieutenant. '09, I got promoted to Captain. And August of 2013,
6 I got promoted to Battalion Chief.

7 All my time as a Fireman, except for the year at 25, we
8 started the 11 Engine, I got promoted there, was the Aide, stayed
9 at that firehouse. Did a little bit of time at the Training
10 Academy teaching a recruit school and then was transferred to a
11 third battalion. I got promoted to Lieutenant, went to Engine 27
12 for about a year or so and then the special operations deputy
13 called me up, asked me if I was interested in going through rescue
14 squad. So I got assigned to Rescue Squad 3 over in southeast,
15 which is in the same firehouse I'm at now. And I was there for 5
16 years.

17 I got promoted to Captain, went to 30 Engine and then to
18 the Safety Office, back to 30 Engine to 23 Engine and then I got
19 promoted Battalion Chief and got assigned to the 3rd Battalion
20 where I'm presently at.

21 Q. From 30 to 23 (indiscernible) --

22 A. Yeah. That was the other administration too and you
23 couldn't -- you can't manage --

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. -- this company out here way out here, but then he's

1 going to send me over here and then he's going to promote me to
2 manage that whole battalion, so go figure that one out.

3 MR. DOWNS: Anything further?

4 MR. BLACKISTONE: No.

5 MR. DOWNS: Questions over here?

6 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No further questions.

7 MR. DOWNS: Thank you very much, Chief. That concludes
8 our interview.

9 MR. DEAN: Thank you.

10 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: WMATA INCIDENT AT L'ENFANT PLAZA
STATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 12, 2015
Interview of Thomas Dean

DOCKET NUMBER: DCA-15-FR-004

PLACE: Washington, D.C.

DATE: January 28, 2015

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

Tiffany Meeker
Transcriber

This is to confirm that there are no specific discrepancies found in the transcript:

BFC Thomas P. Dean

A black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of the official.